@wowok/agent-mcp 2.7.1 → 2.7.2

package/dist/project/game-theory.js

@@ -1,177 +1 @@
-export const GAME_THEORY_CONSTRAINTS = [
-    {
-        scenario: "merchant_may_deliver_late",
-        conflict: "Merchant incentive: collect payment fast, deliver at own pace (or never). User bears schedule risk with no leverage once funds leave their wallet.",
-        userProtection: {
-            mechanism: "Milestone escrow — funds locked in Order, released per verified milestone",
-            object: "Order + Allocation",
-            guard: "milestone forward guard verifies deliverable before release",
-        },
-        merchantConstraint: {
-            requiredDeposit: true,
-            timeoutPenalty: "compensation_fund covers refund for unstarted milestones",
-        },
-        evaluationMetric: "timeout_protection",
-        mitigationSignals: [
-            ["edge:has_order_allocators", "node:main_machine"],
-            ["module:milestone_escrow"],
-        ],
-        mitigatingModules: ["milestone_escrow", "refund_guarantee"],
-        recommendation: "Adopt milestone_escrow module: bind order_allocators + Machine so funds release only per verified milestone. Add compensation_fund for late-delivery refunds.",
-    },
-    {
-        scenario: "merchant_may_abandon",
-        conflict: "Merchant incentive: maximize intake then abandon the service (exit scam). User has no recourse without locked funds or deposit.",
-        userProtection: {
-            mechanism: "Escrow + compensation fund — user refunds from on-chain fund even if merchant vanishes",
-            object: "Service.compensation_fund + Order",
-            guard: "refund_guard validates claim conditions",
-        },
-        merchantConstraint: {
-            requiredDeposit: true,
-            requiredArbitration: true,
-        },
-        evaluationMetric: "escrow_quality",
-        mitigationSignals: [
-            ["edge:has_order_allocators", "module:refund_guarantee"],
-            ["module:refund_guarantee", "node:main_arbitration"],
-        ],
-        mitigatingModules: ["refund_guarantee", "milestone_escrow", "reputation_on_chain"],
-        recommendation: "Adopt refund_guarantee module: compensation_fund_add > 0 with refund_guard. Escrow via order_allocators prevents merchant from touching funds before delivery.",
-    },
-    {
-        scenario: "customer_may_deny_acceptance",
-        conflict: "Customer incentive: withhold acceptance confirmation to delay payment indefinitely while using the deliverable. Merchant's funds stay locked.",
-        userProtection: {
-            mechanism: "Accept timeout — after N days without response, order auto-advances (adminUnhold) and merchant gets paid",
-            object: "Machine forward + Progress",
-            guard: "time_guard on accept forward",
-        },
-        merchantConstraint: {
-            timeoutPenalty: "user silence past timeout = implicit acceptance",
-        },
-        evaluationMetric: "timeout_protection",
-        mitigationSignals: [
-            ["module:accept_timeout_protection"],
-            ["node:guard_accept_timeout_protection"],
-        ],
-        mitigatingModules: ["accept_timeout_protection"],
-        recommendation: "Adopt accept_timeout_protection module: time_guard on the accept forward (e.g. 7 days) + PROGRESS_UNHOLD permission so the workflow auto-advances on customer silence.",
-    },
-    {
-        scenario: "customer_may_false_claim",
-        conflict: "Customer incentive: claim non-delivery or defect to obtain refund while keeping the goods/service. Merchant loses both deliverable and payment.",
-        userProtection: {
-            mechanism: "WIP provenance — delivery hash committed on-chain before/at delivery; independent arbitration verifies evidence",
-            object: "Repository + Arbitration",
-            guard: "Guard compares proof.signer/proof.time against committed WIP hash",
-        },
-        merchantConstraint: {
-            requiredProof: "wip_hash committed to Repository before fund release",
-            requiredArbitration: true,
-        },
-        evaluationMetric: "proof_integrity",
-        mitigationSignals: [
-            ["node:main_repository", "node:main_arbitration"],
-            ["module:wip_provenance", "node:main_arbitration"],
-        ],
-        mitigatingModules: ["wip_provenance", "independent_arbitration", "damage_attestation"],
