@oneuptime/common 14.0.8 → 14.0.10

package/Tests/Utils/AiRemediation/Resource/ResourceCommandPolicy.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,1305 @@
+import ResourceCommandPolicy, {
+  RESOURCE_ALLOWLIST_MAX_PATTERNS,
+  RESOURCE_ALLOWLIST_MAX_PATTERN_LENGTH,
+} from "../../../../Utils/AiRemediation/Resource/ResourceCommandPolicy";
+import {
+  ResourceAutoExecutionVerdict,
+  ResourceCommandPolicyResult,
+  ResourceToolPolicy,
+  deniedResult,
+  renderResourceDisplayCommand,
+} from "../../../../Utils/AiRemediation/Resource/ResourceCommandPolicyCore";
+import DockerEngineCommandPolicy from "../../../../Utils/AiRemediation/Resource/DockerEngineCommandPolicy";
+import DockerSwarmCommandPolicy from "../../../../Utils/AiRemediation/Resource/DockerSwarmCommandPolicy";
+import ProxmoxCommandPolicy from "../../../../Utils/AiRemediation/Resource/ProxmoxCommandPolicy";
+import GovcCommandPolicy from "../../../../Utils/AiRemediation/Resource/GovcCommandPolicy";
+import CephCommandPolicy from "../../../../Utils/AiRemediation/Resource/CephCommandPolicy";
+import DatabaseCommandPolicy from "../../../../Utils/AiRemediation/Resource/DatabaseCommandPolicy";
+import HostCommandPolicy from "../../../../Utils/AiRemediation/Resource/HostCommandPolicy";
+import AiResourceType, {
+  AI_RESOURCE_TYPE_INFO,
+  ALL_AI_RESOURCE_TYPES,
+} from "../../../../Types/ResourceAiAgent/AiResourceType";
+import { ResourceCommandTier } from "../../../../Types/ResourceAiAgent/ResourceAiAccess";
+import { AiRemediationCommandPolicyVerdict } from "../../../../Types/AutoRemediation/AiRemediationCommandPolicyVerdict";
+import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, test } from "@jest/globals";
+
+/*
+ * Contract under test — ResourceCommandPolicy, the dispatcher every caller
+ * uses (server tools, the enqueue chokepoint, the approval path, the
+ * dashboard form and the agent).
+ *
+ * - Routing: each resource type reaches its tool policy; a command whose
+ *   first word is not one of the type's programs is Denied before any tool
+ *   policy reads it; the Wave 1 stubs deny everything.
+ * - Fail-closed argv handling: garbage, oversized, multi-line and
+ *   privilege-escalating argvs are Denied without reaching the tool, and a
+ *   tool that throws or answers nonsense is read as Denied.
+ * - The ladder, the allowlist (validity, matching, broadness) and the
+ *   agent's write scope, exercised against a fake tool policy with a real
+ *   grammar so every branch is reachable while the stubs deny everything.
+ */
+
+// A number, as a memory limit or an OSD id is written.
+const DIGITS: RegExp = /^[0-9]+$/;
+
+/*
+ * A tiny docker-like grammar: enough shapes to reach every branch of the
+ * dispatcher. The real kits replace the stubs; this never ships.
+ */
+const FAKE_DOCKER: ResourceToolPolicy = {
+  name: "fake-docker",
+  programs: ["docker"],
+  readCommandGuide: "- docker ps",
+  writeCommandGuide: "- docker restart NAME (safe)",
+  evaluateArgv(argv: Array<string>): ResourceCommandPolicyResult {
+    const [program, verb, ...rest] = argv;
+    const base: Omit<ResourceCommandPolicyResult, "tier" | "reason"> = {
+      program: program || "",
+      args: argv.slice(1),
+      verb: verb || "",
+      displayCommand: renderResourceDisplayCommand(argv),
+      targets: [],
+    };
+
+    if (verb === "ps" && rest.length <= 1) {
+      return {
+        ...base,
+        tier: ResourceCommandTier.Read,
+        reason: "lists containers",
+      };
+    }
+
+    if (verb === "restart" && rest.length === 1) {
+      return {
+        ...base,
+        tier: ResourceCommandTier.SafeWrite,
+        reason: "restarts one container",
+        targets: [rest[0]!],
+      };
+    }
+
+    if (verb === "stop" && rest.length === 1) {
+      return {
+        ...base,
+        tier: ResourceCommandTier.RiskyWrite,
+        reason: "stops one container",
+        targets: [rest[0]!],
+      };
+    }
+
+    if (verb === "kill" && rest.length === 1) {
+      return {
+        ...base,
+        tier: ResourceCommandTier.RiskyWrite,
+        reason: "kills one container",
+        targets: [rest[0]!],
+        requiresHuman: true,
+      };
+    }
+
+    if (
+      verb === "update" &&
+      rest.length === 3 &&
+      rest[0] === "--memory" &&
+      DIGITS.test(rest[1]!)
+    ) {
+      return {
+        ...base,
+        tier: ResourceCommandTier.RiskyWrite,
+        reason: "changes one container's memory limit",
+        targets: [rest[2]!],
+      };
+    }
+
+    if (verb === "system" && rest[0] === "prune" && rest.length === 1) {
+      return {
+        ...base,
+        tier: ResourceCommandTier.RiskyWrite,
+        reason: "prunes the engine",
+        targets: [],
+      };
+    }
+
+    return deniedResult(argv, `docker ${verb || ""} is not allowed`);
+  },
+};
+
+// A ceph-like grammar whose target must be a number (an OSD id).
