@contember/engine-tenant-api 2.2.0-alpha.3 → 2.2.0-alpha.6

package/dist/development/src/model/service/PasswordlessSignInManager.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"PasswordlessSignInManager.js","sources":["../../../../../../packages/engine-tenant-api/src/model/service/PasswordlessSignInManager.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { ApiKeyManager } from './apiKey/index.js'\nimport { ConfigurationQuery, PersonQuery, PersonRow } from '../queries/index.js'\nimport { Response, ResponseError, ResponseOk } from '../utils/Response.js'\nimport {\n\tActivatePasswordlessOtpErrorCode,\n\tInitSignInPasswordlessErrorCode,\n\tInitSignInPasswordlessResult,\n\tSignInPasswordlessErrorCode,\n} from '../../schema/index.js'\nimport { DatabaseContext, validateToken } from '../utils/index.js'\nimport { UserMailer } from '../mailing/index.js'\nimport {\n\tActivateOtpCommand,\n\tApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\tCreatePersonTokenCommand,\n\tIncreaseOtpAttemptCommand,\n\tInvalidateTokenCommand,\n\tMarkEmailVerifiedCommand,\n} from '../commands/index.js'\nimport { getPreferredProject } from './helpers/getPreferredProject.js'\nimport { isPasswordlessEnabled } from './helpers/isPasswordlessEnabled.js'\nimport { ProjectManager } from './ProjectManager.js'\nimport { PermissionContext } from '../authorization/index.js'\nimport { PersonTokenQuery } from '../queries/personToken/PersonTokenQuery.js'\nimport { ImplementationException } from '../../exceptions.js'\nimport { OtpManager } from './OtpManager.js'\nimport { BackupCodeManager } from './BackupCodeManager.js'\nimport { PersonToken } from '../type/index.js'\nimport { AuthLogService } from './AuthLogService.js'\nimport { intervalToSeconds } from '../utils/interval.js'\nimport { NextMailAttemptQuery } from '../queries/authLog/NextMailAttemptQuery.js'\n\nclass PasswordlessSignInManager {\n\tconstructor(\n\t\tprivate readonly apiKeyManager: ApiKeyManager,\n\t\tprivate readonly mailer: UserMailer,\n\t\tprivate readonly projectManager: ProjectManager,\n\t\tprivate readonly otpManager: OtpManager,\n\t\tprivate readonly backupCodeManager: BackupCodeManager,\n\t) {}\n\n\tasync initSignInPasswordless({ db, permissionContext, mailVariant, mailProject, email }: {\n\t\tdb: DatabaseContext\n\t\tpermissionContext: PermissionContext\n\t\temail: string\n\t\tmailVariant?: string\n\t\tmailProject?: string\n\t}): Promise<PasswordlessSignInManager.InitSignInPasswordlessResponse> {\n\t\treturn db.transaction(async (db): Promise<PasswordlessSignInManager.InitSignInPasswordlessResponse> => {\n\t\t\tconst configuration = await db.queryHandler.fetch(new ConfigurationQuery(db.providers))\n\t\t\tif (configuration.passwordless.enabled === 'never') {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('PASSWORDLESS_DISABLED', 'Passwordless sign-in is disabled', {\n\t\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({}),\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tconst person = await db.queryHandler.fetch(PersonQuery.byEmail(email))\n\t\t\tif (!person) {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('PERSON_NOT_FOUND', `Person ${email} not found`, {\n\t\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonInput: email,\n\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif (!isPasswordlessEnabled(configuration.passwordless.enabled, person.passwordless_enabled)) {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('PASSWORDLESS_DISABLED', 'Passwordless sign-in is disabled for this person', {\n\t\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonInput: email,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: person.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// Per-email exponential backoff on outbound mails — bound the spam\n\t\t\t// pressure on a real user even if attackers spray the endpoint.\n\t\t\t// Reuses login_* backoff config against person_auth_log.\n\t\t\tconst nextAllowed = await db.queryHandler.fetch(\n\t\t\t\tnew NextMailAttemptQuery(email, 'passwordless_login_init', 'passwordless_login'),\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t\tif (nextAllowed > new Date()) {\n\t\t\t\tconst retryAfterSeconds = Math.max(1, Math.ceil((nextAllowed.getTime() - Date.now()) / 1000))\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError(\n\t\t\t\t\t'RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED',\n\t\t\t\t\t`Too many passwordless sign-in requests for this email. Retry after ${retryAfterSeconds}s.`,\n\t\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonInput: email,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: person.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tconst createTokenCommand = CreatePersonTokenCommand.createPasswordlessRequest(\n\t\t\t\tperson.id,\n\t\t\t\tintervalToSeconds(configuration.passwordless.expiration) / 60,\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t\tconst result = await db.commandBus.execute(createTokenCommand)\n\n\t\t\tconst url = this.formatUrl(configuration.passwordless.url ?? null, result.token, result.id, email) ?? undefined\n\n\t\t\tconst projects = await this.projectManager.getProjectsByIdentity(db, person.identity_id, permissionContext)\n\t\t\tconst project = getPreferredProject(projects, mailProject ?? null)\n\n\t\t\tawait this.mailer.sendPasswordlessEmail(db, {\n\t\t\t\temail,\n\t\t\t\ttoken: result.token,\n\t\t\t\turl,\n\t\t\t\tproject: project?.name,\n\t\t\t\tprojectSlug: project?.slug,\n\t\t\t\trequestId: result.id,\n\t\t\t}, {\n\t\t\t\tvariant: mailVariant || '',\n\t\t\t\tprojectId: project?.id ?? null,\n\t\t\t})\n\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseOk({\n\t\t\t\trequestId: result.id,\n\t\t\t\texpiresAt: result.expiresAt,\n\t\t\t\tperson,\n\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\tpersonInput: email,\n\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: person.id,\n\t\t\t\t\ttokenId: result.id,\n\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tprivate formatUrl(url: string | null, token: string, requestId: string, email: string): string | null {\n\t\tif (!url) {\n\t\t\treturn null\n\t\t}\n\t\tconst urlObj = new URL(url)\n\t\turlObj.searchParams.set('token', token)\n\t\turlObj.searchParams.set('request_id', requestId)\n\t\turlObj.searchParams.set('email', email)\n\t\treturn urlObj.toString()\n\t}\n\n\tasync signInPasswordless({ db, expiration, token, requestId, mfaOtp, backupCode, validationType, requestInfo, trustForwardedInfo }: {\n\t\tdb: DatabaseContext\n\t\tvalidationType: PersonToken.ValidationType\n\t\trequestId: string\n\t\ttoken: string\n\t\tmfaOtp?: string\n\t\tbackupCode?: string\n\t\texpiration?: number\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo\n\t\ttrustForwardedInfo?: boolean\n\t}): Promise<PasswordlessSignInManager.SignInPasswordlessResponse> {\n\t\treturn db.transaction(async (db): Promise<PasswordlessSignInManager.SignInPasswordlessResponse> => {\n\t\t\tconst tokenResult = await db.queryHandler.fetch(PersonTokenQuery.byId(requestId, 'passwordless'))\n\t\t\tconst tokenValidationResult = validateToken({\n\t\t\t\tentry: tokenResult,\n\t\t\t\ttoken,\n\t\t\t\tnow: db.providers.now(),\n\t\t\t\tvalidationType,\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t\tif (!tokenValidationResult.ok) {\n\t\t\t\tif (tokenValidationResult.error === 'TOKEN_INVALID' && validationType === 'otp') {\n\t\t\t\t\tawait db.commandBus.execute(new IncreaseOtpAttemptCommand(tokenResult!.id))\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError(tokenValidationResult.error, tokenValidationResult.errorMessage, {\n\t\t\t\t\t...tokenValidationResult.metadata ?? {},\n\t\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: tokenResult?.person_id,\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttokenId: tokenResult?.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif (!tokenResult) {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new ImplementationException()\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tconst personRow = await db.queryHandler.fetch(PersonQuery.byId(tokenValidationResult.result.person_id))\n\t\t\tif (!personRow) {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new ImplementationException()\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif (personRow.disabled_at !== null) {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('PERSON_DISABLED', `Person is disabled`, {\n\t\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: personRow.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttokenId: tokenResult?.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tlet usedBackupCode = false\n\t\t\tif (personRow.otp_secret && personRow.otp_activated_at) {\n\t\t\t\tif (mfaOtp) {\n\t\t\t\t\tif (!await this.otpManager.verifyOtp(db, personRow, mfaOtp)) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: personRow.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\ttokenId: tokenResult?.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t} else if (backupCode) {\n\t\t\t\t\tif (!await this.backupCodeManager.verifyAndConsume(db, personRow, backupCode)) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: personRow.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\ttokenId: tokenResult?.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\tusedBackupCode = true\n\t\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('OTP_REQUIRED', `2FA is enabled. OTP token is required`, {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: personRow.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\ttokenId: tokenResult?.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// NOTE: passwordless sign-in does NOT enforce mandatory-MFA enrollment.\n\t\t\t// A person with no MFA factor is let through even when an auth_policy would\n\t\t\t// require MFA — enroll-via-sign-in is password-only, and passwordless email\n\t\t\t// access is itself a possession factor. An existing factor (TOTP/backup\n\t\t\t// code, handled above) is still verified. Documented limitation (A06).\n\n\t\t\tawait db.commandBus.execute(new InvalidateTokenCommand(tokenValidationResult.result.id))\n\t\t\t// Receiving and clicking the magic link proves ownership of the address,\n\t\t\t// so a successful passwordless sign-in also satisfies the e-mail\n\t\t\t// verification requirement. Without this, a required-but-unverified\n\t\t\t// account could obtain a session here while being blocked from password\n\t\t\t// sign-in (SignInManager) — an inconsistent, exploitable gap.\n\t\t\tconst emailVerifiedNow = personRow.email_verified_at === null\n\t\t\tif (emailVerifiedNow) {\n\t\t\t\tawait db.commandBus.execute(new MarkEmailVerifiedCommand(personRow.id))\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tconst sessionToken = await this.apiKeyManager.createSessionApiKey(db, personRow.identity_id, expiration, requestInfo, trustForwardedInfo)\n\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseOk({\n\t\t\t\tperson: personRow,\n\t\t\t\ttoken: sessionToken,\n\t\t\t\tusedBackupCode,\n\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: personRow.id,\n\t\t\t\t\ttokenId: tokenResult?.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t// Record that this sign-in also satisfied e-mail verification, so\n\t\t\t\t\t// the audit trail shows when/how the address became verified.\n\t\t\t\t\teventData: emailVerifiedNow ? { emailVerified: true } : undefined,\n\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tasync activatePasswordlessOtp({ db, token, requestId, otpHash }: {\n\t\tdb: DatabaseContext\n\t\trequestId: string\n\t\ttoken: string\n\t\totpHash: string\n\t}): Promise<PasswordlessSignInManager.ActivatePasswordlessOtpResponse> {\n\t\treturn db.transaction(async (db): Promise<PasswordlessSignInManager.ActivatePasswordlessOtpResponse> => {\n\t\t\tconst tokenResult = await db.queryHandler.fetch(PersonTokenQuery.byId(requestId, 'passwordless'))\n\t\t\tconst tokenValidationResult = validateToken({\n\t\t\t\tentry: tokenResult,\n\t\t\t\ttoken,\n\t\t\t\tnow: db.providers.now(),\n\t\t\t\tvalidationType: 'token',\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t\tif (!tokenValidationResult.ok) {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError(tokenValidationResult.error, tokenValidationResult.errorMessage, {\n\t\t\t\t\t...tokenValidationResult.metadata ?? {},\n\t\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: tokenResult?.person_id,\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttokenId: tokenResult?.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tawait db.commandBus.execute(new ActivateOtpCommand(tokenValidationResult.result.id, otpHash))\n\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseOk({\n\t\t\t\tperson: tokenResult?.person_id,\n\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: tokenResult?.person_id,\n\t\t\t\t\ttokenId: tokenResult?.id,\n\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t})\n\t}\n}\n\nnamespace PasswordlessSignInManager {\n\texport type InitSignInPasswordlessResponse = Response<\n\t\tInitSignInPasswordlessResult & {\n\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n\t\t},\n\t\tInitSignInPasswordlessErrorCode,\n\t\t{\n\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n\t\t}\n\t>\n\n\tinterface SignInPasswordlessResult {\n\t\treadonly person: PersonRow\n\t\treadonly token: string\n\t\t/** True when MFA was satisfied by consuming a backup code (instead of a TOTP token). */\n\t\treadonly usedBackupCode?: boolean\n\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n\t}\n\texport type SignInPasswordlessResponse = Response<SignInPasswordlessResult, SignInPasswordlessErrorCode, {\n\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n\t}>\n\n\texport type ActivatePasswordlessOtpResponse = Response<\n\t\t{\n\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n\t\t},\n\t\tActivatePasswordlessOtpErrorCode,\n\t\t{\n\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n\t\t}\n\t>\n}\n\nexport { PasswordlessSignInManager 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+{"version":3,"file":"PasswordlessSignInManager.js","sources":["../../../../../../packages/engine-tenant-api/src/model/service/PasswordlessSignInManager.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { ApiKeyManager } from './apiKey/index.js'\nimport { ConfigurationQuery, LocalAuthDisablingIdpsQuery, PersonQuery, PersonRow } from '../queries/index.js'\nimport { Response, ResponseError, ResponseOk } from '../utils/Response.js'\nimport {\n\tActivatePasswordlessOtpErrorCode,\n\tInitSignInPasswordlessErrorCode,\n\tInitSignInPasswordlessResult,\n\tSignInPasswordlessErrorCode,\n} from '../../schema/index.js'\nimport { DatabaseContext, validateToken } from '../utils/index.js'\nimport { UserMailer } from '../mailing/index.js'\nimport {\n\tActivateOtpCommand,\n\tApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\tCreatePersonTokenCommand,\n\tIncreaseOtpAttemptCommand,\n\tInvalidateTokenCommand,\n\tMarkEmailVerifiedCommand,\n} from '../commands/index.js'\nimport { getPreferredProject } from './helpers/getPreferredProject.js'\nimport { isPasswordlessEnabled } from './helpers/isPasswordlessEnabled.js'\nimport { ProjectManager } from './ProjectManager.js'\nimport { PermissionContext } from '../authorization/index.js'\nimport { PersonTokenQuery } from '../queries/personToken/PersonTokenQuery.js'\nimport { ImplementationException } from '../../exceptions.js'\nimport { OtpManager } from './OtpManager.js'\nimport { BackupCodeManager } from './BackupCodeManager.js'\nimport { PersonToken } from '../type/index.js'\nimport { AuthLogService } from './AuthLogService.js'\nimport { intervalToSeconds } from '../utils/interval.js'\nimport { NextMailAttemptQuery } from '../queries/authLog/NextMailAttemptQuery.js'\n\nclass PasswordlessSignInManager {\n\tconstructor(\n\t\tprivate readonly apiKeyManager: ApiKeyManager,\n\t\tprivate readonly mailer: UserMailer,\n\t\tprivate readonly projectManager: ProjectManager,\n\t\tprivate readonly otpManager: OtpManager,\n\t\tprivate readonly backupCodeManager: BackupCodeManager,\n\t) {}\n\n\tasync initSignInPasswordless({ db, permissionContext, mailVariant, mailProject, email }: {\n\t\tdb: DatabaseContext\n\t\tpermissionContext: PermissionContext\n\t\temail: string\n\t\tmailVariant?: string\n\t\tmailProject?: string\n\t}): Promise<PasswordlessSignInManager.InitSignInPasswordlessResponse> {\n\t\treturn db.transaction(async (db): Promise<PasswordlessSignInManager.InitSignInPasswordlessResponse> => {\n\t\t\tconst configuration = await db.queryHandler.fetch(new ConfigurationQuery(db.providers))\n\t\t\tif (configuration.passwordless.enabled === 'never') {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('PASSWORDLESS_DISABLED', 'Passwordless sign-in is disabled', {\n\t\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({}),\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tconst person = await db.queryHandler.fetch(PersonQuery.byEmail(email))\n\t\t\tif (!person) {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('PERSON_NOT_FOUND', `Person ${email} not found`, {\n\t\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonInput: email,\n\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tconst exclusiveIdps = await db.queryHandler.fetch(new LocalAuthDisablingIdpsQuery(person.id))\n\t\t\tif (exclusiveIdps.length > 0) {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('IDP_REQUIRED', `Sign in using ${exclusiveIdps.join(' or ')}`, {\n\t\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonInput: email,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: person.