@yahyahammad/venastine 0.3.8 → 0.3.10

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (130) hide show
  1. package/.env.example +19 -19
  2. package/CONFIG_ARCHITECTURE.md +2139 -2002
  3. package/LICENSE +201 -201
  4. package/README.md +1043 -1034
  5. package/agents/builtin/compactor.md +75 -75
  6. package/agents/builtin/explore.md +77 -77
  7. package/agents/builtin/pipeline-reviewer.md +100 -100
  8. package/agents/builtin/plan.md +106 -106
  9. package/agents/builtin/review.md +74 -74
  10. package/agents/manager.py +261 -261
  11. package/agents/subagent_tool.py +472 -472
  12. package/agents/tui_commands.py +238 -146
  13. package/bin/venastine.mjs +584 -528
  14. package/bin/venastine.py +73 -71
  15. package/cli_commands.py +848 -835
  16. package/config.yaml +64 -0
  17. package/config_edit.py +1301 -1301
  18. package/config_schema.py +987 -966
  19. package/config_update.py +749 -749
  20. package/core/agent_activity.py +256 -256
  21. package/core/ansi.py +452 -452
  22. package/core/approval.py +137 -137
  23. package/core/call_view.py +364 -364
  24. package/core/cancel.py +121 -121
  25. package/core/chatgpt_auth.py +747 -747
  26. package/core/claims_view.py +107 -107
  27. package/core/client.py +2756 -2715
  28. package/core/commands.py +464 -454
  29. package/core/compaction.py +1735 -1735
  30. package/core/config_loader.py +1982 -1982
  31. package/core/connect.py +686 -686
  32. package/core/events.py +123 -123
  33. package/core/file_mentions.py +280 -280
  34. package/core/interaction.py +411 -411
  35. package/core/loop.py +2566 -2566
  36. package/core/memory.py +482 -482
  37. package/core/pipeline_models.py +190 -190
  38. package/core/provider_errors.py +274 -234
  39. package/core/reasoning/authorization.py +130 -130
  40. package/core/reasoning/base.py +219 -219
  41. package/core/reasoning/confidence_scoring.py +484 -484
  42. package/core/reasoning/events.py +149 -149
  43. package/core/reasoning/orchestrator.py +1561 -1561
  44. package/core/reasoning/output_writer.py +345 -345
  45. package/core/reasoning/payload_validation.py +524 -524
  46. package/core/reasoning/pipeline_storage.py +427 -427
  47. package/core/reasoning/scholar.py +467 -458
  48. package/core/reasoning/source_corpus.py +433 -433
  49. package/core/reasoning/source_scoring.py +855 -855
  50. package/core/replay.py +315 -315
  51. package/core/shell_sessions.py +1553 -1553
  52. package/credentials.py +307 -307
  53. package/database.py +333 -333
  54. package/docs/PRIVACY.md +78 -78
  55. package/docs/SECURITY.md +114 -108
  56. package/docs/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md +148 -148
  57. package/env_secrets.py +118 -118
  58. package/json_store.py +343 -343
  59. package/logging_setup.py +295 -295
  60. package/main.py +3433 -3433
  61. package/mcp_client/client.py +780 -733
  62. package/mcp_client/config.py +484 -484
  63. package/mcp_client/registration.py +343 -343
  64. package/memories/manager.py +147 -147
  65. package/memories/tui_commands.py +319 -239
  66. package/package.json +303 -303
  67. package/project_init/config_files.py +282 -282
  68. package/project_init/generator.py +728 -728
  69. package/project_init/manifest.py +418 -418
  70. package/project_init/tui_commands.py +147 -147
  71. package/prompts/critic_pass.md +24 -24
  72. package/prompts/revalidate.md +25 -25
  73. package/prompts/revise.md +17 -17
  74. package/prompts/source_grounding.md +66 -66
  75. package/prompts/system_prompts.py +316 -316
  76. package/providers.json.example +94 -94
  77. package/pyproject.toml +149 -149
  78. package/requirements.txt +314 -295
  79. package/safety/policy_enforcement.py +1082 -1082
  80. package/security/askpass.py +419 -419
  81. package/security/capability.py +207 -207
  82. package/security/confine.py +484 -484
  83. package/security/hosted.py +182 -182
  84. package/security/permissions.py +237 -237
  85. package/security/protected_paths.py +501 -501
  86. package/security/sandbox.py +4108 -4108
  87. package/skills/builtin/math/formal-specification.md +67 -67
  88. package/skills/builtin/math/numerical-methods.md +66 -66
  89. package/skills/builtin/research/experiment-design.md +62 -62
