@serfab/cadre-core 0.10.0 → 0.12.0

package/src/control-formation-recorder.ts

@@ -1,304 +1,305 @@
-import debug from 'debug';
-import { randomBytes } from '@optimystic/quereus-plugin-crypto';
-import { FormationAbortedError, type ControlDatabase } from './control-database.js';
-import {
-  createHttpFormationApprover,
-  verifyFormationApproval,
-  FormationApprovalError,
-  type FormationApprover,
-  type FormationApproval,
-  type FormationApprovalRequest
-} from './formation-approval.js';
-import type { FormationUsageRecorder, ResolvedHostStrand } from './strand-solicitation.js';
-import type { OpenInvitation } from './types.js';
-
-const log = debug('sereus:cadre:formation-recorder');
-
-/** Far-future sentinel for an invitation that never expires (max valid JS Date). */
-const NEVER_EXPIRES = new Date(8640000000000000);
-
-/**
- * {@link FormationUsageRecorder} backed by the real `CadreControl` tables.
- *
- * It reads `FormationInvite` / `FormationUsage` to answer token-validity and
- * usage questions, and writes the consent row that records a redemption. Two
- * provisioning shapes are supported, keyed on whether the invite binds a host strand:
- *
- * - **Bound (provision-then-record):** the host strand already exists (owner-signed
- *   up front and named by the invite's `StrandId`), so {@link resolveStrand} reports it
- *   and {@link recordUsage} writes the consent row against that pre-existing strand
- *   (record-only) rather than inserting a new `Strand`.
- * - **Unbound (responder-provisions):** the invite carries no `StrandId`, so
- *   {@link provisionAndRecord} mints a fresh strand and records consent against it
- *   ATOMICALLY (one `FormationUsage` row), closing the single-use hole the older
- *   never-record fallback left open.
- *
- * This replaces the in-memory stubs used by the formation tests so the consent path
- * is exercised against the persisted control network.
- *
- * Usage accounting follows the schema's `FormationUsage.Authorized` semantics:
- * a null `TotalUses` means unlimited uses; otherwise the invite is "used up"
- * once the recorded usage count reaches `TotalUses`.
- *
- * When the invite carries a `ValidationUrl`, both write paths first obtain an outside
- * approval ({@link obtainApproval}) — the recorder is the one place where the nonce that is
- * SIGNED and the nonce that is INSERTED are trivially the same value, since it also performs
- * the write. That makes this class do network I/O; failures surface as
- * {@link FormationApprovalError}s the manager maps to protocol rejection reasons.
- */
-export class ControlFormationUsageRecorder implements FormationUsageRecorder {
-  private readonly approver: FormationApprover;
-
-  /**
-   * `approver` defaults to the real HTTP hook client — deliberately ON: this recorder is
-   * constructed by the reference apps and the integration harness, not by `CadreNode`, so an
-   * opt-in approver would leave every real deployment unable to redeem a
-   * `ValidationUrl`-bearing invite. Tests inject a fake.
-   */
-  constructor(
-    private readonly controlDatabase: ControlDatabase,
-    options?: { approver?: FormationApprover }
-  ) {
-    this.approver = options?.approver ?? createHttpFormationApprover();
-  }
-
-  /** A token is valid when a matching, unexpired `FormationInvite` exists. */
-  async isTokenValid(token: string): Promise<{ valid: boolean; invitation?: OpenInvitation }> {
-    const invite = await this.controlDatabase.queryFormationInvite(token);
-    if (!invite) {
-      return { valid: false };
-    }
-    if (invite.expiresAtMs !== null && invite.expiresAtMs <= Date.now()) {
-      log('Token expired: %s', token);
-      return { valid: false };
-    }
-    return {
-      valid: true,
-      invitation: {
-        token: invite.token,
-        sAppId: invite.sAppId,
-        expiration: invite.expiresAtMs !== null ? new Date(invite.expiresAtMs) : NEVER_EXPIRES,
-        bootstrap: [],
-      },
-    };
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * A token is "used" when its recorded usage count has reached the invite's
-   * `TotalUses`. A null `TotalUses` (unlimited) is never used up; an unknown
-   * token is reported not-used (validity is handled by {@link isTokenValid}).
