comisai 1.0.45 → 1.0.46

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/api/context-handlers.d.ts

@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
 /**
  * Context (LCD lossless-store) operator-browse RPC handler module.
  *
- * Backs the web Context DAG browser (`packages/web/src/views/context-dag-browser.ts`),
- * which previously called `context.conversations` / `context.tree` via untyped
- * `.call()` against UNREGISTERED handlers — every call returned JSON-RPC -32601
- * and the view was 100% dead. This module registers the two methods (computed-key
- * `[Contract.method]:` form, so the bidirectional 1:1 architecture test resolves
- * them through `packages/core/src/api-contracts/context.ts`).
+ * Backs the web Context DAG browser (`packages/web/src/views/context-dag-browser.ts`):
+ * without this module its `context.conversations` / `context.tree` calls would hit
+ * unregistered methods and fail with JSON-RPC -32601, leaving the view dead. This
+ * module registers the two methods (computed-key `[Contract.method]:` form, so the
+ * bidirectional 1:1 architecture test resolves them through
+ * `packages/core/src/api-contracts/context.ts`).
  *
- * **Scope (R4 / WR-02).** Both methods are AGENT+TENANT scoped exactly like the
+ * **Scope.** Both methods are AGENT+TENANT scoped exactly like the
  * `rpc`-scoped memory reads: `agentId` comes from the dispatcher-injected
  * `_agentId` (falling back to `deps.defaultAgentId`), `tenantId` from
  * `deps.tenantId`. The caller cannot pass agentId/tenantId — they ride the
@@ -20,8 +20,8 @@
  * `contentPreview` per summary node and the per-node `taint` flag — surfaced for
  * a HUMAN operator dashboard (Lit text-escapes it), NEVER re-fed to a model. Full
  * per-node content recovery (the taint-sensitive `context.inspect`) and in-
- * conversation FTS (`context.searchByConversation`) are intentionally out of this
- * pass and remain unregistered.
+ * conversation FTS (`context.searchByConversation`) are intentionally
+ * unregistered.
  *
  * The dispatcher-injected `_X` internal fields are stripped via
  * `stripInternalFields` BEFORE `contract.request.parse(...)`; `_agentId` is read

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/api/context-handlers.js

@@ -3,14 +3,14 @@
 /**
  * Context (LCD lossless-store) operator-browse RPC handler module.
  *
- * Backs the web Context DAG browser (`packages/web/src/views/context-dag-browser.ts`),
- * which previously called `context.conversations` / `context.tree` via untyped
- * `.call()` against UNREGISTERED handlers — every call returned JSON-RPC -32601
- * and the view was 100% dead. This module registers the two methods (computed-key
- * `[Contract.method]:` form, so the bidirectional 1:1 architecture test resolves
- * them through `packages/core/src/api-contracts/context.ts`).
+ * Backs the web Context DAG browser (`packages/web/src/views/context-dag-browser.ts`):
+ * without this module its `context.conversations` / `context.tree` calls would hit
+ * unregistered methods and fail with JSON-RPC -32601, leaving the view dead. This
+ * module registers the two methods (computed-key `[Contract.method]:` form, so the
+ * bidirectional 1:1 architecture test resolves them through
+ * `packages/core/src/api-contracts/context.ts`).
  *
- * **Scope (R4 / WR-02).** Both methods are AGENT+TENANT scoped exactly like the
+ * **Scope.** Both methods are AGENT+TENANT scoped exactly like the
  * `rpc`-scoped memory reads: `agentId` comes from the dispatcher-injected
  * `_agentId` (falling back to `deps.defaultAgentId`), `tenantId` from
  * `deps.tenantId`. The caller cannot pass agentId/tenantId — they ride the
@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@
  * `contentPreview` per summary node and the per-node `taint` flag — surfaced for
  * a HUMAN operator dashboard (Lit text-escapes it), NEVER re-fed to a model. Full
  * per-node content recovery (the taint-sensitive `context.inspect`) and in-
- * conversation FTS (`context.searchByConversation`) are intentionally out of this
- * pass and remain unregistered.
+ * conversation FTS (`context.searchByConversation`) are intentionally
+ * unregistered.
  *
  * The dispatcher-injected `_X` internal fields are stripped via
  * `stripInternalFields` BEFORE `contract.request.parse(...)`; `_agentId` is read
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ export function createContextHandlers(deps) {
         // context.conversations — distinct conversations for THIS agent+tenant.
         // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
         [ContextConversationsContract.method]: async (rawParams) => {
-            // R4: agent from the dispatcher (never caller-supplied); tenant from deps.
+            // Agent from the dispatcher (never caller-supplied); tenant from deps.
             const agentId = rawParams._agentId ?? deps.defaultAgentId;
             const userParams = stripInternalFields(rawParams);
             const params = ContextConversationsContract.request.parse(userParams);
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ export function createContextHandlers(deps) {
                     ContextTreeContract.response.parse(empty);
                 return empty;
             }
-            // R4 read scope. sessionKey == conversationId in the current single-
+            // Agent+tenant read scope. sessionKey == conversationId in the current single-
             // session-per-conversation model; the LCD read filters on
             // (conversation_id, agent_id, tenant_id), so sessionKey is unused for
             // these reads but is required by the ContextStoreScope shape.

