@yahyahammad/venastine 0.3.8 → 0.3.10

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (130) hide show
  1. package/.env.example +19 -19
  2. package/CONFIG_ARCHITECTURE.md +2139 -2002
  3. package/LICENSE +201 -201
  4. package/README.md +1043 -1034
  5. package/agents/builtin/compactor.md +75 -75
  6. package/agents/builtin/explore.md +77 -77
  7. package/agents/builtin/pipeline-reviewer.md +100 -100
  8. package/agents/builtin/plan.md +106 -106
  9. package/agents/builtin/review.md +74 -74
  10. package/agents/manager.py +261 -261
  11. package/agents/subagent_tool.py +472 -472
  12. package/agents/tui_commands.py +238 -146
  13. package/bin/venastine.mjs +584 -528
  14. package/bin/venastine.py +73 -71
  15. package/cli_commands.py +848 -835
  16. package/config.yaml +64 -0
  17. package/config_edit.py +1301 -1301
  18. package/config_schema.py +987 -966
  19. package/config_update.py +749 -749
  20. package/core/agent_activity.py +256 -256
  21. package/core/ansi.py +452 -452
  22. package/core/approval.py +137 -137
  23. package/core/call_view.py +364 -364
  24. package/core/cancel.py +121 -121
  25. package/core/chatgpt_auth.py +747 -747
  26. package/core/claims_view.py +107 -107
  27. package/core/client.py +2756 -2715
  28. package/core/commands.py +464 -454
  29. package/core/compaction.py +1735 -1735
  30. package/core/config_loader.py +1982 -1982
  31. package/core/connect.py +686 -686
  32. package/core/events.py +123 -123
  33. package/core/file_mentions.py +280 -280
  34. package/core/interaction.py +411 -411
  35. package/core/loop.py +2566 -2566
  36. package/core/memory.py +482 -482
  37. package/core/pipeline_models.py +190 -190
  38. package/core/provider_errors.py +274 -234
  39. package/core/reasoning/authorization.py +130 -130
  40. package/core/reasoning/base.py +219 -219
  41. package/core/reasoning/confidence_scoring.py +484 -484
  42. package/core/reasoning/events.py +149 -149
  43. package/core/reasoning/orchestrator.py +1561 -1561
  44. package/core/reasoning/output_writer.py +345 -345
  45. package/core/reasoning/payload_validation.py +524 -524
  46. package/core/reasoning/pipeline_storage.py +427 -427
  47. package/core/reasoning/scholar.py +467 -458
  48. package/core/reasoning/source_corpus.py +433 -433
  49. package/core/reasoning/source_scoring.py +855 -855
  50. package/core/replay.py +315 -315
  51. package/core/shell_sessions.py +1553 -1553
  52. package/credentials.py +307 -307
  53. package/database.py +333 -333
  54. package/docs/PRIVACY.md +78 -78
  55. package/docs/SECURITY.md +114 -108
  56. package/docs/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md +148 -148
  57. package/env_secrets.py +118 -118
  58. package/json_store.py +343 -343
  59. package/logging_setup.py +295 -295
  60. package/main.py +3433 -3433
  61. package/mcp_client/client.py +780 -733
  62. package/mcp_client/config.py +484 -484
  63. package/mcp_client/registration.py +343 -343
  64. package/memories/manager.py +147 -147
  65. package/memories/tui_commands.py +319 -239
  66. package/package.json +303 -303
  67. package/project_init/config_files.py +282 -282
  68. package/project_init/generator.py +728 -728
  69. package/project_init/manifest.py +418 -418
  70. package/project_init/tui_commands.py +147 -147
  71. package/prompts/critic_pass.md +24 -24
  72. package/prompts/revalidate.md +25 -25
  73. package/prompts/revise.md +17 -17
  74. package/prompts/source_grounding.md +66 -66
  75. package/prompts/system_prompts.py +316 -316
  76. package/providers.json.example +94 -94
  77. package/pyproject.toml +149 -149
  78. package/requirements.txt +314 -295
  79. package/safety/policy_enforcement.py +1082 -1082
  80. package/security/askpass.py +419 -419
  81. package/security/capability.py +207 -207
  82. package/security/confine.py +484 -484
  83. package/security/hosted.py +182 -182
  84. package/security/permissions.py +237 -237
  85. package/security/protected_paths.py +501 -501
  86. package/security/sandbox.py +4108 -4108
  87. package/skills/builtin/math/formal-specification.md +67 -67
  88. package/skills/builtin/math/numerical-methods.md +66 -66
  89. package/skills/builtin/research/experiment-design.md +62 -62
  90. package/skills/builtin/research/reproducibility.md +55 -55
  91. package/skills/builtin/research/source-evaluation.md +70 -70
  92. package/skills/builtin/research/statistical-inference.md +63 -63
  93. package/skills/builtin/research/technical-writing.md +59 -59
  94. package/skills/builtin/software/code-review.md +61 -61
  95. package/skills/builtin/software/debugging.md +61 -61
  96. package/skills/builtin/software/test-design.md +67 -67
  97. package/skills/tui_commands.py +110 -110
  98. package/storage.py +1338 -1338
  99. package/tools/base.py +465 -465
  100. package/tools/builtin/_math_common.py +667 -667
  101. package/tools/builtin/_net_common.py +1145 -267
  102. package/tools/builtin/_page_text.py +490 -0
  103. package/tools/builtin/_pdf_text.py +113 -0
  104. package/tools/builtin/arxiv.py +685 -681
  105. package/tools/builtin/fetch_url.py +639 -371
  106. package/tools/builtin/file_ops.py +720 -720
  107. package/tools/builtin/geometry.py +184 -184
  108. package/tools/builtin/load_skill.py +76 -76
  109. package/tools/builtin/pin.py +227 -227
  110. package/tools/builtin/probability_stats.py +224 -224
  111. package/tools/builtin/project_docs.py +464 -464
  112. package/tools/builtin/remember.py +175 -175
  113. package/tools/builtin/shell.py +980 -980
  114. package/tools/builtin/todo.py +149 -149
  115. package/tools/builtin/web_search.py +402 -328
  116. package/tools/context.py +159 -159
  117. package/tools/isolation.py +387 -387
  118. package/tools/registry.py +1252 -1242
  119. package/tui/app.py +8372 -8307
  120. package/tui/app.tcss +754 -739
  121. package/tui/commands.py +26 -26
  122. package/tui/diffs.py +286 -286
  123. package/tui/history.py +128 -128
  124. package/tui/hosted_driver.py +102 -102
  125. package/tui/markdown.py +1329 -1329
  126. package/tui/meters.py +364 -364
  127. package/tui/ravens.py +146 -146
  128. package/tui/screens.py +1255 -1197
  129. package/tui/themes.py +599 -599
  130. package/tui/widgets.py +3861 -3796
@@ -1,484 +1,484 @@
1
- """
2
- security/confine.py
3
-
4
- ROADMAP_v3 §79 (HD11). The walls a math tool's child puts up around itself in
5
- a shared hosted deployment: after it has imported SymPy, and before it reads
6
- the expression a visitor's model sent.
