@yahyahammad/venastine 0.3.8 → 0.3.10
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/.env.example +19 -19
- package/CONFIG_ARCHITECTURE.md +2139 -2002
- package/LICENSE +201 -201
- package/README.md +1043 -1034
- package/agents/builtin/compactor.md +75 -75
- package/agents/builtin/explore.md +77 -77
- package/agents/builtin/pipeline-reviewer.md +100 -100
- package/agents/builtin/plan.md +106 -106
- package/agents/builtin/review.md +74 -74
- package/agents/manager.py +261 -261
- package/agents/subagent_tool.py +472 -472
- package/agents/tui_commands.py +238 -146
- package/bin/venastine.mjs +584 -528
- package/bin/venastine.py +73 -71
- package/cli_commands.py +848 -835
- package/config.yaml +64 -0
- package/config_edit.py +1301 -1301
- package/config_schema.py +987 -966
- package/config_update.py +749 -749
- package/core/agent_activity.py +256 -256
- package/core/ansi.py +452 -452
- package/core/approval.py +137 -137
- package/core/call_view.py +364 -364
- package/core/cancel.py +121 -121
- package/core/chatgpt_auth.py +747 -747
- package/core/claims_view.py +107 -107
- package/core/client.py +2756 -2715
- package/core/commands.py +464 -454
- package/core/compaction.py +1735 -1735
- package/core/config_loader.py +1982 -1982
- package/core/connect.py +686 -686
- package/core/events.py +123 -123
- package/core/file_mentions.py +280 -280
- package/core/interaction.py +411 -411
- package/core/loop.py +2566 -2566
- package/core/memory.py +482 -482
- package/core/pipeline_models.py +190 -190
- package/core/provider_errors.py +274 -234
- package/core/reasoning/authorization.py +130 -130
- package/core/reasoning/base.py +219 -219
- package/core/reasoning/confidence_scoring.py +484 -484
- package/core/reasoning/events.py +149 -149
- package/core/reasoning/orchestrator.py +1561 -1561
- package/core/reasoning/output_writer.py +345 -345
- package/core/reasoning/payload_validation.py +524 -524
- package/core/reasoning/pipeline_storage.py +427 -427
- package/core/reasoning/scholar.py +467 -458
- package/core/reasoning/source_corpus.py +433 -433
- package/core/reasoning/source_scoring.py +855 -855
- package/core/replay.py +315 -315
- package/core/shell_sessions.py +1553 -1553
- package/credentials.py +307 -307
- package/database.py +333 -333
- package/docs/PRIVACY.md +78 -78
- package/docs/SECURITY.md +114 -108
- package/docs/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md +148 -148
- package/env_secrets.py +118 -118
- package/json_store.py +343 -343
- package/logging_setup.py +295 -295
- package/main.py +3433 -3433
- package/mcp_client/client.py +780 -733
- package/mcp_client/config.py +484 -484
- package/mcp_client/registration.py +343 -343
- package/memories/manager.py +147 -147
- package/memories/tui_commands.py +319 -239
- package/package.json +303 -303
- package/project_init/config_files.py +282 -282
- package/project_init/generator.py +728 -728
- package/project_init/manifest.py +418 -418
- package/project_init/tui_commands.py +147 -147
- package/prompts/critic_pass.md +24 -24
- package/prompts/revalidate.md +25 -25
- package/prompts/revise.md +17 -17
- package/prompts/source_grounding.md +66 -66
- package/prompts/system_prompts.py +316 -316
- package/providers.json.example +94 -94
- package/pyproject.toml +149 -149
- package/requirements.txt +314 -295
- package/safety/policy_enforcement.py +1082 -1082
- package/security/askpass.py +419 -419
- package/security/capability.py +207 -207
- package/security/confine.py +484 -484
- package/security/hosted.py +182 -182
- package/security/permissions.py +237 -237
- package/security/protected_paths.py +501 -501
- package/security/sandbox.py +4108 -4108
- package/skills/builtin/math/formal-specification.md +67 -67
- package/skills/builtin/math/numerical-methods.md +66 -66
- package/skills/builtin/research/experiment-design.md +62 -62
- package/skills/builtin/research/reproducibility.md +55 -55
- package/skills/builtin/research/source-evaluation.md +70 -70
- package/skills/builtin/research/statistical-inference.md +63 -63
- package/skills/builtin/research/technical-writing.md +59 -59
- package/skills/builtin/software/code-review.md +61 -61
- package/skills/builtin/software/debugging.md +61 -61
- package/skills/builtin/software/test-design.md +67 -67
- package/skills/tui_commands.py +110 -110
- package/storage.py +1338 -1338
- package/tools/base.py +465 -465
- package/tools/builtin/_math_common.py +667 -667
- package/tools/builtin/_net_common.py +1145 -267
- package/tools/builtin/_page_text.py +490 -0
- package/tools/builtin/_pdf_text.py +113 -0
- package/tools/builtin/arxiv.py +685 -681
- package/tools/builtin/fetch_url.py +639 -371
- package/tools/builtin/file_ops.py +720 -720
- package/tools/builtin/geometry.py +184 -184
- package/tools/builtin/load_skill.py +76 -76
- package/tools/builtin/pin.py +227 -227
- package/tools/builtin/probability_stats.py +224 -224
- package/tools/builtin/project_docs.py +464 -464
- package/tools/builtin/remember.py +175 -175
- package/tools/builtin/shell.py +980 -980
- package/tools/builtin/todo.py +149 -149
- package/tools/builtin/web_search.py +402 -328
- package/tools/context.py +159 -159
- package/tools/isolation.py +387 -387
- package/tools/registry.py +1252 -1242
- package/tui/app.py +8372 -8307
- package/tui/app.tcss +754 -739
- package/tui/commands.py +26 -26
- package/tui/diffs.py +286 -286
- package/tui/history.py +128 -128
- package/tui/hosted_driver.py +102 -102
- package/tui/markdown.py +1329 -1329
- package/tui/meters.py +364 -364
- package/tui/ravens.py +146 -146
- package/tui/screens.py +1255 -1197
- package/tui/themes.py +599 -599
- package/tui/widgets.py +3861 -3796
package/security/askpass.py
CHANGED
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@@ -1,419 +1,419 @@
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"""
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security/askpass.py
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ROADMAP_v3 §49 slice 5a (SS63, SS64). How a stored secret reaches `ssh`
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without ever being in `ssh`'s environment, its argv, or a file.
