comisai 1.0.45 → 1.0.46

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/executor/prompt-runner/failure-path.js

@@ -86,11 +86,11 @@ export async function processFailurePath(params, messageText, promptImages, init
  */
 function emitFailureDiagnostics(params, messageText, promptError) {
     const { sessionKey, result, executionStartMs, config, deps, agentId, effectiveTimeout, } = params;
-    // Classify BEFORE the WARN so the knob-named hint rides the log line
-    // (LAT-01). For a PromptTimeoutError the binding provenance comes from the
-    // 177-02 effectiveTimeout (source + operationType + configured numbers,
-    // including the non-optional stallCeilingMultiplier — 177-REVIEW IN-01:
-    // without it the makespan hint's multiplier clause rendered number-less).
+    // Classify BEFORE the WARN so the knob-named hint rides the log line.
+    // For a PromptTimeoutError the binding provenance comes from the
+    // effectiveTimeout (source + operationType + configured numbers,
+    // including the non-optional stallCeilingMultiplier —
+    // without it the makespan hint's multiplier clause renders number-less).
     const isPromptTimeout = promptError instanceof PromptTimeoutError;
     const classified = isPromptTimeout
         ? classifyPromptTimeout(promptError, {
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ function emitFailureDiagnostics(params, messageText, promptError) {
     // Never expose raw error internals to users.
     // The raw error is already logged to deps.logger.warn above for operator diagnostics.
     // The classified userMessage stays generic/user-safe — the knob detail
-    // rides ONLY the hint above (T-177-13).
+    // rides ONLY the hint above.
     // Enrich auth_invalid messages with the failing provider name
     if (classified.category === "auth_invalid") {
         result.response = `The AI service could not authenticate with the "${config.provider}" provider. Please check the API key or notify the system administrator.`;
@@ -130,9 +130,9 @@ function emitFailureDiagnostics(params, messageText, promptError) {
     // Anthropic still bills input tokens even when the request times out,
     // but pi-ai discards partial usage. Emit a conservative estimate so
     // the cost gap is visible in tracking. The error's timeoutMs carries the
-    // limit that FIRED (177-REVIEW IN-04: a makespan kill ran
-    // ~promptTimeoutMs × stallCeilingMultiplier ms — reporting the stall
-    // budget understated latencyMs by up to the multiplier).
+    // limit that FIRED — a makespan kill ran
+    // ~promptTimeoutMs × stallCeilingMultiplier ms, so reporting the stall
+    // budget would understate latencyMs by up to the multiplier.
     if (promptError instanceof PromptTimeoutError) {
         ghostCost = emitTimeoutGhostCost(params, messageText, promptError.timeoutMs);
     }
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ function emitFailureDiagnostics(params, messageText, promptError) {
  * @param firedTimeoutMs - The ms value of the limit that FIRED
  *   (`PromptTimeoutError.timeoutMs`): stall budget, makespan ceiling, or
  *   whole-turn retry window — rides `latencyMs` so makespan kills are not
- *   understated by the multiplier (177-REVIEW IN-04).
+ *   understated by the multiplier.
  */
 function emitTimeoutGhostCost(params, messageText, firedTimeoutMs) {
     const { msg, sessionKey, agentId, executionId, config, resolvedModel, deps, systemPrompt, mergedCustomTools, getLastCacheWriteTokens, } = params;
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ function emitTimeoutGhostCost(params, messageText, firedTimeoutMs) {
         const paramLen = t.parameters ? JSON.stringify(t.parameters).length : 0;
         return sum + t.name.length + descLen + paramLen;
     }, 0);
-    // Effective-chars ONE-ceil form (TOK-01): each text term divides by its own
+    // Effective-chars ONE-ceil form: each text term divides by its own
     // script factor; per-term ceils would inflate pure-ASCII results.
     const estimatedPromptTokens = Math.ceil((messageText.length / scriptTokenFactor(messageText) +
         sysPromptText.length / scriptTokenFactor(sysPromptText) +

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/executor/prompt-runner/goal-anchor.d.ts

@@ -2,11 +2,11 @@
  * GoalAnchor builder — pure function that formats an ExecutionPlan into a
  * tail-injected anchor block for the system prompt.
  *
- * The caller (Plan 02 / wrapEnvelope) gates on scaffoldLevel === "max" before
+ * The caller (wrapEnvelope) gates on scaffoldLevel === "max" before
  * calling this function. This module has no I/O and does not import from
  * @comis/core to keep the dependency graph clean (pure agent-internal utility).
  *
- * Threat mitigations (T-153-01a):
+ * Threat mitigations:
  *   - Output bounded by maxChars (default 500); excess truncated with "…"
  *   - Plain text only — no HTML/markdown injection path in the formatted block
  *

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/executor/prompt-runner/goal-anchor.js