7
-
8
- WHY THE MATH CHILD. SymPy's parser ends in `eval` -- `_math_common.py`'s
9
- docstring is the long account of how far that goes -- and in a shared demo
10
- the visitor connects and prompts their OWN model, so they choose every
11
- expression the six math tools are handed. `_validate_ast` is the lock. This
12
- is what stands behind it if that lock ever opens: a child that cannot read
13
- another visitor's files, write anywhere, open a socket, start a process,
14
- signal or trace one, or keep root. `tools/isolation.py` already ran each
15
- call in its own short-lived child for the CPU bound (H2, H3); this module
16
- is what that child does to itself first, so the boundary already existed
17
- and only its walls are new.
18
-
19
- FOUR LAYERS, in the order they go up. Each was measured on the Space before
20
- it was relied on (2026-10-20: Amazon Linux kernel 6.18, x86_64, sessions
21
- running as root with Docker's default capabilities less NET_RAW, Landlock
22
- ABI 7, seccomp filters installable):
23
-
24
- 1. LIMITS. No file may grow past the cap already in force (RLIMIT_FSIZE:
25
- zero, or the cap isolation.py puts on the two output files it hands
26
- a math child), few descriptors, no core dump, and the process is
27
- non-dumpable. CPU and memory are already bounded by isolation.py's
28
- preexec_fn.
29
- 2. IDENTITY. A child started as root becomes `nobody`, and loses every
30
- capability with it -- DAC_OVERRIDE above all, which is what lets root
31
- read a 0700 directory it does not own. Why the session environment
32
- lives in /opt when the bridge runs as root: `nobody` must be able to
33
- import SymPy from it (session_env.py).
34
- 3. LANDLOCK. Read-only beneath the interpreter's own import roots and
35
- nothing else -- no other visitor's session directory, no /tmp, no
36
- /proc, no write anywhere. ABI 4 adds no TCP; ABI 6 adds no signals or
37
- abstract sockets outside the child.
38
- 4. SECCOMP. A denylist answered with EPERM, so SymPy sees an ordinary
39
- OSError and the tool reports it, rather than a killed process. Last,
40
- because it refuses the calls the layers before it are made of.
41
-
42
- A DENYLIST, NOT AN ALLOWLIST, and on purpose. Which syscalls CPython, glibc
43
- and SymPy's lazy imports need is a property of their versions, not of this
44
- code, and an allowlist that misses one presents as a math tool that fails
45
- for no reason the model can act on. Landlock carries the filesystem, so
46
- the denylist only has to carry what Landlock does not: processes,
47
- networking on a kernel older than ABI 4, cross-process access, privilege,
48
- and the kernel's own control surfaces.
49
-
50
- ALL OR NOTHING. `lock_down()` returns None only when every layer is in
51
- place; anything else is the reason, and the caller does not run the tool.
52
- A half-walled child that ran anyway would be the "reports a bound that did
53
- not happen" this project keeps refusing (isolation.py says it first).
54
- Linux on x86_64 only; anywhere else every call is refused, because the
55
- syscall numbers below are that architecture's.
56
-
57
- THE SELF-TEST is how a deployment knows, rather than hopes. The bridge runs
58
- `python -m security.confine --self-test` on the session interpreter at
59
- startup: the child locks itself down exactly as a math call's child does,
60
- computes an integral, and then tries every escape this module claims to
61
- prevent. Only a clean pass lets the bridge tell its sessions
62
- `VENASTINE_CONFINEMENT=verified`; without it a shared deployment refuses
63
- the six math tools outright (security/hosted.py).
64
- """
65
-
66
- from __future__ import annotations
67
-
68
- import ctypes
69
- import errno
70
- import json
71
- import os
72
- import platform
73
- import subprocess # nosec B404 - runs this module on the session interpreter, never a shell
74
- import sys
75
- import sysconfig
76
- from typing import Optional
77
-
78
- MARKER = "@@VENASTINE_CONFINE@@"
79
-
80
- # --- Landlock -----------------------------------------------------------------
81
- # One syscall number on every architecture: they postdate the unified table.
82
- _LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET = 444
83
- _LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE = 445
84
- _LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF = 446
85
- _LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION = 1 << 0
86
- _LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH = 1
87
- _FS_EXECUTE = 1 << 0
88
- _FS_READ_FILE = 1 << 2
89
- _FS_READ_DIR = 1 << 3
90
- _FS_REFER = 1 << 13 # ABI 2
91
- _FS_TRUNCATE = 1 << 14 # ABI 3
92
- _FS_IOCTL_DEV = 1 << 15 # ABI 5
93
- _NET_BIND_TCP = 1 << 0 # ABI 4
94
- _NET_CONNECT_TCP = 1 << 1 # ABI 4
95
- _SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET = 1 << 0 # ABI 6
96
- _SCOPE_SIGNAL = 1 << 1 # ABI 6
97
- # What the child may do beneath an import root: read, and map a C
98
- # extension. EXECUTE grants execve, which seccomp refuses regardless.
99
- _READ_ONLY = _FS_EXECUTE | _FS_READ_FILE | _FS_READ_DIR
100
-
101
- # Never a read root, whatever sys.path says: a jail with `/` or `/tmp` in it
102
- # is no jail, and /proc is where another process's environment lives.
103
- _NEVER_ROOTS = ("/proc", "/sys", "/dev", "/tmp", "/var/tmp", "/run") # nosec B108 - places the child may NOT read
104
-
105
- # --- prctl and seccomp ----------------------------------------------------------
106
- _PR_SET_DUMPABLE = 4
107
- _PR_SET_SECCOMP = 22
108
- _PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS = 38
109
- _SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER = 2
110
- _AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64 = 0xC000003E
111
- _RET_KILL_PROCESS = 0x80000000
112
- _RET_ERRNO = 0x00050000
113
- _RET_ALLOW = 0x7FFF0000
114
- _BPF_LD_W_ABS = 0x20
115
- _BPF_JEQ_K = 0x15
116
- _BPF_JGE_K = 0x35
117
- _BPF_RET_K = 0x06
118
- _X32_SYSCALL_BIT = 0x40000000
119
-
120
- # x86_64 numbers, grouped by what each group would let an escaped child do.
121
- DENIED_SYSCALLS = {
122
- # Start a process, or become a different program.
123
- "clone": 56, "fork": 57, "vfork": 58, "execve": 59, "execveat": 322,
124
- "clone3": 435,
125
- # Reach the network, or another process through a socket.
126
- "socket": 41, "connect": 42, "accept": 43, "bind": 49, "listen": 50,
127
- "socketpair": 53, "accept4": 288,
128
- # Signal, trace or read another process.