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/api/cron-handlers.js

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 import { sanitizeToolOutput } from "@comis/agent";
 import { CronAddContract, CronListContract, CronUpdateContract, CronRemoveContract, CronStatusContract, CronRunsContract, CronRunContract, SchedulerWakeContract, stripInternalFields, requireCapability, systemGetEnv, systemNowMs, } from "@comis/core";
 import { buildCronSchedule } from "../wiring/daemon-utils.js";
+import { CronDeliveryTargetSchema } from "@comis/scheduler";
 import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // Dev-mode response parse helper
@@ -43,7 +44,7 @@ const IS_DEV = systemGetEnv("NODE_ENV") !== "production";
 function resolveJobByName(scheduler, jobName) {
     if (!jobName) {
         // Echoing the unmatched var produced "Job not found: undefined" when a
-        // caller used the wrong param key (live finding, 2026-06-11 memory run).
+        // caller used the wrong param key (observed in a live run).
         throw new Error("Missing required parameter: jobName (resolve names via cron.list)");
     }
     const matches = scheduler.getJobs().filter((j) => j.name === jobName);
@@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ function resolveJob(scheduler, params) {
     const jobName = params.jobName;
     if (!jobName) {
         // Echoing the unmatched var produced "Job not found: undefined" when a
-        // caller used the wrong param key (live finding, 2026-06-11 memory run).
+        // caller used the wrong param key (observed in a live run).
         throw new Error("Missing required parameter: jobId or jobName (resolve names via cron.list)");
     }
     return resolveJobByName(scheduler, jobName);
@@ -103,6 +104,11 @@ function normalizeCronAddParams(params) {
         schedule_every_ms: schedule?.everyMs,
         schedule_at: schedule?.at,
         schedule_in_seconds: schedule?.seconds,
+        // Fold the web nested wake-gate into the flat authoring fields the cron.add
+        // body reads. The script is code for the jail and is carried through
+        // untouched -- it is never scrubbed as payload text.
+        wake_gate_script: params.wakeGate?.script,
+        wake_gate_language: params.wakeGate?.language,
     };
 }
 /**
@@ -111,7 +117,7 @@ function normalizeCronAddParams(params) {
 export function createCronHandlers(deps) {
     return {
         [CronAddContract.method]: async (rawParams) => {
-            // CAP-03/05 (v8 §3.7): in-process capability gate — the agent loop skips
+            // In-process capability gate — the agent loop skips
             // checkScope, so orch:cron is enforced here, reading the injected
             // _capabilities from raw params BEFORE the strip.
             requireCapability(rawParams._capabilities, "orch:cron");
@@ -151,6 +157,11 @@ export function createCronHandlers(deps) {
             const forwardToMain = normalized.forward_to_main ?? false;
             const sessionStrategy = normalized.session_strategy ?? "fresh";
             const maxHistoryTurns = normalized.max_history_turns ?? undefined;
+            // Pre-run wake-gate authoring. The script is CODE for the jail, so it is
+            // read raw and NEVER passed through sanitizeToolOutput (that helper scrubs
+            // payload TEXT). Language falls back to the store schema value.
+            const wakeGateScript = normalized.wake_gate_script;
+            const wakeGateLanguage = normalized.wake_gate_language;
             const job = {
                 id: randomUUID(),
                 name,
@@ -162,6 +173,13 @@ export function createCronHandlers(deps) {
                 forwardToMain,
                 sessionStrategy: sessionStrategy,
                 ...(maxHistoryTurns !== undefined ? { maxHistoryTurns } : {}),
+                // A wake-gate is added only when a script was authored -- an un-gated job
+                // is byte-identical to one built without these params. The script is
+                // stored verbatim (never sanitized); language falls back to the store
+                // schema value.
+                ...(wakeGateScript
+                    ? { wakeGate: { script: wakeGateScript, language: wakeGateLanguage ?? "js", timeoutSeconds: 30 } }
+                    : {}),