  90. package/skills/builtin/research/reproducibility.md +55 -55
  91. package/skills/builtin/research/source-evaluation.md +70 -70
  92. package/skills/builtin/research/statistical-inference.md +63 -63
  93. package/skills/builtin/research/technical-writing.md +59 -59
  94. package/skills/builtin/software/code-review.md +61 -61
  95. package/skills/builtin/software/debugging.md +61 -61
  96. package/skills/builtin/software/test-design.md +67 -67
  97. package/skills/tui_commands.py +110 -110
  98. package/storage.py +1338 -1338
  99. package/tools/base.py +465 -465
  100. package/tools/builtin/_math_common.py +667 -667
  101. package/tools/builtin/_net_common.py +1145 -267
  102. package/tools/builtin/_page_text.py +490 -0
  103. package/tools/builtin/_pdf_text.py +113 -0
  104. package/tools/builtin/arxiv.py +685 -681
  105. package/tools/builtin/fetch_url.py +639 -371
  106. package/tools/builtin/file_ops.py +720 -720
  107. package/tools/builtin/geometry.py +184 -184
  108. package/tools/builtin/load_skill.py +76 -76
  109. package/tools/builtin/pin.py +227 -227
  110. package/tools/builtin/probability_stats.py +224 -224
  111. package/tools/builtin/project_docs.py +464 -464
  112. package/tools/builtin/remember.py +175 -175
  113. package/tools/builtin/shell.py +980 -980
  114. package/tools/builtin/todo.py +149 -149
  115. package/tools/builtin/web_search.py +402 -328
  116. package/tools/context.py +159 -159
  117. package/tools/isolation.py +387 -387
  118. package/tools/registry.py +1252 -1242
  119. package/tui/app.py +8372 -8307
  120. package/tui/app.tcss +754 -739
  121. package/tui/commands.py +26 -26
  122. package/tui/diffs.py +286 -286
  123. package/tui/history.py +128 -128
  124. package/tui/hosted_driver.py +102 -102
  125. package/tui/markdown.py +1329 -1329
  126. package/tui/meters.py +364 -364
  127. package/tui/ravens.py +146 -146
  128. package/tui/screens.py +1255 -1197
  129. package/tui/themes.py +599 -599
  130. package/tui/widgets.py +3861 -3796
@@ -1,207 +1,207 @@
1
- """
2
- security/capability.py
3
-
4
- ROADMAP_v2 §28. The generic half of the shell approval gate: what a call
5
- is able to do (`CommandProfile`), what the harness can confine it to
6
- (`CONTAINED` / `UNCONTAINED` / `UNAVAILABLE`), and the one rule that turns
7
- those two into "does a human have to say yes".
8
-
9
- Nothing here knows what a shell command is. That is deliberate (G2):
10
- `write`, `edit` and MCP tools have the same shape of question -- this call
11
- can reach these things, and the harness can confine it this far -- and the
12
- audit found the same defect (#67/#133) twice already by letting each site
13
- answer it separately. The SHELL-specific part, deciding which capabilities
14
- a particular command string has, lives in security/sandbox.py.
15
-
16
- Note the direction of the dependency: sandbox.py imports this module, not
17
- the other way round. A second producer of profiles must not have to import
18
- the shell sandbox to describe a file write.
19
- """
20
-
21
- from __future__ import annotations
22
-
23
- from dataclasses import dataclass
24
-
25
- # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
26
- # ---- Containment ----------------------------------------------------------
27
- # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
28
-
29
- # How far the harness can confine a call it is about to make. Three values,
30
- # not a boolean, because "cannot run this at all" is a real third answer and
31
- # it changes what the gate should do: asking about a call that is going to
32
- # fail regardless burns a turn and teaches the model to retry.
33
- CONTAINED = "contained" # confined to the workspace (a Docker or Podman container)
34
- UNCONTAINED = "uncontained" # runs with the user's own authority (host)
35
- UNAVAILABLE = "unavailable" # no backend can run it
36
-
37
- # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
38
- # ---- Approval modes -------------------------------------------------------
39
- # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
40
-
41
- ALWAYS = "always"
42
- TIERED = "tiered"
43
- # §48 (CE2). The pre-§48 `tiered` rule, kept under its own name: anything
44
- # the container confines and that gets no network runs unasked.
