@serfab/cadre-core 0.10.0 → 0.12.0

package/src/peer-authorization.ts

@@ -1,259 +1,259 @@
-import debug from 'debug';
-import { digest, verify } from '@optimystic/quereus-plugin-crypto';
-import { controlAuthorizationFields } from './control-authorization.js';
-import type { ControlAction, ControlDomain, RevocableTable } from './control-authorization.js';
-
-const log = debug('sereus:cadre:peer-authorization');
-
-/**
- * base64url SHA-256 digest over the shared domain-tagged field vector (see
- * control-authorization.ts). The base64url twin of
- * control-database.ts:buildAuthorizationMessage (which returns the same digest as raw
- * bytes): sign either encoding with input encoding to match and the signed bytes agree.
- */
-function taggedDigest(domain: ControlDomain, action: ControlAction, rowFields: string[]): string {
-  return digest(controlAuthorizationFields(domain, action, rowFields), 'sha256', 'base64url') as string;
-}
-
-/**
- * Canonical digest an owner signs to vouch a peer's ENROLLMENT — the offline
- * credential `cadre enroll register` verifies. No table checks this digest, so it
- * carries its own `'Cadre.Enrollment'` domain tag to stay disjoint from every
- * CadreControl table rule (pre-tag it collided with the `DeviceToken` owner digests,
- * so an enrollment vouch doubled as a push-token delete approval).
- *
- * Factored into one place so the producer (owner signing) and the verifier (the
- * offline `cadre enroll register` check) can never drift apart — change the digest
- * here and both move together.
- */
-export function peerAuthorizationDigest(peerId: string): string {
-  return taggedDigest('Cadre.Enrollment', 'vouch', [peerId]);
-}
-
-/**
- * The `CadreControl.DeviceToken` columns {@link deviceTokenAddDigest} binds, in the
- * schema's order. A whole-row struct rather than six positional strings, so a caller
- * cannot silently transpose `platform` and `token` (both opaque strings) and mint a
- * signature over a row it did not mean to approve.
- *
- * Structurally satisfied by a `DeviceTokenRecord` spread with the row's `stampId`;
- * `types.ts:DeviceTokenRecord` deliberately does NOT carry the stamp — it is the
- * SELF-signed record shape, and the peer's own `Sig` does not cover `StampId`.
- * `updatedAt` / `sig` are nullable because the columns are: both sign as `''` when
- * absent, mirroring the schema's `coalesce(...)`.
- */
-export interface DeviceTokenAuthorizedRow {
-  peerId: string;
-  platform: string;
-  token: string;
-  updatedAt: number | null;
-  sig: string | null;
-  stampId: string;
-}
-
-/**
- * Canonical digest an owner signs to authorize a `DeviceToken` INSERT — the WHOLE row,
- * ending in its single-use `StampId` nonce. SQL mirror:
- * `digest('CadreControl.DeviceToken', 'add', new.PeerId, new.Platform, new.Token,
- * coalesce(cast(new.UpdatedAt as text), ''), coalesce(new.Sig, ''), new.StampId)` in
- * `DeviceToken.AuthorizedInsert`.
- *
- * Binding every column means a captured approval can only ever reproduce the exact row
- * it approved — never one carrying attacker-chosen `Platform`/`Token`/`UpdatedAt` — and
- * binding the stamp makes it single-use: while the row lives the `unique` column blocks
- * a replay, and after a clear the stamp is retired permanently into
- * `CadreControl.Revocation` (`DeviceToken.NotRevoked`). This matters more here than for
- * `CadrePeer`: a resurrected push token has NO freshness ceiling to retire it
- * (`CadreNode.resolveDeviceToken` defaults `maxAgeMs` to infinity by design), so stamp
- * retirement is the only thing that sticks.
- *
- * Distinct from {@link deviceTokenRemoveDigest} so a captured insert approval can never
- * be replayed to delete the token, and vice versa.
