@oneuptime/common 12.0.7 → 12.0.9

package/Models/DatabaseModels/UserNotificationRule.ts

@@ -27,12 +27,76 @@ import ObjectID from "../../Types/ObjectID";
 import Permission from "../../Types/Permission";
 import { Column, Entity, Index, JoinColumn, ManyToOne } from "typeorm";
 
+/*
+ * Who, other than the owner, may look at a member's paging configuration, and
+ * who may repair it. Named once and spread everywhere so the table-level gate
+ * and the per-column gates cannot drift apart - a column quietly narrower than
+ * its table is how a required field becomes unwritable by the very permission
+ * that was supposed to be able to write it.
+ */
+const ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS: Array<Permission> = [
+  Permission.ProjectOwner,
+  Permission.ProjectAdmin,
+  Permission.ReadProjectUserNotificationRule,
+];
+
+const ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS: Array<Permission> = [
+  Permission.ProjectOwner,
+  Permission.ProjectAdmin,
+  Permission.EditProjectUserNotificationRule,
+];
+
+/*
+ * Two audiences, one table, and the difference between them is decided by which
+ * permission let the caller through rather than by two different endpoints.
+ *
+ * Permission.CurrentUser stays first in every list and
+ * @CurrentUserCanAccessRecordBy("userId") stays on the class, because together
+ * they are what keeps an ordinary member scoped. TenantPermission
+ * .isAccessGrantedOnlyByCurrentUser intersects what the caller holds with what
+ * the model accepts: a plain member matches nothing here but the auto-granted
+ * CurrentUser, so addCurrentUserScopeToQuery rewrites their query to
+ * `userId = me` and rejects outright any attempt to name somebody else. Adding
+ * the admin entries below does not weaken that - a member holds none of them,
+ * so their intersection is unchanged.
+ *
+ * For a caller who DOES hold one of them the intersection is no longer
+ * CurrentUser alone, the ownership predicate is not applied, and they can read
+ * and repair another member's rules. TeamMember already carries exactly this
+ * combination and behaves the same way, which is the reason to reuse the
+ * mechanism here rather than invent a second one.
+ *
+ * That capability is the entire point of this table being reachable by an
+ * administrator at all. An on-call policy can say "page the engineer on duty",
+ * but whether that page arrives is decided by rows in THIS table, and until now
+ * nobody but the engineer themselves could see them. A member with no matching
+ * rule was silently unpageable, and the only person able to notice was the
+ * person who was not being notified.
+ *
+ * ProjectOwner and ProjectAdmin are listed ALONGSIDE the granular permissions,
+ * not instead of them, and that is load-bearing rather than belt-and-braces.
+ * Existing project teams are seeded with ROLES only, so a brand-new granular
+ * permission is held by literally nobody on the day it ships; a list containing
+ * only EditProjectUserNotificationRule would leave the feature dead on arrival
+ * for every project that already exists.
+ *
+ * Note the asymmetry with the seven notification-method models this rule points
+ * at (UserEmail, UserSMS, UserCall, UserPush, UserWhatsApp, UserTelegram,
+ * UserWebhook). There, only `read` is widened. An administrator may see which
+ * methods a member has and repair the rules that route to them, but may never
+ * create or edit a method on somebody else's behalf. Letting them would hand
+ * any administrator a paging-hijack primitive - add a phone number or webhook
+ * you control, point the victim's rules at it, and their pages arrive at your
+ * device - and it would not even solve the problem it appears to solve, because
+ * a member with no methods needs to verify a device THEY own. The lever for
+ * that case is a reminder, not a keyboard.
+ */
 @TenantColumn("projectId")
 @TableAccessControl({
-  create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-  read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-  delete: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-  update: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+  create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+  read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
+  delete: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+  update: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
 })
 @CrudApiEndpoint(new Route("/user-notification-rule"))
 @Entity({
@@ -47,9 +111,15 @@ import { Column, Entity, Index, JoinColumn, ManyToOne } from "typeorm";
 })
 @CurrentUserCanAccessRecordBy("userId")
 class UserNotificationRule extends BaseModel {
+  /*
+   * Writable at create, readable by an administrator, and permanently frozen
+   * afterwards - see the essay on `userId` below, which applies to this column
+   * for the same reason. A rule that could be moved between projects would
+   * escape the tenant scope it was created under.
+   */
   @ColumnAccessControl({
-    create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-    read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+    create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+    read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
     update: [],
   })
   @TableColumn({
@@ -73,9 +143,13 @@ class UserNotificationRule extends BaseModel {
   @JoinColumn({ name: "projectId" })
   public project?: Project = undefined;
 