129
- "kill": 62, "tkill": 200, "tgkill": 234, "rt_sigqueueinfo": 129,
130
- "rt_tgsigqueueinfo": 297, "pidfd_send_signal": 424, "pidfd_open": 434,
131
- "pidfd_getfd": 438, "ptrace": 101, "process_vm_readv": 310,
132
- "process_vm_writev": 311, "kcmp": 312, "perf_event_open": 298,
133
- # Change who it is, or undo the walls.
134
- "setuid": 105, "setgid": 106, "setreuid": 113, "setregid": 114,
135
- "setgroups": 116, "setresuid": 117, "setresgid": 119, "setfsuid": 122,
136
- "setfsgid": 123, "capset": 126, "prctl": 157, "personality": 135,
137
- # Rearrange the filesystem it sees.
138
- "chroot": 161, "pivot_root": 155, "mount": 165, "umount2": 166,
139
- "unshare": 272, "setns": 308, "open_tree": 428, "move_mount": 429,
140
- "fsopen": 430, "fsconfig": 431, "fsmount": 432, "fspick": 433,
141
- "mount_setattr": 442, "name_to_handle_at": 303, "open_by_handle_at": 304,
142
- # The kernel's own control surfaces.
143
- "bpf": 321, "userfaultfd": 323, "io_uring_setup": 425,
144
- "io_uring_enter": 426, "io_uring_register": 427, "keyctl": 250,
145
- "add_key": 248, "request_key": 249, "init_module": 175,
146
- "finit_module": 313, "delete_module": 176, "kexec_load": 246,
147
- "kexec_file_load": 320, "reboot": 169, "swapon": 167, "swapoff": 168,
148
- "acct": 163, "quotactl": 179, "syslog": 103, "iopl": 172, "ioperm": 173,
149
- "sethostname": 170, "setdomainname": 171, "settimeofday": 164,
150
- "clock_settime": 227, "adjtimex": 159, "clock_adjtime": 305,
151
- "vhangup": 153,
152
- }
153
-
154
- _OPEN_FILES = 64
155
-
156
-
157
- def supported() -> Optional[str]:
158
- """None where this module can confine a child, else why it cannot."""
159
- if not sys.platform.startswith("linux"):
160
- return f"{sys.platform} has no Landlock or seccomp"
161
- if platform.machine() != "x86_64":
162
- return f"the seccomp filter is x86_64's, not {platform.machine()}'s"
163
- return None
164
-
165
-
166
- def _libc():
167
- libc = ctypes.CDLL(None, use_errno=True)
168
- libc.syscall.restype = ctypes.c_long
169
- return libc
170
-
171
-
172
- def _errno_name() -> str:
173
- code = ctypes.get_errno()
174
- return errno.errorcode.get(code, str(code))
175
-
176
-
177
- def landlock_abi() -> int:
178
- """Landlock's ABI version, or -1 when the kernel offers none."""
179
- if not sys.platform.startswith("linux"):
180
- return -1
181
- abi = _libc().syscall(_LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET, None, 0,
182
- _LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION)
183
- return int(abi) if abi >= 0 else -1
184
-
185
-
186
- def read_roots() -> list:
187
- """The directories the child may read beneath: where this interpreter
188
- imports from, and nothing that holds another process's data."""
189
- candidates = {sysconfig.get_paths()[key]
190
- for key in ("stdlib", "platstdlib", "purelib", "platlib")}
191
- candidates.update(p for p in sys.path if p)
192
- candidates.add(sys.base_prefix)
193
- roots = set()
194
- for candidate in candidates:
195
- real = os.path.realpath(candidate)
196
- if not os.path.isdir(real) or real == "/":
197
- continue
198
- if any(real == never or real.startswith(never + "/")
199
- for never in _NEVER_ROOTS):
200
- continue
201
- roots.add(real)
202
- return sorted(roots)
203
-
204
-
205
- # --- the layers ---------------------------------------------------------------
206
-
207
- def _apply_limits() -> Optional[str]:
208
- import resource
209
-
210
- try:
211
- # THE LIMIT ALREADY IN FORCE, or zero where there is none. Since
212
- # batch 221 (#204) isolation.py hands a math child two FILES for
213
- # stdout and stderr and caps them, so zero here refused the child's
214
- # own result: every confined call exited 120 with "no usable
215
- # result", while the self-test, whose child writes to pipes, still
216
- # passed. Landlock is what refuses opening any file for writing; the
217
- # only files this child can grow are those two, and their cap is
218
- # the transport's. Never raised, so a caller with no cap gets zero.
219
- soft, _hard = resource.getrlimit(resource.RLIMIT_FSIZE)
220
- grow = 0 if soft == resource.RLIM_INFINITY else soft
221
- resource.setrlimit(resource.RLIMIT_FSIZE, (grow, grow))
222
- resource.setrlimit(resource.RLIMIT_CORE, (0, 0))
223
- resource.setrlimit(resource.RLIMIT_NOFILE, (_OPEN_FILES, _OPEN_FILES))
224
- except (OSError, ValueError) as exc:
225
- return f"limits: {exc}"
226
- if _libc().prctl(_PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0) != 0:
227
- return f"non-dumpable: {_errno_name()}"
228
- return None
229
-
230
-
231
- def _drop_root() -> Optional[str]:
232
- """Become `nobody` when started as root; nothing to do otherwise."""