-        recommendation: "Adopt wip_provenance + independent_arbitration modules: Repository stores WIP hashes as tamper-proof delivery evidence; Arbitration (independent Permission) resolves false claims against on-chain proof.",
-    },
-    {
-        scenario: "supplier_may_not_deliver",
-        conflict: "Supplier incentive: accept sub-order payment terms then under-deliver, leaving the merchant liable to the end customer. Multi-party opacity hides the failure point.",
-        userProtection: {
-            mechanism: "Supplier visibility — Demand + sub-order flow with multi-tier Allocation; each tier paid only on its own verified delivery",
-            object: "Demand + Allocation (multi-tier)",
-            guard: "per-tier release guard",
-        },
-        merchantConstraint: {
-            requiredProof: "sub-delivery proof per Allocation tier",
-        },
-        evaluationMetric: "supplier_visibility",
-        mitigationSignals: [
-            ["module:supplier_collaboration"],
-            ["module:multi_tier_allocation"],
-        ],
-        mitigatingModules: ["supplier_collaboration", "multi_tier_allocation"],
-        recommendation: "Adopt supplier_collaboration module: publish Demand referencing the main Service, split Allocation across tiers so each supplier is paid only for verified sub-delivery.",
-    },
-];
-function evalSignal(token, graph, intent) {
-    const [kind, value] = token.split(":", 2);
-    switch (kind) {
-        case "node":
-            return graph.nodes.some((n) => n.id === value);
-        case "edge":
-            return graph.edges.some((e) => e.relation === value);
-        case "module":
-            return graph.adoptedModules.includes(value);
-        case "type":
-            return graph.nodes.some((n) => n.type === value);
-        case "trust": {
-            const v = intent.trust;
-            return v[value] === true || (typeof v[value] === "string" && v[value] !== "none");
-        }
-        default:
-            return false;
-    }
-}
-export function checkGameTheoryConstraints(graph, intent) {
-    const results = [];
-    for (const c of GAME_THEORY_CONSTRAINTS) {
-        let matched = null;
-        let bestPartial = [];
-        let bestPartialScore = -1;
-        for (const group of c.mitigationSignals) {
-            const hits = group.filter((s) => evalSignal(s, graph, intent));
-            if (hits.length === group.length) {
-                matched = group;
-                break;
-            }
-            const score = hits.length / group.length;
-            if (hits.length > 0 && score > bestPartialScore) {
-                bestPartialScore = score;
-                bestPartial = hits;
-            }
-        }
-        results.push({
-            scenario: c.scenario,
-            conflict: c.conflict,
-            covered: matched !== null,
-            matchedSignals: matched ?? [],
-            partialSignals: matched ? [] : bestPartial,
-            userProtection: `${c.userProtection.mechanism} (${c.userProtection.object}${c.userProtection.guard ? `, guard: ${c.userProtection.guard}` : ""})`,
-            evaluationMetric: c.evaluationMetric,
-            recommendation: matched ? undefined : c.recommendation,
-        });
-    }
-    const covered = results.filter((r) => r.covered);
-    const exposed = results.filter((r) => !r.covered);
-    const wowAlignments = [];
-    if (graph.edges.some((e) => e.relation === "has_order_allocators")) {
-        wowAlignments.push("Milestone escrow: funds locked in Order, released per verified milestone — merchant paid for delivery, user pays for value");
-    }
-    if (graph.adoptedModules.includes("accept_timeout_protection")) {
-        wowAlignments.push("Accept timeout: customer silence past N days = implicit acceptance — merchant protected from payment stalling");
-    }
-    if (graph.nodes.some((n) => n.id === "main_repository")) {
-        wowAlignments.push("WIP provenance: delivery hash on-chain — false claims verifiable against tamper-proof evidence");
-    }
-    if (graph.nodes.some((n) => n.id === "main_arbitration")) {
-        wowAlignments.push("Micro-arbitration: Guard-weighted voting with independent Permission — low-cost dispute resolution without platform fees");
-    }
-    if (graph.adoptedModules.includes("reputation_on_chain")) {
-        wowAlignments.push("On-chain reputation: both sides' behavior permanently recorded — future transactions price the risk");
