comisai 1.0.45 → 1.0.46

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/wiring/setup-channel-liveness-monitor.js

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+import { systemNowMs } from "@comis/core";
+/**
+ * Cap on the poll cadence. A 6h threshold checked every 6h would detect a
+ * breach up to 12h late; capping the interval bounds detection latency to at
+ * most this window past the threshold without polling more often than needed.
+ */
+const MAX_LIVENESS_CHECK_INTERVAL_MS = 900_000; // 15 minutes
+/**
+ * Wire the missed-inbound liveness monitor. Returns `{ monitor, stop }`; both
+ * are `undefined` (a no-op) when the msteams webhook channel is disabled or no
+ * webhook adapter is present, mirroring `setupChannelHealthMonitor`.
+ */
+export function setupChannelLivenessMonitor(deps) {
+    const { adaptersByType, daemonLogger, container, timer } = deps;
+    const now = deps.now ?? systemNowMs;
+    // The threshold lives on the msteams config — the only webhook channel today
+    // (a fully-defaulted config always carries it). Disabled → nothing to watch.
+    const msteamsConfig = container.config.channels?.msteams;
+    if (!msteamsConfig?.enabled)
+        return { monitor: undefined, stop: undefined };
+    const thresholdMs = msteamsConfig.missedInboundThresholdMs;
+    /** Read an adapter's connection mode without letting a throwing getStatus()
+     *  abort the scan (mirrors the health monitor's defensive probe). */
+    function connectionModeOf(adapter) {
+        try {
+            return adapter.getStatus?.()?.connectionMode;
+        }
+        catch {
+            return undefined;
+        }
+    }
+    // If there is no webhook adapter to watch, stay a no-op (no leaked timer).
+    const hasWebhookAdapter = [...adaptersByType.values()].some((adapter) => connectionModeOf(adapter) === "webhook");
+    if (!hasWebhookAdapter)
+        return { monitor: undefined, stop: undefined };
+    // Baseline for an adapter that has never reported inbound: the daemon start
+    // (this setup call). A bot that has NEVER received is the headline dead
+    // ingress, so it alerts once uptime exceeds the threshold.
+    const daemonStartMs = now();
+    // Debounce: emit once per silent window. A channel is removed from the set
+    // the moment its silence drops back under the threshold, so a fresh silence
+    // after inbound resumes re-alerts.
+    const alertedChannels = new Set();
+    function checkOnce() {
+        const currentMs = now();
+        for (const [channelType, adapter] of adaptersByType) {
+            let status;
+            try {
+                status = adapter.getStatus?.();
+            }
+            catch {
+                continue;
+            }
+            if (status?.connectionMode !== "webhook")
+                continue;
+            const lastInboundAt = status.lastInboundAt ?? null;
+            const baselineMs = lastInboundAt ?? daemonStartMs;
+            const silentForMs = currentMs - baselineMs;
+            if (silentForMs > thresholdMs) {
+                if (alertedChannels.has(channelType))
+                    continue; // already alerted this window
+                alertedChannels.add(channelType);
+                container.eventBus.emit("channel:inbound_silent", {
+                    channelType,
+                    lastInboundAt,
+                    silentForMs,
+                    thresholdMs,
+                    timestamp: currentMs,
+                });
+                daemonLogger.warn({
+                    channelType,
+                    silentForMs,
+                    thresholdMs,
+                    hint: "No inbound activity past the missed-inbound threshold — verify the channel's inbound webhook route is reachable (app registration messaging endpoint + gateway route) and that senders are allowlisted",
+                    errorKind: "platform",
+                }, "Channel ingress silent past the missed-inbound threshold");
+            }
+            else {
+                // Inbound is within the threshold — clear the debounce so the next
+                // silent window re-alerts.
+                alertedChannels.delete(channelType);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    const checkIntervalMs = Math.min(thresholdMs, MAX_LIVENESS_CHECK_INTERVAL_MS);
+    const handle = timer.setInterval(checkOnce, checkIntervalMs);
+    handle.unref();
+    const stop = () => {
+        if (!handle.cancelled)
+            handle.cancel();
+    };
+    return { monitor: { stop }, stop };
+}

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/wiring/setup-channels/resolve-memory-ops-capability.d.ts

