@contember/engine-tenant-api 2.2.0-alpha.3 → 2.2.0-alpha.6

package/dist/development/src/model/service/idp/IDPManager.js

@@ -12,18 +12,22 @@ import "@contember/schema";
 import { CreateIdpCommand } from "../../commands/idp/CreateIdpCommand.js";
 import { IdentityProviderNotFoundError } from "./IdentityProviderNotFoundError.js";
 import { InvalidIDPConfigurationError } from "./InvalidIDPConfigurationError.js";
+import { findRemovedRuleKeys, parseClaimMapping, findClaimMappingShapeErrors, isRecord } from "./ClaimMapping.js";
+import { validateClaimMappingMembership } from "./ClaimMappingValidation.js";
 import { DisableIdpCommand } from "../../commands/idp/DisableIdpCommand.js";
 import { EnableIdpCommand } from "../../commands/idp/EnableIdpCommand.js";
 import { UpdateIdpCommand } from "../../commands/idp/UpdateIdpCommand.js";
 class IDPManager {
-  constructor(idpRegistry) {
+  constructor(idpRegistry, projectSchemaResolver) {
     this.idpRegistry = idpRegistry;
+    this.projectSchemaResolver = projectSchemaResolver;
   }
   async addIDP(db, idp) {
     return await db.transaction(async (db2) => {
       try {
         const providerService = this.idpRegistry.getHandler(idp.type);
-        providerService.validateConfiguration(idp.configuration);
+        this.assertNoUnknownConfigurationKeys(providerService.validateConfiguration(idp.configuration), idp.configuration);
+        await this.assertValidClaimMapping(idp.configuration);
       } catch (e) {
         if (e instanceof IdentityProviderNotFoundError) {
           return new ResponseError("UNKNOWN_TYPE", `IDP type ${idp.type} not found`);
@@ -71,28 +75,13 @@ class IDPManager {
       if (!existing) {
         return new ResponseError("NOT_FOUND", `IDP ${slug} not found`);
       }
-      const newConfiguration = (() => {
-        if (!data.configuration) {
-          return existing.configuration;
-        }
-        if (!mergeConfiguration) {
-          return data.configuration;
-        }
-        const newConfiguration2 = { ...existing.configuration };
-        for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(data.configuration)) {
-          if (value === null) {
-            delete newConfiguration2[key];
-          } else {
-            newConfiguration2[key] = value;
-          }
-        }
-        return newConfiguration2;
-      })();
+      const newConfiguration = !data.configuration ? existing.configuration : mergeConfiguration ? deepMergeConfiguration(existing.configuration, data.configuration) : data.configuration;
       try {
         const type = data.type ?? existing.type;
         const providerService = this.idpRegistry.getHandler(type);
         if (data.configuration !== void 0 || type !== existing.type) {
-          providerService.validateConfiguration(newConfiguration);
+          this.assertNoUnknownConfigurationKeys(providerService.validateConfiguration(newConfiguration), newConfiguration);
+          await this.assertValidClaimMapping(newConfiguration);
         }
       } catch (e) {
         if (e instanceof InvalidIDPConfigurationError) {
@@ -109,6 +98,76 @@ class IDPManager {
       return new ResponseOk(null);
     });
   }
+  /**
+   * Reject top-level `configuration` keys the provider does not recognise.
+   *
+   * Every provider configuration is parsed with `Typesafe.partial`, which silently DROPS unknown
+   * properties. Without this check `addIDP` / `updateIDP` answer `ok` to a configuration the
+   * provider will never act on — a typo like `fetchUserinfo` (lowercase i) reads as a successfully
+   * applied setting while the option stays off, and an option that a given engine version does not
+   * support yet looks indistinguishable from one that works.
+   *
+   * The parsed result carries exactly the keys the provider understood, so the difference against
+   * the submitted object is the set of ignored keys. All of them are reported at once (rather than
+   * the first, as `Typesafe.noExtraProps` would) so a configuration with several typos takes one
+   * round trip to fix, matching {@link findRemovedRuleKeys}.
+   *
+   * Only the top level is checked: nested shapes that need strictness validate themselves
+   * (`claimMapping` via {@link parseClaimMapping}). Reading a stored configuration is deliberately
+   * left untouched — this runs at write time only, so a row written before this check keeps
+   * authenticating instead of locking its users out.
+   */
+  assertNoUnknownConfigurationKeys(parsed, submitted) {
+    const known = new Set(Object.keys(parsed));
+    const unknown = Object.keys(submitted).filter((key) => !known.has(key));
+    if (unknown.length > 0) {
+      throw new InvalidIDPConfigurationError(
+        `unknown configuration ${unknown.length === 1 ? "property" : "properties"} ${unknown.join(", ")}; remove ${unknown.length === 1 ? "it" : "them"} or check the spelling — the provider would ignore ${unknown.length === 1 ? "it" : "them"}`
+      );
+    }
+  }
+  /**
+   * Validate the optional A09 `claimMapping` embedded in an IdP `configuration`: reject a removed
+   * `grantRoles` (global-role mapping was dropped — see {@link parseClaimMapping}), reject a
+   * malformed shape, and validate each granted membership's role against the target project's ACL
+   * schema (mirroring the direct add-member path). Throws {@link InvalidIDPConfigurationError},
+   * surfaced as `INVALID_CONFIGURATION`.
+   */
+  async assertValidClaimMapping(configuration) {
+    const removed = findRemovedRuleKeys(configuration);
+    if (removed.length > 0) {
+      throw new InvalidIDPConfigurationError(
+        `claimMapping no longer supports ${removed.join(", ")} (global-role mapping was removed); grant a project membership via grantMembership instead`
+      );
+    }
+    let mapping;
+    try {
+      mapping = parseClaimMapping(configuration);
+    } catch (e) {
+      throw new InvalidIDPConfigurationError(`Invalid claimMapping: ${e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e)}`);
+    }
+    if (!mapping) {
+      return;
+    }
+    const shapeErrors = findClaimMappingShapeErrors(mapping);
+    if (shapeErrors.length > 0) {
+      throw new InvalidIDPConfigurationError(shapeErrors[0]);
+    }
+    for (const rule of mapping.rules) {
+      const membership = rule.grantMembership;
+      if (!membership) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      const schema = await this.projectSchemaResolver.getSchema(membership.project);
+      if (!schema) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      const errors = validateClaimMappingMembership(schema.acl, membership);
+      if (errors.length > 0) {
+        throw new InvalidIDPConfigurationError(errors[0].message);
+      }
+    }
+  }
   async listIDP(db) {
     const result = await db.queryHandler.fetch(new IdentityProvidersQuery());
     return result.map((it) => {
@@ -118,6 +177,23 @@ class IDPManager {
     });
   }
 }
+const deepMergeConfiguration = (base, updates) => {
+  const result = { ...base };
+  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(updates)) {
+    if (key === "__proto__" || key === "constructor" || key === "prototype") {
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (value === null) {
+      delete result[key];
+    } else if (isRecord(value)) {
+      const existingChild = result[key];
+      result[key] = deepMergeConfiguration(isRecord(existingChild) ? existingChild : {}, value);
+    } else {
+      result[key] = value;
+    }
+  }
+  return result;
+};
 export {
   IDPManager
 };