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THE PROPERTY THIS PRESERVES (SS63)
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----------------------------------
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Slice 4's SS47 read as "BatchMode=yes", but `BatchMode` was never the
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property -- it was that **`ssh` can never prompt on a terminal this process
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does not own**. `BatchMode=yes` guaranteed that by refusing to prompt at
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all, which also meant an encrypted key or a password host simply could not
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be used. `SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE=force` guarantees the same thing the other
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way round: every prompt goes to a helper that answers immediately and
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cannot block.
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Measured, on this machine, against a real sshd (batch 103):
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* with `BatchMode=no` and NO askpass, Windows OpenSSH 9.5p2 HUNG -- 20 s
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and still waiting, trying to prompt on a terminal this process does not
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own. That is SS47's measurement reproduced, and it is what this module
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exists to prevent;
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* with `SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE=force` and a helper, the same call returned
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in 0.8 s, rc=0. Both binaries on this box agree;
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* the Git-for-Windows build did NOT hang under the same conditions
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(3.1 s, refused). So the hang is a property of the BUILD, which is
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exactly why the guarantee may not rest on "ssh will give up".
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**When no secret is stored for the host, `BatchMode=yes` is kept exactly as
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slice 4 shipped it** and none of this module runs. A user on key-and-agent
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auth sees an argv that has not moved by a single option.
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WHY A SOCKET AND NOT AN ENVIRONMENT VARIABLE (SS64)
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---------------------------------------------------
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`ssh` passes its whole environment to the askpass child, so the obvious
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implementation puts the password in a variable and the helper echoes it.
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That environment is readable by any process running as this user --
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`/proc/<pid>/environ` on Linux, the PEB on Windows -- which is precisely
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the property that got an OS keystore rejected for the store itself.
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So the environment carries a single-use TOKEN and a port. The helper
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forwards `(token, prompt)` and is handed one answer.
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**What that buys, stated precisely rather than oversold:** an attacker who
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can read `ssh`'s environment gets a token, and must then be present during
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the connection window and win a race against the helper. An attacker who
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can do that could have read the password from the environment at the moment
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it mattered anyway. This is a real narrowing of the window -- from "at rest
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for the life of the process" to "during one connection" -- and it is not a
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boundary. The helper holds no secret and no policy, which is what makes it
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safe to leave on disk.
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THE CORRECTION THE PROBE FORCED
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-------------------------------
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This was designed as a ONE-SHOT listener: one connection, one secret, then
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closed. Measured, that is wrong. A WRONG password produced **two** askpass
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invocations despite `NumberOfPasswordPrompts=1`, because
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`keyboard-interactive` and `password` are separate authentication methods
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and each gets its own prompt budget. A stacked host
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(`AuthenticationMethods publickey,password`) legitimately makes two asks
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too -- the key passphrase and then the account password. So the listener
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serves a BOUNDED NUMBER of prompts within one connection window, and the
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bound is what stops a runaway rather than the count of one.
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THE PROMPT STRINGS ARE MEASURED, NOT GUESSED
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--------------------------------------------
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The harness decides which secret answers which prompt, so these are policy
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input. All three were captured from a real `ssh` (batch 103):
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Enter passphrase for key 'C:\\Users\\...\\19552cfb-c47c-4e1a-b':
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venprobe@127.0.0.1's password:
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(venprobe@127.0.0.1) Password:
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**The key prompt's path is TRUNCATED mid-string** -- OpenSSH cuts the
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prompt to a fixed width -- so matching it against the identity file's path
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would fail on any path longer than about sixty characters, which is most of
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them. The prefix is what is dependable. The two password forms are the two
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authentication methods: `password` produces the first, `keyboard-interactive`
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the second, and a server offering both serves keyboard-interactive.
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An unrecognised prompt is REFUSED and locks the store. An askpass that
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answers a question it did not understand is the wrong secret sent to the
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wrong prompt, and the one question `ssh` might ask that is not either of
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these is a trust decision -- which SS49 already answers by pinning the host
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key, and which must never be answered by a program.
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"""
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import hmac
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import logging
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import os
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import shutil
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import socket
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import stat
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import sys
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import tempfile
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import threading
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import time
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from security import secrets
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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#: Logical names the caller supplies answers under.
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KEY_PASSPHRASE = "key_passphrase"
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LOGIN = "login"
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#: Measured (batch 103). PREFIX only: OpenSSH truncates this prompt, so the
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#: path in it is not the identity file's path and cannot be matched on.
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_KEY_PROMPT_PREFIX = "Enter passphrase for key "
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#: Measured: the `password` method and the `keyboard-interactive` method.
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_PASSWORD_SUFFIXES = ("'s password: ", ") Password: ")
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#: How many prompts one connection window may legitimately produce. A
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#: stacked host asks twice; a wrong password asks twice; the cap is above
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#: both and low enough that a loop is refused rather than served.
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MAX_SERVES = 6
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#: How long the listener stays open. Bounded by `ConnectTimeout` and the
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#: session in practice; this is the backstop for a connection that neither
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#: succeeds nor fails.
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DEADLINE_S = 120.0
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#: How long the helper may take between connecting and asking.
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_CLIENT_TIMEOUT_S = 10.0
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#: How often the accept loop wakes to check whether it has been stopped.
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_ACCEPT_POLL_S = 0.5
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#: The helper, as source. It imports nothing but the stdlib, holds no secret
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#: and makes no decision -- it is a pipe with a password on it, which is what
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#: makes it safe to write to a temp directory.
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_HELPER_SOURCE = '''\
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import os
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import socket
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import sys
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token = os.environ.get("VEN_ASKPASS_TOKEN", "")
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port = int(os.environ.get("VEN_ASKPASS_PORT", "0") or 0)
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prompt = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else ""
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if not token or not port:
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sys.exit(1)
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try:
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conn = socket.create_connection(("127.0.0.1", port), 10)
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except OSError:
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sys.exit(1)
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try:
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conn.sendall((token + "\\n" + prompt + "\\n\\n").encode("utf-8"))
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buf = b""
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while not buf.endswith(b"\\n") and len(buf) < 65536:
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chunk = conn.recv(4096)
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if not chunk:
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break
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buf += chunk
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finally:
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conn.close()
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if buf.strip() == b"":
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sys.exit(1)
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sys.stdout.write(buf.decode("utf-8", "replace"))
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'''
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def classify(prompt: str):
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"""Which stored secret answers *prompt*, or None to refuse.
