opencode-skills-collection 4.0.67 → 4.0.69

package/bundled-skills/mcp-server-security/references/details.md

@@ -0,0 +1,745 @@
+# Details (moved from SKILL.md)
+
+> Extended reference content for `mcp-server-security`, kept under `references/` so the entrypoint stays within the audit budget.
+
+## 6. Input Validation
+
+### 6.1 JSON Schema for Tool Parameters
+
+Define strict schemas for every tool's input. Reject anything that does not conform.
+
+```typescript
+// src/validation.ts
+import Ajv from "ajv";
+import addFormats from "ajv-formats";
+
+const ajv = new Ajv({ allErrors: true, removeAdditional: true });
+addFormats(ajv);
+
+// Schema registry keyed by tool name
+const toolSchemas: Record<string, object> = {
+  read_file: {
+    type: "object",
+    properties: {
+      path: {
+        type: "string",
+        pattern: "^[a-zA-Z0-9_/\\-.]+$",  // No path traversal chars
+        maxLength: 256,
+      },
+    },
+    required: ["path"],
+    additionalProperties: false,
+  },
+  query_database: {
+    type: "object",
+    properties: {
+      query: { type: "string", maxLength: 2048 },
+      database: { type: "string", enum: ["analytics", "public_catalog"] },
+      parameters: {
+        type: "array",
+        items: { type: ["string", "number", "boolean"] },
+        maxItems: 20,
+      },
+    },
+    required: ["query", "database"],
+    additionalProperties: false,
+  },
+};
+
+export function validateToolInput(toolName: string, params: unknown): { valid: boolean; errors?: string } {
+  const schema = toolSchemas[toolName];
+  if (!schema) return { valid: false, errors: `No schema registered for tool: ${toolName}` };
+
+  const validate = ajv.compile(schema);
+  if (validate(params)) return { valid: true };
+
+  const errorMsg = validate.errors?.map((e) => `${e.instancePath} ${e.message}`).join("; ");
+  return { valid: false, errors: errorMsg };
+}
+```
+
+### 6.2 SQL Injection Prevention
+
+Never pass raw agent-supplied strings into queries. Use parameterized queries and
+statement-level restrictions.
+
+```typescript
+// src/safeSql.ts
+const FORBIDDEN_PATTERNS = [
+  /;\s*(DROP|ALTER|TRUNCATE|DELETE|UPDATE|INSERT|CREATE|GRANT|REVOKE)/i,
+  /UNION\s+SELECT/i,
+  /INTO\s+OUTFILE/i,
+  /LOAD_FILE\s*\(/i,
+  /xp_cmdshell/i,
+];
+
+export function sanitizeSqlQuery(query: string): { safe: boolean; reason?: string } {
+  for (const pattern of FORBIDDEN_PATTERNS) {
+    if (pattern.test(query)) {
+      return { safe: false, reason: `Query matches forbidden pattern: ${pattern}` };
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Only allow SELECT statements
+  const trimmed = query.trim().toUpperCase();
+  if (!trimmed.startsWith("SELECT")) {
+    return { safe: false, reason: "Only SELECT queries are permitted" };
+  }
+
+  return { safe: true };
+}
+
+// Usage in a database tool handler
+export async function handleDatabaseQuery(params: { query: string; parameters?: any[] }, db: any) {
+  const check = sanitizeSqlQuery(params.query);
+  if (!check.safe) {
+    throw new Error(`Query rejected: ${check.reason}`);
+  }
+  // Always use parameterized execution
+  return db.query(params.query, params.parameters || []);
+}
+```
+
+### 6.3 Filesystem Path Injection Prevention
+
+```typescript
+// src/safePath.ts
+import path from "path";
+
+const SANDBOX_ROOT = "/home/mcpuser/workspace";
+
+export function resolveSafePath(userPath: string): string {
+  // Resolve to absolute, then verify it is inside the sandbox
+  const resolved = path.resolve(SANDBOX_ROOT, userPath);
+
+  if (!resolved.startsWith(SANDBOX_ROOT + path.sep) && resolved !== SANDBOX_ROOT) {
+    throw new Error(`Path traversal blocked: "${userPath}" resolves outside sandbox.`);
+  }
+
+  // Block symlink escape
+  const real = require("fs").realpathSync.native(resolved);
+  if (!real.startsWith(SANDBOX_ROOT)) {
+    throw new Error(`Symlink escape blocked: "${userPath}" -> "${real}"`);
+  }
+
+  return resolved;
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+
+## 7. Resource Access Control
+
+### 7.1 Filesystem Sandboxing
+
+Use OS-level controls in addition to application-level path validation.