233
- if os.geteuid() != 0:
234
- return None
235
- import pwd
236
-
237
- try:
238
- entry = pwd.getpwnam("nobody")
239
- os.setgroups([])
240
- os.setgid(entry.pw_gid)
241
- os.setuid(entry.pw_uid)
242
- except (KeyError, OSError) as exc:
243
- return f"dropping root: {exc}"
244
- if os.geteuid() == 0 or os.getegid() == 0:
245
- return "dropping root: still root afterwards"
246
- return None
247
-
248
-
249
- def _apply_landlock(roots) -> Optional[str]:
250
- abi = landlock_abi()
251
- if abi < 1:
252
- return "Landlock is not available on this kernel"
253
-
254
- handled_fs = (1 << 13) - 1 # every ABI 1 right
255
- if abi >= 2:
256
- handled_fs |= _FS_REFER
257
- if abi >= 3:
258
- handled_fs |= _FS_TRUNCATE
259
- if abi >= 5:
260
- handled_fs |= _FS_IOCTL_DEV
261
- fields = [("handled_access_fs", ctypes.c_uint64)]
262
- values = [handled_fs]
263
- if abi >= 4:
264
- fields.append(("handled_access_net", ctypes.c_uint64))
265
- values.append(_NET_BIND_TCP | _NET_CONNECT_TCP)
266
- if abi >= 6:
267
- fields.append(("scoped", ctypes.c_uint64))
268
- values.append(_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET | _SCOPE_SIGNAL)
269
-
270
- class RulesetAttr(ctypes.Structure):
271
- _fields_ = fields
272
-
273
- class PathBeneath(ctypes.Structure):
274
- _pack_ = 1
275
- _fields_ = [("allowed_access", ctypes.c_uint64),
276
- ("parent_fd", ctypes.c_int32)]
277
-
278
- libc = _libc()
279
- attr = RulesetAttr(*values)
280
- ruleset = libc.syscall(_LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET, ctypes.byref(attr),
281
- ctypes.sizeof(attr), 0)
282
- if ruleset < 0:
283
- return f"Landlock ruleset: {_errno_name()}"
284
- try:
285
- for root in roots:
286
- try:
287
- dirfd = os.open(root, os.O_PATH | os.O_CLOEXEC)
288
- except OSError as exc:
289
- return f"Landlock root {root}: {exc.strerror}"
290
- try:
291
- rule = PathBeneath(_READ_ONLY & handled_fs, dirfd)
292
- if libc.syscall(_LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE, ruleset,
293
- _LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH,
294
- ctypes.byref(rule), 0) != 0:
295
- return f"Landlock rule {root}: {_errno_name()}"
296
- finally:
297
- os.close(dirfd)
298
- if libc.prctl(_PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) != 0:
299
- return f"no_new_privs: {_errno_name()}"
300
- if libc.syscall(_LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF, ruleset, 0) != 0:
301
- return f"Landlock restrict: {_errno_name()}"
302
- finally:
303
- os.close(ruleset)
304
- return None
305
-
306
-
307
- def seccomp_program() -> list:
308
- """The filter as (code, jt, jf, k) rows: the architecture checked first,
309
- an x32 number refused, every DENIED_SYSCALLS entry answered EPERM, and
310
- everything else allowed."""
311
- denied = sorted(set(DENIED_SYSCALLS.values()))
312
- count = len(denied)
313
- rows = [
314
- (_BPF_LD_W_ABS, 0, 0, 4), # seccomp_data.arch
315
- (_BPF_JEQ_K, 1, 0, _AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64),
316
- (_BPF_RET_K, 0, 0, _RET_KILL_PROCESS),
317
- (_BPF_LD_W_ABS, 0, 0, 0), # seccomp_data.nr
318
- (_BPF_JGE_K, count + 1, 0, _X32_SYSCALL_BIT),
319
- ]
320
- for index, number in enumerate(denied):
321
- rows.append((_BPF_JEQ_K, count - index, 0, number))
322
- rows.append((_BPF_RET_K, 0, 0, _RET_ALLOW))
323
- rows.append((_BPF_RET_K, 0, 0, _RET_ERRNO | errno.EPERM))
324
- return rows
325
-
326
-
327
- def _apply_seccomp() -> Optional[str]:
328
- class Filter(ctypes.Structure):
329
- _fields_ = [("code", ctypes.c_ushort), ("jt", ctypes.c_ubyte),
330
- ("jf", ctypes.c_ubyte), ("k", ctypes.c_uint32)]
331
-
332
- class Program(ctypes.Structure):
333
- _fields_ = [("len", ctypes.c_ushort),
334
- ("filter", ctypes.POINTER(Filter))]
335
-
336
- rows = seccomp_program()
337
- array = (Filter * len(rows))(*[Filter(*row) for row in rows])
338
- program = Program(len(rows), array)
339
- libc = _libc()
340
- if libc.prctl(_PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) != 0:
341
- return f"no_new_privs: {_errno_name()}"
342
- if libc.prctl(_PR_SET_SECCOMP, _SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER,
343
- ctypes.byref(program), 0, 0) != 0:
344
- return f"seccomp: {_errno_name()}"
345
- return None
346
-
347
-
348
- def lock_down(roots: Optional[list] = None) -> Optional[str]:
349
- """Put every wall up around THIS process. None when all are up; else
350
- the reason, and the caller must not run the tool (see the docstring).
351
- Irreversible: call it in a process that exists for one tool call."""
352
- reason = supported()
353
- if reason:
354
- return reason
355
- roots = read_roots() if roots is None else roots
356
- for layer in (_apply_limits, _drop_root, lambda: _apply_landlock(roots),
357
- _apply_seccomp):
358
- reason = layer()
359
- if reason:
360
- return reason
361
- return None
362
-
363
-
364
- # --- the self-test --------------------------------------------------------------
365
-
366
- def _attempt(fn) -> str:
367
- try:
368
- fn()
369
- except OSError as exc:
370
- return f"refused ({errno.errorcode.get(exc.errno, exc.errno)})"
371
- except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 -- reported; the verdict reads it
372
- return f"failed ({type(exc).__name__})"
373
- return "ALLOWED"
374
-
375
-
376
- def _ptrace_parent() -> None:
377
- libc = _libc()
378
- libc.ptrace.restype = ctypes.c_long
379
- if libc.ptrace(16, os.getppid(), None, None) != 0: # PTRACE_ATTACH
380
- code = ctypes.get_errno()
381
- raise OSError(code, os.strerror(code))
382
-
383
-
384
- def _read_one(path: str) -> None:
385
- """The probe is whether the open is refused. One that is not still
386
- closes what it opened, rather than leaving that to the collector."""
387
- with open(path, "rb") as fh:
388
- fh.read(1)
389
-
390
-
391
- def _create(path: str) -> None:
392
- with open(path, "wb"):
393
- pass # creating it is the escape being probed; nothing is written
394
-
395
-
396
- def _escapes(app_root: str) -> dict:
397
- """Every escape this module claims to prevent, by name."""
398
- parent = os.getppid()
399
- planted = os.path.join(app_root, f".confine-probe-{os.getpid()}")
400
- return {
401
- "read /etc/hostname": lambda: _read_one("/etc/hostname"),
402
- "list /tmp": lambda: os.listdir("/tmp"), # nosec B108 - asserting it is refused
403
- "write /tmp": lambda: _create(f"/tmp/.confine-probe-{os.getpid()}"), # nosec B108 - asserting it is refused
404
- "write into the app": lambda: _create(planted),
405
- "read the parent's environment":
406
- lambda: _read_one(f"/proc/{parent}/environ"),
407
- "open a socket": lambda: __import__("socket").socket().close(),
408
- "fork": os.fork,
409
- "start a program": lambda: subprocess.run(["true"], check=False), # nosec B603 B607 - asserting it is refused
410
- "signal the parent": lambda: os.kill(parent, 0),
411
- "trace the parent": _ptrace_parent,
412
- "become root again": lambda: os.setuid(0),
413
- }
414
-
415
-
416
- def self_test() -> dict:
417
- """In THIS process: load the math tool, lock down, compute, try every
418
- escape. `ok` only when the walls went up, the math still works and
419
- every escape was refused."""
