@contember/engine-tenant-api 2.2.0-alpha.3 → 2.2.0-alpha.6

package/dist/production/src/model/service/SignInManager.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"SignInManager.js","sources":["../../../../../../packages/engine-tenant-api/src/model/service/SignInManager.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { CreateSessionTokenErrorCode, MfaEnrollment, SignInErrorCode } from '../../schema/index.js'\nimport { ApiKeyManager, AuthPolicyResolver, BackupCodeManager, EmailOtpManager, LoginRiskAnalyzer, OtpManager } from '../service/index.js'\nimport { ConfigurationQuery, PersonQuery, PersonRow, PersonUniqueIdentifier } from '../queries/index.js'\nimport { Config } from '../type/Config.js'\nimport { Providers } from '../providers.js'\nimport { DatabaseContext } from '../utils/index.js'\nimport { Response, ResponseError, ResponseOk } from '../utils/Response.js'\nimport { ImplementationException } from '../../exceptions.js'\nimport { AuthLogService } from './AuthLogService.js'\nimport { UserMailer } from '../mailing/index.js'\nimport { ApiKeyRequestInfo, SetMfaGraceUntilCommand } from '../commands/index.js'\nimport { intervalToSeconds } from '../utils/interval.js'\n\nclass SignInManager {\n\tconstructor(\n\t\tprivate readonly apiKeyManager: ApiKeyManager,\n\t\tprivate readonly providers: Providers,\n\t\tprivate readonly otpManager: OtpManager,\n\t\tprivate readonly backupCodeManager: BackupCodeManager,\n\t\tprivate readonly emailOtpManager: EmailOtpManager,\n\t\tprivate readonly authPolicyResolver: AuthPolicyResolver,\n\t\tprivate readonly loginRiskAnalyzer: LoginRiskAnalyzer,\n\t\tprivate readonly userMailer: UserMailer,\n\t) {}\n\n\tasync signIn(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\temail: string,\n\t\tpassword: string,\n\t\texpiration?: number,\n\t\totpCode?: string,\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t\ttrustForwardedInfo?: boolean,\n\t\tbackupCode?: string,\n\t\tconfig?: Config,\n\t\tgeoCountry?: string,\n\t): Promise<SignInResponse> {\n\t\tconst person = await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(PersonQuery.byEmail(email))\n\n\t\tif (person === null) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('UNKNOWN_EMAIL', `Person with email ${email} not found`, {\n\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\tpersonInput: email,\n\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst authLogData = {\n\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\tpersonInput: email,\n\t\t\t\tpersonId: person.id,\n\t\t\t}),\n\t\t}\n\t\tif (!person.password_hash) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('NO_PASSWORD_SET', `No password set`, authLogData)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (person.disabled_at !== null) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('PERSON_DISABLED', `Person is disabled`, authLogData)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst passwordValid = await this.providers.bcryptCompare(password, person.password_hash)\n\n\t\tif (!passwordValid) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_PASSWORD', `Password does not match`, authLogData)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Block sign-in for accounts that were created while email verification\n\t\t// was required but never proved ownership. Accounts predating the\n\t\t// requirement carry email_verification_required = false and pass through.\n\t\tif (person.email_verification_required && person.email_verified_at === null) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('EMAIL_NOT_VERIFIED', `E-mail address has not been verified`, authLogData)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tlet usedBackupCode = false\n\t\t// Whether a second factor was actively proven in THIS request. Anomaly\n\t\t// step-up (A03) reuses this: a login that already cleared a second factor\n\t\t// is not asked to step up again.\n\t\tlet mfaSatisfiedThisRequest = false\n\t\tconst hasActiveTotp = Boolean(person.otp_secret && person.otp_activated_at)\n\t\tif (hasActiveTotp) {\n\t\t\t// Active TOTP takes precedence (A07 path, unchanged).\n\t\t\tif (otpCode) {\n\t\t\t\tif (!await this.otpManager.verifyOtp(dbContext, person, otpCode)) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', authLogData)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest = true\n\t\t\t} else if (backupCode) {\n\t\t\t\tif (!await this.backupCodeManager.verifyAndConsume(dbContext, person, backupCode)) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', authLogData)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tusedBackupCode = true\n\t\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest = true\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('OTP_REQUIRED', `2FA is enabled. OTP token is required`, authLogData)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else if (person.email_otp_enabled) {\n\t\t\t// No active TOTP, but email OTP is enabled (A05).\n\t\t\tif (otpCode) {\n\t\t\t\tif (!await this.emailOtpManager.verifyAndConsume(dbContext, person, otpCode)) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', authLogData)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest = true\n\t\t\t} else if (backupCode) {\n\t\t\t\tif (!await this.backupCodeManager.verifyAndConsume(dbContext, person, backupCode)) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', authLogData)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tusedBackupCode = true\n\t\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest = true\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t// Dispatch a fresh code and ask the client to retry with otpToken. Reuses\n\t\t\t\t// the existing OTP_REQUIRED contract so clients that already handle it work.\n\t\t\t\t// The send is rate-limited per person; when throttled nothing is emailed\n\t\t\t\t// (emailOtpSent: false) but a previously emailed code stays valid.\n\t\t\t\t// Independent fetch (not the passed-in `config`): the email-OTP send is\n\t\t\t\t// rate-limited by the live config and this branch never reaches the\n\t\t\t\t// anomaly analyzer, so query shape stays as before A03.\n\t\t\t\tconst emailOtpConfig = await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(new ConfigurationQuery(dbContext.providers))\n\t\t\t\tconst decision = await this.emailOtpManager.sendCode(dbContext, person, emailOtpConfig)\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('OTP_REQUIRED', `2FA is enabled. OTP token is required`, {\n\t\t\t\t\temailOtpSent: decision.ok,\n\t\t\t\t\t...authLogData,\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t// No active factor at all (A06). Enforce MFA if a matching auth_policy\n\t\t\t// requires it. With no policy rows configured this resolves to\n\t\t\t// mfaRequired=false and sign-in proceeds exactly as before.\n\t\t\tconst enforcement = await this.enforceMfaEnrollment(dbContext, person, otpCode, authLogData)\n\t\t\tif (enforcement !== null) {\n\t\t\t\tif ('error' in enforcement) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn enforcement\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t// Enrollment completed in this request (pending TOTP promoted to active),\n\t\t\t\t// so MFA is definitively satisfied — anomaly step-up cannot apply.\n\t\t\t\tconst riskHandled = await this.applyRiskPolicy(dbContext, person, {\n\t\t\t\t\tconfig,\n\t\t\t\t\tgeoCountry,\n\t\t\t\t\trequestInfo,\n\t\t\t\t\totpCode,\n\t\t\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest: true,\n\t\t\t\t\tauthLogData,\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\tif (riskHandled !== null && 'error' in riskHandled) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn riskHandled\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tconst sessionToken = await this.apiKeyManager.createSessionApiKey(\n\t\t\t\t\tdbContext,\n\t\t\t\t\tperson.identity_id,\n\t\t\t\t\texpiration,\n\t\t\t\t\trequestInfo,\n\t\t\t\t\ttrustForwardedInfo,\n\t\t\t\t)\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseOk({\n\t\t\t\t\tperson,\n\t\t\t\t\ttoken: sessionToken,\n\t\t\t\t\tbackupCodes: enforcement.backupCodes,\n\t\t\t\t\tunusualLoginDetected: riskHandled?.unusualLoginDetected || undefined,\n\t\t\t\t\trisk: riskHandled?.risk,\n\t\t\t\t\t...authLogData,\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst riskHandled = await this.applyRiskPolicy(dbContext, person, {\n\t\t\tconfig,\n\t\t\tgeoCountry,\n\t\t\trequestInfo,\n\t\t\totpCode,\n\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest,\n\t\t\tauthLogData,\n\t\t})\n\t\tif (riskHandled !== null && 'error' in riskHandled) {\n\t\t\treturn riskHandled\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst sessionToken = await this.apiKeyManager.createSessionApiKey(dbContext, person.identity_id, expiration, requestInfo, trustForwardedInfo)\n\n\t\treturn new ResponseOk({\n\t\t\tperson,\n\t\t\ttoken: sessionToken,\n\t\t\tusedBackupCode,\n\t\t\tunusualLoginDetected: riskHandled?.unusualLoginDetected || undefined,\n\t\t\trisk: riskHandled?.risk,\n\t\t\t...authLogData,\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * A03 — evaluate the sign-in risk score and act per policy. Returns:\n\t * - `null` when anomaly detection is off or no `config` was supplied (the\n\t *   default): no DB work, sign-in proceeds unchanged.\n\t * - `{ unusualLoginDetected: true }` when an informational UNUSUAL_LOGIN email\n\t *   was sent (best-effort) but the session may still be issued.\n\t * - a `ResponseError('OTP_REQUIRED')` when step-up is required and no code was\n\t *   supplied — reuses the email-OTP step-up channel (dispatches a code).\n\t * - a `ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN')` when a step-up code was supplied but\n\t *   did not verify. A valid code consumes the token and the session is issued.\n\t * - `{ unusualLoginDetected: false }` when the score was below every threshold.\n\t *\n\t * The audit entries (`unusual_login_detected`, `step_up_required`) are emitted\n\t * by the resolver from the response metadata, matching the project convention.\n\t */\n\tprivate async applyRiskPolicy(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tperson: PersonRow,\n\t\targs: {\n\t\t\tconfig?: Config\n\t\t\tgeoCountry?: string\n\t\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo\n\t\t\totpCode?: string\n\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest: boolean\n\t\t\tauthLogData: { [AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag }\n\t\t},\n\t): Promise<RiskPolicyOutcome> {\n\t\tconst { config, geoCountry, requestInfo, otpCode, mfaSatisfiedThisRequest, authLogData } = args\n\t\tconst policy = config?.login.anomalyDetection\n\t\tif (!config || !policy?.enabled) {\n\t\t\treturn null\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst assessment = await this.loginRiskAnalyzer.analyze(dbContext, person.id, {\n\t\t\tgeoCountry: geoCountry ?? null,\n\t\t\tdeviceFingerprint: this.loginRiskAnalyzer.fingerprint(requestInfo?.userAgent),\n\t\t\tip: requestInfo?.ip ?? null,\n\t\t}, policy)\n\n\t\tif (assessment.action === 'allow') {\n\t\t\treturn { unusualLoginDetected: false }\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst riskMeta = { score: assessment.score, reasons: assessment.reasons }\n\n\t\tif (assessment.action === 'stepUp' && !mfaSatisfiedThisRequest) {\n\t\t\t// Reuse the existing email-OTP step-up channel. This is independent of\n\t\t\t// `person.email_otp_enabled`, which gates email OTP only as the *primary*\n\t\t\t// second factor (A05); the step-up challenge stands on its own, so a person\n\t\t\t// with no standing MFA can still complete it. Without consuming the code\n\t\t\t// here, such a person would never satisfy the step-up and would loop on\n\t\t\t// OTP_REQUIRED forever (the score is unchanged on every retry).\n\t\t\tif (otpCode) {\n\t\t\t\t// Retry leg: the client resent the emailed code as otpToken. Mirror the\n\t\t\t\t// A05 contract — an invalid code is rejected (not re-sent); the per-code\n\t\t\t\t// 3-attempt cap still applies, and a fresh code is issued only when the\n\t\t\t\t// client retries without a code.\n\t\t\t\tif (!await this.emailOtpManager.verifyAndConsume(dbContext, person, otpCode)) {\n\t\t\t\t\t// A failed *forced* second factor is itself an anomaly signal — carry the\n\t\t\t\t\t// step-up/risk metadata so the resolver still emits unusual_login_detected\n\t\t\t\t\t// + step_up_required with the score/reasons, rather than logging it as an\n\t\t\t\t\t// ordinary mistyped-OTP login indistinguishable from a normal 2FA typo.\n\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tstepUpRequired: true,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tunusualLoginDetected: true,\n\t\t\t\t\t\trisk: riskMeta,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t...authLogData,\n\t\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t// Step-up satisfied this request — fall through to notify + allow below.\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t// First leg: dispatch a code and ask the client to retry with otpToken.\n\t\t\t\t// Rate-limited per person; a previously emailed code stays valid when throttled.\n\t\t\t\tconst decision = await this.emailOtpManager.sendCode(dbContext, person, config)\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('OTP_REQUIRED', 'Additional verification is required for this sign-in', {\n\t\t\t\t\temailOtpSent: decision.ok,\n\t\t\t\t\tstepUpRequired: true,\n\t\t\t\t\tunusualLoginDetected: true,\n\t\t\t\t\trisk: riskMeta,\n\t\t\t\t\t...authLogData,\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// action === 'email', or step-up satisfied (already this request, or just now\n\t\t// via the emailed code): notify the person of the unusual sign-in. A failed\n\t\t// email must never block sign-in.\n\t\tawait this.sendUnusualLoginEmail(dbContext, person, geoCountry ?? null, requestInfo?.ip ?? null)\n\t\treturn { unusualLoginDetected: true, risk: riskMeta }\n\t}\n\n\tprivate async sendUnusualLoginEmail(dbContext: DatabaseContext, person: PersonRow, geoCountry: string | null, ip: string | null): Promise<void> {\n\t\tif (!person.email) {\n\t\t\t// No address to notify (e.g. an IDP-only person) — nothing to send.\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tawait this.userMailer.sendUnusualLoginEmail(dbContext, {\n\t\t\t\temail: person.email,\n\t\t\t\tgeoCountry,\n\t\t\t\tipAddress: ip,\n\t\t\t}, { projectId: null, variant: '' })\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t// ignore — informational only\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * A06 enforcement for the no-active-factor case. Returns:\n\t * - `null` when MFA is not required, or grace currently allows sign-in\n\t *   (caller proceeds to issue a session as normal). With zero auth_policy\n\t *   rows this is always the outcome — no behavior change.\n\t * - a `ResponseError` (MFA_ENROLLMENT_REQUIRED with the pending secret to\n\t *   enroll, or INVALID_OTP_TOKEN) when sign-in must be blocked.\n\t * - `{ ok: true, backupCodes }` when enrollment just completed (pending TOTP\n\t *   promoted to active); caller issues the session.