@serfab/cadre-core 0.10.0 → 0.12.0

package/dist/membership-connection-gater.js

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 /**
- * Control-network inbound connection gate (defense-in-depth).
+ * Control-network inbound admission gates (defense-in-depth): the
+ * encrypted-connection checkpoint and the circuit-relay reservation checkpoint.
  *
  * Layer 2 of the membership enforcement chain: the PRIMARY gates are per-stream
  * — every sensitive sereus control protocol rejects a peer that fails the
@@ -10,7 +11,9 @@
  * time. This module adds the opportunistic connection-level layer on top: a
  * peer this node can positively determine is NOT authorized is refused at the
  * encrypted-connection checkpoint, before any protocol negotiation, so a
- * known-nothing outsider is never even in the conversation.
+ * known-nothing outsider is never even in the conversation — EXCEPT on a node
+ * that runs the circuit-relay server, where the refusal moves to the
+ * relay-reservation checkpoint instead (see "The relay-reservation seam").
  *
  * ## The stranger allowlist (the ONE place it is defined)
  *
@@ -45,14 +48,54 @@
  *
  *  - **Announced delegate peers** (`delegate-admission.ts`). A member's strand
  *    node runs as a separate libp2p identity whose peerId no sibling can
- *    recompute, so a relay-running control node would deny its circuit-relay
- *    reservation. Before starting a strand node, a member's control node
+ *    recompute. Before starting a strand node, a member's control node
  *    announces that peerId over the already-authenticated strand-addr RPC, and
  *    the receiver holds a short-lived grant for it
- *    (`CadreNode.grantDelegateAdmission`). The grant admits the CONNECTION and
- *    nothing else — a reservation needs no stream — and is deliberately
- *    invisible to the per-stream gate below, so a delegate still gets refused
- *    on every members-only protocol.
+ *    (`CadreNode.grantDelegateAdmission`). The grant admits the CONNECTION,
+ *    admits the peer's RESERVATION at the seam below (without spending the
+ *    unauthorized budget), and nothing else — it is deliberately invisible to
+ *    the per-stream gate, so a delegate still gets refused on every
+ *    members-only protocol.
+ *
+ * ## The relay-reservation seam
+ *
+ * A circuit-relay reservation is established by the reserving peer DIALING the
+ * relay, so at the relay it is an inbound connection — and killing that
+ * connection kills the reservation. For a genuine member whose `CadrePeer` row
+ * has not yet replicated to this node, a connection-level deny here is NOT
+ * self-healing the way a data connection's is: an outbound reconcile dial
+ * re-establishes a data link, but no outbound dial can grant the REMOTE peer a
+ * reservation, and a relay-only peer has no address of its own to dial back —
+ * the reservation IS its address. Boot ordering makes the window ordinary (a
+ * node's circuit listener runs inside `libp2p.start()`, before its own row
+ * could have replicated anywhere), and a stalled replication makes it
+ * unbounded. So the relay would be answering a RELAY question ("may this peer
+ * use my forwarding capacity?") with a MEMBERSHIP answer, at a checkpoint where
+ * a wrong answer is unrecoverable.
+ *
+ * On a node whose relay server is enabled the two questions are separated:
+ *
+ *  - The policy returns `'admit-for-relay'` instead of `'deny'`, and the
+ *    connection is ADMITTED. The fail-closed per-stream gates still refuse such
+ *    a peer every members-only protocol, so it gains identify/ping and the
+ *    relay hop protocol, nothing else.
+ *  - The reservation itself is decided at libp2p's
+ *    `denyInboundRelayReservation` hook (the circuit-relay server consults it
+ *    per RESERVE request): the policy admits members, delegates and configured
+ *    infra outright, and admits peers it cannot place only within a bounded
+ *    budget ({@link UnauthorizedReservationBudget}) — a member whose row is in
+ *    flight always finds a slot under any sane cap, while outsiders cannot
+ *    annex the party's relay capacity.