@@ -1,17 +1,17 @@
 /**
- * R6 capability resolution for the memory-job daemon wiring (CR-01).
+ * Capability resolution for the memory-job daemon wiring.
  *
  * The LLM-backed memory jobs (`runMemoryReview`, `runMemoryConsolidation`, the
  * `createDialecticSeam` synthesis) gate their LLM call on
  * `resolveMemoryOpsStrategy(capabilityClass, hasCapableModelOverride)` so a
- * small/nano model never fabricates citations/triples into trusted storage
- * (T-153-fabricate). Those two fields were declared OPTIONAL on each job's deps
- * and DEFAULTED to "frontier"/false — but NO daemon call site ever passed them,
- * so every consumer hit the default and the abstain branch was unreachable in
- * production (R6 dead). This helper single-sources the derivation so all three
+ * small/nano model never fabricates citations/triples into trusted storage.
+ * Those two fields are declared OPTIONAL on each job's deps
+ * and DEFAULT to "frontier"/false — but a daemon call site that never passed them
+ * would hit the default and leave the abstain branch unreachable in
+ * production. This helper single-sources the derivation so all three
  * sites thread the SAME, correct values.
  *
- * R6 KEYS ON THE MEMORY MODEL, NOT THE AGENT'S PRIMARY. Each job already resolves
+ * THE CAPABILITY GATE KEYS ON THE MEMORY MODEL, NOT THE AGENT'S PRIMARY. Each job already resolves
  * the cheap "cron"/cheap operation model via `resolveOperationModel` and makes its
  * LLM call with THAT model — so the capability that matters is that model's, not
  * the agent's interactive model. (A frontier agent with a nano cron model must
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
  */
 import { type CapabilityClass } from "@comis/agent";
 import type { ProviderCapabilities } from "@comis/core";
-/** The R6 routing inputs threaded into each memory-job deps object. */
+/** The capability-gating routing inputs threaded into each memory-job deps object. */
 export interface MemoryOpsCapability {
     /** The capability class of the cron/memory model (drives the abstain gate). */
     capabilityClass: CapabilityClass;
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ export interface MemoryOpsCapability {
     hasCapableModelOverride: boolean;
 }
 /**
- * Derive the R6 `{ capabilityClass, hasCapableModelOverride }` for a memory job
+ * Derive the `{ capabilityClass, hasCapableModelOverride }` for a memory job
  * from the resolved cron/memory model + that provider's capabilities.
  *
  * @param model - The resolved cron/memory model parts (`resolveOperationModel`

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/wiring/setup-channels/resolve-memory-ops-capability.js

@@ -1,18 +1,18 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 /**
- * R6 capability resolution for the memory-job daemon wiring (CR-01).
+ * Capability resolution for the memory-job daemon wiring.
  *
  * The LLM-backed memory jobs (`runMemoryReview`, `runMemoryConsolidation`, the
  * `createDialecticSeam` synthesis) gate their LLM call on
  * `resolveMemoryOpsStrategy(capabilityClass, hasCapableModelOverride)` so a
- * small/nano model never fabricates citations/triples into trusted storage
- * (T-153-fabricate). Those two fields were declared OPTIONAL on each job's deps
- * and DEFAULTED to "frontier"/false — but NO daemon call site ever passed them,
- * so every consumer hit the default and the abstain branch was unreachable in
- * production (R6 dead). This helper single-sources the derivation so all three
+ * small/nano model never fabricates citations/triples into trusted storage.
+ * Those two fields are declared OPTIONAL on each job's deps
+ * and DEFAULT to "frontier"/false — but a daemon call site that never passed them
+ * would hit the default and leave the abstain branch unreachable in
+ * production. This helper single-sources the derivation so all three
  * sites thread the SAME, correct values.
  *
- * R6 KEYS ON THE MEMORY MODEL, NOT THE AGENT'S PRIMARY. Each job already resolves
+ * THE CAPABILITY GATE KEYS ON THE MEMORY MODEL, NOT THE AGENT'S PRIMARY. Each job already resolves
  * the cheap "cron"/cheap operation model via `resolveOperationModel` and makes its
  * LLM call with THAT model — so the capability that matters is that model's, not
  * the agent's interactive model. (A frontier agent with a nano cron model must
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
  */
 import { resolveModelProfile } from "@comis/agent";
 /**
- * Derive the R6 `{ capabilityClass, hasCapableModelOverride }` for a memory job
+ * Derive the `{ capabilityClass, hasCapableModelOverride }` for a memory job
  * from the resolved cron/memory model + that provider's capabilities.
  *
  * @param model - The resolved cron/memory model parts (`resolveOperationModel`