                 enabled: true,
                 consecutiveErrors: 0,
                 createdAtMs: systemNowMs(),
@@ -198,9 +216,14 @@ export function createCronHandlers(deps) {
                 consecutiveErrors: j.consecutiveErrors,
                 createdAtMs: j.createdAtMs,
                 deliveryTarget: j.deliveryTarget,
+                // Surface the pre-run wake-gate so the web scheduler editor can DISPLAY
+                // and edit an existing gate (scheduler.ts reads job.wakeGate). Without
+                // this the gate is invisible in the UI (appears absent) and uneditable.
+                // Content is the operator's own authored job config, like `payload`.
+                wakeGate: j.wakeGate,
             });
-            // TARGET-01: `agentId: "*"` → every agent's jobs (the admin inventory view I
-            // lacked when a non-default agent's crons were invisible).
+            // `agentId: "*"` → every agent's jobs (the admin inventory view; without
+            // it a non-default agent's crons were invisible).
             if (params.agentId === "*") {
                 const jobs = [];
                 for (const scheduler of deps.cronSchedulers.values()) {
@@ -229,7 +252,7 @@ export function createCronHandlers(deps) {
             return result;
         },
         [CronUpdateContract.method]: async (rawParams) => {
-            // CAP-03/05 (v8 §3.7): in-process capability gate (see cron.add).
+            // In-process capability gate (see cron.add).
             requireCapability(rawParams._capabilities, "orch:cron");
             const userParams = stripInternalFields(rawParams);
             CronUpdateContract.request.parse(userParams);
@@ -263,19 +286,62 @@ export function createCronHandlers(deps) {
             if (rawParams.message !== undefined) {
                 job.payload = { ...job.payload, kind: "agent_turn", message: rawParams.message };
             }
-            // Delivery target: set structured target or clear with null
+            // Wake-gate: accept the flat (chat tool) or nested (web) shape. The script
+            // is CODE for the jail, so it is set raw and NEVER passed through
+            // sanitizeToolOutput. A non-empty script sets/replaces the gate; an
+            // explicit empty script CLEARS it; an absent script leaves the existing
+            // gate untouched. Language falls back to the store schema value.
+            const wakeGateNested = rawParams.wakeGate;
+            const updateWakeGateScript = rawParams.wake_gate_script ?? wakeGateNested?.script;
+            if (updateWakeGateScript === "") {
+                // An explicit empty script clears the gate. Writing { script: "" } would
+                // fail the store schema (script.min(1)) and drop the whole job on the
+                // next reload -- clearing is the only safe reading of "".
+                job.wakeGate = undefined;
+            }
+            else if (updateWakeGateScript !== undefined) {
+                const updateWakeGateLanguage = rawParams.wake_gate_language ?? wakeGateNested?.language;
+                job.wakeGate = {
+                    script: updateWakeGateScript,
+                    language: updateWakeGateLanguage ?? "js",
+                    timeoutSeconds: wakeGateNested?.timeoutSeconds ?? 30,
+                };
+            }
+            // Delivery target: set structured target or clear with null. Validate a
+            // caller-supplied target against the SAME schema the cron store enforces on
+            // load (CronDeliveryTargetSchema, required channelId/userId/tenantId) — a
+            // bare cast let a partial target (e.g. {channelType,channelId}) persist, and
+            // because cron-store.load() parses the WHOLE job array atomically, that one
+            // invalid job made the store "return empty job list" on the next reload,
+            // silently dropping every cron on a restart. Reject at the API boundary
+            // instead (mirrors the wake-gate empty-clear guard above).
             if (rawParams.deliveryTarget !== undefined) {
-                job.deliveryTarget = rawParams.deliveryTarget === null
-                    ? undefined
-                    : rawParams.deliveryTarget;
+                if (rawParams.deliveryTarget === null) {