+const FAKE_CEPH: ResourceToolPolicy = {
+  name: "fake-ceph",
+  programs: ["ceph"],
+  readCommandGuide: "- ceph health",
+  writeCommandGuide: "- ceph osd out ID (risky)",
+  evaluateArgv(argv: Array<string>): ResourceCommandPolicyResult {
+    if (argv[1] === "health" && argv.length === 2) {
+      return {
+        tier: ResourceCommandTier.Read,
+        reason: "shows health",
+        program: "ceph",
+        args: argv.slice(1),
+        verb: "health",
+        displayCommand: renderResourceDisplayCommand(argv),
+        targets: [],
+      };
+    }
+
+    if (
+      argv[1] === "osd" &&
+      argv[2] === "out" &&
+      argv.length === 4 &&
+      DIGITS.test(argv[3]!)
+    ) {
+      return {
+        tier: ResourceCommandTier.RiskyWrite,
+        reason: "marks one OSD out",
+        program: "ceph",
+        args: argv.slice(1),
+        verb: "osd out",
+        displayCommand: renderResourceDisplayCommand(argv),
+        targets: [`osd.${argv[3]}`],
+      };
+    }
+
+    return deniedResult(argv, "not a ceph command this fake knows");
+  },
+};
+
+function useFakeTools(): jest.SpyInstance {
+  return jest
+    .spyOn(ResourceCommandPolicy, "getToolPolicy")
+    .mockImplementation((type: AiResourceType): ResourceToolPolicy => {
+      return type === AiResourceType.CephCluster ? FAKE_CEPH : FAKE_DOCKER;
+    });
+}
+
+function evaluate(
+  command: string,
+  resourceType: AiResourceType = AiResourceType.DockerHost,
+): ResourceCommandPolicyResult {
+  return ResourceCommandPolicy.evaluateCommand({ resourceType, command });
+}
+
+afterEach(() => {
+  jest.restoreAllMocks();
+});
+
+describe("routing", () => {
+  test("each resource type reaches its tool policy", () => {
+    const expected: Record<AiResourceType, ResourceToolPolicy> = {
+      [AiResourceType.DockerHost]: DockerEngineCommandPolicy,
+      [AiResourceType.PodmanHost]: DockerEngineCommandPolicy,
+      [AiResourceType.DockerSwarmCluster]: DockerSwarmCommandPolicy,
+      [AiResourceType.ProxmoxCluster]: ProxmoxCommandPolicy,
+      [AiResourceType.VMwareVCenter]: GovcCommandPolicy,
+      [AiResourceType.CephCluster]: CephCommandPolicy,
+      [AiResourceType.DatabaseServer]: DatabaseCommandPolicy,
+      [AiResourceType.Host]: HostCommandPolicy,
+    };
+
+    for (const type of ALL_AI_RESOURCE_TYPES) {
+      expect(ResourceCommandPolicy.getToolPolicy(type)).toBe(expected[type]);
+    }
+  });
+
+  test("pins the tool policy names", () => {
+    expect(
+      ALL_AI_RESOURCE_TYPES.map((type: AiResourceType): string => {
+        return ResourceCommandPolicy.getToolPolicy(type).name;
+      }),
+    ).toEqual([
+      "docker-engine",
+      "docker-engine",
+      "docker-swarm",
+      "pvesh",
+      "govc",
+      "ceph",
+      "db",
+      "host",
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  test("each tool policy covers exactly its types' programs", () => {
+    for (const type of ALL_AI_RESOURCE_TYPES) {
+      expect([...ResourceCommandPolicy.getToolPolicy(type).programs]).toEqual([
+        ...AI_RESOURCE_TYPE_INFO[type].programs,
+      ]);
+    }
+  });
+
+  test("an unknown type gets a policy that refuses everything", () => {
+    const tool: ResourceToolPolicy = ResourceCommandPolicy.getToolPolicy(
+      "KubernetesCluster" as AiResourceType,
+    );
+
+    expect(tool.programs).toEqual([]);
+    expect(tool.evaluateArgv(["kubectl", "get", "pods"]).tier).toBe(
+      ResourceCommandTier.Denied,
+    );
+    expect(
+      evaluate("kubectl get pods", "KubernetesCluster" as AiResourceType).tier,
+    ).toBe(ResourceCommandTier.Denied);
+    expect(
+      evaluate("docker ps", "KubernetesCluster" as AiResourceType).reason,
+    ).toContain("no command policy");
+  });
+});
+
+describe("the Wave 1 stubs fail closed", () => {
+  const stubs: Array<ResourceToolPolicy> = [
+    DockerEngineCommandPolicy,
+    DockerSwarmCommandPolicy,
+    ProxmoxCommandPolicy,
+    GovcCommandPolicy,
+    CephCommandPolicy,
+    DatabaseCommandPolicy,
+    HostCommandPolicy,
+  ];
+
+  /*
+   * Only while a stub is in place: a kit that replaces the module makes its
+   * own reads non-Denied, and these assertions move to the kit's suite.
