@yahyahammad/venastine 0.3.8 → 0.3.10
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/.env.example +19 -19
- package/CONFIG_ARCHITECTURE.md +2139 -2002
- package/LICENSE +201 -201
- package/README.md +1043 -1034
- package/agents/builtin/compactor.md +75 -75
- package/agents/builtin/explore.md +77 -77
- package/agents/builtin/pipeline-reviewer.md +100 -100
- package/agents/builtin/plan.md +106 -106
- package/agents/builtin/review.md +74 -74
- package/agents/manager.py +261 -261
- package/agents/subagent_tool.py +472 -472
- package/agents/tui_commands.py +238 -146
- package/bin/venastine.mjs +584 -528
- package/bin/venastine.py +73 -71
- package/cli_commands.py +848 -835
- package/config.yaml +64 -0
- package/config_edit.py +1301 -1301
- package/config_schema.py +987 -966
- package/config_update.py +749 -749
- package/core/agent_activity.py +256 -256
- package/core/ansi.py +452 -452
- package/core/approval.py +137 -137
- package/core/call_view.py +364 -364
- package/core/cancel.py +121 -121
- package/core/chatgpt_auth.py +747 -747
- package/core/claims_view.py +107 -107
- package/core/client.py +2756 -2715
- package/core/commands.py +464 -454
- package/core/compaction.py +1735 -1735
- package/core/config_loader.py +1982 -1982
- package/core/connect.py +686 -686
- package/core/events.py +123 -123
- package/core/file_mentions.py +280 -280
- package/core/interaction.py +411 -411
- package/core/loop.py +2566 -2566
- package/core/memory.py +482 -482
- package/core/pipeline_models.py +190 -190
- package/core/provider_errors.py +274 -234
- package/core/reasoning/authorization.py +130 -130
- package/core/reasoning/base.py +219 -219
- package/core/reasoning/confidence_scoring.py +484 -484
- package/core/reasoning/events.py +149 -149
- package/core/reasoning/orchestrator.py +1561 -1561
- package/core/reasoning/output_writer.py +345 -345
- package/core/reasoning/payload_validation.py +524 -524
- package/core/reasoning/pipeline_storage.py +427 -427
- package/core/reasoning/scholar.py +467 -458
- package/core/reasoning/source_corpus.py +433 -433
- package/core/reasoning/source_scoring.py +855 -855
- package/core/replay.py +315 -315
- package/core/shell_sessions.py +1553 -1553
- package/credentials.py +307 -307
- package/database.py +333 -333
- package/docs/PRIVACY.md +78 -78
- package/docs/SECURITY.md +114 -108
- package/docs/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md +148 -148
- package/env_secrets.py +118 -118
- package/json_store.py +343 -343
- package/logging_setup.py +295 -295
- package/main.py +3433 -3433
- package/mcp_client/client.py +780 -733
- package/mcp_client/config.py +484 -484
- package/mcp_client/registration.py +343 -343
- package/memories/manager.py +147 -147
- package/memories/tui_commands.py +319 -239
- package/package.json +303 -303
- package/project_init/config_files.py +282 -282
- package/project_init/generator.py +728 -728
- package/project_init/manifest.py +418 -418
- package/project_init/tui_commands.py +147 -147
- package/prompts/critic_pass.md +24 -24
- package/prompts/revalidate.md +25 -25
- package/prompts/revise.md +17 -17
- package/prompts/source_grounding.md +66 -66
- package/prompts/system_prompts.py +316 -316
- package/providers.json.example +94 -94
- package/pyproject.toml +149 -149
- package/requirements.txt +314 -295
- package/safety/policy_enforcement.py +1082 -1082
- package/security/askpass.py +419 -419
- package/security/capability.py +207 -207
- package/security/confine.py +484 -484
- package/security/hosted.py +182 -182
- package/security/permissions.py +237 -237
- package/security/protected_paths.py +501 -501
- package/security/sandbox.py +4108 -4108
- package/skills/builtin/math/formal-specification.md +67 -67
- package/skills/builtin/math/numerical-methods.md +66 -66
- package/skills/builtin/research/experiment-design.md +62 -62
- package/skills/builtin/research/reproducibility.md +55 -55
- package/skills/builtin/research/source-evaluation.md +70 -70
- package/skills/builtin/research/statistical-inference.md +63 -63
- package/skills/builtin/research/technical-writing.md +59 -59
- package/skills/builtin/software/code-review.md +61 -61
- package/skills/builtin/software/debugging.md +61 -61
- package/skills/builtin/software/test-design.md +67 -67
- package/skills/tui_commands.py +110 -110
- package/storage.py +1338 -1338
- package/tools/base.py +465 -465
- package/tools/builtin/_math_common.py +667 -667
- package/tools/builtin/_net_common.py +1145 -267
- package/tools/builtin/_page_text.py +490 -0
- package/tools/builtin/_pdf_text.py +113 -0
- package/tools/builtin/arxiv.py +685 -681
- package/tools/builtin/fetch_url.py +639 -371
- package/tools/builtin/file_ops.py +720 -720
- package/tools/builtin/geometry.py +184 -184
- package/tools/builtin/load_skill.py +76 -76
- package/tools/builtin/pin.py +227 -227
- package/tools/builtin/probability_stats.py +224 -224
- package/tools/builtin/project_docs.py +464 -464
- package/tools/builtin/remember.py +175 -175
- package/tools/builtin/shell.py +980 -980
- package/tools/builtin/todo.py +149 -149
- package/tools/builtin/web_search.py +402 -328
- package/tools/context.py +159 -159
- package/tools/isolation.py +387 -387
- package/tools/registry.py +1252 -1242
- package/tui/app.py +8372 -8307
- package/tui/app.tcss +754 -739
- package/tui/commands.py +26 -26
- package/tui/diffs.py +286 -286
- package/tui/history.py +128 -128
- package/tui/hosted_driver.py +102 -102
- package/tui/markdown.py +1329 -1329
- package/tui/meters.py +364 -364
- package/tui/ravens.py +146 -146
- package/tui/screens.py +1255 -1197
- package/tui/themes.py +599 -599
- package/tui/widgets.py +3861 -3796
package/tools/context.py