@@ -3,11 +3,11 @@
  * GoalAnchor builder — pure function that formats an ExecutionPlan into a
  * tail-injected anchor block for the system prompt.
  *
- * The caller (Plan 02 / wrapEnvelope) gates on scaffoldLevel === "max" before
+ * The caller (wrapEnvelope) gates on scaffoldLevel === "max" before
  * calling this function. This module has no I/O and does not import from
  * @comis/core to keep the dependency graph clean (pure agent-internal utility).
  *
- * Threat mitigations (T-153-01a):
+ * Threat mitigations:
  *   - Output bounded by maxChars (default 500); excess truncated with "…"
  *   - Plain text only — no HTML/markdown injection path in the formatted block
  *

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/executor/prompt-runner/index.d.ts

@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@
  *   - runPrompt (value) — orchestrator
  *   - PromptRunnerBridge, RunPromptParams, PromptRunResult (types)
  *
- * Names are kept byte-identical (no `as` aliases) so the parity snapshot
- * reproduces verbatim.
+ * Names are kept byte-identical (no `as` aliases) so consumers see the
+ * exact canonical names the defining modules export.
  *
  * @module
  */

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/executor/prompt-runner/index.js

@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@
  *   - runPrompt (value) — orchestrator
  *   - PromptRunnerBridge, RunPromptParams, PromptRunResult (types)
  *
- * Names are kept byte-identical (no `as` aliases) so the parity snapshot
- * reproduces verbatim.
+ * Names are kept byte-identical (no `as` aliases) so consumers see the
+ * exact canonical names the defining modules export.
  *
  * @module
  */

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/executor/prompt-runner/output-escalation.d.ts

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ import type { PromptRunResult, RunPromptParams } from "./prompt-runner-types.js"
  * Compute the final PromptRunResult by running output escalation, success-
  * path response processing, and failure-path overflow recovery as needed.
  *
- * Side effects (matching pre-split behavior):
+ * Side effects:
  *   - mutates `params.result.response`, `params.result.finishReason`,
  *     `params.result.errorContext`, `params.result.continuationMetrics`,
  *     `params.result.budgetMetrics`.

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/executor/prompt-runner/output-escalation.js

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ import { processFailurePath } from "./failure-path.js";
  * Compute the final PromptRunResult by running output escalation, success-
  * path response processing, and failure-path overflow recovery as needed.
  *
- * Side effects (matching pre-split behavior):
+ * Side effects:
  *   - mutates `params.result.response`, `params.result.finishReason`,
  *     `params.result.errorContext`, `params.result.continuationMetrics`,
  *     `params.result.budgetMetrics`.
@@ -215,14 +215,14 @@ async function processSuccessPath(params, budgetTracker, budgetCapped, requested
     if (sepEnabled && !executionPlanRef.current && extractedResponse && toolCallCount === 0) {
         deps.logger.debug({ agentId }, "SEP extraction skipped: no tool calls in execution (likely conversational response)");
     }
-    // L4: Post-batch continuation (replaces the deleted SEP one-shot nudge).
+    // L4: Post-batch continuation (the silent-termination enforcement path).
     // Detects empty final assistant turn after a successful tool batch within
     // the current execution window and fires a directive followUp with multi-
     // shot retry. Falls through to L3 synthesis (recoverEmptyFinalResponse) on
     // exhaustion. SEP plan extraction + step counting remain intact for
     // observability — see pi-event-bridge.ts:949-1024.
     await runPostBatchContinuationStep(params);
-    // Issue 4 (small-model e2e 2026-06-12): narrate-without-emit nudge — the
+    // Narrate-without-emit nudge — the
     // sibling of L4 for turns that END ON intent narration ("Now let me write
     // the script:") with NO tool call. small/nano-gated, one bounded re-prompt;
     // an unrecovered fire marks result.narrateNudge so the post-execution
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ async function runPostBatchContinuationStep(params) {
         result.continuationMetrics = { fired: false, attempts: 0, outcome: "still_empty" };
     }
 }
-/** Issue-4 narrate-without-emit nudge step — separated like the post-batch step. */
+/** Narrate-without-emit nudge step — separated like the post-batch step. */
 async function runNarrateNudgeStep(params) {
     const { session, agentId, result, deps } = params;
     // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ async function runBudgetContinuation(params, budgetTracker, budgetCapped, reques
         // Nudge instructs LLM to continue without premature summarization
         const budgetNudgeText = `[budget:nudge] You have used ${nudgePercent}% of the requested ${budgetTracker.targetTokens.toLocaleString()} token budget. Continue working on the task - do not summarize or wrap up prematurely. Produce more detailed output.`;
         deps.logger.debug({ utilization: decision.utilization, continuations: budgetContinuations, targetTokens: budgetTracker.targetTokens }, "Budget continuation nudge");
-        // fromPromise wrapping per CLAUDE.md: no thrown exceptions
+        // fromPromise wrapping: followUp rejections surface as Result values, never thrown exceptions.
         const followUpResult = await fromPromise(session.followUp(budgetNudgeText));
         if (!followUpResult.ok) {
             deps.logger.warn({ err: followUpResult.error, hint: "Budget continuation followUp failed; preserving response collected so far", errorKind: "sdk" }, "followUp error, stopping budget continuation");