+                    job.deliveryTarget = undefined;
+                }
+                else {
+                    const parsed = CronDeliveryTargetSchema.safeParse(rawParams.deliveryTarget);
+                    if (!parsed.success) {
+                        throw new Error(`Invalid deliveryTarget: ${parsed.error.issues
+                            .map((i) => `${i.path.join(".") || "(root)"}: ${i.message}`)
+                            .join("; ")}. Required: channelId, userId, tenantId (channelType optional).`);
+                    }
+                    job.deliveryTarget = parsed.data;
+                }
             }
+            // Persist the in-place mutations NOW. The field-by-field updates above mutate
+            // the live in-memory job (a getJobs() reference); without this flush the edit
+            // only reaches the store on the next due fire's tick save, so a daemon
+            // restart before then silently REVERTS the update (e.g. a cleared wake-gate
+            // reappears). This makes cron.update durable, matching cron.add/remove.
+            await agentScheduler.persist();
             const result = { jobName: job.name, updated: true };
             if (IS_DEV)
                 CronUpdateContract.response.parse(result);
             return result;
         },
         [CronRemoveContract.method]: async (rawParams) => {
-            // CAP-03/05 (v8 §3.7): in-process capability gate (see cron.add).
+            // In-process capability gate (see cron.add).
             requireCapability(rawParams._capabilities, "orch:cron");
             const userParams = stripInternalFields(rawParams);
             CronRemoveContract.request.parse(userParams);
@@ -292,7 +358,7 @@ export function createCronHandlers(deps) {
         [CronStatusContract.method]: async (rawParams) => {
             const userParams = stripInternalFields(rawParams);
             const params = CronStatusContract.request.parse(userParams);
-            const cronAgentId = params.agentId ?? rawParams._agentId ?? deps.defaultAgentId; // TARGET-01
+            const cronAgentId = params.agentId ?? rawParams._agentId ?? deps.defaultAgentId; // explicit agentId wins over the connection default
             const scheduler = deps.cronSchedulers.get(cronAgentId);
             const result = {
                 running: scheduler !== undefined,
@@ -306,7 +372,7 @@ export function createCronHandlers(deps) {
         [CronRunsContract.method]: async (rawParams) => {
             const userParams = stripInternalFields(rawParams);
             const params = CronRunsContract.request.parse(userParams);
-            const cronAgentId = params.agentId ?? rawParams._agentId ?? deps.defaultAgentId; // TARGET-01
+            const cronAgentId = params.agentId ?? rawParams._agentId ?? deps.defaultAgentId; // explicit agentId wins over the connection default
             const scheduler = deps.cronSchedulers.get(cronAgentId);
             const tracker = deps.executionTrackers.get(cronAgentId);
             if (!tracker || !scheduler) {
@@ -324,13 +390,13 @@ export function createCronHandlers(deps) {
             return result;
         },
         [CronRunContract.method]: async (rawParams) => {
-            // CAP-03/05 (v8 §3.7): in-process capability gate (see cron.add).
+            // In-process capability gate (see cron.add).
             requireCapability(rawParams._capabilities, "orch:cron");
             const userParams = stripInternalFields(rawParams);
             const params = CronRunContract.request.parse(userParams);
-            // TARGET-01: explicit request `agentId` wins over the connection `_agentId`,
-            // then the default — and we ALWAYS report the agent we resolved (I5: no silent
-            // default; the prior behavior triggered the wrong agent's cron 3× in live runs).
+            // Explicit request `agentId` wins over the connection `_agentId`,
+            // then the default — and we ALWAYS report the agent we resolved (no silent
+            // default; a silently-defaulted target triggered the wrong agent's cron 3× in live runs).
             const cronAgentId = params.agentId ?? rawParams._agentId ?? deps.defaultAgentId;
             const agentScheduler = deps.getAgentCronScheduler(cronAgentId);
             const jobName = params.jobName;

