@pellux/goodvibes-tui 0.18.11 → 0.18.13

package/src/runtime/plugins/quarantine.ts

@@ -1,202 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Plugin quarantine engine.
- *
- * Quarantine removes a plugin's unsafe contribution effects without fully
- * unloading it. This allows the operator to isolate a suspicious plugin,
- * inspect it, then either restore or permanently disable it.
- *
- * Quarantine effects:
- *   - All high-risk capabilities are revoked in the resolved manifest.
- *   - The plugin is moved to a `quarantined` lifecycle bucket in the store.
- *   - A quarantine record is created with a timestamp and reason.
- *
- * Restore path:
- *   - `lift()` — Restores previously revoked capabilities (if trust was upgraded).
- *   - The caller is responsible for reloading the plugin after lifting.
- */
-
-import { logger } from '@pellux/goodvibes-sdk/platform/utils/logger';
-import type { PluginCapability, PluginCapabilityManifest } from '@pellux/goodvibes-sdk/platform/runtime/plugins/types';
-import { isHighRiskCapability } from '@pellux/goodvibes-sdk/platform/runtime/plugins/manifest';
-
-// ── Quarantine Record ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-/**
- * A record describing a plugin currently in quarantine.
- */
-export interface QuarantineRecord {
-  /** Plugin name. */
-  readonly pluginName: string;
-  /** Unix epoch ms when quarantine was applied. */
-  readonly quarantinedAt: number;
-  /** Human-readable reason for quarantine. */
-  readonly reason: string;
-  /** The capabilities that were revoked when quarantine was applied. */
-  readonly revokedCapabilities: ReadonlyArray<PluginCapability>;
-  /** Whether the quarantine has been lifted. */
-  lifted: boolean;
-  /** Unix epoch ms when quarantine was lifted, if applicable. */
-  liftedAt?: number;
-}
-
-// ── Quarantine Engine ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-/**
- * PluginQuarantineEngine — Tracks quarantined plugins and applies/revokes
- * capability restrictions.
- *
- * This is intentionally separate from the PluginLifecycleManager so that
- * quarantine can be applied without triggering a full state machine transition.
- * The lifecycle manager delegates to this engine when quarantine is requested.
- */
-export class PluginQuarantineEngine {
-  private readonly records = new Map<string, QuarantineRecord>();
-
-  /**
-   * quarantine — Apply quarantine to a plugin.
-   *
-   * Revokes all high-risk capabilities from the plugin's resolved manifest
-   * and creates a quarantine record. The plugin remains in memory but its
-   * unsafe contributions are neutralised.
-   *
-   * @param pluginName       - Plugin identifier.
-   * @param capabilityManifest - The plugin's live capability manifest (mutated in place).
-   * @param reason           - Human-readable reason for quarantine.
-   * @returns The quarantine record, or null if already quarantined.
-   */
-  quarantine(
-    pluginName: string,
-    capabilityManifest: PluginCapabilityManifest,
-    reason: string,
-  ): QuarantineRecord | null {
-    if (this.isQuarantined(pluginName)) {
-      logger.warn(`[plugin-quarantine] ${pluginName}: already quarantined — skipping`);
-      return null;
-    }
-
-    // Identify which currently-granted capabilities are high-risk.
-    const revokedCapabilities: PluginCapability[] = capabilityManifest.granted.filter(
-      (cap) => isHighRiskCapability(cap),
-    );
-
-    // Strip high-risk capabilities from the live manifest.
-    capabilityManifest.granted = capabilityManifest.granted.filter(
-      (cap) => !isHighRiskCapability(cap),
-    );
-
-    // Record denied reason for each revoked cap. Collect first, then assign once.
-    const newDenied: PluginCapability[] = [];
-    for (const cap of revokedCapabilities) {
-      newDenied.push(cap);
-      capabilityManifest.denialReasons[cap] = `Capability '${cap}' revoked: plugin quarantined — ${reason}`;
-    }
-    capabilityManifest.denied = [...capabilityManifest.denied, ...newDenied];
-
-    const record: QuarantineRecord = {
-      pluginName,
-      quarantinedAt: Date.now(),
-      reason,
-      revokedCapabilities: Object.freeze(revokedCapabilities),
-      lifted: false,
-    };
-
-    this.records.set(pluginName, record);
-
-    logger.warn(
-      `[plugin-quarantine] ${pluginName}: quarantined — ${reason}` +
-      (revokedCapabilities.length > 0
-        ? ` (revoked: [${revokedCapabilities.join(', ')}])`
-        : ' (no high-risk capabilities were granted)'),
-    );
-
-    return record;
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * lift — Lift quarantine for a plugin.
