comisai 1.0.45 → 1.0.46

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/executor/model-retry.js

@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ export async function runWithModelRetry(params) {
     const { session, messageText, promptImages, config, deps, timeoutConfig } = params;
     const { eventBus, logger, authRotation, modelRegistry, clock, timers } = deps;
     const fallbackModels = deps.fallbackModels ?? [];
-    // §16.9: turn-scoping ids stamped onto every model:* emit so
+    // Turn-scoping ids are stamped onto every model:* emit so
     // kind:"model" activity groups to the right turn. agentId/sessionKey come
     // from deps; traceId rides on the RequestContext (AsyncLocalStorage) — the
     // same source tool:* uses. Omit a field when absent so the optional schema
@@ -154,25 +154,25 @@ export async function runWithModelRetry(params) {
     let promptSucceeded = false;
     let effectiveModel;
     try {
-        // Primary prompt uses resettable timeout so tool completions (and, since
-        // LAT-02, stream deltas) can reset the deadline. Retry/fallback paths use
+        // Primary prompt uses resettable timeout so tool completions and stream
+        // deltas can reset the deadline. Retry/fallback paths use
         // the original withPromptTimeout (fresh whole-turn timeout).
         const resettable = withResettablePromptTimeout(session.prompt(messageText, {
             expandPromptTemplates: false,
             images: promptImages,
         }), timeoutConfig.promptTimeoutMs, () => session.abort(), timers, {
-            // LAT-02 (177-01 DECISION): the makespan ceiling is non-optional
-            // wherever stall semantics apply — DERIVED here from the multiplier,
-            // never a standalone ms knob. A delta-resetting runaway generation is
-            // bounded at promptTimeoutMs × stallCeilingMultiplier (T-177-08).
-            // initialBudgetMs deliberately NOT wired (first_activity_scaling:
-            // none — wiring it would re-open the LAT-02-5 hang-detection cost
-            // without a decision record).
-            // Clamped at Node's 32-bit timer cap (177-REVIEW WR-02,
-            // defense-in-depth against hand-built configs that bypass the zod
-            // 1..100 bound): a product > 2^31-1 makes setTimeout clamp the delay
-            // to 1ms — the ceiling would fire INSTANTLY, every prompt killed at
-            // once, classified makespan, and suppressed from providerHealth.
+            // The makespan ceiling is non-optional wherever stall semantics
+            // apply — DERIVED here from the multiplier, never a standalone ms
+            // knob. A delta-resetting runaway generation is bounded at
+            // promptTimeoutMs × stallCeilingMultiplier.
+            // initialBudgetMs deliberately NOT wired: scaling the first-activity
+            // budget would stretch hang-detection latency from minutes to tens
+            // of minutes, a cost accepted nowhere.
+            // Clamped at Node's 32-bit timer cap (defense-in-depth against
+            // hand-built configs that bypass the zod 1..100 bound): a product
+            // > 2^31-1 makes setTimeout clamp the delay to 1ms — the ceiling
+            // would fire INSTANTLY, every prompt killed at once, classified
+            // makespan, and suppressed from providerHealth.
             ...(timeoutConfig.stallCeilingMultiplier !== undefined && {
                 makespanMs: Math.min(timeoutConfig.promptTimeoutMs * timeoutConfig.stallCeilingMultiplier, 2_147_483_647),
             }),
@@ -197,11 +197,11 @@ export async function runWithModelRetry(params) {
             maxRetries,
             totalElapsedMs: clock.now() - retryStartMs,
             hint: "Primary model failed, attempting fallback",
-            // LAT-04: timeouts are their own failure class — booking them as
+            // Timeouts are their own failure class — booking them as
             // "dependency" misclassified every prompt timeout in fleet rollups.
             errorKind: (primaryError instanceof PromptTimeoutError ? "timeout" : "dependency"),
         }, "Primary model prompt error");
-        // GBNF-02: a grammar-compile/schema 400 is deterministic — rotating auth or
+        // A grammar-compile/schema 400 is deterministic — rotating auth or
         // burning fallback models cannot fix a schema the provider can't compile.
         // Short-circuit the ladder; the executor's withSession-scoped strip-retry
         // (silent-failure-handlers.ts) owns the single repair attempt. The raw body
@@ -215,9 +215,9 @@ export async function runWithModelRetry(params) {
             }, "Schema-unsupported error: fallback ladder skipped");
             return { succeeded: false, error: primaryError };
         }
-        // Emit prompt timeout event for observability (LAT-04: full attribution —
+        // Emit prompt timeout event for observability (full attribution —
         // numbers + enum + the pre-rendered config-KEY string only, never delta
-        // content or env values; T-177-11).
+        // content or env values).
         if (primaryError instanceof PromptTimeoutError) {
             eventBus.emit("execution:prompt_timeout", {
                 agentId: deps.agentId ?? "unknown",
@@ -234,10 +234,10 @@ export async function runWithModelRetry(params) {
             });
         }
         // Feed failure into provider health monitor — EXCEPT makespan-kills.
-        // LAT-04: a makespan-kill is the model streaming forever (runaway), not
+        // A makespan-kill is the model streaming forever (runaway), not
         // the provider failing; booking it would let slow-prefill turns trip the
         // safety gate into provider_degraded skips. Stall-kills (indistinguishable
-        // from a hung provider) still record (Pitfall 6 both-directions).
+        // from a hung provider) still record.
         const isPrimaryMakespanKill = primaryError instanceof PromptTimeoutError && primaryError.limit === "makespan";
         if (isPrimaryMakespanKill) {
             logger.debug({
@@ -261,9 +261,9 @@ export async function runWithModelRetry(params) {
                     logger.debug({ retryAfterMs, model: displayModel, sessionKey: deps.sessionKey }, "Short retry -- preserving model for cache hit");
                     await new Promise(r => { const h = timers.setTimeout(() => r(), retryAfterMs); void h; });
                     try {
-                        // LAT-02 scope decision (177 Open Q2): retry/fallback prompts KEEP