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif (!isPasswordlessEnabled(configuration.passwordless.enabled, person.passwordless_enabled)) {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('PASSWORDLESS_DISABLED', 'Passwordless sign-in is disabled for this person', {\n\t\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonInput: email,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: person.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// Per-email exponential backoff on outbound mails — bound the spam\n\t\t\t// pressure on a real user even if attackers spray the endpoint.\n\t\t\t// Reuses login_* backoff config against person_auth_log.\n\t\t\tconst nextAllowed = await db.queryHandler.fetch(\n\t\t\t\tnew NextMailAttemptQuery(email, 'passwordless_login_init', 'passwordless_login'),\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t\tif (nextAllowed > new Date()) {\n\t\t\t\tconst retryAfterSeconds = Math.max(1, Math.ceil((nextAllowed.getTime() - Date.now()) / 1000))\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError(\n\t\t\t\t\t'RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED',\n\t\t\t\t\t`Too many passwordless sign-in requests for this email. Retry after ${retryAfterSeconds}s.`,\n\t\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonInput: email,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: person.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tconst createTokenCommand = CreatePersonTokenCommand.createPasswordlessRequest(\n\t\t\t\tperson.id,\n\t\t\t\tintervalToSeconds(configuration.passwordless.expiration) / 60,\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t\tconst result = await db.commandBus.execute(createTokenCommand)\n\n\t\t\tconst url = this.formatUrl(configuration.passwordless.url ?? null, result.token, result.id, email) ?? undefined\n\n\t\t\tconst projects = await this.projectManager.getProjectsByIdentity(db, person.identity_id, permissionContext)\n\t\t\tconst project = getPreferredProject(projects, mailProject ?? null)\n\n\t\t\tawait this.mailer.sendPasswordlessEmail(db, {\n\t\t\t\temail,\n\t\t\t\ttoken: result.token,\n\t\t\t\turl,\n\t\t\t\tproject: project?.name,\n\t\t\t\tprojectSlug: project?.slug,\n\t\t\t\trequestId: result.id,\n\t\t\t}, {\n\t\t\t\tvariant: mailVariant || '',\n\t\t\t\tprojectId: project?.id ?? null,\n\t\t\t})\n\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseOk({\n\t\t\t\trequestId: result.id,\n\t\t\t\texpiresAt: result.expiresAt,\n\t\t\t\tperson,\n\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\tpersonInput: email,\n\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: person.id,\n\t\t\t\t\ttokenId: result.id,\n\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tprivate formatUrl(url: string | null, token: string, requestId: string, email: string): string | null {\n\t\tif (!url) {\n\t\t\treturn null\n\t\t}\n\t\tconst urlObj = new URL(url)\n\t\turlObj.searchParams.set('token', token)\n\t\turlObj.searchParams.set('request_id', requestId)\n\t\turlObj.searchParams.set('email', email)\n\t\treturn urlObj.toString()\n\t}\n\n\tasync signInPasswordless({ db, expiration, token, requestId, mfaOtp, backupCode, validationType, requestInfo, trustForwardedInfo }: {\n\t\tdb: DatabaseContext\n\t\tvalidationType: PersonToken.ValidationType\n\t\trequestId: string\n\t\ttoken: string\n\t\tmfaOtp?: string\n\t\tbackupCode?: string\n\t\texpiration?: number\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo\n\t\ttrustForwardedInfo?: boolean\n\t}): Promise<PasswordlessSignInManager.SignInPasswordlessResponse> {\n\t\treturn db.transaction(async (db): Promise<PasswordlessSignInManager.SignInPasswordlessResponse> => {\n\t\t\tconst tokenResult = await db.queryHandler.fetch(PersonTokenQuery.byId(requestId, 'passwordless'))\n\t\t\tconst tokenValidationResult = validateToken({\n\t\t\t\tentry: tokenResult,\n\t\t\t\ttoken,\n\t\t\t\tnow: db.providers.now(),\n\t\t\t\tvalidationType,\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t\tif (!tokenValidationResult.ok) {\n\t\t\t\tif (tokenValidationResult.error === 'TOKEN_INVALID' && validationType === 'otp') {\n\t\t\t\t\tawait db.commandBus.execute(new IncreaseOtpAttemptCommand(tokenResult!.id))\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError(tokenValidationResult.error, tokenValidationResult.errorMessage, {\n\t\t\t\t\t...tokenValidationResult.metadata ?? {},\n\t\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: tokenResult?.person_id,\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttokenId: tokenResult?.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif (!tokenResult) {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new ImplementationException()\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tconst personRow = await db.queryHandler.fetch(PersonQuery.byId(tokenValidationResult.result.person_id))\n\t\t\tif (!personRow) {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new ImplementationException()\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif (personRow.disabled_at !== null) {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('PERSON_DISABLED', `Person is disabled`, {\n\t\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: personRow.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttokenId: tokenResult?.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// Re-checked here and not only at init: a link created while this magic link\n\t\t\t// was in flight would otherwise still mint a locally authenticated session.\n\t\t\tconst exclusiveIdps = await db.queryHandler.fetch(new LocalAuthDisablingIdpsQuery(personRow.id))\n\t\t\tif (exclusiveIdps.length > 0) {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('IDP_REQUIRED', `Sign in using ${exclusiveIdps.join(' or ')}`, {\n\t\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: personRow.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttokenId: tokenResult?.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tlet usedBackupCode = false\n\t\t\tif (personRow.otp_secret && personRow.otp_activated_at) {\n\t\t\t\tif (mfaOtp) {\n\t\t\t\t\tif (!await this.otpManager.verifyOtp(db, personRow, mfaOtp)) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: personRow.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\ttokenId: tokenResult?.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t} else if (backupCode) {\n\t\t\t\t\tif (!await this.backupCodeManager.verifyAndConsume(db, personRow, backupCode)) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: personRow.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\ttokenId: tokenResult?.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\tusedBackupCode = true\n\t\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('OTP_REQUIRED', `2FA is enabled. OTP token is required`, {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: personRow.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\ttokenId: tokenResult?.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// NOTE: passwordless sign-in does NOT enforce mandatory-MFA enrollment.\n\t\t\t// A person with no MFA factor is let through even when an auth_policy would\n\t\t\t// require MFA — enroll-via-sign-in is password-only, and passwordless email\n\t\t\t// access is itself a possession factor. An existing factor (TOTP/backup\n\t\t\t// code, handled above) is still verified. Documented limitation (A06).\n\n\t\t\tawait db.commandBus.execute(new InvalidateTokenCommand(tokenValidationResult.result.id))\n\t\t\t// Receiving and clicking the magic link proves ownership of the address,\n\t\t\t// so a successful passwordless sign-in also satisfies the e-mail\n\t\t\t// verification requirement. Without this, a required-but-unverified\n\t\t\t// account could obtain a session here while being blocked from password\n\t\t\t// sign-in (SignInManager) — an inconsistent, exploitable gap.\n\t\t\tconst emailVerifiedNow = personRow.email_verified_at === null\n\t\t\tif (emailVerifiedNow) {\n\t\t\t\tawait db.commandBus.execute(new MarkEmailVerifiedCommand(personRow.id))\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tconst sessionToken = await this.apiKeyManager.createSessionApiKey(db, personRow.identity_id, expiration, requestInfo, trustForwardedInfo)\n\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseOk({\n\t\t\t\tperson: personRow,\n\t\t\t\ttoken: sessionToken,\n\t\t\t\tusedBackupCode,\n\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: personRow.id,\n\t\t\t\t\ttokenId: tokenResult?.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t// Record that this sign-in also satisfied e-mail verification, so\n\t\t\t\t\t// the audit trail shows when/how the address became verified.\n\t\t\t\t\teventData: emailVerifiedNow ? { emailVerified: true } : undefined,\n\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tasync activatePasswordlessOtp({ db, token, requestId, otpHash }: {\n\t\tdb: DatabaseContext\n\t\trequestId: string\n\t\ttoken: string\n\t\totpHash: string\n\t}): Promise<PasswordlessSignInManager.ActivatePasswordlessOtpResponse> {\n\t\treturn db.transaction(async (db): Promise<PasswordlessSignInManager.ActivatePasswordlessOtpResponse> => {\n\t\t\tconst tokenResult = await db.queryHandler.fetch(PersonTokenQuery.byId(requestId, 'passwordless'))\n\t\t\tconst tokenValidationResult = validateToken({\n\t\t\t\tentry: tokenResult,\n\t\t\t\ttoken,\n\t\t\t\tnow: db.providers.now(),\n\t\t\t\tvalidationType: 'token',\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t\tif (!tokenValidationResult.ok) {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError(tokenValidationResult.error, tokenValidationResult.errorMessage, {\n\t\t\t\t\t...tokenValidationResult.metadata ?? {},\n\t\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: tokenResult?.person_id,\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttokenId: tokenResult?.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tawait db.commandBus.execute(new ActivateOtpCommand(tokenValidationResult.result.id, otpHash))\n\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseOk({\n\t\t\t\tperson: tokenResult?.person_id,\n\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: tokenResult?.person_id,\n\t\t\t\t\ttokenId: tokenResult?.id,\n\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t})\n\t}\n}\n\nnamespace PasswordlessSignInManager {\n\texport type InitSignInPasswordlessResponse = Response<\n\t\tInitSignInPasswordlessResult & {\n\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n\t\t},\n\t\tInitSignInPasswordlessErrorCode,\n\t\t{\n\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n\t\t}\n\t>\n\n\tinterface SignInPasswordlessResult {\n\t\treadonly person: PersonRow\n\t\treadonly token: string\n\t\t/** True when MFA was satisfied by consuming a backup code (instead of a TOTP token). */\n\t\treadonly usedBackupCode?: boolean\n\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n\t}\n\texport type SignInPasswordlessResponse = Response<SignInPasswordlessResult, SignInPasswordlessErrorCode, {\n\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n\t}>\n\n\texport type ActivatePasswordlessOtpResponse = Response<\n\t\t{\n\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n\t\t},\n\t\tActivatePasswordlessOtpErrorCode,\n\t\t{\n\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n\t\t}\n\t>\n}\n\nexport { PasswordlessSignInManager 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package/dist/development/src/model/service/PersonAccessManager.cjs

@@ -1,12 +1,13 @@
 "use strict";
 Object.defineProperty(exports, Symbol.toStringTag, { value: "Module" });
 const DisablePersonCommand = require("../commands/person/DisablePersonCommand.cjs");
+const EnablePersonCommand = require("../commands/person/EnablePersonCommand.cjs");
 const Response = require("../utils/Response.cjs");
 class PersonAccessManager {
   constructor(apiKeyManager) {
     this.apiKeyManager = apiKeyManager;
   }
-  async disablePerson(dbContext, person) {
+  async disablePerson(dbContext, person, logger) {
     return await dbContext.transaction(async (trx) => {
       if (person.disabled_at !== null) {
         return new Response.ResponseError("PERSON_ALREADY_DISABLED", "Person is already disabled");
@@ -14,7 +15,14 @@ class PersonAccessManager {
       await this.disablePersonAccount(trx, person.id);
       await this.disableIdentityApiKeys(trx, person.identity_id);
       return new Response.ResponseOk(null);
-    });
+    }, { retry: { logger } });
+  }
+  async enablePerson(dbContext, person) {
+    if (person.disabled_at === null) {
+      return new Response.ResponseError("PERSON_ALREADY_ENABLED", "Person is already enabled");
+    }
+    await dbContext.commandBus.execute(new EnablePersonCommand.EnablePersonCommand(person.id));
+    return new Response.ResponseOk(null);
   }
   async disablePersonAccount(dbContext, personId) {
     await dbContext.commandBus.execute(new DisablePersonCommand.DisablePersonCommand(personId));

package/dist/development/src/model/service/PersonAccessManager.cjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"PersonAccessManager.cjs","sources":["../../../../../../packages/engine-tenant-api/src/model/service/PersonAccessManager.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { PersonQuery, PersonRow } from '../queries/index.js'\nimport { DatabaseContext } from '../utils/index.js'\nimport { DisablePersonCommand } from '../commands/person/DisablePersonCommand.js'\nimport { ApiKeyManager } from './apiKey/index.js'\nimport { Response, ResponseError, ResponseOk } from '../utils/Response.js'\nimport { DisablePersonErrorCode } from '../../schema/index.js'\n\nclass PersonAccessManager {\n\tconstructor(private readonly apiKeyManager: ApiKeyManager) {}\n\n\tasync disablePerson(dbContext: DatabaseContext, person: PersonRow): Promise<PersonDisableAccessResponse> {\n\t\treturn await dbContext.transaction(async trx => {\n\t\t\tif (person.disabled_at !== null) {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('PERSON_ALREADY_DISABLED', 'Person is already disabled')\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// Deactivate person & invalidate all api keys associated with person identity\n\t\t\tawait this.disablePersonAccount(trx, person.id)\n\t\t\tawait this.disableIdentityApiKeys(trx, person.identity_id)\n\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseOk(null)\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tprivate async disablePersonAccount(dbContext: DatabaseContext, personId: string) {\n\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(new DisablePersonCommand(personId))\n\t}\n\n\tprivate async disableIdentityApiKeys(dbContext: DatabaseContext, personIdentityId: string) {\n\t\tawait this.apiKeyManager.disableIdentityApiKeys(dbContext, personIdentityId)\n\t}\n}\n\nexport type PersonDisableAccessResponse = Response<null, DisablePersonErrorCode>\n\nexport { PersonAccessManager }\n"],"names":["ResponseError","ResponseOk","DisablePersonCommand"],"mappings":";;;;AAOA,MAAM,oBAAoB;AAAA,EACzB,YAA6B,eAA8B;AAA9B,SAAA,gBAAA;AAAA,EAA+B;AAAA,EAE5D,MAAM,cAAc,WAA4B,QAAyD;AACxG,WAAO,MAAM,UAAU,YAAY,OAAM,QAAO;AAC/C,UAAI,OAAO,gBAAgB,MAAM;AAChC,eAAO,IAAIA,SAAAA,cAAc,2BAA2B,4BAA4B;AAAA,MACjF;AAGA,YAAM,KAAK,qBAAqB,KAAK,OAAO,EAAE;AAC9C,YAAM,KAAK,uBAAuB,KAAK,OAAO,WAAW;AAEzD,aAAO,IAAIC,SAAAA,WAAW,IAAI;AAAA,IAC3B,CAAC;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EAEA,MAAc,qBAAqB,WAA4B,UAAkB;AAChF,UAAM,UAAU,WAAW,QAAQ,IAAIC,qBAAAA,qBAAqB,QAAQ,CAAC;AAAA,EACtE;AAAA,EAEA,MAAc,uBAAuB,WAA4B,kBAA0B;AAC1F,UAAM,KAAK,cAAc,uBAAuB,WAAW,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAC5E;AACD;;"}
+{"version":3,"file":"PersonAccessManager.cjs","sources":["../../../../../../packages/engine-tenant-api/src/model/service/PersonAccessManager.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { Logger } from '@contember/logger'\nimport { PersonQuery, PersonRow } from '../queries/index.js'\nimport { DatabaseContext } from '../utils/index.js'\nimport { DisablePersonCommand } from '../commands/person/DisablePersonCommand.js'\nimport { EnablePersonCommand } from '../commands/person/EnablePersonCommand.js'\nimport { ApiKeyManager } from './apiKey/index.js'\nimport { Response, ResponseError, ResponseOk } from '../utils/Response.js'\nimport { DisablePersonErrorCode, EnablePersonErrorCode } from '../../schema/index.js'\n\nclass PersonAccessManager {\n\tconstructor(private readonly apiKeyManager: ApiKeyManager) {}\n\n\tasync disablePerson(dbContext: DatabaseContext, person: PersonRow, logger: Logger): Promise<PersonDisableAccessResponse> {\n\t\t// Retried: the api_key update races the target's own background session tracking and loses with a 40001,\n\t\t// which would otherwise leave the person enabled behind an internal error. Nothing here escapes the transaction.\n\t\treturn await dbContext.transaction(async trx => {\n\t\t\tif (person.disabled_at !== null) {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('PERSON_ALREADY_DISABLED', 'Person is already disabled')\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// Deactivate person & invalidate all api keys associated with person identity\n\t\t\tawait this.disablePersonAccount(trx, person.id)\n\t\t\tawait this.disableIdentityApiKeys(trx, person.identity_id)\n\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseOk(null)\n\t\t}, { retry: { logger } })\n\t}\n\n\tasync enablePerson(dbContext: DatabaseContext, person: PersonRow): Promise<PersonEnableAccessResponse> {\n\t\tif (person.disabled_at === null) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('PERSON_ALREADY_ENABLED', 'Person is already enabled')\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Only clears the disabled flag — api keys revoked while disabling stay revoked, the person has to sign in again.\n\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(new EnablePersonCommand(person.id))\n\n\t\treturn new ResponseOk(null)\n\t}\n\n\tprivate async disablePersonAccount(dbContext: DatabaseContext, personId: string) {\n\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(new DisablePersonCommand(personId))\n\t}\n\n\tprivate async disableIdentityApiKeys(dbContext: DatabaseContext, personIdentityId: string) {\n\t\tawait this.apiKeyManager.disableIdentityApiKeys(dbContext, personIdentityId)\n\t}\n}\n\nexport type PersonDisableAccessResponse = Response<null, DisablePersonErrorCode>\nexport type PersonEnableAccessResponse = Response<null, EnablePersonErrorCode>\n\nexport { PersonAccessManager }\n"],"names":["ResponseError","ResponseOk","EnablePersonCommand","DisablePersonCommand"],"mappings":";;;;;AASA,MAAM,oBAAoB;AAAA,EACzB,YAA6B,eAA8B;AAA9B,SAAA,gBAAA;AAAA,EAA+B;AAAA,EAE5D,MAAM,cAAc,WAA4B,QAAmB,QAAsD;AAGxH,WAAO,MAAM,UAAU,YAAY,OAAM,QAAO;AAC/C,UAAI,OAAO,gBAAgB,MAAM;AAChC,eAAO,IAAIA,SAAAA,cAAc,2BAA2B,4BAA4B;AAAA,MACjF;AAGA,YAAM,KAAK,qBAAqB,KAAK,OAAO,EAAE;AAC9C,YAAM,KAAK,uBAAuB,KAAK,OAAO,WAAW;AAEzD,aAAO,IAAIC,SAAAA,WAAW,IAAI;AAAA,IAC3B,GAAG,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,OAAA,GAAU;AAAA,EACzB;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,aAAa,WAA4B,QAAwD;AACtG,QAAI,OAAO,gBAAgB,MAAM;AAChC,aAAO,IAAID,SAAAA,cAAc,0BAA0B,2BAA2B;AAAA,IAC/E;AAGA,UAAM,UAAU,WAAW,QAAQ,IAAIE,oBAAAA,oBAAoB,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;AAErE,WAAO,IAAID,SAAAA,WAAW,IAAI;AAAA,EAC3B;AAAA,EAEA,MAAc,qBAAqB,WAA4B,UAAkB;AAChF,UAAM,UAAU,WAAW,QAAQ,IAAIE,qBAAAA,qBAAqB,QAAQ,CAAC;AAAA,EACtE;AAAA,EAEA,MAAc,uBAAuB,WAA4B,kBAA0B;AAC1F,UAAM,KAAK,cAAc,uBAAuB,WAAW,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAC5E;AACD;;"}