-   *
-   * Previously revoked capabilities are NOT automatically restored here;
-   * the caller should trigger a re-resolve of the capability manifest
-   * (e.g. by reloading the plugin) after lifting so that trust-tier
-   * constraints are re-evaluated with the new tier.
-   *
-   * @returns true if quarantine was successfully lifted; false if not found.
-   */
-  lift(pluginName: string): boolean {
-    const record = this.records.get(pluginName);
-    if (!record) {
-      logger.debug(`[plugin-quarantine] ${pluginName}: no quarantine record found — nothing to lift`);
-      return false;
-    }
-    if (record.lifted) {
-      logger.debug(`[plugin-quarantine] ${pluginName}: quarantine already lifted`);
-      return false;
-    }
-
-    record.lifted = true;
-    record.liftedAt = Date.now();
-
-    logger.info(`[plugin-quarantine] ${pluginName}: quarantine lifted`);
-    return true;
-  }
-
-  /** Returns whether a plugin is currently quarantined (and not lifted). */
-  isQuarantined(pluginName: string): boolean {
-    const record = this.records.get(pluginName);
-    return record !== undefined && !record.lifted;
-  }
-
-  /** Returns the quarantine record for a plugin, or undefined. */
-  getRecord(pluginName: string): Readonly<QuarantineRecord> | undefined {
-    return this.records.get(pluginName);
-  }
-
-  /** Returns all quarantine records (including lifted ones). */
-  getAllRecords(): ReadonlyArray<Readonly<QuarantineRecord>> {
-    return Array.from(this.records.values());
-  }
-
-  /** Returns only active (not-lifted) quarantine records. */
-  getActiveQuarantines(): ReadonlyArray<Readonly<QuarantineRecord>> {
-    return Array.from(this.records.values()).filter((r) => !r.lifted);
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * applyToNewManifest — Apply quarantine constraints to a freshly-resolved
-   * capability manifest. Used when a plugin is reloaded while under quarantine.
-   *
-   * Unlike `quarantine()`, this does not create a new record — it reuses the
-   * existing one. Call this during manifest re-resolution if `isQuarantined()`
-   * is true.
-   */
-  applyToNewManifest(
-    pluginName: string,
-    capabilityManifest: PluginCapabilityManifest,
-  ): void {
-    if (!this.isQuarantined(pluginName)) return;
-
-    const toRevoke: PluginCapability[] = capabilityManifest.granted.filter(
-      (cap) => isHighRiskCapability(cap),
-    );
-
-    if (toRevoke.length === 0) return;
-
-    capabilityManifest.granted = capabilityManifest.granted.filter(
-      (cap) => !isHighRiskCapability(cap),
-    );
-
-    // Collect all denied caps first, then assign once to avoid quadratic churn.
-    const reason = this.records.get(pluginName)?.reason ?? 'quarantined';
-    const newDenied: PluginCapability[] = [];
-    for (const cap of toRevoke) {
-      newDenied.push(cap);
-      capabilityManifest.denialReasons[cap] = `Capability '${cap}' blocked: plugin is quarantined — ${reason}`;
-    }
-    capabilityManifest.denied = [...capabilityManifest.denied, ...newDenied];
-
-    logger.debug(
-      `[plugin-quarantine] ${pluginName}: quarantine re-applied to reloaded manifest` +
-      ` (blocked: [${toRevoke.join(', ')}])`,
-    );
-  }
-}

package/src/runtime/plugins/trust.ts

@@ -1,291 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Plugin extension trust framework.
- *
- * Defines trust tiers (untrusted, limited, trusted), signed manifest
- * validation for the trusted tier, and the PluginTrustStore that manages
- * trust records with persistence support.
- *
- * Trust tiers gate access to high-risk capabilities:
- *   - untrusted — only safe, read-only capabilities allowed
- *   - limited   — moderate capabilities; high-risk capabilities blocked
- *   - trusted   — full capability set; requires signed manifest validation
- */
-
-import { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
-import { logger } from '@pellux/goodvibes-sdk/platform/utils/logger';
-import type { PluginCapability } from '@pellux/goodvibes-sdk/platform/runtime/plugins/types';
-import { isHighRiskCapability } from '@pellux/goodvibes-sdk/platform/runtime/plugins/manifest';
-
-// ── Trust Tier ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-/**
- * The three trust tiers available to a plugin.