+  /*
+   * update: [] - deliberately, and not merely inherited from the shape this
+   * model had before administrators could touch it. See `userId`.
+   */
   @ColumnAccessControl({
-    create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-    read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+    create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+    read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
     update: [],
   })
   @Index()
@@ -94,9 +168,17 @@ class UserNotificationRule extends BaseModel {
   })
   public projectId?: ObjectID = undefined;
 
+  /*
+   * The rule type, together with the severity relations further down, is the
+   * ADDRESS of this rule - the cell in the grid it occupies. Changing it would
+   * silently move a rule from one cell to another, which reads as an edit but
+   * behaves as a delete plus a create, so it stays create-only for everybody.
+   * An administrator repairing a member's setup adds and removes rules; they do
+   * not slide an existing one sideways.
+   */
   @ColumnAccessControl({
-    create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-    read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+    create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+    read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
     update: [],
   })
   @TableColumn({
@@ -115,9 +197,17 @@ class UserNotificationRule extends BaseModel {
   })
   public ruleType?: NotificationRuleType = undefined;
 
+  /*
+   * The relation spelling of the ownership column. It is `update: []` for the
+   * same reason `userId` is, and it has to be stated separately because the two
+   * are different decorated members over one physical column: an update
+   * expressed as `user: { _id }` is resolved by TypeORM to the same join column
+   * that `userId` writes. Closing one spelling and leaving the other open would
+   * close nothing at all.
+   */
   @ColumnAccessControl({
-    create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-    read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+    create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+    read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
     update: [],
   })
   @TableColumn({
@@ -141,9 +231,40 @@ class UserNotificationRule extends BaseModel {
   @JoinColumn({ name: "userId" })
   public user?: User = undefined;
 
+  /*
+   * READ THIS BEFORE WIDENING `update` HERE.
+   *
+   * This column is the ownership column - the one @CurrentUserCanAccessRecordBy
+   * points at, and therefore the one that decides whose pages this rule is
+   * consulted for. It is writable at CREATE, because provisioning a rule on
+   * behalf of a member who has none is the entire point of the administrator
+   * capability; it is writable at UPDATE by nobody, including the
+   * administrators who may otherwise rewrite every other field on the row.
+   *
+   * The temptation to mirror the widened lists onto this column is strong and
+   * wrong. An administrator who can re-point an EXISTING rule's userId does not
+   * gain a convenience, they gain a paging hijack: take a rule that already
+   * points at their own verified phone, move its userId to a colleague, and the
+   * colleague's pages now ring the administrator's handset - or take the
+   * colleague's rule and hand it to themselves. Nothing about that is
+   * distinguishable from a legitimate edit at the row level, and it is exactly
+   * the hole the create-side ownership gate was written to close
+   * (Common/Server/Types/Database/Permissions/CreatePermission.ts), reopened
+   * through a different verb.
+   *
+   * Create is safe by comparison only because it is guarded: the create gate
+   * defers to a real role permission rather than stamping the caller, and the
+   * service layer verifies that the supplied userId is a member of
+   * props.tenantId before the row is written. A rule pointed at a stranger from
+   * another project is refused there, not here.
+   *
+   * The correct way for an administrator to move a rule to a different member is
+   * to delete it and create another. That leaves two audit events instead of a
+   * silent mutation, which is the behaviour we want.
+   */
   @ColumnAccessControl({
-    create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-    read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+    create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+    read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
     update: [],
   })
   @TableColumn({
@@ -160,9 +281,16 @@ class UserNotificationRule extends BaseModel {
   @Index()
   public userId?: ObjectID = undefined;
 