package/dist/development/src/model/service/PersonAccessManager.js

@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
 import { DisablePersonCommand } from "../commands/person/DisablePersonCommand.js";
+import { EnablePersonCommand } from "../commands/person/EnablePersonCommand.js";
 import { ResponseError, ResponseOk } from "../utils/Response.js";
 class PersonAccessManager {
   constructor(apiKeyManager) {
     this.apiKeyManager = apiKeyManager;
   }
-  async disablePerson(dbContext, person) {
+  async disablePerson(dbContext, person, logger) {
     return await dbContext.transaction(async (trx) => {
       if (person.disabled_at !== null) {
         return new ResponseError("PERSON_ALREADY_DISABLED", "Person is already disabled");
@@ -12,7 +13,14 @@ class PersonAccessManager {
       await this.disablePersonAccount(trx, person.id);
       await this.disableIdentityApiKeys(trx, person.identity_id);
       return new ResponseOk(null);
-    });
+    }, { retry: { logger } });
+  }
+  async enablePerson(dbContext, person) {
+    if (person.disabled_at === null) {
+      return new ResponseError("PERSON_ALREADY_ENABLED", "Person is already enabled");
+    }
+    await dbContext.commandBus.execute(new EnablePersonCommand(person.id));
+    return new ResponseOk(null);
   }
   async disablePersonAccount(dbContext, personId) {
     await dbContext.commandBus.execute(new DisablePersonCommand(personId));

package/dist/development/src/model/service/PersonAccessManager.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"PersonAccessManager.js","sources":["../../../../../../packages/engine-tenant-api/src/model/service/PersonAccessManager.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { PersonQuery, PersonRow } from '../queries/index.js'\nimport { DatabaseContext } from '../utils/index.js'\nimport { DisablePersonCommand } from '../commands/person/DisablePersonCommand.js'\nimport { ApiKeyManager } from './apiKey/index.js'\nimport { Response, ResponseError, ResponseOk } from '../utils/Response.js'\nimport { DisablePersonErrorCode } from '../../schema/index.js'\n\nclass PersonAccessManager {\n\tconstructor(private readonly apiKeyManager: ApiKeyManager) {}\n\n\tasync disablePerson(dbContext: DatabaseContext, person: PersonRow): Promise<PersonDisableAccessResponse> {\n\t\treturn await dbContext.transaction(async trx => {\n\t\t\tif (person.disabled_at !== null) {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('PERSON_ALREADY_DISABLED', 'Person is already disabled')\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// Deactivate person & invalidate all api keys associated with person identity\n\t\t\tawait this.disablePersonAccount(trx, person.id)\n\t\t\tawait this.disableIdentityApiKeys(trx, person.identity_id)\n\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseOk(null)\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tprivate async disablePersonAccount(dbContext: DatabaseContext, personId: string) {\n\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(new DisablePersonCommand(personId))\n\t}\n\n\tprivate async disableIdentityApiKeys(dbContext: DatabaseContext, personIdentityId: string) {\n\t\tawait this.apiKeyManager.disableIdentityApiKeys(dbContext, personIdentityId)\n\t}\n}\n\nexport type PersonDisableAccessResponse = Response<null, DisablePersonErrorCode>\n\nexport { PersonAccessManager }\n"],"names":[],"mappings":";;AAOA,MAAM,oBAAoB;AAAA,EACzB,YAA6B,eAA8B;AAA9B,SAAA,gBAAA;AAAA,EAA+B;AAAA,EAE5D,MAAM,cAAc,WAA4B,QAAyD;AACxG,WAAO,MAAM,UAAU,YAAY,OAAM,QAAO;AAC/C,UAAI,OAAO,gBAAgB,MAAM;AAChC,eAAO,IAAI,cAAc,2BAA2B,4BAA4B;AAAA,MACjF;AAGA,YAAM,KAAK,qBAAqB,KAAK,OAAO,EAAE;AAC9C,YAAM,KAAK,uBAAuB,KAAK,OAAO,WAAW;AAEzD,aAAO,IAAI,WAAW,IAAI;AAAA,IAC3B,CAAC;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EAEA,MAAc,qBAAqB,WAA4B,UAAkB;AAChF,UAAM,UAAU,WAAW,QAAQ,IAAI,qBAAqB,QAAQ,CAAC;AAAA,EACtE;AAAA,EAEA,MAAc,uBAAuB,WAA4B,kBAA0B;AAC1F,UAAM,KAAK,cAAc,uBAAuB,WAAW,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAC5E;AACD;"}
+{"version":3,"file":"PersonAccessManager.js","sources":["../../../../../../packages/engine-tenant-api/src/model/service/PersonAccessManager.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { Logger } from '@contember/logger'\nimport { PersonQuery, PersonRow } from '../queries/index.js'\nimport { DatabaseContext } from '../utils/index.js'\nimport { DisablePersonCommand } from '../commands/person/DisablePersonCommand.js'\nimport { EnablePersonCommand } from '../commands/person/EnablePersonCommand.js'\nimport { ApiKeyManager } from './apiKey/index.js'\nimport { Response, ResponseError, ResponseOk } from '../utils/Response.js'\nimport { DisablePersonErrorCode, EnablePersonErrorCode } from '../../schema/index.js'\n\nclass PersonAccessManager {\n\tconstructor(private readonly apiKeyManager: ApiKeyManager) {}\n\n\tasync disablePerson(dbContext: DatabaseContext, person: PersonRow, logger: Logger): Promise<PersonDisableAccessResponse> {\n\t\t// Retried: the api_key update races the target's own background session tracking and loses with a 40001,\n\t\t// which would otherwise leave the person enabled behind an internal error. Nothing here escapes the transaction.\n\t\treturn await dbContext.transaction(async trx => {\n\t\t\tif (person.disabled_at !== null) {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('PERSON_ALREADY_DISABLED', 'Person is already disabled')\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// Deactivate person & invalidate all api keys associated with person identity\n\t\t\tawait this.disablePersonAccount(trx, person.id)\n\t\t\tawait this.disableIdentityApiKeys(trx, person.identity_id)\n\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseOk(null)\n\t\t}, { retry: { logger } })\n\t}\n\n\tasync enablePerson(dbContext: DatabaseContext, person: PersonRow): Promise<PersonEnableAccessResponse> {\n\t\tif (person.disabled_at === null) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('PERSON_ALREADY_ENABLED', 'Person is already enabled')\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Only clears the disabled flag — api keys revoked while disabling stay revoked, the person has to sign in again.\n\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(new EnablePersonCommand(person.id))\n\n\t\treturn new ResponseOk(null)\n\t}\n\n\tprivate async disablePersonAccount(dbContext: DatabaseContext, personId: string) {\n\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(new DisablePersonCommand(personId))\n\t}\n\n\tprivate async disableIdentityApiKeys(dbContext: DatabaseContext, personIdentityId: string) {\n\t\tawait this.apiKeyManager.disableIdentityApiKeys(dbContext, personIdentityId)\n\t}\n}\n\nexport type PersonDisableAccessResponse = Response<null, DisablePersonErrorCode>\nexport type PersonEnableAccessResponse = Response<null, EnablePersonErrorCode>\n\nexport { PersonAccessManager }\n"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;AASA,MAAM,oBAAoB;AAAA,EACzB,YAA6B,eAA8B;AAA9B,SAAA,gBAAA;AAAA,EAA+B;AAAA,EAE5D,MAAM,cAAc,WAA4B,QAAmB,QAAsD;AAGxH,WAAO,MAAM,UAAU,YAAY,OAAM,QAAO;AAC/C,UAAI,OAAO,gBAAgB,MAAM;AAChC,eAAO,IAAI,cAAc,2BAA2B,4BAA4B;AAAA,MACjF;AAGA,YAAM,KAAK,qBAAqB,KAAK,OAAO,EAAE;AAC9C,YAAM,KAAK,uBAAuB,KAAK,OAAO,WAAW;AAEzD,aAAO,IAAI,WAAW,IAAI;AAAA,IAC3B,GAAG,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,OAAA,GAAU;AAAA,EACzB;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,aAAa,WAA4B,QAAwD;AACtG,QAAI,OAAO,gBAAgB,MAAM;AAChC,aAAO,IAAI,cAAc,0BAA0B,2BAA2B;AAAA,IAC/E;AAGA,UAAM,UAAU,WAAW,QAAQ,IAAI,oBAAoB,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;AAErE,WAAO,IAAI,WAAW,IAAI;AAAA,EAC3B;AAAA,EAEA,MAAc,qBAAqB,WAA4B,UAAkB;AAChF,UAAM,UAAU,WAAW,QAAQ,IAAI,qBAAqB,QAAQ,CAAC;AAAA,EACtE;AAAA,EAEA,MAAc,uBAAuB,WAA4B,kBAA0B;AAC1F,UAAM,KAAK,cAAc,uBAAuB,WAAW,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAC5E;AACD;"}

package/dist/development/src/model/service/SignInManager.cjs

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ require("../type/ApiKey.cjs");
 const ConfigurationQuery = require("../queries/configuration/ConfigurationQuery.cjs");
 const exceptions = require("../../exceptions.cjs");
 const PersonQuery = require("../queries/person/PersonQuery.cjs");
+const LocalAuthDisablingIdpsQuery = require("../queries/idp/LocalAuthDisablingIdpsQuery.cjs");
 require("../authorization/PermissionActions.cjs");
 require("@contember/authorization");
 require("../authorization/PermissionContext.cjs");
@@ -42,6 +43,10 @@ class SignInManager {
         personId: person.id
       })
     };
+    const exclusiveIdps = await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(new LocalAuthDisablingIdpsQuery.LocalAuthDisablingIdpsQuery(person.id));
+    if (exclusiveIdps.length > 0) {
+      return new Response.ResponseError("IDP_REQUIRED", `Sign in using ${exclusiveIdps.join(" or ")}`, authLogData);
+    }
     if (!person.password_hash) {
       return new Response.ResponseError("NO_PASSWORD_SET", `No password set`, authLogData);
     }

package/dist/development/src/model/service/SignInManager.cjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"SignInManager.cjs","sources":["../../../../../../packages/engine-tenant-api/src/model/service/SignInManager.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { CreateSessionTokenErrorCode, MfaEnrollment, SignInErrorCode } from '../../schema/index.js'\nimport { ApiKeyManager, AuthPolicyResolver, BackupCodeManager, EmailOtpManager, LoginRiskAnalyzer, OtpManager } from '../service/index.js'\nimport { ConfigurationQuery, PersonQuery, PersonRow, PersonUniqueIdentifier } from '../queries/index.js'\nimport { Config } from '../type/Config.js'\nimport { Providers } from '../providers.js'\nimport { DatabaseContext } from '../utils/index.js'\nimport { Response, ResponseError, ResponseOk } from '../utils/Response.js'\nimport { ImplementationException } from '../../exceptions.js'\nimport { AuthLogService } from './AuthLogService.js'\nimport { UserMailer } from '../mailing/index.js'\nimport { ApiKeyRequestInfo, SetMfaGraceUntilCommand } from '../commands/index.js'\nimport { intervalToSeconds } from '../utils/interval.js'\n\nclass SignInManager {\n\tconstructor(\n\t\tprivate readonly apiKeyManager: ApiKeyManager,\n\t\tprivate readonly providers: Providers,\n\t\tprivate readonly otpManager: OtpManager,\n\t\tprivate readonly backupCodeManager: BackupCodeManager,\n\t\tprivate readonly emailOtpManager: EmailOtpManager,\n\t\tprivate readonly authPolicyResolver: AuthPolicyResolver,\n\t\tprivate readonly loginRiskAnalyzer: LoginRiskAnalyzer,\n\t\tprivate readonly userMailer: UserMailer,\n\t) {}\n\n\tasync signIn(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\temail: string,\n\t\tpassword: string,\n\t\texpiration?: number,\n\t\totpCode?: string,\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t\ttrustForwardedInfo?: boolean,\n\t\tbackupCode?: string,\n\t\tconfig?: Config,\n\t\tgeoCountry?: string,\n\t): Promise<SignInResponse> {\n\t\tconst person = await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(PersonQuery.byEmail(email))\n\n\t\tif (person === null) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('UNKNOWN_EMAIL', `Person with email ${email} not found`, {\n\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\tpersonInput: email,\n\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst authLogData = {\n\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\tpersonInput: email,\n\t\t\t\tpersonId: person.id,\n\t\t\t}),\n\t\t}\n\t\tif (!person.password_hash) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('NO_PASSWORD_SET', `No password set`, authLogData)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (person.disabled_at !== null) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('PERSON_DISABLED', `Person is disabled`, authLogData)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst passwordValid = await this.providers.bcryptCompare(password, person.password_hash)\n\n\t\tif (!passwordValid) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_PASSWORD', `Password does not match`, authLogData)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Block sign-in for accounts that were created while email verification\n\t\t// was required but never proved ownership. Accounts predating the\n\t\t// requirement carry email_verification_required = false and pass through.\n\t\tif (person.email_verification_required && person.email_verified_at === null) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('EMAIL_NOT_VERIFIED', `E-mail address has not been verified`, authLogData)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tlet usedBackupCode = false\n\t\t// Whether a second factor was actively proven in THIS request. Anomaly\n\t\t// step-up (A03) reuses this: a login that already cleared a second factor\n\t\t// is not asked to step up again.\n\t\tlet mfaSatisfiedThisRequest = false\n\t\tconst hasActiveTotp = Boolean(person.otp_secret && person.otp_activated_at)\n\t\tif (hasActiveTotp) {\n\t\t\t// Active TOTP takes precedence (A07 path, unchanged).\n\t\t\tif (otpCode) {\n\t\t\t\tif (!await this.otpManager.verifyOtp(dbContext, person, otpCode)) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', authLogData)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest = true\n\t\t\t} else if (backupCode) {\n\t\t\t\tif (!await this.backupCodeManager.verifyAndConsume(dbContext, person, backupCode)) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', authLogData)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tusedBackupCode = true\n\t\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest = true\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('OTP_REQUIRED', `2FA is enabled. OTP token is required`, authLogData)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else if (person.email_otp_enabled) {\n\t\t\t// No active TOTP, but email OTP is enabled (A05).\n\t\t\tif (otpCode) {\n\t\t\t\tif (!await this.emailOtpManager.verifyAndConsume(dbContext, person, otpCode)) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', authLogData)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest = true\n\t\t\t} else if (backupCode) {\n\t\t\t\tif (!await this.backupCodeManager.verifyAndConsume(dbContext, person, backupCode)) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', authLogData)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tusedBackupCode = true\n\t\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest = true\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t// Dispatch a fresh code and ask the client to retry with otpToken. Reuses\n\t\t\t\t// the existing OTP_REQUIRED contract so clients that already handle it work.\n\t\t\t\t// The send is rate-limited per person; when throttled nothing is emailed\n\t\t\t\t// (emailOtpSent: false) but a previously emailed code stays valid.\n\t\t\t\t// Independent fetch (not the passed-in `config`): the email-OTP send is\n\t\t\t\t// rate-limited by the live config and this branch never reaches the\n\t\t\t\t// anomaly analyzer, so query shape stays as before A03.\n\t\t\t\tconst emailOtpConfig = await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(new ConfigurationQuery(dbContext.providers))\n\t\t\t\tconst decision = await this.emailOtpManager.sendCode(dbContext, person, emailOtpConfig)\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('OTP_REQUIRED', `2FA is enabled. OTP token is required`, {\n\t\t\t\t\temailOtpSent: decision.ok,\n\t\t\t\t\t...authLogData,\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t// No active factor at all (A06). Enforce MFA if a matching auth_policy\n\t\t\t// requires it. With no policy rows configured this resolves to\n\t\t\t// mfaRequired=false and sign-in proceeds exactly as before.\n\t\t\tconst enforcement = await this.enforceMfaEnrollment(dbContext, person, otpCode, authLogData)\n\t\t\tif (enforcement !== null) {\n\t\t\t\tif ('error' in enforcement) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn enforcement\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t// Enrollment completed in this request (pending TOTP promoted to active),\n\t\t\t\t// so MFA is definitively satisfied — anomaly step-up cannot apply.