@openparachute/agent 0.1.2 → 0.2.2

package/src/spawn-agent.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,569 @@
+/**
+ * SHARED spawn helpers — the sandbox/filesystem/env/spec-persistence primitives
+ * that BOTH live agent backends build on:
+ *
+ *   - the PROGRAMMATIC backend (`src/backends/programmatic.ts`) — `claude -p` turns;
+ *   - the PARKED interactive spawner (`src/_parked/interactive-spawn.ts`) — the
+ *     retired tmux backend, kept for future terminal/process-mgmt (design
+ *     2026-06-19-retire-interactive-backend.md).
+ *
+ * What lives here:
+ *   - {@link wrapArgvInSandbox} — the ONE place the sandbox/egress/filesystem policy
+ *     is applied to a launch argv (every launch gets the same egress floor + scoped-
+ *     read confinement);
+ *   - {@link seedAgentHome} — the per-session writable HOME (the stability keystone);
+ *   - {@link buildAgentChildEnv} — the scrubbed child env (NEVER `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`;
+ *     the session runs on the subscription via `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN`, §6);
+ *   - {@link resolveAgentCwd} / {@link sessionWorkspace} / {@link persistSpec} /
+ *     {@link readPersistedSpec} / {@link shellJoin} — the spec/path/quoting helpers.
+ *
+ * The interactive tmux SPAWNER itself (the `claude` argv, the launch script, the
+ * dev-channels-consent auto-answer, `spawnAgent`, the `TmuxLauncher`) was PARKED to
+ * `src/_parked/interactive-spawn.ts` when the interactive backend retired — it
+ * imports these helpers, it didn't fork them.
+ */
+
+import { writeFileSync, mkdirSync, chmodSync, existsSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs";
+import { homedir } from "node:os";
+import { join } from "node:path";
+import type { AgentSpec, BaseBinds } from "./sandbox/types.ts";
+import { Sandbox, type SandboxEngine, type WrappedCommand } from "./sandbox/index.ts";
+import type { EgressBaseInput } from "./sandbox/egress.ts";
+import { DENYLISTED_ENV } from "./credentials.ts";
+
+/**
+ * Slug guard for `spec.name`. The name is used UNESCAPED as a tmux session
+ * target (`-t`) and a path segment under `sessionsDir`, so it must be a strict
+ * slug — mirrors `scripts/launch-session.sh`'s existing check. Anything with
+ * `..`, `/`, or spaces would traverse the sessions dir or break tmux targeting.
+ * Phase 2 makes spawns API/MCP-triggered (the name becomes less-trusted input),
+ * so the guard is enforced now, before any fs/tmux side effect.
+ */
+const AGENT_NAME_SLUG = /^[a-z0-9_-]+$/i;
+
+/**
+ * Process-wide serialization for the sandbox-runtime singleton. `SandboxManager`
+ * is global (initialize → wrap → reset share one set of host proxies), so two
+ * concurrent `spawnAgent` calls would race the initialize→wrap window (a second
+ * `initialize` could clobber the first's config before its command is wrapped).
+ * Only that brief window needs the lock — the sandbox policy is baked into the
+ * argv at `wrapWithSandboxArgv`, after which the spawned process runs
+ * independently. This is a minimal FIFO async mutex: each acquirer chains onto
+ * the previous one's release.
+ */
+let spawnLock: Promise<void> = Promise.resolve();
+async function withSpawnLock<T>(fn: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {
+  const prior = spawnLock;
+  let release!: () => void;
+  spawnLock = new Promise<void>((r) => (release = r));
+  await prior;
+  try {
+    return await fn();
+  } finally {
+    release();
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Inputs to {@link wrapArgvInSandbox} — the spec (carries network/filesystem/
+ * mounts/egress), the workspace + runtime read binds, the egress base origins, the
+ * argv to run, and the engine + ripgrep overrides.