-   */
-  async isTokenUsed(token: string): Promise<boolean> {
-    const invite = await this.controlDatabase.queryFormationInvite(token);
-    if (!invite || invite.totalUses === null) {
-      return false;
-    }
-    const uses = await this.controlDatabase.countFormationUsage(token);
-    return uses >= invite.totalUses;
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * Any `FormationInvite` row still unexpired and not fully consumed — the
-   * durable half of the control-network connection gate's "does this node
-   * expect a stranger?" question. Survives a restart and sees invites
-   * replicated in from sibling nodes of the same cadre.
-   */
-  async hasOutstandingInvitation(): Promise<boolean> {
-    return await this.controlDatabase.hasOutstandingFormationInvite();
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * Obtain the approval material for ONE redemption, when the invite demands it.
-   *
-   * `validationUrl === null` → `{}`: no approval required. The `usageStampId` nonce is
-   * ALWAYS supplied by the caller — the JOINER mints it, signs its own consent over it, and
-   * sends it in the contact message — so the approver signs over the identical nonce in both
-   * paths. Two local pre-checks run before anything is written:
-   *
-   * - {@link verifyFormationApproval} — did the hook sign the exact fields we hold?
-   * - {@link ControlDatabase.queryValidationKeyStampId} — is the approval's key enrolled?
-   *
-   * Both pre-checks exist purely for legibility — they turn a bad approval into a named
-   * {@link FormationApprovalError} instead of an opaque `CHECK constraint failed: Authorized`
-   * at commit. The database re-verifies against the STORED `ValidationKey` row and remains
-   * the security authority; do not "simplify" the database check away in favour of these.
-   */
-  private async obtainApproval(
-    request: Omit<FormationApprovalRequest, 'validationUrl'> & { validationUrl: string | null },
-    signal?: AbortSignal
-  ): Promise<{ validationKey?: string; validationSignature?: string }> {
-    const { validationUrl, ...fields } = request;
-    if (validationUrl === null) {
-      return {};
-    }
-    if (signal?.aborted) {
-      throw new FormationAbortedError(fields.token, 'approval');
-    }
-    const fullRequest: FormationApprovalRequest = { ...fields, validationUrl };
-    const approval = await this.askApprover(fullRequest, signal);
-    if (!verifyFormationApproval(fullRequest, approval)) {
-      throw new FormationApprovalError(
-        'malformed',
-        `Approval signature does not verify over this redemption (token ${fields.token})`
-      );
-    }
-    if (await this.controlDatabase.queryValidationKeyStampId(approval.validationKey) === null) {
-      throw new FormationApprovalError(
-        'unenrolled',
-        'Approval is signed by a key that is not an enrolled ValidationKey'
-      );
-    }
-    return approval;
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * Ask the approver, re-labelling a caller-abort as a {@link FormationAbortedError}.
-   *
-   * The HTTP client relays a caller-abort onto its own request and reports it as an
-   * `unavailable` {@link FormationApprovalError} — which the manager cannot tell from a
-   * genuinely dead hook, and so maps to a rejection reason and RETURNS. Every other abort on
-   * this path THROWS, which is what makes the manager rethrow and leave the reply to the
-   * listener's timeout path; a mid-hook abort belongs in the same class. The approval error
-   * is kept as `cause` so the transport-level detail is not lost.
-   */
-  private async askApprover(
-    request: FormationApprovalRequest,
-    signal?: AbortSignal
-  ): Promise<FormationApproval> {
-    try {
-      return await this.approver.requestApproval(request, signal);
-    } catch (err) {
-      if (signal?.aborted) {
-        throw new FormationAbortedError(request.token, 'approval', { cause: err });
-      }
-      throw err;
-    }
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * Record consent against an **already-existing** host strand (record-only): the
-   * single `FormationUsage` insert auto-commits and the deferred `StrandExists`
-   * CHECK is satisfied by the pre-existing strand. This is the provision-then-record
-   * commitment — the strand was minted owner-signed up front, so we do NOT
-   * re-insert it (which would double-insert the same PK). `peerKey` is written as the
-   * usage `PeerKey`, which BOTH signed digests cover: the joiner's own consent signature
-   * (`peerSignature`, verified by the schema's `PeerConsented` CHECK) and — when the invite
-   * carries a `ValidationUrl` — the approver's sign-off, so it is the joiner an approval is
-   * spent on AND provably the joiner that agreed. Use
-   * {@link ControlDatabase.redeemInvitation} for the consent-creates-strand path instead.