\n\t */\n\tprivate async enforceMfaEnrollment(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tperson: PersonRow,\n\t\totpCode: string | undefined,\n\t\tauthLogData: { [AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag },\n\t): Promise<\n\t\t| null\n\t\t| ResponseError<SignInErrorCode, {\n\t\t\temailOtpSent?: boolean\n\t\t\tmfaEnrollmentRequired?: boolean\n\t\t\tmfaEnrollment?: MfaEnrollment\n\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n\t\t}>\n\t\t| { backupCodes: string[] }\n\t> {\n\t\tconst policy = await this.authPolicyResolver.resolveForIdentity(dbContext, person.identity_id, person.roles)\n\t\tif (!policy.mfaRequired) {\n\t\t\treturn null\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst now = this.providers.now()\n\n\t\t// Resolve the effective grace duration (seconds). A per-policy override\n\t\t// wins; otherwise we fall back to the global config default. Only fetch the\n\t\t// config when the override is absent, to keep query shapes minimal.\n\t\tlet graceSeconds: number\n\t\tif (policy.graceDuration !== null) {\n\t\t\tgraceSeconds = intervalToSeconds(policy.graceDuration)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tconst config = await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(new ConfigurationQuery(dbContext.providers))\n\t\t\tgraceSeconds = intervalToSeconds(config.login.mfaGraceDuration)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Grace handling. Default grace duration is 0 (immediate enforcement), so\n\t\t// by default neither branch below opens a window.\n\t\tif (person.mfa_grace_until !== null) {\n\t\t\tif (person.mfa_grace_until.getTime() > now.getTime()) {\n\t\t\t\t// Still inside an open grace window — allow sign-in.\n\t\t\t\treturn null\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// Grace expired → fall through to enforcement.\n\t\t} else if (graceSeconds > 0) {\n\t\t\t// Open the grace window now and allow this sign-in.\n\t\t\tconst graceUntil = new Date(now.getTime() + graceSeconds * 1000)\n\t\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(new SetMfaGraceUntilCommand(person.id, graceUntil))\n\t\t\treturn null\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Enforce.\n\t\tif (otpCode && person.otp_pending_secret) {\n\t\t\t// Enrollment completion: verify against the pending secret, then promote.\n\t\t\tif (!await this.otpManager.verifyPendingOtp(person, otpCode)) {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', authLogData)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tconst promoted = await this.otpManager.confirmOtp(dbContext, person)\n\t\t\tif (!promoted) {\n\t\t\t\t// Lost a concurrent enrollment-completion race: the pending secret was\n\t\t\t\t// already promoted by the other request (which issued the backup codes).\n\t\t\t\t// Don't regenerate here — that would invalidate the codes already\n\t\t\t\t// returned. TOTP is now active, so a retry signs in via the normal path.\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', authLogData)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tconst backupCodes = await this.backupCodeManager.generate(dbContext, person.id)\n\t\t\treturn { backupCodes }\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Provision a fresh pending TOTP secret and ask the client to enroll.\n\t\tconst otp = await this.otpManager.prepareOtp(dbContext, person, 'Contember')\n\t\tconst mfaEnrollment: MfaEnrollment = { otpUri: otp.uri, otpSecret: otp.secret }\n\t\treturn new ResponseError('MFA_ENROLLMENT_REQUIRED', 'MFA enrollment is required', {\n\t\t\tmfaEnrollmentRequired: true,\n\t\t\tmfaEnrollment,\n\t\t\t...authLogData,\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tasync createSessionToken(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tpersonIdentifier: PersonUniqueIdentifier,\n\t\texpiration?: number,\n\t\tverifier?: (person: PersonRow) => Promise<void>,\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t\ttrustForwardedInfo?: boolean,\n\t): Promise<CreateSessionTokenResponse> {\n\t\tconst person = await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(PersonQuery.byUniqueIdentifier(personIdentifier))\n\n\t\tif (person === null) {\n\t\t\tif (personIdentifier.type === 'email') {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('UNKNOWN_EMAIL', `Person with email ${personIdentifier.email} not found`, {\n\t\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonInput: personIdentifier.email,\n\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t} else if (personIdentifier.type === 'id') {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('UNKNOWN_PERSON_ID', `Person with id ${personIdentifier.id} not found`, {\n\t\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonInput: personIdentifier.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tthrow new ImplementationException()\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst inputValue = personIdentifier.type === 'email' ? personIdentifier.email : personIdentifier.id\n\t\tif (person.disabled_at !== null) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('PERSON_DISABLED', `Person with id ${person.id} is disabled`, {\n\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: person.id,\n\t\t\t\t\tpersonInput: inputValue,\n\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tawait verifier?.(person)\n\n\t\tconst sessionToken = await this.apiKeyManager.createSessionApiKey(dbContext, person.identity_id, expiration, requestInfo, trustForwardedInfo)\n\t\treturn new ResponseOk({\n\t\t\tperson,\n\t\t\ttoken: sessionToken,\n\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\tpersonId: person.id,\n\t\t\t\tpersonInput: inputValue,\n\t\t\t}),\n\t\t})\n\t}\n}\n\n/** A03: greppable payload describing why a sign-in scored as unusual. */\nexport interface RiskMeta {\n\treadonly score: number\n\treadonly reasons: readonly string[]\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of {@link SignInManager.applyRiskPolicy}: `null` = feature off / no\n * config; a metadata object when the session may still be issued; a\n * `ResponseError` when step-up blocks the session.\n */\ntype RiskPolicyOutcome =\n\t| null\n\t| { unusualLoginDetected: boolean; risk?: RiskMeta }\n\t| ResponseError<SignInErrorCode, {\n\t\temailOtpSent?: boolean\n\t\tstepUpRequired?: boolean\n\t\tunusualLoginDetected?: boolean\n\t\trisk?: RiskMeta\n\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n\t}>\n\nexport interface SignInResult {\n\treadonly person: PersonRow\n\treadonly token: string\n\t/** True when MFA was satisfied by consuming a backup code (instead of a TOTP token). */\n\treadonly usedBackupCode?: boolean\n\t/** Set when sign-in completed an MFA enrollment (A06): the freshly issued backup codes, shown once. */\n\treadonly backupCodes?: string[]\n\t/** A03: true when this sign-in scored as unusual and an UNUSUAL_LOGIN email was sent. */\n\treadonly unusualLoginDetected?: boolean\n\t/** A03: the risk score + reasons, recorded in the `unusual_login_detected` audit `event_data`. */\n\treadonly risk?: RiskMeta\n\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n}\n\nexport type SignInResponse = Response<SignInResult, SignInErrorCode, {\n\t/** Set on an OTP_REQUIRED error when an email-OTP code was just dispatched (A05). */\n\temailOtpSent?: boolean\n\t/** Set on a MFA_ENROLLMENT_REQUIRED error (A06): triggers the `mfa_enrollment_required` audit. */\n\tmfaEnrollmentRequired?: boolean\n\t/** Set on a MFA_ENROLLMENT_REQUIRED error (A06): the pending secret the client must enroll. */\n\tmfaEnrollment?: MfaEnrollment\n\t/** Set on an OTP_REQUIRED error raised by A03 anomaly step-up: triggers the `step_up_required` audit. */\n\tstepUpRequired?: boolean\n\t/** A03: true when the sign-in scored as unusual (triggers the `unusual_login_detected` audit). */\n\tunusualLoginDetected?: boolean\n\t/** A03: the risk score + reasons, recorded in the audit `event_data`. */\n\trisk?: RiskMeta\n\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n}>\nexport type CreateSessionTokenResponse = Response<SignInResult, CreateSessionTokenErrorCode, {\n\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n}>\n\nexport { SignInManager 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+{"version":3,"file":"SignInManager.js","sources":["../../../../../../packages/engine-tenant-api/src/model/service/SignInManager.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { CreateSessionTokenErrorCode, MfaEnrollment, SignInErrorCode } from '../../schema/index.js'\nimport { ApiKeyManager, AuthPolicyResolver, BackupCodeManager, EmailOtpManager, LoginRiskAnalyzer, OtpManager } from '../service/index.js'\nimport { ConfigurationQuery, LocalAuthDisablingIdpsQuery, PersonQuery, PersonRow, PersonUniqueIdentifier } from '../queries/index.js'\nimport { Config } from '../type/Config.js'\nimport { Providers } from '../providers.js'\nimport { DatabaseContext } from '../utils/index.js'\nimport { Response, ResponseError, ResponseOk } from '../utils/Response.js'\nimport { ImplementationException } from '../../exceptions.js'\nimport { AuthLogService } from './AuthLogService.js'\nimport { UserMailer } from '../mailing/index.js'\nimport { ApiKeyRequestInfo, SetMfaGraceUntilCommand } from '../commands/index.js'\nimport { intervalToSeconds } from '../utils/interval.js'\n\nclass SignInManager {\n\tconstructor(\n\t\tprivate readonly apiKeyManager: ApiKeyManager,\n\t\tprivate readonly providers: Providers,\n\t\tprivate readonly otpManager: OtpManager,\n\t\tprivate readonly backupCodeManager: BackupCodeManager,\n\t\tprivate readonly emailOtpManager: EmailOtpManager,\n\t\tprivate readonly authPolicyResolver: AuthPolicyResolver,\n\t\tprivate readonly loginRiskAnalyzer: LoginRiskAnalyzer,\n\t\tprivate readonly userMailer: UserMailer,\n\t) {}\n\n\tasync signIn(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\temail: string,\n\t\tpassword: string,\n\t\texpiration?: number,\n\t\totpCode?: string,\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t\ttrustForwardedInfo?: boolean,\n\t\tbackupCode?: string,\n\t\tconfig?: Config,\n\t\tgeoCountry?: string,\n\t): Promise<SignInResponse> {\n\t\tconst person = await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(PersonQuery.byEmail(email))\n\n\t\tif (person === null) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('UNKNOWN_EMAIL', `Person with email ${email} not found`, {\n\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\tpersonInput: email,\n\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst authLogData = {\n\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\tpersonInput: email,\n\t\t\t\tpersonId: person.id,\n\t\t\t}),\n\t\t}\n\t\t// Refused before the password is even looked at: for a person federated\n\t\t// through a provider with `disableLocalAuthentication`, a password is not a\n\t\t// credential this tenant accepts, however it got set.\n\t\tconst exclusiveIdps = await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(new LocalAuthDisablingIdpsQuery(person.id))\n\t\tif (exclusiveIdps.length > 0) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('IDP_REQUIRED', `Sign in using ${exclusiveIdps.join(' or ')}`, authLogData)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (!person.password_hash) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('NO_PASSWORD_SET', `No password set`, authLogData)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (person.disabled_at !== null) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('PERSON_DISABLED', `Person is disabled`, authLogData)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst passwordValid = await this.providers.bcryptCompare(password, person.password_hash)\n\n\t\tif (!passwordValid) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_PASSWORD', `Password does not match`, authLogData)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Block sign-in for accounts that were created while email verification\n\t\t// was required but never proved ownership. Accounts predating the\n\t\t// requirement carry email_verification_required = false and pass through.\n\t\tif (person.email_verification_required && person.email_verified_at === null) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('EMAIL_NOT_VERIFIED', `E-mail address has not been verified`, authLogData)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tlet usedBackupCode = false\n\t\t// Whether a second factor was actively proven in THIS request. Anomaly\n\t\t// step-up (A03) reuses this: a login that already cleared a second factor\n\t\t// is not asked to step up again.\n\t\tlet mfaSatisfiedThisRequest = false\n\t\tconst hasActiveTotp = Boolean(person.otp_secret && person.otp_activated_at)\n\t\tif (hasActiveTotp) {\n\t\t\t// Active TOTP takes precedence (A07 path, unchanged).\n\t\t\tif (otpCode) {\n\t\t\t\tif (!await this.otpManager.verifyOtp(dbContext, person, otpCode)) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', authLogData)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest = true\n\t\t\t} else if (backupCode) {\n\t\t\t\tif (!await this.backupCodeManager.verifyAndConsume(dbContext, person, backupCode)) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', authLogData)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tusedBackupCode = true\n\t\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest = true\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('OTP_REQUIRED', `2FA is enabled. OTP token is required`, authLogData)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else if (person.email_otp_enabled) {\n\t\t\t// No active TOTP, but email OTP is enabled (A05).\n\t\t\tif (otpCode) {\n\t\t\t\tif (!await this.emailOtpManager.verifyAndConsume(dbContext, person, otpCode)) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', authLogData)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest = true\n\t\t\t} else if (backupCode) {\n\t\t\t\tif (!await this.backupCodeManager.verifyAndConsume(dbContext, person, backupCode)) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', authLogData)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tusedBackupCode = true\n\t\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest = true\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t// Dispatch a fresh code and ask the client to retry with otpToken. Reuses\n\t\t\t\t// the existing OTP_REQUIRED contract so clients that already handle it work.\n\t\t\t\t// The send is rate-limited per person; when throttled nothing is emailed\n\t\t\t\t// (emailOtpSent: false) but a previously emailed code stays valid.\n\t\t\t\t// Independent fetch (not the passed-in `config`): the email-OTP send is\n\t\t\t\t// rate-limited by the live config and this branch never reaches the\n\t\t\t\t// anomaly analyzer, so query shape stays as before A03.