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/executor/prompt-runner/prompt-runner-types.d.ts

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ export interface PromptRunnerBridge {
         };
         stepsExecuted?: number;
         toolCallHistory?: string[];
-        /** R2: Abort redirect message set at bridge abort sites; undefined for normal completions. */
+        /** Abort redirect message set at bridge abort sites; undefined for normal completions. */
         abortResponse?: string;
     };
 }
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ export interface RunPromptParams {
         provider: string;
         input?: string[];
     } | undefined;
-    /** ModelProfile resolved once per execution; drives scaffoldLevel-gated features (R1 GoalAnchor). */
+    /** ModelProfile resolved once per execution; drives scaffoldLevel-gated features (e.g. GoalAnchor). */
     modelProfile?: ModelProfile;
     deps: {
         eventBus: TypedEventBus;
@@ -104,12 +104,12 @@ export interface RunPromptParams {
         /** Timer scheduling. */
         timers: TimerPort;
         /**
-         * ISSUE #2: the canonical system-tokens (system prompt + tools) estimate the
+         * The canonical system-tokens (system prompt + tools) estimate the
          * pre-flight throws on (cachedSystemTokensEstimate). Lets wrapEnvelope size the
          * tight-window residual (window − S − floorHeadroom) and drop the heavy
          * tool-discovery preamble before it overflows — using the SAME S so the decision
-         * cannot drift from the assembler. Absent ⇒ the drop is skipped (no S → can't size
-         * the residual → never drop, byte-identical to pre-ISSUE#2).
+         * cannot drift from the assembler. Absent ⇒ the drop is skipped (no S → can't
+         * size the residual → never drop, byte-identical envelope output).
          */
         getSystemTokensEstimate?: () => number;
     };

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/executor/prompt-runner/prompt-runner.js

@@ -32,9 +32,9 @@ export async function runPrompt(params) {
     // Emit prompt:submitted observability boundary event.
     // Fires after envelope assembly + before the retry-loop drives the
     // model call so the trajectory writer captures the exact (system,
-    // messages) pair the model is about to see. Sha256 digests over
-    // stableStringify make the digest stable across runs that produce
-    // semantically-identical prompts (the cache-trace consumer joins on
+    // messages) pair the model is about to see. Sha256 digests over the
+    // raw strings are stable across runs that produce
+    // byte-identical prompts (the cache-trace consumer joins on
     // these digests).
     emitPromptSubmitted(params, envelope.messageText);
     // Budget pre-check (skipped automatically when skipPrompt is true).

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/executor/prompt-runner/retry-loop.d.ts

@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ export interface RetryOutcome {
  * Execute the model retry pipeline + silent-failure detection.
  *
  * When `skipPrompt` is true the function returns `{ promptSucceeded: true,
- * stuckSessionDetected: false }` without invoking the model — matching the
- * pre-split bypass for standalone /commands.
+ * stuckSessionDetected: false }` without invoking the model — the bypass for
+ * standalone /commands.
  */
 export declare function runRetryLoop(params: RunPromptParams, messageText: string, promptImages: ImageContent[] | undefined, skipPrompt: boolean): Promise<RetryOutcome>;
 /**

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/executor/prompt-runner/retry-loop.js