420
- app_root = os.getcwd()
421
- try:
422
- from tools.builtin import symbolic_math
423
- except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 -- the verdict says why
424
- return {"ok": False, "reason": f"the math tool would not load: {exc}"}
425
- started_as_root = os.geteuid() == 0
426
- reason = lock_down()
427
- if reason:
428
- return {"ok": False, "reason": reason}
429
- answer = symbolic_math.run({"operation": "integrate",
430
- "expression": "sin(x)**2"})
431
- checks = {"math": answer.get("result") or f"failed: {answer.get('error')}"}
432
- if started_as_root:
433
- # Landlock and seccomp would still hold, but root's capabilities
434
- # are a wall this module claims to remove, so it is checked too.
435
- checks["still root"] = ("ALLOWED" if os.geteuid() == 0
436
- else f"refused (uid {os.geteuid()})")
437
- try:
438
- __import__("sympy.physics.units")
439
- checks["a lazy import"] = "ok"
440
- except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 -- the verdict says why
441
- checks["a lazy import"] = f"failed ({type(exc).__name__})"
442
- for label, fn in _escapes(app_root).items():
443
- checks[label] = _attempt(fn)
444
- escaped = [label for label, verdict in checks.items()
445
- if verdict == "ALLOWED"]
446
- broken = [label for label in ("math", "a lazy import")
447
- if str(checks[label]).startswith("failed")]
448
- ok = not escaped and not broken
449
- return {"ok": ok, "uid": os.getuid(), "landlock_abi": landlock_abi(),
450
- "reason": None if ok else
451
- f"allowed: {escaped}; broken: {broken}", "checks": checks}
452
-
453
-
454
- def verify(python, root, *, run=subprocess.run, timeout: float = 120) -> dict:
455
- """Run the self-test in a child on `python`, from `root`. The verdict,
456
- or `ok: False` with why the child gave none."""
457
- env = {"PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", "/usr/bin:/bin"),
458
- "PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE": "1", "PYTHONIOENCODING": "utf-8"}
459
- try:
460
- done = run([str(python), "-m", "security.confine", "--self-test"],
461
- cwd=str(root), env=env, capture_output=True, text=True,
462
- timeout=timeout, check=False) # nosec B603 - fixed arguments, no shell
463
- except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired) as exc:
464
- return {"ok": False, "reason": f"the self-test did not run: "
465
- f"{type(exc).__name__}"}
466
- for line in (done.stdout or "").splitlines():
467
- if line.startswith(MARKER):
468
- try:
469
- return json.loads(line[len(MARKER):])
470
- except ValueError:
471
- break
472
- tail = (done.stderr or "").strip()[-400:]
473
- return {"ok": False, "reason": f"the self-test gave no verdict (exit "
474
- f"{done.returncode}): {tail}"}
475
-
476
-
477
- if __name__ == "__main__":
478
- if sys.argv[1:] != ["--self-test"]:
479
- print("usage: python -m security.confine --self-test", file=sys.stderr)
480
- sys.exit(2)
481
- verdict = self_test()
482
- sys.stdout.write(MARKER + json.dumps(verdict) + "\n")
483
- sys.stdout.flush()
484
- sys.exit(0)
1
+ """
2
+ security/confine.py
3
+
4
+ ROADMAP_v3 §79 (HD11). The walls a math tool's child puts up around itself in
5
+ a shared hosted deployment: after it has imported SymPy, and before it reads
6
+ the expression a visitor's model sent.
7
+
8
+ WHY THE MATH CHILD. SymPy's parser ends in `eval` -- `_math_common.py`'s
9
+ docstring is the long account of how far that goes -- and in a shared demo
10
+ the visitor connects and prompts their OWN model, so they choose every
11
+ expression the six math tools are handed. `_validate_ast` is the lock. This
12
+ is what stands behind it if that lock ever opens: a child that cannot read
13
+ another visitor's files, write anywhere, open a socket, start a process,
14
+ signal or trace one, or keep root. `tools/isolation.py` already ran each
15
+ call in its own short-lived child for the CPU bound (H2, H3); this module
16
+ is what that child does to itself first, so the boundary already existed
17
+ and only its walls are new.
18
+
19
+ FOUR LAYERS, in the order they go up. Each was measured on the Space before
20
+ it was relied on (2026-10-20: Amazon Linux kernel 6.18, x86_64, sessions
21
+ running as root with Docker's default capabilities less NET_RAW, Landlock
22
+ ABI 7, seccomp filters installable):
23
+
24
+ 1. LIMITS. No file may grow past the cap already in force (RLIMIT_FSIZE:
25
+ zero, or the cap isolation.py puts on the two output files it hands
26
+ a math child), few descriptors, no core dump, and the process is
27
+ non-dumpable. CPU and memory are already bounded by isolation.py's
28
+ preexec_fn.
29
+ 2. IDENTITY. A child started as root becomes `nobody`, and loses every
30
+ capability with it -- DAC_OVERRIDE above all, which is what lets root
31
+ read a 0700 directory it does not own. Why the session environment
32
+ lives in /opt when the bridge runs as root: `nobody` must be able to
33
+ import SymPy from it (session_env.py).
34
+ 3. LANDLOCK. Read-only beneath the interpreter's own import roots and
35
+ nothing else -- no other visitor's session directory, no /tmp, no
36
+ /proc, no write anywhere. ABI 4 adds no TCP; ABI 6 adds no signals or
37
+ abstract sockets outside the child.
38
+ 4. SECCOMP. A denylist answered with EPERM, so SymPy sees an ordinary
39
+ OSError and the tool reports it, rather than a killed process. Last,
40
+ because it refuses the calls the layers before it are made of.
41
+
42
+ A DENYLIST, NOT AN ALLOWLIST, and on purpose. Which syscalls CPython, glibc
43
+ and SymPy's lazy imports need is a property of their versions, not of this
44
+ code, and an allowlist that misses one presents as a math tool that fails
45
+ for no reason the model can act on. Landlock carries the filesystem, so
46
+ the denylist only has to carry what Landlock does not: processes,
47
+ networking on a kernel older than ABI 4, cross-process access, privilege,
48
+ and the kernel's own control surfaces.
49
+
50
+ ALL OR NOTHING. `lock_down()` returns None only when every layer is in
51
+ place; anything else is the reason, and the caller does not run the tool.
52
+ A half-walled child that ran anyway would be the "reports a bound that did
53
+ not happen" this project keeps refusing (isolation.py says it first).
54
+ Linux on x86_64 only; anywhere else every call is refused, because the
55
+ syscall numbers below are that architecture's.
56
+
57
+ THE SELF-TEST is how a deployment knows, rather than hopes. The bridge runs
58
+ `python -m security.confine --self-test` on the session interpreter at
59
+ startup: the child locks itself down exactly as a math call's child does,
60
+ computes an integral, and then tries every escape this module claims to
61
+ prevent. Only a clean pass lets the bridge tell its sessions
62
+ `VENASTINE_CONFINEMENT=verified`; without it a shared deployment refuses
63
+ the six math tools outright (security/hosted.py).
