@oneuptime/common 12.0.7 → 12.0.9

package/build/dist/Models/DatabaseModels/UserNotificationRule.js

@@ -35,44 +35,391 @@ import NotificationRuleType from "../../Types/NotificationRule/NotificationRuleT
 import ObjectID from "../../Types/ObjectID";
 import Permission from "../../Types/Permission";
 import { Column, Entity, Index, JoinColumn, ManyToOne } from "typeorm";
+/*
+ * Who, other than the owner, may look at a member's paging configuration, and
+ * who may repair it. Named once and spread everywhere so the table-level gate
+ * and the per-column gates cannot drift apart - a column quietly narrower than
+ * its table is how a required field becomes unwritable by the very permission
+ * that was supposed to be able to write it.
+ */
+const ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS = [
+    Permission.ProjectOwner,
+    Permission.ProjectAdmin,
+    Permission.ReadProjectUserNotificationRule,
+];
+const ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS = [
+    Permission.ProjectOwner,
+    Permission.ProjectAdmin,
+    Permission.EditProjectUserNotificationRule,
+];
+/*
+ * Two audiences, one table, and the difference between them is decided by which
+ * permission let the caller through rather than by two different endpoints.
+ *
+ * Permission.CurrentUser stays first in every list and
+ * @CurrentUserCanAccessRecordBy("userId") stays on the class, because together
+ * they are what keeps an ordinary member scoped. TenantPermission
+ * .isAccessGrantedOnlyByCurrentUser intersects what the caller holds with what
+ * the model accepts: a plain member matches nothing here but the auto-granted
+ * CurrentUser, so addCurrentUserScopeToQuery rewrites their query to
+ * `userId = me` and rejects outright any attempt to name somebody else. Adding
+ * the admin entries below does not weaken that - a member holds none of them,
+ * so their intersection is unchanged.
+ *
+ * For a caller who DOES hold one of them the intersection is no longer
+ * CurrentUser alone, the ownership predicate is not applied, and they can read
+ * and repair another member's rules. TeamMember already carries exactly this
+ * combination and behaves the same way, which is the reason to reuse the
+ * mechanism here rather than invent a second one.
+ *
+ * That capability is the entire point of this table being reachable by an
+ * administrator at all. An on-call policy can say "page the engineer on duty",
+ * but whether that page arrives is decided by rows in THIS table, and until now
+ * nobody but the engineer themselves could see them. A member with no matching
+ * rule was silently unpageable, and the only person able to notice was the
+ * person who was not being notified.
+ *
+ * ProjectOwner and ProjectAdmin are listed ALONGSIDE the granular permissions,
+ * not instead of them, and that is load-bearing rather than belt-and-braces.
+ * Existing project teams are seeded with ROLES only, so a brand-new granular
+ * permission is held by literally nobody on the day it ships; a list containing
+ * only EditProjectUserNotificationRule would leave the feature dead on arrival
+ * for every project that already exists.
+ *
+ * Note the asymmetry with the seven notification-method models this rule points
+ * at (UserEmail, UserSMS, UserCall, UserPush, UserWhatsApp, UserTelegram,
+ * UserWebhook). There, only `read` is widened. An administrator may see which
+ * methods a member has and repair the rules that route to them, but may never
+ * create or edit a method on somebody else's behalf. Letting them would hand
+ * any administrator a paging-hijack primitive - add a phone number or webhook
+ * you control, point the victim's rules at it, and their pages arrive at your
+ * device - and it would not even solve the problem it appears to solve, because
+ * a member with no methods needs to verify a device THEY own. The lever for
+ * that case is a reminder, not a keyboard.
+ */
 let UserNotificationRule = class UserNotificationRule extends BaseModel {
     constructor() {
         super(...arguments);
+        /*
+         * Writable at create, readable by an administrator, and permanently frozen
+         * afterwards - see the essay on `userId` below, which applies to this column
+         * for the same reason. A rule that could be moved between projects would
+         * escape the tenant scope it was created under.
+         */
         this.project = undefined;
+        /*
+         * update: [] - deliberately, and not merely inherited from the shape this
+         * model had before administrators could touch it. See `userId`.