\n\t\t\t\tconst emailOtpConfig = await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(new ConfigurationQuery(dbContext.providers))\n\t\t\t\tconst decision = await this.emailOtpManager.sendCode(dbContext, person, emailOtpConfig)\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('OTP_REQUIRED', `2FA is enabled. OTP token is required`, {\n\t\t\t\t\temailOtpSent: decision.ok,\n\t\t\t\t\t...authLogData,\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t// No active factor at all (A06). Enforce MFA if a matching auth_policy\n\t\t\t// requires it. With no policy rows configured this resolves to\n\t\t\t// mfaRequired=false and sign-in proceeds exactly as before.\n\t\t\tconst enforcement = await this.enforceMfaEnrollment(dbContext, person, otpCode, authLogData)\n\t\t\tif (enforcement !== null) {\n\t\t\t\tif ('error' in enforcement) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn enforcement\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t// Enrollment completed in this request (pending TOTP promoted to active),\n\t\t\t\t// so MFA is definitively satisfied — anomaly step-up cannot apply.\n\t\t\t\tconst riskHandled = await this.applyRiskPolicy(dbContext, person, {\n\t\t\t\t\tconfig,\n\t\t\t\t\tgeoCountry,\n\t\t\t\t\trequestInfo,\n\t\t\t\t\totpCode,\n\t\t\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest: true,\n\t\t\t\t\tauthLogData,\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\tif (riskHandled !== null && 'error' in riskHandled) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn riskHandled\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tconst sessionToken = await this.apiKeyManager.createSessionApiKey(\n\t\t\t\t\tdbContext,\n\t\t\t\t\tperson.identity_id,\n\t\t\t\t\texpiration,\n\t\t\t\t\trequestInfo,\n\t\t\t\t\ttrustForwardedInfo,\n\t\t\t\t)\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseOk({\n\t\t\t\t\tperson,\n\t\t\t\t\ttoken: sessionToken,\n\t\t\t\t\tbackupCodes: enforcement.backupCodes,\n\t\t\t\t\tunusualLoginDetected: riskHandled?.unusualLoginDetected || undefined,\n\t\t\t\t\trisk: riskHandled?.risk,\n\t\t\t\t\t...authLogData,\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst riskHandled = await this.applyRiskPolicy(dbContext, person, {\n\t\t\tconfig,\n\t\t\tgeoCountry,\n\t\t\trequestInfo,\n\t\t\totpCode,\n\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest,\n\t\t\tauthLogData,\n\t\t})\n\t\tif (riskHandled !== null && 'error' in riskHandled) {\n\t\t\treturn riskHandled\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst sessionToken = await this.apiKeyManager.createSessionApiKey(dbContext, person.identity_id, expiration, requestInfo, trustForwardedInfo)\n\n\t\treturn new ResponseOk({\n\t\t\tperson,\n\t\t\ttoken: sessionToken,\n\t\t\tusedBackupCode,\n\t\t\tunusualLoginDetected: riskHandled?.unusualLoginDetected || undefined,\n\t\t\trisk: riskHandled?.risk,\n\t\t\t...authLogData,\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * A03 — evaluate the sign-in risk score and act per policy. Returns:\n\t * - `null` when anomaly detection is off or no `config` was supplied (the\n\t *   default): no DB work, sign-in proceeds unchanged.\n\t * - `{ unusualLoginDetected: true }` when an informational UNUSUAL_LOGIN email\n\t *   was sent (best-effort) but the session may still be issued.\n\t * - a `ResponseError('OTP_REQUIRED')` when step-up is required and no code was\n\t *   supplied — reuses the email-OTP step-up channel (dispatches a code).\n\t * - a `ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN')` when a step-up code was supplied but\n\t *   did not verify. A valid code consumes the token and the session is issued.\n\t * - `{ unusualLoginDetected: false }` when the score was below every threshold.\n\t *\n\t * The audit entries (`unusual_login_detected`, `step_up_required`) are emitted\n\t * by the resolver from the response metadata, matching the project convention.\n\t */\n\tprivate async applyRiskPolicy(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tperson: PersonRow,\n\t\targs: {\n\t\t\tconfig?: Config\n\t\t\tgeoCountry?: string\n\t\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo\n\t\t\totpCode?: string\n\t\t\tmfaSatisfiedThisRequest: boolean\n\t\t\tauthLogData: { [AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag }\n\t\t},\n\t): Promise<RiskPolicyOutcome> {\n\t\tconst { config, geoCountry, requestInfo, otpCode, mfaSatisfiedThisRequest, authLogData } = args\n\t\tconst policy = config?.login.anomalyDetection\n\t\tif (!config || !policy?.enabled) {\n\t\t\treturn null\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst assessment = await this.loginRiskAnalyzer.analyze(dbContext, person.id, {\n\t\t\tgeoCountry: geoCountry ?? null,\n\t\t\tdeviceFingerprint: this.loginRiskAnalyzer.fingerprint(requestInfo?.userAgent),\n\t\t\tip: requestInfo?.ip ?? null,\n\t\t}, policy)\n\n\t\tif (assessment.action === 'allow') {\n\t\t\treturn { unusualLoginDetected: false }\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst riskMeta = { score: assessment.score, reasons: assessment.reasons }\n\n\t\tif (assessment.action === 'stepUp' && !mfaSatisfiedThisRequest) {\n\t\t\t// Reuse the existing email-OTP step-up channel. This is independent of\n\t\t\t// `person.email_otp_enabled`, which gates email OTP only as the *primary*\n\t\t\t// second factor (A05); the step-up challenge stands on its own, so a person\n\t\t\t// with no standing MFA can still complete it. Without consuming the code\n\t\t\t// here, such a person would never satisfy the step-up and would loop on\n\t\t\t// OTP_REQUIRED forever (the score is unchanged on every retry).\n\t\t\tif (otpCode) {\n\t\t\t\t// Retry leg: the client resent the emailed code as otpToken. Mirror the\n\t\t\t\t// A05 contract — an invalid code is rejected (not re-sent); the per-code\n\t\t\t\t// 3-attempt cap still applies, and a fresh code is issued only when the\n\t\t\t\t// client retries without a code.\n\t\t\t\tif (!await this.emailOtpManager.verifyAndConsume(dbContext, person, otpCode)) {\n\t\t\t\t\t// A failed *forced* second factor is itself an anomaly signal — carry the\n\t\t\t\t\t// step-up/risk metadata so the resolver still emits unusual_login_detected\n\t\t\t\t\t// + step_up_required with the score/reasons, rather than logging it as an\n\t\t\t\t\t// ordinary mistyped-OTP login indistinguishable from a normal 2FA typo.\n\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tstepUpRequired: true,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tunusualLoginDetected: true,\n\t\t\t\t\t\trisk: riskMeta,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t...authLogData,\n\t\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t// Step-up satisfied this request — fall through to notify + allow below.\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t// First leg: dispatch a code and ask the client to retry with otpToken.\n\t\t\t\t// Rate-limited per person; a previously emailed code stays valid when throttled.\n\t\t\t\tconst decision = await this.emailOtpManager.sendCode(dbContext, person, config)\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('OTP_REQUIRED', 'Additional verification is required for this sign-in', {\n\t\t\t\t\temailOtpSent: decision.ok,\n\t\t\t\t\tstepUpRequired: true,\n\t\t\t\t\tunusualLoginDetected: true,\n\t\t\t\t\trisk: riskMeta,\n\t\t\t\t\t...authLogData,\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// action === 'email', or step-up satisfied (already this request, or just now\n\t\t// via the emailed code): notify the person of the unusual sign-in. A failed\n\t\t// email must never block sign-in.\n\t\tawait this.sendUnusualLoginEmail(dbContext, person, geoCountry ?? null, requestInfo?.ip ?? null)\n\t\treturn { unusualLoginDetected: true, risk: riskMeta }\n\t}\n\n\tprivate async sendUnusualLoginEmail(dbContext: DatabaseContext, person: PersonRow, geoCountry: string | null, ip: string | null): Promise<void> {\n\t\tif (!person.email) {\n\t\t\t// No address to notify (e.g. an IDP-only person) — nothing to send.\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tawait this.userMailer.sendUnusualLoginEmail(dbContext, {\n\t\t\t\temail: person.email,\n\t\t\t\tgeoCountry,\n\t\t\t\tipAddress: ip,\n\t\t\t}, { projectId: null, variant: '' })\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t// ignore — informational only\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * A06 enforcement for the no-active-factor case. Returns:\n\t * - `null` when MFA is not required, or grace currently allows sign-in\n\t *   (caller proceeds to issue a session as normal). With zero auth_policy\n\t *   rows this is always the outcome — no behavior change.\n\t * - a `ResponseError` (MFA_ENROLLMENT_REQUIRED with the pending secret to\n\t *   enroll, or INVALID_OTP_TOKEN) when sign-in must be blocked.\n\t * - `{ ok: true, backupCodes }` when enrollment just completed (pending TOTP\n\t *   promoted to active); caller issues the session.\n\t */\n\tprivate async enforceMfaEnrollment(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tperson: PersonRow,\n\t\totpCode: string | undefined,\n\t\tauthLogData: { [AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag },\n\t): Promise<\n\t\t| null\n\t\t| ResponseError<SignInErrorCode, {\n\t\t\temailOtpSent?: boolean\n\t\t\tmfaEnrollmentRequired?: boolean\n\t\t\tmfaEnrollment?: MfaEnrollment\n\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n\t\t}>\n\t\t| { backupCodes: string[] }\n\t> {\n\t\tconst policy = await this.authPolicyResolver.resolveForIdentity(dbContext, person.identity_id, person.roles)\n\t\tif (!policy.mfaRequired) {\n\t\t\treturn null\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst now = this.providers.now()\n\n\t\t// Resolve the effective grace duration (seconds). A per-policy override\n\t\t// wins; otherwise we fall back to the global config default. Only fetch the\n\t\t// config when the override is absent, to keep query shapes minimal.\n\t\tlet graceSeconds: number\n\t\tif (policy.graceDuration !== null) {\n\t\t\tgraceSeconds = intervalToSeconds(policy.graceDuration)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tconst config = await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(new ConfigurationQuery(dbContext.providers))\n\t\t\tgraceSeconds = intervalToSeconds(config.login.mfaGraceDuration)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Grace handling. Default grace duration is 0 (immediate enforcement), so\n\t\t// by default neither branch below opens a window.\n\t\tif (person.mfa_grace_until !== null) {\n\t\t\tif (person.mfa_grace_until.getTime() > now.getTime()) {\n\t\t\t\t// Still inside an open grace window — allow sign-in.\n\t\t\t\treturn null\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// Grace expired → fall through to enforcement.\n\t\t} else if (graceSeconds > 0) {\n\t\t\t// Open the grace window now and allow this sign-in.\n\t\t\tconst graceUntil = new Date(now.getTime() + graceSeconds * 1000)\n\t\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(new SetMfaGraceUntilCommand(person.id, graceUntil))\n\t\t\treturn null\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Enforce.\n\t\tif (otpCode && person.otp_pending_secret) {\n\t\t\t// Enrollment completion: verify against the pending secret, then promote.\n\t\t\tif (!await this.otpManager.verifyPendingOtp(person, otpCode)) {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', authLogData)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tconst promoted = await this.otpManager.confirmOtp(dbContext, person)\n\t\t\tif (!promoted) {\n\t\t\t\t// Lost a concurrent enrollment-completion race: the pending secret was\n\t\t\t\t// already promoted by the other request (which issued the backup codes).\n\t\t\t\t// Don't regenerate here — that would invalidate the codes already\n\t\t\t\t// returned. TOTP is now active, so a retry signs in via the normal path.\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_OTP_TOKEN', 'OTP token validation has failed', authLogData)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tconst backupCodes = await this.backupCodeManager.generate(dbContext, person.id)\n\t\t\treturn { backupCodes }\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Provision a fresh pending TOTP secret and ask the client to enroll.\n\t\tconst otp = await this.otpManager.prepareOtp(dbContext, person, 'Contember')\n\t\tconst mfaEnrollment: MfaEnrollment = { otpUri: otp.uri, otpSecret: otp.secret }\n\t\treturn new ResponseError('MFA_ENROLLMENT_REQUIRED', 'MFA enrollment is required', {\n\t\t\tmfaEnrollmentRequired: true,\n\t\t\tmfaEnrollment,\n\t\t\t...authLogData,\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tasync createSessionToken(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tpersonIdentifier: PersonUniqueIdentifier,\n\t\texpiration?: number,\n\t\tverifier?: (person: PersonRow) => Promise<void>,\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t\ttrustForwardedInfo?: boolean,\n\t): Promise<CreateSessionTokenResponse> {\n\t\tconst person = await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(PersonQuery.byUniqueIdentifier(personIdentifier))\n\n\t\tif (person === null) {\n\t\t\tif (personIdentifier.type === 'email') {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('UNKNOWN_EMAIL', `Person with email ${personIdentifier.email} not found`, {\n\t\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonInput: personIdentifier.email,\n\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t} else if (personIdentifier.type === 'id') {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('UNKNOWN_PERSON_ID', `Person with id ${personIdentifier.id} not found`, {\n\t\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonInput: personIdentifier.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tthrow new ImplementationException()\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst inputValue = personIdentifier.type === 'email' ? personIdentifier.email : personIdentifier.id\n\t\tif (person.disabled_at !== null) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('PERSON_DISABLED', `Person with id ${person.id} is disabled`, {\n\t\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: person.id,\n\t\t\t\t\tpersonInput: inputValue,\n\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tawait verifier?.(person)\n\n\t\tconst sessionToken = await this.apiKeyManager.createSessionApiKey(dbContext, person.identity_id, expiration, requestInfo, trustForwardedInfo)\n\t\treturn new ResponseOk({\n\t\t\tperson,\n\t\t\ttoken: sessionToken,\n\t\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: new AuthLogService.Bag({\n\t\t\t\tpersonId: person.id,\n\t\t\t\tpersonInput: inputValue,\n\t\t\t}),\n\t\t})\n\t}\n}\n\n/** A03: greppable payload describing why a sign-in scored as unusual. */\nexport interface RiskMeta {\n\treadonly score: number\n\treadonly reasons: readonly string[]\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of {@link SignInManager.applyRiskPolicy}: `null` = feature off / no\n * config; a metadata object when the session may still be issued; a\n * `ResponseError` when step-up blocks the session.\n */\ntype RiskPolicyOutcome =\n\t| null\n\t| { unusualLoginDetected: boolean; risk?: RiskMeta }\n\t| ResponseError<SignInErrorCode, {\n\t\temailOtpSent?: boolean\n\t\tstepUpRequired?: boolean\n\t\tunusualLoginDetected?: boolean\n\t\trisk?: RiskMeta\n\t\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n\t}>\n\nexport interface SignInResult {\n\treadonly person: PersonRow\n\treadonly token: string\n\t/** True when MFA was satisfied by consuming a backup code (instead of a TOTP token). */\n\treadonly usedBackupCode?: boolean\n\t/** Set when sign-in completed an MFA enrollment (A06): the freshly issued backup codes, shown once. */\n\treadonly backupCodes?: string[]\n\t/** A03: true when this sign-in scored as unusual and an UNUSUAL_LOGIN email was sent. */\n\treadonly unusualLoginDetected?: boolean\n\t/** A03: the risk score + reasons, recorded in the `unusual_login_detected` audit `event_data`. */\n\treadonly risk?: RiskMeta\n\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n}\n\nexport type SignInResponse = Response<SignInResult, SignInErrorCode, {\n\t/** Set on an OTP_REQUIRED error when an email-OTP code was just dispatched (A05). */\n\temailOtpSent?: boolean\n\t/** Set on a MFA_ENROLLMENT_REQUIRED error (A06): triggers the `mfa_enrollment_required` audit. */\n\tmfaEnrollmentRequired?: boolean\n\t/** Set on a MFA_ENROLLMENT_REQUIRED error (A06): the pending secret the client must enroll. */\n\tmfaEnrollment?: MfaEnrollment\n\t/** Set on an OTP_REQUIRED error raised by A03 anomaly step-up: triggers the `step_up_required` audit. */\n\tstepUpRequired?: boolean\n\t/** A03: true when the sign-in scored as unusual (triggers the `unusual_login_detected` audit). */\n\tunusualLoginDetected?: boolean\n\t/** A03: the risk score + reasons, recorded in the audit `event_data`. */\n\trisk?: RiskMeta\n\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n}>\nexport type CreateSessionTokenResponse = Response<SignInResult, CreateSessionTokenErrorCode, {\n\t[AuthLogService.Key]: AuthLogService.Bag\n}>\n\nexport { SignInManager 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package/dist/production/src/model/service/apiKey/ApiKeyManager.cjs