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The one place a prompt string becomes a decision. Returns a logical
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name rather than a value, so this function can be tested against the
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measured strings without a store existing at all.
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"""
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if prompt.startswith(_KEY_PROMPT_PREFIX):
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return KEY_PASSPHRASE
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for suffix in _PASSWORD_SUFFIXES:
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if prompt.endswith(suffix):
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return LOGIN
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return None
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class _Listener:
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"""One connection window's worth of answering."""
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def __init__(self, answers: dict) -> None:
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#: {logical name -> Secret}. Absent means "refuse that prompt",
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#: which is how a host with a passphrase but no password still gets
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#: a refusal rather than an empty string for the password ask.
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self._answers = answers
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self._token = os.urandom(32).hex()
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self._sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
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self._sock.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
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self._sock.listen(8)
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# HERE, not at the top of `_run`. The thread may not reach its
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# first statement before `close()` runs -- a `serving` block can be
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# that short -- and on Windows calling anything on a closed socket
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# raises WinError 10038, which as an unhandled thread exception
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# prints a traceback to stderr. Setting it while this object is
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# still the only thing holding the socket removes the race rather
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# than catching it.
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self._sock.settimeout(_ACCEPT_POLL_S)
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self.port = self._sock.getsockname()[1]
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self.served = []
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self.refusal = ""
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self._stop = threading.Event()
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self._thread = threading.Thread(
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target=self._run, name="venastine-askpass", daemon=True)
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# -- the answering loop -------------------------------------------------
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def _refuse(self, why: str) -> None:
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"""Refuse, and LOCK (SS60).
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Every refusal here means something asked for a secret in a way the
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harness did not arrange: a token it should not have, a prompt
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nobody measured, or more asks than a connection can legitimately
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make. None of those is a condition to keep plaintext through.
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NAMES the cause, never the prompt's content or any value.
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"""
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if not self.refusal:
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self.refusal = why
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logger.warning("askpass: refused (%s)", why)
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secrets.lock("askpass refused: %s" % why)
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def _run(self) -> None:
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219
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-
try:
|
|
220
|
-
self._loop()
|
|
221
|
-
except OSError:
|
|
222
|
-
# The socket was closed underneath us, which is what `close()`
|
|
223
|
-
# does and is not a failure. Belt and braces over the
|
|
224
|
-
# `settimeout` move above: this thread must never raise, because
|
|
225
|
-
# an unhandled thread exception is a traceback on stderr and
|
|
226
|
-
# nothing here is worth painting over a running TUI for.
|
|
227
|
-
return
|
|
228
|
-
|
|
229
|
-
def _loop(self) -> None:
|
|
230
|
-
deadline = time.monotonic() + DEADLINE_S
|
|
231
|
-
while not self._stop.is_set():
|
|
232
|
-
if time.monotonic() > deadline:
|
|
233
|
-
self._refuse("deadline")
|
|
234
|
-
return
|
|
235
|
-
try:
|
|
236
|
-
conn, _ = self._sock.accept()
|
|
237
|
-
except TimeoutError:
|
|
238
|
-
continue
|
|
239
|
-
except OSError:
|
|
240
|
-
return
|
|
241
|
-
try:
|
|
242
|
-
self._answer(conn)
|
|
243
|
-
except OSError as exc:
|
|
244
|
-
self._refuse("connection error: %s" % type(exc).__name__)
|
|
245
|
-
finally:
|
|
246
|
-
try:
|
|
247
|
-
conn.close()
|
|
248
|
-
except OSError:
|
|
249
|
-
pass # the connection is finished either way; a failed close says nothing
|
|
250
|
-
|
|
251
|
-
def _answer(self, conn) -> None:
|
|
252
|
-
conn.settimeout(_CLIENT_TIMEOUT_S)
|
|
253
|
-
data = b""
|
|
254
|
-
while b"\n\n" not in data and len(data) < 8192:
|
|
255
|
-
chunk = conn.recv(4096)
|
|
256
|
-
if not chunk:
|
|
257
|
-
break
|
|
258
|
-
data += chunk
|
|
259
|
-
token, _, rest = data.partition(b"\n")
|
|
260
|
-
prompt = rest.partition(b"\n")[0]