- *
- * - `untrusted` — Default for newly discovered plugins. Only safe capabilities
- *   are accessible. The plugin may not have been reviewed.
- * - `limited`   — Operator-reviewed plugin. Moderate capabilities granted.
- *   High-risk capabilities (shell.exec, filesystem.write, network.outbound)
- *   remain blocked without explicit trust escalation.
- * - `trusted`   — Fully trusted plugin. Requires a valid signed manifest.
- *   All declared capabilities may be granted (subject to runtime policy).
- */
-export type PluginTrustTier = 'untrusted' | 'limited' | 'trusted';
-
-// ── Trust Record ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-/**
- * A persisted trust record for a single plugin.
- */
-export interface PluginTrustRecord {
-  /** Plugin identifier (manifest name). */
-  readonly pluginName: string;
-  /** Current trust tier. */
-  tier: PluginTrustTier;
-  /** Unix epoch ms when the trust record was last updated. */
-  updatedAt: number;
-  /** Who or what granted this trust level. */
-  grantedBy: 'operator' | 'signed-manifest';
-  /**
-   * Fingerprint of the verified signature for trusted-tier plugins.
-   * Undefined for untrusted/limited plugins.
-   */
-  signatureFingerprint?: string;
-  /** Optional human-readable note attached by the operator. */
-  note?: string;
-}
-
-// ── Signature Validation ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-/**
- * Result of validating a plugin's signed manifest.
- */
-export interface SignatureValidationResult {
-  /** Whether the signature is valid. */
-  valid: boolean;
-  /** A stable fingerprint derived from the signature (e.g. hex digest prefix). */
-  fingerprint?: string;
-  /** Human-readable failure reason. Only set when `valid` is false. */
-  reason?: string;
-}
-
-/**
- * validatePluginSignature — Validates the manifest signature for a plugin
- * seeking the `trusted` tier.
- *
- * The signature field in PluginManifestV2 is expected to be a base64-encoded
- * HMAC-SHA256 of the canonical manifest JSON (name + version + capabilities
- * sorted and serialised). For production use, callers should supply a real
- * key; this implementation uses a structural check so external tooling can
- * provide real crypto without requiring Node.js crypto APIs at import time.
- *
- * @param manifest  - The raw manifest object containing the `signature` field.
- * @param publicKey - Optional verification key. When omitted, structural
- *                    validity only is checked (suitable for CI/test).
- */
-export function validatePluginSignature(
-  manifest: { name: string; version: string; capabilities?: string[]; signature?: string },
-  publicKey?: string,
-): SignatureValidationResult {
-  const { name, version, capabilities = [], signature } = manifest;
-
-  if (!signature || typeof signature !== 'string' || signature.trim().length === 0) {
-    return { valid: false, reason: 'No signature field present in manifest' };
-  }
-
-  // Structural check: signature must be a non-empty hex or base64 string.
-  const isStructurallyValid = /^[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{32,}$/.test(signature.trim());
-  if (!isStructurallyValid) {
-    return { valid: false, reason: 'Signature field does not match expected format (base64/hex, min 32 chars)' };
-  }
-
-  // Canonical payload that should have been signed.
-  const sortedCapabilities = [...capabilities].sort();
-  const payload = JSON.stringify({ name, version, capabilities: sortedCapabilities });
-
-  // When a public key is provided, perform full HMAC verification.
-  if (publicKey) {
-    const expected = createHmac('sha256', publicKey)
-      .update(payload)
-      .digest('base64');
-    const sigBuf = Buffer.from(signature.trim(), 'base64');
-    const expBuf = Buffer.from(expected, 'base64');
-    if (sigBuf.length !== expBuf.length || !timingSafeEqual(sigBuf, expBuf)) {
-      return { valid: false, reason: 'HMAC mismatch' };
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Derive a short fingerprint for record keeping.
-  const fingerprint = signature.trim().slice(0, 16);
-
-  logger.debug(
-    `[plugin-trust] Manifest signature validated — plugin=${name} fingerprint=${fingerprint}` +
-    (publicKey ? ' (full HMAC)' : ' (structural only)'),
-  );
-
-  return { valid: true, fingerprint };
-}
-
-// ── Capability filtering by trust tier ───────────────────────────────────────
-
-/**
- * Capabilities that are safe for any trust tier (including untrusted).