-   *
-   * Reads the invite first (one extra read per redemption) to learn its `ValidationUrl`, and
-   * obtains the approval through {@link obtainApproval} when one is demanded.
-   */
-  async recordUsage(params: {
-    token: string;
-    peerKey: string;
-    peerSignature: string;
-    usageStampId: string;
-    strandId: string;
-    disclosure: string;
-    signal?: AbortSignal;
-  }): Promise<void> {
-    const { token, peerKey, peerSignature, usageStampId, strandId, disclosure, signal } = params;
-    if (signal?.aborted) {
-      throw new FormationAbortedError(token, 'usage recording');
-    }
-    const invite = await this.controlDatabase.queryFormationInvite(token);
-    // NOTE: a missing invite row reads as "no approval required" here and in
-    // `provisionAndRecord`, so an invite that vanished between `resolveStrand` and this read
-    // would be written unapproved. Safe only because the database's `FormationUsage.Authorized`
-    // CHECK demands a matching `FormationInvite` and rolls the write back regardless; if that
-    // CHECK ever loosens, reject on `invite === null` instead of defaulting to null.
-    const approval = await this.obtainApproval({
-      token, usageStampId, strandId, peerKey, disclosure,
-      validationUrl: invite?.validationUrl ?? null,
-    }, signal);
-    await this.controlDatabase.recordFormationUsage({
-      token, strandId, peerKey, peerSignature, usageStampId, disclosure, signal,
-      totalUses: invite?.totalUses ?? null, ...approval,
-    });
-    log('Recorded formation usage: token=%s strand=%s', token, strandId);
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * Classify the host strand this invite binds to (see {@link ResolvedHostStrand}):
-   *
-   * - no invite / no `StrandId` → `unbound` (responder-provisions path).
-   * - `StrandId` set AND the strand row is present → `bound`, carrying its
-   *   `MemberPrivateKey` (the closed-strand read-gating secret) for delivery to a
-   *   validated invitee.
-   * - `StrandId` set but the strand row is absent → `missing` (the host strand has not
-   *   converged on this responder yet); the manager rejects cleanly instead of recording
-   *   usage against a non-existent strand, which would fail the deferred `StrandExists`
-   *   CHECK at commit and drop the result frame.
-   */
-  async resolveStrand(token: string): Promise<ResolvedHostStrand> {
-    const invite = await this.controlDatabase.queryFormationInvite(token);
-    if (!invite || !invite.strandId) {
-      return { kind: 'unbound' };
-    }
-    const strand = await this.controlDatabase.queryStrand(invite.strandId);
-    if (!strand) {
-      return { kind: 'missing', strandId: invite.strandId };
-    }
-    return {
-      kind: 'bound',
-      strandId: invite.strandId,
-      memberPrivateKey: strand.MemberPrivateKey ?? null,
-    };
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * Provision a NEW strand for an UNBOUND invite and record consent against it in ONE
-   * transaction (the responder-provisions fallback, now single-use-enforced).
-   *
-   * Mints a fresh, globally-unique strand id from {@link randomBytes} — the same
-   * cross-platform CSPRNG `control-database`'s `generateStampId` uses, NOT
-   * `crypto.randomUUID` / `Date.now` / `Math.random` (not uniformly available across
-   * node/browser/RN) — then delegates to {@link ControlDatabase.redeemInvitation}, whose
-   * single `begin … commit` inserts the consent-authorized `Strand` row AND the matching
-   * `FormationUsage` row together (both deferred CHECKs see both rows at commit). That one
-   * `FormationUsage` row makes the unbound redemption single-use exactly like the bound
-   * path: the next redemption of a `TotalUses:1` invite sees `count 1 >= 1` and is rejected.