- */
-export function deviceTokenAddDigest(row: DeviceTokenAuthorizedRow): string {
-  return taggedDigest('CadreControl.DeviceToken', 'add', [
-    row.peerId,
-    row.platform,
-    row.token,
-    row.updatedAt === null ? '' : String(row.updatedAt),
-    row.sig ?? '',
-    row.stampId,
-  ]);
-}
-
-/**
- * Canonical digest an owner signs to authorize a `DeviceToken` DELETE, bound to the
- * STORED row's (PeerId, StampId). SQL mirror:
- * `digest('CadreControl.DeviceToken', 'remove', old.PeerId, old.StampId)` in
- * `DeviceToken.AuthorizedDelete`.
- *
- * A narrower vector than {@link deviceTokenAddDigest} on purpose (the same split
- * `CadrePeer` makes): the clear approval names only which row is being retired, so it
- * cannot be re-cut into an insert approval, and it is dead the moment the stamp it
- * names is tombstoned.
- */
-export function deviceTokenRemoveDigest(peerId: string, stampId: string): string {
-  return taggedDigest('CadreControl.DeviceToken', 'remove', [peerId, stampId]);
-}
-
-/**
- * Canonical digest an owner signs to VOUCH a `CadrePeer` membership row (insert
- * and the owner re-touch update — same semantics, deliberately the same digest).
- * Binds the peer id to the row's single-use `StampId` nonce, so a captured signed
- * insert cannot be replayed — while the row lives the `unique` column blocks it, and
- * after a removal the stamp is retired permanently into `CadreControl.Revocation`
- * (`CadrePeer.NotRevoked`) — and, because {@link cadrePeerRemoveDigest} scopes a
- * DIFFERENT payload, the stored voucher (`VouchSig`) cannot be replayed to authorize
- * a delete. The domain tag keeps the stored, replicated `VouchSig` useless against
- * every OTHER table's rules.
- *
- * SQL mirror: `digest('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'vouch', new.PeerId, new.StampId)`.
- */
-export function cadrePeerVoucherDigest(peerId: string, stampId: string): string {
-  return taggedDigest('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'vouch', [peerId, stampId]);
-}
-
-/**
- * Canonical digest an owner signs to REMOVE a `CadrePeer` row. Deliberately a
- * distinct payload from {@link cadrePeerVoucherDigest} (the `'remove'` action tag)
- * so the row's stored voucher — a signature over the voucher digest — can never
- * satisfy this delete check. The signature is supplied in write context and never
- * stored, so no reader can replay it; a captured remove is also dead after the
- * delete lands, because a re-added row carries a FRESH `StampId` (the removed row's
- * stamp is retired into `CadreControl.Revocation` and never reused).
- *
- * SQL mirror: `digest('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'remove', old.PeerId, old.StampId)`.
- */
-export function cadrePeerRemoveDigest(peerId: string, stampId: string): string {
-  return taggedDigest('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'remove', [peerId, stampId]);
-}
-
-/**
- * Canonical digest an owner signs to APPEND a `CadreControl.Revocation` tombstone —
- * the row retiring `stampId` for the named guarded table, and recording `rowKey`
- * (the removed row's primary key: OwnerKey.Key / ValidationKey.Key /
- * CadrePeer.PeerId / DeviceToken.PeerId / Strand.Id) as which row was retired.
- * SQL mirror:
- * `digest('CadreControl.Revocation', 'remove', new.TableName, new.RowKey, new.StampId)`
- * in `Revocation.Authorized`.
- *
- * Its own `'CadreControl.Revocation'` domain tag makes it disjoint from the
- * `'CadreControl.CadrePeer'` (or `OwnerKey` / `ValidationKey` / `Strand`)
- * `'remove'` digest the same owner signs in the SAME transaction for the delete
- * this tombstone accompanies — a removal signature is not a retirement
- * signature and cannot be replayed as one.
- */
-export function revocationDigest(tableName: RevocableTable, rowKey: string, stampId: string): string {
-  return taggedDigest('CadreControl.Revocation', 'remove', [tableName, rowKey, stampId]);
-}
-
-/**
- * Verify that `signature` is a valid owner ed25519 signature over `peerId`'s
- * authorization digest, using `ownerPublicKey` (base64url).