|
|
261
|
-
# compare_digest, not ==. The token is a secret of its own for the
|
|
262
|
-
# length of one connection, and a timing oracle on it is a timing
|
|
263
|
-
# oracle on the password behind it.
|
|
264
|
-
# REFUSE FIRST, REPLY SECOND, in all four branches. The reply is
|
|
265
|
-
# an empty line, which makes the helper exit non-zero and ssh give
|
|
266
|
-
# up -- but sending it before `_refuse` has locked the store leaves
|
|
267
|
-
# a window in which the answer is already out and the plaintext is
|
|
268
|
-
# still held. The window is small and it is not nothing, and
|
|
269
|
-
# closing it costs the two lines being swapped.
|
|
270
|
-
#
|
|
271
|
-
# It also makes the refusal OBSERVABLE the moment the client's
|
|
272
|
-
# `recv` returns, which is what lets the tests assert it without a
|
|
273
|
-
# local wait helper -- and a local wait helper is what
|
|
274
|
-
# `test_pilot_wait.py` forbids, for the reason five copies of one
|
|
275
|
-
# taught this project.
|
|
276
|
-
if not hmac.compare_digest(token.decode("utf-8", "replace"),
|
|
277
|
-
self._token):
|
|
278
|
-
self._refuse("bad token")
|
|
279
|
-
conn.sendall(b"\n")
|
|
280
|
-
return
|
|
281
|
-
if len(self.served) >= MAX_SERVES:
|
|
282
|
-
self._refuse("more prompts than a connection can make")
|
|
283
|
-
conn.sendall(b"\n")
|
|
284
|
-
return
|
|
285
|
-
name = classify(prompt.decode("utf-8", "replace"))
|
|
286
|
-
if name is None:
|
|
287
|
-
self._refuse("unrecognised prompt")
|
|
288
|
-
conn.sendall(b"\n")
|
|
289
|
-
return
|
|
290
|
-
secret = self._answers.get(name)
|
|
291
|
-
if secret is None:
|
|
292
|
-
self._refuse("no stored secret answers a %s prompt" % name)
|
|
293
|
-
conn.sendall(b"\n")
|
|
294
|
-
return
|
|
295
|
-
conn.sendall(secret.reveal() + b"\n")
|
|
296
|
-
self.served.append(name)
|
|
297
|
-
|
|
298
|
-
# -- lifecycle ----------------------------------------------------------
|
|
299
|
-
|
|
300
|
-
def start(self) -> None:
|
|
301
|
-
self._thread.start()
|
|
302
|
-
|
|
303
|
-
def close(self) -> None:
|
|
304
|
-
self._stop.set()
|
|
305
|
-
try:
|
|
306
|
-
self._sock.close()
|
|
307
|
-
except OSError:
|
|
308
|
-
pass # already closed; shutting down goes on
|
|
309
|
-
self._thread.join(timeout=3)
|
|
310
|
-
|
|
311
|
-
@property
|
|
312
|
-
def token(self) -> str:
|
|
313
|
-
return self._token
|
|
314
|
-
|
|
315
|
-
|
|
316
|
-
def _write_helper(directory: str) -> str:
|
|
317
|
-
"""Write the helper and return what `SSH_ASKPASS` should point at.
|
|
318
|
-
|
|
319
|
-
On Windows `SSH_ASKPASS` has to name something `CreateProcess` can run
|
|
320
|
-
and takes no arguments of its own, so the script cannot be named
|
|
321
|
-
directly -- a `.cmd` shim carries the interpreter. Measured: both a
|
|
322
|
-
`.cmd` and a `.bat` work, and the prompt reaches the script as
|
|
323
|
-
`argv[1]` through either.
|
|
324
|
-
|
|
325
|
-
On POSIX the script is executable with its own shebang and no shim.
|
|
326
|
-
"""
|
|
327
|
-
script = os.path.join(directory, "venastine_askpass.py")
|
|
328
|
-
with open(script, "w", encoding="utf-8", newline="\n") as handle:
|
|
329
|
-
handle.write(_HELPER_SOURCE)
|
|
330
|
-
if os.name == "nt":
|
|
331
|
-
shim = os.path.join(directory, "venastine_askpass.cmd")
|
|
332
|
-
with open(shim, "w", newline="") as handle:
|
|
333
|
-
handle.write('@echo off\r\n"%s" "%s" %%*\r\n'
|
|
334
|
-
% (sys.executable, script))
|
|
335
|
-
return shim
|
|
336
|
-
os.chmod(script, stat.S_IRWXU)
|
|
337
|
-
launcher = os.path.join(directory, "venastine_askpass.sh")
|
|
338
|
-
with open(launcher, "w", encoding="utf-8", newline="\n") as handle:
|
|
339
|
-
handle.write('#!/bin/sh\nexec "%s" "%s" "$@"\n'
|
|
340
|
-
% (sys.executable, script))
|
|
341
|
-
os.chmod(launcher, stat.S_IRWXU)
|
|
342
|
-
return launcher
|
|
343
|
-
|
|
344
|
-
|
|
345
|
-
class Serving:
|
|
346
|
-
"""The live connection window: what the environment must carry, and
|
|
347
|
-
what happened."""
|
|
348
|
-
|
|
349
|
-
def __init__(self, listener: _Listener, env: dict) -> None:
|
|
350
|
-
self._listener = listener
|
|
351
|
-
self.env = env
|
|
352
|
-
|
|
353
|
-
@property
|
|
354
|
-
def served(self) -> list:
|
|
355
|
-
return list(self._listener.served)
|
|
356
|
-
|
|
357
|
-
@property
|
|
358
|
-
def refusal(self) -> str:
|
|
359
|
-
return self._listener.refusal
|
|
360
|
-
|
|
361
|
-
|
|
362
|
-
class serving:
|
|
363
|
-
"""Context manager: stand up a listener and a helper for one connection.
|
|
364
|
-
|
|
365
|
-
Yields a `Serving` whose `.env` is the fragment to merge into the
|
|
366
|
-
subprocess environment. On exit the listener is closed and the helper
|
|
367
|
-
directory removed, whatever happened -- and an exception escaping the
|
|
368
|
-
block locks the store, because an unknown state is not a state to hold
|
|
369
|
-
plaintext through (SS60).
|
|
370
|
-
|
|
371
|
-
Not a `@contextlib.contextmanager` generator: the cleanup has to run on
|
|
372
|
-
every path including the one where `__enter__` itself fails partway,
|
|
373
|
-
and a class makes each half explicit.
|
|
374
|
-
"""
|
|
375
|
-
|
|
376
|
-
def __init__(self, answers: dict) -> None:
|
|
377
|
-
# No None-filter here, and that is a deliberate removal: one was
|
|
378
|
-
# written, and the mutation pass showed it can never be observed,
|
|
379
|
-
# because `_Listener._answer` checks for a missing answer anyway
|
|
380
|
-
# and a None value reaches the same refusal. Two guards where one
|
|
381
|
-
# fires is the shape that reads as protection without being any.
|
|
382
|
-
self._answers = dict(answers)
|
|
383
|
-
self._listener = None
|
|
384
|
-
self._dir = ""
|
|
385
|
-
|
|
386
|
-
def __enter__(self) -> Serving:
|
|
387
|
-
self._dir = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="venastine-askpass-")
|
|
388
|
-
try:
|
|
389
|
-
helper = _write_helper(self._dir)
|
|
390
|
-
self._listener = _Listener(self._answers)
|
|
391
|
-
self._listener.start()
|
|
392
|
-
except BaseException:
|
|
393
|
-
self._cleanup()
|
|
394
|
-
raise
|
|
395
|
-
env = {
|
|
396
|
-
"SSH_ASKPASS": helper,
|
|
397
|
-
# The whole guarantee. Without `force`, ssh uses askpass only
|
|
398
|
-
# when it has no terminal AND DISPLAY is set -- and with a
|
|
399
|
-
# terminal it prompts, which is the 20-second hang measured
|
|
400
|
-
# above.
|
|
401
|
-
"SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE": "force",
|
|
402
|
-
"VEN_ASKPASS_TOKEN": self._listener.token,
|
|
403
|
-
"VEN_ASKPASS_PORT": str(self._listener.port),
|
|
404
|
-
}
|
|
405
|
-
return Serving(self._listener, env)
|
|
406
|
-
|
|
407
|
-
def __exit__(self, exc_type, exc, tb) -> bool:
|
|
408
|
-
self._cleanup()
|
|
409
|
-
if exc_type is not None:
|
|
410
|
-
secrets.lock("exception during an askpass connection")
|
|
411
|
-
return False
|
|
412
|
-
|
|
413
|
-
def _cleanup(self) -> None:
|
|
414
|
-
if self._listener is not None:
|
|
415
|
-
self._listener.close()
|
|
416
|
-
self._listener = None
|
|
417
|
-
if self._dir:
|
|
418
|
-
shutil.rmtree(self._dir, ignore_errors=True)
|
|
419
|
-
self._dir = ""
|
|
1
|
+
"""
|
|
2
|
+
security/askpass.py
|
|
3
|
+
|
|
4
|
+
ROADMAP_v3 §49 slice 5a (SS63, SS64). How a stored secret reaches `ssh`
|
|
5
|
+
without ever being in `ssh`'s environment, its argv, or a file.