+  /*
+   * Read is widened but create is not, because this column is stamped
+   * server-side from props.userId after the permission checks have run and is
+   * never accepted from a request body. Widening the read matters for a reason
+   * beyond completeness: it is what lets a member see that a rule on their own
+   * account was written by an administrator rather than by themselves.
+   */
   @ColumnAccessControl({
     create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-    read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+    read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
     update: [],
   })
   @TableColumn({
@@ -189,7 +317,7 @@ class UserNotificationRule extends BaseModel {
 
   @ColumnAccessControl({
     create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-    read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+    read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
     update: [],
   })
   @TableColumn({
@@ -253,8 +381,64 @@ class UserNotificationRule extends BaseModel {
   })
   public deletedByUserId?: ObjectID = undefined;
 
+  /*
+   * THE SEVEN METHOD RELATIONS BELOW ARE THE MOST DANGEROUS COLUMNS ON THIS
+   * MODEL. What follows applies to every one of them - userCall, userPush,
+   * userSms, userWhatsApp, userTelegram, userWebhook and userEmail, in both
+   * their relation and their `*Id` spelling - and is written out once here
+   * rather than fourteen times.
+   *
+   * A rule is a pair: the ownership column decides WHOSE pages select the row,
+   * and the method relation decides WHERE those pages are delivered. The two
+   * halves are read from different tables and nothing in the schema requires
+   * them to agree. A row owned by a victim and pointing at an administrator's
+   * own webhook or email is perfectly well-formed, and it silently redirects the
+   * victim's pages to the administrator's device. That is the whole hijack, and
+   * it needs no other bug to work.
+   *
+   * The `*Id` columns are open to UPDATE because repairing a member's routing is
+   * the capability this phase exists to provide: "your rules point at an email
+   * you never verified" is only actionable if somebody can re-point them at one
+   * the member did verify. But THIS ACCESS CONTROL LIST IS NOT WHAT MAKES THAT
+   * SAFE. A column list answers "may this caller write this column at all"; it
+   * never sees the VALUE being written, so it cannot tell a repair from a
+   * redirect.
+   *
+   * What makes it safe is a service-layer assertion: whenever one of these FKs
+   * is written, on create or on update, the referenced method row must belong to
+   * the same user as the rule's own userId - and on update that userId is
+   * re-read from the database rather than taken from the request body, because
+   * the body is exactly what an attacker controls. DO NOT REMOVE THAT ASSERTION
+   * BELIEVING THIS DECORATOR COVERS IT. It does not, and the failure is silent:
+   * everything keeps working, pages just start arriving somewhere else.
+   *
+   * The relation spellings stay `update: []` while the `*Id` spellings open.
+   * That is not an oversight. They are two decorated members over one physical
+   * join column, so leaving both writable would give the same hijack two
+   * different shapes to arrive in, and the ownership assertion would have to
+   * recognise both to be complete. One spelling in, one spelling out, and the
+   * check has exactly one form to validate.
+   */
+  /*
+   * READ IS OWNER-ONLY ON THE RELATION, EVEN THOUGH THIS TABLE IS ADMIN-READABLE.
+   *
+   * Widening the relation would re-open the exposure that reverting the seven
+   * method models was meant to close, by a different route. A read of this
+   * table is NOT pinned to the caller's own rows for an administrator - that is
+   * the whole point of the phase - and QueryPermission.checkRelationQueryPermission
+   * authorises each nested field with relatedModel.hasReadPermissions, a
+   * name-intersection in which Permission.CurrentUser is auto-granted to every
+   * authenticated caller. So `select: { userCall: { phone: true } }` on somebody
+   * else's rule would hand back their raw phone number with no row scope
+   * anywhere in the path.
+   *
+   * The FK below stays admin-readable: an id is not sensitive, and it is what
+   * correlates a rule with the masked entry in OnCallReadinessService's
+   * ReadinessMethod { methodId, methodType, maskedIdentifier, isVerified }.
+   * That masked payload is the administrator's sanctioned view of a method.
+   */
   @ColumnAccessControl({
-    create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+    create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
     read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
     update: [],
   })
@@ -279,10 +463,11 @@ class UserNotificationRule extends BaseModel {
   @JoinColumn({ name: "userCallId" })
   public userCall?: UserCall = undefined;
 