-    }
-    return {
-        results,
-        coveredCount: covered.length,
-        totalCount: results.length,
-        exposedScenarios: exposed.map((r) => r.scenario),
-        wowAlignments,
-        summary: exposed.length === 0
-            ? `All ${results.length} adversarial scenarios have on-chain mitigations.`
-            : `${exposed.length}/${results.length} adversarial scenarios EXPOSED: ${exposed.map((r) => r.scenario).join(", ")}. Apply the recommendations to align incentives.`,
-    };
-}
+export const GAME_THEORY_CONSTRAINTS=[{'scenario':'merchant_may_deliver_late','conflict':'Merchant\x20incentive:\x20collect\x20payment\x20fast,\x20deliver\x20at\x20own\x20pace\x20(or\x20never).\x20User\x20bears\x20schedule\x20risk\x20with\x20no\x20leverage\x20once\x20funds\x20leave\x20their\x20wallet.','userProtection':{'mechanism':'Milestone\x20escrow\x20—\x20funds\x20locked\x20in\x20Order,\x20released\x20per\x20verified\x20milestone','object':'Order\x20+\x20Allocation','guard':'milestone\x20forward\x20guard\x20verifies\x20deliverable\x20before\x20release'},'merchantConstraint':{'requiredDeposit':!![],'timeoutPenalty':'compensation_fund\x20covers\x20refund\x20for\x20unstarted\x20milestones'},'evaluationMetric':'timeout_protection','mitigationSignals':[['edge:has_order_allocators','node:main_machine'],['module:milestone_escrow']],'mitigatingModules':['milestone_escrow','refund_guarantee'],'recommendation':'Adopt\x20milestone_escrow\x20module:\x20bind\x20order_allocators\x20+\x20Machine\x20so\x20funds\x20release\x20only\x20per\x20verified\x20milestone.\x20Add\x20compensation_fund\x20for\x20late-delivery\x20refunds.'},{'scenario':'merchant_may_abandon','conflict':'Merchant\x20incentive:\x20maximize\x20intake\x20then\x20abandon\x20the\x20service\x20(exit\x20scam).\x20User\x20has\x20no\x20recourse\x20without\x20locked\x20funds\x20or\x20deposit.','userProtection':{'mechanism':'Escrow\x20+\x20compensation\x20fund\x20—\x20user\x20refunds\x20from\x20on-chain\x20fund\x20even\x20if\x20merchant\x20vanishes','object':'Service.compensation_fund\x20+\x20Order','guard':'refund_guard\x20validates\x20claim\x20conditions'},'merchantConstraint':{'requiredDeposit':!![],'requiredArbitration':!![]},'evaluationMetric':'escrow_quality','mitigationSignals':[['edge:has_order_allocators','module:refund_guarantee'],['module:refund_guarantee','node:main_arbitration']],'mitigatingModules':['refund_guarantee','milestone_escrow','reputation_on_chain'],'recommendation':'Adopt\x20refund_guarantee\x20module:\x20compensation_fund_add\x20>\x200\x20with\x20refund_guard.\x20Escrow\x20via\x20order_allocators\x20prevents\x20merchant\x20from\x20touching\x20funds\x20before\x20delivery.'},{'scenario':'customer_may_deny_acceptance','conflict':'Customer\x20incentive:\x20withhold\x20acceptance\x20confirmation\x20to\x20delay\x20payment\x20indefinitely\x20while\x20using\x20the\x20deliverable.\x20Merchant\x27s\x20funds\x20stay\x20locked.','userProtection':{'mechanism':'Accept\x20timeout\x20—\x20after\x20N\x20days\x20without\x20response,\x20order\x20auto-advances\x20(adminUnhold)\x20and\x20merchant\x20gets\x20paid','object':'Machine\x20forward\x20+\x20Progress','guard':'time_guard\x20on\x20accept\x20forward'},'merchantConstraint':{'timeoutPenalty':'user\x20silence\x20past\x20timeout\x20=\x20implicit\x20acceptance'},'evaluationMetric':'timeout_protection','mitigationSignals':[['module:accept_timeout_protection'],['node:guard_accept_timeout_protection']],'mitigatingModules':['accept_timeout_protection'],'recommendation':'Adopt\x20accept_timeout_protection\x20module:\x20time_guard\x20on\x20the\x20accept\x20forward\x20(e.g.\x207\x20days)\x20+\x20PROGRESS_UNHOLD\x20permission\x20so\x20the\x20workflow\x20auto-advances\x20on\x20customer\x20silence.'},{'scenario':'customer_may_false_claim','conflict':'Customer\x20incentive:\x20claim\x20non-delivery\x20or\x20defect\x20to\x20obtain\x20refund\x20while\x20keeping\x20the\x20goods/service.