@@ -24,8 +24,8 @@ import { handleClientRequest, handleRateLimited, handleSignedReplay, handleSilen
  * Execute the model retry pipeline + silent-failure detection.
  *
  * When `skipPrompt` is true the function returns `{ promptSucceeded: true,
- * stuckSessionDetected: false }` without invoking the model — matching the
- * pre-split bypass for standalone /commands.
+ * stuckSessionDetected: false }` without invoking the model — the bypass for
+ * standalone /commands.
  */
 export async function runRetryLoop(params, messageText, promptImages, skipPrompt) {
     const { session, agentId, bridge, deps } = params;
@@ -47,8 +47,8 @@ export async function runRetryLoop(params, messageText, promptImages, skipPrompt
         if (retryResult.succeeded && retryResult.effectiveModel) {
             deps.lastKnownModel?.recordSuccess(agentId ?? "default", retryResult.effectiveModel.provider, retryResult.effectiveModel.model);
         }
-        // WR-01 (175-REVIEW): grammar-400s can also surface on the THROWN path —
-        // session.prompt() throws and runWithModelRetry's GBNF-02 ladder guard
+        // Grammar-400s can also surface on the THROWN path —
+        // session.prompt() throws and runWithModelRetry's grammar-ladder guard
         // returns { succeeded: false, error } immediately. Without this dispatch
         // the failure went straight to output-escalation, where the canned
         // tool_schema_unsupported userMessage PROMISED an automatic retry that
@@ -96,13 +96,24 @@ export async function runRetryLoop(params, messageText, promptImages, skipPrompt
             // produce visible text in an intermediate turn (stopReason: "toolUse")
             // then return an empty final turn after a bookkeeping tool call.
             // The textEmitted flag from the bridge tracks all text_delta events.
-            if ((earlyBridgeResult.llmCalls ?? 0) > 0 && !earlyBridgeResult.textEmitted) {
+            // A run the bridge itself ABORTED is excluded: a safety-control abort
+            // (spend/budget/step/loop/context) cuts the stream mid-loop, so the
+            // empty tail is the abort, not a silent provider failure. abortResponse
+            // is set exactly at those abort sites and already carries the
+            // user-facing outcome (executor-post-execution substitutes it as the
+            // response). Re-entering the model here would re-drive a
+            // deliberately-stopped run with the bridge's aborted latch disarming
+            // every safety gate, and re-appending the prompt duplicates the user
+            // message in the session and the conversation store.
+            if ((earlyBridgeResult.llmCalls ?? 0) > 0 &&
+                !earlyBridgeResult.textEmitted &&
+                earlyBridgeResult.abortResponse === undefined) {
                 // Single-entry by construction: detectSilentFailure is called at most
                 // once per runPrompt invocation (the surrounding `if (promptSucceeded
                 // && !skipPrompt)` cannot re-enter this branch). The
-                // `silentRetryAttempted` parameter on detectSilentFailure is the
-                // pre-split file's gate-close shape — preserved for the defensive
-                // invariant the helper documents, threaded in as `false` here.
+                // `silentRetryAttempted` parameter on detectSilentFailure is a
+                // gate-close guard kept for the defensive invariant the helper
+                // documents, threaded in as `false` here.
                 await detectSilentFailure(params, messageText, promptImages, earlyBridgeResult, retryState, invokeRetry, false);
             }
         }
@@ -140,10 +151,10 @@ async function invokeModelRetry(params, messageText, promptImages) {
         timeoutConfig: {
             promptTimeoutMs: effectiveTimeout.promptTimeoutMs,
             retryPromptTimeoutMs: effectiveTimeout.retryPromptTimeoutMs,
-            // LAT-02 (177-03): makespan ceiling derivation input — threaded
-            // UNCONDITIONALLY (R-1; gate_scope all-providers per 177-01 DECISION).
+            // Makespan ceiling derivation input — threaded
+            // UNCONDITIONALLY (stall semantics apply to all providers).
             stallCeilingMultiplier: effectiveTimeout.stallCeilingMultiplier,
-            // LAT-01 binding provenance for the prompt_timeout emit attribution.
+            // Binding provenance for the prompt_timeout emit attribution.
             source: effectiveTimeout.source,
             operationType: effectiveTimeout.operationType,
         },
@@ -171,13 +182,13 @@ async function invokeModelRetry(params, messageText, promptImages) {
  *   2. classify the bridge's recorded LLM error → branch:
  *        a. client_request_signed_replay  → scrub + retry (signed-replay self-heal)
  *        b. tool_schema_unsupported       → strip pattern/format + retry once
- *                                           per session (GBNF-02 self-heal)
+ *                                           per session (grammar self-heal)
  *        c. rate_limited                  → short-circuit (window can't roll)
  *        d. client_request                → short-circuit (deterministic failure)
  *        e. default                       → strip empty turns + retry + LKW fallback
  */
 async function detectSilentFailure(params, messageText, promptImages, earlyBridgeResult, retryState, invokeRetry, silentRetryAttempted) {
-    const { session, deps } = params;
+    const { session, agentId, sessionKey, deps } = params;
     // Before declaring failure, attempt a single continuation
     // when the model stopped normally but only produced thinking blocks
     // (no visible text). Common with Gemini thinking-only responses.
@@ -190,6 +201,17 @@ async function detectSilentFailure(params, messageText, promptImages, earlyBridg
             errorKind: "transient",
         }, "Attempting continuation after thinking-only final turn");
         const followUpResult = await fromPromise(session.followUp("(continued from previous message)"));
+        const nudgeRecovered = followUpResult.ok && getVisibleAssistantText(session) !== "";
+        // Announce the continuation nudge (a followUp re-drive on a thinking-only
+        // "stop" turn) so `explain` shows the recovery attempt (previously
+        // log-only, and only on the recovered branch).
+        deps.eventBus.emit("execution:recovery_attempted", {
+            agentId: agentId ?? "default",
+            sessionKey: formatSessionKey(sessionKey),
+            reason: "continuation_nudge",
+            succeeded: nudgeRecovered,
+            timestamp: deps.clock.now(),
+        });
         if (followUpResult.ok) {
             const recoveredText = getVisibleAssistantText(session);
             if (recoveredText !== "") {