\n\t\t\t\tconst riskHandled = await this.applyRiskPolicy(dbContext, person, {\n\t\t\t\t\tconfig,\n\t\t\t\t\tgeoCountry,\n\t\t\t\t\trequestInfo,\n\t\t\t\t\totpCode,\n\t\t\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest: true,\n\t\t\t\t\tauthLogData,\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\tif (riskHandled !== null && 'error' in riskHandled) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn riskHandled\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tconst sessionToken = await this.apiKeyManager.createSessionApiKey(\n\t\t\t\t\tdbContext,\n\t\t\t\t\tperson.identity_id,\n\t\t\t\t\texpiration,\n\t\t\t\t\trequestInfo,\n\t\t\t\t\ttrustForwardedInfo,\n\t\t\t\t)\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseOk({\n\t\t\t\t\tperson,\n\t\t\t\t\ttoken: sessionToken,\n\t\t\t\t\tbackupCodes: enforcement.backupCodes,\n\t\t\t\t\tunusualLoginDetected: riskHandled?.unusualLoginDetected || undefined,\n\t\t\t\t\trisk: riskHandled?.risk,\n\t\t\t\t\t...authLogData,\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst riskHandled = await this.applyRiskPolicy(dbContext, person, {\n\t\t\tconfig,\n\t\t\tgeoCountry,\n\t\t\trequestInfo,\n\t\t\totpCode,\n\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest,\n\t\t\tauthLogData,\n\t\t})\n\t\tif (riskHandled !== null && 'error' in riskHandled) {\n\t\t\treturn riskHandled\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst sessionToken = await this.apiKeyManager.createSessionApiKey(dbContext, person.identity_id, expiration, requestInfo, trustForwardedInfo)\n\n\t\treturn new ResponseOk({\n\t\t\tperson,\n\t\t\ttoken: sessionToken,\n\t\t\tusedBackupCode,\n\t\t\tunusualLoginDetected: riskHandled?.unusualLoginDetected || undefined,\n\t\t\trisk: riskHandled?.risk,\n\t\t\t...authLogData,\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * A03 — evaluate the sign-in risk score and act per policy. Returns:\n\t * - `null` when anomaly detection is off or no `config` was supplied (the\n\t *   default): no DB work, sign-in proceeds unchanged.\n\t * - `{ unusualLoginDetected: true }` when an informational UNUSUAL_LOGIN email\n\t *   was sent (best-effort) but the session may still be issued.\n\t * - a `ResponseError('OTP_REQUIRED')` when step-up is required and no code was\n\t *   supplied — reuses the email-OTP step-up channel (dispatches a code).\n\t * - a `ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN')` when a step-up code was supplied but\n\t *   did not verify. A valid code consumes the token and the session is issued.\n\t * - `{ unusualLoginDetected: false }` when the score was below every threshold.\n\t *\n\t * The audit entries (`unusual_login_detected`, `step_up_required`) are emitted\n\t * by the resolver from the response metadata, matching the project convention.\n\t */\n\tprivate async applyRiskPolicy(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tperson: PersonRow,\n\t\targs: {\n\t\t\tconfig?: Config\n\t\t\tgeoCountry?: string\n\t\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo\n\t\t\totpCode?: string\n\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest: boolean\n\t\t\tauthLogData: { [AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag }\n\t\t},\n\t): Promise<RiskPolicyOutcome> {\n\t\tconst { config, geoCountry, requestInfo, otpCode, mfaSatisfiedThisRequest, authLogData } = args\n\t\tconst policy = config?.login.anomalyDetection\n\t\tif (!config || !policy?.enabled) {\n\t\t\treturn null\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst assessment = await this.loginRiskAnalyzer.analyze(dbContext, person.id, {\n\t\t\tgeoCountry: geoCountry ?? null,\n\t\t\tdeviceFingerprint: this.loginRiskAnalyzer.fingerprint(requestInfo?.userAgent),\n\t\t\tip: requestInfo?.ip ?? null,\n\t\t}, policy)\n\n\t\tif (assessment.action === 'allow') {\n\t\t\treturn { unusualLoginDetected: false }\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst riskMeta = { score: assessment.score, reasons: assessment.reasons }\n\n\t\tif (assessment.action === 'stepUp' && !mfaSatisfiedThisRequest) {\n\t\t\t// Reuse the existing email-OTP step-up channel. This is independent of\n\t\t\t// `person.email_otp_enabled`, which gates email OTP only as the *primary*\n\t\t\t// second factor (A05); the step-up challenge stands on its own, so a person\n\t\t\t// with no standing MFA can still complete it. Without consuming the code\n\t\t\t// here, such a person would never satisfy the step-up and would loop on\n\t\t\t// OTP_REQUIRED forever (the score is unchanged on every retry).\n\t\t\tif (otpCode) {\n\t\t\t\t// Retry leg: the client resent the emailed code as otpToken. Mirror the\n\t\t\t\t// A05 contract — an invalid code is rejected (not re-sent); the per-code\n\t\t\t\t// 3-attempt cap still applies, and a fresh code is issued only when the\n\t\t\t\t// client retries without a code.\n\t\t\t\tif (!await this.emailOtpManager.verifyAndConsume(dbContext, person, otpCode)) {\n\t\t\t\t\t// A failed *forced* second factor is itself an anomaly signal — carry the\n\t\t\t\t\t// step-up/risk metadata so the resolver still emits unusual_login_detected\n\t\t\t\t\t// + step_up_required with the score/reasons, rather than logging it as an\n\t\t\t\t\t// ordinary mistyped-OTP login indistinguishable from a normal 2FA typo.\n\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tstepUpRequired: true,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tunusualLoginDetected: true,\n\t\t\t\t\t\trisk: riskMeta,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t...authLogData,\n\t\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t// Step-up satisfied this request — fall through to notify + allow below.\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t// First leg: dispatch a code and ask the client to retry with otpToken.\n\t\t\t\t// Rate-limited per person; a previously emailed code stays valid when throttled.\n\t\t\t\tconst decision = await this.emailOtpManager.sendCode(dbContext, person, config)\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('OTP_REQUIRED', 'Additional verification is required for this sign-in', {\n\t\t\t\t\temailOtpSent: decision.ok,\n\t\t\t\t\tstepUpRequired: true,\n\t\t\t\t\tunusualLoginDetected: true,\n\t\t\t\t\trisk: riskMeta,\n\t\t\t\t\t...authLogData,\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// action === 'email', or step-up satisfied (already this request, or just now\n\t\t// via the emailed code): notify the person of the unusual sign-in. A failed\n\t\t// email must never block sign-in.\n\t\tawait this.sendUnusualLoginEmail(dbContext, person, geoCountry ?? null, requestInfo?.ip ?? null)\n\t\treturn { unusualLoginDetected: true, risk: riskMeta }\n\t}\n\n\tprivate async sendUnusualLoginEmail(dbContext: DatabaseContext, person: PersonRow, geoCountry: string | null, ip: string | null): Promise<void> {\n\t\tif (!person.email) {\n\t\t\t// No address to notify (e.g. an IDP-only person) — nothing to send.\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tawait this.userMailer.sendUnusualLoginEmail(dbContext, {\n\t\t\t\temail: person.email,\n\t\t\t\tgeoCountry,\n\t\t\t\tipAddress: ip,\n\t\t\t}, { projectId: null, variant: '' })\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t// ignore — informational only\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * A06 enforcement for the no-active-factor case. Returns:\n\t * - `null` when MFA is not required, or grace currently allows sign-in\n\t *   (caller proceeds to issue a session as normal). With zero auth_policy\n\t *   rows this is always the outcome — no behavior change.\n\t * - a `ResponseError` (MFA_ENROLLMENT_REQUIRED with the pending secret to\n\t *   enroll, or INVALID_OTP_TOKEN) when sign-in must be blocked.\n\t * - `{ ok: true, backupCodes }` when enrollment just completed (pending TOTP\n\t *   promoted to active); caller issues the session.\n\t */\n\tprivate async enforceMfaEnrollment(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tperson: PersonRow,\n\t\totpCode: string | undefined,\n\t\tauthLogData: { [AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag },\n\t): Promise<\n\t\t| null\n\t\t| ResponseError<SignInErrorCode, {\n\t\t\temailOtpSent?: boolean\n\t\t\tmfaEnrollmentRequired?: boolean\n\t\t\tmfaEnrollment?: MfaEnrollment\n\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n\t\t}>\n\t\t| { backupCodes: string[] }\n\t> {\n\t\tconst policy = await this.authPolicyResolver.resolveForIdentity(dbContext, person.identity_id, person.roles)\n\t\tif (!policy.mfaRequired) {\n\t\t\treturn null\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst now = this.providers.now()\n\n\t\t// Resolve the effective grace duration (seconds). A per-policy override\n\t\t// wins; otherwise we fall back to the global config default. Only fetch the\n\t\t// config when the override is absent, to keep query shapes minimal.\n\t\tlet graceSeconds: number\n\t\tif (policy.graceDuration !== null) {\n\t\t\tgraceSeconds = intervalToSeconds(policy.graceDuration)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tconst config = await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(new ConfigurationQuery(dbContext.providers))\n\t\t\tgraceSeconds = intervalToSeconds(config.login.mfaGraceDuration)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Grace handling. Default grace duration is 0 (immediate enforcement), so\n\t\t// by default neither branch below opens a window.\n\t\tif (person.mfa_grace_until !== null) {\n\t\t\tif (person.mfa_grace_until.getTime() > now.getTime()) {\n\t\t\t\t// Still inside an open grace window — allow sign-in.\n\t\t\t\treturn null\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// Grace expired → fall through to enforcement.\n\t\t} else if (graceSeconds > 0) {\n\t\t\t// Open the grace window now and allow this sign-in.\n\t\t\tconst graceUntil = new Date(now.getTime() + graceSeconds * 1000)\n\t\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(new SetMfaGraceUntilCommand(person.id, graceUntil))\n\t\t\treturn null\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Enforce.\n\t\tif (otpCode && person.otp_pending_secret) {\n\t\t\t// Enrollment completion: verify against the pending secret, then promote.\n\t\t\tif (!await this.otpManager.verifyPendingOtp(person, otpCode)) {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', authLogData)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tconst promoted = await this.otpManager.confirmOtp(dbContext, person)\n\t\t\tif (!promoted) {\n\t\t\t\t// Lost a concurrent enrollment-completion race: the pending secret was\n\t\t\t\t// already promoted by the other request (which issued the backup codes).\n\t\t\t\t// Don't regenerate here — that would invalidate the codes already\n\t\t\t\t// returned. TOTP is now active, so a retry signs in via the normal path.\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', authLogData)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tconst backupCodes = await this.backupCodeManager.generate(dbContext, person.id)\n\t\t\treturn { backupCodes }\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Provision a fresh pending TOTP secret and ask the client to enroll.\n\t\tconst otp = await this.otpManager.prepareOtp(dbContext, person, 'Contember')\n\t\tconst mfaEnrollment: MfaEnrollment = { otpUri: otp.uri, otpSecret: otp.secret }\n\t\treturn new ResponseError('MFA_ENROLLMENT_REQUIRED', 'MFA enrollment is required', {\n\t\t\tmfaEnrollmentRequired: true,\n\t\t\tmfaEnrollment,\n\t\t\t...authLogData,\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tasync createSessionToken(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tpersonIdentifier: PersonUniqueIdentifier,\n\t\texpiration?: number,\n\t\tverifier?: (person: PersonRow) => Promise<void>,\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t\ttrustForwardedInfo?: boolean,\n\t): Promise<CreateSessionTokenResponse> {\n\t\tconst person = await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(PersonQuery.byUniqueIdentifier(personIdentifier))\n\n\t\tif (person === null) {\n\t\t\tif (personIdentifier.type === 'email') {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('UNKNOWN_EMAIL', `Person with email ${personIdentifier.email} not found`, {\n\t\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonInput: personIdentifier.email,\n\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t} else if (personIdentifier.type === 'id') {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('UNKNOWN_PERSON_ID', `Person with id ${personIdentifier.id} not found`, {\n\t\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonInput: personIdentifier.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tthrow new ImplementationException()\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst inputValue = personIdentifier.type === 'email' ? personIdentifier.email : personIdentifier.id\n\t\tif (person.disabled_at !== null) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('PERSON_DISABLED', `Person with id ${person.id} is disabled`, {\n\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: person.id,\n\t\t\t\t\tpersonInput: inputValue,\n\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tawait verifier?.(person)\n\n\t\tconst sessionToken = await this.apiKeyManager.createSessionApiKey(dbContext, person.identity_id, expiration, requestInfo, trustForwardedInfo)\n\t\treturn new ResponseOk({\n\t\t\tperson,\n\t\t\ttoken: sessionToken,\n\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\tpersonId: person.id,\n\t\t\t\tpersonInput: inputValue,\n\t\t\t}),\n\t\t})\n\t}\n}\n\n/** A03: greppable payload describing why a sign-in scored as unusual. */\nexport interface RiskMeta {\n\treadonly score: number\n\treadonly reasons: readonly string[]\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of {@link SignInManager.applyRiskPolicy}: `null` = feature off / no\n * config; a metadata object when the session may still be issued; a\n * `ResponseError` when step-up blocks the session.\n */\ntype RiskPolicyOutcome =\n\t| null\n\t| { unusualLoginDetected: boolean; risk?: RiskMeta }\n\t| ResponseError<SignInErrorCode, {\n\t\temailOtpSent?: boolean\n\t\tstepUpRequired?: boolean\n\t\tunusualLoginDetected?: boolean\n\t\trisk?: RiskMeta\n\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n\t}>\n\nexport interface SignInResult {\n\treadonly person: PersonRow\n\treadonly token: string\n\t/** True when MFA was satisfied by consuming a backup code (instead of a TOTP token). */\n\treadonly usedBackupCode?: boolean\n\t/** Set when sign-in completed an MFA enrollment (A06): the freshly issued backup codes, shown once. */\n\treadonly backupCodes?: string[]\n\t/** A03: true when this sign-in scored as unusual and an UNUSUAL_LOGIN email was sent. */\n\treadonly unusualLoginDetected?: boolean\n\t/** A03: the risk score + reasons, recorded in the `unusual_login_detected` audit `event_data`. */\n\treadonly risk?: RiskMeta\n\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n}\n\nexport type SignInResponse = Response<SignInResult, SignInErrorCode, {\n\t/** Set on an OTP_REQUIRED error when an email-OTP code was just dispatched (A05). */\n\temailOtpSent?: boolean\n\t/** Set on a MFA_ENROLLMENT_REQUIRED error (A06): triggers the `mfa_enrollment_required` audit. */\n\tmfaEnrollmentRequired?: boolean\n\t/** Set on a MFA_ENROLLMENT_REQUIRED error (A06): the pending secret the client must enroll. */\n\tmfaEnrollment?: MfaEnrollment\n\t/** Set on an OTP_REQUIRED error raised by A03 anomaly step-up: triggers the `step_up_required` audit. */\n\tstepUpRequired?: boolean\n\t/** A03: true when the sign-in scored as unusual (triggers the `unusual_login_detected` audit). */\n\tunusualLoginDetected?: boolean\n\t/** A03: the risk score + reasons, recorded in the audit `event_data`. */\n\trisk?: RiskMeta\n\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n}>\nexport type CreateSessionTokenResponse = Response<SignInResult, CreateSessionTokenErrorCode, {\n\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n}>\n\nexport { SignInManager 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+{"version":3,"file":"SignInManager.cjs","sources":["../../../../../../packages/engine-tenant-api/src/model/service/SignInManager.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { CreateSessionTokenErrorCode, MfaEnrollment, SignInErrorCode } from '../../schema/index.js'\nimport { ApiKeyManager, AuthPolicyResolver, BackupCodeManager, EmailOtpManager, LoginRiskAnalyzer, OtpManager } from '../service/index.js'\nimport { ConfigurationQuery, LocalAuthDisablingIdpsQuery, PersonQuery, PersonRow, PersonUniqueIdentifier } from '../queries/index.js'\nimport { Config } from '../type/Config.js'\nimport { Providers } from '../providers.js'\nimport { DatabaseContext } from '../utils/index.js'\nimport { Response, ResponseError, ResponseOk } from '../utils/Response.js'\nimport { ImplementationException } from '../../exceptions.js'\nimport { AuthLogService } from './AuthLogService.js'\nimport { UserMailer } from '../mailing/index.js'\nimport { ApiKeyRequestInfo, SetMfaGraceUntilCommand } from '../commands/index.js'\nimport { intervalToSeconds } from '../utils/interval.js'\n\nclass SignInManager {\n\tconstructor(\n\t\tprivate readonly apiKeyManager: ApiKeyManager,\n\t\tprivate readonly providers: Providers,\n\t\tprivate readonly otpManager: OtpManager,\n\t\tprivate readonly backupCodeManager: BackupCodeManager,\n\t\tprivate readonly emailOtpManager: EmailOtpManager,\n\t\tprivate readonly authPolicyResolver: AuthPolicyResolver,\n\t\tprivate readonly loginRiskAnalyzer: LoginRiskAnalyzer,\n\t\tprivate readonly userMailer: UserMailer,\n\t) {}\n\n\tasync signIn(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\temail: string,\n\t\tpassword: string,\n\t\texpiration?: number,\n\t\totpCode?: string,\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t\ttrustForwardedInfo?: boolean,\n\t\tbackupCode?: string,\n\t\tconfig?: Config,\n\t\tgeoCountry?: string,\n\t): Promise<SignInResponse> {\n\t\tconst person = await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(PersonQuery.byEmail(email))\n\n\t\tif (person === null) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('UNKNOWN_EMAIL', `Person with email ${email} not found`, {\n\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\tpersonInput: email,\n\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst authLogData = {\n\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\tpersonInput: email,\n\t\t\t\tpersonId: person.id,\n\t\t\t}),\n\t\t}\n\t\t// Refused before the password is even looked at: for a person federated\n\t\t// through a provider with `disableLocalAuthentication`, a password is not a\n\t\t// credential this tenant accepts, however it got set.