+   */
+  const isStub: (tool: ResourceToolPolicy) => boolean = (
+    tool: ResourceToolPolicy,
+  ): boolean => {
+    return tool
+      .evaluateArgv([tool.programs[0] || ""])
+      .reason.includes("not implemented yet");
+  };
+
+  test.each(
+    ALL_AI_RESOURCE_TYPES.map((type: AiResourceType) => {
+      return [type];
+    }),
+  )(
+    "%s: every Test connection command is Denied while its policy is a stub",
+    (type: AiResourceType) => {
+      const tool: ResourceToolPolicy =
+        ResourceCommandPolicy.getToolPolicy(type);
+
+      if (!isStub(tool)) {
+        return;
+      }
+
+      for (const command of AI_RESOURCE_TYPE_INFO[type].testCommands) {
+        const result: ResourceCommandPolicyResult = evaluate(command, type);
+
+        expect(result.tier).toBe(ResourceCommandTier.Denied);
+        expect(result.reason).toContain("not implemented yet");
+        expect(
+          ResourceCommandPolicy.isReadOnly({ resourceType: type, command }),
+        ).toBe(false);
+      }
+    },
+  );
+
+  test.each(
+    stubs.map((tool: ResourceToolPolicy): [string, ResourceToolPolicy] => {
+      return [tool.name, tool];
+    }),
+  )(
+    "the %s stub is total and denies garbage without throwing",
+    (_name: string, tool: ResourceToolPolicy) => {
+      if (!isStub(tool)) {
+        return;
+      }
+
+      for (const argv of [
+        [],
+        [tool.programs[0] || ""],
+        [tool.programs[0] || "", "anything", "at", "all"],
+        null,
+        undefined,
+        [1, {}, null],
+      ]) {
+        const result: ResourceCommandPolicyResult = tool.evaluateArgv(
+          argv as unknown as Array<string>,
+        );
+
+        expect(result.tier).toBe(ResourceCommandTier.Denied);
+        expect(result.targets).toEqual([]);
+      }
+
+      expect(tool.readCommandGuide).toContain("Unavailable");
+      expect(tool.writeCommandGuide).toContain("not implemented yet");
+    },
+  );
+});
+
+describe("evaluateArgv / evaluateCommand fail closed before the tool", () => {
+  let toolSpy: jest.SpyInstance;
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    useFakeTools();
+    toolSpy = jest.spyOn(FAKE_DOCKER, "evaluateArgv");
+  });
+
+  test.each([
+    ["pvesh get /version", '"docker"'],
+    ["govc about", "Docker AI agent"],
+    ["kubectl get pods", "Docker host"],
+    ["systemctl restart docker", '"docker"'],
+    ["Docker ps", '"docker"'],
+  ])(
+    "%p is Denied for a Docker host: not one of its programs",
+    (command: string, mentions: string) => {
+      const result: ResourceCommandPolicyResult = evaluate(command);
+
+      expect(result.tier).toBe(ResourceCommandTier.Denied);
+      expect(result.reason).toContain(mentions);
+      expect(result.reason).toContain(
+        "is not a program the Docker AI agent runs",
+      );
+      expect(toolSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    },
+  );
+
+  test("a program written with a path is told to drop the path", () => {
+    const result: ResourceCommandPolicyResult = evaluate("/usr/bin/docker ps");
+
+    expect(result.tier).toBe(ResourceCommandTier.Denied);
+    expect(result.reason).toContain("without a path");
+    expect(toolSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  test("a host program is Denied for a Docker host and docker is Denied for a Host", () => {
+    expect(evaluate("uptime").tier).toBe(ResourceCommandTier.Denied);
+    expect(evaluate("docker ps", AiResourceType.Host).reason).toContain(
+      "Host AI agent",
+    );
+  });
+
+  test.each([
+    [null],
+    [undefined],
+    ["docker ps"],
+    [[]],
+    [["docker", 7]],
+    [["docker", null]],
+    [
+      [
+        {
+          toString: (): string => {
+            return "docker";
+          },
+        },
+        "ps",
+      ],
+    ],
+  ])("argv %p is Denied", (argv: unknown) => {
+    const result: ResourceCommandPolicyResult =
+      ResourceCommandPolicy.evaluateArgv({
+        resourceType: AiResourceType.DockerHost,
+        argv: argv as Array<string>,
+      });
+
+    expect(result.tier).toBe(ResourceCommandTier.Denied);
+    expect(toolSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  test("more than 64 words is Denied", () => {
+    const argv: Array<string> = [
+      "docker",
+      ...Array.from({ length: 64 }, (): string => {
+        return "ps";
+      }),
+    ];
+
+    expect(
+      ResourceCommandPolicy.evaluateArgv({
+        resourceType: AiResourceType.DockerHost,
+        argv,
+      }).reason,
+    ).toContain("at most 64 words");
+    expect(toolSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  test("more than 2000 characters of words is Denied", () => {
+    expect(
+      ResourceCommandPolicy.evaluateArgv({
+        resourceType: AiResourceType.DockerHost,
+        argv: ["docker", "logs", "x".repeat(2000)],
+      }).reason,
+    ).toContain("2000-character limit");
+    expect(toolSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  test.each([["web\nrm"], ["web\r"], ["web\0"]])(
+    "a word holding %p is Denied",
+    (word: string) => {
+      expect(
+        ResourceCommandPolicy.evaluateArgv({
+          resourceType: AiResourceType.DockerHost,
+          argv: ["docker", "restart", word],
+        }).reason,
+      ).toContain("single line");
+      expect(toolSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    },
+  );
+
+  test.each([[["sudo", "docker", "ps"]], [["/usr/bin/sudo", "docker", "ps"]]])(
+    "argv %p is Denied as a privilege switch",
+    (argv: Array<string>) => {
+      expect(
+        ResourceCommandPolicy.evaluateArgv({
+          resourceType: AiResourceType.DockerHost,
+          argv,
+        }).reason,
+      ).toContain("own permissions");