CHANGED
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@@ -1,159 +1,159 @@
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"""
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tools/context.py
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ROADMAP_v2 §15. `ToolContext` is the per-run bundle of tool restrictions
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contributed by whatever is currently active above the global policy --
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an agent (§18), the skills it has activated (§19), or a subagent's
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inherited scope. It is data only: the "stricter wins" composition rule
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(D14) lives in security/permissions.py, not here.
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Deliberately a leaf module with no project imports. security/permissions.py
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type-hints against it under TYPE_CHECKING only, so the existing
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`tools -> security` dependency direction is never inverted at runtime.
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A `None` context means "no layer above global policy has an opinion",
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which is the state every current production caller is in until §18 lands.
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"""
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from dataclasses import dataclass, field
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from typing import Optional
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@dataclass
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class ToolContext:
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"""One active restriction layer.
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allowed_tools: None means this layer expresses NO opinion (not "no
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tools"). A set restricts to exactly those names. Composition is
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intersection -- a layer can only ever narrow what is available,
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never widen it past the global policy (D14).
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approval_overrides: name -> bool. Only `True` is meaningful: approval
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is OR'd across layers, so an entry can add an approval
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requirement but can never remove one. See requires_approval().
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subagent_depth: incremented by §18's spawn_subagent each time it
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builds a child context; the nesting limit is checked against it.
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spawn_targets: None means this layer expresses NO opinion about WHICH
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agents may be spawned -- not "none of them", exactly as for
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allowed_tools above. A set restricts spawn_subagent to those
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agent names, and composes the same way: intersection, so a layer
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can only ever narrow the roster it inherited.
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SEPARATE FROM allowed_tools because they answer different
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questions. `allowed_tools` decides whether this run may spawn AT
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ALL; this decides who it may spawn, and the two failure modes are
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not the same one. C6 caps a child's tools by intersecting them
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with the parent's, which turns "a parent that should not delegate
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this work" into "a child that quietly cannot do it" -- `plan`
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spawning `build` returned a build with no `write` or `edit` and
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no way for either side to tell. An agent that must not delegate
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a kind of work should be refused, not narrowed.
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"""
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allowed_tools: Optional[set[str]] = None
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approval_overrides: dict[str, bool] = field(default_factory=dict)
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subagent_depth: int = 0
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spawn_targets: Optional[set[str]] = None
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@dataclass
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class RunInfo:
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"""Identity of the enclosing run, for context-aware tool handlers that
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spawn further runs (§18's spawn_subagent inherits model / provider /
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effort when the agent definition names none of its own).
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Carries no policy -- deliberately separate from ToolContext so a
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handler's signature cannot confuse inheritance with restriction.