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/executor/prompt-runner/silent-failure-handlers.d.ts

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * throwing but emitted a content-less assistant turn:
  *
  *   1. signed-replay self-heal (scrub thinking state + retry once with 1s settle)
- *   2. tool-schema strip-retry (GBNF-02: strip pattern/format once per
+ *   2. tool-schema strip-retry (strip pattern/format once per
  *      session + retry; body lives in tool-schema-unsupported-handler.ts —
  *      500-line directory cap — and is re-exported below)
  *   3. rate-limit short-circuit (window can't roll; declare terminal failure)

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/executor/prompt-runner/silent-failure-handlers.js

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  * throwing but emitted a content-less assistant turn:
  *
  *   1. signed-replay self-heal (scrub thinking state + retry once with 1s settle)
- *   2. tool-schema strip-retry (GBNF-02: strip pattern/format once per
+ *   2. tool-schema strip-retry (strip pattern/format once per
  *      session + retry; body lives in tool-schema-unsupported-handler.ts —
  *      500-line directory cap — and is re-exported below)
  *   3. rate-limit short-circuit (window can't roll; declare terminal failure)
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ import { normalizeModelId } from "../../provider/model-id-normalize.js";
 import { withPromptTimeout } from "../prompt-timeout.js";
 import { scrubSignedReplayStateInPlace } from "../signature-block-scrubber.js";
 import { getVisibleAssistantText } from "../phase-filter.js";
-// GBNF-02 strip-retry handler (cascade member #2). Extracted to a sibling
+// Tool-schema strip-retry handler (cascade member #2). Extracted to a sibling
 // module for the prompt-runner 500-line file cap; re-exported here so the
 // retry-loop dispatch imports the whole silent-failure cascade from one
 // module. Behavioral coverage: tool-schema-unsupported-handler.test.ts.
@@ -159,6 +159,18 @@ export async function handleSilentRetryDefault(params, messageText, promptImages
     const retryResult = await invokeRetry(messageText, promptImages);
     retryState.promptSucceeded = retryResult.succeeded;
     retryState.promptError = retryResult.error;
+    // Announce the re-drive so `explain` can show the session re-entered the
+    // model on a silent failure (previously log-only — the budget incident's
+    // re-drive was findable only by a debug-log grep). `succeeded` reflects the
+    // post-retry visible-text recovery re-checked just below.
+    const silentRecovered = retryState.promptSucceeded && (session.getLastAssistantText?.() ?? "") !== "";
+    deps.eventBus.emit("execution:recovery_attempted", {
+        agentId: params.agentId ?? "default",
+        sessionKey: formatSessionKey(params.sessionKey),
+        reason: "silent_retry",
+        succeeded: silentRecovered,
+        timestamp: deps.clock.now(),
+    });
     // Re-check for empty response after retry
     if (retryState.promptSucceeded) {
         const retryText = session.getLastAssistantText?.() ?? "";
@@ -256,6 +268,15 @@ async function attemptLkwFallback(params, messageText, promptImages, retryBridge
         stripTrailingEmptyAssistantTurns(session);
         await withPromptTimeout(session.prompt(messageText, { expandPromptTemplates: false, images: promptImages }), effectiveTimeout.retryPromptTimeoutMs, () => session.abort(), deps.timers);
         const lkwText = getVisibleAssistantText(session);
+        // Announce the model-swap re-drive (previously log-only) so `explain`
+        // shows the fallback attempt + whether it recovered.
+        deps.eventBus.emit("execution:recovery_attempted", {
+            agentId: agentId ?? "default",
+            sessionKey: formatSessionKey(params.sessionKey),
+            reason: "lkw_fallback",
+            succeeded: lkwText !== "",
+            timestamp: deps.clock.now(),
+        });
         if (lkwText !== "") {
             retryState.promptSucceeded = true;
             retryState.promptError = undefined;

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/executor/prompt-runner/tool-schema-strip.d.ts