-   *
-   * The strand is open (`'o'`) — an unbound responder-provisioned strand has no membership
-   * key — so the returned `memberPrivateKey` is null. `sAppId` is accepted for parity/future
-   * use; `redeemInvitation` does not currently thread it into the `Strand` row.
-   *
-   * A concurrent redemption of the same single-use invite still THROWS for the loser — the
-   * manager maps that to a clean protocol rejection (it never lets the dropped insert close
-   * the stream silently) — but no longer via a `(Token, UseNumber)` primary-key collision on
-   * this node: `redeemInvitation` reads the use number INSIDE the write lock, so two local
-   * redemptions serialize and the second one reads the number the first already committed.
-   * It is then refused because that number is past the invite's seat budget, reported as a
-   * named `InvitationExhaustedError` on every attempt (including the first, which is what a
-   * same-node race hits). A PK collision is still what a cross-node race surfaces as, and that
-   * one IS retried under a fresh use number rather than thrown.
-   */
-  async provisionAndRecord(params: {
-    token: string;
-    peerKey: string;
-    peerSignature: string;
-    usageStampId: string;
-    sAppId: string;
-    disclosure: string;
-    signal?: AbortSignal;
-  }): Promise<{ strandId: string; memberPrivateKey: string | null }> {
-    const { token, peerKey, peerSignature, usageStampId, disclosure, signal } = params;
-    if (signal?.aborted) {
-      throw new FormationAbortedError(token, 'redemption');
-    }
-    const strandId = `strand-${randomBytes(128, 'hex') as string}`;
-    const invite = await this.controlDatabase.queryFormationInvite(token);
-    const approval = await this.obtainApproval({
-      token, usageStampId, strandId, peerKey, disclosure,
-      validationUrl: invite?.validationUrl ?? null,
-    }, signal);
-    await this.controlDatabase.redeemInvitation({
-      token, strandId, peerKey, peerSignature, usageStampId, disclosure, signal,
-      totalUses: invite?.totalUses ?? null, ...approval,
-    });
-    log('Provisioned + recorded unbound strand: token=%s strand=%s', token, strandId);
-    return { strandId, memberPrivateKey: null };
-  }
-}
+import debug from 'debug';
+import { randomBytes } from '@optimystic/quereus-plugin-crypto';
+import { FormationAbortedError, type ControlDatabase } from './control-database.js';
+import {
+  createHttpFormationApprover,
+  verifyFormationApproval,
+  FormationApprovalError,
+  type FormationApprover,
+  type FormationApproval,
+  type FormationApprovalRequest
+} from './formation-approval.js';
+import type { FormationUsageRecorder, ResolvedHostStrand } from './strand-solicitation.js';
+import type { OpenInvitation } from './types.js';
+
+const log = debug('sereus:cadre:formation-recorder');
+
+/** Far-future sentinel for an invitation that never expires (max valid JS Date). */
+const NEVER_EXPIRES = new Date(8640000000000000);
+
+/**
+ * {@link FormationUsageRecorder} backed by the real `CadreControl` tables.
+ *
+ * It reads `FormationInvite` / `FormationUsage` to answer token-validity and
+ * usage questions, and writes the consent row that records a redemption. Two
+ * provisioning shapes are supported, keyed on whether the invite binds a host strand:
+ *
+ * - **Bound (provision-then-record):** the host strand already exists (owner-signed
+ *   up front and named by the invite's `StrandId`), so {@link resolveStrand} reports it
+ *   and {@link recordUsage} writes the consent row against that pre-existing strand
+ *   (record-only) rather than inserting a new `Strand`.
+ * - **Unbound (responder-provisions):** the invite carries no `StrandId`, so
+ *   {@link provisionAndRecord} mints a fresh strand and records consent against it
+ *   ATOMICALLY (one `FormationUsage` row), closing the single-use hole the older
+ *   never-record fallback left open.
+ *
+ * This replaces the in-memory stubs used by the formation tests so the consent path
+ * is exercised against the persisted control network.
+ *
+ * Usage accounting follows the schema's `FormationUsage.Authorized` semantics:
+ * a null `TotalUses` means unlimited uses; otherwise the invite is "used up"
+ * once the recorded usage count reaches `TotalUses`.