+    },
+  );
+
+  test("shell syntax in a command string is Denied with the rule", () => {
+    const result: ResourceCommandPolicyResult = evaluate(
+      "docker ps | grep web",
+    );
+
+    expect(result.tier).toBe(ResourceCommandTier.Denied);
+    expect(result.reason).toContain(
+      "pipes and redirects are not supported; run one command",
+    );
+    expect(result.displayCommand).toBe("docker ps | grep web");
+    expect(result.program).toBe("");
+    expect(result.args).toEqual([]);
+    expect(toolSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  test("an unparseable command's display is trimmed and capped at 200 characters", () => {
+    const long: string = `  docker logs ${"x".repeat(300)} |  `;
+
+    expect(evaluate(long).displayCommand).toBe(long.trim().slice(0, 200));
+  });
+
+  test("a non-string command is Denied", () => {
+    expect(
+      ResourceCommandPolicy.evaluateCommand({
+        resourceType: AiResourceType.DockerHost,
+        command: null as unknown as string,
+      }).tier,
+    ).toBe(ResourceCommandTier.Denied);
+  });
+
+  test("a valid command reaches the tool with a copy of the argv", () => {
+    const result: ResourceCommandPolicyResult = evaluate("docker ps -a");
+
+    expect(result.tier).toBe(ResourceCommandTier.Read);
+    expect(result.program).toBe("docker");
+    expect(result.args).toEqual(["ps", "-a"]);
+    expect(toolSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith(["docker", "ps", "-a"]);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("evaluateArgv distrusts the tool's answer", () => {
+  function withTool(
+    evaluateArgv: (argv: Array<string>) => unknown,
+  ): ResourceCommandPolicyResult {
+    jest.spyOn(ResourceCommandPolicy, "getToolPolicy").mockReturnValue({
+      ...FAKE_DOCKER,
+      evaluateArgv: evaluateArgv as ResourceToolPolicy["evaluateArgv"],
+    });
+
+    return ResourceCommandPolicy.evaluateArgv({
+      resourceType: AiResourceType.DockerHost,
+      argv: ["docker", "restart", "web"],
+    });
+  }
+
+  test("a tool that throws is Denied", () => {
+    const result: ResourceCommandPolicyResult = withTool((): never => {
+      throw new Error("boom");
+    });
+
+    expect(result.tier).toBe(ResourceCommandTier.Denied);
+    expect(result.reason).toContain("could not evaluate");
+  });
+
+  test.each([[null], [undefined], ["SafeWrite"], [42]])(
+    "a tool that answers %p is Denied",
+    (answer: unknown) => {
+      expect(
+        withTool((): unknown => {
+          return answer;
+        }).tier,
+      ).toBe(ResourceCommandTier.Denied);
+    },
+  );
+
+  test.each([["safewrite"], ["Allowed"], [""], [undefined], [1]])(
+    "a tool that answers the tier %p is Denied",
+    (tier: unknown) => {
+      const result: ResourceCommandPolicyResult = withTool((): unknown => {
+        return { tier, reason: "fine", targets: ["web"] };
+      });
+
+      expect(result.tier).toBe(ResourceCommandTier.Denied);
+      expect(result.reason).toContain("unknown tier");
+    },
+  );
+
+  test("the program is always argv[0] and missing fields are filled in", () => {
+    const result: ResourceCommandPolicyResult = withTool((): unknown => {
+      return {
+        tier: ResourceCommandTier.SafeWrite,
+        program: "sh",
+        targets: ["web", 7, null],
+        requiresHuman: "yes",
+      };
+    });
+
+    expect(result).toEqual({
+      tier: ResourceCommandTier.SafeWrite,
+      reason: "no reason was given",
+      program: "docker",
+      args: ["restart", "web"],
+      verb: "",
+      displayCommand: "docker restart web",
+      targets: ["web"],
+    });
+  });
+
+  test("requiresHuman is kept only as a literal true", () => {
+    expect(
+      withTool((): unknown => {
+        return {
+          tier: ResourceCommandTier.RiskyWrite,
+          reason: "r",
+          requiresHuman: true,
+        };
+      }).requiresHuman,
+    ).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  test("a tool that mutates the argv it was given cannot change the caller's", () => {
+    const argv: Array<string> = ["docker", "restart", "web"];
+
+    jest.spyOn(ResourceCommandPolicy, "getToolPolicy").mockReturnValue({
+      ...FAKE_DOCKER,
+      evaluateArgv: (given: Array<string>): ResourceCommandPolicyResult => {
+        given[2] = "oneuptime-ai-agent";
+        return FAKE_DOCKER.evaluateArgv(given);
+      },
+    });
+
+    ResourceCommandPolicy.evaluateArgv({
+      resourceType: AiResourceType.DockerHost,
+      argv,
+    });
+
+    expect(argv).toEqual(["docker", "restart", "web"]);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("evaluateForAutoExecution — the ladder through the dispatcher", () => {
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    useFakeTools();
+  });
+
+  function verdictFor(data: {
+    command: string;
+    allowlistPatterns?: Array<string>;
+    bypassApproval?: boolean;
+  }): ResourceAutoExecutionVerdict {
+    return ResourceCommandPolicy.evaluateForAutoExecution({
+      resourceType: AiResourceType.DockerHost,
+      command: data.command,
+      allowlistPatterns: data.allowlistPatterns || [],
+      bypassApproval: data.bypassApproval === true,
+    });
+  }
+
+  test("Denied is Denied, bypass and allowlist included", () => {
+    const verdict: ResourceAutoExecutionVerdict = verdictFor({
+      command: "docker exec web sh",
+      allowlistPatterns: ["docker exec * sh"],
+      bypassApproval: true,
+    });
+
+    expect(verdict.verdict).toBe(AiRemediationCommandPolicyVerdict.Denied);
+    expect(verdict.tier).toBe(ResourceCommandTier.Denied);
+  });
+
+  test("a read auto-approves", () => {
+    expect(verdictFor({ command: "docker ps" }).verdict).toBe(