64
+ """
65
+
66
+ from __future__ import annotations
67
+
68
+ import ctypes
69
+ import errno
70
+ import json
71
+ import os
72
+ import platform
73
+ import subprocess # nosec B404 - runs this module on the session interpreter, never a shell
74
+ import sys
75
+ import sysconfig
76
+ from typing import Optional
77
+
78
+ MARKER = "@@VENASTINE_CONFINE@@"
79
+
80
+ # --- Landlock -----------------------------------------------------------------
81
+ # One syscall number on every architecture: they postdate the unified table.
82
+ _LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET = 444
83
+ _LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE = 445
84
+ _LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF = 446
85
+ _LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION = 1 << 0
86
+ _LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH = 1
87
+ _FS_EXECUTE = 1 << 0
88
+ _FS_READ_FILE = 1 << 2
89
+ _FS_READ_DIR = 1 << 3
90
+ _FS_REFER = 1 << 13 # ABI 2
91
+ _FS_TRUNCATE = 1 << 14 # ABI 3
92
+ _FS_IOCTL_DEV = 1 << 15 # ABI 5
93
+ _NET_BIND_TCP = 1 << 0 # ABI 4
94
+ _NET_CONNECT_TCP = 1 << 1 # ABI 4
95
+ _SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET = 1 << 0 # ABI 6
96
+ _SCOPE_SIGNAL = 1 << 1 # ABI 6
97
+ # What the child may do beneath an import root: read, and map a C
98
+ # extension. EXECUTE grants execve, which seccomp refuses regardless.
99
+ _READ_ONLY = _FS_EXECUTE | _FS_READ_FILE | _FS_READ_DIR
100
+
101
+ # Never a read root, whatever sys.path says: a jail with `/` or `/tmp` in it
102
+ # is no jail, and /proc is where another process's environment lives.
103
+ _NEVER_ROOTS = ("/proc", "/sys", "/dev", "/tmp", "/var/tmp", "/run") # nosec B108 - places the child may NOT read
104
+
105
+ # --- prctl and seccomp ----------------------------------------------------------
106
+ _PR_SET_DUMPABLE = 4
107
+ _PR_SET_SECCOMP = 22
108
+ _PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS = 38
109
+ _SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER = 2
110
+ _AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64 = 0xC000003E
111
+ _RET_KILL_PROCESS = 0x80000000
112
+ _RET_ERRNO = 0x00050000
113
+ _RET_ALLOW = 0x7FFF0000
114
+ _BPF_LD_W_ABS = 0x20
115
+ _BPF_JEQ_K = 0x15
116
+ _BPF_JGE_K = 0x35
117
+ _BPF_RET_K = 0x06
118
+ _X32_SYSCALL_BIT = 0x40000000
119
+
120
+ # x86_64 numbers, grouped by what each group would let an escaped child do.
121
+ DENIED_SYSCALLS = {
122
+ # Start a process, or become a different program.
123
+ "clone": 56, "fork": 57, "vfork": 58, "execve": 59, "execveat": 322,
124
+ "clone3": 435,
125
+ # Reach the network, or another process through a socket.
126
+ "socket": 41, "connect": 42, "accept": 43, "bind": 49, "listen": 50,
127
+ "socketpair": 53, "accept4": 288,
128
+ # Signal, trace or read another process.
129
+ "kill": 62, "tkill": 200, "tgkill": 234, "rt_sigqueueinfo": 129,
130
+ "rt_tgsigqueueinfo": 297, "pidfd_send_signal": 424, "pidfd_open": 434,
131
+ "pidfd_getfd": 438, "ptrace": 101, "process_vm_readv": 310,
132
+ "process_vm_writev": 311, "kcmp": 312, "perf_event_open": 298,
133
+ # Change who it is, or undo the walls.
134
+ "setuid": 105, "setgid": 106, "setreuid": 113, "setregid": 114,
135
+ "setgroups": 116, "setresuid": 117, "setresgid": 119, "setfsuid": 122,
136
+ "setfsgid": 123, "capset": 126, "prctl": 157, "personality": 135,
137
+ # Rearrange the filesystem it sees.
138
+ "chroot": 161, "pivot_root": 155, "mount": 165, "umount2": 166,
139
+ "unshare": 272, "setns": 308, "open_tree": 428, "move_mount": 429,
140
+ "fsopen": 430, "fsconfig": 431, "fsmount": 432, "fspick": 433,
141
+ "mount_setattr": 442, "name_to_handle_at": 303, "open_by_handle_at": 304,
142
+ # The kernel's own control surfaces.
143
+ "bpf": 321, "userfaultfd": 323, "io_uring_setup": 425,
144
+ "io_uring_enter": 426, "io_uring_register": 427, "keyctl": 250,
145
+ "add_key": 248, "request_key": 249, "init_module": 175,
146
+ "finit_module": 313, "delete_module": 176, "kexec_load": 246,
147
+ "kexec_file_load": 320, "reboot": 169, "swapon": 167, "swapoff": 168,
148
+ "acct": 163, "quotactl": 179, "syslog": 103, "iopl": 172, "ioperm": 173,
149
+ "sethostname": 170, "setdomainname": 171, "settimeofday": 164,
150
+ "clock_settime": 227, "adjtimex": 159, "clock_adjtime": 305,
151
+ "vhangup": 153,
152
+ }
153
+
154
+ _OPEN_FILES = 64
155
+
156
+
157
+ def supported() -> Optional[str]:
158
+ """None where this module can confine a child, else why it cannot."""
159
+ if not sys.platform.startswith("linux"):
160
+ return f"{sys.platform} has no Landlock or seccomp"
161
+ if platform.machine() != "x86_64":
162
+ return f"the seccomp filter is x86_64's, not {platform.machine()}'s"
163
+ return None
164
+
165
+
166
+ def _libc():
167
+ libc = ctypes.CDLL(None, use_errno=True)
168
+ libc.syscall.restype = ctypes.c_long
169
+ return libc
170
+
171
+
172
+ def _errno_name() -> str:
173
+ code = ctypes.get_errno()
174
+ return errno.errorcode.get(code, str(code))
175
+
176
+
177
+ def landlock_abi() -> int:
178
+ """Landlock's ABI version, or -1 when the kernel offers none."""
179
+ if not sys.platform.startswith("linux"):
180
+ return -1
181
+ abi = _libc().syscall(_LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET, None, 0,
182
+ _LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION)
183
+ return int(abi) if abi >= 0 else -1
184
+
185
+
186
+ def read_roots() -> list:
187
+ """The directories the child may read beneath: where this interpreter
188
+ imports from, and nothing that holds another process's data."""