+         */
         this.projectId = undefined;
+        /*
+         * The rule type, together with the severity relations further down, is the
+         * ADDRESS of this rule - the cell in the grid it occupies. Changing it would
+         * silently move a rule from one cell to another, which reads as an edit but
+         * behaves as a delete plus a create, so it stays create-only for everybody.
+         * An administrator repairing a member's setup adds and removes rules; they do
+         * not slide an existing one sideways.
+         */
         this.ruleType = undefined;
+        /*
+         * The relation spelling of the ownership column. It is `update: []` for the
+         * same reason `userId` is, and it has to be stated separately because the two
+         * are different decorated members over one physical column: an update
+         * expressed as `user: { _id }` is resolved by TypeORM to the same join column
+         * that `userId` writes. Closing one spelling and leaving the other open would
+         * close nothing at all.
+         */
         this.user = undefined;
+        /*
+         * READ THIS BEFORE WIDENING `update` HERE.
+         *
+         * This column is the ownership column - the one @CurrentUserCanAccessRecordBy
+         * points at, and therefore the one that decides whose pages this rule is
+         * consulted for. It is writable at CREATE, because provisioning a rule on
+         * behalf of a member who has none is the entire point of the administrator
+         * capability; it is writable at UPDATE by nobody, including the
+         * administrators who may otherwise rewrite every other field on the row.
+         *
+         * The temptation to mirror the widened lists onto this column is strong and
+         * wrong. An administrator who can re-point an EXISTING rule's userId does not
+         * gain a convenience, they gain a paging hijack: take a rule that already
+         * points at their own verified phone, move its userId to a colleague, and the
+         * colleague's pages now ring the administrator's handset - or take the
+         * colleague's rule and hand it to themselves. Nothing about that is
+         * distinguishable from a legitimate edit at the row level, and it is exactly
+         * the hole the create-side ownership gate was written to close
+         * (Common/Server/Types/Database/Permissions/CreatePermission.ts), reopened
+         * through a different verb.
+         *
+         * Create is safe by comparison only because it is guarded: the create gate
+         * defers to a real role permission rather than stamping the caller, and the
+         * service layer verifies that the supplied userId is a member of
+         * props.tenantId before the row is written. A rule pointed at a stranger from
+         * another project is refused there, not here.
+         *
+         * The correct way for an administrator to move a rule to a different member is
+         * to delete it and create another. That leaves two audit events instead of a
+         * silent mutation, which is the behaviour we want.
+         */
         this.userId = undefined;
+        /*
+         * Read is widened but create is not, because this column is stamped
+         * server-side from props.userId after the permission checks have run and is
+         * never accepted from a request body. Widening the read matters for a reason
+         * beyond completeness: it is what lets a member see that a rule on their own
+         * account was written by an administrator rather than by themselves.
+         */
         this.createdByUser = undefined;
         this.createdByUserId = undefined;
         this.deletedByUser = undefined;
         this.deletedByUserId = undefined;
+        /*
+         * THE SEVEN METHOD RELATIONS BELOW ARE THE MOST DANGEROUS COLUMNS ON THIS
+         * MODEL. What follows applies to every one of them - userCall, userPush,
+         * userSms, userWhatsApp, userTelegram, userWebhook and userEmail, in both
+         * their relation and their `*Id` spelling - and is written out once here
+         * rather than fourteen times.
+         *
+         * A rule is a pair: the ownership column decides WHOSE pages select the row,
+         * and the method relation decides WHERE those pages are delivered. The two
+         * halves are read from different tables and nothing in the schema requires
+         * them to agree. A row owned by a victim and pointing at an administrator's
+         * own webhook or email is perfectly well-formed, and it silently redirects the
+         * victim's pages to the administrator's device. That is the whole hijack, and
+         * it needs no other bug to work.
+         *
+         * The `*Id` columns are open to UPDATE because repairing a member's routing is
+         * the capability this phase exists to provide: "your rules point at an email
+         * you never verified" is only actionable if somebody can re-point them at one
+         * the member did verify. But THIS ACCESS CONTROL LIST IS NOT WHAT MAKES THAT
+         * SAFE. A column list answers "may this caller write this column at all"; it
+         * never sees the VALUE being written, so it cannot tell a repair from a
+         * redirect.