45
- #
46
- # NOT called CONTAINED, and the reason is a hazard rather than a style
47
- # point: `CONTAINED = "contained"` above is a CONTAINMENT value, and the
48
- # two vocabularies share a spelling. A mode compared against the
49
- # containment constant would read as correct and match, so the Python
50
- # names must differ even though the strings cannot.
51
- CONTAINED_MODE = "contained"
52
- NEVER = "never"
53
-
54
- # Strictest first. The order is what validate_mode's message lists, so a
55
- # reader of the error sees the modes the way config.yaml describes them.
56
- APPROVAL_MODES = (ALWAYS, TIERED, CONTAINED_MODE, NEVER)
57
-
58
-
59
- def validate_mode(value: str, setting_name: str) -> str:
60
- """Return *value*, or raise if it is not an approval mode.
61
-
62
- Called at IMPORT time by whoever owns the setting, which is D24's
63
- posture applied to a value rather than a field: a typo in a security
64
- setting must not be resolved by falling back to a default. The two
65
- directions a typo can fail are not symmetric -- silently reading
66
- `"teired"` as anything other than an error either asks about
67
- everything (annoying, visible) or asks about nothing (catastrophic,
68
- invisible), and there is no way to pick a default that is safe under
69
- both readings. So there is no default.
70
- """
71
- if value not in APPROVAL_MODES:
72
- raise ValueError(
73
- f"{setting_name} must be one of {', '.join(APPROVAL_MODES)}, "
74
- f"got {value!r}")
75
- return value
76
-
77
-
78
- # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
79
- # ---- Capability profile ---------------------------------------------------
80
- # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
81
-
82
-
83
- @dataclass(frozen=True)
84
- class CommandProfile:
85
- """What one call is able to do, as a capability SET rather than a
86
- trust level (G1).
87
-
88
- A linear tier ordering was the obvious design and it is wrong here,
89
- because it orders harms that are not comparable: `rm -rf /workspace`
90
- (writes, no network) and `curl https://x` (no writes, network) are
91
- different harms, not more and less of one thing. Ranking them forces
92
- an answer to a question nobody asked, and a new dimension later
93
- renumbers every tier. A set lets policy read exactly the dimension it
94
- cares about and lets a dimension arrive without touching the others.
95
-
96
- `tier` survives as a LABEL -- it names the profile for the approval
97
- prompt and the record, and nothing branches on it. If you find
98
- yourself writing `if profile.tier == ...` in policy, the field you
99
- actually wanted is missing.
100
-
101
- Every field is an UPPER BOUND. `writes` means "not known to be
102
- read-only", not "will write" -- knowing which would mean parsing the
103
- command, and refusing to parse is the property that makes the
104
- classifier sound (G2).
105
- """
106
-
107
- tier: str
108
- # Whether the classifier could characterise this call AT ALL.
109
- #
110
- # A separate dimension from the capabilities, and the one the `tier`
111
- # label was standing in for: "read-only, nothing leaves the workspace"
112
- # and "we could not tell" are different claims, and only the first is
113
- # a reason to skip a human. Without this field the containment
114
- # argument silently covers the second -- an unmeasurable call inside a
115
- # network-less container satisfies every capability test by returning
116
- # False to all of them, which is the vacuity class this audit keeps
117
- # finding: a check that passes because its input was empty.
118
- #
119
- # It is also what batch 9 needs. A model-based classifier's "I am not
120
- # sure" has to land somewhere that cannot be argued away by
121
- # containment, and this is that place.
122
- measured: bool
123
- # Some argument resolves outside the workspace. Only meaningful where
124
- # the workspace is the boundary -- under CONTAINED the container's
125
- # filesystem is not the host's, so this says nothing useful there.
126
- escapes_workspace: bool
127
- # Not known to be read-only.
128
- writes: bool
129
- # Not known to be free of code execution: the call may run code its own
130
- # tokens do not show -- an interpreter's `-c`, a script on disk, a
131
- # Makefile, a test runner's conftest.py (§48, CE7). An UPPER BOUND like
132
- # every field here, and its own dimension although every shell profile
133
- # today sets it alike with `writes`: changing a file and running a
134
- # program are different harms, and a future write/edit profile changes
135
- # a file without running anything. Required, with no default, so a
136
- # producer cannot leave it unsaid.