+
+```bash
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# run-mcp-sandboxed.sh - Launch MCP server with Linux namespace sandboxing
+
+exec unshare --map-root-user --mount --pid --fork -- bash -c '
+  # Create a read-only bind mount for the workspace
+  mount --bind /home/mcpuser/workspace /home/mcpuser/workspace
+  mount -o remount,ro,bind /home/mcpuser/workspace
+
+  # Make the writable output directory available
+  mount --bind /home/mcpuser/output /home/mcpuser/output
+
+  # Block access to sensitive host paths
+  mount -t tmpfs tmpfs /etc/ssh
+  mount -t tmpfs tmpfs /root
+  mount -t tmpfs tmpfs /home/mcpuser/.ssh
+
+  # Run the MCP server
+  exec node /opt/mcp-server/dist/index.js
+'
+```
+
+### 7.2 Database Query Restrictions
+
+Create a dedicated read-only database user for MCP servers:
+
+```sql
+-- PostgreSQL: MCP server database user
+CREATE ROLE mcp_readonly WITH LOGIN PASSWORD 'use-a-vault-generated-secret';
+
+-- Grant read-only access to specific schemas only
+GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA public TO mcp_readonly;
+GRANT SELECT ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA public TO mcp_readonly;
+ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES IN SCHEMA public GRANT SELECT ON TABLES TO mcp_readonly;
+
+-- Restrict row-level access where needed
+ALTER TABLE customer_data ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+CREATE POLICY mcp_access ON customer_data
+  FOR SELECT TO mcp_readonly
+  USING (sensitivity_level < 3);
+
+-- Set resource limits to prevent expensive queries
+ALTER ROLE mcp_readonly SET statement_timeout = '10s';
+ALTER ROLE mcp_readonly SET work_mem = '64MB';
+```
+
+### 7.3 Network Access Controls
+
+Prevent MCP tools from reaching internal services (SSRF mitigation):
+
+```typescript
+// src/networkPolicy.ts
+import { URL } from "url";
+import net from "net";
+
+const BLOCKED_CIDRS = [
+  "10.0.0.0/8",
+  "172.16.0.0/12",
+  "192.168.0.0/16",
+  "127.0.0.0/8",
+  "169.254.169.254/32",   // Cloud metadata endpoint
+  "fd00::/8",
+];
+
+const ALLOWED_DOMAINS = [
+  "api.github.com",
+  "registry.npmjs.org",
+];
+
+export function validateOutboundUrl(urlString: string): { allowed: boolean; reason?: string } {
+  let parsed: URL;
+  try {
+    parsed = new URL(urlString);
+  } catch {
+    return { allowed: false, reason: "Invalid URL" };
+  }
+
+  // Block non-HTTPS
+  if (parsed.protocol !== "https:") {
+    return { allowed: false, reason: "Only HTTPS is allowed" };
+  }
+
+  // Domain allowlist
+  if (!ALLOWED_DOMAINS.includes(parsed.hostname)) {
+    return { allowed: false, reason: `Domain ${parsed.hostname} is not in the allowlist` };
+  }
+
+  return { allowed: true };