+ *
+ * When the invite carries a `ValidationUrl`, both write paths first obtain an outside
+ * approval ({@link obtainApproval}) — the recorder is the one place where the nonce that is
+ * SIGNED and the nonce that is INSERTED are trivially the same value, since it also performs
+ * the write. That makes this class do network I/O; failures surface as
+ * {@link FormationApprovalError}s the manager maps to protocol rejection reasons.
+ */
+export class ControlFormationUsageRecorder implements FormationUsageRecorder {
+  private readonly approver: FormationApprover;
+
+  /**
+   * `approver` defaults to the real HTTP hook client — deliberately ON: this recorder is
+   * constructed by the reference apps and the integration harness, not by `CadreNode`, so an
+   * opt-in approver would leave every real deployment unable to redeem a
+   * `ValidationUrl`-bearing invite. Tests inject a fake.
+   */
+  constructor(
+    private readonly controlDatabase: ControlDatabase,
+    options?: { approver?: FormationApprover }
+  ) {
+    this.approver = options?.approver ?? createHttpFormationApprover();
+  }
+
+  /** A token is valid when a matching, unexpired `FormationInvite` exists. */
+  async isTokenValid(token: string): Promise<{ valid: boolean; invitation?: OpenInvitation }> {
+    const invite = await this.controlDatabase.queryFormationInvite(token);
+    if (!invite) {
+      return { valid: false };
+    }
+    if (invite.expiresAtMs !== null && invite.expiresAtMs <= Date.now()) {
+      log('Token expired: %s', token);
+      return { valid: false };
+    }
+    return {
+      valid: true,
+      invitation: {
+        token: invite.token,
+        sAppId: invite.sAppId,
+        expiration: invite.expiresAtMs !== null ? new Date(invite.expiresAtMs) : NEVER_EXPIRES,
+        bootstrap: [],
+      },
+    };
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * A token is "used" when its recorded usage count has reached the invite's
+   * `TotalUses`. A null `TotalUses` (unlimited) is never used up; an unknown
+   * token is reported not-used (validity is handled by {@link isTokenValid}).
+   */
+  async isTokenUsed(token: string): Promise<boolean> {
+    const invite = await this.controlDatabase.queryFormationInvite(token);
+    if (!invite || invite.totalUses === null) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    const uses = await this.controlDatabase.countFormationUsage(token);
+    return uses >= invite.totalUses;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Any `FormationInvite` row still unexpired and not fully consumed — the
+   * durable half of the control-network connection gate's "does this node
+   * expect a stranger?" question. Survives a restart and sees invites
+   * replicated in from sibling nodes of the same cadre.
+   */
+  async hasOutstandingInvitation(): Promise<boolean> {
+    return await this.controlDatabase.hasOutstandingFormationInvite();
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Obtain the approval material for ONE redemption, when the invite demands it.
+   *
+   * `validationUrl === null` → `{}`: no approval required. The `usageStampId` nonce is
+   * ALWAYS supplied by the caller — the JOINER mints it, signs its own consent over it, and
+   * sends it in the contact message — so the approver signs over the identical nonce in both
+   * paths. Two local pre-checks run before anything is written:
+   *
+   * - {@link verifyFormationApproval} — did the hook sign the exact fields we hold?
+   * - {@link ControlDatabase.queryValidationKeyStampId} — is the approval's key enrolled?
+   *
+   * Both pre-checks exist purely for legibility — they turn a bad approval into a named
+   * {@link FormationApprovalError} instead of an opaque `CHECK constraint failed: Authorized`
+   * at commit. The database re-verifies against the STORED `ValidationKey` row and remains
+   * the security authority; do not "simplify" the database check away in favour of these.