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/wiring/setup-channels/review-session-source.d.ts

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
 /**
  * LCD-merged session source for the memory-review cron.
  *
- * Live finding 2026-06-11 (LIVEMEM run): `runMemoryReview` reads
+ * `runMemoryReview` reads
  * `sessionStore.listDetailed` — the daemon session store — but in DAG mode
  * (the DEFAULT context engine) the real conversations live in the pi runtime
  * JSONLs and the LCD store; the daemon store holds only a handful of
- * near-empty rows. The nightly extraction (memories, entities, causal edges)
- * was a silent no-op on a default deployment — `memory_entities` and
- * `memory_causal_edges` had ZERO rows on a live daemon with days of
+ * near-empty rows. Without this adapter the nightly extraction (memories, entities, causal edges)
+ * is a silent no-op on a default deployment — `memory_entities` and
+ * `memory_causal_edges` stay at ZERO rows on a live daemon with days of
  * conversations.
  *
  * This adapter presents the union of BOTH stores through the exact

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/wiring/setup-channels/review-session-source.js

@@ -2,13 +2,13 @@
 /**
  * LCD-merged session source for the memory-review cron.
  *
- * Live finding 2026-06-11 (LIVEMEM run): `runMemoryReview` reads
+ * `runMemoryReview` reads
  * `sessionStore.listDetailed` — the daemon session store — but in DAG mode
  * (the DEFAULT context engine) the real conversations live in the pi runtime
  * JSONLs and the LCD store; the daemon store holds only a handful of
- * near-empty rows. The nightly extraction (memories, entities, causal edges)
- * was a silent no-op on a default deployment — `memory_entities` and
- * `memory_causal_edges` had ZERO rows on a live daemon with days of
+ * near-empty rows. Without this adapter the nightly extraction (memories, entities, causal edges)
+ * is a silent no-op on a default deployment — `memory_entities` and
+ * `memory_causal_edges` stay at ZERO rows on a live daemon with days of
  * conversations.
  *
  * This adapter presents the union of BOTH stores through the exact

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/wiring/setup-channels/setup-channels-activity-renderers.d.ts

@@ -30,9 +30,9 @@
  * selectStrategy can route to now produces a live per-channelId factory.
  *
  * NOTE: the activity kill-switch (per-channel runtime toggle + global
- * emergency override) is enforced in a later phase — this function wires the
- * renderer UNCONDITIONALLY (capability-driven only via selectStrategy). Do NOT
- * add any config-toggle gate here; absence is intentional.
+ * emergency override) is enforced downstream in the turn coordinator — this
+ * function wires the renderer UNCONDITIONALLY (capability-driven only via
+ * selectStrategy). Do NOT add any config-toggle gate here; absence is intentional.
  *
  * The returned map feeds the orchestrator's per-turn `coordinatorFactory`
  * (ExecutionPipelineDeps), keyed by channelType. Threading the

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/wiring/setup-channels/setup-channels-activity-renderers.js

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 // (ActivityStatusMarkers also used in the per-call factory signature below.)
 import { selectStrategy } from "@comis/core";
-import { createTestSink, createTelegramActivityRenderer, createDiscordActivityRenderer, createSlackActivityRenderer, createWhatsAppActivityRenderer, createSignalActivityRenderer, createIMessageActivityRenderer, createLineActivityRenderer, createIrcActivityRenderer, createEmailActivityRenderer, } from "@comis/channels";
+import { createTestSink, createTelegramActivityRenderer, createDiscordActivityRenderer, createSlackActivityRenderer, createWhatsAppActivityRenderer, createSignalActivityRenderer, createIMessageActivityRenderer, createLineActivityRenderer, createIrcActivityRenderer, createEmailActivityRenderer, createMSTeamsActivityRenderer, } from "@comis/channels";
 /**
  * Closed dispatch: each edit-capable channelType → its create<Ch>ActivityRenderer.
  * A `selectStrategy(...) === "EditPlace"` for a channelType NOT in `EditPlaceChannel`
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ const EDIT_PLACE_RENDERER_FACTORIES = {
     discord: createDiscordActivityRenderer,
     slack: createSlackActivityRenderer,
     whatsapp: createWhatsAppActivityRenderer,
+    msteams: createMSTeamsActivityRenderer,
 };
 /** DeleteAndRepost → Signal (deleteMessages, no edit). Uses {timer, clock}. */
 const DELETE_AND_REPOST_RENDERER_FACTORIES = {