+ *  - An `'admit-for-relay'` connection that is NOT reserving is dropped: it has
+ *    {@link RELAY_ADMISSION_RESERVE_DEADLINE_MS} to get a reservation ADMITTED
+ *    at that hook, after which the underlying connection is aborted. The
+ *    guarantee above thus weakens on relay-enabled nodes from "never in the
+ *    conversation" to "in it briefly, and can speak nothing".
+ *
+ * The deadline clears on reservation ADMISSION, not on the reservation's own
+ * success: this gate cannot observe the server-side `reserve()` outcome, so a
+ * peer whose admitted reservation is then refused for server capacity keeps its
+ * connection until either side closes it — bounded and mute, so harmless.
  *
  * Everything else a control node handles — the Optimystic control-DB protocols
  * (`/optimystic/control-<party>/{repo,cluster,sync,block-transfer}/…`), wake
@@ -70,12 +113,45 @@
  * stranger carve-outs — an enrollment window admits a stranger's connection
  * for seed delivery, yet its repo streams are still refused.
  *
+ * ## The bring-up quiet period
+ *
+ * One state is decided BEFORE any of the above, and is not about the remote peer
+ * at all: while this node's control-database bring-up is in flight
+ * (`InboundAdmissionPolicy.bringUpInFlight`), the gate denies BOTH directions —
+ * `denyDialPeer` and `denyInboundEncryptedConnection` — and then opens.
+ *
+ * The invariant it protects is "`ControlDatabase.initialize()` runs while this
+ * node holds ZERO control connections". Building that database is a long chain
+ * of cohort-consulting block probes, and every connected same-party sibling is in
+ * the cohort those probes consult. A sibling that has not yet replicated this
+ * node's `CadrePeer` row correctly refuses them at its own fail-closed per-stream
+ * gate, so ONE connection in this window turns bring-up into
+ * `BlockUnavailableError` and `start()` rejects. Retrying cannot converge: the
+ * condition that would clear the refusal is this node's own row reaching the
+ * sibling, and writing that row needs the database the retry is building. So the
+ * only fix is to not be in the conversation yet — which is what this window is.
+ *
+ * The ordering is arranged so nothing SHOULD open a connection here anyway:
+ * `network.relayAddrs` resolves to a listener that dials nothing and reserves
+ * after bring-up (`relay-addrs.ts`), and the control-cohort reconcile pass is
+ * scheduled post-start. This window is what makes that a property rather than an
+ * accident of ordering — the live case it actually catches is
+ * `controlNetwork.bootstrapNodes`, where `@libp2p/bootstrap` emits its discovery
+ * events ~1 s after `libp2p.start()` and the connection manager auto-dials from
+ * there, which is a race bring-up wins only while raw-storage latency stays low.
+ *
+ * A denial here costs a retry, not a partition: libp2p's connection manager
+ * re-dials on its auto-dial cadence, the reservation supervisor re-drives, and a
+ * denied inbound peer reconnects. The window opens on bring-up FAILURE too (via
+ * `CadreNode.cleanup`), so teardown is never gated.
+ *
  * ## Fail-open, deliberately
  *
- * This layer only ever denies on a POSITIVE determination of "unauthorized
- * outsider while no stranger path is open". Any error, missing dependency, or
- * ambiguous state admits the connection and defers to the fail-closed stream
- * gates — a DB hiccup must not partition a legitimate cadre.
+ * Outside that window this layer only ever denies on a POSITIVE determination of
+ * "unauthorized outsider while no stranger path is open". Any error, missing
+ * dependency, or ambiguous state admits the connection (and the reservation) and
+ * defers to the fail-closed stream gates — a DB hiccup must not partition a
+ * legitimate cadre.
  */
 import debug from 'debug';
 import { SEED_PROTOCOL } from './seed-bootstrap.js';
@@ -97,7 +173,8 @@ export const STRANGER_OPEN_PROTOCOLS = [SEED_PROTOCOL, FORMATION_PROTOCOL];
  */
 export const DEFAULT_ENROLLMENT_WINDOW_MS = 30 * 60 * 1000;
 /**
- * Deadline for one admission decision, after which the connection is ADMITTED.