+   */
+  private async obtainApproval(
+    request: Omit<FormationApprovalRequest, 'validationUrl'> & { validationUrl: string | null },
+    signal?: AbortSignal
+  ): Promise<{ validationKey?: string; validationSignature?: string }> {
+    const { validationUrl, ...fields } = request;
+    if (validationUrl === null) {
+      return {};
+    }
+    if (signal?.aborted) {
+      throw new FormationAbortedError(fields.token, 'approval');
+    }
+    const fullRequest: FormationApprovalRequest = { ...fields, validationUrl };
+    const approval = await this.askApprover(fullRequest, signal);
+    if (!verifyFormationApproval(fullRequest, approval)) {
+      throw new FormationApprovalError(
+        'malformed',
+        `Approval signature does not verify over this redemption (token ${fields.token})`
+      );
+    }
+    if (await this.controlDatabase.queryValidationKeyStampId(approval.validationKey) === null) {
+      throw new FormationApprovalError(
+        'unenrolled',
+        'Approval is signed by a key that is not an enrolled ValidationKey'
+      );
+    }
+    return approval;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Ask the approver, re-labelling a caller-abort as a {@link FormationAbortedError}.
+   *
+   * The HTTP client relays a caller-abort onto its own request and reports it as an
+   * `unavailable` {@link FormationApprovalError} — which the manager cannot tell from a
+   * genuinely dead hook, and so maps to a rejection reason and RETURNS. Every other abort on
+   * this path THROWS, which is what makes the manager rethrow and leave the reply to the
+   * listener's timeout path; a mid-hook abort belongs in the same class. The approval error
+   * is kept as `cause` so the transport-level detail is not lost.
+   */
+  private async askApprover(
+    request: FormationApprovalRequest,
+    signal?: AbortSignal
+  ): Promise<FormationApproval> {
+    try {
+      return await this.approver.requestApproval(request, signal);
+    } catch (err) {
+      if (signal?.aborted) {
+        throw new FormationAbortedError(request.token, 'approval', { cause: err });
+      }
+      throw err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Record consent against an **already-existing** host strand (record-only): the
+   * single `FormationUsage` insert auto-commits and the deferred `StrandExists`
+   * CHECK is satisfied by the pre-existing strand. This is the provision-then-record
+   * commitment — the strand was minted owner-signed up front, so we do NOT
+   * re-insert it (which would double-insert the same PK). `peerKey` is written as the
+   * usage `PeerKey`, which BOTH signed digests cover: the joiner's own consent signature
+   * (`peerSignature`, verified by the schema's `PeerConsented` CHECK) and — when the invite
+   * carries a `ValidationUrl` — the approver's sign-off, so it is the joiner an approval is
+   * spent on AND provably the joiner that agreed. Use
+   * {@link ControlDatabase.redeemInvitation} for the consent-creates-strand path instead.
+   *
+   * Reads the invite first (one extra read per redemption) to learn its `ValidationUrl`, and
+   * obtains the approval through {@link obtainApproval} when one is demanded.
+   */
+  async recordUsage(params: {
+    token: string;
+    peerKey: string;
+    peerSignature: string;
+    usageStampId: string;
+    strandId: string;
+    disclosure: string;
+    signal?: AbortSignal;
+  }): Promise<void> {
+    const { token, peerKey, peerSignature, usageStampId, strandId, disclosure, signal } = params;
+    if (signal?.aborted) {
+      throw new FormationAbortedError(token, 'usage recording');
+    }
+    const invite = await this.controlDatabase.queryFormationInvite(token);
+    // NOTE: a missing invite row reads as "no approval required" here and in
+    // `provisionAndRecord`, so an invite that vanished between `resolveStrand` and this read
+    // would be written unapproved. Safe only because the database's `FormationUsage.Authorized`
+    // CHECK demands a matching `FormationInvite` and rolls the write back regardless; if that
+    // CHECK ever loosens, reject on `invite === null` instead of defaulting to null.
+    const approval = await this.obtainApproval({
+      token, usageStampId, strandId, peerKey, disclosure,
+      validationUrl: invite?.validationUrl ?? null,
+    }, signal);
+    await this.controlDatabase.recordFormationUsage({
+      token, strandId, peerKey, peerSignature, usageStampId, disclosure, signal,
+      totalUses: invite?.totalUses ?? null, ...approval,
+    });
+    log('Recorded formation usage: token=%s strand=%s', token, strandId);
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Classify the host strand this invite binds to (see {@link ResolvedHostStrand}):
+   *
+   * - no invite / no `StrandId` → `unbound` (responder-provisions path).