\n\t\tconst exclusiveIdps = await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(new LocalAuthDisablingIdpsQuery(person.id))\n\t\tif (exclusiveIdps.length > 0) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('IDP_REQUIRED', `Sign in using ${exclusiveIdps.join(' or ')}`, authLogData)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (!person.password_hash) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('NO_PASSWORD_SET', `No password set`, authLogData)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (person.disabled_at !== null) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('PERSON_DISABLED', `Person is disabled`, authLogData)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst passwordValid = await this.providers.bcryptCompare(password, person.password_hash)\n\n\t\tif (!passwordValid) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_PASSWORD', `Password does not match`, authLogData)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Block sign-in for accounts that were created while email verification\n\t\t// was required but never proved ownership. Accounts predating the\n\t\t// requirement carry email_verification_required = false and pass through.\n\t\tif (person.email_verification_required && person.email_verified_at === null) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('EMAIL_NOT_VERIFIED', `E-mail address has not been verified`, authLogData)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tlet usedBackupCode = false\n\t\t// Whether a second factor was actively proven in THIS request. Anomaly\n\t\t// step-up (A03) reuses this: a login that already cleared a second factor\n\t\t// is not asked to step up again.\n\t\tlet mfaSatisfiedThisRequest = false\n\t\tconst hasActiveTotp = Boolean(person.otp_secret && person.otp_activated_at)\n\t\tif (hasActiveTotp) {\n\t\t\t// Active TOTP takes precedence (A07 path, unchanged).\n\t\t\tif (otpCode) {\n\t\t\t\tif (!await this.otpManager.verifyOtp(dbContext, person, otpCode)) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', authLogData)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest = true\n\t\t\t} else if (backupCode) {\n\t\t\t\tif (!await this.backupCodeManager.verifyAndConsume(dbContext, person, backupCode)) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', authLogData)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tusedBackupCode = true\n\t\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest = true\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('OTP_REQUIRED', `2FA is enabled. OTP token is required`, authLogData)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else if (person.email_otp_enabled) {\n\t\t\t// No active TOTP, but email OTP is enabled (A05).\n\t\t\tif (otpCode) {\n\t\t\t\tif (!await this.emailOtpManager.verifyAndConsume(dbContext, person, otpCode)) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', authLogData)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest = true\n\t\t\t} else if (backupCode) {\n\t\t\t\tif (!await this.backupCodeManager.verifyAndConsume(dbContext, person, backupCode)) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', authLogData)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tusedBackupCode = true\n\t\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest = true\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t// Dispatch a fresh code and ask the client to retry with otpToken. Reuses\n\t\t\t\t// the existing OTP_REQUIRED contract so clients that already handle it work.\n\t\t\t\t// The send is rate-limited per person; when throttled nothing is emailed\n\t\t\t\t// (emailOtpSent: false) but a previously emailed code stays valid.\n\t\t\t\t// Independent fetch (not the passed-in `config`): the email-OTP send is\n\t\t\t\t// rate-limited by the live config and this branch never reaches the\n\t\t\t\t// anomaly analyzer, so query shape stays as before A03.\n\t\t\t\tconst emailOtpConfig = await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(new ConfigurationQuery(dbContext.providers))\n\t\t\t\tconst decision = await this.emailOtpManager.sendCode(dbContext, person, emailOtpConfig)\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('OTP_REQUIRED', `2FA is enabled. OTP token is required`, {\n\t\t\t\t\temailOtpSent: decision.ok,\n\t\t\t\t\t...authLogData,\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t// No active factor at all (A06). Enforce MFA if a matching auth_policy\n\t\t\t// requires it. With no policy rows configured this resolves to\n\t\t\t// mfaRequired=false and sign-in proceeds exactly as before.\n\t\t\tconst enforcement = await this.enforceMfaEnrollment(dbContext, person, otpCode, authLogData)\n\t\t\tif (enforcement !== null) {\n\t\t\t\tif ('error' in enforcement) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn enforcement\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t// Enrollment completed in this request (pending TOTP promoted to active),\n\t\t\t\t// so MFA is definitively satisfied — anomaly step-up cannot apply.\n\t\t\t\tconst riskHandled = await this.applyRiskPolicy(dbContext, person, {\n\t\t\t\t\tconfig,\n\t\t\t\t\tgeoCountry,\n\t\t\t\t\trequestInfo,\n\t\t\t\t\totpCode,\n\t\t\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest: true,\n\t\t\t\t\tauthLogData,\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\tif (riskHandled !== null && 'error' in riskHandled) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn riskHandled\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tconst sessionToken = await this.apiKeyManager.createSessionApiKey(\n\t\t\t\t\tdbContext,\n\t\t\t\t\tperson.identity_id,\n\t\t\t\t\texpiration,\n\t\t\t\t\trequestInfo,\n\t\t\t\t\ttrustForwardedInfo,\n\t\t\t\t)\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseOk({\n\t\t\t\t\tperson,\n\t\t\t\t\ttoken: sessionToken,\n\t\t\t\t\tbackupCodes: enforcement.backupCodes,\n\t\t\t\t\tunusualLoginDetected: riskHandled?.unusualLoginDetected || undefined,\n\t\t\t\t\trisk: riskHandled?.risk,\n\t\t\t\t\t...authLogData,\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst riskHandled = await this.applyRiskPolicy(dbContext, person, {\n\t\t\tconfig,\n\t\t\tgeoCountry,\n\t\t\trequestInfo,\n\t\t\totpCode,\n\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest,\n\t\t\tauthLogData,\n\t\t})\n\t\tif (riskHandled !== null && 'error' in riskHandled) {\n\t\t\treturn riskHandled\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst sessionToken = await this.apiKeyManager.createSessionApiKey(dbContext, person.identity_id, expiration, requestInfo, trustForwardedInfo)\n\n\t\treturn new ResponseOk({\n\t\t\tperson,\n\t\t\ttoken: sessionToken,\n\t\t\tusedBackupCode,\n\t\t\tunusualLoginDetected: riskHandled?.unusualLoginDetected || undefined,\n\t\t\trisk: riskHandled?.risk,\n\t\t\t...authLogData,\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * A03 — evaluate the sign-in risk score and act per policy. Returns:\n\t * - `null` when anomaly detection is off or no `config` was supplied (the\n\t *   default): no DB work, sign-in proceeds unchanged.\n\t * - `{ unusualLoginDetected: true }` when an informational UNUSUAL_LOGIN email\n\t *   was sent (best-effort) but the session may still be issued.\n\t * - a `ResponseError('OTP_REQUIRED')` when step-up is required and no code was\n\t *   supplied — reuses the email-OTP step-up channel (dispatches a code).\n\t * - a `ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN')` when a step-up code was supplied but\n\t *   did not verify. A valid code consumes the token and the session is issued.\n\t * - `{ unusualLoginDetected: false }` when the score was below every threshold.\n\t *\n\t * The audit entries (`unusual_login_detected`, `step_up_required`) are emitted\n\t * by the resolver from the response metadata, matching the project convention.\n\t */\n\tprivate async applyRiskPolicy(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tperson: PersonRow,\n\t\targs: {\n\t\t\tconfig?: Config\n\t\t\tgeoCountry?: string\n\t\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo\n\t\t\totpCode?: string\n\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest: boolean\n\t\t\tauthLogData: { [AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag }\n\t\t},\n\t): Promise<RiskPolicyOutcome> {\n\t\tconst { config, geoCountry, requestInfo, otpCode, mfaSatisfiedThisRequest, authLogData } = args\n\t\tconst policy = config?.login.anomalyDetection\n\t\tif (!config || !policy?.enabled) {\n\t\t\treturn null\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst assessment = await this.loginRiskAnalyzer.analyze(dbContext, person.id, {\n\t\t\tgeoCountry: geoCountry ?? null,\n\t\t\tdeviceFingerprint: this.loginRiskAnalyzer.fingerprint(requestInfo?.userAgent),\n\t\t\tip: requestInfo?.ip ?? null,\n\t\t}, policy)\n\n\t\tif (assessment.action === 'allow') {\n\t\t\treturn { unusualLoginDetected: false }\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst riskMeta = { score: assessment.score, reasons: assessment.reasons }\n\n\t\tif (assessment.action === 'stepUp' && !mfaSatisfiedThisRequest) {\n\t\t\t// Reuse the existing email-OTP step-up channel. This is independent of\n\t\t\t// `person.email_otp_enabled`, which gates email OTP only as the *primary*\n\t\t\t// second factor (A05); the step-up challenge stands on its own, so a person\n\t\t\t// with no standing MFA can still complete it. Without consuming the code\n\t\t\t// here, such a person would never satisfy the step-up and would loop on\n\t\t\t// OTP_REQUIRED forever (the score is unchanged on every retry).\n\t\t\tif (otpCode) {\n\t\t\t\t// Retry leg: the client resent the emailed code as otpToken. Mirror the\n\t\t\t\t// A05 contract — an invalid code is rejected (not re-sent); the per-code\n\t\t\t\t// 3-attempt cap still applies, and a fresh code is issued only when the\n\t\t\t\t// client retries without a code.\n\t\t\t\tif (!await this.emailOtpManager.verifyAndConsume(dbContext, person, otpCode)) {\n\t\t\t\t\t// A failed *forced* second factor is itself an anomaly signal — carry the\n\t\t\t\t\t// step-up/risk metadata so the resolver still emits unusual_login_detected\n\t\t\t\t\t// + step_up_required with the score/reasons, rather than logging it as an\n\t\t\t\t\t// ordinary mistyped-OTP login indistinguishable from a normal 2FA typo.\n\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tstepUpRequired: true,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tunusualLoginDetected: true,\n\t\t\t\t\t\trisk: riskMeta,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t...authLogData,\n\t\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t// Step-up satisfied this request — fall through to notify + allow below.\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t// First leg: dispatch a code and ask the client to retry with otpToken.\n\t\t\t\t// Rate-limited per person; a previously emailed code stays valid when throttled.\n\t\t\t\tconst decision = await this.emailOtpManager.sendCode(dbContext, person, config)\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('OTP_REQUIRED', 'Additional verification is required for this sign-in', {\n\t\t\t\t\temailOtpSent: decision.ok,\n\t\t\t\t\tstepUpRequired: true,\n\t\t\t\t\tunusualLoginDetected: true,\n\t\t\t\t\trisk: riskMeta,\n\t\t\t\t\t...authLogData,\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// action === 'email', or step-up satisfied (already this request, or just now\n\t\t// via the emailed code): notify the person of the unusual sign-in. A failed\n\t\t// email must never block sign-in.\n\t\tawait this.sendUnusualLoginEmail(dbContext, person, geoCountry ?? null, requestInfo?.ip ?? null)\n\t\treturn { unusualLoginDetected: true, risk: riskMeta }\n\t}\n\n\tprivate async sendUnusualLoginEmail(dbContext: DatabaseContext, person: PersonRow, geoCountry: string | null, ip: string | null): Promise<void> {\n\t\tif (!person.email) {\n\t\t\t// No address to notify (e.g. an IDP-only person) — nothing to send.\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tawait this.userMailer.sendUnusualLoginEmail(dbContext, {\n\t\t\t\temail: person.email,\n\t\t\t\tgeoCountry,\n\t\t\t\tipAddress: ip,\n\t\t\t}, { projectId: null, variant: '' })\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t// ignore — informational only\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * A06 enforcement for the no-active-factor case. Returns:\n\t * - `null` when MFA is not required, or grace currently allows sign-in\n\t *   (caller proceeds to issue a session as normal). With zero auth_policy\n\t *   rows this is always the outcome — no behavior change.\n\t * - a `ResponseError` (MFA_ENROLLMENT_REQUIRED with the pending secret to\n\t *   enroll, or INVALID_OTP_TOKEN) when sign-in must be blocked.\n\t * - `{ ok: true, backupCodes }` when enrollment just completed (pending TOTP\n\t *   promoted to active); caller issues the session.\n\t */\n\tprivate async enforceMfaEnrollment(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tperson: PersonRow,\n\t\totpCode: string | undefined,\n\t\tauthLogData: { [AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag },\n\t): Promise<\n\t\t| null\n\t\t| ResponseError<SignInErrorCode, {\n\t\t\temailOtpSent?: boolean\n\t\t\tmfaEnrollmentRequired?: boolean\n\t\t\tmfaEnrollment?: MfaEnrollment\n\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n\t\t}>\n\t\t| { backupCodes: string[] }\n\t> {\n\t\tconst policy = await this.authPolicyResolver.resolveForIdentity(dbContext, person.identity_id, person.roles)\n\t\tif (!policy.mfaRequired) {\n\t\t\treturn null\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst now = this.providers.now()\n\n\t\t// Resolve the effective grace duration (seconds). A per-policy override\n\t\t// wins; otherwise we fall back to the global config default. Only fetch the\n\t\t// config when the override is absent, to keep query shapes minimal.\n\t\tlet graceSeconds: number\n\t\tif (policy.graceDuration !== null) {\n\t\t\tgraceSeconds = intervalToSeconds(policy.graceDuration)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tconst config = await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(new ConfigurationQuery(dbContext.providers))\n\t\t\tgraceSeconds = intervalToSeconds(config.login.mfaGraceDuration)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Grace handling. Default grace duration is 0 (immediate enforcement), so\n\t\t// by default neither branch below opens a window.\n\t\tif (person.mfa_grace_until !== null) {\n\t\t\tif (person.mfa_grace_until.getTime() > now.getTime()) {\n\t\t\t\t// Still inside an open grace window — allow sign-in.\n\t\t\t\treturn null\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// Grace expired → fall through to enforcement.\n\t\t} else if (graceSeconds > 0) {\n\t\t\t// Open the grace window now and allow this sign-in.\n\t\t\tconst graceUntil = new Date(now.getTime() + graceSeconds * 1000)\n\t\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(new SetMfaGraceUntilCommand(person.id, graceUntil))\n\t\t\treturn null\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Enforce.\n\t\tif (otpCode && person.otp_pending_secret) {\n\t\t\t// Enrollment completion: verify against the pending secret, then promote.\n\t\t\tif (!await this.otpManager.verifyPendingOtp(person, otpCode)) {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', authLogData)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tconst promoted = await this.otpManager.confirmOtp(dbContext, person)\n\t\t\tif (!promoted) {\n\t\t\t\t// Lost a concurrent enrollment-completion race: the pending secret was\n\t\t\t\t// already promoted by the other request (which issued the backup codes).\n\t\t\t\t// Don't regenerate here — that would invalidate the codes already\n\t\t\t\t// returned. TOTP is now active, so a retry signs in via the normal path.\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', authLogData)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tconst backupCodes = await this.backupCodeManager.generate(dbContext, person.id)\n\t\t\treturn { backupCodes }\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Provision a fresh pending TOTP secret and ask the client to enroll.