+ * Deadline for one admission decision, after which the fail-open outcome is
+ * used (connection admitted / reservation admitted).
  *
  * libp2p awaits `denyInboundEncryptedConnection` inside the inbound upgrade
  * WITHOUT racing its inbound-upgrade timeout signal (unlike the pre-encryption
@@ -110,16 +187,118 @@ export const DEFAULT_ENROLLMENT_WINDOW_MS = 30 * 60 * 1000;
  * failing closed (or not at all).
  */
 export const ADMISSION_DECISION_TIMEOUT_MS = 2000;
+/**
+ * How long an `'admit-for-relay'` connection may exist without a relay
+ * reservation being ADMITTED at the `denyInboundRelayReservation` hook, after
+ * which the gate aborts the underlying connection. A reserving client asks for
+ * its slot immediately after the connection upgrades (`relay-reservation.ts`
+ * dials and requests in one drive; a strand node's configured circuit listener
+ * does the same from inside its own `listen()`), so a connection idle past this
+ * deadline is not reserving.
+ */
+export const RELAY_ADMISSION_RESERVE_DEADLINE_MS = 5000;
+/**
+ * Default cap on concurrent relay reservations held by peers the membership
+ * check could not place (see {@link UnauthorizedReservationBudget}). Small on
+ * purpose: it exists for the handful of genuine members whose rows are still
+ * in flight, not as public relay capacity. Overridable per node via
+ * `network.unauthorizedRelayReservationCap` (0 refuses every unauthorized
+ * reservation — the strict pre-seam posture).
+ *
+ * NOTE: this cap shares the relay server's own reservation store, whose default
+ * size is 15 (`@libp2p/circuit-relay-v2`'s `DEFAULT_MAX_RESERVATION_STORE_SIZE`);
+ * unplaced peers may therefore occupy up to this many of those slots, and the
+ * rest are what members and delegates compete for. This module cannot read the
+ * server's size, so the two are kept apart by hand — if either is raised, keep
+ * this one well under the store's, or a fleet of unplaceable peers can crowd
+ * genuine members out of the server's own store (which the gate cannot override).
+ */
+export const MAX_UNAUTHORIZED_RELAY_RESERVATIONS = 8;
+/**
+ * How long one {@link UnauthorizedReservationBudget} entry occupies a slot
+ * without a refresh. Mirrors the relay server's own default reservation TTL
+ * (`@libp2p/circuit-relay-v2`'s `DEFAULT_MAX_RESERVATION_TTL`, 2 h): the server
+ * holds an unrefreshed reservation exactly that long, and a live reserver
+ * re-requests (re-hitting the admission hook, refreshing its entry) well before
+ * expiry — so the live entry count tracks the server's own occupancy without
+ * this module reaching into the server's reservation store.
+ *
+ * NOTE: a mirror, not a live coupling — if the relay server is ever configured
+ * with a non-default `reservationTtl` (db-p2p's `relayServerInit`), update this
+ * constant alongside it or the budget's occupancy drifts from the server's.
+ */
+export const UNAUTHORIZED_RESERVATION_TTL_MS = 2 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
+/**
+ * Bounded budget of concurrent relay reservations for peers the membership
+ * check could not place. `tryAdmit` is the whole surface: an already-admitted
+ * peer refreshes its entry (a reservation refresh never double-counts), a new
+ * peer takes a free slot or is refused. Entries expire after `ttlMs` (see
+ * {@link UNAUTHORIZED_RESERVATION_TTL_MS} for why that mirrors the relay
+ * server's own hold). Injectable `now` keeps expiry testable without fake
+ * timers. Authorized members and delegates are never run through this — the
+ * policy admits them before consulting the budget, and `release`s the slot such
+ * a peer took while it was still unplaceable, so the boot-ordering window a
+ * member passes through costs the budget nothing once its row lands.