- */
-export const SAFE_CAPABILITIES: ReadonlyArray<PluginCapability> = [
-  'register.tool',
-  'register.provider',
-  'register.panel',
-  'register.hook',
-  'filesystem.read',
-] as const;
-
-/**
- * filterCapabilitiesByTrust — Returns the subset of `requested` capabilities
- * that are permitted for the given trust tier.
- *
- * - `untrusted`: only SAFE_CAPABILITIES
- * - `limited`:   all capabilities except HIGH_RISK_CAPABILITIES
- * - `trusted`:   all capabilities (HIGH_RISK_CAPABILITIES included)
- */
-export function filterCapabilitiesByTrust(
-  requested: ReadonlyArray<PluginCapability>,
-  tier: PluginTrustTier,
-): { permitted: PluginCapability[]; blocked: PluginCapability[]; reasons: Partial<Record<PluginCapability, string>> } {
-  const permitted: PluginCapability[] = [];
-  const blocked: PluginCapability[] = [];
-  const reasons: Partial<Record<PluginCapability, string>> = {};
-
-  for (const cap of requested) {
-    if (tier === 'trusted') {
-      permitted.push(cap);
-    } else if (tier === 'limited') {
-      if (isHighRiskCapability(cap)) {
-        blocked.push(cap);
-        reasons[cap] = `Capability '${cap}' requires trust tier 'trusted' (current: limited)`;
-      } else {
-        permitted.push(cap);
-      }
-    } else {
-      // untrusted
-      if ((SAFE_CAPABILITIES as ReadonlyArray<string>).includes(cap)) {
-        permitted.push(cap);
-      } else {
-        blocked.push(cap);
-        reasons[cap] = `Capability '${cap}' requires trust tier 'limited' or higher (current: untrusted)`;
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  return { permitted, blocked, reasons };
-}
-
-// ── Trust Store ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-/**
- * PluginTrustStore — In-memory trust registry for all plugins.
- *
- * Callers are responsible for persistence (serialise/deserialise via
- * `exportRecords` / `importRecords`). The PluginManager bridges this to
- * the plugins.json state file.
- */
-export class PluginTrustStore {
-  private readonly records = new Map<string, PluginTrustRecord>();
-
-  /**
-   * Returns the trust record for a plugin, or `undefined` if not yet assessed.
-   * Callers should treat `undefined` as implicitly `untrusted`.
-   */
-  getRecord(pluginName: string): Readonly<PluginTrustRecord> | undefined {
-    return this.records.get(pluginName);
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * Returns the trust tier for a plugin.
-   * Plugins without an explicit record are treated as `untrusted`.
-   */
-  getTier(pluginName: string): PluginTrustTier {
-    return this.records.get(pluginName)?.tier ?? 'untrusted';
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * setTier — Explicitly assign a trust tier to a plugin.
-   *
-   * Intended for operator use via `/plugin trust`.
-   * For the `trusted` tier, prefer `trustSigned()` which also validates the signature.
-   */
-  setTier(
-    pluginName: string,
-    tier: PluginTrustTier,
-    options: { note?: string } = {},
-  ): PluginTrustRecord {
-    const record: PluginTrustRecord = {
-      pluginName,
-      tier,
-      updatedAt: Date.now(),
-      grantedBy: 'operator',
-      note: options.note,
-    };
-    this.records.set(pluginName, record);
-    logger.info(`[plugin-trust] ${pluginName}: tier set to '${tier}'${options.note ? ` — ${options.note}` : ''}`);
-    return record;
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * trustSigned — Elevate a plugin to the `trusted` tier after verifying its
-   * signed manifest. Returns `{ ok: false, reason }` if validation fails.
-   */
-  trustSigned(
-    pluginName: string,
-    manifest: { name: string; version: string; capabilities?: string[]; signature?: string },
-    publicKey?: string,
-  ): { ok: true; record: PluginTrustRecord } | { ok: false; reason: string } {
-    const validation = validatePluginSignature(manifest, publicKey);
-    if (!validation.valid) {
-      logger.warn(`[plugin-trust] ${pluginName}: signature validation failed — ${validation.reason}`);
-      return { ok: false, reason: validation.reason! };
-    }
-
-    const record: PluginTrustRecord = {
-      pluginName,
-      tier: 'trusted',
-      updatedAt: Date.now(),
-      grantedBy: 'signed-manifest',
-      signatureFingerprint: validation.fingerprint,
-    };
-    this.records.set(pluginName, record);
-    logger.info(`[plugin-trust] ${pluginName}: elevated to 'trusted' via signed manifest (fingerprint=${validation.fingerprint})`);
-    return { ok: true, record };
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * verify — Verify the current signature on a plugin manifest without
-   * changing its tier. Useful for `/plugin verify` inspection.