+      AiRemediationCommandPolicyVerdict.AutoApproved,
+    );
+  });
+
+  test("a safe write auto-approves", () => {
+    const verdict: ResourceAutoExecutionVerdict = verdictFor({
+      command: "docker restart web",
+    });
+
+    expect(verdict.verdict).toBe(
+      AiRemediationCommandPolicyVerdict.AutoApproved,
+    );
+    expect(verdict.tier).toBe(ResourceCommandTier.SafeWrite);
+  });
+
+  test("a risky write asks, unless bypassed or allowlisted", () => {
+    expect(verdictFor({ command: "docker stop web" }).verdict).toBe(
+      AiRemediationCommandPolicyVerdict.RequiresApproval,
+    );
+    expect(
+      verdictFor({ command: "docker stop web", bypassApproval: true }).verdict,
+    ).toBe(AiRemediationCommandPolicyVerdict.AutoApproved);
+    expect(
+      verdictFor({
+        command: "docker stop web",
+        allowlistPatterns: ["docker stop *"],
+      }).reason,
+    ).toBe("Matched the resource's command allowlist.");
+    expect(
+      verdictFor({
+        command: "docker stop api",
+        allowlistPatterns: ["docker stop web"],
+      }).verdict,
+    ).toBe(AiRemediationCommandPolicyVerdict.RequiresApproval);
+  });
+
+  test("requiresHuman asks whatever the operator set", () => {
+    const verdict: ResourceAutoExecutionVerdict = verdictFor({
+      command: "docker kill web",
+      allowlistPatterns: ["docker kill *"],
+      bypassApproval: true,
+    });
+
+    expect(verdict.verdict).toBe(
+      AiRemediationCommandPolicyVerdict.RequiresApproval,
+    );
+    expect(verdict.requiresHuman).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  test("an unparseable command is Denied", () => {
+    expect(
+      verdictFor({ command: "docker stop web; docker rm web" }).verdict,
+    ).toBe(AiRemediationCommandPolicyVerdict.Denied);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("allowlist", () => {
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    useFakeTools();
+  });
+
+  function problem(
+    pattern: unknown,
+    resourceType: AiResourceType = AiResourceType.DockerHost,
+  ): string | null {
+    return ResourceCommandPolicy.describeAllowlistPatternProblem({
+      resourceType,
+      pattern,
+    });
+  }
+
+  test("pins the bounds", () => {
+    expect(RESOURCE_ALLOWLIST_MAX_PATTERNS).toBe(50);
+    expect(RESOURCE_ALLOWLIST_MAX_PATTERN_LENGTH).toBe(500);
+  });
+
+  describe("describeAllowlistPatternProblem", () => {
+    test.each([
+      ["docker stop *"],
+      ["docker stop web"],
+      ["docker restart *"],
+      ["docker update --memory * web"],
+      ["docker update --memory 512 *"],
+      ["docker system prune"],
+      ["  docker stop *  "],
+    ])("%p is valid", (pattern: string) => {
+      expect(problem(pattern)).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    test("a numeric-only target can be allowlisted with *", () => {
+      expect(problem("ceph osd out *", AiResourceType.CephCluster)).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    test.each([[""], ["   "], [null], [undefined], [42], [["docker stop *"]]])(
+      "%p is blank",
+      (pattern: unknown) => {
+        expect(problem(pattern)).toBe("An allowlist entry cannot be blank.");
+      },
+    );
+
+    test("longer than 500 characters", () => {
+      expect(problem(`docker stop ${"x".repeat(500)}`)).toBe(
+        "An allowlist entry can be at most 500 characters long.",
+      );
+    });
+
+    test("does not parse", () => {
+      expect(problem("docker stop * | xargs")).toContain(
+        "cannot be read as one command",
+      );
+      expect(problem("docker stop 'web")).toContain("Unbalanced quotes");
+    });
+
+    test.each([
+      ["stop *"],
+      ["pvesh create /x"],
+      ["* stop web"],
+      ["sudo docker stop *"],
+    ])("%p does not start with the type's program", (pattern: string) => {
+      const text: string | null = problem(pattern);
+
+      expect(text).not.toBeNull();
+      expect(text).toMatch(
+        /does not start with a program the Docker AI agent runs|own permissions/,
+      );
+    });
+
+    test.each([["docker"], ["docker stop"], ["docker *"]])(
+      "%p has fewer than two words after the program",
+      (pattern: string) => {
+        expect(problem(pattern)).toContain(
+          'has fewer than two words after "docker"',
+        );
+      },
+    );
+
+    test("a * where the command goes", () => {
+      expect(problem("docker * web")).toContain(
+        "has a * where the command goes",
+      );
+    });
+
+    test("a read pre-approves nothing", () => {
+      expect(problem("docker ps -a")).toContain("is a read-only command");
+      expect(problem("docker ps *")).toContain("is a read-only command");
+    });
+
+    test("a denied command can never match", () => {
+      expect(problem("docker exec * sh")).toContain(
+        "can never match a command that runs",
+      );
+      expect(problem("docker exec * sh")).toContain(
+        "docker exec is not allowed",
+      );
+    });
+
+    test("an entry for the wrong resource type", () => {
+      expect(problem("docker stop *", AiResourceType.CephCluster)).toContain(
+        "Ceph AI agent",
+      );
+    });
+
+    test("an unknown resource type", () => {
+      expect(problem("docker stop *", "Nope" as AiResourceType)).toContain(
+        "no command policy",
+      );
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe("describeAllowlistProblems", () => {
+    test("a valid list", () => {
+      expect(
+        ResourceCommandPolicy.describeAllowlistProblems({
+          resourceType: AiResourceType.DockerHost,
+          patterns: ["docker stop *", "docker restart web"],
+        }),
+      ).toBeNull();
+      expect(