@@ -1,15 +1,17 @@
 /**
- * Reactive 2-keyword tool-schema strip — GBNF-02's repair payload.
+ * Reactive 2-keyword tool-schema strip — the repair payload for
+ * `tool_schema_unsupported` rejections.
  *
  * REACTIVE-ONLY: the proactive gbnf normalize profile (clean-for-gbnf.ts)
  * deliberately does NOT strip `pattern`/`format` — llama.cpp largely
  * supports them. This module is the once-per-session remedy applied AFTER a
  * provider has already rejected the toolset at grammar-compile/unmarshal
- * time (`tool_schema_unsupported` classification), mirroring the Hermes
- * precedent. Deliberately a 2-keyword subset of clean-for-xai's
+ * time (`tool_schema_unsupported` classification): schemas are only ever
+ * degraded in reaction to a real rejection, never up front.
+ * Deliberately a 2-keyword subset of clean-for-xai's
  * XAI_REJECTED; defined here to keep this module self-contained.
  *
- * IN-PLACE MUTATION RATIONALE (A5, proven by the real-SDK decider in
+ * IN-PLACE MUTATION RATIONALE (proven by the real-SDK decider in
  * tool-schema-strip.test.ts): the AgentSession holds REFERENCES to the
  * exact ToolDefinition objects passed as `customTools` (pi-executor.ts:580;
  * the post-creation `tool.execute` mutation at pi-executor.ts:1517-1526 is
@@ -21,17 +23,17 @@
  *   - mutating the CONTENTS of the existing parameters object propagates to
  *     BOTH the SDK registry (`getToolDefinition`) and the wire;
  *   - replacing `tool.parameters` with a new object would update the
- *     registry but ORPHAN the wrapped tools the wire reads — the silent
- *     no-propagation failure RESEARCH Pitfall 6 warns about.
+ *     registry but ORPHAN the wrapped tools the wire reads — a silent
+ *     no-propagation failure.
  * `applyReactiveSchemaStripInPlace` accordingly write-backs CONTENT into the
  * same parameters object (identity preserved — test-pinned).
  *
- * SECURITY (I6 / T-175-15): strictly REMOVAL — the strip never adds or
+ * SECURITY: strictly REMOVAL — the strip never adds or
  * tightens constraints. The stripped schema becomes the validation schema
  * for the retry turn, i.e. strictly FEWER constraints than the
  * operator-registered schema. Accepted: tool handlers already treat
  * arguments as untrusted input (existing posture), and no policy gate reads
- * `pattern`/`format` (research-verified).
+ * `pattern`/`format`.
  *
  * @module
  */
@@ -43,7 +45,7 @@
 export declare const REACTIVE_STRIP_KEYWORDS: ReadonlySet<string>;
 /**
  * Pure deep strip: returns a NEW schema with the given keywords removed at
- * every nesting depth REACHABLE THROUGH the recursion key set (WR-06):
+ * every nesting depth REACHABLE THROUGH the recursion key set:
  * schema maps (`properties`/`$defs`/`definitions`/`patternProperties` —
  * map keys are names, values are schemas), `items`/`prefixItems` (single or
  * tuple array), `allOf`/`anyOf`/`oneOf`, and `additionalProperties`-as-schema.
@@ -56,7 +58,7 @@ export declare const REACTIVE_STRIP_KEYWORDS: ReadonlySet<string>;
  * Map KEYS (property names, definition names, patternProperties key regexes)
  * are never treated as keywords — a property literally named "pattern"
  * survives, and a patternProperties key regex is preserved verbatim.
- * Non-object inputs pass through unchanged; subtrees beyond the WR-03 depth
+ * Non-object inputs pass through unchanged; subtrees beyond the depth
  * cap pass through un-walked (`depthLimited: true`).
  */
 export declare function stripSchemaKeywordsDeep(schema: unknown, keywords: ReadonlySet<string>): {
@@ -69,7 +71,7 @@ export declare function stripSchemaKeywordsDeep(schema: unknown, keywords: Reado
  * holds references to these exact objects — and the SDK's wrapped
  * AgentTools hold the exact parameters object — so identity-preserving
  * content mutation is THE propagation mechanism; see the module JSDoc and
- * the A5 decider test). Returns the names of tools whose schemas changed
+ * the real-SDK decider test). Returns the names of tools whose schemas changed
  * plus the union of stripped keywords.
  *
  * Tools without an object `parameters` value are skipped (nothing to strip,

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/executor/prompt-runner/tool-schema-strip.js