-   */
-  verify(
-    manifest: { name: string; version: string; capabilities?: string[]; signature?: string },
-    publicKey?: string,
-  ): SignatureValidationResult {
-    return validatePluginSignature(manifest, publicKey);
-  }
-
-  /** Returns all trust records as an array. */
-  getAllRecords(): ReadonlyArray<Readonly<PluginTrustRecord>> {
-    return Array.from(this.records.values());
-  }
-
-  /** Export all records for persistence. */
-  exportRecords(): Record<string, PluginTrustRecord> {
-    const out: Record<string, PluginTrustRecord> = {};
-    for (const [name, record] of this.records) {
-      out[name] = { ...record };
-    }
-    return out;
-  }
-
-  /** Import records from persisted state. Merges into existing records. */
-  importRecords(records: Record<string, PluginTrustRecord>): void {
-    for (const [name, record] of Object.entries(records)) {
-      this.records.set(name, record);
-    }
-    logger.debug(`[plugin-trust] Imported ${Object.keys(records).length} trust record(s)`);
-  }
-}

package/src/runtime/plugins/types.ts

@@ -1,205 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Plugin lifecycle system types.
- *
- * Types here extend the store domain types with the richer capability
- * manifest and transition models used by the PluginLifecycleManager.
- */
-
-import type { PluginLifecycleState } from '@pellux/goodvibes-sdk/platform/runtime/store/domains/plugins';
-import type { PluginManifest } from '../../plugins/loader';
-
-// Re-export so consumers only need to import from this module.
-export type { PluginLifecycleState } from '@pellux/goodvibes-sdk/platform/runtime/store/domains/plugins';
-
-// ── Capability manifest ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-/**
- * The set of capabilities a plugin can declare in its manifest.
- *
- * All capabilities are **deny-by-default**: a plugin must explicitly request
- * each capability and the runtime must grant it before the capability is
- * exercisable.
- */
-export type PluginCapability =
-  | 'filesystem.read'
-  | 'filesystem.write'
-  | 'network.outbound'
-  | 'shell.exec'
-  | 'register.tool'
-  | 'register.provider'
-  | 'register.panel'
-  | 'register.hook';
-
-/** All defined capability strings as a readonly array. */
-export const ALL_CAPABILITIES: ReadonlyArray<PluginCapability> = [
-  'filesystem.read',
-  'filesystem.write',
-  'network.outbound',
-  'shell.exec',
-  'register.tool',
-  'register.provider',
-  'register.panel',
-  'register.hook',
-] as const;
-
-/**
- * High-risk capabilities that require the `trusted` tier to be granted.
- * These capabilities can have significant side-effects outside the process.
- */
-export const HIGH_RISK_CAPABILITIES: ReadonlyArray<PluginCapability> = [
-  'filesystem.write',
-  'network.outbound',
-  'shell.exec',
-] as const;
-
-/**
- * Capability manifest embedded in (or derived from) a plugin's manifest.json.
- *
- * `requested` lists every capability the plugin declares it needs.
- * `granted` is resolved by the runtime after validation — it may be a strict
- * subset of `requested` if some capabilities are denied by policy.
- */
-export interface PluginCapabilityManifest {
-  /** Capabilities declared by the plugin author. */
-  readonly requested: ReadonlyArray<PluginCapability>;
-  /** Capabilities actually granted by the runtime. Populated after resolution. */
-  granted: PluginCapability[];
-  /** Capabilities that were requested but explicitly denied by runtime policy. */
-  denied: PluginCapability[];
-  /** Human-readable denial reasons keyed by capability. */
-  denialReasons: Partial<Record<PluginCapability, string>>;
-}
-
-// ── Extended plugin manifest ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-/**
- * PluginManifestV2 extends the loader's PluginManifest with capability
- * declarations and trust framework fields.
- * Stored inside manifest.json under the `capabilities` key.
- * Omitting the key is equivalent to requesting no capabilities.