@@ -92,8 +92,8 @@ class ApiKeyManager {
         return new Response.ResponseError("disabled", "IdP session was revoked");
       }
     }
-    setImmediate(async () => {
-      await dbContext.commandBus.execute(
+    setImmediate(() => {
+      dbContext.commandBus.execute(
         new ProlongApiKeyCommand.ProlongApiKeyCommand(
           apiKeyRow.id,
           apiKeyRow.type,
@@ -107,7 +107,8 @@ class ApiKeyManager {
           },
           apiKeyRow.max_expires_at
         )
-      );
+      ).catch(() => {
+      });
     });
     return new Response.ResponseOk(
       new VerifyResult(

package/dist/production/src/model/service/apiKey/ApiKeyManager.cjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"ApiKeyManager.cjs","sources":["../../../../../../../packages/engine-tenant-api/src/model/service/apiKey/ApiKeyManager.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import {\n\tApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\tCreateApiKeyCommand,\n\tDisableApiKeyCommand,\n\tDisableIdentityApiKeysCommand,\n\tDisableOneOffApiKeyCommand,\n\tPROLONG_THROTTLE_MS,\n\tProlongApiKeyCommand,\n} from '../../commands/index.js'\nimport { ApiKey } from '../../type/index.js'\n\nimport { Response, ResponseError, ResponseOk } from '../../utils/Response.js'\nimport { DatabaseContext, TokenHash } from '../../utils/index.js'\nimport { ApiKeyService, CreateApiKeyResponse } from './ApiKeyService.js'\nimport assert from 'node:assert'\nimport { Acl } from '@contember/schema'\nimport { ApiKeyByIdQuery, ApiKeyByTokenQuery, ApiKeyRow, ConfigurationQuery, IdentityQuery } from '../../queries/index.js'\nimport PostgresInterval from 'postgres-interval'\nimport { Config } from '../../type/Config.js'\nimport { intervalToPostgres, intervalToSeconds } from '../../utils/interval.js'\nimport { AuthPolicyResolver } from '../AuthPolicyResolver.js'\nimport { AuthLogService } from '../AuthLogService.js'\nimport { IdpSessionRevalidator } from '../idp/IdpSessionRevalidator.js'\nimport { UnpersistedApiKeyManager } from './UnpersistedApiKeyManager.js'\n\nexport class ApiKeyManager {\n\tconstructor(\n\t\tprivate readonly apiKeyService: ApiKeyService,\n\t\tprivate readonly authPolicyResolver: AuthPolicyResolver,\n\t\tprivate readonly authLogService: AuthLogService,\n\t\tprivate readonly unpersistedApiKeyManager: UnpersistedApiKeyManager = new UnpersistedApiKeyManager(),\n\t\tprivate readonly idpSessionRevalidator?: IdpSessionRevalidator,\n\t) {}\n\n\tasync verifyAndProlong(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\treadDbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\ttoken: string,\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t\tforwardedInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t): Promise<VerifyResponse> {\n\t\tconst unpersistedResult = this.unpersistedApiKeyManager.verify(token)\n\t\tif (unpersistedResult !== null) {\n\t\t\t// Configured (unpersisted) root token: no DB row to prolong/track.\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseOk(unpersistedResult)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst apiKeyRow = await readDbContext.queryHandler.fetch(new ApiKeyByTokenQuery(token))\n\t\tif (apiKeyRow === null) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError(VerifyErrorCode.NOT_FOUND, 'API key was not found')\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (apiKeyRow.disabled_at !== null) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError(\n\t\t\t\tVerifyErrorCode.DISABLED,\n\t\t\t\t`API key was disabled at ${apiKeyRow.disabled_at.toISOString()}`,\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Single injectable clock for all session-policy time math (matches issuance,\n\t\t// which uses providers.now()), so the A19 idle/max logic is deterministically testable.\n\t\tconst now = dbContext.providers.now()\n\t\tif (apiKeyRow.expires_at !== null && apiKeyRow.expires_at <= now) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError(VerifyErrorCode.DISABLED, `API key expired at ${apiKeyRow.expires_at.toISOString()}`)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// A19: absolute hard cap (defensive — the prolong clamp should already keep\n\t\t// expires_at <= max_expires_at, but enforce it here regardless).\n\t\tif (apiKeyRow.max_expires_at !== null && apiKeyRow.max_expires_at <= now) {\n\t\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(new DisableApiKeyCommand(apiKeyRow.id))\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError(\n\t\t\t\tVerifyErrorCode.DISABLED,\n\t\t\t\t`API key reached its maximum lifetime at ${apiKeyRow.max_expires_at.toISOString()}`,\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// A19: idle timeout. Reject + disable when the session has been idle longer\n\t\t// than the policy's idle_timeout. A null idle_timeout (today's default) or a\n\t\t// never-used key (last_used_at null) are never idle-expired.\n\t\tif (apiKeyRow.idle_timeout !== null && apiKeyRow.last_used_at !== null) {\n\t\t\tconst idleMs = intervalToSeconds(apiKeyRow.idle_timeout) * 1000\n\t\t\t// last_used_at is written at most once per PROLONG_THROTTLE_MS (tracking is\n\t\t\t// throttled), so it can legitimately lag a continuously-active session by up\n\t\t\t// to that window. Add the throttle as slack so a small idle_timeout can't\n\t\t\t// idle-expire a session that is actually in use.\n\t\t\tif (now.getTime() - apiKeyRow.last_used_at.getTime() > idleMs + PROLONG_THROTTLE_MS) {\n\t\t\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(new DisableApiKeyCommand(apiKeyRow.id))\n\t\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\t\tawait this.authLogService.logSessionEvent(dbContext, {\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttype: 'session_expired_idle',\n\t\t\t\t\t\tidentityId: apiKeyRow.identity_id,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: apiKeyRow.person_id,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tipAddress: requestInfo?.ip,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tuserAgent: requestInfo?.userAgent,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tsuccess: false,\n\t\t\t\t\t\teventData: {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tlastUsedAt: apiKeyRow.last_used_at?.toISOString() ?? null,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tidleTimeout: String(apiKeyRow.idle_timeout),\n\t\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t\t\t/* best-effort: auth path must stay resilient */\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError(\n\t\t\t\t\tVerifyErrorCode.DISABLED,\n\t\t\t\t\t`API key was idle since ${apiKeyRow.last_used_at.toISOString()} and exceeded the idle timeout`,\n\t\t\t\t)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst effectiveInfo: ApiKeyRequestInfo | undefined = apiKeyRow.trust_forwarded_info && forwardedInfo\n\t\t\t? {\n\t\t\t\tip: forwardedInfo.ip ?? requestInfo?.ip,\n\t\t\t\tuserAgent: forwardedInfo.userAgent ?? requestInfo?.userAgent,\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t: requestInfo\n\n\t\t// Re-validate IdP-backed sessions against their identity provider (A24). In the\n\t\t// default `background` mode this returns immediately and revalidates after the\n\t\t// response (revocation lands on the next request); in `blocking` mode it can revoke\n\t\t// the current request. 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[]\n\t\tconst policy = await this.authPolicyResolver.resolveForIdentity(dbContext, identityId, globalRoles)\n\n\t\tconst defaultExpirationMinutes = intervalToSeconds(config.login.defaultTokenExpiration) / 60\n\t\t// remember_me_allowed === false: ignore a client-supplied longer lifetime and\n\t\t// force the default. (true/null leave the requested expiration untouched.)\n\t\tconst requestedMinutes = policy.rememberMeAllowed === false\n\t\t\t? defaultExpirationMinutes\n\t\t\t: (expiration ?? defaultExpirationMinutes)\n\n\t\t// Cap by maxTokenExpiration (existing behavior) AND by the policy's\n\t\t// tokenExpiration (A19) — strictest wins.\n\t\tlet expirationCapped = config.login.maxTokenExpiration\n\t\t\t? Math.min(requestedMinutes, intervalToSeconds(config.login.maxTokenExpiration) / 60)\n\t\t\t: requestedMinutes\n\t\tif (policy.tokenExpiration) {\n\t\t\texpirationCapped = Math.min(expirationCapped, intervalToSeconds(policy.tokenExpiration) / 60)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Absolute hard cap: issued_at + policy.tokenExpiration. NULL = uncapped\n\t\t// sliding window (today's behavior).\n\t\tconst issuedAt = dbContext.providers.now()\n\t\tconst maxExpiresAt = policy.tokenExpiration\n\t\t\t? new Date(issuedAt.getTime() + intervalToSeconds(policy.tokenExpiration) * 1000)\n\t\t\t: null\n\n\t\tconst command = new CreateApiKeyCommand({\n\t\t\ttype: ApiKey.Type.SESSION,\n\t\t\tidentityId,\n\t\t\texpiration: expirationCapped,\n\t\t\trequestInfo,\n\t\t\ttrustForwardedInfo,\n\t\t\tidleTimeout: policy.idleTimeout ? intervalToPostgres(policy.idleTimeout) : null,\n\t\t\tmaxExpiresAt,\n\t\t})\n\t\tconst { id, token } = await dbContext.commandBus.execute(command)\n\t\tassert(token !== undefined)\n\n\t\t// A19: audit only when a policy is actually in effect. With zero auth_policy\n\t\t// rows the resolved policy is inert and no extra insert happens.\n\t\tconst policyApplied = policy.mfaRequired === true\n\t\t\t|| policy.tokenExpiration !== null\n\t\t\t|| policy.idleTimeout !== null\n\t\t\t|| policy.rememberMeAllowed !== null\n\t\tif (policyApplied) {\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\tawait this.authLogService.logSessionEvent(dbContext, {\n\t\t\t\t\ttype: 'session_policy_applied',\n\t\t\t\t\tidentityId,\n\t\t\t\t\tipAddress: requestInfo?.ip,\n\t\t\t\t\tuserAgent: requestInfo?.userAgent,\n\t\t\t\t\tsuccess: true,\n\t\t\t\t\teventData: {\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttokenExpiration: policy.tokenExpiration ? intervalToPostgres(policy.tokenExpiration) : null,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tidleTimeout: policy.idleTimeout ? intervalToPostgres(policy.idleTimeout) : null,\n\t\t\t\t\t\trememberMeAllowed: policy.rememberMeAllowed,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tmfaRequired: policy.mfaRequired,\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t\t/* best-effort: sign-in must not break on an audit failure */\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\treturn { id, token }\n\t}\n\n\tasync findApiKey(dbContext: DatabaseContext, apiKeyId: string): Promise<ApiKeyRow | null> {\n\t\treturn await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(\n\t\t\tnew ApiKeyByIdQuery(apiKeyId),\n\t\t)\n\t}\n\n\tasync disableOneOffApiKey(dbContext: DatabaseContext, apiKeyId: string): Promise<void> {\n\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(new DisableOneOffApiKeyCommand(apiKeyId))\n\t}\n\n\tasync disableApiKey(dbContext: DatabaseContext, apiKeyId: string): Promise<boolean> {\n\t\treturn await dbContext.commandBus.execute(new DisableApiKeyCommand(apiKeyId))\n\t}\n\n\tasync disableIdentityApiKeys(dbContext: DatabaseContext, identityId: string): Promise<void> {\n\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(new DisableIdentityApiKeysCommand(identityId))\n\t}\n\n\tasync createGlobalPermanentApiKey(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tdescription: string,\n\t\troles: readonly string[],\n\t\ttokenHash?: TokenHash,\n\t\ttrustForwardedInfo?: boolean,\n\t): Promise<CreateApiKeyResponse> {\n\t\treturn await dbContext.transaction(async db => {\n\t\t\treturn await this.apiKeyService.createPermanentApiKey(db, description, roles, tokenHash, trustForwardedInfo)\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tasync createProjectPermanentApiKey(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tprojectId: string,\n\t\tmemberships: readonly Acl.Membership[],\n\t\tdescription: string,\n\t\ttokenHash?: TokenHash,\n\t\ttrustForwardedInfo?: boolean,\n\t): Promise<CreateApiKeyResponse> {\n\t\treturn await dbContext.transaction(async db => {\n\t\t\treturn await this.apiKeyService.createProjectPermanentApiKey(db, projectId, memberships, description, tokenHash, trustForwardedInfo)\n\t\t})\n\t}\n}\n\nexport type VerifyResponse = Response<VerifyResult, VerifyErrorCode>\n\nexport class VerifyResult {\n\treadonly valid = true\n\n\tconstructor(\n\t\tpublic readonly identityId: string,\n\t\tpublic readonly apiKeyId: string,\n\t\tpublic readonly roles: string[],\n\t\tpublic readonly personId: string | null,\n\t\tpublic readonly trustForwardedInfo: boolean = false,\n\t) {}\n}\n\nexport enum VerifyErrorCode {\n\tNOT_FOUND = 'not_found',\n\tDISABLED = 'disabled',\n\tEXPIRED = 'expired',\n\tNO_AUTH_HEADER = 'no_auth_header',\n\tINVALID_AUTH_HEADER = 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Reject + disable when the session has been idle longer\n\t\t// than the policy's idle_timeout. A null idle_timeout (today's default) or a\n\t\t// never-used key (last_used_at null) are never idle-expired.