-                        // whole-turn retryPromptTimeoutMs semantics (non-resettable) — pinned
-                        // by LAT-02-W-6; extend only if local retries die spuriously in
+                        // Scope decision: retry/fallback prompts KEEP whole-turn
+                        // retryPromptTimeoutMs semantics (non-resettable) — pinned
+                        // by test; extend only if local retries die spuriously in
                         // practice. Applies to ALL withPromptTimeout sites in this function.
                         await withPromptTimeout(session.prompt(messageText, { expandPromptTemplates: false, images: promptImages }), timeoutConfig.retryPromptTimeoutMs, () => session.abort(), timers);
                         promptSucceeded = true;
@@ -305,15 +305,15 @@ export async function runWithModelRetry(params) {
                         maxRetries,
                         totalElapsedMs: clock.now() - retryStartMs,
                         hint: "Rotated key also failed, proceeding to model fallback",
-                        // LAT-04: a timeout on the rotated-key retry is a timeout, not
+                        // A timeout on the rotated-key retry is a timeout, not
                         // an auth failure — keep "auth" only for non-timeout errors.
                         errorKind: (rotatedKeyError instanceof PromptTimeoutError ? "timeout" : "auth"),
                     }, "Rotated key retry failed");
-                    // Emit prompt timeout event on rotation retry timeout (LAT-04
+                    // Emit prompt timeout event on rotation retry timeout (full
                     // attribution; `limit` absent ⇒ whole-turn retry semantics — the
                     // kill that fired is the retryPromptTimeoutMs race, so the knob is
                     // the RETRY key, never the promptTimeoutMs binding that
-                    // timeoutConfig.source describes (177-REVIEW WR-01).
+                    // timeoutConfig.source describes).
                     if (rotatedKeyError instanceof PromptTimeoutError) {
                         eventBus.emit("execution:prompt_timeout", {
                             agentId: deps.agentId ?? "unknown",
@@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ export async function runWithModelRetry(params) {
                         });
                     }
                     // Feed rotation failure into provider health monitor — makespan-kill
-                    // suppression mirrors the primary site (LAT-04; structurally dead on
+                    // suppression mirrors the primary site (structurally dead on
                     // this whole-turn path today, but the gate keeps the split uniform).
                     const isRotatedMakespanKill = rotatedKeyError instanceof PromptTimeoutError && rotatedKeyError.limit === "makespan";
                     if (isRotatedMakespanKill) {
@@ -399,12 +399,12 @@ export async function runWithModelRetry(params) {
                     maxRetries,
                     totalElapsedMs: clock.now() - retryStartMs,
                     hint: "Fallback model also failed",
-                    // LAT-04: timeout class for PromptTimeoutError (fleet rollups).
+                    // Timeout class for PromptTimeoutError (fleet rollups).
                     errorKind: (fallbackError instanceof PromptTimeoutError ? "timeout" : "dependency"),
                 }, "Fallback model prompt error");
-                // Emit prompt timeout event on fallback timeout (LAT-04 attribution;
+                // Emit prompt timeout event on fallback timeout (full attribution;
                 // `limit` absent ⇒ whole-turn retry semantics — the knob is the RETRY
-                // key, never the promptTimeoutMs binding; 177-REVIEW WR-01).
+                // key, never the promptTimeoutMs binding).
                 if (fallbackError instanceof PromptTimeoutError) {
                     eventBus.emit("execution:prompt_timeout", {
                         agentId: deps.agentId ?? "unknown",
@@ -423,8 +423,8 @@ export async function runWithModelRetry(params) {
                     });
                 }
                 // Feed fallback failure into provider health monitor — makespan-kill
-                // suppression mirrors the primary site (LAT-04; structurally dead on
-                // this whole-turn path today, but the gate keeps the split uniform).
+                // suppression mirrors the primary site (structurally dead on this
+                // whole-turn path today, but the gate keeps the split uniform).
                 const isFallbackMakespanKill = fallbackError instanceof PromptTimeoutError && fallbackError.limit === "makespan";
                 if (isFallbackMakespanKill) {
                     logger.debug({
@@ -488,10 +488,10 @@ export async function runWithModelRetry(params) {
                         lkwProvider: lkw.provider,
                         lkwModel: lkw.model,
                         hint: "Last-known-working model also failed",
-                        // LAT-04: timeout class for PromptTimeoutError (fleet rollups).
+                        // Timeout class for PromptTimeoutError (fleet rollups).
                         errorKind: (lkwError instanceof PromptTimeoutError ? "timeout" : "dependency"),
                     }, "Last-known-working model fallback failed");
-                    // Emit prompt timeout event on LKW timeout (177-REVIEW IN-03):
+                    // Emit prompt timeout event on LKW timeout:
                     // the explain verdict consumes the LAST execution.prompt_timeout
                     // record — without this emit, a terminal LKW timeout left the
                     // prior rotation/fallback kill as the "terminal" record and its
@@ -514,8 +514,8 @@ export async function runWithModelRetry(params) {
                             ...(lkwError.makespanMs !== undefined && { makespanMs: lkwError.makespanMs }),
                         });
                     }
-                    // providerHealth deliberately NOT recorded here (177-REVIEW IN-03
-                    // disposition): the LKW attempt runs against a DIFFERENT provider
+                    // providerHealth deliberately NOT recorded here:
+                    // the LKW attempt runs against a DIFFERENT provider
                     // chosen as a desperation fallback after an auth failure on the
                     // configured ladder — booking its failure would extend the safety
                     // gate's input surface beyond the 3 configured-path recordFailure