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"""
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model: str
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provider_name: str
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effort: Optional[str] = None
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# Tools already signed off for the rest of THIS run (§18 subagent
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# sign-off, S1). A RunInfo is built once per _run() call and _run() is
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# called once per turn, so run-scope is turn-scope -- which is the
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# granularity the sign-off was specified at: approving a spawn covers
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# every subagent in that turn, including nested ones, and nothing
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# beyond it.
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#
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# A GRANT, not a policy override. It records that the user answered
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# the approval question early, exactly as an approval_callback
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# returning True does; it is deliberately not an approval_overrides
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# entry, because those OR and can therefore only ever tighten (D14).
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granted_tools: set = field(default_factory=set)
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# §25: the ceiling on how many granted calls may proceed without being
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# asked about. A core.approval.GrantBudget, or None for no ceiling.
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#
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# Typed as object so this module stays a leaf with no project imports
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# (see the module docstring) -- the same reason ToolContext is
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# type-hinted from security/permissions.py under TYPE_CHECKING only.
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# One budget instance is SHARED by every pass of a pipeline run; a
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# per-pass budget would multiply the ceiling by the pass count while
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# reading as if it enforced one.
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grant_budget: Optional[object] = None
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# ROADMAP_v2 §23 (AC1b). Sign-off answers already given in this run,
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# keyed by (tool name, SUBJECT). A subject is whatever the question was
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# about -- for spawn_subagent, the agent's name -- and is None for every
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# tool whose approval is a plain yes/no.
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#
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# Separate from granted_tools because the two carry different things: a
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# granted TOOL is a name approved with no further detail, while a
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# sign-off carries the SUBSET the child may use. Merging them would
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signoffs: dict = field(default_factory=dict)
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# ROADMAP_v3 §81 (IM6). Whether an image in a tool result can reach the
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# model in this run: the provider is marked `accepts_images` and the
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# thread is not a research pass. Computed ONCE, by the loop, and read
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# twice -- by the schema list, to leave `view_image` out, and by the
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# handler, to refuse a call made anyway -- so the two cannot disagree.
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# False by default: a RunInfo built anywhere else delivers no images.
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def remember_signoff(self, tool_name: str, subject, subset) -> None:
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"""Record an answer so the rest of this run need not re-ask.
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A subset of None means the answer carried no detail -- a plain
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approval -- and lands in granted_tools exactly as it did before
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§23. Anything else is keyed by subject, because the answer was
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about that subject and means nothing for another one.
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"""
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self.signoffs[(tool_name, subject)] = set(subset)
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def recall_signoff(self, tool_name: str, subject) -> tuple:
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"""(remembered, subset) for a call this run may already have
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answered.
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The subject-keyed memo is checked FIRST. A tool can appear in both
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(a pipeline grant names it, and a sign-off answered about one
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subject), and the specific answer is the one the user actually
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gave about this subject.
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R14: a grant BY NAME may not answer a question that carries a
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SUBJECT. J8 rebuilt the memo around (tool, subject) because
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approving a spawn of agent `a` had silently covered a later spawn
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of `b`; the grant branch below kept answering both, because it
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never looked at the subject at all:
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granted_tools={'spawn_subagent'}
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recall_signoff('spawn_subagent', 'agent-a') -> (True, None)
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recall_signoff('spawn_subagent', 'agent-b') -> (True, None)
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recall_signoff('spawn_subagent', <anything>) -> (True, None)
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-- J8's pre-fix behaviour, reached through the grant rather than
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the memo. A name-level answer is about the TOOL; a subject-carrying
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question is about one agent, and the two are not the same consent.
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Belt and braces after R13 made spawn_subagent GRANT_NEVER, since
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that is the only tool supplying a subject today: this holds for a
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hand-built or stale RunInfo, and for any later tool that carries
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one. `subject is None` for every other tool, so nothing else
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changes behaviour.
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"""
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key = (tool_name, subject)
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if key in self.signoffs:
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return True, self.signoffs[key]
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if subject is None and tool_name in self.granted_tools:
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return True, None
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return False, None
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"""
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tools/context.py
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ROADMAP_v2 §15. `ToolContext` is the per-run bundle of tool restrictions
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contributed by whatever is currently active above the global policy --
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an agent (§18), the skills it has activated (§19), or a subagent's
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inherited scope. It is data only: the "stricter wins" composition rule
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(D14) lives in security/permissions.py, not here.