\n\t\tif (apiKeyRow.idle_timeout !== null && apiKeyRow.last_used_at !== null) {\n\t\t\tconst idleMs = intervalToSeconds(apiKeyRow.idle_timeout) * 1000\n\t\t\t// last_used_at is written at most once per PROLONG_THROTTLE_MS (tracking is\n\t\t\t// throttled), so it can legitimately lag a continuously-active session by up\n\t\t\t// to that window. Add the throttle as slack so a small idle_timeout can't\n\t\t\t// idle-expire a session that is actually in use.\n\t\t\tif (now.getTime() - apiKeyRow.last_used_at.getTime() > idleMs + PROLONG_THROTTLE_MS) {\n\t\t\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(new DisableApiKeyCommand(apiKeyRow.id))\n\t\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\t\tawait this.authLogService.logSessionEvent(dbContext, {\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttype: 'session_expired_idle',\n\t\t\t\t\t\tidentityId: apiKeyRow.identity_id,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: apiKeyRow.person_id,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tipAddress: requestInfo?.ip,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tuserAgent: requestInfo?.userAgent,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tsuccess: false,\n\t\t\t\t\t\teventData: {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tlastUsedAt: apiKeyRow.last_used_at?.toISOString() ?? null,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tidleTimeout: String(apiKeyRow.idle_timeout),\n\t\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t\t\t/* best-effort: auth path must stay resilient */\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError(\n\t\t\t\t\tVerifyErrorCode.DISABLED,\n\t\t\t\t\t`API key was idle since ${apiKeyRow.last_used_at.toISOString()} and exceeded the idle timeout`,\n\t\t\t\t)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst effectiveInfo: ApiKeyRequestInfo | undefined = apiKeyRow.trust_forwarded_info && forwardedInfo\n\t\t\t? {\n\t\t\t\tip: forwardedInfo.ip ?? requestInfo?.ip,\n\t\t\t\tuserAgent: forwardedInfo.userAgent ?? requestInfo?.userAgent,\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t: requestInfo\n\n\t\t// Re-validate IdP-backed sessions against their identity provider (A24). In the\n\t\t// default `background` mode this returns immediately and revalidates after the\n\t\t// response (revocation lands on the next request); in `blocking` mode it can revoke\n\t\t// the current request. No-op for password sessions and IdPs without revalidation.\n\t\t// `effectiveInfo` is passed so the audit entries record the originating request's IP/UA.\n\t\tif (this.idpSessionRevalidator) {\n\t\t\tconst outcome = await this.idpSessionRevalidator.revalidate(dbContext, readDbContext, apiKeyRow, effectiveInfo)\n\t\t\tif (outcome === 'revoked') {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError(VerifyErrorCode.DISABLED, 'IdP session was revoked')\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Detached (runs after the response), so a rejection here would be an unhandledRejection and can take the\n\t\t// worker down. Tracking is best-effort — the next request writes it again.\n\t\tsetImmediate(() => {\n\t\t\tdbContext.commandBus.execute(\n\t\t\t\tnew ProlongApiKeyCommand(\n\t\t\t\t\tapiKeyRow.id,\n\t\t\t\t\tapiKeyRow.type,\n\t\t\t\t\tapiKeyRow.expiration,\n\t\t\t\t\tapiKeyRow.expires_at,\n\t\t\t\t\teffectiveInfo,\n\t\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlastIp: apiKeyRow.last_ip,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlastUserAgent: apiKeyRow.last_user_agent,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlastUsedAt: apiKeyRow.last_used_at,\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t\tapiKeyRow.max_expires_at,\n\t\t\t\t),\n\t\t\t).catch(() => {})\n\t\t})\n\n\t\treturn new ResponseOk(\n\t\t\tnew VerifyResult(\n\t\t\t\tapiKeyRow.identity_id,\n\t\t\t\tapiKeyRow.id,\n\t\t\t\tapiKeyRow.roles,\n\t\t\t\tapiKeyRow.person_id,\n\t\t\t\tapiKeyRow.trust_forwarded_info,\n\t\t\t),\n\t\t)\n\t}\n\n\tasync createSessionApiKey(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tidentityId: string,\n\t\texpiration?: number,\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t\ttrustForwardedInfo?: boolean,\n\t): Promise<string> {\n\t\tconst { token } = await this.createSessionApiKeyWithId(dbContext, identityId, expiration, requestInfo, trustForwardedInfo)\n\t\treturn token\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Like {@link createSessionApiKey} but also returns the api_key id — needed when the\n\t * caller has to bind another row to the session (e.g. an `idp_session` for IdP\n\t * re-validation).\n\t */\n\tasync createSessionApiKeyWithId(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tidentityId: string,\n\t\texpiration?: number,\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t\ttrustForwardedInfo?: boolean,\n\t): Promise<{ id: string; token: string }> {\n\t\tconst config = await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(new ConfigurationQuery(dbContext.providers))\n\n\t\t// A19: snapshot the effective session policy onto the api_key at sign-in.\n\t\t// With no matching policy, every field is null/baseline and the result is\n\t\t// byte-for-byte today's behavior.\n\t\tconst [identityRow] = await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(new IdentityQuery([identityId]))\n\t\tconst globalRoles = identityRow?.roles ?? []\n\t\tconst policy = await this.authPolicyResolver.resolveForIdentity(dbContext, identityId, globalRoles)\n\n\t\tconst defaultExpirationMinutes = intervalToSeconds(config.login.defaultTokenExpiration) / 60\n\t\t// remember_me_allowed === false: ignore a client-supplied longer lifetime and\n\t\t// force the default. (true/null leave the requested expiration untouched.)\n\t\tconst requestedMinutes = policy.rememberMeAllowed === false\n\t\t\t? defaultExpirationMinutes\n\t\t\t: (expiration ?? defaultExpirationMinutes)\n\n\t\t// Cap by maxTokenExpiration (existing behavior) AND by the policy's\n\t\t// tokenExpiration (A19) — strictest wins.\n\t\tlet expirationCapped = config.login.maxTokenExpiration\n\t\t\t? Math.min(requestedMinutes, intervalToSeconds(config.login.maxTokenExpiration) / 60)\n\t\t\t: requestedMinutes\n\t\tif (policy.tokenExpiration) {\n\t\t\texpirationCapped = Math.min(expirationCapped, intervalToSeconds(policy.tokenExpiration) / 60)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Absolute hard cap: issued_at + policy.tokenExpiration. NULL = uncapped\n\t\t// sliding window (today's behavior).\n\t\tconst issuedAt = dbContext.providers.now()\n\t\tconst maxExpiresAt = policy.tokenExpiration\n\t\t\t? new Date(issuedAt.getTime() + intervalToSeconds(policy.tokenExpiration) * 1000)\n\t\t\t: null\n\n\t\tconst command = new CreateApiKeyCommand({\n\t\t\ttype: ApiKey.Type.SESSION,\n\t\t\tidentityId,\n\t\t\texpiration: expirationCapped,\n\t\t\trequestInfo,\n\t\t\ttrustForwardedInfo,\n\t\t\tidleTimeout: policy.idleTimeout ? intervalToPostgres(policy.idleTimeout) : null,\n\t\t\tmaxExpiresAt,\n\t\t})\n\t\tconst { id, token } = await dbContext.commandBus.execute(command)\n\t\tassert(token !== undefined)\n\n\t\t// A19: audit only when a policy is actually in effect. With zero auth_policy\n\t\t// rows the resolved policy is inert and no extra insert happens.\n\t\tconst policyApplied = policy.mfaRequired === true\n\t\t\t|| policy.tokenExpiration !== null\n\t\t\t|| policy.idleTimeout !== null\n\t\t\t|| policy.rememberMeAllowed !== null\n\t\tif (policyApplied) {\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\tawait this.authLogService.logSessionEvent(dbContext, {\n\t\t\t\t\ttype: 'session_policy_applied',\n\t\t\t\t\tidentityId,\n\t\t\t\t\tipAddress: requestInfo?.ip,\n\t\t\t\t\tuserAgent: requestInfo?.userAgent,\n\t\t\t\t\tsuccess: true,\n\t\t\t\t\teventData: {\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttokenExpiration: policy.tokenExpiration ? intervalToPostgres(policy.tokenExpiration) : null,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tidleTimeout: policy.idleTimeout ? intervalToPostgres(policy.idleTimeout) : null,\n\t\t\t\t\t\trememberMeAllowed: policy.rememberMeAllowed,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tmfaRequired: policy.mfaRequired,\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t\t/* best-effort: sign-in must not break on an audit failure */\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\treturn { id, token }\n\t}\n\n\tasync findApiKey(dbContext: DatabaseContext, apiKeyId: string): Promise<ApiKeyRow | null> {\n\t\treturn await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(\n\t\t\tnew ApiKeyByIdQuery(apiKeyId),\n\t\t)\n\t}\n\n\tasync disableOneOffApiKey(dbContext: DatabaseContext, apiKeyId: string): Promise<void> {\n\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(new DisableOneOffApiKeyCommand(apiKeyId))\n\t}\n\n\tasync disableApiKey(dbContext: DatabaseContext, apiKeyId: string): Promise<boolean> {\n\t\treturn await dbContext.commandBus.execute(new DisableApiKeyCommand(apiKeyId))\n\t}\n\n\tasync disableIdentityApiKeys(dbContext: DatabaseContext, identityId: string): Promise<void> {\n\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(new DisableIdentityApiKeysCommand(identityId))\n\t}\n\n\tasync createGlobalPermanentApiKey(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tdescription: string,\n\t\troles: readonly string[],\n\t\ttokenHash?: TokenHash,\n\t\ttrustForwardedInfo?: boolean,\n\t): Promise<CreateApiKeyResponse> {\n\t\treturn await dbContext.transaction(async db => {\n\t\t\treturn await this.apiKeyService.createPermanentApiKey(db, description, roles, tokenHash, trustForwardedInfo)\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tasync createProjectPermanentApiKey(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tprojectId: string,\n\t\tmemberships: readonly Acl.Membership[],\n\t\tdescription: string,\n\t\ttokenHash?: TokenHash,\n\t\ttrustForwardedInfo?: boolean,\n\t): Promise<CreateApiKeyResponse> {\n\t\treturn await dbContext.transaction(async db => {\n\t\t\treturn await this.apiKeyService.createProjectPermanentApiKey(db, projectId, memberships, description, tokenHash, trustForwardedInfo)\n\t\t})\n\t}\n}\n\nexport type VerifyResponse = Response<VerifyResult, VerifyErrorCode>\n\nexport class VerifyResult {\n\treadonly valid = true\n\n\tconstructor(\n\t\tpublic readonly identityId: string,\n\t\tpublic readonly apiKeyId: string,\n\t\tpublic readonly roles: string[],\n\t\tpublic readonly personId: string | null,\n\t\tpublic readonly trustForwardedInfo: boolean = false,\n\t) {}\n}\n\nexport enum VerifyErrorCode {\n\tNOT_FOUND = 'not_found',\n\tDISABLED = 'disabled',\n\tEXPIRED = 'expired',\n\tNO_AUTH_HEADER = 'no_auth_header',\n\tINVALID_AUTH_HEADER = 'invalid_auth_header',\n}\n"],"names":["UnpersistedApiKeyManager","ResponseOk","ApiKeyByTokenQuery","ResponseError","DisableApiKeyCommand","intervalToSeconds","PROLONG_THROTTLE_MS","ProlongApiKeyCommand","ConfigurationQuery","IdentityQuery","CreateApiKeyCommand","ApiKey","intervalToPostgres","ApiKeyByIdQuery","DisableOneOffApiKeyCommand","DisableIdentityApiKeysCommand","VerifyErrorCode"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAyBO,MAAM,cAAc;AAAA,EAC1B,YACkB,eACA,oBACA,gBACA,2BAAqD,IAAIA,yBAAAA,yBAAA,GACzD,uBAChB;AALgB,SAAA,gBAAA;AACA,SAAA,qBAAA;AACA,SAAA,iBAAA;AACA,SAAA,2BAAA;AACA,SAAA,wBAAA;AAAA,EACf;AAAA,EAEH,MAAM,iBACL,WACA,eACA,OACA,aACA,eAC0B;AAC1B,UAAM,oBAAoB,KAAK,yBAAyB,OAAO,KAAK;AACpE,QAAI,sBAAsB,MAAM;AAE/B,aAAO,IAAIC,SAAAA,WAAW,iBAAiB;AAAA,IACxC;AAEA,UAAM,YAAY,MAAM,cAAc,aAAa,MAAM,IAAIC,YAAAA,mBAAmB,KAAK,CAAC;AACtF,QAAI,cAAc,MAAM;AACvB,aAAO,IAAIC,SAAAA,cAAc,aAA2B,uBAAuB;AAAA,IAC5E;AAEA,QAAI,UAAU,gBAAgB,MAAM;AACnC,aAAO,IAAIA,SAAAA;AAAAA,QACV;AAAA,QACA,2BAA2B,UAAU,YAAY,YAAA,CAAa;AAAA,MAAA;AAAA,IAEhE;AAIA,UAAM,MAAM,UAAU,UAAU,IAAA;AAChC,QAAI,UAAU,eAAe,QAAQ,UAAU,cAAc,KAAK;AACjE,aAAO,IAAIA,SAAAA,cAAc,YAA0B,sBAAsB,UAAU,WAAW,YAAA,CAAa,EAAE;AAAA,IAC9G;AAIA,QAAI,UAAU,mBAAmB,QAAQ,UAAU,kBAAkB,KAAK;AACzE,YAAM,UAAU,WAAW,QAAQ,IAAIC,qBAAAA,qBAAqB,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;AACzE,aAAO,IAAID,SAAAA;AAAAA,QACV;AAAA,QACA,2CAA2C,UAAU,eAAe,YAAA,CAAa;AAAA,MAAA;AAAA,IAEnF;AAKA,QAAI,UAAU,iBAAiB,QAAQ,UAAU,iBAAiB,MAAM;AACvE,YAAM,SAASE,SAAAA,kBAAkB,UAAU,YAAY,IAAI;AAK3D,UAAI,IAAI,YAAY,UAAU,aAAa,QAAA,IAAY,SAASC,0CAAqB;AACpF,cAAM,UAAU,WAAW,QAAQ,IAAIF,qBAAAA,qBAAqB,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;AACzE,YAAI;AACH,gBAAM,KAAK,eAAe,gBAAgB,WAAW;AAAA,YACpD,MAAM;AAAA,YACN,YAAY,UAAU;AAAA,YACtB,UAAU,UAAU;AAAA,YACpB,WAAW,aAAa;AAAA,YACxB,WAAW,aAAa;AAAA,YACxB,SAAS;AAAA,YACT,WAAW;AAAA,cACV,YAAY,UAAU,cAAc,YAAA,KAAiB;AAAA,cACrD,aAAa,OAAO,UAAU,YAAY;AAAA,YAAA;AAAA,UAC3C,CACA;AAAA,QACF,QAAQ;AAAA,QAER;AACA,eAAO,IAAID,SAAAA;AAAAA,UACV;AAAA,UACA,0BAA0B,UAAU,aAAa,YAAA,CAAa;AAAA,QAAA;AAAA,MAEhE;AAAA,IACD;AAEA,UAAM,gBAA+C,UAAU,wBAAwB,gBACpF;AAAA,MACD,IAAI,cAAc,MAAM,aAAa;AAAA,MACrC,WAAW,cAAc,aAAa,aAAa;AAAA,IAAA,IAElD;AAOH,QAAI,KAAK,uBAAuB;AAC/B,YAAM,UAAU,MAAM,KAAK,sBAAsB,WAAW,WAAW,eAAe,WAAW,aAAa;AAC9G,UAAI,YAAY,WAAW;AAC1B,eAAO,IAAIA,SAAAA,cAAc,YAA0B,yBAAyB;AAAA,MAC7E;AAAA,IACD;AAIA,iBAAa,MAAM;AAClB,gBAAU,WAAW;AAAA,QACpB,IAAII,qBAAAA;AAAAA,UACH,UAAU;AAAA,UACV,UAAU;AAAA,UACV,UAAU;AAAA,UACV,UAAU;AAAA,UACV;AAAA,UACA;AAAA,YACC,QAAQ,UAAU;AAAA,YAClB,eAAe,UAAU;AAAA,YACzB,YAAY,UAAU;AAAA,UAAA;AAAA,UAEvB,UAAU;AAAA,QAAA;AAAA,MACX,EACC,MAAM,MAAM;AAAA,MAAC,CAAC;AAAA,IACjB,CAAC;AAED,WAAO,IAAIN,SAAAA;AAAAA,MACV,IAAI;AAAA,QACH,UAAU;AAAA,QACV,UAAU;AAAA,QACV,UAAU;AAAA,QACV,UAAU;AAAA,QACV,UAAU;AAAA,MAAA;AAAA,IACX;AAAA,EAEF;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,oBACL,WACA,YACA,YACA,aACA,oBACkB;AAClB,UAAM,EAAE,UAAU,MAAM,KAAK,0BAA0B,WAAW,YAAY,YAAY,aAAa,kBAAkB;AACzH,WAAO;AAAA,EACR;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAOA,MAAM,0BACL,WACA,YACA,YACA,aACA,oBACyC;AACzC,UAAM,SAAS,MAAM,UAAU,aAAa,MAAM,IAAIO,mBAAAA,mBAAmB,UAAU,SAAS,CAAC;AAK7F,UAAM,CAAC,WAAW,IAAI,MAAM,UAAU,aAAa,MAAM,IAAIC,cAAAA,cAAc,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC;AACxF,UAAM,cAAc,aAAa,SAAS,CAAA;AAC1C,UAAM,SAAS,MAAM,KAAK,mBAAmB,mBAAmB,WAAW,YAAY,WAAW;AAElG,UAAM,2BAA2BJ,SAAAA,kBAAkB,OAAO,MAAM,sBAAsB,IAAI;AAG1F,UAAM,mBAAmB,OAAO,sBAAsB,QACnD,2BACC,cAAc;AAIlB,QAAI,mBAAmB,OAAO,MAAM,qBACjC,KAAK,IAAI,kBAAkBA,SAAAA,kBAAkB,OAAO,MAAM,kBAAkB,IAAI,EAAE,IAClF;AACH,QAAI,OAAO,iBAAiB;AAC3B,yBAAmB,KAAK,IAAI,kBAAkBA,SAAAA,kBAAkB,OAAO,eAAe,IAAI,EAAE;AAAA,IAC7F;AAIA,UAAM,WAAW,UAAU,UAAU,IAAA;AACrC,UAAM,eAAe,OAAO,kBACzB,IAAI,KAAK,SAAS,QAAA,IAAYA,SAAAA,kBAAkB,OAAO,eAAe,IAAI,GAAI,IAC9E;AAEH,UAAM,UAAU,IAAIK,wCAAoB;AAAA,MACvC,MAAMC,OAAAA,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,MAClB;AAAA,MACA,YAAY;AAAA,MACZ;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,aAAa,OAAO,cAAcC,SAAAA,mBAAmB,OAAO,WAAW,IAAI;AAAA,MAC3E;AAAA,IAAA,CACA;AACD,UAAM,EAAE,IAAI,MAAA,IAAU,MAAM,UAAU,WAAW,QAAQ,OAAO;AAChE,WAAO,UAAU,MAAS;AAI1B,UAAM,gBAAgB,OAAO,gBAAgB,QACzC,OAAO,oBAAoB,QAC3B,OAAO,gBAAgB,QACvB,OAAO,sBAAsB;AACjC,QAAI,eAAe;AAClB,UAAI;AACH,cAAM,KAAK,eAAe,gBAAgB,WAAW;AAAA,UACpD,MAAM;AAAA,UACN;AAAA,UACA,WAAW,aAAa;AAAA,UACxB,WAAW,aAAa;AAAA,UACxB,SAAS;AAAA,UACT,WAAW;AAAA,YACV,iBAAiB,OAAO,kBAAkBA,SAAAA,mBAAmB,OAAO,eAAe,IAAI;AAAA,YACvF,aAAa,OAAO,cAAcA,SAAAA,mBAAmB,OAAO,WAAW,IAAI;AAAA,YAC3E,mBAAmB,OAAO;AAAA,YAC1B,aAAa,OAAO;AAAA,UAAA;AAAA,QACrB,CACA;AAAA,MACF,QAAQ;AAAA,MAER;AAAA,IACD;AAEA,WAAO,EAAE,IAAI,MAAA;AAAA,EACd;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,WAAW,WAA4B,UAA6C;AACzF,WAAO,MAAM,UAAU,aAAa;AAAA,MACnC,IAAIC,YAAAA,gBAAgB,QAAQ;AAAA,IAAA;AAAA,EAE9B;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,oBAAoB,WAA4B,UAAiC;AACtF,UAAM,UAAU,WAAW,QAAQ,IAAIC,2BAAAA,2BAA2B,QAAQ,CAAC;AAAA,EAC5E;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,cAAc,WAA4B,UAAoC;AACnF,WAAO,MAAM,UAAU,WAAW,QAAQ,IAAIV,qBAAAA,qBAAqB,QAAQ,CAAC;AAAA,EAC7E;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,uBAAuB,WAA4B,YAAmC;AAC3F,UAAM,UAAU,WAAW,QAAQ,IAAIW,8BAAAA,8BAA8B,UAAU,CAAC;AAAA,EACjF;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,4BACL,WACA,aACA,OACA,WACA,oBACgC;AAChC,WAAO,MAAM,UAAU,YAAY,OAAM,OAAM;AAC9C,aAAO,MAAM,KAAK,cAAc,sBAAsB,IAAI,aAAa,OAAO,WAAW,kBAAkB;AAAA,IAC5G,CAAC;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,6BACL,WACA,WACA,aACA,aACA,WACA,oBACgC;AAChC,WAAO,MAAM,UAAU,YAAY,OAAM,OAAM;AAC9C,aAAO,MAAM,KAAK,cAA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package/dist/production/src/model/service/apiKey/ApiKeyManager.js