- *
- * This is the mirror of the signing done in
- * {@link SeedBootstrapService.authorizePeer}: it checks the signature against
- * {@link peerAuthorizationDigest}. A `true` result means the holder of the
- * owner private key vouched for this peer ID — it does NOT mean the peer is
- * registered anywhere.
- *
- * Returns a boolean and never throws: malformed base64url, a bad/garbage key, or
- * any crypto failure resolves to `false` (callers want a verdict, not an
- * exception). The catch is logged at debug.
- */
-export function verifyPeerAuthorization(
-  peerId: string,
-  ownerPublicKey: string,
-  signature: string
-): boolean {
-  try {
-    return verify(
-      peerAuthorizationDigest(peerId),
-      signature,
-      ownerPublicKey,
-      'ed25519',
-      'base64url',
-      'base64url',
-      'base64url'
-    );
-  } catch (error) {
-    log('verifyPeerAuthorization failed: %o', error);
-    return false;
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Verify that `signature` is a valid owner ed25519 signature over the
- * `CadrePeer` voucher digest for (`peerId`, `stampId`) — the read-side mirror
- * of the voucher {@link ControlDatabase.insertCadrePeer} signs and persists into
- * `VouchOwner`/`VouchSig` (see {@link cadrePeerVoucherDigest}).
- *
- * A `true` result means the holder of `ownerPublicKey` vouched THIS membership
- * row (the peer id bound to the row's single-use `StampId` nonce). It says
- * nothing about whether that owner key is itself trustworthy — the caller must
- * separately check the key against the node-local trusted-owner anchor
- * (`TrustedOwnerStore`), never the replicated `OwnerKey` table.
- *
- * Returns a boolean and never throws (same contract as
- * {@link verifyPeerAuthorization}): malformed input or any crypto failure
- * resolves to `false`, logged at debug.
- */
-export function verifyCadrePeerVoucher(
-  peerId: string,
-  stampId: string,
-  ownerPublicKey: string,
-  signature: string
-): boolean {
-  try {
-    return verify(
-      cadrePeerVoucherDigest(peerId, stampId),
-      signature,
-      ownerPublicKey,
-      'ed25519',
-      'base64url',
-      'base64url',
-      'base64url'
-    );
-  } catch (error) {
-    log('verifyCadrePeerVoucher failed: %o', error);
-    return false;
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Canonical digest a JOINING peer signs to consent to ONE `FormationUsage`
- * redemption — the read-side mirror of `formationConsentMessage` in
- * control-database.ts, base64url-encoded instead of raw bytes (see
- * {@link taggedDigest}). That doc comment carries the field-vector rationale
- * (notably why `strandId` is not signed); the two vectors must not drift, which
- * peer-authorization.spec.ts pins by signing one form and verifying the other.
- */
-export function formationConsentDigest(
-  token: string, usageStampId: string, peerKey: string, disclosure: string
-): string {
-  return taggedDigest('CadreControl.FormationUsage', 'consent', [token, usageStampId, peerKey, disclosure]);
-}
-
-/**
- * Verify that `row.peerSig` is a valid ed25519 signature over the joining peer's
- * consent digest (see {@link formationConsentDigest}) — the row's OWN `peerKey`.
- *
- * Unlike {@link verifyCadrePeerVoucher} there is no separate enrolled/owner row to
- * look up: the identity IS the key carried on the row, so a forged consent would
- * need that joiner's own private key. Returns a boolean and never throws (same
- * contract as the siblings above): malformed input or any crypto failure resolves
- * to `false`, logged at debug.