+  // Re-pointable by an administrator. Read the essay above `userCall` first.
   @ColumnAccessControl({
-    create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-    read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-    update: [],
+    create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+    read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
+    update: [...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
   })
   @Index()
   @TableColumn({
@@ -300,8 +485,26 @@ class UserNotificationRule extends BaseModel {
   })
   public userCallId?: ObjectID = undefined;
 
+  /*
+   * READ IS OWNER-ONLY ON THE RELATION, EVEN THOUGH THIS TABLE IS ADMIN-READABLE.
+   *
+   * Widening the relation would re-open the exposure that reverting the seven
+   * method models was meant to close, by a different route. A read of this
+   * table is NOT pinned to the caller's own rows for an administrator - that is
+   * the whole point of the phase - and QueryPermission.checkRelationQueryPermission
+   * authorises each nested field with relatedModel.hasReadPermissions, a
+   * name-intersection in which Permission.CurrentUser is auto-granted to every
+   * authenticated caller. So `select: { userPush: { deviceToken: true } }` on somebody
+   * else's rule would hand back their raw device token with no row scope
+   * anywhere in the path.
+   *
+   * The FK below stays admin-readable: an id is not sensitive, and it is what
+   * correlates a rule with the masked entry in OnCallReadinessService's
+   * ReadinessMethod { methodId, methodType, maskedIdentifier, isVerified }.
+   * That masked payload is the administrator's sanctioned view of a method.
+   */
   @ColumnAccessControl({
-    create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+    create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
     read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
     update: [],
   })
@@ -326,10 +529,11 @@ class UserNotificationRule extends BaseModel {
   @JoinColumn({ name: "userPushId" })
   public userPush?: UserPush = undefined;
 
+  // Re-pointable by an administrator. Read the essay above `userCall` first.
   @ColumnAccessControl({
-    create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-    read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-    update: [],
+    create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+    read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
+    update: [...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
   })
   @Index()
   @TableColumn({
@@ -347,8 +551,26 @@ class UserNotificationRule extends BaseModel {
   })
   public userPushId?: ObjectID = undefined;
 
+  /*
+   * READ IS OWNER-ONLY ON THE RELATION, EVEN THOUGH THIS TABLE IS ADMIN-READABLE.
+   *
+   * Widening the relation would re-open the exposure that reverting the seven
+   * method models was meant to close, by a different route. A read of this
+   * table is NOT pinned to the caller's own rows for an administrator - that is
+   * the whole point of the phase - and QueryPermission.checkRelationQueryPermission
+   * authorises each nested field with relatedModel.hasReadPermissions, a
+   * name-intersection in which Permission.CurrentUser is auto-granted to every
+   * authenticated caller. So `select: { userSms: { phone: true } }` on somebody
+   * else's rule would hand back their raw phone number with no row scope
+   * anywhere in the path.
+   *
+   * The FK below stays admin-readable: an id is not sensitive, and it is what
+   * correlates a rule with the masked entry in OnCallReadinessService's
+   * ReadinessMethod { methodId, methodType, maskedIdentifier, isVerified }.
+   * That masked payload is the administrator's sanctioned view of a method.
+   */
   @ColumnAccessControl({
-    create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+    create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
     read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
     update: [],
   })
@@ -373,10 +595,11 @@ class UserNotificationRule extends BaseModel {
   @JoinColumn({ name: "userSmsId" })
   public userSms?: UserSMS = undefined;
 