+         *
+         * What makes it safe is a service-layer assertion: whenever one of these FKs
+         * is written, on create or on update, the referenced method row must belong to
+         * the same user as the rule's own userId - and on update that userId is
+         * re-read from the database rather than taken from the request body, because
+         * the body is exactly what an attacker controls. DO NOT REMOVE THAT ASSERTION
+         * BELIEVING THIS DECORATOR COVERS IT. It does not, and the failure is silent:
+         * everything keeps working, pages just start arriving somewhere else.
+         *
+         * The relation spellings stay `update: []` while the `*Id` spellings open.
+         * That is not an oversight. They are two decorated members over one physical
+         * join column, so leaving both writable would give the same hijack two
+         * different shapes to arrive in, and the ownership assertion would have to
+         * recognise both to be complete. One spelling in, one spelling out, and the
+         * check has exactly one form to validate.
+         */
+        /*
+         * READ IS OWNER-ONLY ON THE RELATION, EVEN THOUGH THIS TABLE IS ADMIN-READABLE.
+         *
+         * Widening the relation would re-open the exposure that reverting the seven
+         * method models was meant to close, by a different route. A read of this
+         * table is NOT pinned to the caller's own rows for an administrator - that is
+         * the whole point of the phase - and QueryPermission.checkRelationQueryPermission
+         * authorises each nested field with relatedModel.hasReadPermissions, a
+         * name-intersection in which Permission.CurrentUser is auto-granted to every
+         * authenticated caller. So `select: { userCall: { phone: true } }` on somebody
+         * else's rule would hand back their raw phone number with no row scope
+         * anywhere in the path.
+         *
+         * The FK below stays admin-readable: an id is not sensitive, and it is what
+         * correlates a rule with the masked entry in OnCallReadinessService's
+         * ReadinessMethod { methodId, methodType, maskedIdentifier, isVerified }.
+         * That masked payload is the administrator's sanctioned view of a method.
+         */
         this.userCall = undefined;
+        // Re-pointable by an administrator. Read the essay above `userCall` first.
         this.userCallId = undefined;
+        /*
+         * READ IS OWNER-ONLY ON THE RELATION, EVEN THOUGH THIS TABLE IS ADMIN-READABLE.
+         *
+         * Widening the relation would re-open the exposure that reverting the seven
+         * method models was meant to close, by a different route. A read of this
+         * table is NOT pinned to the caller's own rows for an administrator - that is
+         * the whole point of the phase - and QueryPermission.checkRelationQueryPermission
+         * authorises each nested field with relatedModel.hasReadPermissions, a
+         * name-intersection in which Permission.CurrentUser is auto-granted to every
+         * authenticated caller. So `select: { userPush: { deviceToken: true } }` on somebody
+         * else's rule would hand back their raw device token with no row scope
+         * anywhere in the path.
+         *
+         * The FK below stays admin-readable: an id is not sensitive, and it is what
+         * correlates a rule with the masked entry in OnCallReadinessService's
+         * ReadinessMethod { methodId, methodType, maskedIdentifier, isVerified }.
+         * That masked payload is the administrator's sanctioned view of a method.
+         */
         this.userPush = undefined;
+        // Re-pointable by an administrator. Read the essay above `userCall` first.
         this.userPushId = undefined;
+        /*
+         * READ IS OWNER-ONLY ON THE RELATION, EVEN THOUGH THIS TABLE IS ADMIN-READABLE.
+         *
+         * Widening the relation would re-open the exposure that reverting the seven
+         * method models was meant to close, by a different route. A read of this
+         * table is NOT pinned to the caller's own rows for an administrator - that is
+         * the whole point of the phase - and QueryPermission.checkRelationQueryPermission
+         * authorises each nested field with relatedModel.hasReadPermissions, a
+         * name-intersection in which Permission.CurrentUser is auto-granted to every
+         * authenticated caller. So `select: { userSms: { phone: true } }` on somebody
+         * else's rule would hand back their raw phone number with no row scope
+         * anywhere in the path.