+ */
+export interface WrapArgvInSandboxInput {
+  /** The agent spec — its network/filesystem/egress/mounts drive the sandbox config. */
+  spec: AgentSpec;
+  /** Private per-session workspace (rw). */
+  workspace: string;
+  /** Read-only runtime/claude-config binds the session needs to run `claude`. */
+  runtimeReadOnly: string[];
+  /** Hub origin for the non-removable egress base. */
+  hubOrigin: string;
+  /** Vault origin for the egress base (if the spec binds a vault). */
+  vaultUrl?: string;
+  /** The argv to sandbox-wrap (e.g. the `claude …` invocation). */
+  argv: string[];
+  /** Sandbox engine override (tests inject a fake). */
+  sandboxEngine?: SandboxEngine;
+  /**
+   * Optional ripgrep override threaded to the sandbox (macOS deny-path scan needs a
+   * real `rg`; pass one when the host has none on PATH).
+   */
+  ripgrep?: { command: string; args?: string[] };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Sandbox-wrap an argv for one launch — the SHARED sandbox seam both the
+ * programmatic backend (`claude -p`) and the parked interactive spawner (tmux
+ * `claude`, `src/_parked/interactive-spawn.ts`) call. Extracted so the sandbox/
+ * egress/filesystem policy lives in
+ * exactly ONE place: every launch, regardless of backend, gets the same egress
+ * floor (§4.4) + scoped-read confinement (§4.5) baked into its argv.
+ *
+ * It owns the process-wide serialization of the sandbox-runtime singleton's
+ * initialize→wrap window (`withSpawnLock`): the engine is global (one set of host
+ * proxies), so two concurrent wraps would race the initialize→wrap window. Only
+ * that brief window holds the lock — the policy is baked into the returned argv at
+ * `wrap`, after which the spawned process runs independently.
+ */
+export async function wrapArgvInSandbox(input: WrapArgvInSandboxInput): Promise<WrappedCommand> {
+  const baseBinds: BaseBinds = {
+    workspace: input.workspace,
+    runtimeReadOnly: input.runtimeReadOnly,
+  };
+  const egressBase: EgressBaseInput = {
+    hubOrigin: input.hubOrigin,
+    ...(input.vaultUrl ? { vaultOrigin: input.vaultUrl } : {}),
+  };
+  const sandbox = new Sandbox(input.sandboxEngine);
+  return withSpawnLock(() =>
+    sandbox.wrap({
+      spec: input.spec,
+      baseBinds,
+      egressBase,
+      command: shellJoin(input.argv),
+      ...(input.ripgrep ? { ripgrep: input.ripgrep } : {}),
+    }),
+  );
+}
+
+/**
+ * The SHARED, NON-tmux deps a real session launch needs (hub origin + manager
+ * bearer for minting, channel/vault URLs, the sessions dir, the runtime read binds,
+ * the per-channel credential/env resolvers, sandbox/ripgrep overrides). The
+ * programmatic backend reads its slice of these; `resolveSpawnDeps` builds them.
+ *
+ * The PARKED interactive spawner extends this with a `tmux` launcher
+ * (`SpawnAgentDeps` in `src/_parked/interactive-spawn.ts`); the live tree never
+ * carries a tmux launcher in its deps.
+ */
+export interface SpawnAgentBaseDeps {
+  /** Hub origin + manager bearer for minting (§4.3). */
+  hubOrigin: string;
+  managerBearer: string;
+  /** Daemon base URL the channel MCP endpoints live under. */
+  channelUrl: string;
+  /** Vault base URL (if the spec binds a vault). Defaults to hubOrigin. */
+  vaultUrl?: string;
+  /** Base for session workspaces (e.g. `~/.parachute/agent/sessions`). */
+  sessionsDir: string;
+  /**
+   * Read-only runtime/config binds the sandbox always grants (the claude config
+   * dir, etc.). Workspace is derived per-session under `sessionsDir`.
+   */
+  runtimeReadOnly: string[];
+  /**
+   * Resolve the Claude OAuth token to inject as `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN`, given
+   * the spec's wake channel. Defaults to the real per-channel secret store
+   * (`credentials.ts` — channel override ?? default/operator ?? throw). The store
+   * throws `CredentialNotConfiguredError` when neither is set, which aborts the
+   * launch BEFORE any side effect (no session ever runs without auth).