|
|
6
|
+
|
|
7
|
+
THE PROPERTY THIS PRESERVES (SS63)
|
|
8
|
+
----------------------------------
|
|
9
|
+
Slice 4's SS47 read as "BatchMode=yes", but `BatchMode` was never the
|
|
10
|
+
property -- it was that **`ssh` can never prompt on a terminal this process
|
|
11
|
+
does not own**. `BatchMode=yes` guaranteed that by refusing to prompt at
|
|
12
|
+
all, which also meant an encrypted key or a password host simply could not
|
|
13
|
+
be used. `SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE=force` guarantees the same thing the other
|
|
14
|
+
way round: every prompt goes to a helper that answers immediately and
|
|
15
|
+
cannot block.
|
|
16
|
+
|
|
17
|
+
Measured, on this machine, against a real sshd (batch 103):
|
|
18
|
+
|
|
19
|
+
* with `BatchMode=no` and NO askpass, Windows OpenSSH 9.5p2 HUNG -- 20 s
|
|
20
|
+
and still waiting, trying to prompt on a terminal this process does not
|
|
21
|
+
own. That is SS47's measurement reproduced, and it is what this module
|
|
22
|
+
exists to prevent;
|
|
23
|
+
* with `SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE=force` and a helper, the same call returned
|
|
24
|
+
in 0.8 s, rc=0. Both binaries on this box agree;
|
|
25
|
+
* the Git-for-Windows build did NOT hang under the same conditions
|
|
26
|
+
(3.1 s, refused). So the hang is a property of the BUILD, which is
|
|
27
|
+
exactly why the guarantee may not rest on "ssh will give up".
|
|
28
|
+
|
|
29
|
+
**When no secret is stored for the host, `BatchMode=yes` is kept exactly as
|
|
30
|
+
slice 4 shipped it** and none of this module runs. A user on key-and-agent
|
|
31
|
+
auth sees an argv that has not moved by a single option.
|
|
32
|
+
|
|
33
|
+
WHY A SOCKET AND NOT AN ENVIRONMENT VARIABLE (SS64)
|
|
34
|
+
---------------------------------------------------
|
|
35
|
+
`ssh` passes its whole environment to the askpass child, so the obvious
|
|
36
|
+
implementation puts the password in a variable and the helper echoes it.
|
|
37
|
+
That environment is readable by any process running as this user --
|
|
38
|
+
`/proc/<pid>/environ` on Linux, the PEB on Windows -- which is precisely
|
|
39
|
+
the property that got an OS keystore rejected for the store itself.
|
|
40
|
+
|
|
41
|
+
So the environment carries a single-use TOKEN and a port. The helper
|
|
42
|
+
forwards `(token, prompt)` and is handed one answer.
|
|
43
|
+
|
|
44
|
+
**What that buys, stated precisely rather than oversold:** an attacker who
|
|
45
|
+
can read `ssh`'s environment gets a token, and must then be present during
|
|
46
|
+
the connection window and win a race against the helper. An attacker who
|
|
47
|
+
can do that could have read the password from the environment at the moment
|
|
48
|
+
it mattered anyway. This is a real narrowing of the window -- from "at rest
|
|
49
|
+
for the life of the process" to "during one connection" -- and it is not a
|
|
50
|
+
boundary. The helper holds no secret and no policy, which is what makes it
|
|
51
|
+
safe to leave on disk.
|
|
52
|
+
|
|
53
|
+
THE CORRECTION THE PROBE FORCED
|
|
54
|
+
-------------------------------
|
|
55
|
+
This was designed as a ONE-SHOT listener: one connection, one secret, then
|
|
56
|
+
closed. Measured, that is wrong. A WRONG password produced **two** askpass
|
|
57
|
+
invocations despite `NumberOfPasswordPrompts=1`, because
|
|
58
|
+
`keyboard-interactive` and `password` are separate authentication methods
|
|
59
|
+
and each gets its own prompt budget. A stacked host
|
|
60
|
+
(`AuthenticationMethods publickey,password`) legitimately makes two asks
|
|
61
|
+
too -- the key passphrase and then the account password. So the listener
|
|
62
|
+
serves a BOUNDED NUMBER of prompts within one connection window, and the
|
|
63
|
+
bound is what stops a runaway rather than the count of one.
|
|
64
|
+
|
|
65
|
+
THE PROMPT STRINGS ARE MEASURED, NOT GUESSED
|
|
66
|
+
--------------------------------------------
|
|
67
|
+
The harness decides which secret answers which prompt, so these are policy
|
|
68
|
+
input. All three were captured from a real `ssh` (batch 103):
|
|
69
|
+
|
|
70
|
+
Enter passphrase for key 'C:\\Users\\...\\19552cfb-c47c-4e1a-b':
|
|
71
|
+
venprobe@127.0.0.1's password:
|
|
72
|
+
(venprobe@127.0.0.1) Password:
|
|
73
|
+
|
|
74
|
+
**The key prompt's path is TRUNCATED mid-string** -- OpenSSH cuts the
|
|
75
|
+
prompt to a fixed width -- so matching it against the identity file's path
|
|
76
|
+
would fail on any path longer than about sixty characters, which is most of
|
|
77
|
+
them. The prefix is what is dependable. The two password forms are the two
|
|
78
|
+
authentication methods: `password` produces the first, `keyboard-interactive`
|
|
79
|
+
the second, and a server offering both serves keyboard-interactive.