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/api/env-handlers.d.ts

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  *   - `env.list` -- enumerate secret NAMES (admin-only, read-only, values never returned)
  *
  * Storage backend: SecretStorePort (encrypted secrets.db via AES-256-GCM).
- * The legacy .env-file fallback is gone; env.set rejects with an
+ * There is no .env-file fallback; env.set rejects with an
  * actionable error when the daemon was booted without
  * SECRETS_MASTER_KEY (same posture as secrets-handlers.ts).
  *

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/api/env-handlers.js

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
  *   - `env.list` -- enumerate secret NAMES (admin-only, read-only, values never returned)
  *
  * Storage backend: SecretStorePort (encrypted secrets.db via AES-256-GCM).
- * The legacy .env-file fallback is gone; env.set rejects with an
+ * There is no .env-file fallback; env.set rejects with an
  * actionable error when the daemon was booted without
  * SECRETS_MASTER_KEY (same posture as secrets-handlers.ts).
  *

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/api/errors.d.ts

@@ -5,10 +5,10 @@
  * validation failures) log at `warn` instead of `error` — keeping the
  * operator's alerting posture meaningful.
  *
- * Pre-Fix C, every handler `throw`ed bare `Error` and the dispatcher
- * matched on message substrings to pick an errorKind, defaulting all
+ * Throw these instead of bare `Error`: with only bare errors the dispatcher
+ * must match on message substrings to pick an errorKind, defaulting all
  * unmatched cases to `error`/`internal` and triggering operator alerts
- * for routine "wrong session state" calls (see ~/.comis/logs/ analysis).
+ * for routine "wrong session state" calls.
  *
  * @module
  */
@@ -22,13 +22,13 @@ export declare class ValidationError extends Error {
 }
 /**
  * Caller lacks the admin TRUST this control-plane method requires (an operator on a
- * non-admin token, or using the wrong route). OBS-10 (reflect-obs-20260627): an EXPECTED
+ * non-admin token, or using the wrong route). This is an EXPECTED
  * authorization denial — NOT an internal/handler fault. `classifyRpcError` maps it to
  * `errorKind:"auth"`, `level:"warn"` so an operator's wrong-trust call (e.g. obs.explain over
  * a non-admin token) does NOT read as a fleet ERROR / trip operator alerts (the denial itself
- * is correct + the gate still fired; only the LOG classification changes). Replaces the bare
- * `throw new Error("Admin access required …")` the dispatcher mis-classified as internal/error
- * (the deleted substring-fallback — typed errors are the sanctioned path).
+ * is correct + the gate still fired; only the LOG classification changes). Throw this typed
+ * error rather than a bare `Error("Admin access required …")`, which the dispatcher would
+ * mis-classify as internal/error — typed errors are the sanctioned path.
  */
 export declare class AuthorizationError extends Error {
     constructor(message: string);

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/api/errors.js

@@ -7,10 +7,10 @@
  * validation failures) log at `warn` instead of `error` — keeping the
  * operator's alerting posture meaningful.
  *
- * Pre-Fix C, every handler `throw`ed bare `Error` and the dispatcher
- * matched on message substrings to pick an errorKind, defaulting all
+ * Throw these instead of bare `Error`: with only bare errors the dispatcher
+ * must match on message substrings to pick an errorKind, defaulting all
  * unmatched cases to `error`/`internal` and triggering operator alerts
- * for routine "wrong session state" calls (see ~/.comis/logs/ analysis).
+ * for routine "wrong session state" calls.
  *
  * @module
  */
@@ -30,13 +30,13 @@ export class ValidationError extends Error {
 }
 /**
  * Caller lacks the admin TRUST this control-plane method requires (an operator on a
- * non-admin token, or using the wrong route). OBS-10 (reflect-obs-20260627): an EXPECTED
+ * non-admin token, or using the wrong route). This is an EXPECTED
  * authorization denial — NOT an internal/handler fault. `classifyRpcError` maps it to
  * `errorKind:"auth"`, `level:"warn"` so an operator's wrong-trust call (e.g. obs.explain over
  * a non-admin token) does NOT read as a fleet ERROR / trip operator alerts (the denial itself
- * is correct + the gate still fired; only the LOG classification changes). Replaces the bare
- * `throw new Error("Admin access required …")` the dispatcher mis-classified as internal/error
- * (the deleted substring-fallback — typed errors are the sanctioned path).
+ * is correct + the gate still fired; only the LOG classification changes). Throw this typed
+ * error rather than a bare `Error("Admin access required …")`, which the dispatcher would
+ * mis-classify as internal/error — typed errors are the sanctioned path.
  */
 export class AuthorizationError extends Error {
     constructor(message) {