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/wiring/setup-channels/setup-channels-credentials.d.ts

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ export interface CronEventListenerDeps {
     logger: ComisLogger;
     /** Composition-root clock — threaded to runMemoryReview for relative-date resolution. */
     clock: ClockPort;
-    /** Per-agent auto-refreshing OAuth token resolver (wraps OAuthTokenManager); lets background memory/learning jobs run on an OAuth main provider instead of skipping "no API key" (LEARN-01). Undefined ⇒ static-key/keyless only. */
+    /** Per-agent auto-refreshing OAuth token resolver (wraps OAuthTokenManager); lets background memory/learning jobs run on an OAuth main provider instead of skipping "no API key". Undefined ⇒ static-key/keyless only. */
     resolveAccessToken?: (agentId: string, provider: string) => Promise<string | undefined>;
     adaptersByType: Map<string, ChannelPort>;
     deliveryService: DeliveryService;
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ export interface CronEventListenerDeps {
     transcriber?: TranscriptionPort;
     workspaceDirs?: Map<string, string>;
     memoryAdapter?: MemoryPort;
-    /** LCD read + browse for the review session source (live 2026-06-11: DAG transcripts live in LCD, not the near-empty daemon store). Absent ⇒ daemon-store-only review. */
+    /** LCD read + browse for the review session source (DAG transcripts live in LCD, not the near-empty daemon store). Absent ⇒ daemon-store-only review. */
     lcdStore?: import("@comis/core").ContextStorePort;
     contextBrowse?: import("@comis/core").ContextBrowsePort;
     /** Entity-associative store. Threaded into runMemoryReview so each
@@ -51,9 +51,9 @@ export interface CronEventListenerDeps {
      *  isolation. Absent => causes parsed but not persisted. Built
      *  in setup-memory on the SAME db handle the memory adapter owns; the port TYPE (agent↛memory cut). */
     causalStore?: MemoryCausalStore;
-    /** Consolidation store. ORPHANED in Phase 225-05 (the runMemoryConsolidation job +
-     *  the `__MEMORY_CONSOLIDATION__` sentinel were deleted); the port + its memories table are
-     *  retired in Phase 226. Still threaded (no live writer). Built in setup-memory on the SAME db
+    /** Consolidation store. ORPHANED — the runMemoryConsolidation job and
+     *  the `__MEMORY_CONSOLIDATION__` sentinel were removed, so the port and its memories table are
+     *  retired. Still threaded (no live writer). Built in setup-memory on the SAME db
      *  handle the memory adapter owns; injected as the port TYPE (agent↛memory cut). */
     consolidationStore?: MemoryConsolidationStore;
     /** Memory-lifecycle sweep store — the KEYLESS
@@ -66,10 +66,10 @@ export interface CronEventListenerDeps {
     outcomeStore?: OutcomeSignalPort;
     learnedSkillStore?: MentalModelStorePort;
     /** High-trust source read surface (`inspect`) — the surviving __REFLECT__ sentinel scopes
-     *  its per-(tenant, agent) profile/topic source read over it (the Phase 225 FOLD path).
+     *  its per-(tenant, agent) profile/topic source read over it (the folded profile/topic read path).
      *  Built in setup-memory; daemon-side (the agent imports no memory package). (The
      *  __USER_REPRESENTATION__ + __SOCIAL_MODELING__ readers that also used this surface were
-     *  deleted in Phase 225-05 / 226-04 with their subsystems.) */
+     *  deleted with their subsystems.) */
     memoryApi?: MemoryApi;
     tenantId?: string;
     piSessionAdapters?: Map<string, {

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/wiring/setup-channels/setup-channels-credentials.js