+         *
+         * The FK below stays admin-readable: an id is not sensitive, and it is what
+         * correlates a rule with the masked entry in OnCallReadinessService's
+         * ReadinessMethod { methodId, methodType, maskedIdentifier, isVerified }.
+         * That masked payload is the administrator's sanctioned view of a method.
+         */
         this.userSms = undefined;
+        // Re-pointable by an administrator. Read the essay above `userCall` first.
         this.userSmsId = undefined;
+        /*
+         * READ IS OWNER-ONLY ON THE RELATION, EVEN THOUGH THIS TABLE IS ADMIN-READABLE.
+         *
+         * Widening the relation would re-open the exposure that reverting the seven
+         * method models was meant to close, by a different route. A read of this
+         * table is NOT pinned to the caller's own rows for an administrator - that is
+         * the whole point of the phase - and QueryPermission.checkRelationQueryPermission
+         * authorises each nested field with relatedModel.hasReadPermissions, a
+         * name-intersection in which Permission.CurrentUser is auto-granted to every
+         * authenticated caller. So `select: { userWhatsApp: { phone: true } }` on somebody
+         * else's rule would hand back their raw phone number with no row scope
+         * anywhere in the path.
+         *
+         * The FK below stays admin-readable: an id is not sensitive, and it is what
+         * correlates a rule with the masked entry in OnCallReadinessService's
+         * ReadinessMethod { methodId, methodType, maskedIdentifier, isVerified }.
+         * That masked payload is the administrator's sanctioned view of a method.
+         */
         this.userWhatsApp = undefined;
+        // Re-pointable by an administrator. Read the essay above `userCall` first.
         this.userWhatsAppId = undefined;
+        /*
+         * READ IS OWNER-ONLY ON THE RELATION, EVEN THOUGH THIS TABLE IS ADMIN-READABLE.
+         *
+         * Widening the relation would re-open the exposure that reverting the seven
+         * method models was meant to close, by a different route. A read of this
+         * table is NOT pinned to the caller's own rows for an administrator - that is
+         * the whole point of the phase - and QueryPermission.checkRelationQueryPermission
+         * authorises each nested field with relatedModel.hasReadPermissions, a
+         * name-intersection in which Permission.CurrentUser is auto-granted to every
+         * authenticated caller. So `select: { userTelegram: { telegramChatId: true } }` on somebody
+         * else's rule would hand back their raw Telegram chat id with no row scope
+         * anywhere in the path.
+         *
+         * The FK below stays admin-readable: an id is not sensitive, and it is what
+         * correlates a rule with the masked entry in OnCallReadinessService's
+         * ReadinessMethod { methodId, methodType, maskedIdentifier, isVerified }.
+         * That masked payload is the administrator's sanctioned view of a method.
+         */
         this.userTelegram = undefined;
+        // Re-pointable by an administrator. Read the essay above `userCall` first.
         this.userTelegramId = undefined;
+        /*
+         * READ IS OWNER-ONLY ON THE RELATION, EVEN THOUGH THIS TABLE IS ADMIN-READABLE.
+         *
+         * Widening the relation would re-open the exposure that reverting the seven
+         * method models was meant to close, by a different route. A read of this
+         * table is NOT pinned to the caller's own rows for an administrator - that is
+         * the whole point of the phase - and QueryPermission.checkRelationQueryPermission
+         * authorises each nested field with relatedModel.hasReadPermissions, a
+         * name-intersection in which Permission.CurrentUser is auto-granted to every
+         * authenticated caller. So `select: { userWebhook: { webhookUrl: true } }` on somebody
+         * else's rule would hand back their raw webhook URL with no row scope
+         * anywhere in the path.
+         *
+         * The FK below stays admin-readable: an id is not sensitive, and it is what
+         * correlates a rule with the masked entry in OnCallReadinessService's
+         * ReadinessMethod { methodId, methodType, maskedIdentifier, isVerified }.
+         * That masked payload is the administrator's sanctioned view of a method.