+        ResourceCommandPolicy.describeAllowlistProblems({
+          resourceType: AiResourceType.DockerHost,
+          patterns: [],
+        }),
+      ).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    test.each([[null], ["docker stop *"], [{ 0: "docker stop *" }]])(
+      "%p is not a list",
+      (patterns: unknown) => {
+        expect(
+          ResourceCommandPolicy.describeAllowlistProblems({
+            resourceType: AiResourceType.DockerHost,
+            patterns,
+          }),
+        ).toBe("The allowlist must be a list of commands.");
+      },
+    );
+
+    test("more than 50 entries", () => {
+      const patterns: Array<string> = Array.from(
+        { length: 51 },
+        (_: unknown, i: number): string => {
+          return `docker stop web-${i}`;
+        },
+      );
+
+      expect(
+        ResourceCommandPolicy.describeAllowlistProblems({
+          resourceType: AiResourceType.DockerHost,
+          patterns,
+        }),
+      ).toContain("at most 50 entries");
+      expect(
+        ResourceCommandPolicy.describeAllowlistProblems({
+          resourceType: AiResourceType.DockerHost,
+          patterns: patterns.slice(0, 50),
+        }),
+      ).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    test("names the first bad entry", () => {
+      expect(
+        ResourceCommandPolicy.describeAllowlistProblems({
+          resourceType: AiResourceType.DockerHost,
+          patterns: ["docker stop *", "docker ps -a", "docker exec * sh"],
+        }),
+      ).toContain('"docker ps -a" is a read-only command');
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe("matchesAllowlist", () => {
+    function matches(command: string, patterns: Array<string>): boolean {
+      return ResourceCommandPolicy.matchesAllowlist({
+        resourceType: AiResourceType.DockerHost,
+        command,
+        patterns,
+      });
+    }
+
+    test("token by token, a whole-word * for one word", () => {
+      expect(matches("docker stop web", ["docker stop *"])).toBe(true);
+      expect(matches("docker stop web", ["docker stop web"])).toBe(true);
+      expect(matches("docker stop web", ["docker stop api"])).toBe(false);
+      expect(matches("docker stop web-1", ["docker stop web-*"])).toBe(false);
+      expect(
+        matches("docker update --memory 512 web", [
+          "docker update --memory * web",
+        ]),
+      ).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    test("quoting in the command and the pattern is read the same way", () => {
+      expect(matches("docker stop 'web'", ['docker stop "web"'])).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    test("an entry describeAllowlistPatternProblem refuses is skipped", () => {
+      // "docker ps *" would match word for word, but it is a read entry.
+      expect(matches("docker ps -a", ["docker ps *"])).toBe(false);
+      expect(matches("docker exec web sh", ["docker exec * sh"])).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    test("only the first 50 entries are read", () => {
+      const filler: Array<string> = Array.from(
+        { length: 50 },
+        (_: unknown, i: number): string => {
+          return `docker stop filler-${i}`;
+        },
+      );
+
+      expect(matches("docker stop web", [...filler, "docker stop web"])).toBe(
+        false,
+      );
+      expect(
+        matches("docker stop web", [...filler.slice(1), "docker stop web"]),
+      ).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    test("garbage never matches", () => {
+      expect(matches("docker stop web | x", ["docker stop *"])).toBe(false);
+      expect(matches("", ["docker stop *"])).toBe(false);
+      expect(
+        ResourceCommandPolicy.matchesAllowlist({
+          resourceType: AiResourceType.DockerHost,
+          command: "docker stop web",
+          patterns: null as unknown as Array<string>,
+        }),
+      ).toBe(false);
+      expect(
+        matches("docker stop web", [
+          7 as unknown as string,
+          null as unknown as string,
+        ]),
+      ).toBe(false);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe("isBroadAllowlistPattern", () => {
+    function broad(
+      pattern: unknown,
+      resourceType: AiResourceType = AiResourceType.DockerHost,
+    ): boolean {
+      return ResourceCommandPolicy.isBroadAllowlistPattern({
+        resourceType,
+        pattern,
+      });
+    }
+
+    test("a * that stands for the target is broad", () => {
+      expect(broad("docker stop *")).toBe(true);
+      expect(broad("docker update --memory 512 *")).toBe(true);
+      expect(broad("ceph osd out *", AiResourceType.CephCluster)).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    test("a * that stands for a value, not a target, is not broad", () => {
+      expect(broad("docker update --memory * web")).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    test("an entry without a * is not broad", () => {
+      expect(broad("docker stop web")).toBe(false);
+      expect(broad("docker system prune")).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    test("an invalid entry is never broad", () => {
+      expect(broad("docker ps *")).toBe(false);
+      expect(broad("docker exec * sh")).toBe(false);
+      expect(broad("")).toBe(false);
+      expect(broad(null)).toBe(false);
+      expect(broad("docker stop *", AiResourceType.CephCluster)).toBe(false);
+    });
+  });
+});
+
+describe("getWriteScopeRefusal", () => {
+  function scope(
+    result: Partial<ResourceCommandPolicyResult>,
+    posture: {
+      allowWrites?: boolean;
+      writeTargets?: Array<string>;
+      protectedTargets?: Array<string>;
+      resourceType?: AiResourceType;