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+
+## 8. Rate Limiting
+
+### 8.1 Per-Client Rate Limits
+
+```typescript
+// src/rateLimit.ts
+
+interface RateBucket {
+  tokens: number;
+  lastRefill: number;
+}
+
+const buckets = new Map<string, RateBucket>();
+
+const DEFAULT_RATE = 60;       // requests per minute
+const DEFAULT_BURST = 10;      // max burst
+
+export function checkRateLimit(
+  clientId: string,
+  maxPerMinute: number = DEFAULT_RATE,
+  burst: number = DEFAULT_BURST
+): { allowed: boolean; retryAfterMs?: number } {
+  const now = Date.now();
+  let bucket = buckets.get(clientId);
+
+  if (!bucket) {
+    bucket = { tokens: burst, lastRefill: now };
+    buckets.set(clientId, bucket);
+  }
+
+  // Refill tokens based on elapsed time
+  const elapsed = now - bucket.lastRefill;
+  const refill = (elapsed / 60000) * maxPerMinute;
+  bucket.tokens = Math.min(burst, bucket.tokens + refill);
+  bucket.lastRefill = now;
+
+  if (bucket.tokens < 1) {
+    const waitMs = ((1 - bucket.tokens) / maxPerMinute) * 60000;
+    return { allowed: false, retryAfterMs: Math.ceil(waitMs) };
+  }
+
+  bucket.tokens -= 1;
+  return { allowed: true };
+}
+```
+
+### 8.2 Token Budget Enforcement
+
+Limit how many LLM tokens a single session can consume through tool calls:
+
+```typescript
+// src/tokenBudget.ts
+
+interface SessionBudget {
+  usedInputTokens: number;
+  usedOutputTokens: number;
+  maxInputTokens: number;
+  maxOutputTokens: number;
+}
+
+const sessionBudgets = new Map<string, SessionBudget>();
+
+export function initSessionBudget(sessionId: string, maxInput = 500_000, maxOutput = 100_000) {
+  sessionBudgets.set(sessionId, {
+    usedInputTokens: 0,
+    usedOutputTokens: 0,
+    maxInputTokens: maxInput,
+    maxOutputTokens: maxOutput,
+  });
+}
+
+export function consumeTokens(
+  sessionId: string,
+  inputTokens: number,
+  outputTokens: number
+): { allowed: boolean; remaining: { input: number; output: number } } {
+  const budget = sessionBudgets.get(sessionId);
+  if (!budget) return { allowed: false, remaining: { input: 0, output: 0 } };
+
+  budget.usedInputTokens += inputTokens;
+  budget.usedOutputTokens += outputTokens;
+
+  const remaining = {
+    input: budget.maxInputTokens - budget.usedInputTokens,
+    output: budget.maxOutputTokens - budget.usedOutputTokens,
+  };
+
+  if (remaining.input < 0 || remaining.output < 0) {
+    return { allowed: false, remaining };
+  }
+  return { allowed: true, remaining };
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+
+## 9. Audit Logging
+
+### 9.1 Structured Tool Invocation Logging
+
+Log every tool call with full context. Never log raw secrets or credentials.