\n\t\tconst otp = await this.otpManager.prepareOtp(dbContext, person, 'Contember')\n\t\tconst mfaEnrollment: MfaEnrollment = { otpUri: otp.uri, otpSecret: otp.secret }\n\t\treturn new ResponseError('MFA_ENROLLMENT_REQUIRED', 'MFA enrollment is required', {\n\t\t\tmfaEnrollmentRequired: true,\n\t\t\tmfaEnrollment,\n\t\t\t...authLogData,\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tasync createSessionToken(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tpersonIdentifier: PersonUniqueIdentifier,\n\t\texpiration?: number,\n\t\tverifier?: (person: PersonRow) => Promise<void>,\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t\ttrustForwardedInfo?: boolean,\n\t): Promise<CreateSessionTokenResponse> {\n\t\tconst person = await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(PersonQuery.byUniqueIdentifier(personIdentifier))\n\n\t\tif (person === null) {\n\t\t\tif (personIdentifier.type === 'email') {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('UNKNOWN_EMAIL', `Person with email ${personIdentifier.email} not found`, {\n\t\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonInput: personIdentifier.email,\n\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t} else if (personIdentifier.type === 'id') {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('UNKNOWN_PERSON_ID', `Person with id ${personIdentifier.id} not found`, {\n\t\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonInput: personIdentifier.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tthrow new ImplementationException()\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst inputValue = personIdentifier.type === 'email' ? personIdentifier.email : personIdentifier.id\n\t\tif (person.disabled_at !== null) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('PERSON_DISABLED', `Person with id ${person.id} is disabled`, {\n\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: person.id,\n\t\t\t\t\tpersonInput: inputValue,\n\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tawait verifier?.(person)\n\n\t\tconst sessionToken = await this.apiKeyManager.createSessionApiKey(dbContext, person.identity_id, expiration, requestInfo, trustForwardedInfo)\n\t\treturn new ResponseOk({\n\t\t\tperson,\n\t\t\ttoken: sessionToken,\n\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\tpersonId: person.id,\n\t\t\t\tpersonInput: inputValue,\n\t\t\t}),\n\t\t})\n\t}\n}\n\n/** A03: greppable payload describing why a sign-in scored as unusual. */\nexport interface RiskMeta {\n\treadonly score: number\n\treadonly reasons: readonly string[]\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of {@link SignInManager.applyRiskPolicy}: `null` = feature off / no\n * config; a metadata object when the session may still be issued; a\n * `ResponseError` when step-up blocks the session.\n */\ntype RiskPolicyOutcome =\n\t| null\n\t| { unusualLoginDetected: boolean; risk?: RiskMeta }\n\t| ResponseError<SignInErrorCode, {\n\t\temailOtpSent?: boolean\n\t\tstepUpRequired?: boolean\n\t\tunusualLoginDetected?: boolean\n\t\trisk?: RiskMeta\n\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n\t}>\n\nexport interface SignInResult {\n\treadonly person: PersonRow\n\treadonly token: string\n\t/** True when MFA was satisfied by consuming a backup code (instead of a TOTP token). */\n\treadonly usedBackupCode?: boolean\n\t/** Set when sign-in completed an MFA enrollment (A06): the freshly issued backup codes, shown once. */\n\treadonly backupCodes?: string[]\n\t/** A03: true when this sign-in scored as unusual and an UNUSUAL_LOGIN email was sent. */\n\treadonly unusualLoginDetected?: boolean\n\t/** A03: the risk score + reasons, recorded in the `unusual_login_detected` audit `event_data`. */\n\treadonly risk?: RiskMeta\n\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n}\n\nexport type SignInResponse = Response<SignInResult, SignInErrorCode, {\n\t/** Set on an OTP_REQUIRED error when an email-OTP code was just dispatched (A05). */\n\temailOtpSent?: boolean\n\t/** Set on a MFA_ENROLLMENT_REQUIRED error (A06): triggers the `mfa_enrollment_required` audit. */\n\tmfaEnrollmentRequired?: boolean\n\t/** Set on a MFA_ENROLLMENT_REQUIRED error (A06): the pending secret the client must enroll. */\n\tmfaEnrollment?: MfaEnrollment\n\t/** Set on an OTP_REQUIRED error raised by A03 anomaly step-up: triggers the `step_up_required` audit. */\n\tstepUpRequired?: boolean\n\t/** A03: true when the sign-in scored as unusual (triggers the `unusual_login_detected` audit). */\n\tunusualLoginDetected?: boolean\n\t/** A03: the risk score + reasons, recorded in the audit `event_data`. */\n\trisk?: RiskMeta\n\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n}>\nexport type CreateSessionTokenResponse = Response<SignInResult, CreateSessionTokenErrorCode, {\n\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n}>\n\nexport { SignInManager 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package/dist/development/src/model/service/SignInManager.js

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import "../type/ApiKey.js";
 import { ConfigurationQuery } from "../queries/configuration/ConfigurationQuery.js";
 import { ImplementationException } from "../../exceptions.js";
 import { PersonQuery } from "../queries/person/PersonQuery.js";
+import { LocalAuthDisablingIdpsQuery } from "../queries/idp/LocalAuthDisablingIdpsQuery.js";
 import "../authorization/PermissionActions.js";
 import "@contember/authorization";
 import "../authorization/PermissionContext.js";
@@ -40,6 +41,10 @@ class SignInManager {
         personId: person.id
       })
     };
+    const exclusiveIdps = await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(new LocalAuthDisablingIdpsQuery(person.id));
+    if (exclusiveIdps.length > 0) {
+      return new ResponseError("IDP_REQUIRED", `Sign in using ${exclusiveIdps.join(" or ")}`, authLogData);
+    }
     if (!person.password_hash) {
       return new ResponseError("NO_PASSWORD_SET", `No password set`, authLogData);
     }

package/dist/development/src/model/service/SignInManager.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"SignInManager.js","sources":["../../../../../../packages/engine-tenant-api/src/model/service/SignInManager.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { CreateSessionTokenErrorCode, MfaEnrollment, SignInErrorCode } from '../../schema/index.js'\nimport { ApiKeyManager, AuthPolicyResolver, BackupCodeManager, EmailOtpManager, LoginRiskAnalyzer, OtpManager } from '../service/index.js'\nimport { ConfigurationQuery, PersonQuery, PersonRow, PersonUniqueIdentifier } from '../queries/index.js'\nimport { Config } from '../type/Config.js'\nimport { Providers } from '../providers.js'\nimport { DatabaseContext } from '../utils/index.js'\nimport { Response, ResponseError, ResponseOk } from '../utils/Response.js'\nimport { ImplementationException } from '../../exceptions.js'\nimport { AuthLogService } from './AuthLogService.js'\nimport { UserMailer } from '../mailing/index.js'\nimport { ApiKeyRequestInfo, SetMfaGraceUntilCommand } from '../commands/index.js'\nimport { intervalToSeconds } from '../utils/interval.js'\n\nclass SignInManager {\n\tconstructor(\n\t\tprivate readonly apiKeyManager: ApiKeyManager,\n\t\tprivate readonly providers: Providers,\n\t\tprivate readonly otpManager: OtpManager,\n\t\tprivate readonly backupCodeManager: BackupCodeManager,\n\t\tprivate readonly emailOtpManager: EmailOtpManager,\n\t\tprivate readonly authPolicyResolver: AuthPolicyResolver,\n\t\tprivate readonly loginRiskAnalyzer: LoginRiskAnalyzer,\n\t\tprivate readonly userMailer: UserMailer,\n\t) {}\n\n\tasync signIn(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\temail: string,\n\t\tpassword: string,\n\t\texpiration?: number,\n\t\totpCode?: string,\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t\ttrustForwardedInfo?: boolean,\n\t\tbackupCode?: string,\n\t\tconfig?: Config,\n\t\tgeoCountry?: string,\n\t): Promise<SignInResponse> {\n\t\tconst person = await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(PersonQuery.byEmail(email))\n\n\t\tif (person === null) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('UNKNOWN_EMAIL', `Person with email ${email} not found`, {\n\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\tpersonInput: email,\n\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst authLogData = {\n\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\tpersonInput: email,\n\t\t\t\tpersonId: person.id,\n\t\t\t}),\n\t\t}\n\t\tif (!person.password_hash) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('NO_PASSWORD_SET', `No password set`, authLogData)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (person.disabled_at !== null) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('PERSON_DISABLED', `Person is disabled`, authLogData)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst passwordValid = await this.providers.bcryptCompare(password, person.password_hash)\n\n\t\tif (!passwordValid) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_PASSWORD', `Password does not match`, authLogData)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Block sign-in for accounts that were created while email verification\n\t\t// was required but never proved ownership. Accounts predating the\n\t\t// requirement carry email_verification_required = false and pass through.\n\t\tif (person.email_verification_required && person.email_verified_at === null) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('EMAIL_NOT_VERIFIED', `E-mail address has not been verified`, authLogData)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tlet usedBackupCode = false\n\t\t// Whether a second factor was actively proven in THIS request. Anomaly\n\t\t// step-up (A03) reuses this: a login that already cleared a second factor\n\t\t// is not asked to step up again.\n\t\tlet mfaSatisfiedThisRequest = false\n\t\tconst hasActiveTotp = Boolean(person.otp_secret && person.otp_activated_at)\n\t\tif (hasActiveTotp) {\n\t\t\t// Active TOTP takes precedence (A07 path, unchanged).\n\t\t\tif (otpCode) {\n\t\t\t\tif (!await this.otpManager.verifyOtp(dbContext, person, otpCode)) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', authLogData)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest = true\n\t\t\t} else if (backupCode) {\n\t\t\t\tif (!await this.backupCodeManager.verifyAndConsume(dbContext, person, backupCode)) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', authLogData)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tusedBackupCode = true\n\t\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest = true\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('OTP_REQUIRED', `2FA is enabled. OTP token is required`, authLogData)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else if (person.email_otp_enabled) {\n\t\t\t// No active TOTP, but email OTP is enabled (A05).\n\t\t\tif (otpCode) {\n\t\t\t\tif (!await this.emailOtpManager.verifyAndConsume(dbContext, person, otpCode)) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', authLogData)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest = true\n\t\t\t} else if (backupCode) {\n\t\t\t\tif (!await this.backupCodeManager.verifyAndConsume(dbContext, person, backupCode)) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', authLogData)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tusedBackupCode = true\n\t\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest = true\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t// Dispatch a fresh code and ask the client to retry with otpToken. Reuses\n\t\t\t\t// the existing OTP_REQUIRED contract so clients that already handle it work.\n\t\t\t\t// The send is rate-limited per person; when throttled nothing is emailed\n\t\t\t\t// (emailOtpSent: false) but a previously emailed code stays valid.\n\t\t\t\t// Independent fetch (not the passed-in `config`): the email-OTP send is\n\t\t\t\t// rate-limited by the live config and this branch never reaches the\n\t\t\t\t// anomaly analyzer, so query shape stays as before A03.\n\t\t\t\tconst emailOtpConfig = await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(new ConfigurationQuery(dbContext.providers))\n\t\t\t\tconst decision = await this.emailOtpManager.sendCode(dbContext, person, emailOtpConfig)\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('OTP_REQUIRED', `2FA is enabled. OTP token is required`, {\n\t\t\t\t\temailOtpSent: decision.ok,\n\t\t\t\t\t...authLogData,\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t// No active factor at all (A06). Enforce MFA if a matching auth_policy\n\t\t\t// requires it. With no policy rows configured this resolves to\n\t\t\t// mfaRequired=false and sign-in proceeds exactly as before.\n\t\t\tconst enforcement = await this.enforceMfaEnrollment(dbContext, person, otpCode, authLogData)\n\t\t\tif (enforcement !== null) {\n\t\t\t\tif ('error' in enforcement) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn enforcement\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t// Enrollment completed in this request (pending TOTP promoted to active),\n\t\t\t\t// so MFA is definitively satisfied — anomaly step-up cannot apply.\n\t\t\t\tconst riskHandled = await this.applyRiskPolicy(dbContext, person, {\n\t\t\t\t\tconfig,\n\t\t\t\t\tgeoCountry,\n\t\t\t\t\trequestInfo,\n\t\t\t\t\totpCode,\n\t\t\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest: true,\n\t\t\t\t\tauthLogData,\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\tif (riskHandled !== null && 'error' in riskHandled) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn riskHandled\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tconst sessionToken = await this.apiKeyManager.createSessionApiKey(\n\t\t\t\t\tdbContext,\n\t\t\t\t\tperson.identity_id,\n\t\t\t\t\texpiration,\n\t\t\t\t\trequestInfo,\n\t\t\t\t\ttrustForwardedInfo,\n\t\t\t\t)\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseOk({\n\t\t\t\t\tperson,\n\t\t\t\t\ttoken: sessionToken,\n\t\t\t\t\tbackupCodes: enforcement.backupCodes,\n\t\t\t\t\tunusualLoginDetected: riskHandled?.unusualLoginDetected || undefined,\n\t\t\t\t\trisk: riskHandled?.risk,\n\t\t\t\t\t...authLogData,\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst riskHandled = await this.applyRiskPolicy(dbContext, person, {\n\t\t\tconfig,\n\t\t\tgeoCountry,\n\t\t\trequestInfo,\n\t\t\totpCode,\n\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest,\n\t\t\tauthLogData,\n\t\t})\n\t\tif (riskHandled !== null && 'error' in riskHandled) {\n\t\t\treturn riskHandled\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst sessionToken = await this.apiKeyManager.createSessionApiKey(dbContext, person.identity_id, expiration, requestInfo, trustForwardedInfo)\n\n\t\treturn new ResponseOk({\n\t\t\tperson,\n\t\t\ttoken: sessionToken,\n\t\t\tusedBackupCode,\n\t\t\tunusualLoginDetected: riskHandled?.unusualLoginDetected || undefined,\n\t\t\trisk: riskHandled?.risk,\n\t\t\t...authLogData,\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * A03 — evaluate the sign-in risk score and act per policy. Returns:\n\t * - `null` when anomaly detection is off or no `config` was supplied (the\n\t *   default): no DB work, sign-in proceeds unchanged.\n\t * - `{ unusualLoginDetected: true }` when an informational UNUSUAL_LOGIN email\n\t *   was sent (best-effort) but the session may still be issued.\n\t * - a `ResponseError('OTP_REQUIRED')` when step-up is required and no code was\n\t *   supplied — reuses the email-OTP step-up channel (dispatches a code).\n\t * - a `ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN')` when a step-up code was supplied but\n\t *   did not verify. A valid code consumes the token and the session is issued.\n\t * - `{ unusualLoginDetected: false }` when the score was below every threshold.\n\t *\n\t * The audit entries (`unusual_login_detected`, `step_up_required`) are emitted\n\t * by the resolver from the response metadata, matching the project convention.\n\t */\n\tprivate async applyRiskPolicy(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tperson: PersonRow,\n\t\targs: {\n\t\t\tconfig?: Config\n\t\t\tgeoCountry?: string\n\t\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo\n\t\t\totpCode?: string\n\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest: boolean\n\t\t\tauthLogData: { [AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag }\n\t\t},\n\t): Promise<RiskPolicyOutcome> {\n\t\tconst { config, geoCountry, requestInfo, otpCode, mfaSatisfiedThisRequest, authLogData } = args\n\t\tconst policy = config?.login.anomalyDetection\n\t\tif (!config || !policy?.enabled) {\n\t\t\treturn null\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst assessment = await this.loginRiskAnalyzer.analyze(dbContext, person.id, {\n\t\t\tgeoCountry: geoCountry ?? null,\n\t\t\tdeviceFingerprint: this.loginRiskAnalyzer.fingerprint(requestInfo?.userAgent),\n\t\t\tip: requestInfo?.ip ?? null,\n\t\t}, policy)\n\n\t\tif (assessment.action === 'allow') {\n\t\t\treturn { unusualLoginDetected: false }\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst riskMeta = { score: assessment.score, reasons: assessment.reasons }\n\n\t\tif (assessment.action === 'stepUp' && !mfaSatisfiedThisRequest) {\n\t\t\t// Reuse the existing email-OTP step-up channel. This is independent of\n\t\t\t// `person.email_otp_enabled`, which gates email OTP only as the *primary*\n\t\t\t// second factor (A05); the step-up challenge stands on its own, so a person\n\t\t\t// with no standing MFA can still complete it. Without consuming the code\n\t\t\t// here, such a person would never satisfy the step-up and would loop on\n\t\t\t// OTP_REQUIRED forever (the score is unchanged on every retry).\n\t\t\tif (otpCode) {\n\t\t\t\t// Retry leg: the client resent the emailed code as otpToken. Mirror the\n\t\t\t\t// A05 contract — an invalid code is rejected (not re-sent); the per-code\n\t\t\t\t// 3-attempt cap still applies, and a fresh code is issued only when the\n\t\t\t\t// client retries without a code.