+   */
+  resolveClaudeToken?: (channel: string) => string;
+  /**
+   * Resolve the per-channel ENV vars (the GH_TOKEN/CLOUDFLARE_* slice) to inject
+   * into the sandboxed child. Read at spawn time so a var set via the config API
+   * applies on the next spawn without a daemon restart. A missing/empty store
+   * resolves to `{}` (env injection is optional).
+   */
+  resolveChannelEnv?: (channel: string) => Record<string, string>;
+  /** Sandbox engine override (tests inject a fake). */
+  sandboxEngine?: SandboxEngine;
+  /** fetch override for the mint client (tests). */
+  fetchFn?: typeof fetch;
+  /** Parent env to scrub from. Defaults to process.env. */
+  parentEnv?: Record<string, string | undefined>;
+  /** claude binary. Defaults to "claude" (resolved by the shell at run, not us). */
+  claudeBin?: string;
+  /**
+   * Optional ripgrep override threaded to the sandbox (macOS deny-path scan needs
+   * a real `rg` binary; pass one when the host has none on PATH).
+   */
+  ripgrep?: { command: string; args?: string[] };
+}
+
+/** Per-session workspace dir under the sessions base. */
+export function sessionWorkspace(sessionsDir: string, specName: string): string {
+  return join(sessionsDir, specName);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Resolve an agent's CWD (the working-directory axis, design
+ * 2026-06-16-agent-filesystem-and-sharing.md). When the spec sets `workspace`
+ * (the shared real dir the agent works from) the cwd is that dir; otherwise it's
+ * the agent's PRIVATE per-session dir (today's behavior, exactly).
+ *
+ * This is ONLY the cwd. The private dir always remains the home for `.mcp.json`,
+ * `spec.json`, `system-prompt.txt`, the seeded `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR`, and `tmp` —
+ * those are passed to `claude` by ABSOLUTE path (`--mcp-config`,
+ * `--system-prompt-file`, `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR`/`TMPDIR` env) so they're unaffected
+ * by the cwd change. The decoupling keeps the working dir shareable while the
+ * credential-bearing private home stays per-agent.
+ */
+export function resolveAgentCwd(spec: AgentSpec, privateWorkspace: string): string {
+  return typeof spec.workspace === "string" && spec.workspace.length > 0
+    ? spec.workspace
+    : privateWorkspace;
+}
+
+/** Path to the persisted spawn-spec for a session (recovered by restart). */
+export function specFilePath(workspace: string): string {
+  return join(workspace, "spec.json");
+}
+
+/**
+ * Persist the spawn {@link AgentSpec} alongside the session workspace so a
+ * per-session restart can faithfully reproduce the original launch (same channels,
+ * vault, network, mounts) WITHOUT re-asking the operator. The live tmux session
+ * carries none of this — `GET /api/agents` only knows name + attached — and the
+ * workspace's `.mcp.json` inlines minted tokens (not a clean spec), so the spec
+ * itself is the recoverable source of truth.
+ *
+ * The spec is NON-SECRET (channel names, access verbs, vault name, host paths) —
+ * the actual credentials live in credentials.json (Claude) / the env store and are
+ * re-resolved at each (re)spawn. We still write it 0600 (matching the workspace's
+ * secret-bearing `.mcp.json`): the per-session workspace dir is umask-inherited (no
+ * tighter than 0755), so 0600 on the file is the real guard — defense-in-depth that
+ * also keeps the perms honest if a future field ever does carry something sensitive.
+ * `chmod`-ed unconditionally since writeFileSync's `mode` only applies on create.
+ * Returns the path written.
+ */
+export function persistSpec(workspace: string, spec: AgentSpec): string {
+  mkdirSync(workspace, { recursive: true });
+  const path = specFilePath(workspace);
+  writeFileSync(path, JSON.stringify(spec, null, 2) + "\n", { mode: 0o600 });
+  chmodSync(path, 0o600);
+  return path;
+}
+
+/** Read a persisted spawn-spec, or null if absent/unreadable. */
+export function readPersistedSpec(workspace: string): AgentSpec | null {
+  const path = specFilePath(workspace);
+  if (!existsSync(path)) return null;
+  try {
+    return JSON.parse(readFileSync(path, "utf-8")) as AgentSpec;
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * The ONLY env keys we accept FROM the sandbox engine's returned `wrapped.env`.