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/executor/narrate-nudge.d.ts

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 /**
- * Narrate-without-emit continuation nudge (Issue 4, small-model e2e 2026-06-12).
+ * Narrate-without-emit continuation nudge.
  *
  * Small models (esp. qwen3.6-class) split "intent narration" from the tool
  * call and drop the call: the turn ends on *"Now let me write the comparison
  * script:"* / *"Found the image analyze tool. Let me use it now."* with NO
  * tool call emitted — the delivered answer is mid-task narration, and the
- * platform recorded the turn as a clean success (UC-2 turn 2; UC-5 vague run:
- * tool discovery ran 4×, the announced image-analysis call was never emitted,
+ * platform recorded the turn as a clean success (observed live: tool
+ * discovery ran 4×, the announced image-analysis call was never emitted,
  * 28 steps of flailing → starved answer marked `degraded:false`).
  *
  * This handler is the sibling of `post-batch-continuation.ts` (which covers
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
  * When the nudge fails to produce a real answer, the caller marks the result
  * (`ExecutionResult.narrateNudge`) so the post-execution chokepoint promotes
  * the turn to the named degraded cause `narration_stall` — closing the
- * soft-false-clean (the secondary half of Issue 4).
+ * soft-false-clean where narration was recorded as a clean success.
  *
  * @module
  */

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/executor/narrate-nudge.js

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 /**
- * Narrate-without-emit continuation nudge (Issue 4, small-model e2e 2026-06-12).
+ * Narrate-without-emit continuation nudge.
  *
  * Small models (esp. qwen3.6-class) split "intent narration" from the tool
  * call and drop the call: the turn ends on *"Now let me write the comparison
  * script:"* / *"Found the image analyze tool. Let me use it now."* with NO
  * tool call emitted — the delivered answer is mid-task narration, and the
- * platform recorded the turn as a clean success (UC-2 turn 2; UC-5 vague run:
- * tool discovery ran 4×, the announced image-analysis call was never emitted,
+ * platform recorded the turn as a clean success (observed live: tool
+ * discovery ran 4×, the announced image-analysis call was never emitted,
  * 28 steps of flailing → starved answer marked `degraded:false`).
  *
  * This handler is the sibling of `post-batch-continuation.ts` (which covers
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
  * When the nudge fails to produce a real answer, the caller marks the result
  * (`ExecutionResult.narrateNudge`) so the post-execution chokepoint promotes
  * the turn to the named degraded cause `narration_stall` — closing the
- * soft-false-clean (the secondary half of Issue 4).
+ * soft-false-clean where narration was recorded as a clean success.
  *
  * @module
  */