@@ -1,16 +1,18 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 /**
- * Reactive 2-keyword tool-schema strip — GBNF-02's repair payload.
+ * Reactive 2-keyword tool-schema strip — the repair payload for
+ * `tool_schema_unsupported` rejections.
  *
  * REACTIVE-ONLY: the proactive gbnf normalize profile (clean-for-gbnf.ts)
  * deliberately does NOT strip `pattern`/`format` — llama.cpp largely
  * supports them. This module is the once-per-session remedy applied AFTER a
  * provider has already rejected the toolset at grammar-compile/unmarshal
- * time (`tool_schema_unsupported` classification), mirroring the Hermes
- * precedent. Deliberately a 2-keyword subset of clean-for-xai's
+ * time (`tool_schema_unsupported` classification): schemas are only ever
+ * degraded in reaction to a real rejection, never up front.
+ * Deliberately a 2-keyword subset of clean-for-xai's
  * XAI_REJECTED; defined here to keep this module self-contained.
  *
- * IN-PLACE MUTATION RATIONALE (A5, proven by the real-SDK decider in
+ * IN-PLACE MUTATION RATIONALE (proven by the real-SDK decider in
  * tool-schema-strip.test.ts): the AgentSession holds REFERENCES to the
  * exact ToolDefinition objects passed as `customTools` (pi-executor.ts:580;
  * the post-creation `tool.execute` mutation at pi-executor.ts:1517-1526 is
@@ -22,17 +24,17 @@
  *   - mutating the CONTENTS of the existing parameters object propagates to
  *     BOTH the SDK registry (`getToolDefinition`) and the wire;
  *   - replacing `tool.parameters` with a new object would update the
- *     registry but ORPHAN the wrapped tools the wire reads — the silent
- *     no-propagation failure RESEARCH Pitfall 6 warns about.
+ *     registry but ORPHAN the wrapped tools the wire reads — a silent
+ *     no-propagation failure.
  * `applyReactiveSchemaStripInPlace` accordingly write-backs CONTENT into the
  * same parameters object (identity preserved — test-pinned).
  *
- * SECURITY (I6 / T-175-15): strictly REMOVAL — the strip never adds or
+ * SECURITY: strictly REMOVAL — the strip never adds or
  * tightens constraints. The stripped schema becomes the validation schema
  * for the retry turn, i.e. strictly FEWER constraints than the
  * operator-registered schema. Accepted: tool handlers already treat
  * arguments as untrusted input (existing posture), and no policy gate reads
- * `pattern`/`format` (research-verified).
+ * `pattern`/`format`.
  *
  * @module
  */
@@ -43,7 +45,7 @@
  */
 export const REACTIVE_STRIP_KEYWORDS = new Set(["pattern", "format"]);
 /**
- * Stack-depth cap for the recursive strip walk (175-REVIEW WR-03).
+ * Stack-depth cap for the recursive strip walk.
  * Third-party MCP schemas are attacker-controlled: a chain deep enough to
  * overflow the un-capped walk still parses cleanly through JSON.parse at the
  * transport boundary — and this walk runs on the REPAIR path the schema
@@ -56,7 +58,7 @@ export const REACTIVE_STRIP_KEYWORDS = new Set(["pattern", "format"]);
 const MAX_STRIP_WALK_DEPTH = 64;
 /**
  * Pure deep strip: returns a NEW schema with the given keywords removed at
- * every nesting depth REACHABLE THROUGH the recursion key set (WR-06):
+ * every nesting depth REACHABLE THROUGH the recursion key set:
  * schema maps (`properties`/`$defs`/`definitions`/`patternProperties` —
  * map keys are names, values are schemas), `items`/`prefixItems` (single or
  * tuple array), `allOf`/`anyOf`/`oneOf`, and `additionalProperties`-as-schema.
@@ -69,7 +71,7 @@ const MAX_STRIP_WALK_DEPTH = 64;
  * Map KEYS (property names, definition names, patternProperties key regexes)
  * are never treated as keywords — a property literally named "pattern"
  * survives, and a patternProperties key regex is preserved verbatim.
- * Non-object inputs pass through unchanged; subtrees beyond the WR-03 depth
+ * Non-object inputs pass through unchanged; subtrees beyond the depth
  * cap pass through un-walked (`depthLimited: true`).
  */
 export function stripSchemaKeywordsDeep(schema, keywords) {
@@ -83,14 +85,14 @@ export function stripSchemaKeywordsDeep(schema, keywords) {
     };
 }
 /** Recursive worker for {@link stripSchemaKeywordsDeep}. Pure — new objects
- *  out. Depth-capped (WR-03): an object node at the cap is returned
+ *  out. Depth-capped: an object node at the cap is returned
  *  UN-WALKED and `limited.hit` is set — pass-through, never a throw. */
 function walkAndStrip(schema, keywords, found, depth, limited) {
     if (schema === null || schema === undefined)
         return schema;
     if (typeof schema !== "object" || Array.isArray(schema))
         return schema;
-    // WR-03: cap BEFORE stripping at this node so the entire subtree passes
+    // Cap BEFORE stripping at this node so the entire subtree passes
     // through byte-identical (a half-stripped cut node would be confusing).
     if (depth >= MAX_STRIP_WALK_DEPTH) {
         limited.hit = true;
@@ -105,7 +107,7 @@ function walkAndStrip(schema, keywords, found, depth, limited) {
             continue;
         }
         // Recurse into schema MAPS: properties / $defs / definitions /
-        // patternProperties (WR-06). Each VALUE is a schema; map KEYS (property
+        // patternProperties. Each VALUE is a schema; map KEYS (property
         // names, definition names, key regexes) are NOT keyword-checked — a
         // patternProperties key regex is preserved verbatim.
         if ((key === "properties" ||
@@ -123,7 +125,7 @@ function walkAndStrip(schema, keywords, found, depth, limited) {
             continue;
         }
         // Recurse into items (single schema or tuple array of schemas) and
-        // prefixItems (the draft-2020 tuple form — WR-06).
+        // prefixItems (the draft-2020 tuple form).
         if (key === "items" || key === "prefixItems") {
             cleaned[key] = Array.isArray(value)
                 ? value.map((item) => walkAndStrip(item, keywords, found, depth + 1, limited))
@@ -151,7 +153,7 @@ function walkAndStrip(schema, keywords, found, depth, limited) {
  * holds references to these exact objects — and the SDK's wrapped
  * AgentTools hold the exact parameters object — so identity-preserving
  * content mutation is THE propagation mechanism; see the module JSDoc and
- * the A5 decider test). Returns the names of tools whose schemas changed
+ * the real-SDK decider test). Returns the names of tools whose schemas changed
  * plus the union of stripped keywords.
  *
  * Tools without an object `parameters` value are skipped (nothing to strip,
@@ -172,7 +174,7 @@ export function applyReactiveSchemaStripInPlace(tools) {
         if (stripped.length === 0)
             continue;
         // CONTENT-level write-back into the SAME parameters object (identity
-        // preserved). Removal-only at every depth (I6) means the only top-level
+        // preserved). Removal-only at every depth means the only top-level
         // keys that can disappear are the two strip keywords themselves —
         // delete them statically, then copy the rebuilt subtrees over.
         const target = params;