+
+```typescript
+// src/auditLog.ts
+import { randomUUID } from "crypto";
+
+interface AuditEntry {
+  id: string;
+  timestamp: string;
+  userId: string;
+  sessionId: string;
+  toolName: string;
+  parameters: Record<string, unknown>;
+  result: "success" | "error" | "denied";
+  durationMs: number;
+  error?: string;
+}
+
+const REDACT_KEYS = ["password", "token", "secret", "api_key", "authorization"];
+
+function redactSensitive(params: Record<string, unknown>): Record<string, unknown> {
+  const redacted: Record<string, unknown> = {};
+  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(params)) {
+    if (REDACT_KEYS.some((k) => key.toLowerCase().includes(k))) {
+      redacted[key] = "[REDACTED]";
+    } else if (typeof value === "object" && value !== null) {
+      redacted[key] = redactSensitive(value as Record<string, unknown>);
+    } else {
+      redacted[key] = value;
+    }
+  }
+  return redacted;
+}
+
+export function logToolInvocation(entry: Omit<AuditEntry, "id" | "timestamp">): AuditEntry {
+  const full: AuditEntry = {
+    ...entry,
+    id: randomUUID(),
+    timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
+    parameters: redactSensitive(entry.parameters),
+  };
+
+  // Write structured JSON to stdout for collection by log aggregator
+  process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(full) + "\n");
+  return full;
+}
+```
+
+### 9.2 OpenTelemetry Integration
+
+```typescript
+// src/otelTracing.ts
+import { trace, SpanStatusCode, context, propagation } from "@opentelemetry/api";
+import { NodeTracerProvider } from "@opentelemetry/sdk-trace-node";
+import { OTLPTraceExporter } from "@opentelemetry/exporter-trace-otlp-http";
+import { BatchSpanProcessor } from "@opentelemetry/sdk-trace-base";
+import { Resource } from "@opentelemetry/resources";
+
+const provider = new NodeTracerProvider({
+  resource: new Resource({
+    "service.name": "mcp-server",
+    "service.version": "1.0.0",
+  }),
+});
+
+provider.addSpanProcessor(
+  new BatchSpanProcessor(
+    new OTLPTraceExporter({ url: "http://otel-collector:4318/v1/traces" })
+  )
+);
+provider.register();
+
+const tracer = trace.getTracer("mcp-server");
+
+export async function traceToolCall<T>(
+  toolName: string,
+  userId: string,
+  params: Record<string, unknown>,
+  fn: () => Promise<T>
+): Promise<T> {
+  return tracer.startActiveSpan(`mcp.tool.${toolName}`, async (span) => {
+    span.setAttribute("mcp.tool.name", toolName);
+    span.setAttribute("mcp.user.id", userId);
+    span.setAttribute("mcp.params.keys", Object.keys(params).join(","));
+
+    try {
+      const result = await fn();
+      span.setStatus({ code: SpanStatusCode.OK });
+      return result;
+    } catch (err: any) {
+      span.setStatus({ code: SpanStatusCode.ERROR, message: err.message });
+      span.recordException(err);
+      throw err;
+    } finally {
+      span.end();
+    }
+  });
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+
+## 10. Deployment Hardening
+
+### 10.1 Docker Container Configuration
+
+```dockerfile
+# Dockerfile.mcp-server
+FROM node:22-slim AS build
+WORKDIR /app
+COPY package*.json ./
+RUN npm ci --ignore-scripts
+COPY src/ src/
+COPY tsconfig.json ./
+RUN npm run build
+
+FROM node:22-slim
+RUN groupadd -r mcp && useradd -r -g mcp -d /home/mcp -s /usr/sbin/nologin mcp
+
+# Remove unnecessary packages
+RUN apt-get purge -y --auto-remove curl wget && \
+    rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+
+WORKDIR /app
+COPY --from=build /app/dist ./dist
+COPY --from=build /app/node_modules ./node_modules
+COPY --from=build /app/package.json ./
+
+# Create minimal writable directories
+RUN mkdir -p /home/mcp/workspace /home/mcp/output && \
+    chown -R mcp:mcp /home/mcp
+
+USER mcp
+
+# Health check
+HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=5s --retries=3 \
+  CMD node -e "fetch('http://localhost:3001/health').then(r => process.exit(r.ok ? 0 : 1))"
+
+EXPOSE 3001
+CMD ["node", "dist/index.js"]
+```
+
+### 10.2 Kubernetes Network Policy
+
+```yaml
+# k8s/network-policy.yaml
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: NetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: mcp-server-policy
+  namespace: ai-platform