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/executor/pi-executor/before-tool-call-guard.js

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
  * Extracted as a named function for independent unit testing.
  */
 export function createBeforeToolCallGuard(stepCounter, 
-// CR-01: the per-execution budget window (the shared BudgetGuard is also
+// The per-execution budget window (the shared BudgetGuard is also
 // structurally assignable). Only checkBudget(0) is used here.
 budgetGuard, circuitBreaker, toolRetryBreaker, messageSendLimiter, turnLoopDetector) {
     return async (context, _signal) => {
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ budgetGuard, circuitBreaker, toolRetryBreaker, messageSendLimiter, turnLoopDetec
         if (circuitBreaker.isOpen()) {
             return { block: true, reason: "Provider circuit breaker open" };
         }
-        // FIX #2c -- short-circuit a repeat idempotent read (the loop-breaker seam).
+        // Short-circuit a repeat idempotent read (the loop-breaker seam).
         // The SDK's BeforeToolCallResult has only {block, reason} -- no content
         // channel -- so a short-circuit blocks the wasteful re-execution and
         // surfaces the one-line steer as the tool-result reason text the model

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/executor/pi-executor/delta-reset.d.ts

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 /**
- * LAT-02 (Phase 177): composes the optional channel streaming callback with a
- * throttled stall-timer reset.
+ * Composes the optional channel streaming callback with a throttled
+ * stall-timer reset.
  *
  * Stream deltas — text AND thinking — are model activity: they must extend
  * the stall budget exactly like tool completions do, or a silent local
  * prefill that streams thinking (but no tool calls) dies at the whole-turn
- * race while visibly working (Critical Finding 6).
+ * race while visibly working.
  *
  * @module
  */
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ export interface DeltaResetState {
  *   (pi-event-bridge.ts `message_update` case), so a missing channel
  *   callback must not silently disable delta→reset. Channel-less runs
  *   (cron, graph subagents) stream deltas too.
- * - RESET BEFORE FORWARD (177-REVIEW WR-03) — the reset is the
+ * - RESET BEFORE FORWARD — the reset is the
  *   safety-relevant half of the composition and must not be hostage to the
  *   forwarding half: a throwing channel callback propagates to the bridge's
  *   message_update catch (swallowed there), so forwarding first would skip
@@ -37,24 +37,24 @@ export interface DeltaResetState {
  * - LIVE ref — `getResetTimer` reads the reset fn at call time
  *   (`currentResetTimer` is assigned later, at the `onResetTimer` hand-off
  *   when the prompt race starts). A delta arriving before assignment is a
- *   correct no-op, never a captured-undefined bug (Pitfall 2).
- * - Throttled ~1/s — resetting a timer per token is needless churn (R-7);
- *   a hand-rolled clock compare touches no timer between throttle windows
- *   (T-177-10). The first delta always resets.
- * - WALL-CLOCK REGRESSION SAFE (177-REVIEW WR-04) — `ClockPort.now()` is
+ *   correct no-op, never a captured-undefined bug.
+ * - Throttled ~1/s — resetting a timer per token is needless churn;
+ *   a hand-rolled clock compare touches no timer between throttle windows.
+ *   The first delta always resets.
+ * - WALL-CLOCK REGRESSION SAFE — `ClockPort.now()` is
  *   epoch ms, not monotonic: a backwards system-clock step (NTP correction,
  *   RTC fix after resume) would otherwise make `now - lastResetAtMs`
  *   negative and starve resets for the full step duration while the
  *   (monotonic) stall timer keeps counting — a spurious stall kill on a
  *   visibly-working turn. Re-baselining on regression bounds the starvation
  *   to one throttle window. Forward jumps stay harmless (extra resets).
- * - Unconditional for all providers — 177-01 DECISION gate_scope:
- *   all-providers (the timer is entirely client-side; no `enabled` flag).
+ * - Unconditional for all providers — the timer is entirely client-side,
+ *   so there is no `enabled` flag and no per-provider gating.
  */
 export declare function createDeltaResetComposer(state: Readonly<DeltaResetState>, args: {
     channelOnDelta: ((delta: string, kind: "text" | "thinking") => void) | undefined;
     getResetTimer: () => (() => void) | undefined;
     clock: ClockPort;
-    /** Minimum ms between stall-timer resets. Default 1_000 (~1/s, R-7). */
+    /** Minimum ms between stall-timer resets. Default 1_000 (~1/s). */
     throttleMs?: number;
 }): (delta: string, kind: "text" | "thinking") => void;