- */
-export function verifyFormationConsent(row: {
-  token: string; usageStampId: string; peerKey: string; disclosure: string; peerSig: string;
-}): boolean {
-  try {
-    return verify(
-      formationConsentDigest(row.token, row.usageStampId, row.peerKey, row.disclosure),
-      row.peerSig, row.peerKey, 'ed25519', 'base64url', 'base64url', 'base64url'
-    );
-  } catch (error) {
-    log('verifyFormationConsent failed: %o', error);
-    return false;
-  }
-}
+import debug from 'debug';
+import { digest, verify } from '@optimystic/quereus-plugin-crypto';
+import { controlAuthorizationFields } from './control-authorization.js';
+import type { ControlAction, ControlDomain, RevocableTable } from './control-authorization.js';
+
+const log = debug('sereus:cadre:peer-authorization');
+
+/**
+ * base64url SHA-256 digest over the shared domain-tagged field vector (see
+ * control-authorization.ts). The base64url twin of
+ * control-database.ts:buildAuthorizationMessage (which returns the same digest as raw
+ * bytes): sign either encoding with input encoding to match and the signed bytes agree.
+ */
+function taggedDigest(domain: ControlDomain, action: ControlAction, rowFields: string[]): string {
+  return digest(controlAuthorizationFields(domain, action, rowFields), 'sha256', 'base64url') as string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Canonical digest an owner signs to vouch a peer's ENROLLMENT — the offline
+ * credential `cadre enroll register` verifies. No table checks this digest, so it
+ * carries its own `'Cadre.Enrollment'` domain tag to stay disjoint from every
+ * CadreControl table rule (pre-tag it collided with the `DeviceToken` owner digests,
+ * so an enrollment vouch doubled as a push-token delete approval).
+ *
+ * Factored into one place so the producer (owner signing) and the verifier (the
+ * offline `cadre enroll register` check) can never drift apart — change the digest
+ * here and both move together.
+ */
+export function peerAuthorizationDigest(peerId: string): string {
+  return taggedDigest('Cadre.Enrollment', 'vouch', [peerId]);
+}
+
+/**
+ * The `CadreControl.DeviceToken` columns {@link deviceTokenAddDigest} binds, in the
+ * schema's order. A whole-row struct rather than six positional strings, so a caller
+ * cannot silently transpose `platform` and `token` (both opaque strings) and mint a
+ * signature over a row it did not mean to approve.
+ *
+ * Structurally satisfied by a `DeviceTokenRecord` spread with the row's `stampId`;
+ * `types.ts:DeviceTokenRecord` deliberately does NOT carry the stamp — it is the
+ * SELF-signed record shape, and the peer's own `Sig` does not cover `StampId`.
+ * `updatedAt` / `sig` are nullable because the columns are: both sign as `''` when
+ * absent, mirroring the schema's `coalesce(...)`.
+ */
+export interface DeviceTokenAuthorizedRow {
+  peerId: string;
+  platform: string;
+  token: string;
+  updatedAt: number | null;
+  sig: string | null;
+  stampId: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Canonical digest an owner signs to authorize a `DeviceToken` INSERT — the WHOLE row,
+ * ending in its single-use `StampId` nonce. SQL mirror:
+ * `digest('CadreControl.DeviceToken', 'add', new.PeerId, new.Platform, new.Token,
+ * coalesce(cast(new.UpdatedAt as text), ''), coalesce(new.Sig, ''), new.StampId)` in
+ * `DeviceToken.AuthorizedInsert`.
+ *
+ * Binding every column means a captured approval can only ever reproduce the exact row
+ * it approved — never one carrying attacker-chosen `Platform`/`Token`/`UpdatedAt` — and
+ * binding the stamp makes it single-use: while the row lives the `unique` column blocks
+ * a replay, and after a clear the stamp is retired permanently into
+ * `CadreControl.Revocation` (`DeviceToken.NotRevoked`). This matters more here than for
+ * `CadrePeer`: a resurrected push token has NO freshness ceiling to retire it
+ * (`CadreNode.resolveDeviceToken` defaults `maxAgeMs` to infinity by design), so stamp
+ * retirement is the only thing that sticks.
+ *
+ * Distinct from {@link deviceTokenRemoveDigest} so a captured insert approval can never
+ * be replayed to delete the token, and vice versa.