+spec:
+  podSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app: mcp-server
+  policyTypes:
+    - Ingress
+    - Egress
+  ingress:
+    # Only allow traffic from the agent orchestrator
+    - from:
+        - podSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              app: agent-orchestrator
+      ports:
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 3001
+  egress:
+    # Allow DNS
+    - to:
+        - namespaceSelector: {}
+      ports:
+        - protocol: UDP
+          port: 53
+    # Allow access to the internal database
+    - to:
+        - podSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              app: postgres
+      ports:
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 5432
+    # Allow HTTPS outbound to specific external APIs
+    - to:
+        - ipBlock:
+            cidr: 0.0.0.0/0
+            except:
+              - 10.0.0.0/8
+              - 172.16.0.0/12
+              - 192.168.0.0/16
+      ports:
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 443
+```
+
+### 10.3 Seccomp Profile
+
+```json
+{
+  "defaultAction": "SCMP_ACT_ERRNO",
+  "architectures": ["SCMP_ARCH_X86_64"],
+  "syscalls": [
+    {
+      "names": [
+        "read", "write", "close", "fstat", "lseek", "mmap", "mprotect",
+        "munmap", "brk", "rt_sigaction", "rt_sigprocmask", "ioctl",
+        "access", "pipe", "select", "sched_yield", "mremap", "madvise",
+        "dup", "dup2", "nanosleep", "getpid", "socket", "connect",
+        "accept", "sendto", "recvfrom", "bind", "listen", "getsockname",
+        "getpeername", "setsockopt", "getsockopt", "clone", "execve",
+        "exit", "wait4", "fcntl", "getdents64", "getcwd", "chdir",
+        "openat", "newfstatat", "readlinkat", "exit_group", "epoll_create1",
+        "epoll_ctl", "epoll_wait", "eventfd2", "futex", "set_robust_list",
+        "clock_gettime", "getrandom", "statx", "pread64", "pwrite64"
+      ],
+      "action": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW"
+    }
+  ]
+}
+```
+
+Apply the seccomp profile in your Kubernetes pod spec:
+
+```yaml
+# k8s/deployment.yaml (relevant snippet)
+spec:
+  containers:
+    - name: mcp-server
+      image: registry.example.com/mcp-server:1.0
+      securityContext:
+        runAsNonRoot: true
+        runAsUser: 1000
+        readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+        allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+        capabilities:
+          drop: ["ALL"]
+        seccompProfile:
+          type: Localhost
+          localhostProfile: profiles/mcp-server-seccomp.json
+      resources:
+        limits:
+          memory: "512Mi"
+          cpu: "500m"
+        requests:
+          memory: "256Mi"
+          cpu: "250m"
+```
+
+---
+
+
+## 11. Testing
+
+### 11.1 Authorization Boundary Tests
+
+```typescript
+// tests/toolAuth.test.ts
+import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
+import { isToolAllowed } from "../src/toolAuth";
+
+describe("Tool Authorization", () => {
+  it("should deny developer access to execute_command", () => {
+    expect(isToolAllowed("developer", "execute_command")).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("should allow developer access to read_file", () => {
+    expect(isToolAllowed("developer", "read_file")).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("should allow admin access to everything", () => {
+    expect(isToolAllowed("admin", "execute_command")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isToolAllowed("admin", "delete_file")).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("should deny unknown roles", () => {
+    expect(isToolAllowed("unknown-role", "read_file")).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("should deny readonly-agent access to write_file", () => {
+    expect(isToolAllowed("readonly-agent", "write_file")).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+```
+
+### 11.2 Input Validation Fuzz Tests
+
+```typescript
+// tests/validation.test.ts
+import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
+import { validateToolInput } from "../src/validation";
+
+describe("Input Validation", () => {
+  const maliciousInputs = [