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Deliberately a leaf module with no project imports. security/permissions.py
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type-hints against it under TYPE_CHECKING only, so the existing
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`tools -> security` dependency direction is never inverted at runtime.
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A `None` context means "no layer above global policy has an opinion",
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which is the state every current production caller is in until §18 lands.
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"""
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from dataclasses import dataclass, field
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from typing import Optional
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@dataclass
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class ToolContext:
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"""One active restriction layer.
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25
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+
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allowed_tools: None means this layer expresses NO opinion (not "no
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tools"). A set restricts to exactly those names. Composition is
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intersection -- a layer can only ever narrow what is available,
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never widen it past the global policy (D14).
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approval_overrides: name -> bool. Only `True` is meaningful: approval
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is OR'd across layers, so an entry can add an approval
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requirement but can never remove one. See requires_approval().
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subagent_depth: incremented by §18's spawn_subagent each time it
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34
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builds a child context; the nesting limit is checked against it.
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35
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spawn_targets: None means this layer expresses NO opinion about WHICH
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36
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agents may be spawned -- not "none of them", exactly as for
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37
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allowed_tools above. A set restricts spawn_subagent to those
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agent names, and composes the same way: intersection, so a layer
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can only ever narrow the roster it inherited.
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40
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+
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41
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SEPARATE FROM allowed_tools because they answer different
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questions. `allowed_tools` decides whether this run may spawn AT
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ALL; this decides who it may spawn, and the two failure modes are
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44
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not the same one. C6 caps a child's tools by intersecting them
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45
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with the parent's, which turns "a parent that should not delegate
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46
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this work" into "a child that quietly cannot do it" -- `plan`
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spawning `build` returned a build with no `write` or `edit` and
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no way for either side to tell. An agent that must not delegate
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a kind of work should be refused, not narrowed.
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"""
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allowed_tools: Optional[set[str]] = None
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+
approval_overrides: dict[str, bool] = field(default_factory=dict)
|
|
54
|
+
subagent_depth: int = 0
|
|
55
|
+
spawn_targets: Optional[set[str]] = None
|
|
56
|
+
|
|
57
|
+
|
|
58
|
+
@dataclass
|
|
59
|
+
class RunInfo:
|
|
60
|
+
"""Identity of the enclosing run, for context-aware tool handlers that
|
|
61
|
+
spawn further runs (§18's spawn_subagent inherits model / provider /
|
|
62
|
+
effort when the agent definition names none of its own).
|
|
63
|
+
|
|
64
|
+
Carries no policy -- deliberately separate from ToolContext so a
|
|
65
|
+
handler's signature cannot confuse inheritance with restriction.
|
|
66
|
+
"""
|
|
67
|
+
|
|
68
|
+
model: str
|
|
69
|
+
provider_name: str
|
|
70
|
+
effort: Optional[str] = None
|
|
71
|
+
# Tools already signed off for the rest of THIS run (§18 subagent
|
|
72
|
+
# sign-off, S1). A RunInfo is built once per _run() call and _run() is
|
|
73
|
+
# called once per turn, so run-scope is turn-scope -- which is the
|
|
74
|
+
# granularity the sign-off was specified at: approving a spawn covers
|
|
75
|
+
# every subagent in that turn, including nested ones, and nothing
|
|
76
|
+
# beyond it.
|
|
77
|
+
#
|
|
78
|
+
# A GRANT, not a policy override. It records that the user answered
|
|
79
|
+
# the approval question early, exactly as an approval_callback
|
|
80
|
+
# returning True does; it is deliberately not an approval_overrides
|
|
81
|
+
# entry, because those OR and can therefore only ever tighten (D14).
|
|
82
|
+
granted_tools: set = field(default_factory=set)