+    } = {},
+  ): string | null {
+    return ResourceCommandPolicy.getWriteScopeRefusal({
+      result: {
+        tier: ResourceCommandTier.SafeWrite,
+        reason: "restarts one container",
+        program: "docker",
+        args: ["restart", "web"],
+        verb: "restart",
+        displayCommand: "docker restart web",
+        targets: ["web"],
+        ...result,
+      },
+      allowWrites: posture.allowWrites ?? true,
+      writeTargets: posture.writeTargets ?? [],
+      protectedTargets: posture.protectedTargets ?? [],
+      resourceType: posture.resourceType ?? AiResourceType.DockerHost,
+    });
+  }
+
+  test("a read is never refused, even by a read-only agent", () => {
+    expect(
+      scope(
+        { tier: ResourceCommandTier.Read, targets: [] },
+        { allowWrites: false, writeTargets: ["nothing"] },
+      ),
+    ).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  test("a write the scope allows", () => {
+    expect(scope({})).toBeNull();
+    expect(scope({ tier: ResourceCommandTier.RiskyWrite })).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  test("a Denied command is refused", () => {
+    expect(
+      scope({ tier: ResourceCommandTier.Denied, reason: "exec is denied" }),
+    ).toContain("exec is denied");
+  });
+
+  test("an unknown tier is refused", () => {
+    expect(scope({ tier: "Mystery" as ResourceCommandTier })).not.toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  test("a missing result is refused", () => {
+    expect(
+      ResourceCommandPolicy.getWriteScopeRefusal({
+        result: null as unknown as ResourceCommandPolicyResult,
+        allowWrites: true,
+        writeTargets: [],
+        protectedTargets: [],
+        resourceType: AiResourceType.DockerHost,
+      }),
+    ).not.toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  test.each(
+    ALL_AI_RESOURCE_TYPES.map((type: AiResourceType) => {
+      return [type];
+    }),
+  )(
+    "a read-only %s agent refuses every write and names ONEUPTIME_AI_ALLOW_WRITES",
+    (type: AiResourceType) => {
+      const refusal: string | null = scope(
+        {},
+        { allowWrites: false, resourceType: type },
+      );
+
+      expect(refusal).toContain("ONEUPTIME_AI_ALLOW_WRITES=true");
+      expect(refusal).toContain(AI_RESOURCE_TYPE_INFO[type].agentDisplayName);
+      expect(refusal).toContain("read-only");
+      expect(refusal).toContain("docker restart web");
+    },
+  );
+
+  test("only a literal true allows writes", () => {
+    expect(
+      ResourceCommandPolicy.getWriteScopeRefusal({
+        result: {
+          tier: ResourceCommandTier.SafeWrite,
+          reason: "r",
+          program: "docker",
+          args: [],
+          verb: "",
+          displayCommand: "docker restart web",
+          targets: ["web"],
+        },
+        allowWrites: "true" as unknown as boolean,
+        writeTargets: [],
+        protectedTargets: [],
+        resourceType: AiResourceType.DockerHost,
+      }),
+    ).toContain("ONEUPTIME_AI_ALLOW_WRITES");
+  });
+
+  describe("protected targets", () => {
+    test.each([
+      ["oneuptime-ai-agent", "oneuptime-ai-agent"],
+      ["ONEUPTIME-AI-AGENT", "oneuptime-ai-agent"],
+      ["/oneuptime-ai-agent", "oneuptime-ai-agent"],
+      ["oneuptime-ai-agent", "/oneuptime-ai-agent"],
+      ["oneuptime-collector", "oneuptime-*"],
+      ["3f2a", "3f2a9c1b7d4e5f60"],
+      ["3f2a9c1b7d4e5f60", "3f2a9c1b7d4e5f60"],
+      ["oneuptime-ai-agent.service", "oneuptime-ai-agent.service"],
+    ])(
+      "%p names the protected %p",
+      (target: string, protectedTarget: string) => {
+        const refusal: string | null = scope(
+          { targets: [target] },
+          { protectedTargets: [protectedTarget] },
+        );
+
+        expect(refusal).toContain("protects");
+        expect(refusal).toContain(target);
+      },
+    );
+
+    test.each([
+      ["web", "oneuptime-ai-agent"],
+      ["3f2b", "3f2a9c1b7d4e5f60"],
+      ["abc", "abc-agent"],
+      // A short protected name is not an id, so a hex target is not its prefix.
+      ["ab", "abcdef"],
+      ["oneuptime", "oneuptime-ai-agent"],
+    ])(
+      "%p is not the protected %p",
+      (target: string, protectedTarget: string) => {
+        expect(
+          scope({ targets: [target] }, { protectedTargets: [protectedTarget] }),
+        ).toBeNull();
+      },
+    );
+
+    test("protection beats the write targets allowlist", () => {
+      expect(
+        scope(
+          { targets: ["oneuptime-ai-agent"] },
+          {
+            writeTargets: ["*"],
+            protectedTargets: ["oneuptime-ai-agent"],
+          },
+        ),
+      ).toContain("protects");
+    });
+
+    test("every target is checked, not just the first", () => {
+      expect(
+        scope(
+          { targets: ["web", "oneuptime-ai-agent"] },
+          { protectedTargets: ["oneuptime-ai-agent"] },
+        ),
+      ).toContain("oneuptime-ai-agent");
+    });
+
+    test("blank and non-string protected entries are ignored", () => {
+      expect(
+        scope(
+          { targets: ["web"] },
+          {
+            protectedTargets: ["", "  ", 7 as unknown as string],
+          },
+        ),
+      ).toBeNull();
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe("ONEUPTIME_AI_WRITE_TARGETS", () => {
+    test("targets inside the globs are allowed", () => {
+      expect(
+        scope({ targets: ["web-1"] }, { writeTargets: ["web-*", "api"] }),
+      ).toBeNull();
+      expect(
+        scope(
+          { targets: ["api", "web-2"] },
+          { writeTargets: ["web-*", "api"] },
+        ),