@@ -90,8 +90,8 @@ class ApiKeyManager {
         return new ResponseError("disabled", "IdP session was revoked");
       }
     }
-    setImmediate(async () => {
-      await dbContext.commandBus.execute(
+    setImmediate(() => {
+      dbContext.commandBus.execute(
         new ProlongApiKeyCommand(
           apiKeyRow.id,
           apiKeyRow.type,
@@ -105,7 +105,8 @@ class ApiKeyManager {
           },
           apiKeyRow.max_expires_at
         )
-      );
+      ).catch(() => {
+      });
     });
     return new ResponseOk(
       new VerifyResult(

package/dist/production/src/model/service/apiKey/ApiKeyManager.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"ApiKeyManager.js","sources":["../../../../../../../packages/engine-tenant-api/src/model/service/apiKey/ApiKeyManager.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import {\n\tApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\tCreateApiKeyCommand,\n\tDisableApiKeyCommand,\n\tDisableIdentityApiKeysCommand,\n\tDisableOneOffApiKeyCommand,\n\tPROLONG_THROTTLE_MS,\n\tProlongApiKeyCommand,\n} from '../../commands/index.js'\nimport { ApiKey } from '../../type/index.js'\n\nimport { Response, ResponseError, ResponseOk } from '../../utils/Response.js'\nimport { DatabaseContext, TokenHash } from '../../utils/index.js'\nimport { ApiKeyService, CreateApiKeyResponse } from './ApiKeyService.js'\nimport assert from 'node:assert'\nimport { Acl } from '@contember/schema'\nimport { ApiKeyByIdQuery, ApiKeyByTokenQuery, ApiKeyRow, ConfigurationQuery, IdentityQuery } from '../../queries/index.js'\nimport PostgresInterval from 'postgres-interval'\nimport { Config } from '../../type/Config.js'\nimport { intervalToPostgres, intervalToSeconds } from '../../utils/interval.js'\nimport { AuthPolicyResolver } from '../AuthPolicyResolver.js'\nimport { AuthLogService } from '../AuthLogService.js'\nimport { IdpSessionRevalidator } from '../idp/IdpSessionRevalidator.js'\nimport { UnpersistedApiKeyManager } from './UnpersistedApiKeyManager.js'\n\nexport class ApiKeyManager {\n\tconstructor(\n\t\tprivate readonly apiKeyService: ApiKeyService,\n\t\tprivate readonly authPolicyResolver: AuthPolicyResolver,\n\t\tprivate readonly authLogService: AuthLogService,\n\t\tprivate readonly unpersistedApiKeyManager: UnpersistedApiKeyManager = new UnpersistedApiKeyManager(),\n\t\tprivate readonly idpSessionRevalidator?: IdpSessionRevalidator,\n\t) {}\n\n\tasync verifyAndProlong(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\treadDbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\ttoken: string,\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t\tforwardedInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t): Promise<VerifyResponse> {\n\t\tconst unpersistedResult = this.unpersistedApiKeyManager.verify(token)\n\t\tif (unpersistedResult !== null) {\n\t\t\t// Configured (unpersisted) root token: no DB row to prolong/track.\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseOk(unpersistedResult)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst apiKeyRow = await readDbContext.queryHandler.fetch(new ApiKeyByTokenQuery(token))\n\t\tif (apiKeyRow === null) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError(VerifyErrorCode.NOT_FOUND, 'API key was not found')\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (apiKeyRow.disabled_at !== null) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError(\n\t\t\t\tVerifyErrorCode.DISABLED,\n\t\t\t\t`API key was disabled at ${apiKeyRow.disabled_at.toISOString()}`,\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Single injectable clock for all session-policy time math (matches issuance,\n\t\t// which uses providers.now()), so the A19 idle/max logic is deterministically testable.\n\t\tconst now = dbContext.providers.now()\n\t\tif (apiKeyRow.expires_at !== null && apiKeyRow.expires_at <= now) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError(VerifyErrorCode.DISABLED, `API key expired at ${apiKeyRow.expires_at.toISOString()}`)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// A19: absolute hard cap (defensive — the prolong clamp should already keep\n\t\t// expires_at <= max_expires_at, but enforce it here regardless).\n\t\tif (apiKeyRow.max_expires_at !== null && apiKeyRow.max_expires_at <= now) {\n\t\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(new DisableApiKeyCommand(apiKeyRow.id))\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError(\n\t\t\t\tVerifyErrorCode.DISABLED,\n\t\t\t\t`API key reached its maximum lifetime at ${apiKeyRow.max_expires_at.toISOString()}`,\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// A19: idle timeout. Reject + disable when the session has been idle longer\n\t\t// than the policy's idle_timeout. A null idle_timeout (today's default) or a\n\t\t// never-used key (last_used_at null) are never idle-expired.\n\t\tif (apiKeyRow.idle_timeout !== null && apiKeyRow.last_used_at !== null) {\n\t\t\tconst idleMs = intervalToSeconds(apiKeyRow.idle_timeout) * 1000\n\t\t\t// last_used_at is written at most once per PROLONG_THROTTLE_MS (tracking is\n\t\t\t// throttled), so it can legitimately lag a continuously-active session by up\n\t\t\t// to that window. 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In the\n\t\t// default `background` mode this returns immediately and revalidates after the\n\t\t// response (revocation lands on the next request); in `blocking` mode it can revoke\n\t\t// the current request. No-op for password sessions and IdPs without revalidation.\n\t\t// `effectiveInfo` is passed so the audit entries record the originating request's IP/UA.\n\t\tif (this.idpSessionRevalidator) {\n\t\t\tconst outcome = await this.idpSessionRevalidator.revalidate(dbContext, readDbContext, apiKeyRow, effectiveInfo)\n\t\t\tif (outcome === 'revoked') {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError(VerifyErrorCode.DISABLED, 'IdP session was revoked')\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tsetImmediate(async () => {\n\t\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(\n\t\t\t\tnew ProlongApiKeyCommand(\n\t\t\t\t\tapiKeyRow.id,\n\t\t\t\t\tapiKeyRow.type,\n\t\t\t\t\tapiKeyRow.expiration,\n\t\t\t\t\tapiKeyRow.expires_at,\n\t\t\t\t\teffectiveInfo,\n\t\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlastIp: apiKeyRow.last_ip,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlastUserAgent: apiKeyRow.last_user_agent,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlastUsedAt: apiKeyRow.last_used_at,\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t\tapiKeyRow.max_expires_at,\n\t\t\t\t),\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t})\n\n\t\treturn new ResponseOk(\n\t\t\tnew VerifyResult(\n\t\t\t\tapiKeyRow.identity_id,\n\t\t\t\tapiKeyRow.id,\n\t\t\t\tapiKeyRow.roles,\n\t\t\t\tapiKeyRow.person_id,\n\t\t\t\tapiKeyRow.trust_forwarded_info,\n\t\t\t),\n\t\t)\n\t}\n\n\tasync createSessionApiKey(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tidentityId: string,\n\t\texpiration?: number,\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t\ttrustForwardedInfo?: boolean,\n\t): Promise<string> {\n\t\tconst { token } = await this.createSessionApiKeyWithId(dbContext, identityId, expiration, requestInfo, trustForwardedInfo)\n\t\treturn token\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Like {@link createSessionApiKey} but also returns the api_key id — needed when the\n\t * caller has to bind another row to the session (e.g. an `idp_session` for IdP\n\t * re-validation).\n\t */\n\tasync createSessionApiKeyWithId(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tidentityId: string,\n\t\texpiration?: number,\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t\ttrustForwardedInfo?: boolean,\n\t): Promise<{ id: string; token: string }> {\n\t\tconst config = await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(new ConfigurationQuery(dbContext.providers))\n\n\t\t// A19: snapshot the effective session policy onto the api_key at sign-in.\n\t\t// With no matching policy, every field is null/baseline and the result is\n\t\t// byte-for-byte today's behavior.\n\t\tconst [identityRow] = await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(new IdentityQuery([identityId]))\n\t\tconst globalRoles = identityRow?.roles ?? []\n\t\tconst policy = await this.authPolicyResolver.resolveForIdentity(dbContext, identityId, globalRoles)\n\n\t\tconst defaultExpirationMinutes = intervalToSeconds(config.login.defaultTokenExpiration) / 60\n\t\t// remember_me_allowed === false: ignore a client-supplied longer lifetime and\n\t\t// force the default. (true/null leave the requested expiration untouched.)\n\t\tconst requestedMinutes = policy.rememberMeAllowed === false\n\t\t\t? defaultExpirationMinutes\n\t\t\t: (expiration ?? defaultExpirationMinutes)\n\n\t\t// Cap by maxTokenExpiration (existing behavior) AND by the policy's\n\t\t// tokenExpiration (A19) — strictest wins.\n\t\tlet expirationCapped = config.login.maxTokenExpiration\n\t\t\t? Math.min(requestedMinutes, intervalToSeconds(config.login.maxTokenExpiration) / 60)\n\t\t\t: requestedMinutes\n\t\tif (policy.tokenExpiration) {\n\t\t\texpirationCapped = Math.min(expirationCapped, intervalToSeconds(policy.tokenExpiration) / 60)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Absolute hard cap: issued_at + policy.tokenExpiration. NULL = uncapped\n\t\t// sliding window (today's behavior).\n\t\tconst issuedAt = dbContext.providers.now()\n\t\tconst maxExpiresAt = policy.tokenExpiration\n\t\t\t? new Date(issuedAt.getTime() + intervalToSeconds(policy.tokenExpiration) * 1000)\n\t\t\t: null\n\n\t\tconst command = new CreateApiKeyCommand({\n\t\t\ttype: ApiKey.Type.SESSION,\n\t\t\tidentityId,\n\t\t\texpiration: expirationCapped,\n\t\t\trequestInfo,\n\t\t\ttrustForwardedInfo,\n\t\t\tidleTimeout: policy.idleTimeout ? intervalToPostgres(policy.idleTimeout) : null,\n\t\t\tmaxExpiresAt,\n\t\t})\n\t\tconst { id, token } = await dbContext.commandBus.execute(command)\n\t\tassert(token !== undefined)\n\n\t\t// A19: audit only when a policy is actually in effect. With zero auth_policy\n\t\t// rows the resolved policy is inert and no extra insert happens.\n\t\tconst policyApplied = policy.mfaRequired === true\n\t\t\t|| policy.tokenExpiration !== null\n\t\t\t|| policy.idleTimeout !== null\n\t\t\t|| policy.rememberMeAllowed !== null\n\t\tif (policyApplied) {\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\tawait this.authLogService.logSessionEvent(dbContext, {\n\t\t\t\t\ttype: 'session_policy_applied',\n\t\t\t\t\tidentityId,\n\t\t\t\t\tipAddress: requestInfo?.ip,\n\t\t\t\t\tuserAgent: requestInfo?.userAgent,\n\t\t\t\t\tsuccess: true,\n\t\t\t\t\teventData: {\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttokenExpiration: policy.tokenExpiration ? intervalToPostgres(policy.tokenExpiration) : null,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tidleTimeout: policy.idleTimeout ? intervalToPostgres(policy.idleTimeout) : null,\n\t\t\t\t\t\trememberMeAllowed: policy.rememberMeAllowed,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tmfaRequired: policy.mfaRequired,\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t\t/* best-effort: sign-in must not break on an audit failure */\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\treturn { id, token }\n\t}\n\n\tasync findApiKey(dbContext: DatabaseContext, apiKeyId: string): Promise<ApiKeyRow | null> {\n\t\treturn await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(\n\t\t\tnew ApiKeyByIdQuery(apiKeyId),\n\t\t)\n\t}\n\n\tasync disableOneOffApiKey(dbContext: DatabaseContext, apiKeyId: string): Promise<void> {\n\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(new DisableOneOffApiKeyCommand(apiKeyId))\n\t}\n\n\tasync disableApiKey(dbContext: DatabaseContext, apiKeyId: string): Promise<boolean> {\n\t\treturn await dbContext.commandBus.execute(new DisableApiKeyCommand(apiKeyId))\n\t}\n\n\tasync disableIdentityApiKeys(dbContext: DatabaseContext, identityId: string): Promise<void> {\n\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(new DisableIdentityApiKeysCommand(identityId))\n\t}\n\n\tasync createGlobalPermanentApiKey(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tdescription: string,\n\t\troles: readonly string[],\n\t\ttokenHash?: TokenHash,\n\t\ttrustForwardedInfo?: boolean,\n\t): Promise<CreateApiKeyResponse> {\n\t\treturn await dbContext.transaction(async db => {\n\t\t\treturn await this.apiKeyService.createPermanentApiKey(db, description, roles, tokenHash, trustForwardedInfo)\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tasync createProjectPermanentApiKey(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tprojectId: string,\n\t\tmemberships: readonly Acl.Membership[],\n\t\tdescription: string,\n\t\ttokenHash?: TokenHash,\n\t\ttrustForwardedInfo?: boolean,\n\t): Promise<CreateApiKeyResponse> {\n\t\treturn await dbContext.transaction(async db => {\n\t\t\treturn await this.apiKeyService.createProjectPermanentApiKey(db, projectId, memberships, description, tokenHash, trustForwardedInfo)\n\t\t})\n\t}\n}\n\nexport type VerifyResponse = Response<VerifyResult, VerifyErrorCode>\n\nexport class VerifyResult {\n\treadonly valid = true\n\n\tconstructor(\n\t\tpublic readonly identityId: string,\n\t\tpublic readonly apiKeyId: string,\n\t\tpublic readonly roles: string[],\n\t\tpublic readonly personId: string | 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+{"version":3,"file":"ApiKeyManager.js","sources":["../../../../../../../packages/engine-tenant-api/src/model/service/apiKey/ApiKeyManager.