+    { path: "../../../etc/passwd" },
+    { path: "/etc/shadow" },
+    { path: "file\x00.txt" },
+    { path: "a".repeat(1000) },
+    { path: "valid.txt", extraField: "injected" },
+  ];
+
+  for (const input of maliciousInputs) {
+    it(`should reject malicious read_file input: ${JSON.stringify(input)}`, () => {
+      const result = validateToolInput("read_file", input);
+      expect(result.valid).toBe(false);
+    });
+  }
+
+  it("should accept valid read_file input", () => {
+    const result = validateToolInput("read_file", { path: "src/index.ts" });
+    expect(result.valid).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  const sqlInjections = [
+    { query: "SELECT 1; DROP TABLE users;", database: "analytics" },
+    { query: "SELECT * FROM t UNION SELECT password FROM users", database: "analytics" },
+    { query: "DELETE FROM users WHERE 1=1", database: "analytics" },
+  ];
+
+  for (const input of sqlInjections) {
+    it(`should reject SQL injection: ${input.query.slice(0, 40)}...`, () => {
+      const result = validateToolInput("query_database", input);
+      // Even if schema validation passes, the SQL sanitizer should catch it
+      expect(result.valid).toBe(true); // schema is valid
+      // The SQL check happens at the handler level - tested separately
+    });
+  }
+});
+```
+
+### 11.3 SSRF Prevention Tests
+
+```typescript
+// tests/networkPolicy.test.ts
+import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
+import { validateOutboundUrl } from "../src/networkPolicy";
+
+describe("Outbound URL Validation", () => {
+  const blockedUrls = [
+    "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
+    "http://localhost:8080/admin",
+    "https://evil.com/exfiltrate",
+    "ftp://internal-server/data",
+    "https://10.0.0.1:8443/internal",
+    "http://[::1]/admin",
+  ];
+
+  for (const url of blockedUrls) {
+    it(`should block: ${url}`, () => {
+      expect(validateOutboundUrl(url).allowed).toBe(false);
+    });
+  }
+
+  it("should allow requests to explicitly allowed domains", () => {
+    expect(validateOutboundUrl("https://api.github.com/repos").allowed).toBe(true);
+    expect(validateOutboundUrl("https://registry.npmjs.org/express").allowed).toBe(true);
+  });
+});
+```
+
+### 11.4 Rate Limit Tests
+
+```typescript
+// tests/rateLimit.test.ts
+import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
+import { checkRateLimit } from "../src/rateLimit";
+
+describe("Rate Limiting", () => {
+  it("should allow requests within the burst limit", () => {
+    const clientId = "test-burst-" + Date.now();
+    for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
+      expect(checkRateLimit(clientId).allowed).toBe(true);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("should deny requests exceeding the burst limit", () => {
+    const clientId = "test-exceed-" + Date.now();
+    for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
+      checkRateLimit(clientId);
+    }
+    const result = checkRateLimit(clientId);
+    expect(result.allowed).toBe(false);
+    expect(result.retryAfterMs).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+  });
+});
+```
+
+---
+
+
+## Quick Reference Checklist
+
+Use this checklist when deploying any MCP server to production:
+
+```
+[ ] TLS 1.3 enabled on all HTTP transports
+[ ] mTLS configured for server-to-server communication
+[ ] OAuth 2.1 or API key authentication enforced on every endpoint
+[ ] Tool allowlist defined per role/user
+[ ] Dangerous tools flagged and require explicit approval
+[ ] JSON Schema validation on every tool's parameters
+[ ] SQL queries use parameterized statements and are restricted to SELECT
+[ ] Filesystem access sandboxed to explicit directories
+[ ] Outbound network requests limited to an allowlist (SSRF mitigation)
+[ ] Per-client rate limits and session token budgets enforced
+[ ] Every tool invocation logged with user, params (redacted), and result
+[ ] OpenTelemetry tracing integrated for observability
+[ ] Container runs as non-root with read-only filesystem
+[ ] Seccomp profile applied to restrict syscalls
+[ ] Network policies restrict pod-to-pod communication
+[ ] Authorization and input validation tests pass in CI
+```
+