+ */
+export class UnauthorizedReservationBudget {
+    constructor(cap = MAX_UNAUTHORIZED_RELAY_RESERVATIONS, ttlMs = UNAUTHORIZED_RESERVATION_TTL_MS) {
+        this.cap = cap;
+        this.ttlMs = ttlMs;
+        this.admitted = new Map();
+    }
+    /** Number of live (unexpired at last prune) entries — test/diagnostic surface. */
+    get size() {
+        return this.admitted.size;
+    }
+    /** Admit (or refresh) `remotePeerId` if a slot is free; false when the cap is spent. */
+    tryAdmit(remotePeerId, now = Date.now()) {
+        this.prune(now);
+        if (!this.admitted.has(remotePeerId) && this.admitted.size >= this.cap) {
+            log('Unauthorized-reservation budget spent (%d/%d) — refusing %s', this.admitted.size, this.cap, remotePeerId);
+            return false;
+        }
+        this.admitted.set(remotePeerId, now + this.ttlMs);
+        return true;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Give back the slot `remotePeerId` holds, if any — called when the peer has
+     * become admissible on its own merits (its membership row replicated, or a
+     * delegate grant landed), so the slot it took during the boot-ordering window
+     * does not stay spent for the remaining TTL on a peer that no longer needs it.
+     */
+    release(remotePeerId) {
+        this.admitted.delete(remotePeerId);
+    }
+    prune(now) {
+        for (const [peerId, expiresAt] of this.admitted) {
+            if (expiresAt <= now) {
+                this.admitted.delete(peerId);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
 /**
  * Build the control node's connection gater: the caller-supplied gater (if any)
  * with membership admission composed onto `denyInboundEncryptedConnection` —
- * the earliest checkpoint where the remote's authenticated PeerId is known.
+ * the earliest checkpoint where the remote's authenticated PeerId is known —
+ * and reservation admission composed onto `denyInboundRelayReservation` — the
+ * hook the circuit-relay server consults per RESERVE request (inert on a node
+ * whose relay server is off; libp2p never calls it there).
+ *
+ * `denyDialPeer` is composed too, but ONLY for the bring-up quiet period (see
+ * the module doc): outside that window outbound dials are never gated by
+ * membership — this node decides for itself who to talk to.
+ *
+ * Composition semantics: every hook of `base` is preserved as-is; on the three
+ * composed hooks a deny from EITHER the base gater or the admission policy
+ * denies. A policy error — or a decision slower than `decisionTimeoutMs` —
+ * takes the fail-open outcome (connection admitted / reservation admitted, see
+ * module doc); the base gater's verdict is still honored first.
  *
- * Composition semantics: every hook of `base` is preserved as-is; on the
- * inbound-encrypted hook a deny from EITHER the base gater or the admission
- * policy denies. A policy error — or a decision slower than
- * `decisionTimeoutMs` — admits (fail-open, see module doc); the base gater's
- * verdict is still honored first.
+ * An `'admit-for-relay'` verdict admits the connection and arms a
+ * `reserveDeadlineMs` timer against it; the timer is disarmed when a
+ * reservation for that peer is ADMITTED at the reservation hook, and aborts the
+ * underlying `MultiaddrConnection` when it fires first.
  *
  * NOTE: `base` is spread, so a gater passed as a CLASS INSTANCE would lose its
  * prototype methods; every caller in this repo (and libp2p's own default)
@@ -136,39 +315,80 @@ export const ADMISSION_DECISION_TIMEOUT_MS = 2000;
  * Control node only: strand cohort nodes legitimately connect cross-party
  * peers, so `CadreNode` threads the raw configured gater to them unchanged.