@@ -39,9 +39,17 @@ export function registerCronEventListeners(deps) {
     const { container, executors, defaultAgentId, sessionManager, logger, adaptersByType, deliveryService, } = deps;
     const agents = container.config.agents;
     container.eventBus.on("scheduler:job_result", async (payload) => {
-        // -- Memory review sentinel intercept --
         const resultText = payload.result;
-        if (resultText === "__MEMORY_REVIEW__") {
+        // The memory-cron sentinels (__MEMORY_REVIEW__ and those dispatched by
+        // handleMemoryCronSentinel) are control tokens for INTERNAL, deliveryTarget-less
+        // jobs — registered as target-less __SENTINEL__ system_event jobs. A user-facing
+        // delivery (a normal cron result OR a wake-gate deliver-on-skip) ALWAYS carries a
+        // deliveryTarget, so only a target-less emit may be interpreted as a control token.
+        // This keeps an untrusted, model-authored deliver equal to a sentinel from being
+        // intercepted: it falls through to verbatim delivery below and never fires an LLM turn.
+        const noDeliveryTarget = !payload.deliveryTarget?.channelType;
+        // -- Memory review sentinel intercept (internal, target-less jobs only) --
+        if (noDeliveryTarget && resultText === "__MEMORY_REVIEW__") {
             const { agentId } = payload;
             if (!agentId) {
                 logger.warn({ hint: "Memory review job fired without agentId", errorKind: "config" }, "Skipping memory review -- no agentId");
@@ -79,7 +87,7 @@ export function registerCronEventListeners(deps) {
                 agentName: agentConfig.name ?? agentId,
                 config: memReviewConfig,
                 memoryPort: deps.memoryAdapter,
-                // R6 (CR-01): small/nano cron model abstains via resolve-memory-ops-capability.ts (never fabricates into trusted storage).
+                // Capability gate: a small/nano cron model abstains via resolve-memory-ops-capability.ts (never fabricates into trusted storage).
                 ...resolveMemoryOpsCapability(resolved, providerEntry?.capabilities),
                 sessionStore: buildReviewSessionSource({ sessionStore: deps.sessionStore, lcdStore: deps.lcdStore, contextBrowse: deps.contextBrowse, agentId, tenantId: deps.tenantId ?? container.config.tenantId ?? "default" }),
                 eventBus: container.eventBus,
@@ -108,7 +116,8 @@ export function registerCronEventListeners(deps) {
         //    to keep this leaf under the 600L cap. Both re-check cfg.enabled (the opt-in
         //    cost gate, defence-in-depth) and inject the segregated stores as port TYPES
         //    (the agent↛memory cut). Returns true when handled → we return here.
-        const handledMemoryCron = await handleMemoryCronSentinel(resultText, payload, {
+        // Same target-less scoping for the remaining memory-cron sentinels.
+        const handledMemoryCron = noDeliveryTarget && await handleMemoryCronSentinel(resultText, payload, {
             container,
             logger,
             clock: deps.clock,
@@ -117,8 +126,8 @@ export function registerCronEventListeners(deps) {
             consolidationStore: deps.consolidationStore,
             memoryLifecycleStore: deps.memoryLifecycleStore,
             memoryApi: deps.memoryApi,
-            reflection: buildReflectionCronDeps(deps), // v2.31 Reflection closed-graph bundle; undefined ⇒ off
-            resolveAccessToken: deps.resolveAccessToken, // LEARN-01: OAuth-provider background jobs
+            reflection: buildReflectionCronDeps(deps), // Reflection closed-graph bundle; undefined ⇒ off
+            resolveAccessToken: deps.resolveAccessToken, // OAuth-provider background jobs
         });
         if (handledMemoryCron)
             return;
@@ -166,7 +175,7 @@ export function registerCronEventListeners(deps) {
                     errorKind: "config",
                 }, "Cron sessionStrategy may waste cache writes at this cadence");
             }
-            // Resolve cron operation model via 5-level priority chain. LAT-01: cronOverrides.promptTimeout is materialized UNCONDITIONALLY, so it must carry resolution.timeoutSource — without the label, decode would treat the 150s cron default as an explicit operator override (the provenance-collapse trap).
+            // Resolve cron operation model via 5-level priority chain. cronOverrides.promptTimeout is materialized UNCONDITIONALLY, so it must carry resolution.timeoutSource — without the label, decode would treat the 150s cron default as an explicit operator override (the provenance-collapse trap).
             const agentConfig = agents[payload.agentId];
             let cronOverrides;
             if (agentConfig) {

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/wiring/setup-channels/setup-channels-cron-credential.d.ts