+      ).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    test("a target outside the globs is refused and names the variable", () => {
+      const refusal: string | null = scope(
+        { targets: ["web-1", "db"] },
+        { writeTargets: ["web-*"] },
+      );
+
+      expect(refusal).toContain("db");
+      expect(refusal).toContain("ONEUPTIME_AI_WRITE_TARGETS=web-*");
+      expect(refusal).toContain("Docker AI agent");
+    });
+
+    test("the globs are case-sensitive (narrower is safer)", () => {
+      expect(
+        scope({ targets: ["Web-1"] }, { writeTargets: ["web-*"] }),
+      ).not.toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    test("a write that names no target is refused when the targets are limited", () => {
+      expect(
+        scope(
+          { targets: [], tier: ResourceCommandTier.RiskyWrite },
+          { writeTargets: ["web-*"] },
+        ),
+      ).toContain("does not name the objects it changes");
+    });
+
+    test("a write that names no target is allowed when the targets are not limited", () => {
+      expect(scope({ targets: [] })).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    test("blank entries do not count as a limit", () => {
+      expect(
+        scope({ targets: ["anything"] }, { writeTargets: ["", "  "] }),
+      ).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    test("blank targets are ignored rather than matched", () => {
+      expect(
+        scope({ targets: ["", "web-1"] }, { writeTargets: ["web-*"] }),
+      ).toBeNull();
+    });
+  });
+});
+
+describe("command guides", () => {
+  test("come from the type's tool policy", () => {
+    useFakeTools();
+
+    expect(
+      ResourceCommandPolicy.getReadCommandGuide(AiResourceType.DockerHost),
+    ).toBe("- docker ps");
+    expect(
+      ResourceCommandPolicy.getWriteCommandGuide(AiResourceType.CephCluster),
+    ).toBe("- ceph osd out ID (risky)");
+  });
+
+  test.each(
+    ALL_AI_RESOURCE_TYPES.map((type: AiResourceType) => {
+      return [type];
+    }),
+  )("%s has non-empty markdown bullet guides", (type: AiResourceType) => {
+    for (const guide of [
+      ResourceCommandPolicy.getReadCommandGuide(type),
+      ResourceCommandPolicy.getWriteCommandGuide(type),
+    ]) {
+      expect(guide.trim().length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+      expect(guide.trimStart().startsWith("- ")).toBe(true);
+    }
+  });
+
+  test("an unknown type says it is unavailable", () => {
+    expect(
+      ResourceCommandPolicy.getReadCommandGuide("Nope" as AiResourceType),
+    ).toContain("Unavailable");
+  });
+});
+
+/*
+ * The allowlist checks with the real tool policies: a `*` is tried with the
+ * generic stand-ins AND the words the tool's own grammar accepts, and an
+ * entry is broad only when the word in place of a `*` changes what the write
+ * touches — never because a stand-in happens to appear inside a target.
+ */
+describe("allowlist stand-ins with the real tool policies", () => {
+  test.each([
+    [AiResourceType.CephCluster, "ceph orch daemon stop *"],
+    [AiResourceType.CephCluster, "ceph pg repair *"],
+    [AiResourceType.CephCluster, "ceph osd reweight * *"],
+    [AiResourceType.CephCluster, "ceph osd set *"],
+    [AiResourceType.DockerHost, "docker stop *"],
+    [AiResourceType.Host, "systemctl stop *"],
+    [AiResourceType.DatabaseServer, "db terminate-session *"],
+    [AiResourceType.VMwareVCenter, "govc vm.power -off *"],
+  ])("%s: %s is a valid entry", (type: AiResourceType, pattern: string) => {
+    expect(
+      ResourceCommandPolicy.describeAllowlistPatternProblem({
+        resourceType: type,
+        pattern,
+      }),
+    ).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  test.each([
+    [AiResourceType.CephCluster, "ceph orch daemon stop *"],
+    [AiResourceType.CephCluster, "ceph pg repair *"],
+    [AiResourceType.CephCluster, "ceph osd reweight * *"],
+    [AiResourceType.DockerHost, "docker stop *"],
+    [AiResourceType.Host, "systemctl stop *"],
+    [AiResourceType.DatabaseServer, "db terminate-session *"],
+    [AiResourceType.VMwareVCenter, "govc vm.power -off *"],
+  ])(
+    "%s: %s names any target, so it is broad",
+    (type: AiResourceType, pattern: string) => {
+      expect(
+        ResourceCommandPolicy.isBroadAllowlistPattern({
+          resourceType: type,
+          pattern,
+        }),
+      ).toBe(true);
+    },
+  );
+
+  test.each([
+    // The stand-in "1" appears inside the VMID 101 — that is not a `*` target.
+    [
+      AiResourceType.ProxmoxCluster,
+      "pvesh create /nodes/pve1/qemu/101/status/shutdown --timeout *",
+    ],
+    [AiResourceType.DockerHost, "docker stop -t * web"],
+    // The flag is a value of a cluster-wide change: the target stays "cluster".
+    [AiResourceType.CephCluster, "ceph osd set *"],
+    [AiResourceType.CephCluster, "ceph osd out 3"],
+    [
+      AiResourceType.ProxmoxCluster,
+      "pvesh create /nodes/pve1/qemu/101/status/stop",
+    ],
+  ])(
+    "%s: %s names its target, so it is not broad",
+    (type: AiResourceType, pattern: string) => {
+      expect(
+        ResourceCommandPolicy.isBroadAllowlistPattern({
+          resourceType: type,
+          pattern,
+        }),
+      ).toBe(false);
+    },
+  );
+
+  test("checking a whole allowlist of many-`*` entries stays fast", () => {
+    const patterns: Array<string> = Array.from({ length: 50 }, (): string => {
+      return "ceph osd reweight * *";
+    });
+    const started: number = Date.now();
+
+    expect(
+      ResourceCommandPolicy.describeAllowlistProblems({
+        resourceType: AiResourceType.CephCluster,
+        patterns,
+      }),
+    ).toBeNull();
+    expect(Date.now() - started).toBeLessThan(5000);
+  });
+});