+  // Re-pointable by an administrator. Read the essay above `userCall` first.
   @ColumnAccessControl({
-    create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-    read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-    update: [],
+    create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+    read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
+    update: [...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
   })
   @Index()
   @TableColumn({
@@ -394,8 +617,26 @@ class UserNotificationRule extends BaseModel {
   })
   public userSmsId?: ObjectID = undefined;
 
+  /*
+   * READ IS OWNER-ONLY ON THE RELATION, EVEN THOUGH THIS TABLE IS ADMIN-READABLE.
+   *
+   * Widening the relation would re-open the exposure that reverting the seven
+   * method models was meant to close, by a different route. A read of this
+   * table is NOT pinned to the caller's own rows for an administrator - that is
+   * the whole point of the phase - and QueryPermission.checkRelationQueryPermission
+   * authorises each nested field with relatedModel.hasReadPermissions, a
+   * name-intersection in which Permission.CurrentUser is auto-granted to every
+   * authenticated caller. So `select: { userWhatsApp: { phone: true } }` on somebody
+   * else's rule would hand back their raw phone number with no row scope
+   * anywhere in the path.
+   *
+   * The FK below stays admin-readable: an id is not sensitive, and it is what
+   * correlates a rule with the masked entry in OnCallReadinessService's
+   * ReadinessMethod { methodId, methodType, maskedIdentifier, isVerified }.
+   * That masked payload is the administrator's sanctioned view of a method.
+   */
   @ColumnAccessControl({
-    create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+    create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
     read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
     update: [],
   })
@@ -421,10 +662,11 @@ class UserNotificationRule extends BaseModel {
   @JoinColumn({ name: "userWhatsAppId" })
   public userWhatsApp?: UserWhatsApp = undefined;
 
+  // Re-pointable by an administrator. Read the essay above `userCall` first.
   @ColumnAccessControl({
-    create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-    read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-    update: [],
+    create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+    read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
+    update: [...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
   })
   @Index()
   @TableColumn({
@@ -442,8 +684,26 @@ class UserNotificationRule extends BaseModel {
   })
   public userWhatsAppId?: ObjectID = undefined;
 
+  /*
+   * READ IS OWNER-ONLY ON THE RELATION, EVEN THOUGH THIS TABLE IS ADMIN-READABLE.
+   *
+   * Widening the relation would re-open the exposure that reverting the seven
+   * method models was meant to close, by a different route. A read of this
+   * table is NOT pinned to the caller's own rows for an administrator - that is
+   * the whole point of the phase - and QueryPermission.checkRelationQueryPermission
+   * authorises each nested field with relatedModel.hasReadPermissions, a
+   * name-intersection in which Permission.CurrentUser is auto-granted to every
+   * authenticated caller. So `select: { userTelegram: { telegramChatId: true } }` on somebody
+   * else's rule would hand back their raw Telegram chat id with no row scope
+   * anywhere in the path.
+   *
+   * The FK below stays admin-readable: an id is not sensitive, and it is what
+   * correlates a rule with the masked entry in OnCallReadinessService's
+   * ReadinessMethod { methodId, methodType, maskedIdentifier, isVerified }.
+   * That masked payload is the administrator's sanctioned view of a method.
+   */
   @ColumnAccessControl({
-    create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+    create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
     read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
     update: [],
   })
@@ -469,10 +729,11 @@ class UserNotificationRule extends BaseModel {
   @JoinColumn({ name: "userTelegramId" })
   public userTelegram?: UserTelegram = undefined;
 
+  // Re-pointable by an administrator. Read the essay above `userCall` first.
   @ColumnAccessControl({
-    create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-    read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-    update: [],
+    create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+    read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
+    update: [...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
   })
   @Index()
   @TableColumn({
@@ -490,8 +751,26 @@ class UserNotificationRule extends BaseModel {
   })
   public userTelegramId?: ObjectID = undefined;
 