  */
-export function createMembershipConnectionGater(policy, base, decisionTimeoutMs = ADMISSION_DECISION_TIMEOUT_MS) {
+export function createMembershipConnectionGater(policy, base, decisionTimeoutMs = ADMISSION_DECISION_TIMEOUT_MS, reserveDeadlineMs = RELAY_ADMISSION_RESERVE_DEADLINE_MS) {
+    const pendingReservations = new PendingReserveDeadlines(reserveDeadlineMs);
+    const quiet = () => policy.bringUpInFlight?.() ?? false;
     return {
         ...base,
+        denyDialPeer: async (peerId) => {
+            if (await base?.denyDialPeer?.(peerId)) {
+                return true;
+            }
+            if (quiet()) {
+                log('Control-database bring-up in flight — refusing the outbound dial to %s', peerId.toString());
+                return true;
+            }
+            return false;
+        },
         denyInboundEncryptedConnection: async (peerId, maConn) => {
             if (await base?.denyInboundEncryptedConnection?.(peerId, maConn)) {
                 return true;
             }
+            if (quiet()) {
+                log('Control-database bring-up in flight — refusing the inbound connection from %s', peerId.toString());
+                return true;
+            }
             const remotePeerId = peerId.toString();
+            let verdict;
             try {
-                return !(await admitWithinDeadline(policy, remotePeerId, decisionTimeoutMs));
+                verdict = await decideWithinDeadline(() => policy.admitInbound(remotePeerId), 'admit', decisionTimeoutMs, `admitInbound(${remotePeerId})`);
             }
             catch (error) {
                 log('admitInbound threw for %s — admitting (fail-open; stream gates decide): %o', remotePeerId, error);
                 return false;
             }
+            if (verdict === 'admit-for-relay') {
+                pendingReservations.arm(remotePeerId, maConn);
+                return false;
+            }
+            return verdict === 'deny';
+        },
+        denyInboundRelayReservation: async (peerId) => {
+            if (await base?.denyInboundRelayReservation?.(peerId)) {
+                return true;
+            }
+            const remotePeerId = peerId.toString();
+            let admitted;
+            try {
+                admitted = await decideWithinDeadline(() => policy.admitRelayReservation(remotePeerId), true, decisionTimeoutMs, `admitRelayReservation(${remotePeerId})`);
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                log('admitRelayReservation threw for %s — admitting (fail-open): %o', remotePeerId, error);
+                admitted = true;
+            }
+            if (admitted) {
+                pendingReservations.disarm(remotePeerId);
+            }
+            return !admitted;
         }
     };
 }
 /**
- * Run the admission decision under {@link ADMISSION_DECISION_TIMEOUT_MS},
- * resolving to "admit" if it has not settled in time (see that constant for why
- * an unbounded await is not safe here). The timer is always cleared so a decided
- * connection never holds the event loop open.
+ * Run one admission decision under `timeoutMs`, resolving to `fallback` (the
+ * fail-open outcome) if it has not settled in time — see
+ * {@link ADMISSION_DECISION_TIMEOUT_MS} for why an unbounded await is not safe
+ * on the connection hook. The timer is always cleared so a decided call never
+ * holds the event loop open.
  */
-async function admitWithinDeadline(policy, remotePeerId, timeoutMs) {
+async function decideWithinDeadline(decide, fallback, timeoutMs, what) {
     let timer;
     try {
         return await Promise.race([
-            Promise.resolve(policy.admitInbound(remotePeerId)),
+            Promise.resolve().then(decide),
             new Promise((resolve) => {
                 timer = setTimeout(() => {
-                    log('admitInbound exceeded %dms for %s — admitting (fail-open; stream gates decide)', timeoutMs, remotePeerId);
-                    resolve(true);
+                    log('%s exceeded %dms — taking the fail-open outcome (stream gates decide)', what, timeoutMs);
+                    resolve(fallback);
                 }, timeoutMs);
             })
         ]);
@@ -177,4 +397,64 @@ async function admitWithinDeadline(policy, remotePeerId, timeoutMs) {
         clearTimeout(timer);
     }
 }
+/**
+ * The not-reserving deadlines for `'admit-for-relay'` connections, keyed by
+ * remote peerId (a Set per peer — one peer can hold several in-flight
+ * connections). `arm` starts a timer that aborts the connection; `disarm`
+ * (called when a reservation for that peer is admitted) cancels every pending
+ * timer for the peer. Timers are unref'd so an armed deadline never holds a
+ * process open, and a timer that fires against an already-closed connection is
+ * a swallowed no-op.