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/api/google-images-transport.d.ts

@@ -1,19 +1,20 @@
-import { type ImagesApiFunction, type ImagesModel } from "@earendil-works/pi-ai";
+import { type ImagesFunction, type ImagesModel } from "@earendil-works/pi-ai";
 /**
- * Hand-built `ImagesModel` for the Gemini image path (Pitfall 4 — pi-ai's image
- * catalog is openrouter-only). The 8 fields tsc requires for `ImagesModel<TApi>`
+ * Hand-built `ImagesModel` for the Gemini image path (pi-ai's image
+ * catalog is openrouter-only, so no catalog entry exists for it). The 8 fields
+ * tsc requires for `ImagesModel<TApi>`
  * are `id,name,api,provider,baseUrl,input,output,cost`. The id defaults to
  * `gemini-2.5-flash-image` (the stable id; VERIFIED in the `@google/genai@1.52.0`
- * `Model_2` union) and is overridable by config/tool. `cost: 0` is the
- * Phase-186 placeholder.
+ * `Model_2` union) and is overridable by config/tool. `cost: 0` is a
+ * placeholder until a real cost mapping exists.
  */
 export declare const GOOGLE_IMAGE_MODEL: ImagesModel<"google-images">;
 /**
- * The `google-images` transport (PRV-02).
+ * The `google-images` transport.
  *
  * Reads the api key from `options.apiKey`, constructs a `GoogleGenAI` client per
  * call, and calls `models.generateContent` with `responseModalities:[IMAGE]`.
  * NEVER throws out — every failure -> an `AssistantImages{ stopReason:"error" }`
  * the shipped classifier maps.
  */
-export declare const generateImagesGoogle: ImagesApiFunction;
+export declare const generateImagesGoogle: ImagesFunction;

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/api/google-images-transport.js