189
+ candidates = {sysconfig.get_paths()[key]
190
+ for key in ("stdlib", "platstdlib", "purelib", "platlib")}
191
+ candidates.update(p for p in sys.path if p)
192
+ candidates.add(sys.base_prefix)
193
+ roots = set()
194
+ for candidate in candidates:
195
+ real = os.path.realpath(candidate)
196
+ if not os.path.isdir(real) or real == "/":
197
+ continue
198
+ if any(real == never or real.startswith(never + "/")
199
+ for never in _NEVER_ROOTS):
200
+ continue
201
+ roots.add(real)
202
+ return sorted(roots)
203
+
204
+
205
+ # --- the layers ---------------------------------------------------------------
206
+
207
+ def _apply_limits() -> Optional[str]:
208
+ import resource
209
+
210
+ try:
211
+ # THE LIMIT ALREADY IN FORCE, or zero where there is none. Since
212
+ # batch 221 (#204) isolation.py hands a math child two FILES for
213
+ # stdout and stderr and caps them, so zero here refused the child's
214
+ # own result: every confined call exited 120 with "no usable
215
+ # result", while the self-test, whose child writes to pipes, still
216
+ # passed. Landlock is what refuses opening any file for writing; the
217
+ # only files this child can grow are those two, and their cap is
218
+ # the transport's. Never raised, so a caller with no cap gets zero.
219
+ soft, _hard = resource.getrlimit(resource.RLIMIT_FSIZE)
220
+ grow = 0 if soft == resource.RLIM_INFINITY else soft
221
+ resource.setrlimit(resource.RLIMIT_FSIZE, (grow, grow))
222
+ resource.setrlimit(resource.RLIMIT_CORE, (0, 0))
223
+ resource.setrlimit(resource.RLIMIT_NOFILE, (_OPEN_FILES, _OPEN_FILES))
224
+ except (OSError, ValueError) as exc:
225
+ return f"limits: {exc}"
226
+ if _libc().prctl(_PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0) != 0:
227
+ return f"non-dumpable: {_errno_name()}"
228
+ return None
229
+
230
+
231
+ def _drop_root() -> Optional[str]:
232
+ """Become `nobody` when started as root; nothing to do otherwise."""
233
+ if os.geteuid() != 0:
234
+ return None
235
+ import pwd
236
+
237
+ try:
238
+ entry = pwd.getpwnam("nobody")
239
+ os.setgroups([])
240
+ os.setgid(entry.pw_gid)
241
+ os.setuid(entry.pw_uid)
242
+ except (KeyError, OSError) as exc:
243
+ return f"dropping root: {exc}"
244
+ if os.geteuid() == 0 or os.getegid() == 0:
245
+ return "dropping root: still root afterwards"
246
+ return None
247
+
248
+
249
+ def _apply_landlock(roots) -> Optional[str]:
250
+ abi = landlock_abi()
251
+ if abi < 1:
252
+ return "Landlock is not available on this kernel"
253
+
254
+ handled_fs = (1 << 13) - 1 # every ABI 1 right
255
+ if abi >= 2:
256
+ handled_fs |= _FS_REFER
257
+ if abi >= 3:
258
+ handled_fs |= _FS_TRUNCATE
259
+ if abi >= 5:
260
+ handled_fs |= _FS_IOCTL_DEV
261
+ fields = [("handled_access_fs", ctypes.c_uint64)]
262
+ values = [handled_fs]
263
+ if abi >= 4:
264
+ fields.append(("handled_access_net", ctypes.c_uint64))
265
+ values.append(_NET_BIND_TCP | _NET_CONNECT_TCP)
266
+ if abi >= 6:
267
+ fields.append(("scoped", ctypes.c_uint64))
268
+ values.append(_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET | _SCOPE_SIGNAL)
269
+
270
+ class RulesetAttr(ctypes.Structure):
271
+ _fields_ = fields
272
+
273
+ class PathBeneath(ctypes.Structure):
274
+ _pack_ = 1
275
+ _fields_ = [("allowed_access", ctypes.c_uint64),
276
+ ("parent_fd", ctypes.c_int32)]
277
+
278
+ libc = _libc()
279
+ attr = RulesetAttr(*values)
280
+ ruleset = libc.syscall(_LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET, ctypes.byref(attr),
281
+ ctypes.sizeof(attr), 0)
282
+ if ruleset < 0:
283
+ return f"Landlock ruleset: {_errno_name()}"
284
+ try:
285
+ for root in roots:
286
+ try:
287
+ dirfd = os.open(root, os.O_PATH | os.O_CLOEXEC)
288
+ except OSError as exc:
289
+ return f"Landlock root {root}: {exc.strerror}"
290
+ try:
291
+ rule = PathBeneath(_READ_ONLY & handled_fs, dirfd)
292
+ if libc.syscall(_LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE, ruleset,
293
+ _LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH,
294
+ ctypes.byref(rule), 0) != 0:
295
+ return f"Landlock rule {root}: {_errno_name()}"
296
+ finally:
297
+ os.close(dirfd)
298
+ if libc.prctl(_PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) != 0:
299
+ return f"no_new_privs: {_errno_name()}"
300
+ if libc.syscall(_LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF, ruleset, 0) != 0:
301
+ return f"Landlock restrict: {_errno_name()}"
302
+ finally:
303
+ os.close(ruleset)
304
+ return None
305
+
306
+
307
+ def seccomp_program() -> list:
308
+ """The filter as (code, jt, jf, k) rows: the architecture checked first,
309
+ an x32 number refused, every DENIED_SYSCALLS entry answered EPERM, and
310
+ everything else allowed."""
311
+ denied = sorted(set(DENIED_SYSCALLS.values()))
312
+ count = len(denied)
313
+ rows = [
314
+ (_BPF_LD_W_ABS, 0, 0, 4), # seccomp_data.arch
315
+ (_BPF_JEQ_K, 1, 0, _AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64),
316
+ (_BPF_RET_K, 0, 0, _RET_KILL_PROCESS),
317
+ (_BPF_LD_W_ABS, 0, 0, 0), # seccomp_data.nr
318
+ (_BPF_JGE_K, count + 1, 0, _X32_SYSCALL_BIT),
319
+ ]
320
+ for index, number in enumerate(denied):
321
+ rows.append((_BPF_JEQ_K, count - index, 0, number))
322
+ rows.append((_BPF_RET_K, 0, 0, _RET_ALLOW))
323
+ rows.append((_BPF_RET_K, 0, 0, _RET_ERRNO | errno.EPERM))
324
+ return rows
325
+
326
+
327
+ def _apply_seccomp() -> Optional[str]:
328
+ class Filter(ctypes.Structure):
329
+ _fields_ = [("code", ctypes.c_ushort), ("jt", ctypes.c_ubyte),
330
+ ("jf", ctypes.c_ubyte), ("k", ctypes.c_uint32)]
331
+
332
+ class Program(ctypes.Structure):
333
+ _fields_ = [("len", ctypes.c_ushort),
334
+ ("filter", ctypes.POINTER(Filter))]
335
+
336
+ rows = seccomp_program()
337
+ array = (Filter * len(rows))(*[Filter(*row) for row in rows])
338
+ program = Program(len(rows), array)
339
+ libc = _libc()
340
+ if libc.prctl(_PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) != 0:
341
+ return f"no_new_privs: {_errno_name()}"
342
+ if libc.prctl(_PR_SET_SECCOMP, _SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER,
343
+ ctypes.byref(program), 0, 0) != 0:
344
+ return f"seccomp: {_errno_name()}"
345
+ return None
346
+
347
+
348
+ def lock_down(roots: Optional[list] = None) -> Optional[str]:
349
+ """Put every wall up around THIS process. None when all are up; else
350
+ the reason, and the caller must not run the tool (see the docstring).