137
- runs_code: bool
138
- # The sandbox will GRANT this call network access. One fact for both
139
- # consumers, deliberately: the executor uses it to decide whether to
140
- # pass `--network`, and the gate uses it to decide whether to ask.
141
- # Splitting it into a permissive routing answer and a pessimistic
142
- # approval answer is exactly the shape of #67/#133 -- sharing the
143
- # mechanism is not sharing the policy -- inside the module written to
144
- # close that.
145
- network: bool
146
- # Why the classifier said what it said. Shown in the approval prompt,
147
- # so it is written for the person answering it, not for a log.
148
- reason: str
149
-
150
-
151
- # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
152
- # ---- The rule -------------------------------------------------------------
153
- # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
154
-
155
-
156
- def auto_approved(profile: CommandProfile, containment: str) -> bool:
157
- """Whether *profile* is covered by *containment* without asking anyone.
158
-
159
- One branch per containment, rather than one predicate ANDed across
160
- all of them, because the dimensions that matter genuinely differ:
161
-
162
- CONTAINED the container bounds the filesystem, so
163
- `escapes_workspace` says nothing -- `cat /etc/passwd`
164
- in a container reads the container's. What the
165
- container does NOT bound is egress, and that is the
166
- half the pre-§28 gate never looked at (#157 hole 2).
167
- Nor does it make running code harmless (§48, CE1,
168
- amending G4, which approved anything contained without
169
- network): the classifier cannot see what a `-c`, a
170
- script or a Makefile will do, a protected segment read
171
- through one carries no token to catch, and code is
172
- where a way out of the container starts. So
173
- `runs_code` asks here too.
174
-
175
- UNCONTAINED nothing is bounded, so everything must be clear: no
176
- argument leaving the workspace (#157 hole 1), nothing
177
- that might write, no network.
178
-
179
- UNAVAILABLE the call cannot run, so it is not covered either.
180
- Note this is NOT "do not ask": False here means ASK,
181
- like every other False. A caller that would rather stay
182
- silent about a call which is going to fail regardless
183
- has to say so itself -- shell does, and the two
184
- polarities meeting is worth the one explicit branch
185
- rather than a second meaning smuggled into this return.
186
-
187
- `measured` gates all three. A call the classifier could not
188
- characterise must not be auto-approved by a containment argument,
189
- because every capability test passes vacuously on a profile that
190
- knows nothing.
191
-
192
- This function reads no config and knows about no tool. A caller with
193
- an explicit documented override applies it before calling here, where
194
- it is visible, rather than passing a flag in to be honoured out of
195
- sight. There are two today, both in shell's `_shell_approval_check`:
196
- `AUTO_APPROVE_SANDBOX_FALLBACK`, and the `contained` approval mode
197
- (§48, CE2), which is this rule's CONTAINED branch as it read before
198
- `runs_code` joined it.
199
- """
200
- if not profile.measured:
201
- return False
202
- if containment == CONTAINED:
203
- return not (profile.network or profile.runs_code)
204
- if containment == UNCONTAINED:
205
- return not (profile.escapes_workspace or profile.writes
206
- or profile.runs_code or profile.network)
207
- return False
1
+ """
2
+ security/capability.py
3
+
4
+ ROADMAP_v2 §28. The generic half of the shell approval gate: what a call
5
+ is able to do (`CommandProfile`), what the harness can confine it to
6
+ (`CONTAINED` / `UNCONTAINED` / `UNAVAILABLE`), and the one rule that turns
7
+ those two into "does a human have to say yes".
8
+
9
+ Nothing here knows what a shell command is. That is deliberate (G2):
10
+ `write`, `edit` and MCP tools have the same shape of question -- this call
11
+ can reach these things, and the harness can confine it this far -- and the
12
+ audit found the same defect (#67/#133) twice already by letting each site
13
+ answer it separately. The SHELL-specific part, deciding which capabilities
14
+ a particular command string has, lives in security/sandbox.py.
15
+
16
+ Note the direction of the dependency: sandbox.py imports this module, not
17
+ the other way round. A second producer of profiles must not have to import
18
+ the shell sandbox to describe a file write.