+         */
         this.userWebhook = undefined;
+        // Re-pointable by an administrator. Read the essay above `userCall` first.
         this.userWebhookId = undefined;
+        /*
+         * READ IS OWNER-ONLY ON THE RELATION, EVEN THOUGH THIS TABLE IS ADMIN-READABLE.
+         *
+         * Widening the relation would re-open the exposure that reverting the seven
+         * method models was meant to close, by a different route. A read of this
+         * table is NOT pinned to the caller's own rows for an administrator - that is
+         * the whole point of the phase - and QueryPermission.checkRelationQueryPermission
+         * authorises each nested field with relatedModel.hasReadPermissions, a
+         * name-intersection in which Permission.CurrentUser is auto-granted to every
+         * authenticated caller. So `select: { userEmail: { email: true } }` on somebody
+         * else's rule would hand back their raw email address with no row scope
+         * anywhere in the path.
+         *
+         * The FK below stays admin-readable: an id is not sensitive, and it is what
+         * correlates a rule with the masked entry in OnCallReadinessService's
+         * ReadinessMethod { methodId, methodType, maskedIdentifier, isVerified }.
+         * That masked payload is the administrator's sanctioned view of a method.
+         */
         this.userEmail = undefined;
+        // Re-pointable by an administrator. Read the essay above `userCall` first.
         this.userEmailId = undefined;
+        /*
+         * The escalation delay, and one of only two plain preference columns an
+         * administrator may rewrite. It is here rather than frozen because "you are
+         * on the escalation policy but your first rule waits thirty minutes" is a
+         * real, common misconfiguration, and correcting a number carries none of the
+         * redirect risk the method relations do - the page still goes to the same
+         * place, it just goes sooner.
+         */
         this.notifyAfterMinutes = undefined;
+        /*
+         * Part of the rule's address, like `ruleType` - create-only for everybody.
+         */
         this.incidentSeverity = undefined;
         this.incidentSeverityId = undefined;
         // alert severity.
         this.alertSeverity = undefined;
         this.alertSeverityId = undefined;
+        /*
+         * An opt-out row is a rule that exists in order to send nothing. It carries a
+         * `ruleType` and a severity exactly like a normal rule, sets `isOptOut` to true, and
+         * holds NO notification-method relation at all — there is no userEmail, userSms,
+         * userCall, userPush, userWhatsApp, userTelegram or userWebhook on it, and that
+         * absence is the point rather than a misconfiguration.
+         *
+         * It exists because "this user has zero rules matching this ruleType and severity" is
+         * otherwise two completely different situations wearing the same clothes. Almost
+         * always it means the user never configured anything for that cell — a severity added
+         * after they joined, an episode rule type they never opened the page for — and a page
+         * routed to them must still land somewhere. Occasionally it means the user genuinely
+         * asked not to be woken for that cell, and paging them anyway would be the bug.
+         *
+         * Before this column the runtime could not tell those apart, so it chose the safe-
+         * looking option and delivered nothing, which is how pages were being lost silently.
+         * Making deliberate silence expressible as a row is the precondition for the fallback:
+         * once "do not page me" has somewhere to live, the remaining zero-row cases can be
+         * treated as misconfiguration and rescued by notifying the user on whatever verified
+         * method they do have.
+         *
+         * Note the `update` permission below. Every column on this model except
+         * `notifyAfterMinutes` is `update: []`, so copying a neighbour's access control would
+         * have left this flag writable only at create time — a user could opt out but never
+         * opt back in without deleting and recreating the row. Muting and unmuting is exactly
+         * the kind of preference that gets toggled, so it is explicitly updatable by its owner.
+         *
+         * An administrator may toggle it too, and that deserves a word because it looks
+         * like the one place where the admin capability could be used to silence somebody.
+         * It could - but an administrator who wanted a colleague unpageable has a far
+         * blunter tool available in the same breath, which is to delete their rules
+         * outright, and that is a capability nobody proposes withholding. The reason
+         * this direction matters more is the opposite one: a member who opted out of a
+         * severity months ago and forgot is precisely the invisible gap this phase
+         * exists to close, and leaving an administrator able to SEE the opt-out but not
+         * lift it would stop one step short of the fix. Both directions are audited
+         * against props.userId, so a suppression an administrator made is attributable.