+  /*
+   * READ IS OWNER-ONLY ON THE RELATION, EVEN THOUGH THIS TABLE IS ADMIN-READABLE.
+   *
+   * Widening the relation would re-open the exposure that reverting the seven
+   * method models was meant to close, by a different route. A read of this
+   * table is NOT pinned to the caller's own rows for an administrator - that is
+   * the whole point of the phase - and QueryPermission.checkRelationQueryPermission
+   * authorises each nested field with relatedModel.hasReadPermissions, a
+   * name-intersection in which Permission.CurrentUser is auto-granted to every
+   * authenticated caller. So `select: { userWebhook: { webhookUrl: true } }` on somebody
+   * else's rule would hand back their raw webhook URL with no row scope
+   * anywhere in the path.
+   *
+   * The FK below stays admin-readable: an id is not sensitive, and it is what
+   * correlates a rule with the masked entry in OnCallReadinessService's
+   * ReadinessMethod { methodId, methodType, maskedIdentifier, isVerified }.
+   * That masked payload is the administrator's sanctioned view of a method.
+   */
   @ColumnAccessControl({
-    create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+    create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
     read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
     update: [],
   })
@@ -517,10 +796,11 @@ class UserNotificationRule extends BaseModel {
   @JoinColumn({ name: "userWebhookId" })
   public userWebhook?: UserWebhook = undefined;
 
+  // Re-pointable by an administrator. Read the essay above `userCall` first.
   @ColumnAccessControl({
-    create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-    read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-    update: [],
+    create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+    read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
+    update: [...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
   })
   @Index()
   @TableColumn({
@@ -538,8 +818,26 @@ class UserNotificationRule extends BaseModel {
   })
   public userWebhookId?: ObjectID = undefined;
 
+  /*
+   * READ IS OWNER-ONLY ON THE RELATION, EVEN THOUGH THIS TABLE IS ADMIN-READABLE.
+   *
+   * Widening the relation would re-open the exposure that reverting the seven
+   * method models was meant to close, by a different route. A read of this
+   * table is NOT pinned to the caller's own rows for an administrator - that is
+   * the whole point of the phase - and QueryPermission.checkRelationQueryPermission
+   * authorises each nested field with relatedModel.hasReadPermissions, a
+   * name-intersection in which Permission.CurrentUser is auto-granted to every
+   * authenticated caller. So `select: { userEmail: { email: true } }` on somebody
+   * else's rule would hand back their raw email address with no row scope
+   * anywhere in the path.
+   *
+   * The FK below stays admin-readable: an id is not sensitive, and it is what
+   * correlates a rule with the masked entry in OnCallReadinessService's
+   * ReadinessMethod { methodId, methodType, maskedIdentifier, isVerified }.
+   * That masked payload is the administrator's sanctioned view of a method.
+   */
   @ColumnAccessControl({
-    create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+    create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
     read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
     update: [],
   })
@@ -564,10 +862,11 @@ class UserNotificationRule extends BaseModel {
   @JoinColumn({ name: "userEmailId" })
   public userEmail?: UserEmail = undefined;
 
+  // Re-pointable by an administrator. Read the essay above `userCall` first.
   @ColumnAccessControl({
-    create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-    read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-    update: [],
+    create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+    read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
+    update: [...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
   })
   @Index()
   @TableColumn({
@@ -585,10 +884,18 @@ class UserNotificationRule extends BaseModel {
   })
   public userEmailId?: ObjectID = undefined;
 
+  /*
+   * The escalation delay, and one of only two plain preference columns an
+   * administrator may rewrite. It is here rather than frozen because "you are
+   * on the escalation policy but your first rule waits thirty minutes" is a
+   * real, common misconfiguration, and correcting a number carries none of the
+   * redirect risk the method relations do - the page still goes to the same
+   * place, it just goes sooner.
+   */
   @ColumnAccessControl({
-    create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-    read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-    update: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+    create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+    read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
+    update: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
   })
   @Index()
   @TableColumn({
@@ -608,9 +915,12 @@ class UserNotificationRule extends BaseModel {
   })
   public notifyAfterMinutes?: number = undefined;
 
+  /*
+   * Part of the rule's address, like `ruleType` - create-only for everybody.
+   */
   @ColumnAccessControl({
-    create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-    read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+    create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+    read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
     update: [],
   })
   @TableColumn({
@@ -636,8 +946,8 @@ class UserNotificationRule extends BaseModel {
   public incidentSeverity?: IncidentSeverity = undefined;
 
   @ColumnAccessControl({
-    create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-    read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+    create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+    read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
     update: [],
   })
   @Index()
@@ -659,8 +969,8 @@ class UserNotificationRule extends BaseModel {
   // alert severity.
 