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 /**
  * Shared credential resolution for the background memory/learning cron jobs.
  *
- * Live VPS incident 2026-06-19 (LEARN-01): every background job (skill
+ * Every background job (skill
  * synthesis, memory review/consolidation/reasoning, user-representation,
- * social-modeling, usefulness-judge, triple-extraction) resolved its model
+ * social-modeling, usefulness-judge, triple-extraction) resolves its model
  * credential via `secretManager.get(apiKeyName)` with a fallback ONLY for
  * `KEYLESS_PROVIDER_TYPES`. An **OAuth provider** (e.g. `openai-codex`) is
  * neither an API-key provider nor keyless, so the lookup returned "" and the
@@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ import { type JudgeProviderEntry } from "../setup-learning-judge.js";
 /**
  * Spread-ready `{customModel?}` for a keyless/local cron/memory-ops seam — resolves the
  * provider's `/v1` baseUrl spec so a YAML provider (ollama/lm-studio/…) the pi-ai catalog
- * can't see still resolves a Model. Without it the memory-ops seams resolved "model not
- * found" and SKIPPED on every keyless run (the #223 / DIALECTIC-FIX bug class, live 2026-06-20).
+ * can't see still resolves a Model. Without it the memory-ops seams resolve "model not
+ * found" and SKIP on every keyless run.
  */
 export declare function cronCustomModelOpt(providerEntry: JudgeProviderEntry | undefined, provider: string, modelId: string): {
     customModel?: CustomCompletionsModelSpec;
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ export interface CronJobCredential {
 export declare function resolveCronJobCredential(container: AppContainer, agentId: string, provider: string, resolveAccessToken?: CronOAuthTokenResolver): Promise<CronJobCredential>;
 /**
  * Build the operator-actionable skip hint for an unresolvable credential,
- * branched by failure class (§16 — a hint must name the RIGHT knob): an OAuth
+ * branched by failure class (a hint must name the RIGHT knob): an OAuth
  * provider gets the re-login hint, not the misleading "set an API key".
  */
 export declare function cronCredentialSkipHint(cred: CronJobCredential, provider: string, jobLabel: string): string;

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/wiring/setup-channels/setup-channels-cron-credential.js

@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@
 /**
  * Shared credential resolution for the background memory/learning cron jobs.
  *
- * Live VPS incident 2026-06-19 (LEARN-01): every background job (skill
+ * Every background job (skill
  * synthesis, memory review/consolidation/reasoning, user-representation,
- * social-modeling, usefulness-judge, triple-extraction) resolved its model
+ * social-modeling, usefulness-judge, triple-extraction) resolves its model
  * credential via `secretManager.get(apiKeyName)` with a fallback ONLY for
  * `KEYLESS_PROVIDER_TYPES`. An **OAuth provider** (e.g. `openai-codex`) is
  * neither an API-key provider nor keyless, so the lookup returned "" and the
@@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ import { buildCustomJudgeModelSpec } from "../setup-learning-judge.js";
 /**
  * Spread-ready `{customModel?}` for a keyless/local cron/memory-ops seam — resolves the
  * provider's `/v1` baseUrl spec so a YAML provider (ollama/lm-studio/…) the pi-ai catalog
- * can't see still resolves a Model. Without it the memory-ops seams resolved "model not
- * found" and SKIPPED on every keyless run (the #223 / DIALECTIC-FIX bug class, live 2026-06-20).
+ * can't see still resolves a Model. Without it the memory-ops seams resolve "model not
+ * found" and SKIP on every keyless run.
  */
 export function cronCustomModelOpt(providerEntry, provider, modelId) {
     const cm = buildCustomJudgeModelSpec(providerEntry, provider, modelId);
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ export async function resolveCronJobCredential(container, agentId, provider, res
     // Keyless-ness is a property of the provider TYPE (ollama / lm-studio), not its config NAME. A
     // user-NAMED entry (providers.entries["local-ollama"] = { type: "ollama" }) must still resolve
     // keyless — else the reflection/memory-review crons skip ("no API key") on a local keyless daemon,
-    // silently disabling the learning loop (package-delivery-20260628). Mirrors the agent completion
+    // silently disabling the learning loop. Mirrors the agent completion
     // path + setup-dialectic, which key off entry.type. Guarded by test/architecture/keyless-provider-by-type.
     if (KEYLESS_PROVIDER_TYPES.has(providerEntry?.type ?? provider)) {
         return { apiKey: KEYLESS_API_KEY_SENTINEL, apiKeyName, source: "keyless", hasOAuthProfile };
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ export async function resolveCronJobCredential(container, agentId, provider, res
 }
 /**
  * Build the operator-actionable skip hint for an unresolvable credential,
- * branched by failure class (§16 — a hint must name the RIGHT knob): an OAuth
+ * branched by failure class (a hint must name the RIGHT knob): an OAuth
  * provider gets the re-login hint, not the misleading "set an API key".
  */
 export function cronCredentialSkipHint(cred, provider, jobLabel) {