+ *
+ * Disarming is final for the connections it cancelled: a peer that reserved
+ * once and then lets its reservation lapse keeps a mute connection (the
+ * fail-closed stream gates refuse it every members-only protocol) until either
+ * side closes it. Bounded — only a peer the reservation policy already admitted
+ * can reach that state, so unplaceable peers are bounded by the budget cap.
+ */
+class PendingReserveDeadlines {
+    constructor(deadlineMs) {
+        this.deadlineMs = deadlineMs;
+        this.byPeer = new Map();
+    }
+    arm(remotePeerId, maConn) {
+        const entry = {
+            maConn,
+            timer: setTimeout(() => this.expire(remotePeerId, entry), this.deadlineMs)
+        };
+        entry.timer.unref?.();
+        let entries = this.byPeer.get(remotePeerId);
+        if (!entries) {
+            entries = new Set();
+            this.byPeer.set(remotePeerId, entries);
+        }
+        entries.add(entry);
+        log('Admitted %s for relay only — dropping the connection unless a reservation is admitted within %dms', remotePeerId, this.deadlineMs);
+    }
+    disarm(remotePeerId) {
+        const entries = this.byPeer.get(remotePeerId);
+        if (!entries) {
+            return;
+        }
+        this.byPeer.delete(remotePeerId);
+        for (const entry of entries) {
+            clearTimeout(entry.timer);
+        }
+    }
+    expire(remotePeerId, entry) {
+        const entries = this.byPeer.get(remotePeerId);
+        entries?.delete(entry);
+        if (entries?.size === 0) {
+            this.byPeer.delete(remotePeerId);
+        }
+        log('Relay-only admission expired for %s — no reservation admitted within %dms, aborting the connection', remotePeerId, this.deadlineMs);
+        try {
+            entry.maConn.abort(new Error(`relay-only admission expired: no relay reservation admitted within ${this.deadlineMs}ms`));
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            // Aborting a connection that already closed on its own is not a failure.
+            log('Aborting the expired relay-only connection from %s threw: %o', remotePeerId, error);
+        }
+    }
+}
 //# sourceMappingURL=membership-connection-gater.js.map

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package/dist/peer-addr-book.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+/**
+ * Merging verified cadre addresses into a libp2p node's **address book** (its
+ * peerStore), so that every layer below cadre-core which dials by bare peer id
+ * — Optimystic's cluster client, repo client, FRET ping/announce, all funnelling
+ * into `libp2p.dialProtocol(peerId, …)` — has an address to use for a sibling
+ * whose connection has dropped, instead of failing with `NoValidAddressesError`
+ * until the next reconcile pass happens to re-dial it.
+ *
+ * Shared by the control-cohort reconcile pass and the strand one (both in
+ * `CadreNode`): each resolves a peer's addresses its own way and then needs
+ * exactly this write, with exactly this workaround.
+ *
+ * Two exports, in the order a caller uses them: {@link groupAddrsByPeerId} turns
+ * a flat address list into per-peer groups (the strand path starts from the
+ * peer-agnostic union the strand-addr RPC returns), and {@link mergePeerAddrs}
+ * writes one peer's group.
+ */
+import type { PeerId, PeerStore } from '@libp2p/interface';
+import { type Multiaddr } from '@multiformats/multiaddr';
+/** Outcome of one address-book merge, for logging and tests. */
+export type MergeAddrsResult = 'merged' | 'restamped' | 'skipped' | 'failed';
+/**
+ * The slice of a libp2p node {@link mergePeerAddrs} touches. Structurally
+ * satisfied by `Libp2p`; narrow so a caller (or a test) can pass a bare
+ * peerStore holder.
+ */
+export interface PeerAddrBookHost {
+    peerStore: PeerStore;
+}
+/**
+ * Write `addrs` into `host`'s address book for `peerId`, best-effort. `peerId`
+ * may be the string form callers hold (a `CadrePeer.PeerId` column, a strand-addr
+ * RPC result); parsing it is part of the best-effort contract below, so no caller
+ * has to wrap this in a second try/catch of its own.