19
+ """
20
+
21
+ from __future__ import annotations
22
+
23
+ from dataclasses import dataclass
24
+
25
+ # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
26
+ # ---- Containment ----------------------------------------------------------
27
+ # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
28
+
29
+ # How far the harness can confine a call it is about to make. Three values,
30
+ # not a boolean, because "cannot run this at all" is a real third answer and
31
+ # it changes what the gate should do: asking about a call that is going to
32
+ # fail regardless burns a turn and teaches the model to retry.
33
+ CONTAINED = "contained" # confined to the workspace (a Docker or Podman container)
34
+ UNCONTAINED = "uncontained" # runs with the user's own authority (host)
35
+ UNAVAILABLE = "unavailable" # no backend can run it
36
+
37
+ # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
38
+ # ---- Approval modes -------------------------------------------------------
39
+ # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
40
+
41
+ ALWAYS = "always"
42
+ TIERED = "tiered"
43
+ # §48 (CE2). The pre-§48 `tiered` rule, kept under its own name: anything
44
+ # the container confines and that gets no network runs unasked.
45
+ #
46
+ # NOT called CONTAINED, and the reason is a hazard rather than a style
47
+ # point: `CONTAINED = "contained"` above is a CONTAINMENT value, and the
48
+ # two vocabularies share a spelling. A mode compared against the
49
+ # containment constant would read as correct and match, so the Python
50
+ # names must differ even though the strings cannot.
51
+ CONTAINED_MODE = "contained"
52
+ NEVER = "never"
53
+
54
+ # Strictest first. The order is what validate_mode's message lists, so a
55
+ # reader of the error sees the modes the way config.yaml describes them.
56
+ APPROVAL_MODES = (ALWAYS, TIERED, CONTAINED_MODE, NEVER)
57
+
58
+
59
+ def validate_mode(value: str, setting_name: str) -> str:
60
+ """Return *value*, or raise if it is not an approval mode.
61
+
62
+ Called at IMPORT time by whoever owns the setting, which is D24's
63
+ posture applied to a value rather than a field: a typo in a security
64
+ setting must not be resolved by falling back to a default. The two
65
+ directions a typo can fail are not symmetric -- silently reading
66
+ `"teired"` as anything other than an error either asks about
67
+ everything (annoying, visible) or asks about nothing (catastrophic,
68
+ invisible), and there is no way to pick a default that is safe under
69
+ both readings. So there is no default.
70
+ """
71
+ if value not in APPROVAL_MODES:
72
+ raise ValueError(
73
+ f"{setting_name} must be one of {', '.join(APPROVAL_MODES)}, "
74
+ f"got {value!r}")
75
+ return value
76
+
77
+
78
+ # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
79
+ # ---- Capability profile ---------------------------------------------------
80
+ # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
81
+
82
+
83
+ @dataclass(frozen=True)
84
+ class CommandProfile:
85
+ """What one call is able to do, as a capability SET rather than a
86
+ trust level (G1).
87
+
88
+ A linear tier ordering was the obvious design and it is wrong here,
89
+ because it orders harms that are not comparable: `rm -rf /workspace`
90
+ (writes, no network) and `curl https://x` (no writes, network) are
91
+ different harms, not more and less of one thing. Ranking them forces
92
+ an answer to a question nobody asked, and a new dimension later
93
+ renumbers every tier. A set lets policy read exactly the dimension it
94
+ cares about and lets a dimension arrive without touching the others.
95
+
96
+ `tier` survives as a LABEL -- it names the profile for the approval
97
+ prompt and the record, and nothing branches on it. If you find
98
+ yourself writing `if profile.tier == ...` in policy, the field you
99
+ actually wanted is missing.
100
+
101
+ Every field is an UPPER BOUND. `writes` means "not known to be
102
+ read-only", not "will write" -- knowing which would mean parsing the
103
+ command, and refusing to parse is the property that makes the
104
+ classifier sound (G2).
105
+ """
106
+
107
+ tier: str
108
+ # Whether the classifier could characterise this call AT ALL.
109
+ #
110
+ # A separate dimension from the capabilities, and the one the `tier`
111
+ # label was standing in for: "read-only, nothing leaves the workspace"
112
+ # and "we could not tell" are different claims, and only the first is
113
+ # a reason to skip a human. Without this field the containment
114
+ # argument silently covers the second -- an unmeasurable call inside a
115
+ # network-less container satisfies every capability test by returning
116
+ # False to all of them, which is the vacuity class this audit keeps
117
+ # finding: a check that passes because its input was empty.