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/wiring/setup-channels/setup-channels-memory-crons-types.d.ts

@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ import type { ComisLogger } from "@comis/infra";
 import type { MemoryApi } from "@comis/memory";
 import type { ReflectionSourceTrajectory } from "@comis/agent";
 /**
- * The closed-graph REFLECTION injectables for the `__REFLECT__` sentinel (v2.31
- * Reflection, Phase 223, REFLECT-01/02 — the reflect-engine replacement for the
+ * The closed-graph REFLECTION injectables for the `__REFLECT__` sentinel (the
+ * reflect-engine replacement for the
  * deleted `SkillSynthesisCronDeps`). Assembled DAEMON-SIDE (registerCronEventListeners,
  * setup-channels-credentials.ts — the SOLE composition root that may import
  * @comis/memory + @comis/agent together) and threaded here so the handler injects
@@ -25,26 +25,26 @@ import type { ReflectionSourceTrajectory } from "@comis/agent";
  *
  * DROPPED vs the synthesis bundle: `buildValidationAdapter` (the sandbox adapter —
  * an advisory doc has no executable surface; the only validation is the JOB's
- * static `validateLearnedDocBody`, INV-3) and `approvalGate` (no mutating-admission
+ * static `validateLearnedDocBody`) and `approvalGate` (no mutating-admission
  * gate — removing it removes an attack surface). The reflect ADAPTER is built
  * per-run in the handler (it needs the resolved model/key), like the synthesis one.
  */
 export interface ReflectionCronDeps {
     /** The @comis/memory mental-model store. `get` reads the prior doc for delta-ops;
-     *  `admit` is the candidate/learned write target; `supersede` (Phase 225 FOLD-01) is
+     *  `admit` is the candidate/learned write target; `supersede` is
      *  the bi-temporal history-append a profile/topic CORRECTION routes through (the prior
      *  body is preserved in `history`, never overwritten). Built on the shared db handle. */
     learnedSkillStore: Pick<MentalModelStorePort, "get" | "admit" | "supersede">;
     /** The @comis/memory outcome-signal store (the fail-closed success gate the job selects on). */
     outcomeSignal: Pick<OutcomeSignalPort, "resolve">;
     /**
-     * Build the per-KIND source trajectories for the reflection SELECT step (Phase 225
-     * FOLD — the daemon-side `kind` seam). SKILL sources are OUTCOME trajectories (the
+     * Build the per-KIND source trajectories for the reflection SELECT step (the
+     * daemon-side `kind` seam). SKILL sources are OUTCOME trajectories (the
      * LCD-merged review source, buildReviewSessionSource — NOT sessionStore.listDetailed),
-     * each carrying a daemon-derived `trustedOrigin` (INV-5/D-04 axis 1) + `sourceTrustExternal:false`
+     * each carrying a daemon-derived `trustedOrigin` (trust axis 1) + `sourceTrustExternal:false`
      * (axis 2 is N/A for an outcome trajectory). PROFILE/TOPIC sources are built from the
      * agent's high-trust SOURCE MEMORIES (memoryApi.inspect), each carrying `sourceTrustExternal =
-     * (trustLevel === "external")` (FOLD-04 axis 2 — the old user-rep layer-1 firewall). The job
+     * (trustLevel === "external")` (the per-memory source-trust axis, axis 2). The job
      * filters on BOTH axes.
      */
     buildSourceTrajectories: (kind: "skill" | "profile" | "topic", agentId: string, tenantId: string) => Promise<ReflectionSourceTrajectory[]>;
@@ -67,25 +67,25 @@ export interface MemoryCronContext {
      * Resolve a per-agent OAuth access token for a provider (auto-refreshing),
      * threaded from the daemon's per-agent OAuthTokenManager map. Lets the
      * background jobs run on an OAuth main provider (e.g. openai-codex) instead
-     * of skipping for "no API key" (LEARN-01). Undefined ⇒ no OAuth resolution
+     * of skipping for "no API key". Undefined ⇒ no OAuth resolution
      * wired (jobs fall back to static-key/keyless resolution only).
      */
     resolveAccessToken?: (agentId: string, provider: string) => Promise<string | undefined>;
     agents: Record<string, any>;
     tenantId?: string;
-    /** Orphaned in Phase 225-05 (the __MEMORY_CONSOLIDATION__ cron + its writer were deleted); retired in 226. */
+    /** Orphaned — the __MEMORY_CONSOLIDATION__ cron and its writer were removed; the store is retired. */
     consolidationStore?: MemoryConsolidationStore;
     /** The DORMANT lifecycle sweep the KEYLESS __MEMORY_LIFECYCLE__
      *  sentinel drives (`runLifecycleSweep(scope)`, per (tenant, agent) + injected `now`).
      *  DORMANT — even when enabled the sweep evicts/demotes 0 rows (live policy deferred). */
     memoryLifecycleStore?: MemoryLifecyclePort;
     /** The `inspect` high-trust source read surface — the surviving __REFLECT__ sentinel scopes
-     *  its per-(tenant, agent) profile/topic source reads over it (the Phase 225 FOLD path). (The
-     *  __SOCIAL_MODELING__ reader was deleted in Phase 226-04; the __USEFULNESS_JUDGE__ +
-     *  __MEMORY_TRIPLE_EXTRACTION__ readers in Phase 226-03 — all with their subsystems.) */
+     *  its per-(tenant, agent) profile/topic source reads over it (the folded profile/topic read path). (The
+     *  __SOCIAL_MODELING__ reader was deleted; the __USEFULNESS_JUDGE__ +
+     *  __MEMORY_TRIPLE_EXTRACTION__ readers too — all with their subsystems.) */
     memoryApi?: MemoryApi;
-    /** The closed-graph reflection injectables (the `__REFLECT__` sentinel, v2.31 Reflection,
-     *  REFLECT-01/02). Assembled daemon-side; the handler injects the mental-model store + the
+    /** The closed-graph reflection injectables (the `__REFLECT__` sentinel).
+     *  Assembled daemon-side; the handler injects the mental-model store + the
      *  trusted-origin LCD source into runReflection. Absent ⇒ off-by-default (a default-config
      *  agent never reaches the sentinel). */
     reflection?: ReflectionCronDeps;