@@ -1,30 +1,30 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 /**
- * Google (Gemini) Images transport (PRV-02).
+ * Google (Gemini) Images transport.
  *
- * A pi-ai `ImagesApiFunction` over the `@google/genai` SDK. It is registered
+ * A pi-ai `ImagesFunction` over the `@google/genai` SDK. It is registered
  * into pi-ai's module-level IMAGES registry under the `google-images` api
- * (`registerComisImageProviders()` — Plan 04's PI-02 seam, extended in this
- * phase) and dispatched through the ONE `generateImages()` call site.
+ * (via `registerComisImageProviders()`) and dispatched through the ONE
+ * `generateImages()` call site.
  *
- * Call shape (RESEARCH CRITICAL #4, VERIFIED against `@google/genai@1.52.0`):
+ * Call shape (VERIFIED against `@google/genai@1.52.0`):
  *   `ai.models.generateContent({ model, contents, config: { responseModalities:
  *   [Modality.IMAGE] } })` where `contents` is a `Part[]` built from the
  *   `ImagesContext.input` (a `{text}` part per text input + a
- *   `{inlineData:{data,mimeType}}` part per IMAGE reference, IN-01). The image
+ *   `{inlineData:{data,mimeType}}` part per IMAGE reference). The image
  *   returns in `candidates[0].content.parts[].inlineData.{data(base64),mimeType}`.
  *
  * `gemini-2.5-flash-image` is a Gemini MULTIMODAL model -> `generateContent`,
  * NOT `models.generateImages` (that is the Imagen `imagen-*` path and would 404
  * the gemini id). The image part is found by scanning ALL parts for the first
- * `inlineData.data` (A2 — it is not guaranteed to be at index 0).
+ * `inlineData.data` (it is not guaranteed to be at index 0).
  *
  * Never-throw discipline (mirrors `codex-images-transport.ts`): EVERY miss (no
  * key, SDK throw, blocked, no image) returns `AssistantImages{
  * stopReason:"error", errorMessage }` so the SHIPPED `classifyImageError`
  * (`pi-image-adapter.ts`) maps it. So this file needs NO `@allow-throw` header.
  *
- * SEC (T-185-01): the api key rides `options.apiKey` -> the SDK client only; it
+ * SEC: the api key rides `options.apiKey` -> the SDK client only; it
  * is never interpolated or logged. This transport logs NOTHING (logging happens
  * in the reused `toImageGenOutput`). The catch surfaces the raw SDK message
  * ONLY on the result's `errorMessage` for classification — never to a logger.
@@ -35,12 +35,13 @@ import { GoogleGenAI, Modality } from "@google/genai";
 // systemNowMs is the globals-gate-sanctioned wall-clock read — NOT Date.now().
 import { systemNowMs } from "@comis/core";
 /**
- * Hand-built `ImagesModel` for the Gemini image path (Pitfall 4 — pi-ai's image
- * catalog is openrouter-only). The 8 fields tsc requires for `ImagesModel<TApi>`
+ * Hand-built `ImagesModel` for the Gemini image path (pi-ai's image
+ * catalog is openrouter-only, so no catalog entry exists for it). The 8 fields
+ * tsc requires for `ImagesModel<TApi>`
  * are `id,name,api,provider,baseUrl,input,output,cost`. The id defaults to
  * `gemini-2.5-flash-image` (the stable id; VERIFIED in the `@google/genai@1.52.0`
- * `Model_2` union) and is overridable by config/tool. `cost: 0` is the
- * Phase-186 placeholder.
+ * `Model_2` union) and is overridable by config/tool. `cost: 0` is a
+ * placeholder until a real cost mapping exists.
  */
 export const GOOGLE_IMAGE_MODEL = {
     id: "gemini-2.5-flash-image",
@@ -50,10 +51,10 @@ export const GOOGLE_IMAGE_MODEL = {
     baseUrl: "https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com",
     input: ["text", "image"],
     output: ["image"],
-    cost: { input: 0, output: 0, cacheRead: 0, cacheWrite: 0 }, // 186: real cost mapping (OBS-03)
+    cost: { input: 0, output: 0, cacheRead: 0, cacheWrite: 0 }, // placeholder — no real cost mapping yet
 };
 /**
- * The `google-images` transport (PRV-02).
+ * The `google-images` transport.
  *
  * Reads the api key from `options.apiKey`, constructs a `GoogleGenAI` client per
  * call, and calls `models.generateContent` with `responseModalities:[IMAGE]`.
@@ -79,7 +80,7 @@ export const generateImagesGoogle = async (model, context, options) => {
     try {
         const ai = new GoogleGenAI({ apiKey: options.apiKey });
         // Build the contents Part[] from the input: a text part per text input, an
-        // inlineData part per IMAGE reference (IN-01), preserving order.
+        // inlineData part per IMAGE reference, preserving order.
         const parts = [];
         for (const c of context.input) {
             if (c.type === "text")
@@ -92,7 +93,7 @@ export const generateImagesGoogle = async (model, context, options) => {
             contents: parts,
             config: { responseModalities: [Modality.IMAGE] },
         });
-        // A2: scan ALL parts for the first inline image (not guaranteed at index 0).
+        // Scan ALL parts for the first inline image (not guaranteed at index 0).
         const img = (r.candidates?.[0]?.content?.parts ?? []).find((p) => p.inlineData?.data);
         const b64 = img?.inlineData?.data;
         if (!b64) {

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/api/graph-handlers/graph-export.js

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ import { IS_DEV } from "./graph-helpers.js";
 export function bindGraphExportHandlers(deps) {
     return {
         [GraphLoadContract.method]: async (rawParams) => {
-            // CAP-03/05 (v8 §3.7): in-process capability gate — the agent loop skips
+            // In-process capability gate — the agent loop skips
             // checkScope, so orch:graph is enforced here (graph.load is in the gated
             // graph family per HANDLER_CAPABILITY_MAP). Read _capabilities BEFORE strip.
             requireCapability(rawParams._capabilities, "orch:graph");

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/api/graph-handlers/graph-helpers.d.ts