\x20Merchant\x20loses\x20both\x20deliverable\x20and\x20payment.','userProtection':{'mechanism':'WIP\x20provenance\x20—\x20delivery\x20hash\x20committed\x20on-chain\x20before/at\x20delivery;\x20independent\x20arbitration\x20verifies\x20evidence','object':'Repository\x20+\x20Arbitration','guard':'Guard\x20compares\x20proof.signer/proof.time\x20against\x20committed\x20WIP\x20hash'},'merchantConstraint':{'requiredProof':'wip_hash\x20committed\x20to\x20Repository\x20before\x20fund\x20release','requiredArbitration':!![]},'evaluationMetric':'proof_integrity','mitigationSignals':[['node:main_repository','node:main_arbitration'],['module:wip_provenance','node:main_arbitration']],'mitigatingModules':['wip_provenance','independent_arbitration','damage_attestation'],'recommendation':'Adopt\x20wip_provenance\x20+\x20independent_arbitration\x20modules:\x20Repository\x20stores\x20WIP\x20hashes\x20as\x20tamper-proof\x20delivery\x20evidence;\x20Arbitration\x20(independent\x20Permission)\x20resolves\x20false\x20claims\x20against\x20on-chain\x20proof.'},{'scenario':'supplier_may_not_deliver','conflict':'Supplier\x20incentive:\x20accept\x20sub-order\x20payment\x20terms\x20then\x20under-deliver,\x20leaving\x20the\x20merchant\x20liable\x20to\x20the\x20end\x20customer.\x20Multi-party\x20opacity\x20hides\x20the\x20failure\x20point.','userProtection':{'mechanism':'Supplier\x20visibility\x20—\x20Demand\x20+\x20sub-order\x20flow\x20with\x20multi-tier\x20Allocation;\x20each\x20tier\x20paid\x20only\x20on\x20its\x20own\x20verified\x20delivery','object':'Demand\x20+\x20Allocation\x20(multi-tier)','guard':'per-tier\x20release\x20guard'},'merchantConstraint':{'requiredProof':'sub-delivery\x20proof\x20per\x20Allocation\x20tier'},'evaluationMetric':'supplier_visibility','mitigationSignals':[['module:supplier_collaboration'],['module:multi_tier_allocation']],'mitigatingModules':['supplier_collaboration','multi_tier_allocation'],'recommendation':'Adopt\x20supplier_collaboration\x20module:\x20publish\x20Demand\x20referencing\x20the\x20main\x20Service,\x20split\x20Allocation\x20across\x20tiers\x20so\x20each\x20supplier\x20is\x20paid\x20only\x20for\x20verified\x20sub-delivery.'}];function evalSignal(a,b,c){const [d,e]=a['split'](':',0x2);switch(d){case'node':return b['nodes']['some'](f=>f['id']===e);case'edge':return b['edges']['some'](f=>f['relation']===e);case'module':return b['adoptedModules']['includes'](e);case'type':return b['nodes']['some'](f=>f['type']===e);case'trust':{const f=c['trust'];return f[e]===!![]||typeof f[e]==='string'&&f[e]!=='none';}default:return![];}}export function checkGameTheoryConstraints(a,b){const d=[];for(const h of GAME_THEORY_CONSTRAINTS){let i=null,j=[],k=-0x1;for(const l of h['mitigationSignals']){const m=l['filter'](o=>evalSignal(o,a,b));if(m['length']===l['length']){i=l;break;}const n=m['length']/l['length'];m['length']>0x0&&n>k&&(k=n,j=m);}d['push']({'scenario':h['scenario'],'conflict':h['conflict'],'covered':i!==null,'matchedSignals':i??[],'partialSignals':i?[]:j,'userProtection':h['userProtection']['mechanism']+'\x20('+h['userProtection']['object']+(h['userProtection']['guard']?',\x20guard:\x20'+h['userProtection']['guard']:'')+')','evaluationMetric':h['evaluationMetric'],'recommendation':i?undefined:h['recommendation']});}const e=d['filter'](o=>o['covered']),f=d['filter'](o=>!o['covered']),g=[];return a['edges']['some'](o=>o['relation']==='has_order_allocators')&&g['push']('Milestone\x20escrow:\x20funds\x20locked\x20in\x20Order,\x20released\x20per\x20verified\x20milestone\x20—\x20merchant\x20paid\x20for\x20delivery,\x20user\x20pays\x20for\x20value'),a['adoptedModules']['includes']('accept_timeout_protection')&&g['push']('Accept\x20timeout:\x20customer\x20silence\x20past\x20N\x20days\x20=\x20implicit\x20acceptance\x20—\x20merchant\x20protected\x20from\x20payment\x20stalling'),a['nodes']['some'](o=>o['id']==='main_repository')&&g['push']('WIP\x20provenance:\x20delivery\x20hash\x20on-chain\x20—\x20false\x20claims\x20verifiable\x20against\x20tamper-proof\x20evidence'),a['nodes']['some'](o=>o['id']==='main_arbitration')&&g['push']('Micro-arbitration:\x20Guard-weighted\x20voting\x20with\x20independent\x20Permission\x20—\x20low-cost\x20dispute\x20resolution\x20without\x20platform\x20fees'),a['adoptedModules']['includes']('reputation_on_chain')&&g['push']('On-chain\x20reputation:\x20both\x20sides\x27\x20behavior\x20permanently\x20recorded\x20—\x20future\x20transactions\x20price\x20the\x20risk'),{'results':d,'coveredCount':e['length'],'totalCount':d['length'],'exposedScenarios':f['map'](o=>o['scenario']),'wowAlignments':g,'summary':f['length']===0x0?'All\x20'+d['length']+'\x20adversarial\x20scenarios\x20have\x20on-chain\x20mitigations.':f['length']+'/'+d['length']+'\x20adversarial\x20scenarios\x20EXPOSED:\x20'+f['map'](o=>o['scenario'])['join'](',\x20')+'.\x20Apply\x20the\x20recommendations\x20to\x20align\x20incentives.'};}