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import {\n\tApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\tCreateApiKeyCommand,\n\tDisableApiKeyCommand,\n\tDisableIdentityApiKeysCommand,\n\tDisableOneOffApiKeyCommand,\n\tPROLONG_THROTTLE_MS,\n\tProlongApiKeyCommand,\n} from '../../commands/index.js'\nimport { ApiKey } from '../../type/index.js'\n\nimport { Response, ResponseError, ResponseOk } from '../../utils/Response.js'\nimport { DatabaseContext, TokenHash } from '../../utils/index.js'\nimport { ApiKeyService, CreateApiKeyResponse } from './ApiKeyService.js'\nimport assert from 'node:assert'\nimport { Acl } from '@contember/schema'\nimport { ApiKeyByIdQuery, ApiKeyByTokenQuery, ApiKeyRow, ConfigurationQuery, IdentityQuery } from '../../queries/index.js'\nimport PostgresInterval from 'postgres-interval'\nimport { Config } from '../../type/Config.js'\nimport { intervalToPostgres, intervalToSeconds } from '../../utils/interval.js'\nimport { AuthPolicyResolver } from '../AuthPolicyResolver.js'\nimport { AuthLogService } from '../AuthLogService.js'\nimport { IdpSessionRevalidator } from '../idp/IdpSessionRevalidator.js'\nimport { UnpersistedApiKeyManager } from './UnpersistedApiKeyManager.js'\n\nexport class ApiKeyManager {\n\tconstructor(\n\t\tprivate readonly apiKeyService: ApiKeyService,\n\t\tprivate readonly authPolicyResolver: AuthPolicyResolver,\n\t\tprivate readonly authLogService: AuthLogService,\n\t\tprivate readonly unpersistedApiKeyManager: UnpersistedApiKeyManager = new UnpersistedApiKeyManager(),\n\t\tprivate readonly idpSessionRevalidator?: IdpSessionRevalidator,\n\t) {}\n\n\tasync verifyAndProlong(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\treadDbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\ttoken: string,\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t\tforwardedInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t): Promise<VerifyResponse> {\n\t\tconst unpersistedResult = this.unpersistedApiKeyManager.verify(token)\n\t\tif (unpersistedResult !== null) {\n\t\t\t// Configured (unpersisted) root token: no DB row to prolong/track.\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseOk(unpersistedResult)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst apiKeyRow = await readDbContext.queryHandler.fetch(new ApiKeyByTokenQuery(token))\n\t\tif (apiKeyRow === null) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError(VerifyErrorCode.NOT_FOUND, 'API key was not found')\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (apiKeyRow.disabled_at !== null) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError(\n\t\t\t\tVerifyErrorCode.DISABLED,\n\t\t\t\t`API key was disabled at ${apiKeyRow.disabled_at.toISOString()}`,\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Single injectable clock for all session-policy time math (matches issuance,\n\t\t// which uses providers.now()), so the A19 idle/max logic is deterministically testable.\n\t\tconst now = dbContext.providers.now()\n\t\tif (apiKeyRow.expires_at !== null && apiKeyRow.expires_at <= now) {\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError(VerifyErrorCode.DISABLED, `API key expired at ${apiKeyRow.expires_at.toISOString()}`)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// A19: absolute hard cap (defensive — the prolong clamp should already keep\n\t\t// expires_at <= max_expires_at, but enforce it here regardless).\n\t\tif (apiKeyRow.max_expires_at !== null && apiKeyRow.max_expires_at <= now) {\n\t\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(new DisableApiKeyCommand(apiKeyRow.id))\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseError(\n\t\t\t\tVerifyErrorCode.DISABLED,\n\t\t\t\t`API key reached its maximum lifetime at ${apiKeyRow.max_expires_at.toISOString()}`,\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// A19: idle timeout. Reject + disable when the session has been idle longer\n\t\t// than the policy's idle_timeout. A null idle_timeout (today's default) or a\n\t\t// never-used key (last_used_at null) are never idle-expired.\n\t\tif (apiKeyRow.idle_timeout !== null && apiKeyRow.last_used_at !== null) {\n\t\t\tconst idleMs = intervalToSeconds(apiKeyRow.idle_timeout) * 1000\n\t\t\t// last_used_at is written at most once per PROLONG_THROTTLE_MS (tracking is\n\t\t\t// throttled), so it can legitimately lag a continuously-active session by up\n\t\t\t// to that window. Add the throttle as slack so a small idle_timeout can't\n\t\t\t// idle-expire a session that is actually in use.\n\t\t\tif (now.getTime() - apiKeyRow.last_used_at.getTime() > idleMs + PROLONG_THROTTLE_MS) {\n\t\t\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(new DisableApiKeyCommand(apiKeyRow.id))\n\t\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\t\tawait this.authLogService.logSessionEvent(dbContext, {\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttype: 'session_expired_idle',\n\t\t\t\t\t\tidentityId: apiKeyRow.identity_id,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: apiKeyRow.person_id,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tipAddress: requestInfo?.ip,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tuserAgent: requestInfo?.userAgent,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tsuccess: false,\n\t\t\t\t\t\teventData: {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tlastUsedAt: apiKeyRow.last_used_at?.toISOString() ?? null,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tidleTimeout: String(apiKeyRow.idle_timeout),\n\t\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t\t\t/* best-effort: auth path must stay resilient */\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError(\n\t\t\t\t\tVerifyErrorCode.DISABLED,\n\t\t\t\t\t`API key was idle since ${apiKeyRow.last_used_at.toISOString()} and exceeded the idle timeout`,\n\t\t\t\t)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst effectiveInfo: ApiKeyRequestInfo | undefined = apiKeyRow.trust_forwarded_info && forwardedInfo\n\t\t\t? {\n\t\t\t\tip: forwardedInfo.ip ?? requestInfo?.ip,\n\t\t\t\tuserAgent: forwardedInfo.userAgent ?? requestInfo?.userAgent,\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t: requestInfo\n\n\t\t// Re-validate IdP-backed sessions against their identity provider (A24). In the\n\t\t// default `background` mode this returns immediately and revalidates after the\n\t\t// response (revocation lands on the next request); in `blocking` mode it can revoke\n\t\t// the current request. No-op for password sessions and IdPs without revalidation.\n\t\t// `effectiveInfo` is passed so the audit entries record the originating request's IP/UA.\n\t\tif (this.idpSessionRevalidator) {\n\t\t\tconst outcome = await this.idpSessionRevalidator.revalidate(dbContext, readDbContext, apiKeyRow, effectiveInfo)\n\t\t\tif (outcome === 'revoked') {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError(VerifyErrorCode.DISABLED, 'IdP session was revoked')\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Detached (runs after the response), so a rejection here would be an unhandledRejection and can take the\n\t\t// worker down. Tracking is best-effort — the next request writes it again.\n\t\tsetImmediate(() => {\n\t\t\tdbContext.commandBus.execute(\n\t\t\t\tnew ProlongApiKeyCommand(\n\t\t\t\t\tapiKeyRow.id,\n\t\t\t\t\tapiKeyRow.type,\n\t\t\t\t\tapiKeyRow.expiration,\n\t\t\t\t\tapiKeyRow.expires_at,\n\t\t\t\t\teffectiveInfo,\n\t\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlastIp: apiKeyRow.last_ip,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlastUserAgent: apiKeyRow.last_user_agent,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlastUsedAt: apiKeyRow.last_used_at,\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t\tapiKeyRow.max_expires_at,\n\t\t\t\t),\n\t\t\t).catch(() => {})\n\t\t})\n\n\t\treturn new ResponseOk(\n\t\t\tnew VerifyResult(\n\t\t\t\tapiKeyRow.identity_id,\n\t\t\t\tapiKeyRow.id,\n\t\t\t\tapiKeyRow.roles,\n\t\t\t\tapiKeyRow.person_id,\n\t\t\t\tapiKeyRow.trust_forwarded_info,\n\t\t\t),\n\t\t)\n\t}\n\n\tasync createSessionApiKey(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tidentityId: string,\n\t\texpiration?: number,\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t\ttrustForwardedInfo?: boolean,\n\t): Promise<string> {\n\t\tconst { token } = await this.createSessionApiKeyWithId(dbContext, identityId, expiration, requestInfo, trustForwardedInfo)\n\t\treturn token\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Like {@link createSessionApiKey} but also returns the api_key id — needed when the\n\t * caller has to bind another row to the session (e.g. an `idp_session` for IdP\n\t * re-validation).\n\t */\n\tasync createSessionApiKeyWithId(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tidentityId: string,\n\t\texpiration?: number,\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t\ttrustForwardedInfo?: boolean,\n\t): Promise<{ id: string; token: string }> {\n\t\tconst config = await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(new ConfigurationQuery(dbContext.providers))\n\n\t\t// A19: snapshot the effective session policy onto the api_key at sign-in.\n\t\t// With no matching policy, every field is null/baseline and the result is\n\t\t// byte-for-byte today's behavior.\n\t\tconst [identityRow] = await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(new IdentityQuery([identityId]))\n\t\tconst globalRoles = identityRow?.roles ?? []\n\t\tconst policy = await this.authPolicyResolver.resolveForIdentity(dbContext, identityId, globalRoles)\n\n\t\tconst defaultExpirationMinutes = intervalToSeconds(config.login.defaultTokenExpiration) / 60\n\t\t// remember_me_allowed === false: ignore a client-supplied longer lifetime and\n\t\t// force the default. (true/null leave the requested expiration untouched.)\n\t\tconst requestedMinutes = policy.rememberMeAllowed === false\n\t\t\t? defaultExpirationMinutes\n\t\t\t: (expiration ?? defaultExpirationMinutes)\n\n\t\t// Cap by maxTokenExpiration (existing behavior) AND by the policy's\n\t\t// tokenExpiration (A19) — strictest wins.\n\t\tlet expirationCapped = config.login.maxTokenExpiration\n\t\t\t? Math.min(requestedMinutes, intervalToSeconds(config.login.maxTokenExpiration) / 60)\n\t\t\t: requestedMinutes\n\t\tif (policy.tokenExpiration) {\n\t\t\texpirationCapped = Math.min(expirationCapped, intervalToSeconds(policy.tokenExpiration) / 60)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Absolute hard cap: issued_at + policy.tokenExpiration. NULL = uncapped\n\t\t// sliding window (today's behavior).\n\t\tconst issuedAt = dbContext.providers.now()\n\t\tconst maxExpiresAt = policy.tokenExpiration\n\t\t\t? new Date(issuedAt.getTime() + intervalToSeconds(policy.tokenExpiration) * 1000)\n\t\t\t: null\n\n\t\tconst command = new CreateApiKeyCommand({\n\t\t\ttype: ApiKey.Type.SESSION,\n\t\t\tidentityId,\n\t\t\texpiration: expirationCapped,\n\t\t\trequestInfo,\n\t\t\ttrustForwardedInfo,\n\t\t\tidleTimeout: policy.idleTimeout ? intervalToPostgres(policy.idleTimeout) : null,\n\t\t\tmaxExpiresAt,\n\t\t})\n\t\tconst { id, token } = await dbContext.commandBus.execute(command)\n\t\tassert(token !== undefined)\n\n\t\t// A19: audit only when a policy is actually in effect. With zero auth_policy\n\t\t// rows the resolved policy is inert and no extra insert happens.\n\t\tconst policyApplied = policy.mfaRequired === true\n\t\t\t|| policy.tokenExpiration !== null\n\t\t\t|| policy.idleTimeout !== null\n\t\t\t|| policy.rememberMeAllowed !== null\n\t\tif (policyApplied) {\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\tawait this.authLogService.logSessionEvent(dbContext, {\n\t\t\t\t\ttype: 'session_policy_applied',\n\t\t\t\t\tidentityId,\n\t\t\t\t\tipAddress: requestInfo?.ip,\n\t\t\t\t\tuserAgent: requestInfo?.userAgent,\n\t\t\t\t\tsuccess: true,\n\t\t\t\t\teventData: {\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttokenExpiration: policy.tokenExpiration ? intervalToPostgres(policy.tokenExpiration) : null,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tidleTimeout: policy.idleTimeout ? intervalToPostgres(policy.idleTimeout) : null,\n\t\t\t\t\t\trememberMeAllowed: policy.rememberMeAllowed,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tmfaRequired: policy.mfaRequired,\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t\t/* best-effort: sign-in must not break on an audit failure */\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\treturn { id, token }\n\t}\n\n\tasync findApiKey(dbContext: DatabaseContext, apiKeyId: string): Promise<ApiKeyRow | null> {\n\t\treturn await dbContext.queryHandler.fetch(\n\t\t\tnew ApiKeyByIdQuery(apiKeyId),\n\t\t)\n\t}\n\n\tasync disableOneOffApiKey(dbContext: DatabaseContext, apiKeyId: string): Promise<void> {\n\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(new DisableOneOffApiKeyCommand(apiKeyId))\n\t}\n\n\tasync disableApiKey(dbContext: DatabaseContext, apiKeyId: string): Promise<boolean> {\n\t\treturn await dbContext.commandBus.execute(new DisableApiKeyCommand(apiKeyId))\n\t}\n\n\tasync disableIdentityApiKeys(dbContext: DatabaseContext, identityId: string): Promise<void> {\n\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(new DisableIdentityApiKeysCommand(identityId))\n\t}\n\n\tasync createGlobalPermanentApiKey(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tdescription: string,\n\t\troles: readonly string[],\n\t\ttokenHash?: TokenHash,\n\t\ttrustForwardedInfo?: boolean,\n\t): Promise<CreateApiKeyResponse> {\n\t\treturn await dbContext.transaction(async db => {\n\t\t\treturn await this.apiKeyService.createPermanentApiKey(db, description, roles, tokenHash, trustForwardedInfo)\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tasync createProjectPermanentApiKey(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tprojectId: string,\n\t\tmemberships: readonly Acl.Membership[],\n\t\tdescription: string,\n\t\ttokenHash?: TokenHash,\n\t\ttrustForwardedInfo?: boolean,\n\t): Promise<CreateApiKeyResponse> {\n\t\treturn await dbContext.transaction(async db => {\n\t\t\treturn await this.apiKeyService.createProjectPermanentApiKey(db, projectId, memberships, description, tokenHash, trustForwardedInfo)\n\t\t})\n\t}\n}\n\nexport type VerifyResponse = Response<VerifyResult, VerifyErrorCode>\n\nexport class VerifyResult {\n\treadonly valid = true\n\n\tconstructor(\n\t\tpublic readonly identityId: string,\n\t\tpublic readonly apiKeyId: string,\n\t\tpublic readonly roles: string[],\n\t\tpublic readonly personId: string | null,\n\t\tpublic readonly trustForwardedInfo: boolean = false,\n\t) {}\n}\n\nexport enum VerifyErrorCode {\n\tNOT_FOUND = 'not_found',\n\tDISABLED = 'disabled',\n\tEXPIRED = 'expired',\n\tNO_AUTH_HEADER = 'no_auth_header',\n\tINVALID_AUTH_HEADER = 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package/dist/production/src/model/service/apiKey/UnpersistedApiKeyManager.cjs

@@ -14,6 +14,10 @@ var __defProp = Object.defineProperty;
 var __defNormalProp = (obj, key, value) => key in obj ? __defProp(obj, key, { enumerable: true, configurable: true, writable: true, value }) : obj[key] = value;