\n\t\t\t\tif (!await this.emailOtpManager.verifyAndConsume(dbContext, person, otpCode)) {\n\t\t\t\t\t// A failed *forced* second factor is itself an anomaly signal — carry the\n\t\t\t\t\t// step-up/risk metadata so the resolver still emits unusual_login_detected\n\t\t\t\t\t// + step_up_required with the score/reasons, rather than logging it as an\n\t\t\t\t\t// ordinary mistyped-OTP login indistinguishable from a normal 2FA typo.\n\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tstepUpRequired: true,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tunusualLoginDetected: true,\n\t\t\t\t\t\trisk: riskMeta,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t...authLogData,\n\t\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t// Step-up satisfied this request — fall through to notify + allow below.\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t// First leg: dispatch a code and ask the client to retry with otpToken.\n\t\t\t\t// Rate-limited per person; a previously emailed code stays valid when throttled.\n\t\t\t\tconst decision = await this.emailOtpManager.sendCode(dbContext, person, config)\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('OTP_REQUIRED', 'Additional verification is required for this sign-in', {\n\t\t\t\t\temailOtpSent: decision.ok,\n\t\t\t\t\tstepUpRequired: true,\n\t\t\t\t\tunusualLoginDetected: true,\n\t\t\t\t\trisk: riskMeta,\n\t\t\t\t\t...authLogData,\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// action === 'email', or step-up satisfied (already this request, or just now\n\t\t// via the emailed code): notify the person of the unusual sign-in. A failed\n\t\t// email must never block sign-in.\n\t\tawait this.sendUnusualLoginEmail(dbContext, person, geoCountry ?? null, requestInfo?.ip ?? null)\n\t\treturn { unusualLoginDetected: true, risk: riskMeta }\n\t}\n\n\tprivate async sendUnusualLoginEmail(dbContext: DatabaseContext, person: PersonRow, geoCountry: string | null, ip: string | null): Promise<void> {\n\t\tif (!person.email) {\n\t\t\t// No address to notify (e.g. an IDP-only person) — nothing to send.\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tawait this.userMailer.sendUnusualLoginEmail(dbContext, {\n\t\t\t\temail: person.email,\n\t\t\t\tgeoCountry,\n\t\t\t\tipAddress: ip,\n\t\t\t}, { projectId: null, variant: '' })\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t// ignore — informational only\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * A06 enforcement for the no-active-factor case. Returns:\n\t * - `null` when MFA is not required, or grace currently allows sign-in\n\t *   (caller proceeds to issue a session as normal). With zero auth_policy\n\t *   rows this is always the outcome — no behavior change.\n\t * - a `ResponseError` (MFA_ENROLLMENT_REQUIRED with the pending secret to\n\t *   enroll, or INVALID_OTP_TOKEN) when sign-in must be blocked.\n\t * - `{ ok: true, backupCodes }` when enrollment just completed (pending TOTP\n\t *   promoted to active); caller issues the session.\n\t */\n\tprivate async enforceMfaEnrollment(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tperson: PersonRow,\n\t\totpCode: string | undefined,\n\t\tauthLogData: { [AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag },\n\t): Promise<\n\t\t| null\n\t\t| ResponseError<SignInErrorCode, {\n\t\t\temailOtpSent?: boolean\n\t\t\tmfaEnrollmentRequired?: boolean\n\t\t\tmfaEnrollment?: MfaEnrollment\n\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n\t\t}>\n\t\t| { backupCodes: string[] }\n\t> {\n\t\tconst policy = await this.authPolicyResolver.resolveForIdentity(dbContext, person.identity_id, person.roles)\n\t\tif (!policy.mfaRequired) {\n\t\t\treturn null\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst now = this.providers.now()\n\n\t\t// Resolve the effective grace duration (seconds). A per-policy override\n\t\t// wins; otherwise we fall back to the global config default. Only fetch the\n\t\t// config when the override is absent, to keep query shapes minimal.\n\t\tlet graceSeconds: number\n\t\tif (policy.graceDuration !== null) {\n\t\t\tgraceSeconds = intervalToSeconds(policy.graceDuration)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tconst config = await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(new ConfigurationQuery(dbContext.providers))\n\t\t\tgraceSeconds = intervalToSeconds(config.login.mfaGraceDuration)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Grace handling. Default grace duration is 0 (immediate enforcement), so\n\t\t// by default neither branch below opens a window.\n\t\tif (person.mfa_grace_until !== null) {\n\t\t\tif (person.mfa_grace_until.getTime() > now.getTime()) {\n\t\t\t\t// Still inside an open grace window — allow sign-in.\n\t\t\t\treturn null\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// Grace expired → fall through to enforcement.\n\t\t} else if (graceSeconds > 0) {\n\t\t\t// Open the grace window now and allow this sign-in.\n\t\t\tconst graceUntil = new Date(now.getTime() + graceSeconds * 1000)\n\t\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(new SetMfaGraceUntilCommand(person.id, graceUntil))\n\t\t\treturn null\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Enforce.\n\t\tif (otpCode && person.otp_pending_secret) {\n\t\t\t// Enrollment completion: verify against the pending secret, then promote.\n\t\t\tif (!await this.otpManager.verifyPendingOtp(person, otpCode)) {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', authLogData)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tconst promoted = await this.otpManager.confirmOtp(dbContext, person)\n\t\t\tif (!promoted) {\n\t\t\t\t// Lost a concurrent enrollment-completion race: the pending secret was\n\t\t\t\t// already promoted by the other request (which issued the backup codes).\n\t\t\t\t// Don't regenerate here — that would invalidate the codes already\n\t\t\t\t// returned. TOTP is now active, so a retry signs in via the normal path.\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', authLogData)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tconst backupCodes = await this.backupCodeManager.generate(dbContext, person.id)\n\t\t\treturn { backupCodes }\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Provision a fresh pending TOTP secret and ask the client to enroll.\n\t\tconst otp = await this.otpManager.prepareOtp(dbContext, person, 'Contember')\n\t\tconst mfaEnrollment: MfaEnrollment = { otpUri: otp.uri, otpSecret: otp.secret }\n\t\treturn new ResponseError('MFA_ENROLLMENT_REQUIRED', 'MFA enrollment is required', {\n\t\t\tmfaEnrollmentRequired: true,\n\t\t\tmfaEnrollment,\n\t\t\t...authLogData,\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tasync createSessionToken(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tpersonIdentifier: PersonUniqueIdentifier,\n\t\texpiration?: number,\n\t\tverifier?: (person: PersonRow) => Promise<void>,\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t\ttrustForwardedInfo?: boolean,\n\t): Promise<CreateSessionTokenResponse> {\n\t\tconst person = await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(PersonQuery.byUniqueIdentifier(personIdentifier))\n\n\t\tif (person === null) {\n\t\t\tif (personIdentifier.type === 'email') {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('UNKNOWN_EMAIL', `Person with email ${personIdentifier.email} not found`, {\n\t\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonInput: personIdentifier.email,\n\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t} else if (personIdentifier.type === 'id') {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('UNKNOWN_PERSON_ID', `Person with id ${personIdentifier.id} not found`, {\n\t\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonInput: personIdentifier.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tthrow new ImplementationException()\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst inputValue = personIdentifier.type === 'email' ? personIdentifier.email : personIdentifier.id\n\t\tif (person.disabled_at !== null) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('PERSON_DISABLED', `Person with id ${person.id} is disabled`, {\n\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: person.id,\n\t\t\t\t\tpersonInput: inputValue,\n\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tawait verifier?.(person)\n\n\t\tconst sessionToken = await this.apiKeyManager.createSessionApiKey(dbContext, person.identity_id, expiration, requestInfo, trustForwardedInfo)\n\t\treturn new ResponseOk({\n\t\t\tperson,\n\t\t\ttoken: sessionToken,\n\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\tpersonId: person.id,\n\t\t\t\tpersonInput: inputValue,\n\t\t\t}),\n\t\t})\n\t}\n}\n\n/** A03: greppable payload describing why a sign-in scored as unusual. */\nexport interface RiskMeta {\n\treadonly score: number\n\treadonly reasons: readonly string[]\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of {@link SignInManager.applyRiskPolicy}: `null` = feature off / no\n * config; a metadata object when the session may still be issued; a\n * `ResponseError` when step-up blocks the session.\n */\ntype RiskPolicyOutcome =\n\t| null\n\t| { unusualLoginDetected: boolean; risk?: RiskMeta }\n\t| ResponseError<SignInErrorCode, {\n\t\temailOtpSent?: boolean\n\t\tstepUpRequired?: boolean\n\t\tunusualLoginDetected?: boolean\n\t\trisk?: RiskMeta\n\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n\t}>\n\nexport interface SignInResult {\n\treadonly person: PersonRow\n\treadonly token: string\n\t/** True when MFA was satisfied by consuming a backup code (instead of a TOTP token). */\n\treadonly usedBackupCode?: boolean\n\t/** Set when sign-in completed an MFA enrollment (A06): the freshly issued backup codes, shown once. */\n\treadonly backupCodes?: string[]\n\t/** A03: true when this sign-in scored as unusual and an UNUSUAL_LOGIN email was sent. */\n\treadonly unusualLoginDetected?: boolean\n\t/** A03: the risk score + reasons, recorded in the `unusual_login_detected` audit `event_data`. */\n\treadonly risk?: RiskMeta\n\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n}\n\nexport type SignInResponse = Response<SignInResult, SignInErrorCode, {\n\t/** Set on an OTP_REQUIRED error when an email-OTP code was just dispatched (A05). */\n\temailOtpSent?: boolean\n\t/** Set on a MFA_ENROLLMENT_REQUIRED error (A06): triggers the `mfa_enrollment_required` audit. */\n\tmfaEnrollmentRequired?: boolean\n\t/** Set on a MFA_ENROLLMENT_REQUIRED error (A06): the pending secret the client must enroll. */\n\tmfaEnrollment?: MfaEnrollment\n\t/** Set on an OTP_REQUIRED error raised by A03 anomaly step-up: triggers the `step_up_required` audit. */\n\tstepUpRequired?: boolean\n\t/** A03: true when the sign-in scored as unusual (triggers the `unusual_login_detected` audit). */\n\tunusualLoginDetected?: boolean\n\t/** A03: the risk score + reasons, recorded in the audit `event_data`. */\n\trisk?: RiskMeta\n\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n}>\nexport type CreateSessionTokenResponse = Response<SignInResult, CreateSessionTokenErrorCode, {\n\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n}>\n\nexport { SignInManager 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+{"version":3,"file":"SignInManager.js","sources":["../../../../../../packages/engine-tenant-api/src/model/service/SignInManager.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { CreateSessionTokenErrorCode, MfaEnrollment, SignInErrorCode } from '../../schema/index.js'\nimport { ApiKeyManager, AuthPolicyResolver, BackupCodeManager, EmailOtpManager, LoginRiskAnalyzer, OtpManager } from '../service/index.js'\nimport { ConfigurationQuery, LocalAuthDisablingIdpsQuery, PersonQuery, PersonRow, PersonUniqueIdentifier } from '../queries/index.js'\nimport { Config } from '../type/Config.js'\nimport { Providers } from '../providers.js'\nimport { DatabaseContext } from '../utils/index.js'\nimport { Response, ResponseError, ResponseOk } from '../utils/Response.js'\nimport { ImplementationException } from '../../exceptions.js'\nimport { AuthLogService } from './AuthLogService.js'\nimport { UserMailer } from '../mailing/index.js'\nimport { ApiKeyRequestInfo, SetMfaGraceUntilCommand } from '../commands/index.js'\nimport { intervalToSeconds } from '../utils/interval.js'\n\nclass SignInManager {\n\tconstructor(\n\t\tprivate readonly apiKeyManager: ApiKeyManager,\n\t\tprivate readonly providers: Providers,\n\t\tprivate readonly otpManager: OtpManager,\n\t\tprivate readonly backupCodeManager: BackupCodeManager,\n\t\tprivate readonly emailOtpManager: EmailOtpManager,\n\t\tprivate readonly authPolicyResolver: AuthPolicyResolver,\n\t\tprivate readonly loginRiskAnalyzer: LoginRiskAnalyzer,\n\t\tprivate readonly userMailer: UserMailer,\n\t) {}\n\n\tasync signIn(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\temail: string,\n\t\tpassword: string,\n\t\texpiration?: number,\n\t\totpCode?: string,\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t\ttrustForwardedInfo?: boolean,\n\t\tbackupCode?: string,\n\t\tconfig?: Config,\n\t\tgeoCountry?: string,\n\t): Promise<SignInResponse> {\n\t\tconst person = await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(PersonQuery.byEmail(email))\n\n\t\tif (person === null) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('UNKNOWN_EMAIL', `Person with email ${email} not found`, {\n\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\tpersonInput: email,\n\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst authLogData = {\n\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\tpersonInput: email,\n\t\t\t\tpersonId: person.id,\n\t\t\t}),\n\t\t}\n\t\t// Refused before the password is even looked at: for a person federated\n\t\t// through a provider with `disableLocalAuthentication`, a password is not a\n\t\t// credential this tenant accepts, however it got set.\n\t\tconst exclusiveIdps = await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(new LocalAuthDisablingIdpsQuery(person.id))\n\t\tif (exclusiveIdps.length > 0) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('IDP_REQUIRED', `Sign in using ${exclusiveIdps.join(' or ')}`, authLogData)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (!person.password_hash) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('NO_PASSWORD_SET', `No password set`, authLogData)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (person.disabled_at !== null) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('PERSON_DISABLED', `Person is disabled`, authLogData)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst passwordValid = await this.providers.bcryptCompare(password, person.password_hash)\n\n\t\tif (!passwordValid) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_PASSWORD', `Password does not match`, authLogData)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Block sign-in for accounts that were created while email verification\n\t\t// was required but never proved ownership. Accounts predating the\n\t\t// requirement carry email_verification_required = false and pass through.\n\t\tif (person.email_verification_required && person.email_verified_at === null) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('EMAIL_NOT_VERIFIED', `E-mail address has not been verified`, authLogData)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tlet usedBackupCode = false\n\t\t// Whether a second factor was actively proven in THIS request. Anomaly\n\t\t// step-up (A03) reuses this: a login that already cleared a second factor\n\t\t// is not asked to step up again.\n\t\tlet mfaSatisfiedThisRequest = false\n\t\tconst hasActiveTotp = Boolean(person.otp_secret && person.otp_activated_at)\n\t\tif (hasActiveTotp) {\n\t\t\t// Active TOTP takes precedence (A07 path, unchanged).\n\t\t\tif (otpCode) {\n\t\t\t\tif (!await this.otpManager.verifyOtp(dbContext, person, otpCode)) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', authLogData)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest = true\n\t\t\t} else if (backupCode) {\n\t\t\t\tif (!await this.backupCodeManager.verifyAndConsume(dbContext, person, backupCode)) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', authLogData)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tusedBackupCode = true\n\t\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest = true\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('OTP_REQUIRED', `2FA is enabled. OTP token is required`, authLogData)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else if (person.email_otp_enabled) {\n\t\t\t// No active TOTP, but email OTP is enabled (A05).\n\t\t\tif (otpCode) {\n\t\t\t\tif (!await this.emailOtpManager.verifyAndConsume(dbContext, person, otpCode)) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', authLogData)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest = true\n\t\t\t} else if (backupCode) {\n\t\t\t\tif (!await this.backupCodeManager.verifyAndConsume(dbContext, person, backupCode)) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', authLogData)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tusedBackupCode = true\n\t\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest = true\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t// Dispatch a fresh code and ask the client to retry with otpToken. Reuses\n\t\t\t\t// the existing OTP_REQUIRED contract so clients that already handle it work.\n\t\t\t\t// The send is rate-limited per person; when throttled nothing is emailed\n\t\t\t\t// (emailOtpSent: false) but a previously emailed code stays valid.\n\t\t\t\t// Independent fetch (not the passed-in `config`): the email-OTP send is\n\t\t\t\t// rate-limited by the live config and this branch never reaches the\n\t\t\t\t// anomaly analyzer, so query shape stays as before A03.