+   * - `StrandId` set AND the strand row is present → `bound`, carrying its
+   *   `MemberPrivateKey` (the closed-strand read-gating secret) for delivery to a
+   *   validated invitee.
+   * - `StrandId` set but the strand row is absent → `missing` (the host strand has not
+   *   converged on this responder yet); the manager rejects cleanly instead of recording
+   *   usage against a non-existent strand, which would fail the deferred `StrandExists`
+   *   CHECK at commit and drop the result frame.
+   */
+  async resolveStrand(token: string): Promise<ResolvedHostStrand> {
+    const invite = await this.controlDatabase.queryFormationInvite(token);
+    if (!invite || !invite.strandId) {
+      return { kind: 'unbound' };
+    }
+    const strand = await this.controlDatabase.queryStrand(invite.strandId);
+    if (!strand) {
+      return { kind: 'missing', strandId: invite.strandId };
+    }
+    return {
+      kind: 'bound',
+      strandId: invite.strandId,
+      memberPrivateKey: strand.MemberPrivateKey ?? null,
+    };
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Provision a NEW strand for an UNBOUND invite and record consent against it in ONE
+   * transaction (the responder-provisions fallback, now single-use-enforced).
+   *
+   * Mints a fresh, globally-unique strand id from {@link randomBytes} — the same
+   * cross-platform CSPRNG `control-database`'s `generateStampId` uses, NOT
+   * `crypto.randomUUID` / `Date.now` / `Math.random` (not uniformly available across
+   * node/browser/RN) — then delegates to {@link ControlDatabase.redeemInvitation}, whose
+   * single `begin … commit` inserts the consent-authorized `Strand` row AND the matching
+   * `FormationUsage` row together (both deferred CHECKs see both rows at commit). That one
+   * `FormationUsage` row makes the unbound redemption single-use exactly like the bound
+   * path: the next redemption of a `TotalUses:1` invite sees `count 1 >= 1` and is rejected.
+   *
+   * The strand is open (`'o'`) — an unbound responder-provisioned strand has no membership
+   * key — so the returned `memberPrivateKey` is null. `sAppId` is accepted for parity/future
+   * use; `redeemInvitation` does not currently thread it into the `Strand` row.
+   *
+   * A concurrent redemption of the same single-use invite still THROWS for the loser — the
+   * manager maps that to a clean protocol rejection (it never lets the dropped insert close
+   * the stream silently): the local write queue serializes the two writes, so the loser's
+   * seat check reads the winner's committed row against the cap and is refused as a named
+   * `InvitationExhaustedError`. A CROSS-node race is not a collision to retry at all — each
+   * redemption writes under its own `UsageStampId`, both rows land and survive convergence,
+   * and the cap can over-admit by the number of concurrent redeemers. That over-admission is
+   * the accepted trade (visible in the append-only record, reversible by owner-gated
+   * removal), chosen over a fought-over shared key whose failure mode was the silent loss of
+   * a consented join.
+   */
+  async provisionAndRecord(params: {
+    token: string;
+    peerKey: string;
+    peerSignature: string;
+    usageStampId: string;
+    sAppId: string;
+    disclosure: string;
+    signal?: AbortSignal;
+  }): Promise<{ strandId: string; memberPrivateKey: string | null }> {
+    const { token, peerKey, peerSignature, usageStampId, disclosure, signal } = params;
+    if (signal?.aborted) {
+      throw new FormationAbortedError(token, 'redemption');
+    }
+    const strandId = `strand-${randomBytes(128, 'hex') as string}`;
+    const invite = await this.controlDatabase.queryFormationInvite(token);
+    const approval = await this.obtainApproval({
+      token, usageStampId, strandId, peerKey, disclosure,
+      validationUrl: invite?.validationUrl ?? null,
+    }, signal);
+    await this.controlDatabase.redeemInvitation({
+      token, strandId, peerKey, peerSignature, usageStampId, disclosure, signal,
+      totalUses: invite?.totalUses ?? null, ...approval,
+    });
+    log('Provisioned + recorded unbound strand: token=%s strand=%s', token, strandId);
+    return { strandId, memberPrivateKey: null };
+  }
+}