|
|
80
|
+
|
|
81
|
+
An unrecognised prompt is REFUSED and locks the store. An askpass that
|
|
82
|
+
answers a question it did not understand is the wrong secret sent to the
|
|
83
|
+
wrong prompt, and the one question `ssh` might ask that is not either of
|
|
84
|
+
these is a trust decision -- which SS49 already answers by pinning the host
|
|
85
|
+
key, and which must never be answered by a program.
|
|
86
|
+
"""
|
|
87
|
+
|
|
88
|
+
import hmac
|
|
89
|
+
import logging
|
|
90
|
+
import os
|
|
91
|
+
import shutil
|
|
92
|
+
import socket
|
|
93
|
+
import stat
|
|
94
|
+
import sys
|
|
95
|
+
import tempfile
|
|
96
|
+
import threading
|
|
97
|
+
import time
|
|
98
|
+
|
|
99
|
+
from security import secrets
|
|
100
|
+
|
|
101
|
+
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
|
|
102
|
+
|
|
103
|
+
#: Logical names the caller supplies answers under.
|
|
104
|
+
KEY_PASSPHRASE = "key_passphrase"
|
|
105
|
+
LOGIN = "login"
|
|
106
|
+
|
|
107
|
+
#: Measured (batch 103). PREFIX only: OpenSSH truncates this prompt, so the
|
|
108
|
+
#: path in it is not the identity file's path and cannot be matched on.
|
|
109
|
+
_KEY_PROMPT_PREFIX = "Enter passphrase for key "
|
|
110
|
+
#: Measured: the `password` method and the `keyboard-interactive` method.
|
|
111
|
+
_PASSWORD_SUFFIXES = ("'s password: ", ") Password: ")
|
|
112
|
+
|
|
113
|
+
#: How many prompts one connection window may legitimately produce. A
|
|
114
|
+
#: stacked host asks twice; a wrong password asks twice; the cap is above
|
|
115
|
+
#: both and low enough that a loop is refused rather than served.
|
|
116
|
+
MAX_SERVES = 6
|
|
117
|
+
#: How long the listener stays open. Bounded by `ConnectTimeout` and the
|
|
118
|
+
#: session in practice; this is the backstop for a connection that neither
|
|
119
|
+
#: succeeds nor fails.
|
|
120
|
+
DEADLINE_S = 120.0
|
|
121
|
+
#: How long the helper may take between connecting and asking.
|
|
122
|
+
_CLIENT_TIMEOUT_S = 10.0
|
|
123
|
+
#: How often the accept loop wakes to check whether it has been stopped.
|
|
124
|
+
_ACCEPT_POLL_S = 0.5
|
|
125
|
+
|
|
126
|
+
#: The helper, as source. It imports nothing but the stdlib, holds no secret
|
|
127
|
+
#: and makes no decision -- it is a pipe with a password on it, which is what
|
|
128
|
+
#: makes it safe to write to a temp directory.
|
|
129
|
+
_HELPER_SOURCE = '''\
|
|
130
|
+
import os
|
|
131
|
+
import socket
|
|
132
|
+
import sys
|
|
133
|
+
|
|
134
|
+
token = os.environ.get("VEN_ASKPASS_TOKEN", "")
|
|
135
|
+
port = int(os.environ.get("VEN_ASKPASS_PORT", "0") or 0)
|
|
136
|
+
prompt = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else ""
|
|
137
|
+
if not token or not port:
|
|
138
|
+
sys.exit(1)
|
|
139
|
+
try:
|
|
140
|
+
conn = socket.create_connection(("127.0.0.1", port), 10)
|
|
141
|
+
except OSError:
|
|
142
|
+
sys.exit(1)
|
|
143
|
+
try:
|
|
144
|
+
conn.sendall((token + "\\n" + prompt + "\\n\\n").encode("utf-8"))
|
|
145
|
+
buf = b""
|
|
146
|
+
while not buf.endswith(b"\\n") and len(buf) < 65536:
|
|
147
|
+
chunk = conn.recv(4096)
|
|
148
|
+
if not chunk:
|
|
149
|
+
break
|
|
150
|
+
buf += chunk
|
|
151
|
+
finally:
|
|
152
|
+
conn.close()
|
|
153
|
+
if buf.strip() == b"":
|
|
154
|
+
sys.exit(1)
|
|
155
|
+
sys.stdout.write(buf.decode("utf-8", "replace"))
|
|
156
|
+
'''
|
|
157
|
+
|
|
158
|
+
|
|
159
|
+
def classify(prompt: str):
|
|
160
|
+
"""Which stored secret answers *prompt*, or None to refuse.
|
|
161
|
+
|
|
162
|
+
The one place a prompt string becomes a decision. Returns a logical
|
|
163
|
+
name rather than a value, so this function can be tested against the
|
|
164
|
+
measured strings without a store existing at all.
|
|
165
|
+
"""
|
|
166
|
+
if prompt.startswith(_KEY_PROMPT_PREFIX):
|
|
167
|
+
return KEY_PASSPHRASE
|
|
168
|
+
for suffix in _PASSWORD_SUFFIXES:
|
|
169
|
+
if prompt.endswith(suffix):
|
|
170
|
+
return LOGIN
|
|
171
|
+
return None
|
|
172
|
+
|
|
173
|
+
|
|
174
|
+
class _Listener:
|
|
175
|
+
"""One connection window's worth of answering."""
|
|
176
|
+
|
|
177
|
+
def __init__(self, answers: dict) -> None:
|
|
178
|
+
#: {logical name -> Secret}. Absent means "refuse that prompt",
|
|
179
|
+
#: which is how a host with a passphrase but no password still gets
|
|
180
|
+
#: a refusal rather than an empty string for the password ask.