+ *
+ * CRITICAL ISOLATION CONTRACT. `@anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime`'s
+ * `wrapWithSandboxArgv` returns `env: process.env` on macOS/Linux (the proxy/sandbox
+ * vars are baked into the wrapped COMMAND STRING via an `env VAR=… sandbox-exec …`
+ * prefix / bwrap `--setenv`, NOT into the returned env) and `{...process.env, ...proxy}`
+ * on Windows (where the proxy vars DO ride in the returned env). So `wrapped.env` is
+ * essentially the WHOLE daemon env. If we spread it over the scrubbed `childEnv`, the
+ * daemon's ambient `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` / any other secret would OVERRIDE the scrub and
+ * reach the sandboxed turn — defeating `buildAgentChildEnv` entirely (the
+ * subscription-billing + no-secret-leak guarantee). So we ALLOWLIST: from `wrapped.env`
+ * we keep ONLY these known sandbox/proxy keys (the exact set the runtime's
+ * `generateProxyEnvVars` + the Linux bwrap `--setenv` markers emit — needed so the
+ * egress proxy works, esp. on Windows where they ride in the returned env), and drop
+ * everything else. {@link DENYLISTED_ENV} is re-applied to whatever we keep as belt-
+ * and-suspenders so the Claude-auth trio can NEVER enter via this seam.
+ *
+ * Source of truth: `@anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime` `sandbox-utils.generateProxyEnvVars`
+ * (`SANDBOX_RUNTIME`, `TMPDIR`, `CA_TRUST_VARS`, `NO_PROXY`/proxy/socks/git-ssh/docker/
+ * cloudsdk/grpc vars) + `linux-sandbox-utils` (`CLAUDE_CODE_HOST_*_PROXY_PORT`). Raise
+ * this set alongside the pinned-engine upgrade gate if the runtime adds a launch var.
+ */
+export const SANDBOX_ENV_ALLOWLIST: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([
+  // Sandbox markers + the per-session temp dir. NB: TMPDIR is allowlisted for the
+  // WINDOWS path (where it rides in the returned env dict); on macOS/Linux it's baked
+  // into the command string. Either way `homeEnv` (seedAgentHome's per-workspace tmp)
+  // is layered LAST in mergeSandboxLaunchEnv, so the session's own TMPDIR wins by design.
+  "SANDBOX_RUNTIME",
+  "TMPDIR",
+  // CA trust stores (CA_TRUST_VARS) — when the proxy terminates TLS the child must
+  // trust the proxy-minted certs.
+  "NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS",
+  "SSL_CERT_FILE",
+  "CURL_CA_BUNDLE",
+  "REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE",
+  "PIP_CERT",
+  "GIT_SSL_CAINFO",
+  "AWS_CA_BUNDLE",
+  "CARGO_HTTP_CAINFO",
+  "DENO_CERT",
+  // Proxy routing (upper + lower case) — the egress floor. Without these the
+  // sandboxed turn loses network on platforms that carry them in the returned env.
+  "NO_PROXY",
+  "no_proxy",
+  "HTTP_PROXY",
+  "http_proxy",
+  "HTTPS_PROXY",
+  "https_proxy",
+  "ALL_PROXY",
+  "all_proxy",
+  "FTP_PROXY",
+  "ftp_proxy",
+  "RSYNC_PROXY",
+  "GRPC_PROXY",
+  "grpc_proxy",
+  "DOCKER_HTTP_PROXY",
+  "DOCKER_HTTPS_PROXY",
+  "CLOUDSDK_PROXY_TYPE",
+  "CLOUDSDK_PROXY_ADDRESS",
+  "CLOUDSDK_PROXY_PORT",
+  // Git-over-SSH through the SOCKS/HTTP proxy.
+  "GIT_SSH_COMMAND",
+  // Linux bwrap host-proxy-port markers (debug/transparency).