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/executor/pi-executor/delta-reset.js

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 /**
- * LAT-02 (Phase 177): composes the optional channel streaming callback with a
- * throttled stall-timer reset.
+ * Composes the optional channel streaming callback with a throttled
+ * stall-timer reset.
  *
  * Stream deltas — text AND thinking — are model activity: they must extend
  * the stall budget exactly like tool completions do, or a silent local
  * prefill that streams thinking (but no tool calls) dies at the whole-turn
- * race while visibly working (Critical Finding 6).
+ * race while visibly working.
  *
  * @module
  */
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
  *   (pi-event-bridge.ts `message_update` case), so a missing channel
  *   callback must not silently disable delta→reset. Channel-less runs
  *   (cron, graph subagents) stream deltas too.
- * - RESET BEFORE FORWARD (177-REVIEW WR-03) — the reset is the
+ * - RESET BEFORE FORWARD — the reset is the
  *   safety-relevant half of the composition and must not be hostage to the
  *   forwarding half: a throwing channel callback propagates to the bridge's
  *   message_update catch (swallowed there), so forwarding first would skip
@@ -28,19 +28,19 @@
  * - LIVE ref — `getResetTimer` reads the reset fn at call time
  *   (`currentResetTimer` is assigned later, at the `onResetTimer` hand-off
  *   when the prompt race starts). A delta arriving before assignment is a
- *   correct no-op, never a captured-undefined bug (Pitfall 2).
- * - Throttled ~1/s — resetting a timer per token is needless churn (R-7);
- *   a hand-rolled clock compare touches no timer between throttle windows
- *   (T-177-10). The first delta always resets.
- * - WALL-CLOCK REGRESSION SAFE (177-REVIEW WR-04) — `ClockPort.now()` is
+ *   correct no-op, never a captured-undefined bug.
+ * - Throttled ~1/s — resetting a timer per token is needless churn;
+ *   a hand-rolled clock compare touches no timer between throttle windows.
+ *   The first delta always resets.
+ * - WALL-CLOCK REGRESSION SAFE — `ClockPort.now()` is
  *   epoch ms, not monotonic: a backwards system-clock step (NTP correction,
  *   RTC fix after resume) would otherwise make `now - lastResetAtMs`
  *   negative and starve resets for the full step duration while the
  *   (monotonic) stall timer keeps counting — a spurious stall kill on a
  *   visibly-working turn. Re-baselining on regression bounds the starvation
  *   to one throttle window. Forward jumps stay harmless (extra resets).
- * - Unconditional for all providers — 177-01 DECISION gate_scope:
- *   all-providers (the timer is entirely client-side; no `enabled` flag).
+ * - Unconditional for all providers — the timer is entirely client-side,
+ *   so there is no `enabled` flag and no per-provider gating.
  */
 export function createDeltaResetComposer(state, args) {
     void state;
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ export function createDeltaResetComposer(state, args) {
     return (delta, kind) => {
         const now = args.clock.now();
         if (now < lastResetAtMs)
-            lastResetAtMs = now; // wall clock stepped backwards — re-baseline (WR-04)
+            lastResetAtMs = now; // wall clock stepped backwards — re-baseline
         if (now - lastResetAtMs >= throttleMs) {
             lastResetAtMs = now;
             args.getResetTimer()?.();

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/executor/pi-executor/execution-plan-holder.d.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /**
- * Holder-backed `ExecutionPlanPort` implementation (spec §16.7 / §17.1).
+ * Holder-backed `ExecutionPlanPort` implementation.
  *
  * The Silent Execution Planner (SEP) stores the live plan for the active turn
  * in a mutable `executionPlanRef` created per-execute in `session-bootstrap.ts`

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/executor/pi-executor/execution-plan-holder.js

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 /**
- * Holder-backed `ExecutionPlanPort` implementation (spec §16.7 / §17.1).
+ * Holder-backed `ExecutionPlanPort` implementation.
  *
  * The Silent Execution Planner (SEP) stores the live plan for the active turn
  * in a mutable `executionPlanRef` created per-execute in `session-bootstrap.ts`

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/executor/pi-executor/index.d.ts