118
+ #
119
+ # It is also what batch 9 needs. A model-based classifier's "I am not
120
+ # sure" has to land somewhere that cannot be argued away by
121
+ # containment, and this is that place.
122
+ measured: bool
123
+ # Some argument resolves outside the workspace. Only meaningful where
124
+ # the workspace is the boundary -- under CONTAINED the container's
125
+ # filesystem is not the host's, so this says nothing useful there.
126
+ escapes_workspace: bool
127
+ # Not known to be read-only.
128
+ writes: bool
129
+ # Not known to be free of code execution: the call may run code its own
130
+ # tokens do not show -- an interpreter's `-c`, a script on disk, a
131
+ # Makefile, a test runner's conftest.py (§48, CE7). An UPPER BOUND like
132
+ # every field here, and its own dimension although every shell profile
133
+ # today sets it alike with `writes`: changing a file and running a
134
+ # program are different harms, and a future write/edit profile changes
135
+ # a file without running anything. Required, with no default, so a
136
+ # producer cannot leave it unsaid.
137
+ runs_code: bool
138
+ # The sandbox will GRANT this call network access. One fact for both
139
+ # consumers, deliberately: the executor uses it to decide whether to
140
+ # pass `--network`, and the gate uses it to decide whether to ask.
141
+ # Splitting it into a permissive routing answer and a pessimistic
142
+ # approval answer is exactly the shape of #67/#133 -- sharing the
143
+ # mechanism is not sharing the policy -- inside the module written to
144
+ # close that.
145
+ network: bool
146
+ # Why the classifier said what it said. Shown in the approval prompt,
147
+ # so it is written for the person answering it, not for a log.
148
+ reason: str
149
+
150
+
151
+ # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
152
+ # ---- The rule -------------------------------------------------------------
153
+ # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
154
+
155
+
156
+ def auto_approved(profile: CommandProfile, containment: str) -> bool:
157
+ """Whether *profile* is covered by *containment* without asking anyone.
158
+
159
+ One branch per containment, rather than one predicate ANDed across
160
+ all of them, because the dimensions that matter genuinely differ:
161
+
162
+ CONTAINED the container bounds the filesystem, so
163
+ `escapes_workspace` says nothing -- `cat /etc/passwd`
164
+ in a container reads the container's. What the
165
+ container does NOT bound is egress, and that is the
166
+ half the pre-§28 gate never looked at (#157 hole 2).
167
+ Nor does it make running code harmless (§48, CE1,
168
+ amending G4, which approved anything contained without
169
+ network): the classifier cannot see what a `-c`, a
170
+ script or a Makefile will do, a protected segment read
171
+ through one carries no token to catch, and code is
172
+ where a way out of the container starts. So
173
+ `runs_code` asks here too.
174
+
175
+ UNCONTAINED nothing is bounded, so everything must be clear: no
176
+ argument leaving the workspace (#157 hole 1), nothing
177
+ that might write, no network.
178
+
179
+ UNAVAILABLE the call cannot run, so it is not covered either.
180
+ Note this is NOT "do not ask": False here means ASK,
181
+ like every other False. A caller that would rather stay
182
+ silent about a call which is going to fail regardless
183
+ has to say so itself -- shell does, and the two
184
+ polarities meeting is worth the one explicit branch
185
+ rather than a second meaning smuggled into this return.
186
+
187
+ `measured` gates all three. A call the classifier could not
188
+ characterise must not be auto-approved by a containment argument,
189
+ because every capability test passes vacuously on a profile that
190
+ knows nothing.
191
+
192
+ This function reads no config and knows about no tool. A caller with
193
+ an explicit documented override applies it before calling here, where
194
+ it is visible, rather than passing a flag in to be honoured out of
195
+ sight. There are two today, both in shell's `_shell_approval_check`:
196
+ `AUTO_APPROVE_SANDBOX_FALLBACK`, and the `contained` approval mode
197
+ (§48, CE2), which is this rule's CONTAINED branch as it read before
198
+ `runs_code` joined it.
199
+ """
200
+ if not profile.measured:
201
+ return False
202
+ if containment == CONTAINED:
203
+ return not (profile.network or profile.runs_code)
204
+ if containment == UNCONTAINED:
205
+ return not (profile.escapes_workspace or profile.writes
206
+ or profile.runs_code or profile.network)
207
+ return False