+  "CLAUDE_CODE_HOST_HTTP_PROXY_PORT",
+  "CLAUDE_CODE_HOST_SOCKS_PROXY_PORT",
+]);
+
+/**
+ * Compose the FINAL launch env for a sandboxed turn so the SCRUB WINS.
+ *
+ * Layering (lowest → highest precedence):
+ *   1. `childEnv` — the scrubbed allowlist from {@link buildAgentChildEnv} (authoritative).
+ *   2. the sandbox/proxy ALLOWLIST drawn from `wrappedEnv` ({@link SANDBOX_ENV_ALLOWLIST}),
+ *      with {@link DENYLISTED_ENV} re-applied defensively — only known egress/sandbox
+ *      vars layer on, never the daemon's ambient `process.env` (the old `...wrappedEnv`
+ *      spread leaked it).
+ *   3. `homeEnv` — `seedAgentHome`'s CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR/XDG/TMP overrides win last.
+ *
+ * `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` (set last by `buildAgentChildEnv`) survives: it is not in the
+ * allowlist AND is denylisted, so step 2 can never overwrite it; step 3 doesn't set it.
+ */
+export function mergeSandboxLaunchEnv(
+  childEnv: Record<string, string>,
+  wrappedEnv: Record<string, string | undefined>,
+  homeEnv: Record<string, string>,
+): Record<string, string | undefined> {
+  const out: Record<string, string | undefined> = { ...childEnv };
+  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(wrappedEnv)) {
+    if (typeof v !== "string" || v.length === 0) continue;
+    if (!SANDBOX_ENV_ALLOWLIST.has(k)) continue; // drop the daemon's ambient env
+    if (DENYLISTED_ENV.has(k)) continue; // never re-admit the Claude-auth trio here
+    out[k] = v;
+  }
+  return { ...out, ...homeEnv };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Build the scrubbed child env for the sandboxed claude. Mirrors runner's
+ * passthrough allowlist MINUS `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` (and the `ANTHROPIC_*`/`CLAUDE_*`
+ * wildcards, which would re-admit it) — the channel session runs on the
+ * interactive subscription, so an API key must never leak in (§6). The injected
+ * `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` is the session's auth.
+ *
+ * The sandbox engine's own env (proxy vars, sandbox markers) is layered on TOP of
+ * this by {@link mergeSandboxLaunchEnv} — but as an ALLOWLIST
+ * ({@link SANDBOX_ENV_ALLOWLIST}), NOT the whole returned `wrapped.env` (which is the
+ * daemon's `process.env` and would re-admit the scrubbed secrets). This scrubbed env
+ * is authoritative; only known sandbox/proxy keys + the home overrides layer on top.
+ *
+ * SECURITY POSTURE — the per-channel env injection (`channelEnv`):
+ *
+ *   The operator scopes a channel's spawned agent extra credentials/vars
+ *   (`GH_TOKEN`, `CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN`, …) via the env store (credentials.ts).
+ *   They are resolved at SPAWN time (issuance-time scoping: the sandbox only ever
+ *   sees the minimal set the operator configured for THAT channel, never the
+ *   daemon's own ambient process env), then merged here. The layering is precise
+ *   so the injection can only ADD capability, never subvert the two guarantees:
+ *
+ *     1. `channelEnv` is applied FIRST (as the base), THEN the structural
+ *        passthrough (PATH/HOME/locale) and FINALLY `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` —
+ *        so a channel-set var can never clobber the Claude auth token or a
+ *        structural fundamental. (seedAgentHome's CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR/XDG/TMP layer
+ *        even later, in spawnAgent, so those win too.)
+ *     2. Denylisted keys (ANTHROPIC_API_KEY / CLAUDE_API_KEY / CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN)
+ *        are dropped defensively with a warning — the setter already blocks them
+ *        and `resolveChannelEnv` already strips them, so this is belt-and-suspenders
+ *        for a hand-edited credentials.json: the subscription-billing + managed-auth
+ *        guarantee holds even if the store is tampered with.