@@ -3,8 +3,9 @@
  *
  * Named re-exports only — no `as` aliases. The canonical public names
  * (createPiExecutor + PiExecutorDeps + createBeforeToolCallGuard +
- * mergeSessionStats) are preserved byte-identical so the parity snapshot
- * reproduces verbatim.
+ * mergeSessionStats) keep their exact spellings: they are the package's
+ * public surface (re-exported by @comis/agent's index), so aliasing or
+ * renaming here is a breaking API change.
  *
  * @module
  */

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/executor/pi-executor/index.js

@@ -4,8 +4,9 @@
  *
  * Named re-exports only — no `as` aliases. The canonical public names
  * (createPiExecutor + PiExecutorDeps + createBeforeToolCallGuard +
- * mergeSessionStats) are preserved byte-identical so the parity snapshot
- * reproduces verbatim.
+ * mergeSessionStats) keep their exact spellings: they are the package's
+ * public surface (re-exported by @comis/agent's index), so aliasing or
+ * renaming here is a breaking API change.
  *
  * @module
  */

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/executor/pi-executor/maybe-run-bootstrap-sweep.d.ts

@@ -1,24 +1,25 @@
 /**
- * DEPTH-03 (Plan 174-03 / WR-02 Plan 174-04) — the run-ONCE bootstrap crash-recovery
- * trigger, extracted from `createPiExecutor`'s in-lock `runSessionLocked` body.
+ * The run-ONCE bootstrap crash-recovery trigger, extracted from
+ * `createPiExecutor`'s in-lock `runSessionLocked` body.
  *
  * Closure-extraction protocol: state-by-parameter (`Readonly<MaybeRunBootstrapSweepState>`)
  * — mirrors `installCompactionTrigger` / `runSafetyGates`, keeping the over-cap
- * `pi-executor.ts` from accreting another inline wiring block (IN-01).
+ * `pi-executor.ts` from accreting another inline wiring block.
  *
- * WR-02 (Plan 174-04): the trigger now runs EXACTLY ONCE per session — gated on the
- * existing `isFirstMessageInSession` signal (`sessionContext.messages.length === 0`),
- * computed once at the top of `runSessionLocked`. The previous inline block gated only
- * on `contextStore` presence, so it re-ran the sweep on EVERY turn for the life of every
- * dag session. Exactly-once was already guaranteed by the durable ingest cursor (turns
- * 2+ were idempotent no-ops), so this removes per-turn LCD single-flight overhead
- * (`runOnConversation` + `getIngestCursor` + `getMessages` + `upsertIngestCursor`) and
- * honors the documented "Runs ONCE at session start" contract — code and comment now agree.
+ * The trigger runs EXACTLY ONCE per session — gated on the existing
+ * `isFirstMessageInSession` signal (`sessionContext.messages.length === 0`),
+ * computed once at the top of `runSessionLocked`. Gating only on `contextStore`
+ * presence would re-run the sweep on EVERY turn for the life of every dag session.
+ * Exactly-once is already guaranteed by the durable ingest cursor (turns 2+ are
+ * idempotent no-ops), so the first-message gate removes per-turn LCD single-flight
+ * overhead (`runOnConversation` + `getIngestCursor` + `getMessages` +
+ * `upsertIngestCursor`) and honors the documented "Runs ONCE at session start"
+ * contract.
  *
  * The recovery itself is the EXISTING `bootstrapLcdSweep` (epoch cursor + fail-closed
  * identity guard); this helper is only the gate + scope build + delegating call. The scope
- * is built EXACTLY as the afterTurn ingest block does so read scope == write scope
- * (DAG-CRIT-1 / WR-02): conversationId === sessionKey === formattedKey,
+ * is built EXACTLY as the afterTurn ingest block does so read scope == write scope:
+ * conversationId === sessionKey === formattedKey,
  * agentId === `agentId ?? "default"`.
  *
  * Architecture cut (agent↛memory): imports ONLY the core `ContextStorePort`/`ClockPort`/
@@ -36,7 +37,7 @@ import type { AgentMessage } from "@earendil-works/pi-agent-core";
  */
 export interface MaybeRunBootstrapSweepState {
     /**
-     * WR-02 run-once gate: true on the FIRST message of this session
+     * Run-once gate: true on the FIRST message of this session
      * (`sessionContext.messages.length === 0`). When false the helper is a no-op (no store
      * read, no event) — the durable cursor already covered any gap on the first message.
      */
@@ -65,8 +66,8 @@ export interface MaybeRunBootstrapSweepState {
     };
 }
 /**
- * Run the DEPTH-03 bootstrap crash-recovery sweep ONCE at session start, before the first
- * turn proceeds. No-op when this is NOT the first message in the session (WR-02) or when no
+ * Run the bootstrap crash-recovery sweep ONCE at session start, before the first
+ * turn proceeds. No-op when this is NOT the first message in the session or when no
  * store is wired. Delegates to {@link bootstrapLcdSweep} (the recovery logic + the
  * `shouldRunLcdStorePasses` dag gate live there; a pipeline agent does no sweep work).
  */