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
  * no factory: every helper is a pure function or interface so the dependency
  * graph stays one-directional (mutate / query / export → graph-helpers →
  * graph-repair). The conservative weak-model repair branch lives in the sibling
- * graph-repair.ts (DEFER-174-FILESIZE-01).
+ * graph-repair.ts.
  *
  * @module
  */
@@ -28,26 +28,26 @@ import type { OrchestratorApiDeps } from "../types.js";
 export type GraphHandlerDeps = OrchestratorApiDeps & {
     graphCoordinator: import("../../graph/graph-coordinator.js").GraphCoordinator;
     /**
-     * TELEM-01 (Phase 173-02): resolve the calling agent's capabilityClass tier
-     * from its `_agentId` for the `pipeline:authored` emit (graph-mutate.ts).
-     * INJECTED dep (mirrors the 172 `resolvePosture` pattern) — the tier is
-     * resolved DAEMON-SIDE, never read from a tool-supplied param (Spoofing
-     * mitigation T-173-03). Wired at the createGraphHandlers({...}) call in
+     * Resolve the calling agent's capabilityClass tier from its `_agentId` for
+     * the `pipeline:authored` emit (graph-mutate.ts).
+     * INJECTED dep (mirrors the `resolvePosture` pattern) — the tier is
+     * resolved DAEMON-SIDE, never read from a tool-supplied param (spoofing
+     * mitigation). Wired at the createGraphHandlers({...}) call in
      * rpc-dispatch.ts. Returns `undefined` when the agent/provider cannot be
      * mapped; the emit then records "unknown" (never silently dropped). A wiring
      * test (rpc-dispatch.test.ts) proves it is actually constructed in production
-     * so the metric is not a permanent "unknown" (the 172-WR-02 fail-default
-     * class / T-173-13 silent-metric-loss).
+     * so the metric is not a permanent "unknown" — an unwired dep would silently
+     * lose the metric.
      */
     resolveCapabilityClass?: (agentId: string | undefined) => CapabilityClass | undefined;
     /**
-     * AUTHOR-01 (Phase 174-03): the orchestration.authoring gate
-     * (config.orchestration.authoring). When `repairProducer` is true AND the
-     * calling agent resolves to a weak tier, an invalid graph routes to the
-     * conservative deterministic repair (template-match + fillDagTemplate) instead
-     * of the fail-closed Phase-157 throw. ABSENT / `repairProducer:false` ⇒ the
-     * tier is never resolved ⇒ byte-identical to today (D-GATED-OFF). Threaded
-     * from config at the rpc-dispatch composition site.
+     * The orchestration.authoring gate (config.orchestration.authoring). When
+     * `repairProducer` is true AND the calling agent resolves to a weak tier, an
+     * invalid graph routes to the conservative deterministic repair
+     * (template-match + fillDagTemplate) instead of the fail-closed validation
+     * throw. ABSENT / `repairProducer:false` ⇒ the tier is never resolved ⇒
+     * byte-identical to the ungated path. Threaded from config at the
+     * rpc-dispatch composition site.
      */
     authoringConfig?: {
         repairProducer: boolean;
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ export type GraphHandlerDeps = OrchestratorApiDeps & {
         gbnfConstrain: boolean;
     };
     /**
-     * AUTHOR-01 (Phase 174-03): the injected conservative repair matcher
+     * The injected conservative repair matcher
      * (`matchRawGraphToTemplate` from @comis/agent). INJECTED — never a direct
      * daemon→agent import inside this pure helper; the boundary is crossed only at
      * the rpc-dispatch composition site (which legitimately imports @comis/agent),
@@ -87,9 +87,9 @@ type ValidatedGraphResult = Extract<ReturnType<typeof validateAndSortGraph>, {
  * parseExecutionGraph, and validates with validateAndSortGraph. Throws
  * descriptive errors on parse or validation failure.
  *
- * ASYNC (AUTHOR-01 / Phase 174-03): the weak-model invalid branch may run the
+ * ASYNC: the weak-model invalid branch may run the
  * conservative repair (graph-repair.ts), so the function returns a Promise. ALL
- * call sites await it (3 production in graph-mutate.ts + the O3 test call sites).
+ * call sites await it (3 production in graph-mutate.ts + the test call sites).
  *
  *   - Capable tier (frontier / mid / undefined): the existing direct path —
  *     byte-identical, no behavior change. The repairProducer gate resolves the