+ */
+export function buildAgentChildEnv(
+  parentEnv: Record<string, string | undefined>,
+  claudeOauthToken: string,
+  channelEnv: Record<string, string> = {},
+): Record<string, string> {
+  const out: Record<string, string> = {};
+
+  // 1. The operator-scoped per-channel env goes in FIRST (lowest precedence) so the
+  //    structural passthrough + the Claude auth token below always win. Drop any
+  //    denylisted key defensively (the store already blocks them; this guards a
+  //    hand-edited file from smuggling an API key / a swapped OAuth token in).
+  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(channelEnv)) {
+    if (typeof v !== "string" || v.length === 0) continue;
+    if (DENYLISTED_ENV.has(k)) {
+      console.warn(
+        `parachute-agent: refusing to inject denylisted env var "${k}" from the channel env store ` +
+          `(it controls Claude auth/billing) — skipping. Remove it from credentials.json.`,
+      );
+      continue;
+    }
+    out[k] = v;
+  }
+
+  // Fundamentals + locale, like runner — but NOT ANTHROPIC_API_KEY / CLAUDE_API_KEY.
+  const passthrough = [
+    "PATH",
+    "HOME",
+    "USER",
+    "LOGNAME",
+    "SHELL",
+    "TERM",
+    "LANG",
+    "TZ",
+    "CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR",
+    "XDG_CONFIG_HOME",
+    "XDG_DATA_HOME",
+    "XDG_CACHE_HOME",
+    "XDG_STATE_HOME",
+    "XDG_RUNTIME_DIR",
+  ];
+  for (const k of passthrough) {
+    const v = parentEnv[k];
+    if (typeof v === "string" && v.length > 0) out[k] = v;
+  }
+  // Pass through LC_* locale vars only. Deliberately NOT the broad ANTHROPIC_*/
+  // CLAUDE_* wildcards runner uses — those would re-admit ANTHROPIC_API_KEY and
+  // route the session onto metered API billing instead of the subscription.
+  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(parentEnv)) {
+    if (typeof v === "string" && v.length > 0 && k.startsWith("LC_")) out[k] = v;
+  }
+  if (!out.PATH) out.PATH = "/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin";
+
+  // The interactive subscription credential (design §6). Explicitly the ONLY
+  // Claude auth var set; ANTHROPIC_API_KEY is intentionally absent. Set LAST so no
+  // channel-injected var can ever override the session's managed auth.
+  out.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN = claudeOauthToken;
+  return out;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Create the agent's PRIVATE, WRITABLE HOME inside its workspace and seed it so
+ * claude starts straight into a usable session — no onboarding flow, no per-folder
+ * trust prompt — and so ALL of claude's config/cache/log/lock/temp writes land
+ * here instead of EPERM-ing against the operator's (read-only, shared) real home.
+ *
+ * This is the keystone of a STABLE sandbox: claude always has a home it can fully
+ * read AND write, decoupled from the operator's ~/.claude (so concurrent agents
+ * never race/corrupt it).
+ *
+ * The seed is based on the operator's REAL `~/.claude.json` so the agent inherits
+ * a fully-COMPLETED first run — onboarding, theme, and every version-migration
+ * flag — which is robust to claude's evolving first-run sub-steps (chasing them
+ * one-by-one is exactly the fragility this avoids). We then strip the heavy /
+ * private bits: `projects` is REPLACED with just this workspace (pre-trusted), and
+ * `oauthAccount` is dropped (the agent authenticates via CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN).
+ * If the operator has no config, fall back to the two flags that gate the prompts.
+ *
+ * Returns the env overrides (CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR + XDG_* + the temp vars — NOT HOME,
+ * which is deliberately left as the operator's so claude finds its real install) to
+ * layer LAST over the launch env so they win over the inherited + engine env.
+ * Idempotent: an existing seed is left as-is (claude owns it after first boot).
+ * `operatorConfigPath` is injectable for tests.