351
+ Irreversible: call it in a process that exists for one tool call."""
352
+ reason = supported()
353
+ if reason:
354
+ return reason
355
+ roots = read_roots() if roots is None else roots
356
+ for layer in (_apply_limits, _drop_root, lambda: _apply_landlock(roots),
357
+ _apply_seccomp):
358
+ reason = layer()
359
+ if reason:
360
+ return reason
361
+ return None
362
+
363
+
364
+ # --- the self-test --------------------------------------------------------------
365
+
366
+ def _attempt(fn) -> str:
367
+ try:
368
+ fn()
369
+ except OSError as exc:
370
+ return f"refused ({errno.errorcode.get(exc.errno, exc.errno)})"
371
+ except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 -- reported; the verdict reads it
372
+ return f"failed ({type(exc).__name__})"
373
+ return "ALLOWED"
374
+
375
+
376
+ def _ptrace_parent() -> None:
377
+ libc = _libc()
378
+ libc.ptrace.restype = ctypes.c_long
379
+ if libc.ptrace(16, os.getppid(), None, None) != 0: # PTRACE_ATTACH
380
+ code = ctypes.get_errno()
381
+ raise OSError(code, os.strerror(code))
382
+
383
+
384
+ def _read_one(path: str) -> None:
385
+ """The probe is whether the open is refused. One that is not still
386
+ closes what it opened, rather than leaving that to the collector."""
387
+ with open(path, "rb") as fh:
388
+ fh.read(1)
389
+
390
+
391
+ def _create(path: str) -> None:
392
+ with open(path, "wb"):
393
+ pass # creating it is the escape being probed; nothing is written
394
+
395
+
396
+ def _escapes(app_root: str) -> dict:
397
+ """Every escape this module claims to prevent, by name."""
398
+ parent = os.getppid()
399
+ planted = os.path.join(app_root, f".confine-probe-{os.getpid()}")
400
+ return {
401
+ "read /etc/hostname": lambda: _read_one("/etc/hostname"),
402
+ "list /tmp": lambda: os.listdir("/tmp"), # nosec B108 - asserting it is refused
403
+ "write /tmp": lambda: _create(f"/tmp/.confine-probe-{os.getpid()}"), # nosec B108 - asserting it is refused
404
+ "write into the app": lambda: _create(planted),
405
+ "read the parent's environment":
406
+ lambda: _read_one(f"/proc/{parent}/environ"),
407
+ "open a socket": lambda: __import__("socket").socket().close(),
408
+ "fork": os.fork,
409
+ "start a program": lambda: subprocess.run(["true"], check=False), # nosec B603 B607 - asserting it is refused
410
+ "signal the parent": lambda: os.kill(parent, 0),
411
+ "trace the parent": _ptrace_parent,
412
+ "become root again": lambda: os.setuid(0),
413
+ }
414
+
415
+
416
+ def self_test() -> dict:
417
+ """In THIS process: load the math tool, lock down, compute, try every
418
+ escape. `ok` only when the walls went up, the math still works and
419
+ every escape was refused."""
420
+ app_root = os.getcwd()
421
+ try:
422
+ from tools.builtin import symbolic_math
423
+ except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 -- the verdict says why
424
+ return {"ok": False, "reason": f"the math tool would not load: {exc}"}
425
+ started_as_root = os.geteuid() == 0
426
+ reason = lock_down()
427
+ if reason:
428
+ return {"ok": False, "reason": reason}
429
+ answer = symbolic_math.run({"operation": "integrate",
430
+ "expression": "sin(x)**2"})
431
+ checks = {"math": answer.get("result") or f"failed: {answer.get('error')}"}
432
+ if started_as_root:
433
+ # Landlock and seccomp would still hold, but root's capabilities
434
+ # are a wall this module claims to remove, so it is checked too.
435
+ checks["still root"] = ("ALLOWED" if os.geteuid() == 0
436
+ else f"refused (uid {os.geteuid()})")
437
+ try:
438
+ __import__("sympy.physics.units")
439
+ checks["a lazy import"] = "ok"
440
+ except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 -- the verdict says why
441
+ checks["a lazy import"] = f"failed ({type(exc).__name__})"
442
+ for label, fn in _escapes(app_root).items():
443
+ checks[label] = _attempt(fn)
444
+ escaped = [label for label, verdict in checks.items()
445
+ if verdict == "ALLOWED"]
446
+ broken = [label for label in ("math", "a lazy import")
447
+ if str(checks[label]).startswith("failed")]
448
+ ok = not escaped and not broken
449
+ return {"ok": ok, "uid": os.getuid(), "landlock_abi": landlock_abi(),
450
+ "reason": None if ok else
451
+ f"allowed: {escaped}; broken: {broken}", "checks": checks}
452
+
453
+
454
+ def verify(python, root, *, run=subprocess.run, timeout: float = 120) -> dict:
455
+ """Run the self-test in a child on `python`, from `root`. The verdict,
456
+ or `ok: False` with why the child gave none."""
457
+ env = {"PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", "/usr/bin:/bin"),
458
+ "PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE": "1", "PYTHONIOENCODING": "utf-8"}
459
+ try:
460
+ done = run([str(python), "-m", "security.confine", "--self-test"],
461
+ cwd=str(root), env=env, capture_output=True, text=True,
462
+ timeout=timeout, check=False) # nosec B603 - fixed arguments, no shell
463
+ except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired) as exc:
464
+ return {"ok": False, "reason": f"the self-test did not run: "
465
+ f"{type(exc).__name__}"}
466
+ for line in (done.stdout or "").splitlines():
467
+ if line.startswith(MARKER):
468
+ try:
469
+ return json.loads(line[len(MARKER):])
470
+ except ValueError:
471
+ break
472
+ tail = (done.stderr or "").strip()[-400:]
473
+ return {"ok": False, "reason": f"the self-test gave no verdict (exit "
474
+ f"{done.returncode}): {tail}"}
475
+
476
+
477
+ if __name__ == "__main__":
478
+ if sys.argv[1:] != ["--self-test"]:
479
+ print("usage: python -m security.confine --self-test", file=sys.stderr)
480
+ sys.exit(2)
481
+ verdict = self_test()
482
+ sys.stdout.write(MARKER + json.dumps(verdict) + "\n")
483
+ sys.stdout.flush()
484
+ sys.exit(0)