|
|
181
|
+
self._answers = answers
|
|
182
|
+
self._token = os.urandom(32).hex()
|
|
183
|
+
self._sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
|
|
184
|
+
self._sock.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
|
|
185
|
+
self._sock.listen(8)
|
|
186
|
+
# HERE, not at the top of `_run`. The thread may not reach its
|
|
187
|
+
# first statement before `close()` runs -- a `serving` block can be
|
|
188
|
+
# that short -- and on Windows calling anything on a closed socket
|
|
189
|
+
# raises WinError 10038, which as an unhandled thread exception
|
|
190
|
+
# prints a traceback to stderr. Setting it while this object is
|
|
191
|
+
# still the only thing holding the socket removes the race rather
|
|
192
|
+
# than catching it.
|
|
193
|
+
self._sock.settimeout(_ACCEPT_POLL_S)
|
|
194
|
+
self.port = self._sock.getsockname()[1]
|
|
195
|
+
self.served = []
|
|
196
|
+
self.refusal = ""
|
|
197
|
+
self._stop = threading.Event()
|
|
198
|
+
self._thread = threading.Thread(
|
|
199
|
+
target=self._run, name="venastine-askpass", daemon=True)
|
|
200
|
+
|
|
201
|
+
# -- the answering loop -------------------------------------------------
|
|
202
|
+
|
|
203
|
+
def _refuse(self, why: str) -> None:
|
|
204
|
+
"""Refuse, and LOCK (SS60).
|
|
205
|
+
|
|
206
|
+
Every refusal here means something asked for a secret in a way the
|
|
207
|
+
harness did not arrange: a token it should not have, a prompt
|
|
208
|
+
nobody measured, or more asks than a connection can legitimately
|
|
209
|
+
make. None of those is a condition to keep plaintext through.
|
|
210
|
+
|
|
211
|
+
NAMES the cause, never the prompt's content or any value.
|
|
212
|
+
"""
|
|
213
|
+
if not self.refusal:
|
|
214
|
+
self.refusal = why
|
|
215
|
+
logger.warning("askpass: refused (%s)", why)
|
|
216
|
+
secrets.lock("askpass refused: %s" % why)
|
|
217
|
+
|
|
218
|
+
def _run(self) -> None:
|
|
219
|
+
try:
|
|
220
|
+
self._loop()
|
|
221
|
+
except OSError:
|
|
222
|
+
# The socket was closed underneath us, which is what `close()`
|
|
223
|
+
# does and is not a failure. Belt and braces over the
|
|
224
|
+
# `settimeout` move above: this thread must never raise, because
|
|
225
|
+
# an unhandled thread exception is a traceback on stderr and
|
|
226
|
+
# nothing here is worth painting over a running TUI for.
|
|
227
|
+
return
|
|
228
|
+
|
|
229
|
+
def _loop(self) -> None:
|
|
230
|
+
deadline = time.monotonic() + DEADLINE_S
|
|
231
|
+
while not self._stop.is_set():
|
|
232
|
+
if time.monotonic() > deadline:
|
|
233
|
+
self._refuse("deadline")
|
|
234
|
+
return
|
|
235
|
+
try:
|
|
236
|
+
conn, _ = self._sock.accept()
|
|
237
|
+
except TimeoutError:
|
|
238
|
+
continue
|
|
239
|
+
except OSError:
|
|
240
|
+
return
|
|
241
|
+
try:
|
|
242
|
+
self._answer(conn)
|
|
243
|
+
except OSError as exc:
|
|
244
|
+
self._refuse("connection error: %s" % type(exc).__name__)
|
|
245
|
+
finally:
|
|
246
|
+
try:
|
|
247
|
+
conn.close()
|
|
248
|
+
except OSError:
|
|
249
|
+
pass # the connection is finished either way; a failed close says nothing
|
|
250
|
+
|
|
251
|
+
def _answer(self, conn) -> None:
|
|
252
|
+
conn.settimeout(_CLIENT_TIMEOUT_S)
|
|
253
|
+
data = b""
|
|
254
|
+
while b"\n\n" not in data and len(data) < 8192:
|
|
255
|
+
chunk = conn.recv(4096)
|
|
256
|
+
if not chunk:
|
|
257
|
+
break
|
|
258
|
+
data += chunk
|
|
259
|
+
token, _, rest = data.partition(b"\n")
|
|
260
|
+
prompt = rest.partition(b"\n")[0]
|
|
261
|
+
# compare_digest, not ==. The token is a secret of its own for the
|
|
262
|
+
# length of one connection, and a timing oracle on it is a timing
|
|
263
|
+
# oracle on the password behind it.
|
|
264
|
+
# REFUSE FIRST, REPLY SECOND, in all four branches. The reply is
|
|
265
|
+
# an empty line, which makes the helper exit non-zero and ssh give
|
|
266
|
+
# up -- but sending it before `_refuse` has locked the store leaves
|
|
267
|
+
# a window in which the answer is already out and the plaintext is
|
|
268
|
+
# still held. The window is small and it is not nothing, and
|
|
269
|
+
# closing it costs the two lines being swapped.
|
|
270
|
+
#
|
|
271
|
+
# It also makes the refusal OBSERVABLE the moment the client's
|
|
272
|
+
# `recv` returns, which is what lets the tests assert it without a
|
|
273
|
+
# local wait helper -- and a local wait helper is what
|
|
274
|
+
# `test_pilot_wait.py` forbids, for the reason five copies of one
|
|
275
|
+
# taught this project.
|
|
276
|
+
if not hmac.compare_digest(token.decode("utf-8", "replace"),
|
|
277
|
+
self._token):
|
|
278
|
+
self._refuse("bad token")
|
|
279
|
+
conn.sendall(b"\n")
|
|
280
|
+
return
|
|
281
|
+
if len(self.served) >= MAX_SERVES:
|
|
282
|
+
self._refuse("more prompts than a connection can make")
|
|
283
|
+
conn.sendall(b"\n")
|
|
284
|
+
return
|
|
285
|
+
name = classify(prompt.decode("utf-8", "replace"))
|
|
286
|
+
if name is None:
|
|
287
|
+
self._refuse("unrecognised prompt")
|
|
288
|
+
conn.sendall(b"\n")
|
|
289
|
+
return
|
|
290
|
+
secret = self._answers.get(name)
|
|
291
|
+
if secret is None:
|
|
292
|
+
self._refuse("no stored secret answers a %s prompt" % name)
|
|
293
|
+
conn.sendall(b"\n")
|
|
294
|
+
return
|
|
295
|
+
conn.sendall(secret.reveal() + b"\n")
|
|
296
|
+
self.served.append(name)
|
|
297
|
+
|
|
298
|
+
# -- lifecycle ----------------------------------------------------------
|
|
299
|
+
|
|
300
|
+
def start(self) -> None:
|
|
301
|
+
self._thread.start()
|
|
302
|
+
|
|
303
|
+
def close(self) -> None:
|
|
304
|
+
self._stop.set()
|
|
305
|
+
try:
|
|
306
|
+
self._sock.close()
|
|
307
|
+
except OSError:
|
|
308
|
+
pass # already closed; shutting down goes on
|
|
309
|
+
self._thread.join(timeout=3)
|
|
310
|
+
|
|
311
|
+
@property
|
|
312
|
+
def token(self) -> str:
|
|
313
|
+
return self._token
|
|
314
|
+
|
|
315
|
+
|
|
316
|
+
def _write_helper(directory: str) -> str:
|
|
317
|
+
"""Write the helper and return what `SSH_ASKPASS` should point at.