+ */
+export function seedAgentHome(
+  workspace: string,
+  opts: { mcpServers?: string[]; operatorConfigPath?: string; projectRoot?: string } = {},
+): Record<string, string> {
+  const mcpServerNames = opts.mcpServers ?? [];
+  const operatorConfigPath = opts.operatorConfigPath ?? join(homedir(), ".claude.json");
+  // The project root claude pre-trusts in the seed. Defaults to the private
+  // workspace (today's behavior), but when the agent's CWD is a shared working dir
+  // (the spec's `workspace`), the CALLER passes that path here so claude's project
+  // (= its cwd) is pre-trusted + its MCP servers pre-approved — otherwise the agent
+  // would hit the per-folder trust / "new MCP server" prompts for the shared dir.
+  // The seeded HOME/config/tmp still live UNDER the private `workspace` regardless.
+  const projectRoot = opts.projectRoot ?? workspace;
+  const home = join(workspace, "home");
+  const claudeDir = join(home, ".claude");
+  const tmp = join(workspace, "tmp");
+  mkdirSync(claudeDir, { recursive: true });
+  mkdirSync(tmp, { recursive: true });
+  // claude reads its primary config from `$CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR/.claude.json` when
+  // CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR is set (which we set below, to claudeDir) — NOT
+  // `$HOME/.claude.json`. Seed THERE. Only seed if absent — after first boot
+  // claude owns this file.
+  const seedPath = join(claudeDir, ".claude.json");
+  if (!existsSync(seedPath)) {
+    let base: Record<string, unknown> = {};
+    try {
+      if (existsSync(operatorConfigPath)) {
+        base = JSON.parse(readFileSync(operatorConfigPath, "utf-8")) as Record<string, unknown>;
+      }
+    } catch {
+      base = {}; // unreadable/garbage operator config → minimal seed
+    }
+    delete base.oauthAccount; // don't copy the operator's account into the agent home
+    const seed = {
+      ...base,
+      hasCompletedOnboarding: true,
+      // Replace the operator's project history with ONLY the agent's project root
+      // (its cwd — the private workspace by default, or the shared working dir when
+      // the spec sets one), pre-trusted AND with our own configured MCP servers
+      // pre-approved (claude otherwise prompts "New MCP server found in this
+      // project" / the per-folder trust dialog — these are operator-configured, not
+      // foreign, so pre-approve them).
+      projects: {
+        [projectRoot]: {
+          hasTrustDialogAccepted: true,
+          hasCompletedProjectOnboarding: true,
+          enabledMcpjsonServers: mcpServerNames,
+          enableAllProjectMcpServers: true,
+        },
+      },
+    };
+    writeFileSync(seedPath, JSON.stringify(seed, null, 2) + "\n", { mode: 0o600 });
+  }
+  // settings.json: pre-suppress the "are you sure?" meta-prompt that
+  // `--dangerously-skip-permissions` shows on first use (the operator's own config
+  // sets this too). Without it, skip-permissions just trades one prompt for another.
+  const settingsPath = join(claudeDir, "settings.json");
+  if (!existsSync(settingsPath)) {
+    writeFileSync(
+      settingsPath,
+      JSON.stringify({ skipDangerousModePermissionPrompt: true }, null, 2) + "\n",
+      { mode: 0o600 },
+    );
+  }
+  // NOTE: we deliberately do NOT override HOME. claude resolves its own install
+  // relative to $HOME (`$HOME/.local/...`); leaving HOME as the operator's means
+  // claude finds its real install (no "setup issue", no per-spawn self-reinstall).
+  // All of claude's WRITES are redirected to the per-session dirs below
+  // (CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR + XDG + temp), so it never EPERMs on the operator's
+  // read-only home and concurrent agents don't share mutable config.
+  return {
+    CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR: claudeDir,
+    XDG_CONFIG_HOME: join(home, ".config"),
+    XDG_DATA_HOME: join(home, ".local", "share"),
+    XDG_CACHE_HOME: join(home, ".cache"),
+    XDG_STATE_HOME: join(home, ".local", "state"),
+    XDG_RUNTIME_DIR: join(home, ".run"),
+    // claude's `/tmp/claude-<uid>` scratch dir follows CLAUDE_CODE_TMPDIR; TMPDIR/
+    // TMP/TEMP cover everything else. All inside the writable workspace, so claude
+    // never EPERMs on temp (the "could not start" death) regardless of read scope.