 var __publicField = (obj, key, value) => __defNormalProp(obj, key + "", value);
 const UNPERSISTED_ROOT_IDENTITY_ID = "f3b2c4d6-0000-4000-8000-000000000001";
+const UNPERSISTED_LOGIN_IDENTITY_ID = "f3b2c4d6-0000-4000-8000-000000000002";
+const unpersistedIdentityIds = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([UNPERSISTED_ROOT_IDENTITY_ID, UNPERSISTED_LOGIN_IDENTITY_ID]);
+const isUnpersistedIdentityId = (identityId) => identityId !== void 0 && unpersistedIdentityIds.has(identityId);
+const createUnpersistedLoginVerifyResult = () => new ApiKeyManager.VerifyResult(UNPERSISTED_LOGIN_IDENTITY_ID, UNPERSISTED_LOGIN_IDENTITY_ID, [Roles.TenantRole.LOGIN], null, false);
 class UnpersistedApiKeyManager {
   constructor(apiKeys = []) {
     __publicField(this, "apiKeys");
@@ -77,6 +81,9 @@ class UnpersistedApiKeyManager {
     return new UnpersistedApiKeyManager(hashes.map((it) => UnpersistedApiKeyManager.createRootApiKey(it)));
   }
 }
+exports.UNPERSISTED_LOGIN_IDENTITY_ID = UNPERSISTED_LOGIN_IDENTITY_ID;
 exports.UNPERSISTED_ROOT_IDENTITY_ID = UNPERSISTED_ROOT_IDENTITY_ID;
 exports.UnpersistedApiKeyManager = UnpersistedApiKeyManager;
+exports.createUnpersistedLoginVerifyResult = createUnpersistedLoginVerifyResult;
+exports.isUnpersistedIdentityId = isUnpersistedIdentityId;
 //# sourceMappingURL=UnpersistedApiKeyManager.cjs.map

package/dist/production/src/model/service/apiKey/UnpersistedApiKeyManager.cjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"UnpersistedApiKeyManager.cjs","sources":["../../../../../../../packages/engine-tenant-api/src/model/service/apiKey/UnpersistedApiKeyManager.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { computeTokenHash, isTokenHash, timingSafeCompareHash, TokenHash } from '../../utils/index.js'\nimport { TenantRole } from '../../authorization/index.js'\nimport { VerifyResult } from './ApiKeyManager.js'\n\n/**\n * Well-known identity id used for super-admin identities authenticated via an\n * unpersisted (configured) root token. The id is stable so that audit logs and\n * created entities consistently reference the same virtual identity, even\n * though no row exists in the `identity` table.\n */\nexport const UNPERSISTED_ROOT_IDENTITY_ID = 'f3b2c4d6-0000-4000-8000-000000000001'\n\n/**\n * Well-known identity id for the pre-sign-in caller of a first-party UI served by the engine (the\n * management panel's login screen). It holds exactly {@link TenantRole.LOGIN} and exists only in\n * memory, so the surface it opens is fixed by this file rather than by whatever token an operator\n * happened to configure.\n */\nexport const UNPERSISTED_LOGIN_IDENTITY_ID = 'f3b2c4d6-0000-4000-8000-000000000002'\n\nconst unpersistedIdentityIds: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([UNPERSISTED_ROOT_IDENTITY_ID, UNPERSISTED_LOGIN_IDENTITY_ID])\n\n/**\n * Whether an identity id is one of the virtual identities above, i.e. has no row in `identity`.\n * Anything writing a foreign key to `identity` must ask first — see `AuthLogService`.\n */\nexport const isUnpersistedIdentityId = (identityId: string | undefined): boolean => identityId !== undefined && unpersistedIdentityIds.has(identityId)\n\n/**\n * The pre-sign-in caller of an engine-served UI, as an already-verified result. There is no token to\n * present: the surface is reached by being routed there, so nothing is compared and nothing is read\n * from the database.\n */\nexport const createUnpersistedLoginVerifyResult = (): VerifyResult =>\n\tnew VerifyResult(UNPERSISTED_LOGIN_IDENTITY_ID, UNPERSISTED_LOGIN_IDENTITY_ID, [TenantRole.LOGIN], null, false)\n\nexport interface UnpersistedApiKey {\n\treadonly tokenHash: TokenHash\n\treadonly identityId: string\n\treadonly roles: readonly string[]\n}\n\n/**\n * Verifies incoming tokens against a fixed set of root tokens configured out of\n * band (env/config) instead of being stored in the database. This enables token\n * rotation without database writes and avoids persisting the token hash.\n *\n * Token hashes are compared in constant time to avoid leaking information about\n * the configured secret.\n */\nexport class UnpersistedApiKeyManager {\n\tprivate readonly apiKeys: readonly UnpersistedApiKey[]\n\n\tconstructor(apiKeys: readonly UnpersistedApiKey[] = []) {\n\t\tthis.apiKeys = apiKeys\n\t}\n\n\tget isEmpty(): boolean {\n\t\treturn this.apiKeys.length === 0\n\t}\n\n\tverify(token: string): VerifyResult | null {\n\t\tif (this.apiKeys.length === 0) {\n\t\t\treturn null\n\t\t}\n\t\tconst tokenHash = computeTokenHash(token)\n\t\t// Iterate over all configured keys (no early return) so that matching\n\t\t// remains independent of the position of the matching key.\n\t\tlet matched: UnpersistedApiKey | null = null\n\t\tfor (const apiKey of this.apiKeys) {\n\t\t\tif (timingSafeCompareHash(tokenHash, apiKey.tokenHash)) {\n\t\t\t\tmatched = apiKey\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tif (matched === null) {\n\t\t\treturn null\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn new VerifyResult(\n\t\t\tmatched.identityId,\n\t\t\t// There is no persisted api_key row, so there is no api key id.\n\t\t\tmatched.identityId,\n\t\t\t[...matched.roles],\n\t\t\tnull,\n\t\t\tfalse,\n\t\t)\n\t}\n\n\tstatic createRootApiKey(tokenHash: TokenHash): UnpersistedApiKey {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\ttokenHash,\n\t\t\tidentityId: UNPERSISTED_ROOT_IDENTITY_ID,\n\t\t\troles: [TenantRole.SUPER_ADMIN],\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Builds a manager for unpersisted super-admin root tokens from configured\n\t * plain tokens and/or pre-computed token hashes.\n\t */\n\tstatic createForRootTokens(input: {\n\t\ttokens?: readonly string[]\n\t\ttokenHashes?: readonly string[]\n\t}): UnpersistedApiKeyManager {\n\t\tconst hashes: TokenHash[] = []\n\t\tfor (const token of input.tokens ?? 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package/dist/production/src/model/service/apiKey/UnpersistedApiKeyManager.js

@@ -12,6 +12,10 @@ var __defProp = Object.defineProperty;
 var __defNormalProp = (obj, key, value) => key in obj ? __defProp(obj, key, { enumerable: true, configurable: true, writable: true, value }) : obj[key] = value;
 var __publicField = (obj, key, value) => __defNormalProp(obj, key + "", value);
 const UNPERSISTED_ROOT_IDENTITY_ID = "f3b2c4d6-0000-4000-8000-000000000001";
+const UNPERSISTED_LOGIN_IDENTITY_ID = "f3b2c4d6-0000-4000-8000-000000000002";
+const unpersistedIdentityIds = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([UNPERSISTED_ROOT_IDENTITY_ID, UNPERSISTED_LOGIN_IDENTITY_ID]);
+const isUnpersistedIdentityId = (identityId) => identityId !== void 0 && unpersistedIdentityIds.has(identityId);
+const createUnpersistedLoginVerifyResult = () => new VerifyResult(UNPERSISTED_LOGIN_IDENTITY_ID, UNPERSISTED_LOGIN_IDENTITY_ID, [TenantRole.LOGIN], null, false);
 class UnpersistedApiKeyManager {
   constructor(apiKeys = []) {
     __publicField(this, "apiKeys");
@@ -76,7 +80,10 @@ class UnpersistedApiKeyManager {
   }
 }
 export {
+  UNPERSISTED_LOGIN_IDENTITY_ID,
   UNPERSISTED_ROOT_IDENTITY_ID,
-  UnpersistedApiKeyManager
+  UnpersistedApiKeyManager,
+  createUnpersistedLoginVerifyResult,
+  isUnpersistedIdentityId
 };
 //# sourceMappingURL=UnpersistedApiKeyManager.js.map

package/dist/production/src/model/service/apiKey/UnpersistedApiKeyManager.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"UnpersistedApiKeyManager.js","sources":["../../../../../../../packages/engine-tenant-api/src/model/service/apiKey/UnpersistedApiKeyManager.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { computeTokenHash, isTokenHash, timingSafeCompareHash, TokenHash } from '../../utils/index.js'\nimport { TenantRole } from '../../authorization/index.js'\nimport { VerifyResult } from './ApiKeyManager.js'\n\n/**\n * Well-known identity id used for super-admin identities authenticated via an\n * unpersisted (configured) root token. The id is stable so that audit logs and\n * created entities consistently reference the same virtual identity, even\n * though no row exists in the `identity` table.\n */\nexport const UNPERSISTED_ROOT_IDENTITY_ID = 'f3b2c4d6-0000-4000-8000-000000000001'\n\nexport interface UnpersistedApiKey {\n\treadonly tokenHash: TokenHash\n\treadonly identityId: string\n\treadonly roles: readonly string[]\n}\n\n/**\n * Verifies incoming tokens against a fixed set of root tokens configured out of\n * band (env/config) instead of being stored in the database. This enables token\n * rotation without database writes and avoids persisting the token hash.\n *\n * Token hashes are compared in constant time to avoid leaking information about\n * the configured secret.\n */\nexport class UnpersistedApiKeyManager {\n\tprivate readonly apiKeys: readonly UnpersistedApiKey[]\n\n\tconstructor(apiKeys: readonly UnpersistedApiKey[] = []) {\n\t\tthis.apiKeys = apiKeys\n\t}\n\n\tget isEmpty(): boolean {\n\t\treturn this.apiKeys.length === 0\n\t}\n\n\tverify(token: string): VerifyResult | null {\n\t\tif (this.apiKeys.length === 0) {\n\t\t\treturn null\n\t\t}\n\t\tconst tokenHash = computeTokenHash(token)\n\t\t// Iterate over all configured keys (no early return) so that matching\n\t\t// remains independent of the position of the matching key.\n\t\tlet matched: UnpersistedApiKey | null = null\n\t\tfor (const apiKey of this.apiKeys) {\n\t\t\tif (timingSafeCompareHash(tokenHash, apiKey.tokenHash)) {\n\t\t\t\tmatched = apiKey\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tif (matched === null) {\n\t\t\treturn null\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn new VerifyResult(\n\t\t\tmatched.identityId,\n\t\t\t// There is no persisted api_key row, so there is no api key id.\n\t\t\tmatched.identityId,\n\t\t\t[...matched.roles],\n\t\t\tnull,\n\t\t\tfalse,\n\t\t)\n\t}\n\n\tstatic createRootApiKey(tokenHash: TokenHash): UnpersistedApiKey {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\ttokenHash,\n\t\t\tidentityId: UNPERSISTED_ROOT_IDENTITY_ID,\n\t\t\troles: [TenantRole.SUPER_ADMIN],\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Builds a manager for unpersisted super-admin root tokens from configured\n\t * plain tokens and/or pre-computed token hashes.\n\t */\n\tstatic createForRootTokens(input: {\n\t\ttokens?: readonly string[]\n\t\ttokenHashes?: readonly string[]\n\t}): UnpersistedApiKeyManager {\n\t\tconst hashes: TokenHash[] = []\n\t\tfor (const token of input.tokens ?? []) {\n\t\t\tif (token.length === 0) {\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\thashes.push(computeTokenHash(token))\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor (const hash of input.tokenHashes ?? []) {\n\t\t\tif (hash.length === 0) {\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tconst normalized = hash.toLowerCase()\n\t\t\tif (!isTokenHash(normalized)) {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new Error(`Invalid unpersisted root token hash: expected a 64-character sha256 hex string.`)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\thashes.push(normalized)\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn new UnpersistedApiKeyManager(hashes.map(it => UnpersistedApiKeyManager.createRootApiKey(it)))\n\t}\n}\n"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;AAUO,MAAM,+BAA+B;AAgBrC,MAAM,yBAAyB;AAAA,EAGrC,YAAY,UAAwC,IAAI;AAFxD,kBAAA,MAAiB,SAAA;AAGhB,SAAK,UAAU;AAAA,EAChB;AAAA,EAEA,IAAI,UAAmB;AACtB,WAAO,KAAK,QAAQ,WAAW;AAAA,EAChC;AAAA,EAEA,OAAO,OAAoC;AAC1C,QAAI,KAAK,QAAQ,WAAW,GAAG;AAC9B,aAAO;AAAA,IACR;AACA,UAAM,YAAY,iBAAiB,KAAK;AAGxC,QAAI,UAAoC;AACxC,eAAW,UAAU,KAAK,SAAS;AAClC,UAAI,sBAAsB,WAAW,OAAO,SAAS,GAAG;AACvD,kBAAU;AAAA,MACX;AAAA,IACD;AACA,QAAI,YAAY,MAAM;AACrB,aAAO;AAAA,IACR;AACA,WAAO,IAAI;AAAA,MACV,QAAQ;AAAA;AAAA,MAER,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,CAAC,GAAG,QAAQ,KAAK;AAAA,MACjB;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IAAA;AAAA,EAEF;AAAA,EAEA,OAAO,iBAAiB,WAAyC;AAChE,WAAO;AAAA,MACN;AAAA,MACA,YAAY;AAAA,MACZ,OAAO,CAAC,WAAW,WAAW;AAAA,IAAA;AAAA,EAEhC;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAMA,OAAO,oBAAoB,OAGE;AAC5B,UAAM,SAAsB,CAAA;AAC5B,eAAW,SAAS,MAAM,UAAU,CAAA,GAAI;AACvC,UAAI,MAAM,WAAW,GAAG;AACvB;AAAA,MACD;AACA,aAAO,KAAK,iBAAiB,KAAK,CAAC;AAAA,IACpC;AACA,eAAW,QAAQ,MAAM,eAAe,CAAA,GAAI;AAC3C,UAAI,KAAK,WAAW,GAAG;AACtB;AAAA,MACD;AACA,YAAM,aAAa,KAAK,YAAA;AACxB,UAAI,CAAC,YAAY,UAAU,GAAG;AAC7B,cAAM,IAAI,MAAM,iFAAiF;AAAA,MAClG;AACA,aAAO,KAAK,UAAU;AAAA,IACvB;AACA,WAAO,IAAI,yBAAyB,OAAO,IAAI,QAAM,yBAAyB,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;AAAA,EACpG;AACD;"}
+{"version":3,"file":"UnpersistedApiKeyManager.js","sources":["../../../../../../../packages/engine-tenant-api/src/model/service/apiKey/UnpersistedApiKeyManager.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { computeTokenHash, isTokenHash, timingSafeCompareHash, TokenHash } from '../../utils/index.js'\nimport { TenantRole } from '../../authorization/index.js'\nimport { VerifyResult } from './ApiKeyManager.js'\n\n/**\n * Well-known identity id used for super-admin identities authenticated via an\n * unpersisted (configured) root token. The id is stable so that audit logs and\n * created entities consistently reference the same virtual identity, even\n * though no row exists in the `identity` table.\n */\nexport const UNPERSISTED_ROOT_IDENTITY_ID = 'f3b2c4d6-0000-4000-8000-000000000001'\n\n/**\n * Well-known identity id for the pre-sign-in caller of a first-party UI served by the engine (the\n * management panel's login screen). It holds exactly {@link TenantRole.LOGIN} and exists only in\n * memory, so the surface it opens is fixed by this file rather than by whatever token an operator\n * happened to configure.\n */\nexport const UNPERSISTED_LOGIN_IDENTITY_ID = 'f3b2c4d6-0000-4000-8000-000000000002'\n\nconst unpersistedIdentityIds: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([UNPERSISTED_ROOT_IDENTITY_ID, UNPERSISTED_LOGIN_IDENTITY_ID])\n\n/**\n * Whether an identity id is one of the virtual identities above, i.e. has no row in `identity`.\n * Anything writing a foreign key to `identity` must ask first — see `AuthLogService`.\n */\nexport const isUnpersistedIdentityId = (identityId: string | undefined): boolean => identityId !== undefined && unpersistedIdentityIds.has(identityId)\n\n/**\n * The pre-sign-in caller of an engine-served UI, as an already-verified result. There is no token to\n * present: the surface is reached by being routed there, so nothing is compared and nothing is read\n * from the database.\n */\nexport const createUnpersistedLoginVerifyResult = (): VerifyResult =>\n\tnew VerifyResult(UNPERSISTED_LOGIN_IDENTITY_ID, UNPERSISTED_LOGIN_IDENTITY_ID, [TenantRole.LOGIN], null, false)\n\nexport interface UnpersistedApiKey {\n\treadonly tokenHash: TokenHash\n\treadonly identityId: string\n\treadonly roles: readonly string[]\n}\n\n/**\n * Verifies incoming tokens against a fixed set of root tokens configured out of\n * band (env/config) instead of being stored in the database. 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