   @ColumnAccessControl({
-    create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-    read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+    create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+    read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
     update: [],
   })
   @TableColumn({
@@ -686,8 +996,8 @@ class UserNotificationRule extends BaseModel {
   public alertSeverity?: AlertSeverity = undefined;
 
   @ColumnAccessControl({
-    create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-    read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+    create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+    read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
     update: [],
   })
   @Index()
@@ -705,6 +1015,66 @@ class UserNotificationRule extends BaseModel {
     transformer: ObjectID.getDatabaseTransformer(),
   })
   public alertSeverityId?: ObjectID = undefined;
+
+  /*
+   * An opt-out row is a rule that exists in order to send nothing. It carries a
+   * `ruleType` and a severity exactly like a normal rule, sets `isOptOut` to true, and
+   * holds NO notification-method relation at all — there is no userEmail, userSms,
+   * userCall, userPush, userWhatsApp, userTelegram or userWebhook on it, and that
+   * absence is the point rather than a misconfiguration.
+   *
+   * It exists because "this user has zero rules matching this ruleType and severity" is
+   * otherwise two completely different situations wearing the same clothes. Almost
+   * always it means the user never configured anything for that cell — a severity added
+   * after they joined, an episode rule type they never opened the page for — and a page
+   * routed to them must still land somewhere. Occasionally it means the user genuinely
+   * asked not to be woken for that cell, and paging them anyway would be the bug.
+   *
+   * Before this column the runtime could not tell those apart, so it chose the safe-
+   * looking option and delivered nothing, which is how pages were being lost silently.
+   * Making deliberate silence expressible as a row is the precondition for the fallback:
+   * once "do not page me" has somewhere to live, the remaining zero-row cases can be
+   * treated as misconfiguration and rescued by notifying the user on whatever verified
+   * method they do have.
+   *
+   * Note the `update` permission below. Every column on this model except
+   * `notifyAfterMinutes` is `update: []`, so copying a neighbour's access control would
+   * have left this flag writable only at create time — a user could opt out but never
+   * opt back in without deleting and recreating the row. Muting and unmuting is exactly
+   * the kind of preference that gets toggled, so it is explicitly updatable by its owner.
+   *
+   * An administrator may toggle it too, and that deserves a word because it looks
+   * like the one place where the admin capability could be used to silence somebody.
+   * It could - but an administrator who wanted a colleague unpageable has a far
+   * blunter tool available in the same breath, which is to delete their rules
+   * outright, and that is a capability nobody proposes withholding. The reason
+   * this direction matters more is the opposite one: a member who opted out of a
+   * severity months ago and forgot is precisely the invisible gap this phase
+   * exists to close, and leaving an administrator able to SEE the opt-out but not
+   * lift it would stop one step short of the fix. Both directions are audited
+   * against props.userId, so a suppression an administrator made is attributable.
+   */
+  @ColumnAccessControl({
+    create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+    read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
+    update: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+  })
+  @TableColumn({
+    type: TableColumnType.Boolean,
+    required: false,
+    isDefaultValueColumn: true,
+    title: "Opt Out of Notifications",
+    description:
+      "When true, this rule deliberately suppresses notifications for its rule type and severity instead of delivering any. A rule with this set carries no notification method.",
+    defaultValue: false,
+    example: false,
+  })
+  @Column({
+    type: ColumnType.Boolean,
+    nullable: true,
+    default: false,
+  })
+  public isOptOut?: boolean = undefined;
 }
 
 export default UserNotificationRule;