+    TMPDIR: tmp,
+    CLAUDE_CODE_TMPDIR: tmp,
+    TMP: tmp,
+    TEMP: tmp,
+    // An ephemeral sandboxed agent shouldn't auto-update itself — it would download
+    // a fresh claude into the per-session data dir on every spawn (bandwidth + disk
+    // for nothing; the agent is gone when the session ends). This narrow flag
+    // disables ONLY the updater — unlike CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_NONESSENTIAL_TRAFFIC,
+    // which also disables the channels feature we depend on.
+    DISABLE_AUTOUPDATER: "1",
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Minimal POSIX shell-quote for joining argv into the single command string the
+ * sandbox engine wraps (`wrapWithSandboxArgv` takes a command string). Quotes any
+ * arg containing shell-significant chars; safe for the controlled argv we build
+ * (claude bin, flags, a workspace-local config path).
+ */
+export function shellJoin(argv: string[]): string {
+  return argv.map(shellQuote).join(" ");
+}
+
+function shellQuote(arg: string): string {
+  if (arg.length > 0 && /^[A-Za-z0-9_@%+=:,./-]+$/.test(arg)) return arg;
+  // Single-quote, escaping embedded single quotes the POSIX way.
+  return `'${arg.replace(/'/g, `'\\''`)}'`;
+}

package/src/spawn-deps.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+/**
+ * Tests for `resolveSpawnDeps` (`src/spawn-deps.ts`) — the real-dep resolver
+ * shared by the CLI and the web spawn endpoint.
+ *
+ * The load-bearing regression guard here is the claude config binding: the
+ * sandboxed `claude` MUST get `~/.claude.json` bound read-only, or it runs
+ * first-run onboarding whose connectivity check is FATAL under the restricted
+ * egress proxy and the tmux session dies instantly ("An unknown error occurred").
+ * That bug shipped once; this test ensures the binding stays.
+ */
+
+import { describe, test, expect, afterEach } from "bun:test";
+import { mkdtempSync, writeFileSync, rmSync } from "node:fs";
+import { tmpdir, homedir } from "node:os";
+import { join, resolve } from "node:path";
+import { resolveSpawnDeps, SpawnDepsError } from "./spawn-deps.ts";
+
+const savedHome = process.env.PARACHUTE_HOME;
+let tmp: string | undefined;
+
+afterEach(() => {
+  if (savedHome === undefined) delete process.env.PARACHUTE_HOME;
+  else process.env.PARACHUTE_HOME = savedHome;
+  if (tmp) {
+    try { rmSync(tmp, { recursive: true, force: true }); } catch {}
+    tmp = undefined;
+  }
+});
+
+describe("resolveSpawnDeps", () => {
+  test("throws SpawnDepsError when there's no operator token", () => {
+    tmp = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "spawn-deps-empty-"));
+    process.env.PARACHUTE_HOME = tmp; // no operator.token inside
+    expect(() => resolveSpawnDeps()).toThrow(SpawnDepsError);
+  });
+
+  test("binds the claude binary (confined reads) but NOT the operator's ~/.claude", () => {
+    tmp = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "spawn-deps-"));
+    process.env.PARACHUTE_HOME = tmp;
+    writeFileSync(join(tmp, "operator.token"), "fake-operator-bearer");
+    const deps = resolveSpawnDeps();
+    // The agent's config/onboarding now lives in its own per-session HOME
+    // (seedAgentHome), so we no longer expose the operator's real config.
+    expect(deps.runtimeReadOnly).not.toContain(resolve(homedir(), ".claude.json"));
+    expect(deps.runtimeReadOnly).not.toContain(resolve(homedir(), ".claude"));
+    // The claude BINARY is still bound (needed under confined/scoped reads) when
+    // resolvable on PATH — and claudeBin is set to its absolute path.
+    const bin = Bun.which("claude");
+    if (bin) {
+      expect(deps.claudeBin).toBe(bin);
+      expect(deps.runtimeReadOnly).toContain(bin);
+    }
+  });
+});