\n\t\t\t\tconst emailOtpConfig = await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(new ConfigurationQuery(dbContext.providers))\n\t\t\t\tconst decision = await this.emailOtpManager.sendCode(dbContext, person, emailOtpConfig)\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('OTP_REQUIRED', `2FA is enabled. OTP token is required`, {\n\t\t\t\t\temailOtpSent: decision.ok,\n\t\t\t\t\t...authLogData,\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t// No active factor at all (A06). Enforce MFA if a matching auth_policy\n\t\t\t// requires it. With no policy rows configured this resolves to\n\t\t\t// mfaRequired=false and sign-in proceeds exactly as before.\n\t\t\tconst enforcement = await this.enforceMfaEnrollment(dbContext, person, otpCode, authLogData)\n\t\t\tif (enforcement !== null) {\n\t\t\t\tif ('error' in enforcement) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn enforcement\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t// Enrollment completed in this request (pending TOTP promoted to active),\n\t\t\t\t// so MFA is definitively satisfied — anomaly step-up cannot apply.\n\t\t\t\tconst riskHandled = await this.applyRiskPolicy(dbContext, person, {\n\t\t\t\t\tconfig,\n\t\t\t\t\tgeoCountry,\n\t\t\t\t\trequestInfo,\n\t\t\t\t\totpCode,\n\t\t\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest: true,\n\t\t\t\t\tauthLogData,\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\tif (riskHandled !== null && 'error' in riskHandled) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn riskHandled\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tconst sessionToken = await this.apiKeyManager.createSessionApiKey(\n\t\t\t\t\tdbContext,\n\t\t\t\t\tperson.identity_id,\n\t\t\t\t\texpiration,\n\t\t\t\t\trequestInfo,\n\t\t\t\t\ttrustForwardedInfo,\n\t\t\t\t)\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseOk({\n\t\t\t\t\tperson,\n\t\t\t\t\ttoken: sessionToken,\n\t\t\t\t\tbackupCodes: enforcement.backupCodes,\n\t\t\t\t\tunusualLoginDetected: riskHandled?.unusualLoginDetected || undefined,\n\t\t\t\t\trisk: riskHandled?.risk,\n\t\t\t\t\t...authLogData,\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst riskHandled = await this.applyRiskPolicy(dbContext, person, {\n\t\t\tconfig,\n\t\t\tgeoCountry,\n\t\t\trequestInfo,\n\t\t\totpCode,\n\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest,\n\t\t\tauthLogData,\n\t\t})\n\t\tif (riskHandled !== null && 'error' in riskHandled) {\n\t\t\treturn riskHandled\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst sessionToken = await this.apiKeyManager.createSessionApiKey(dbContext, person.identity_id, expiration, requestInfo, trustForwardedInfo)\n\n\t\treturn new ResponseOk({\n\t\t\tperson,\n\t\t\ttoken: sessionToken,\n\t\t\tusedBackupCode,\n\t\t\tunusualLoginDetected: riskHandled?.unusualLoginDetected || undefined,\n\t\t\trisk: riskHandled?.risk,\n\t\t\t...authLogData,\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * A03 — evaluate the sign-in risk score and act per policy. Returns:\n\t * - `null` when anomaly detection is off or no `config` was supplied (the\n\t *   default): no DB work, sign-in proceeds unchanged.\n\t * - `{ unusualLoginDetected: true }` when an informational UNUSUAL_LOGIN email\n\t *   was sent (best-effort) but the session may still be issued.\n\t * - a `ResponseError('OTP_REQUIRED')` when step-up is required and no code was\n\t *   supplied — reuses the email-OTP step-up channel (dispatches a code).\n\t * - a `ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN')` when a step-up code was supplied but\n\t *   did not verify. A valid code consumes the token and the session is issued.\n\t * - `{ unusualLoginDetected: false }` when the score was below every threshold.\n\t *\n\t * The audit entries (`unusual_login_detected`, `step_up_required`) are emitted\n\t * by the resolver from the response metadata, matching the project convention.\n\t */\n\tprivate async applyRiskPolicy(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tperson: PersonRow,\n\t\targs: {\n\t\t\tconfig?: Config\n\t\t\tgeoCountry?: string\n\t\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo\n\t\t\totpCode?: string\n\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest: boolean\n\t\t\tauthLogData: { [AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag }\n\t\t},\n\t): Promise<RiskPolicyOutcome> {\n\t\tconst { config, geoCountry, requestInfo, otpCode, mfaSatisfiedThisRequest, authLogData } = args\n\t\tconst policy = config?.login.anomalyDetection\n\t\tif (!config || !policy?.enabled) {\n\t\t\treturn null\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst assessment = await this.loginRiskAnalyzer.analyze(dbContext, person.id, {\n\t\t\tgeoCountry: geoCountry ?? null,\n\t\t\tdeviceFingerprint: this.loginRiskAnalyzer.fingerprint(requestInfo?.userAgent),\n\t\t\tip: requestInfo?.ip ?? null,\n\t\t}, policy)\n\n\t\tif (assessment.action === 'allow') {\n\t\t\treturn { unusualLoginDetected: false }\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst riskMeta = { score: assessment.score, reasons: assessment.reasons }\n\n\t\tif (assessment.action === 'stepUp' && !mfaSatisfiedThisRequest) {\n\t\t\t// Reuse the existing email-OTP step-up channel. This is independent of\n\t\t\t// `person.email_otp_enabled`, which gates email OTP only as the *primary*\n\t\t\t// second factor (A05); the step-up challenge stands on its own, so a person\n\t\t\t// with no standing MFA can still complete it. Without consuming the code\n\t\t\t// here, such a person would never satisfy the step-up and would loop on\n\t\t\t// OTP_REQUIRED forever (the score is unchanged on every retry).\n\t\t\tif (otpCode) {\n\t\t\t\t// Retry leg: the client resent the emailed code as otpToken. Mirror the\n\t\t\t\t// A05 contract — an invalid code is rejected (not re-sent); the per-code\n\t\t\t\t// 3-attempt cap still applies, and a fresh code is issued only when the\n\t\t\t\t// client retries without a code.\n\t\t\t\tif (!await this.emailOtpManager.verifyAndConsume(dbContext, person, otpCode)) {\n\t\t\t\t\t// A failed *forced* second factor is itself an anomaly signal — carry the\n\t\t\t\t\t// step-up/risk metadata so the resolver still emits unusual_login_detected\n\t\t\t\t\t// + step_up_required with the score/reasons, rather than logging it as an\n\t\t\t\t\t// ordinary mistyped-OTP login indistinguishable from a normal 2FA typo.\n\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tstepUpRequired: true,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tunusualLoginDetected: true,\n\t\t\t\t\t\trisk: riskMeta,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t...authLogData,\n\t\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t// Step-up satisfied this request — fall through to notify + allow below.\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t// First leg: dispatch a code and ask the client to retry with otpToken.\n\t\t\t\t// Rate-limited per person; a previously emailed code stays valid when throttled.\n\t\t\t\tconst decision = await this.emailOtpManager.sendCode(dbContext, person, config)\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('OTP_REQUIRED', 'Additional verification is required for this sign-in', {\n\t\t\t\t\temailOtpSent: decision.ok,\n\t\t\t\t\tstepUpRequired: true,\n\t\t\t\t\tunusualLoginDetected: true,\n\t\t\t\t\trisk: riskMeta,\n\t\t\t\t\t...authLogData,\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// action === 'email', or step-up satisfied (already this request, or just now\n\t\t// via the emailed code): notify the person of the unusual sign-in. A failed\n\t\t// email must never block sign-in.\n\t\tawait this.sendUnusualLoginEmail(dbContext, person, geoCountry ?? null, requestInfo?.ip ?? null)\n\t\treturn { unusualLoginDetected: true, risk: riskMeta }\n\t}\n\n\tprivate async sendUnusualLoginEmail(dbContext: DatabaseContext, person: PersonRow, geoCountry: string | null, ip: string | null): Promise<void> {\n\t\tif (!person.email) {\n\t\t\t// No address to notify (e.g. an IDP-only person) — nothing to send.\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tawait this.userMailer.sendUnusualLoginEmail(dbContext, {\n\t\t\t\temail: person.email,\n\t\t\t\tgeoCountry,\n\t\t\t\tipAddress: ip,\n\t\t\t}, { projectId: null, variant: '' })\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t// ignore — informational only\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * A06 enforcement for the no-active-factor case. Returns:\n\t * - `null` when MFA is not required, or grace currently allows sign-in\n\t *   (caller proceeds to issue a session as normal). With zero auth_policy\n\t *   rows this is always the outcome — no behavior change.\n\t * - a `ResponseError` (MFA_ENROLLMENT_REQUIRED with the pending secret to\n\t *   enroll, or INVALID_OTP_TOKEN) when sign-in must be blocked.\n\t * - `{ ok: true, backupCodes }` when enrollment just completed (pending TOTP\n\t *   promoted to active); caller issues the session.\n\t */\n\tprivate async enforceMfaEnrollment(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tperson: PersonRow,\n\t\totpCode: string | undefined,\n\t\tauthLogData: { [AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag },\n\t): Promise<\n\t\t| null\n\t\t| ResponseError<SignInErrorCode, {\n\t\t\temailOtpSent?: boolean\n\t\t\tmfaEnrollmentRequired?: boolean\n\t\t\tmfaEnrollment?: MfaEnrollment\n\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n\t\t}>\n\t\t| { backupCodes: string[] }\n\t> {\n\t\tconst policy = await this.authPolicyResolver.resolveForIdentity(dbContext, person.identity_id, person.roles)\n\t\tif (!policy.mfaRequired) {\n\t\t\treturn null\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst now = this.providers.now()\n\n\t\t// Resolve the effective grace duration (seconds). A per-policy override\n\t\t// wins; otherwise we fall back to the global config default. Only fetch the\n\t\t// config when the override is absent, to keep query shapes minimal.\n\t\tlet graceSeconds: number\n\t\tif (policy.graceDuration !== null) {\n\t\t\tgraceSeconds = intervalToSeconds(policy.graceDuration)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tconst config = await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(new ConfigurationQuery(dbContext.providers))\n\t\t\tgraceSeconds = intervalToSeconds(config.login.mfaGraceDuration)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Grace handling. Default grace duration is 0 (immediate enforcement), so\n\t\t// by default neither branch below opens a window.\n\t\tif (person.mfa_grace_until !== null) {\n\t\t\tif (person.mfa_grace_until.getTime() > now.getTime()) {\n\t\t\t\t// Still inside an open grace window — allow sign-in.\n\t\t\t\treturn null\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// Grace expired → fall through to enforcement.\n\t\t} else if (graceSeconds > 0) {\n\t\t\t// Open the grace window now and allow this sign-in.\n\t\t\tconst graceUntil = new Date(now.getTime() + graceSeconds * 1000)\n\t\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(new SetMfaGraceUntilCommand(person.id, graceUntil))\n\t\t\treturn null\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Enforce.\n\t\tif (otpCode && person.otp_pending_secret) {\n\t\t\t// Enrollment completion: verify against the pending secret, then promote.\n\t\t\tif (!await this.otpManager.verifyPendingOtp(person, otpCode)) {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', authLogData)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tconst promoted = await this.otpManager.confirmOtp(dbContext, person)\n\t\t\tif (!promoted) {\n\t\t\t\t// Lost a concurrent enrollment-completion race: the pending secret was\n\t\t\t\t// already promoted by the other request (which issued the backup codes).\n\t\t\t\t// Don't regenerate here — that would invalidate the codes already\n\t\t\t\t// returned. TOTP is now active, so a retry signs in via the normal path.\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', authLogData)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tconst backupCodes = await this.backupCodeManager.generate(dbContext, person.id)\n\t\t\treturn { backupCodes }\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Provision a fresh pending TOTP secret and ask the client to enroll.\n\t\tconst otp = await this.otpManager.prepareOtp(dbContext, person, 'Contember')\n\t\tconst mfaEnrollment: MfaEnrollment = { otpUri: otp.uri, otpSecret: otp.secret }\n\t\treturn new ResponseError('MFA_ENROLLMENT_REQUIRED', 'MFA enrollment is required', {\n\t\t\tmfaEnrollmentRequired: true,\n\t\t\tmfaEnrollment,\n\t\t\t...authLogData,\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tasync createSessionToken(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tpersonIdentifier: PersonUniqueIdentifier,\n\t\texpiration?: number,\n\t\tverifier?: (person: PersonRow) => Promise<void>,\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t\ttrustForwardedInfo?: boolean,\n\t): Promise<CreateSessionTokenResponse> {\n\t\tconst person = await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(PersonQuery.byUniqueIdentifier(personIdentifier))\n\n\t\tif (person === null) {\n\t\t\tif (personIdentifier.type === 'email') {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('UNKNOWN_EMAIL', `Person with email ${personIdentifier.email} not found`, {\n\t\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonInput: personIdentifier.email,\n\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t} else if (personIdentifier.type === 'id') {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('UNKNOWN_PERSON_ID', `Person with id ${personIdentifier.id} not found`, {\n\t\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonInput: personIdentifier.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tthrow new ImplementationException()\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst inputValue = personIdentifier.type === 'email' ? personIdentifier.email : personIdentifier.id\n\t\tif (person.disabled_at !== null) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('PERSON_DISABLED', `Person with id ${person.id} is disabled`, {\n\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: person.id,\n\t\t\t\t\tpersonInput: inputValue,\n\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tawait verifier?.(person)\n\n\t\tconst sessionToken = await this.apiKeyManager.createSessionApiKey(dbContext, person.identity_id, expiration, requestInfo, trustForwardedInfo)\n\t\treturn new ResponseOk({\n\t\t\tperson,\n\t\t\ttoken: sessionToken,\n\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\tpersonId: person.id,\n\t\t\t\tpersonInput: inputValue,\n\t\t\t}),\n\t\t})\n\t}\n}\n\n/** A03: greppable payload describing why a sign-in scored as unusual. */\nexport interface RiskMeta {\n\treadonly score: number\n\treadonly reasons: readonly string[]\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of {@link SignInManager.applyRiskPolicy}: `null` = feature off / no\n * config; a metadata object when the session may still be issued; a\n * `ResponseError` when step-up blocks the session.\n */\ntype RiskPolicyOutcome =\n\t| null\n\t| { unusualLoginDetected: boolean; risk?: RiskMeta }\n\t| ResponseError<SignInErrorCode, {\n\t\temailOtpSent?: boolean\n\t\tstepUpRequired?: boolean\n\t\tunusualLoginDetected?: boolean\n\t\trisk?: RiskMeta\n\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n\t}>\n\nexport interface SignInResult {\n\treadonly person: PersonRow\n\treadonly token: string\n\t/** True when MFA was satisfied by consuming a backup code (instead of a TOTP token). */\n\treadonly usedBackupCode?: boolean\n\t/** Set when sign-in completed an MFA enrollment (A06): the freshly issued backup codes, shown once. */\n\treadonly backupCodes?: string[]\n\t/** A03: true when this sign-in scored as unusual and an UNUSUAL_LOGIN email was sent. */\n\treadonly unusualLoginDetected?: boolean\n\t/** A03: the risk score + reasons, recorded in the `unusual_login_detected` audit `event_data`. */\n\treadonly risk?: RiskMeta\n\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n}\n\nexport type SignInResponse = Response<SignInResult, SignInErrorCode, {\n\t/** Set on an OTP_REQUIRED error when an email-OTP code was just dispatched (A05). */\n\temailOtpSent?: boolean\n\t/** Set on a MFA_ENROLLMENT_REQUIRED error (A06): triggers the `mfa_enrollment_required` audit. */\n\tmfaEnrollmentRequired?: boolean\n\t/** Set on a MFA_ENROLLMENT_REQUIRED error (A06): the pending secret the client must enroll. */\n\tmfaEnrollment?: MfaEnrollment\n\t/** Set on an OTP_REQUIRED error raised by A03 anomaly step-up: triggers the `step_up_required` audit. */\n\tstepUpRequired?: boolean\n\t/** A03: true when the sign-in scored as unusual (triggers the `unusual_login_detected` audit). */\n\tunusualLoginDetected?: boolean\n\t/** A03: the risk score + reasons, recorded in the audit `event_data`. */\n\trisk?: RiskMeta\n\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n}>\nexport type CreateSessionTokenResponse = Response<SignInResult, CreateSessionTokenErrorCode, {\n\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n}>\n\nexport { SignInManager 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package/dist/development/src/model/service/apiKey/ApiKeyManager.cjs

@@ -92,8 +92,8 @@ class ApiKeyManager {
         return new Response.ResponseError("disabled", "IdP session was revoked");
       }
     }
-    setImmediate(async () => {
-      await dbContext.commandBus.execute(
+    setImmediate(() => {
+      dbContext.commandBus.execute(
         new ProlongApiKeyCommand.ProlongApiKeyCommand(
           apiKeyRow.id,
           apiKeyRow.type,
@@ -107,7 +107,8 @@ class ApiKeyManager {
           },
           apiKeyRow.max_expires_at
         )
-      );
+      ).catch(() => {
+      });
     });
     return new Response.ResponseOk(
       new VerifyResult(