+ *
+ * - **Empty `addrs` writes nothing** and reports `'skipped'`. That is how a
+ *   revoked / stale / untrusted peer's existing entry is allowed to age out on
+ *   its own: the caller resolves `[]` for it, and nothing here refreshes it.
+ * - Otherwise the addresses are merged, and — see the timestamp trap below —
+ *   re-saved when the merge alone leaves them invisible (`'restamped'`).
+ * - Any throw (unparsable peer id, datastore failure, a peerStore double without
+ *   `merge`) is logged and folded to `'failed'`. Callers are best-effort loops:
+ *   an address-book failure must never abort a reconcile pass.
+ *
+ * NOTE: `peerStore.merge` cannot refresh an address's `observed` timestamp in
+ * `@libp2p/peer-store` 12.0.10 — `to-peer-pb.js` shadows its own loop variable
+ * (`…addresses?.find(addr => uint8ArrayEquals(addr.multiaddr, addr.multiaddr))`,
+ * always true, so it returns the FIRST stored address's timestamp), and every
+ * read filters out addresses older than `MAX_ADDRESS_AGE` (1 hour). So an entry
+ * silently dies at the one-hour mark and no amount of re-merging revives it —
+ * not even merging a brand-new address. The `save` below is the workaround:
+ * `save` is the one write path that omits `existingPeer` and therefore stamps
+ * `Date.now()`. Drop it once upstream stamps `Date.now()` on merge.
+ *
+ * NOTE: raising the store's own `maxAddressAge` (libp2p forwards `init.peerStore`
+ * straight into `persistentPeerStore`) would sidestep the bug in one line, and is
+ * deliberately NOT done: expiry is load-bearing here. Only *verified* addresses
+ * come through this helper, and the design relies on everything else — the
+ * cold-start seed entries, identify-learned addresses — still ageing out on the
+ * stock schedule. A global age bump would keep those alive too.
+ *
+ * NOTE: if the store ever REJECTS an address we hand it, the restamp repeats
+ * every pass forever — `allVisible` stays false, and `save` re-submits the same
+ * rejected address. libp2p wires the store's `addressFilter` to
+ * `connectionGater.filterMultiaddrForPeer`, which nothing in this repo implements
+ * today (`createMembershipConnectionGater` gates dials, not addresses), so the
+ * loop is unreachable. If an app ever supplies that gater hook via
+ * `NetworkConfig.connectionGater`, bound the retry — the cost is one redundant
+ * datastore write per gated sibling per reconcile pass.
+ */
+export declare function mergePeerAddrs(host: PeerAddrBookHost, peerId: PeerId | string, addrs: Multiaddr[]): Promise<MergeAddrsResult>;
+/**
+ * Group multiaddr strings by the peer id in their final `/p2p/` component — the
+ * attribution step between a flat, peer-agnostic address list and the per-peer
+ * writes {@link mergePeerAddrs} takes.
+ *
+ * The **last** `/p2p/` component is the addressed peer, not the first: a relayed
+ * address (`…/p2p/<relay>/p2p-circuit/p2p/<dst>`) names the relay first and the
+ * destination last, while a direct address (`…/tcp/…/p2p/<dst>`) names only the
+ * destination. Taking the last therefore attributes both shapes to the peer the
+ * address actually reaches.
+ *
+ * Three shapes are dropped rather than attributed, because none of them names a
+ * peer the address reaches: one that does not parse, one carrying no `/p2p/`
+ * component at all (a peer advertising a bare listen addr), and one whose
+ * `p2p-circuit` comes AFTER its last `/p2p/` (`…/p2p/<relay>/p2p-circuit`) — that
+ * last one is a relay hop with the destination missing, so its trailing peer id
+ * is the RELAY's and filing it under the relay would claim the relay is reachable
+ * at a circuit leading nowhere. Duplicates collapse within a group. Insertion
+ * order is preserved, both between groups and inside one.
+ */
+export declare function groupAddrsByPeerId(addrs: string[]): Map<string, Multiaddr[]>;