+ */
+export function deviceTokenAddDigest(row: DeviceTokenAuthorizedRow): string {
+  return taggedDigest('CadreControl.DeviceToken', 'add', [
+    row.peerId,
+    row.platform,
+    row.token,
+    row.updatedAt === null ? '' : String(row.updatedAt),
+    row.sig ?? '',
+    row.stampId,
+  ]);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Canonical digest an owner signs to authorize a `DeviceToken` DELETE, bound to the
+ * STORED row's (PeerId, StampId). SQL mirror:
+ * `digest('CadreControl.DeviceToken', 'remove', old.PeerId, old.StampId)` in
+ * `DeviceToken.AuthorizedDelete`.
+ *
+ * A narrower vector than {@link deviceTokenAddDigest} on purpose (the same split
+ * `CadrePeer` makes): the clear approval names only which row is being retired, so it
+ * cannot be re-cut into an insert approval, and it is dead the moment the stamp it
+ * names is tombstoned.
+ */
+export function deviceTokenRemoveDigest(peerId: string, stampId: string): string {
+  return taggedDigest('CadreControl.DeviceToken', 'remove', [peerId, stampId]);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Canonical digest an owner signs to VOUCH a `CadrePeer` membership row (insert
+ * and the owner re-touch update — same semantics, deliberately the same digest).
+ * Binds the peer id to the row's single-use `StampId` nonce, so a captured signed
+ * insert cannot be replayed — while the row lives the `unique` column blocks it, and
+ * after a removal the stamp is retired permanently into `CadreControl.Revocation`
+ * (`CadrePeer.NotRevoked`) — and, because {@link cadrePeerRemoveDigest} scopes a
+ * DIFFERENT payload, the stored voucher (`VouchSig`) cannot be replayed to authorize
+ * a delete. The domain tag keeps the stored, replicated `VouchSig` useless against
+ * every OTHER table's rules.
+ *
+ * SQL mirror: `digest('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'vouch', new.PeerId, new.StampId)`.
+ */
+export function cadrePeerVoucherDigest(peerId: string, stampId: string): string {
+  return taggedDigest('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'vouch', [peerId, stampId]);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Canonical digest an owner signs to REMOVE a `CadrePeer` row. Deliberately a
+ * distinct payload from {@link cadrePeerVoucherDigest} (the `'remove'` action tag)
+ * so the row's stored voucher — a signature over the voucher digest — can never
+ * satisfy this delete check. The signature is supplied in write context and never
+ * stored, so no reader can replay it; a captured remove is also dead after the
+ * delete lands, because a re-added row carries a FRESH `StampId` (the removed row's
+ * stamp is retired into `CadreControl.Revocation` and never reused).
+ *
+ * SQL mirror: `digest('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'remove', old.PeerId, old.StampId)`.
+ */
+export function cadrePeerRemoveDigest(peerId: string, stampId: string): string {
+  return taggedDigest('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'remove', [peerId, stampId]);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Canonical digest an owner signs to APPEND a `CadreControl.Revocation` tombstone —
+ * the row retiring `stampId` for the named guarded table, and recording `rowKey`
+ * (the removed row's primary key: OwnerKey.Key / ValidationKey.Key /
+ * CadrePeer.PeerId / DeviceToken.PeerId / Strand.Id) as which row was retired.
+ * SQL mirror:
+ * `digest('CadreControl.Revocation', 'remove', new.TableName, new.RowKey, new.StampId)`
+ * in `Revocation.Authorized`.
+ *
+ * Its own `'CadreControl.Revocation'` domain tag makes it disjoint from the
+ * `'CadreControl.CadrePeer'` (or `OwnerKey` / `ValidationKey` / `Strand`)
+ * `'remove'` digest the same owner signs in the SAME transaction for the delete
+ * this tombstone accompanies — a removal signature is not a retirement
+ * signature and cannot be replayed as one.
+ */
+export function revocationDigest(tableName: RevocableTable, rowKey: string, stampId: string): string {
+  return taggedDigest('CadreControl.Revocation', 'remove', [tableName, rowKey, stampId]);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verify that `signature` is a valid owner ed25519 signature over `peerId`'s
+ * authorization digest, using `ownerPublicKey` (base64url).