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/wiring/setup-channels/setup-channels-memory-crons-wire.d.ts

@@ -7,17 +7,17 @@
  * the existing test entry point are unchanged.
  *
  * Sentinels handled here:
- * - __MEMORY_LIFECYCLE__ (FORGET-01/06, Phase 200 Plan 06): the KEYLESS soft-eviction sweep.
+ * - __MEMORY_LIFECYCLE__: the KEYLESS soft-eviction sweep.
  *   Threads THIS agent's collapsed `learning.forget` eviction policy onto the per-call sweep
  *   scope (the shared store is constructed once; the behavior is per-agent) and emits the
  *   daemon-side learning:memory_demoted/evicted counts (the store has no bus). OFF by
  *   default → DORMANT (byte-identical). Moved here for the 600L setup-channels dir cap.
- * - __REFLECT__ (v2.31 Reflection, Phase 223): the composition root for the reflection loop
+ * - __REFLECT__: the composition root for the reflection loop
  *   — injects the @comis/memory mental-model store + the trusted-origin LCD source into
  *   runReflection and re-emits the counts-only learning:skill_* funnel daemon-side.
  *
- * (The __USEFULNESS_JUDGE__ + __MEMORY_TRIPLE_EXTRACTION__ dormant crons were DELETED in
- * Phase 226-03 — their dispatch branches are gone; an unrecognized sentinel returns false.)
+ * (The __USEFULNESS_JUDGE__ + __MEMORY_TRIPLE_EXTRACTION__ dormant crons were DELETED —
+ * their dispatch branches are gone; an unrecognized sentinel returns false.)
  *
  * Both re-check cfg.enabled (defence-in-depth — the scheduler already gates, a stale
  * persisted job must not run for a now-disabled agent), inject the segregated store(s)