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/executor/prompt-runner/tool-schema-unsupported-handler.d.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /**
- * handleToolSchemaUnsupported — GBNF-02's strip-`pattern`/`format`-and-retry
+ * handleToolSchemaUnsupported — the strip-`pattern`/`format`-and-retry repair
  * for grammar-400s surfacing on the SILENT path (pi-ai catches the provider
  * error in-stream, the SDK's retryable-regex does not match, `prompt()`
  * RESOLVES; the error lands in `bridge.lastLlmErrorMessage` and is
@@ -12,17 +12,17 @@
  * whole cascade from one module. Mirrors `handleSignedReplay`'s structural
  * skeleton (mutate state → WARN with hint/errorKind → ONE `invokeRetry` →
  * post-retry empty-check → event emit → success/failure log pair) with two
- * deviations: a session-keyed ONCE-GATE (T-175-14 — bounded at +1 prompt
+ * deviations: a session-keyed ONCE-GATE (bounded at +1 prompt
  * per session, set BEFORE the retry so re-entry during the retry cannot
  * loop) and NO settle delay (a grammar-400 is a deterministic schema
  * failure, not a transient provider condition).
  *
- * The retry's `invokeRetry` path re-enters `runWithModelRetry`; Plan 175-02's
- * ladder classify-guard guarantees a second grammar-400 inside that retry
+ * The retry's `invokeRetry` path re-enters `runWithModelRetry`; the retry
+ * ladder's classify-guard guarantees a second grammar-400 inside that retry
  * returns immediately — zero rotation/fallback/LKW burn. The once-gate
  * guarantees the cascade never re-strips.
  *
- * I7: the new WARN/event lines carry tool + keyword NAMES only — never
+ * PRIVACY: the WARN/event lines carry tool + keyword NAMES only — never
  * schema bodies and never the raw provider body (llama-server bodies embed
  * full schema dumps; the raw error already reaches operator logs via the
  * existing failure-path `err` serializer).
@@ -41,13 +41,13 @@ type RetryInvoker = (messageText: string, promptImages: ImageContent[] | undefin
 /**
  * The once-gate lives in executor-session-state.ts as a SESSION-LIFETIME
  * flag (`sessionReactiveSchemaStrip`, keyed by `formatSessionKey` — the
- * schema-snapshot / deliveredGuides precedent), NOT a process-lifetime Set
- * (175-REVIEW CR-02): clearSessionState (session:expired +
+ * schema-snapshot / deliveredGuides precedent), NOT a process-lifetime Set:
+ * clearSessionState (session:expired +
  * session.reset_conversation / session.delete) clears it so a reset session
  * gets a fresh repair attempt, and the SAME flag drives the per-turn
  * persisted strip (`applyPersistedReactiveStrip`) so a heal survives the
  * snapshot→normalize rebuild on later turns. The key is armed BEFORE the
- * retry fires so re-entry during the retry cannot loop (T-175-14).
+ * retry fires so re-entry during the retry cannot loop.
  */
 /** Test hook: clears the session-keyed once-gate between test cases. */
 export declare function resetToolSchemaStripGateForTest(): void;