+         */
+        this.isOptOut = undefined;
     }
 };
 __decorate([
     ColumnAccessControl({
-        create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-        read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+        create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+        read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
         update: [],
     }),
     TableColumn({
@@ -95,8 +442,8 @@ __decorate([
 ], UserNotificationRule.prototype, "project", void 0);
 __decorate([
     ColumnAccessControl({
-        create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-        read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+        create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+        read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
         update: [],
     }),
     Index(),
@@ -117,8 +464,8 @@ __decorate([
 ], UserNotificationRule.prototype, "projectId", void 0);
 __decorate([
     ColumnAccessControl({
-        create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-        read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+        create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+        read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
         update: [],
     }),
     TableColumn({
@@ -139,8 +486,8 @@ __decorate([
 ], UserNotificationRule.prototype, "ruleType", void 0);
 __decorate([
     ColumnAccessControl({
-        create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-        read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+        create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+        read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
         update: [],
     }),
     TableColumn({
@@ -163,8 +510,8 @@ __decorate([
 ], UserNotificationRule.prototype, "user", void 0);
 __decorate([
     ColumnAccessControl({
-        create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-        read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+        create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+        read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
         update: [],
     }),
     TableColumn({
@@ -184,7 +531,7 @@ __decorate([
 __decorate([
     ColumnAccessControl({
         create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-        read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+        read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
         update: [],
     }),
     TableColumn({
@@ -208,7 +555,7 @@ __decorate([
 __decorate([
     ColumnAccessControl({
         create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-        read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+        read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
         update: [],
     }),
     TableColumn({
@@ -270,7 +617,7 @@ __decorate([
 ], UserNotificationRule.prototype, "deletedByUserId", void 0);
 __decorate([
     ColumnAccessControl({
-        create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+        create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
         read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
         update: [],
     }),
@@ -294,9 +641,9 @@ __decorate([
 ], UserNotificationRule.prototype, "userCall", void 0);
 __decorate([
     ColumnAccessControl({
-        create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-        read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-        update: [],
+        create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+        read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
+        update: [...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
     }),
     Index(),
     TableColumn({
@@ -316,7 +663,7 @@ __decorate([
 ], UserNotificationRule.prototype, "userCallId", void 0);
 __decorate([
     ColumnAccessControl({
-        create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+        create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
         read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
         update: [],
     }),
@@ -340,9 +687,9 @@ __decorate([
 ], UserNotificationRule.prototype, "userPush", void 0);
 __decorate([
     ColumnAccessControl({
-        create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-        read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-        update: [],
+        create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+        read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
+        update: [...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
     }),
     Index(),
     TableColumn({
@@ -362,7 +709,7 @@ __decorate([
 ], UserNotificationRule.prototype, "userPushId", void 0);
 __decorate([
     ColumnAccessControl({
-        create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+        create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
         read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
         update: [],
     }),
@@ -386,9 +733,9 @@ __decorate([
 ], UserNotificationRule.prototype, "userSms", void 0);
 __decorate([
     ColumnAccessControl({
-        create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-        read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-        update: [],
+        create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+        read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
+        update: [...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
     }),
     Index(),
     TableColumn({
@@ -408,7 +755,7 @@ __decorate([
 ], UserNotificationRule.prototype, "userSmsId", void 0);
 __decorate([
     ColumnAccessControl({
-        create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+        create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
         read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
         update: [],
     }),
@@ -432,9 +779,9 @@ __decorate([
 ], UserNotificationRule.prototype, "userWhatsApp", void 0);
 __decorate([
     ColumnAccessControl({
-        create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-        read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-        update: [],
+        create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+        read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
+        update: [...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
     }),
     Index(),
     TableColumn({
@@ -454,7 +801,7 @@ __decorate([
 ], UserNotificationRule.prototype, "userWhatsAppId", void 0);
 __decorate([
     ColumnAccessControl({