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/executor/pi-executor/maybe-run-bootstrap-sweep.js

@@ -1,25 +1,26 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 /**
- * DEPTH-03 (Plan 174-03 / WR-02 Plan 174-04) — the run-ONCE bootstrap crash-recovery
- * trigger, extracted from `createPiExecutor`'s in-lock `runSessionLocked` body.
+ * The run-ONCE bootstrap crash-recovery trigger, extracted from
+ * `createPiExecutor`'s in-lock `runSessionLocked` body.
  *
  * Closure-extraction protocol: state-by-parameter (`Readonly<MaybeRunBootstrapSweepState>`)
  * — mirrors `installCompactionTrigger` / `runSafetyGates`, keeping the over-cap
- * `pi-executor.ts` from accreting another inline wiring block (IN-01).
+ * `pi-executor.ts` from accreting another inline wiring block.
  *
- * WR-02 (Plan 174-04): the trigger now runs EXACTLY ONCE per session — gated on the
- * existing `isFirstMessageInSession` signal (`sessionContext.messages.length === 0`),
- * computed once at the top of `runSessionLocked`. The previous inline block gated only
- * on `contextStore` presence, so it re-ran the sweep on EVERY turn for the life of every
- * dag session. Exactly-once was already guaranteed by the durable ingest cursor (turns
- * 2+ were idempotent no-ops), so this removes per-turn LCD single-flight overhead
- * (`runOnConversation` + `getIngestCursor` + `getMessages` + `upsertIngestCursor`) and
- * honors the documented "Runs ONCE at session start" contract — code and comment now agree.
+ * The trigger runs EXACTLY ONCE per session — gated on the existing
+ * `isFirstMessageInSession` signal (`sessionContext.messages.length === 0`),
+ * computed once at the top of `runSessionLocked`. Gating only on `contextStore`
+ * presence would re-run the sweep on EVERY turn for the life of every dag session.
+ * Exactly-once is already guaranteed by the durable ingest cursor (turns 2+ are
+ * idempotent no-ops), so the first-message gate removes per-turn LCD single-flight
+ * overhead (`runOnConversation` + `getIngestCursor` + `getMessages` +
+ * `upsertIngestCursor`) and honors the documented "Runs ONCE at session start"
+ * contract.
  *
  * The recovery itself is the EXISTING `bootstrapLcdSweep` (epoch cursor + fail-closed
  * identity guard); this helper is only the gate + scope build + delegating call. The scope
- * is built EXACTLY as the afterTurn ingest block does so read scope == write scope
- * (DAG-CRIT-1 / WR-02): conversationId === sessionKey === formattedKey,
+ * is built EXACTLY as the afterTurn ingest block does so read scope == write scope:
+ * conversationId === sessionKey === formattedKey,
  * agentId === `agentId ?? "default"`.
  *
  * Architecture cut (agent↛memory): imports ONLY the core `ContextStorePort`/`ClockPort`/
@@ -30,13 +31,13 @@
  */
 import { bootstrapLcdSweep } from "../lcd-bootstrap-sweep.js";
 /**
- * Run the DEPTH-03 bootstrap crash-recovery sweep ONCE at session start, before the first
- * turn proceeds. No-op when this is NOT the first message in the session (WR-02) or when no
+ * Run the bootstrap crash-recovery sweep ONCE at session start, before the first
+ * turn proceeds. No-op when this is NOT the first message in the session or when no
  * store is wired. Delegates to {@link bootstrapLcdSweep} (the recovery logic + the
  * `shouldRunLcdStorePasses` dag gate live there; a pipeline agent does no sweep work).
  */
 export async function maybeRunBootstrapSweep(state) {
-    // WR-02: truly run ONCE — gate on the first-message signal. Turns 2+ were already
+    // Truly run ONCE — gate on the first-message signal. Turns 2+ are already
     // idempotent via the durable ingest cursor; skipping them removes the per-turn LCD
     // single-flight overhead and matches the "Runs ONCE at session start" contract.
     if (!state.isFirstMessageInSession || !state.contextStore)

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/executor/pi-executor/message-envelope.d.ts