+ *
+ * This is the mirror of the signing done in
+ * {@link SeedBootstrapService.authorizePeer}: it checks the signature against
+ * {@link peerAuthorizationDigest}. A `true` result means the holder of the
+ * owner private key vouched for this peer ID — it does NOT mean the peer is
+ * registered anywhere.
+ *
+ * Returns a boolean and never throws: malformed base64url, a bad/garbage key, or
+ * any crypto failure resolves to `false` (callers want a verdict, not an
+ * exception). The catch is logged at debug.
+ */
+export function verifyPeerAuthorization(
+  peerId: string,
+  ownerPublicKey: string,
+  signature: string
+): boolean {
+  try {
+    return verify(
+      peerAuthorizationDigest(peerId),
+      signature,
+      ownerPublicKey,
+      'ed25519',
+      'base64url',
+      'base64url',
+      'base64url'
+    );
+  } catch (error) {
+    log('verifyPeerAuthorization failed: %o', error);
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verify that `signature` is a valid owner ed25519 signature over the
+ * `CadrePeer` voucher digest for (`peerId`, `stampId`) — the read-side mirror
+ * of the voucher {@link ControlDatabase.insertCadrePeer} signs and persists into
+ * `VouchOwner`/`VouchSig` (see {@link cadrePeerVoucherDigest}).
+ *
+ * A `true` result means the holder of `ownerPublicKey` vouched THIS membership
+ * row (the peer id bound to the row's single-use `StampId` nonce). It says
+ * nothing about whether that owner key is itself trustworthy — the caller must
+ * separately check the key against the node-local trusted-owner anchor
+ * (`TrustedOwnerStore`), never the replicated `OwnerKey` table.
+ *
+ * Returns a boolean and never throws (same contract as
+ * {@link verifyPeerAuthorization}): malformed input or any crypto failure
+ * resolves to `false`, logged at debug.
+ */
+export function verifyCadrePeerVoucher(
+  peerId: string,
+  stampId: string,
+  ownerPublicKey: string,
+  signature: string
+): boolean {
+  try {
+    return verify(
+      cadrePeerVoucherDigest(peerId, stampId),
+      signature,
+      ownerPublicKey,
+      'ed25519',
+      'base64url',
+      'base64url',
+      'base64url'
+    );
+  } catch (error) {
+    log('verifyCadrePeerVoucher failed: %o', error);
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Canonical digest a JOINING peer signs to consent to ONE `FormationUsage`
+ * redemption — the read-side mirror of `formationConsentMessage` in
+ * control-database.ts, base64url-encoded instead of raw bytes (see
+ * {@link taggedDigest}). That doc comment carries the field-vector rationale
+ * (notably why `strandId` is not signed); the two vectors must not drift, which
+ * peer-authorization.spec.ts pins by signing one form and verifying the other.
+ */
+export function formationConsentDigest(
+  token: string, usageStampId: string, peerKey: string, disclosure: string
+): string {
+  return taggedDigest('CadreControl.FormationUsage', 'consent', [token, usageStampId, peerKey, disclosure]);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verify that `row.peerSig` is a valid ed25519 signature over the joining peer's
+ * consent digest (see {@link formationConsentDigest}) — the row's OWN `peerKey`.
+ *
+ * Unlike {@link verifyCadrePeerVoucher} there is no separate enrolled/owner row to
+ * look up: the identity IS the key carried on the row, so a forged consent would
+ * need that joiner's own private key. Returns a boolean and never throws (same
+ * contract as the siblings above): malformed input or any crypto failure resolves
+ * to `false`, logged at debug.
+ */
+export function verifyFormationConsent(row: {
+  token: string; usageStampId: string; peerKey: string; disclosure: string; peerSig: string;
+}): boolean {
+  try {
+    return verify(
+      formationConsentDigest(row.token, row.usageStampId, row.peerKey, row.disclosure),
+      row.peerSig, row.peerKey, 'ed25519', 'base64url', 'base64url', 'base64url'
+    );
+  } catch (error) {
+    log('verifyFormationConsent failed: %o', error);
+    return false;
+  }
+}