|
|
318
|
+
|
|
319
|
+
On Windows `SSH_ASKPASS` has to name something `CreateProcess` can run
|
|
320
|
+
and takes no arguments of its own, so the script cannot be named
|
|
321
|
+
directly -- a `.cmd` shim carries the interpreter. Measured: both a
|
|
322
|
+
`.cmd` and a `.bat` work, and the prompt reaches the script as
|
|
323
|
+
`argv[1]` through either.
|
|
324
|
+
|
|
325
|
+
On POSIX the script is executable with its own shebang and no shim.
|
|
326
|
+
"""
|
|
327
|
+
script = os.path.join(directory, "venastine_askpass.py")
|
|
328
|
+
with open(script, "w", encoding="utf-8", newline="\n") as handle:
|
|
329
|
+
handle.write(_HELPER_SOURCE)
|
|
330
|
+
if os.name == "nt":
|
|
331
|
+
shim = os.path.join(directory, "venastine_askpass.cmd")
|
|
332
|
+
with open(shim, "w", newline="") as handle:
|
|
333
|
+
handle.write('@echo off\r\n"%s" "%s" %%*\r\n'
|
|
334
|
+
% (sys.executable, script))
|
|
335
|
+
return shim
|
|
336
|
+
os.chmod(script, stat.S_IRWXU)
|
|
337
|
+
launcher = os.path.join(directory, "venastine_askpass.sh")
|
|
338
|
+
with open(launcher, "w", encoding="utf-8", newline="\n") as handle:
|
|
339
|
+
handle.write('#!/bin/sh\nexec "%s" "%s" "$@"\n'
|
|
340
|
+
% (sys.executable, script))
|
|
341
|
+
os.chmod(launcher, stat.S_IRWXU)
|
|
342
|
+
return launcher
|
|
343
|
+
|
|
344
|
+
|
|
345
|
+
class Serving:
|
|
346
|
+
"""The live connection window: what the environment must carry, and
|
|
347
|
+
what happened."""
|
|
348
|
+
|
|
349
|
+
def __init__(self, listener: _Listener, env: dict) -> None:
|
|
350
|
+
self._listener = listener
|
|
351
|
+
self.env = env
|
|
352
|
+
|
|
353
|
+
@property
|
|
354
|
+
def served(self) -> list:
|
|
355
|
+
return list(self._listener.served)
|
|
356
|
+
|
|
357
|
+
@property
|
|
358
|
+
def refusal(self) -> str:
|
|
359
|
+
return self._listener.refusal
|
|
360
|
+
|
|
361
|
+
|
|
362
|
+
class serving:
|
|
363
|
+
"""Context manager: stand up a listener and a helper for one connection.
|
|
364
|
+
|
|
365
|
+
Yields a `Serving` whose `.env` is the fragment to merge into the
|
|
366
|
+
subprocess environment. On exit the listener is closed and the helper
|
|
367
|
+
directory removed, whatever happened -- and an exception escaping the
|
|
368
|
+
block locks the store, because an unknown state is not a state to hold
|
|
369
|
+
plaintext through (SS60).
|
|
370
|
+
|
|
371
|
+
Not a `@contextlib.contextmanager` generator: the cleanup has to run on
|
|
372
|
+
every path including the one where `__enter__` itself fails partway,
|
|
373
|
+
and a class makes each half explicit.
|
|
374
|
+
"""
|
|
375
|
+
|
|
376
|
+
def __init__(self, answers: dict) -> None:
|
|
377
|
+
# No None-filter here, and that is a deliberate removal: one was
|
|
378
|
+
# written, and the mutation pass showed it can never be observed,
|
|
379
|
+
# because `_Listener._answer` checks for a missing answer anyway
|
|
380
|
+
# and a None value reaches the same refusal. Two guards where one
|
|
381
|
+
# fires is the shape that reads as protection without being any.
|
|
382
|
+
self._answers = dict(answers)
|
|
383
|
+
self._listener = None
|
|
384
|
+
self._dir = ""
|
|
385
|
+
|
|
386
|
+
def __enter__(self) -> Serving:
|
|
387
|
+
self._dir = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="venastine-askpass-")
|
|
388
|
+
try:
|
|
389
|
+
helper = _write_helper(self._dir)
|
|
390
|
+
self._listener = _Listener(self._answers)
|
|
391
|
+
self._listener.start()
|
|
392
|
+
except BaseException:
|
|
393
|
+
self._cleanup()
|
|
394
|
+
raise
|
|
395
|
+
env = {
|
|
396
|
+
"SSH_ASKPASS": helper,
|
|
397
|
+
# The whole guarantee. Without `force`, ssh uses askpass only
|
|
398
|
+
# when it has no terminal AND DISPLAY is set -- and with a
|
|
399
|
+
# terminal it prompts, which is the 20-second hang measured
|
|
400
|
+
# above.
|
|
401
|
+
"SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE": "force",
|
|
402
|
+
"VEN_ASKPASS_TOKEN": self._listener.token,
|
|
403
|
+
"VEN_ASKPASS_PORT": str(self._listener.port),
|
|
404
|
+
}
|
|
405
|
+
return Serving(self._listener, env)
|
|
406
|
+
|
|
407
|
+
def __exit__(self, exc_type, exc, tb) -> bool:
|
|
408
|
+
self._cleanup()
|
|
409
|
+
if exc_type is not None:
|
|
410
|
+
secrets.lock("exception during an askpass connection")
|
|
411
|
+
return False
|
|
412
|
+
|
|
413
|
+
def _cleanup(self) -> None:
|
|
414
|
+
if self._listener is not None:
|
|
415
|
+
self._listener.close()
|
|
416
|
+
self._listener = None
|
|
417
|
+
if self._dir:
|
|
418
|
+
shutil.rmtree(self._dir, ignore_errors=True)
|
|
419
|
+
self._dir = ""
|