@@ -65,6 +65,6 @@ export declare function handleEnvelopeException(state: MessageEnvelopeState, dep
     readonly error: unknown;
     readonly sessionKey: SessionKey;
     readonly agentId: string | undefined;
-    /** Execution start (clock ms) — elapsed rides the WARN + timeout hint (177-REVIEW IN-02). */
+    /** Execution start (clock ms) — elapsed rides the WARN + timeout hint. */
     readonly executionStartMs: number;
 }): void;

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/executor/pi-executor/message-envelope.js

@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ export function applyPromptRunOutcome(state, deps, ctx) {
  */
 export function handleEnvelopeException(state, deps, ctx) {
     const { error, sessionKey, agentId, executionStartMs } = ctx;
-    // CR-01 (Phase 166): ContextExhaustionError is a clean escalation — it means
+    // ContextExhaustionError is a clean escalation — it means
     // the pre-flight fit check determined the conversation cannot fit in the context
     // window even after all down-shifts.  It must map to "context_exhausted" so
     // END_REASON_MAP fires the correct degradation cause for fleet-health reporting.
@@ -68,9 +68,9 @@ export function handleEnvelopeException(state, deps, ctx) {
         }, "context_exhausted: mapped to finishReason");
         state.result.finishReason = "context_exhausted";
         state.result.response = "The conversation history is too large to process. Please start a new conversation or use the `sessions reset` command.";
-        // Issue-6: carry the exhaustion message (which embeds the `[cause: …]` tag)
+        // Carry the exhaustion message (which embeds the `[cause: …]` tag)
         // so postExecution's buildContextExhaustedReply can branch its advice by
-        // cause — mirrors what the HR-01 mid-turn path gets via lastLlmErrorMessage.
+        // cause — mirrors what the mid-turn recovery path gets via lastLlmErrorMessage.
         state.result.errorContext = {
             errorType: "ContextExhaustion",
             retryable: false,
@@ -78,14 +78,13 @@ export function handleEnvelopeException(state, deps, ctx) {
         };
         return;
     }
-    // Classify BEFORE the WARN so the knob-named hint rides the log line
-    // (LAT-01). This envelope seam has no effectiveTimeout in scope (state
-    // carries only the result; threading new fields is out of 177-04's scope),
-    // so the binding degrades gracefully to the agent knob with the ctx
-    // agentId — the H-6/H-8 contract: a knob-named hint, never a throw. The
-    // elapsed time IS in scope (executionStartMs, 177-REVIEW IN-02): the §2.7
-    // matrix wants durationMs on failure lines, and the hint's elapsed clause
-    // matches the failure-path consumer.
+    // Classify BEFORE the WARN so the knob-named hint rides the log line.
+    // This envelope seam has no effectiveTimeout in scope (state carries only
+    // the result), so the binding degrades gracefully to the agent knob with
+    // the ctx agentId — the contract: a knob-named hint, never a throw. The
+    // elapsed time IS in scope (executionStartMs): failure log lines must
+    // carry durationMs, and the hint's elapsed clause matches the
+    // failure-path consumer.
     const durationMs = deps.clock.now() - executionStartMs;
     const isPromptTimeout = error instanceof PromptTimeoutError;
     const classifiedOuter = isPromptTimeout
@@ -101,7 +100,7 @@ export function handleEnvelopeException(state, deps, ctx) {
     // Never expose raw error internals (API keys, URLs, stack traces) to users.
     // The raw error is already logged to deps.logger.warn above for operator diagnostics.
     // The classified userMessage stays generic/user-safe — the knob detail
-    // rides ONLY the hint above (T-177-13).
+    // rides ONLY the hint above.
     state.result.response = classifiedOuter.userMessage;
     state.result.errorContext = {
         errorType: isPromptTimeout ? "PromptTimeout" : "UnexpectedError",

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/executor/pi-executor/pi-executor-prompting.d.ts

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
  *   leaks into the trajectory via the prompting field.
  *
  * Currently no live config path populates `userPromptPrefixText` into the
- * executor (verified 2026-05-25). The scaffold is in place so future writers
+ * executor. The scaffold is in place so future writers
  * cannot bypass the redactor. When wired, pass the raw value via the
  * `userPromptPrefixText` field and the optional `pathOpts` for path
  * substitution context.

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/executor/pi-executor/pi-executor-prompting.js

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ import { redactString, substitutePathsInString } from "@comis/observability";
  *   leaks into the trajectory via the prompting field.
  *
  * Currently no live config path populates `userPromptPrefixText` into the
- * executor (verified 2026-05-25). The scaffold is in place so future writers
+ * executor. The scaffold is in place so future writers
  * cannot bypass the redactor. When wired, pass the raw value via the
  * `userPromptPrefixText` field and the optional `pathOpts` for path
  * substitution context.