|
|
83
|
+
# §25: the ceiling on how many granted calls may proceed without being
|
|
84
|
+
# asked about. A core.approval.GrantBudget, or None for no ceiling.
|
|
85
|
+
#
|
|
86
|
+
# Typed as object so this module stays a leaf with no project imports
|
|
87
|
+
# (see the module docstring) -- the same reason ToolContext is
|
|
88
|
+
# type-hinted from security/permissions.py under TYPE_CHECKING only.
|
|
89
|
+
# One budget instance is SHARED by every pass of a pipeline run; a
|
|
90
|
+
# per-pass budget would multiply the ceiling by the pass count while
|
|
91
|
+
# reading as if it enforced one.
|
|
92
|
+
grant_budget: Optional[object] = None
|
|
93
|
+
# ROADMAP_v2 §23 (AC1b). Sign-off answers already given in this run,
|
|
94
|
+
# keyed by (tool name, SUBJECT). A subject is whatever the question was
|
|
95
|
+
# about -- for spawn_subagent, the agent's name -- and is None for every
|
|
96
|
+
# tool whose approval is a plain yes/no.
|
|
97
|
+
#
|
|
98
|
+
# Separate from granted_tools because the two carry different things: a
|
|
99
|
+
# granted TOOL is a name approved with no further detail, while a
|
|
100
|
+
# sign-off carries the SUBSET the child may use. Merging them would
|
|
101
|
+
# force a set to hold both a name and a name-plus-subset.
|
|
102
|
+
signoffs: dict = field(default_factory=dict)
|
|
103
|
+
# ROADMAP_v3 §81 (IM6). Whether an image in a tool result can reach the
|
|
104
|
+
# model in this run: the provider is marked `accepts_images` and the
|
|
105
|
+
# thread is not a research pass. Computed ONCE, by the loop, and read
|
|
106
|
+
# twice -- by the schema list, to leave `view_image` out, and by the
|
|
107
|
+
# handler, to refuse a call made anyway -- so the two cannot disagree.
|
|
108
|
+
# False by default: a RunInfo built anywhere else delivers no images.
|
|
109
|
+
images: bool = False
|
|
110
|
+
|
|
111
|
+
def remember_signoff(self, tool_name: str, subject, subset) -> None:
|
|
112
|
+
"""Record an answer so the rest of this run need not re-ask.
|
|
113
|
+
|
|
114
|
+
A subset of None means the answer carried no detail -- a plain
|
|
115
|
+
approval -- and lands in granted_tools exactly as it did before
|
|
116
|
+
§23. Anything else is keyed by subject, because the answer was
|
|
117
|
+
about that subject and means nothing for another one.
|
|
118
|
+
"""
|
|
119
|
+
if subset is None:
|
|
120
|
+
self.granted_tools.add(tool_name)
|
|
121
|
+
else:
|
|
122
|
+
self.signoffs[(tool_name, subject)] = set(subset)
|
|
123
|
+
|
|
124
|
+
def recall_signoff(self, tool_name: str, subject) -> tuple:
|
|
125
|
+
"""(remembered, subset) for a call this run may already have
|
|
126
|
+
answered.
|
|
127
|
+
|
|
128
|
+
The subject-keyed memo is checked FIRST. A tool can appear in both
|
|
129
|
+
(a pipeline grant names it, and a sign-off answered about one
|
|
130
|
+
subject), and the specific answer is the one the user actually
|
|
131
|
+
gave about this subject.
|
|
132
|
+
|
|
133
|
+
R14: a grant BY NAME may not answer a question that carries a
|
|
134
|
+
SUBJECT. J8 rebuilt the memo around (tool, subject) because
|
|
135
|
+
approving a spawn of agent `a` had silently covered a later spawn
|
|
136
|
+
of `b`; the grant branch below kept answering both, because it
|
|
137
|
+
never looked at the subject at all:
|
|
138
|
+
|
|
139
|
+
granted_tools={'spawn_subagent'}
|
|
140
|
+
recall_signoff('spawn_subagent', 'agent-a') -> (True, None)
|
|
141
|
+
recall_signoff('spawn_subagent', 'agent-b') -> (True, None)
|
|
142
|
+
recall_signoff('spawn_subagent', <anything>) -> (True, None)
|
|
143
|
+
|
|
144
|
+
-- J8's pre-fix behaviour, reached through the grant rather than
|
|
145
|
+
the memo. A name-level answer is about the TOOL; a subject-carrying
|
|
146
|
+
question is about one agent, and the two are not the same consent.
|
|
147
|
+
|
|
148
|
+
Belt and braces after R13 made spawn_subagent GRANT_NEVER, since
|
|
149
|
+
that is the only tool supplying a subject today: this holds for a
|
|
150
|
+
hand-built or stale RunInfo, and for any later tool that carries
|
|
151
|
+
one. `subject is None` for every other tool, so nothing else
|
|
152
|
+
changes behaviour.
|
|
153
|
+
"""
|
|
154
|
+
key = (tool_name, subject)
|
|
155
|
+
if key in self.signoffs:
|
|
156
|
+
return True, self.signoffs[key]
|
|
157
|
+
if subject is None and tool_name in self.granted_tools:
|
|
158
|
+
return True, None
|
|
159
|
+
return False, None
|