- */
-export interface PluginManifestV2 extends PluginManifest {
-  /** Optional capability list declared by the plugin. */
-  capabilities?: PluginCapability[];
-  /**
-   * Minimum runtime version this plugin requires.
-   * Semver string (e.g. "0.9.0"). Unset = no constraint.
-   */
-  minRuntimeVersion?: string;
-  /**
-   * Base64-encoded HMAC-SHA256 signature of the canonical manifest payload.
-   * Required for plugins that want to operate at the `trusted` tier.
-   */
-  signature?: string;
-  /**
-   * Declared trust tier hint from the plugin author.
-   * The runtime validates this against the actual trust record; it does not
-   * grant trust by itself.
-   */
-  trustTier?: import('./trust.ts').PluginTrustTier;
-}
-
-// ── State machine ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-/**
- * A single recorded state transition for a plugin.
- */
-export interface PluginTransition {
-  /** The plugin name this transition applies to. */
-  readonly pluginName: string;
-  /** State before the transition. */
-  readonly from: PluginLifecycleState;
-  /** State after the transition. */
-  readonly to: PluginLifecycleState;
-  /** Unix timestamp (ms) when the transition occurred. */
-  readonly ts: number;
-  /** Optional human-readable reason (e.g. error message, disable reason). */
-  readonly reason?: string;
-}
-
-/**
- * Result of a state machine transition attempt.
- */
-export type TransitionResult =
-  | { ok: true; from: PluginLifecycleState; to: PluginLifecycleState }
-  | { ok: false; reason: string };
-
-// ── Health check ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-/**
- * Result of a plugin health check (used during hot-reload).
- */
-export interface PluginHealthCheckResult {
-  /** Whether the plugin is considered healthy after the check. */
-  readonly healthy: boolean;
-  /** Human-readable status message. */
-  readonly message: string;
-  /** Duration of the health check in milliseconds. */
-  readonly durationMs: number;
-}
-
-// ── Runtime plugin record ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-/**
- * PluginLifecycleRecord — full runtime record for a plugin tracked by the
- * PluginLifecycleManager. Extends the basic RuntimePlugin from the store
- * domain with the capability manifest and transition history.
- */
-export interface PluginLifecycleRecord {
-  /** Plugin name (filesystem identifier). */
-  readonly name: string;
-  /** Plugin version string. */
-  readonly version: string;
-  /** Current lifecycle state. */
-  state: PluginLifecycleState;
-  /** Resolved capability manifest. */
-  capabilities: PluginCapabilityManifest;
-  /** Last N state transitions (capped at MAX_TRANSITION_HISTORY). */
-  transitions: PluginTransition[];
-  /** Epoch ms when the plugin was last successfully activated. */
-  activatedAt?: number;
-  /** Epoch ms when the plugin last transitioned to error. */
-  errorAt?: number;
-  /** Last error message, if any. */
-  lastError?: string;
-  /** Whether a hot-reload is currently in progress for this plugin. */
-  reloading: boolean;
-  /** Trust tier assigned to this plugin. Defaults to 'untrusted'. */
-  trustTier: import('./trust.ts').PluginTrustTier;
-  /** Whether this plugin is currently quarantined. */
-  quarantined: boolean;
-}
-
-/** Maximum transition history entries kept per plugin. */
-export const MAX_TRANSITION_HISTORY = 50;
-
-// ── Manager options ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-/**
- * Options accepted by `createPluginLifecycleManager()`.
- */
-export interface PluginLifecycleManagerOptions {
-  /**
-   * Session ID injected into emitted events.
-   * Defaults to an empty string when not provided.
-   */
-  sessionId?: string;
-  /**
-   * Optional policy callback invoked during capability resolution.
-   * Return `true` to grant the capability, `false` to deny.
-   * Defaults to a permissive policy that grants all valid capabilities.
-   */
-  capabilityPolicy?: (pluginName: string, capability: PluginCapability) => boolean;
-  /**
-   * Optional trust tier resolver. Called during capability resolution to
-   * determine the effective trust tier for capability filtering.
-   * Return the tier for the given plugin name.
-   * Defaults to 'untrusted' for all plugins when not provided.
-   */
-  trustTierResolver?: (pluginName: string) => import('./trust.ts').PluginTrustTier;
-  /**
-   * Runtime event bus used for lifecycle emission.
-   * When omitted, the manager creates an isolated in-memory bus.
-   */
-  runtimeBus?: import('../events/index.ts').RuntimeEventBus;
-}