-        create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+        create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
         read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
         update: [],
     }),
@@ -478,9 +825,9 @@ __decorate([
 ], UserNotificationRule.prototype, "userTelegram", void 0);
 __decorate([
     ColumnAccessControl({
-        create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-        read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-        update: [],
+        create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+        read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
+        update: [...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
     }),
     Index(),
     TableColumn({
@@ -500,7 +847,7 @@ __decorate([
 ], UserNotificationRule.prototype, "userTelegramId", void 0);
 __decorate([
     ColumnAccessControl({
-        create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+        create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
         read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
         update: [],
     }),
@@ -524,9 +871,9 @@ __decorate([
 ], UserNotificationRule.prototype, "userWebhook", void 0);
 __decorate([
     ColumnAccessControl({
-        create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-        read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-        update: [],
+        create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+        read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
+        update: [...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
     }),
     Index(),
     TableColumn({
@@ -546,7 +893,7 @@ __decorate([
 ], UserNotificationRule.prototype, "userWebhookId", void 0);
 __decorate([
     ColumnAccessControl({
-        create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+        create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
         read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
         update: [],
     }),
@@ -570,9 +917,9 @@ __decorate([
 ], UserNotificationRule.prototype, "userEmail", void 0);
 __decorate([
     ColumnAccessControl({
-        create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-        read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-        update: [],
+        create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+        read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
+        update: [...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
     }),
     Index(),
     TableColumn({
@@ -592,9 +939,9 @@ __decorate([
 ], UserNotificationRule.prototype, "userEmailId", void 0);
 __decorate([
     ColumnAccessControl({
-        create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-        read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-        update: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+        create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+        read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
+        update: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
     }),
     Index(),
     TableColumn({
@@ -615,8 +962,8 @@ __decorate([
 ], UserNotificationRule.prototype, "notifyAfterMinutes", void 0);
 __decorate([
     ColumnAccessControl({
-        create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-        read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+        create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+        read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
         update: [],
     }),
     TableColumn({
@@ -639,8 +986,8 @@ __decorate([
 ], UserNotificationRule.prototype, "incidentSeverity", void 0);
 __decorate([
     ColumnAccessControl({
-        create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-        read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+        create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+        read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
         update: [],
     }),
     Index(),
@@ -661,8 +1008,8 @@ __decorate([
 ], UserNotificationRule.prototype, "incidentSeverityId", void 0);
 __decorate([
     ColumnAccessControl({
-        create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-        read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+        create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+        read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
         update: [],
     }),
     TableColumn({
@@ -685,8 +1032,8 @@ __decorate([
 ], UserNotificationRule.prototype, "alertSeverity", void 0);
 __decorate([
     ColumnAccessControl({
-        create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-        read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+        create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+        read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
         update: [],
     }),
     Index(),
@@ -705,13 +1052,35 @@ __decorate([
     }),
     __metadata("design:type", ObjectID)
 ], UserNotificationRule.prototype, "alertSeverityId", void 0);
+__decorate([
+    ColumnAccessControl({
+        create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+        read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
+        update: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+    }),
+    TableColumn({
+        type: TableColumnType.Boolean,
+        required: false,
+        isDefaultValueColumn: true,
+        title: "Opt Out of Notifications",
+        description: "When true, this rule deliberately suppresses notifications for its rule type and severity instead of delivering any. A rule with this set carries no notification method.",
+        defaultValue: false,
+        example: false,
+    }),
+    Column({
+        type: ColumnType.Boolean,
+        nullable: true,
+        default: false,
+    }),
+    __metadata("design:type", Boolean)
+], UserNotificationRule.prototype, "isOptOut", void 0);
 UserNotificationRule = __decorate([
     TenantColumn("projectId"),
     TableAccessControl({
-        create: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-        read: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-        delete: [Permission.CurrentUser],
-        update: [Permission.CurrentUser],
+        create: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+        read: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_READ_PERMISSIONS],
+        delete: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
+        update: [Permission.CurrentUser, ...ADMIN_WRITE_PERMISSIONS],
     }),
     CrudApiEndpoint(new Route("/user-notification-rule")),
     Entity({