package/dist/development/src/model/service/idp/IDPManager.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"IDPManager.js","sources":["../../../../../../../packages/engine-tenant-api/src/model/service/idp/IDPManager.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { Response, ResponseError, ResponseOk } from '../../utils/Response.js'\nimport { AddIdpErrorCode, DisableIdpErrorCode, EnableIdpErrorCode, UpdateIdpErrorCode } from '../../../schema/index.js'\nimport { DatabaseContext } from '../../utils/index.js'\nimport { IdentityProviderData } from '../../type/index.js'\nimport { IdentityProviderBySlugQuery, IdentityProvidersQuery } from '../../queries/index.js'\nimport { CreateIdpCommand } from '../../commands/idp/CreateIdpCommand.js'\nimport { IDPHandlerRegistry } from './IDPHandlerRegistry.js'\nimport { IdentityProviderNotFoundError } from './IdentityProviderNotFoundError.js'\nimport { InvalidIDPConfigurationError } from './InvalidIDPConfigurationError.js'\nimport { DisableIdpCommand } from '../../commands/idp/DisableIdpCommand.js'\nimport { EnableIdpCommand } from '../../commands/idp/EnableIdpCommand.js'\nimport { UpdateIdpCommand, UpdateIdpData } from '../../commands/idp/UpdateIdpCommand.js'\nimport { IdentityProviderDto } from '../../queries/idp/types.js'\n\nexport class IDPManager {\n\tconstructor(\n\t\tprivate readonly idpRegistry: IDPHandlerRegistry,\n\t) {\n\t}\n\n\tpublic async addIDP(db: DatabaseContext, idp: IdentityProviderData): Promise<RegisterIDPResponse> {\n\t\treturn await db.transaction(async (db): Promise<RegisterIDPResponse> => {\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\tconst providerService = this.idpRegistry.getHandler(idp.type)\n\t\t\t\tproviderService.validateConfiguration(idp.configuration)\n\t\t\t} catch (e) {\n\t\t\t\tif (e instanceof IdentityProviderNotFoundError) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('UNKNOWN_TYPE', `IDP type ${idp.type} not found`)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tif (e instanceof InvalidIDPConfigurationError) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_CONFIGURATION', `Invalid IDP configuration: ${e.message}`)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tthrow e\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tconst existing = await db.queryHandler.fetch(new IdentityProviderBySlugQuery(idp.slug))\n\t\t\tif (existing) {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('ALREADY_EXISTS', `IDP with slug ${idp.slug} already exists`)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tawait db.commandBus.execute(new CreateIdpCommand(idp))\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseOk(null)\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tpublic async disableIDP(db: DatabaseContext, slug: string): Promise<DisableIDPResponse> {\n\t\treturn await db.transaction(async db => {\n\t\t\tconst existing = await db.queryHandler.fetch(new IdentityProviderBySlugQuery(slug))\n\t\t\tif (!existing) {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('NOT_FOUND', `IDP ${slug} not found`)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif (!existing.disabledAt) {\n\t\t\t\tawait db.commandBus.execute(new DisableIdpCommand(existing.id))\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseOk(null)\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tpublic async enableIDP(db: DatabaseContext, slug: string): Promise<EnableIDPResponse> {\n\t\treturn await db.transaction(async db => {\n\t\t\tconst existing = await db.queryHandler.fetch(new IdentityProviderBySlugQuery(slug))\n\t\t\tif (!existing) {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('NOT_FOUND', `IDP ${slug} not found`)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif (existing.disabledAt) {\n\t\t\t\tawait db.commandBus.execute(new EnableIdpCommand(existing.id))\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseOk(null)\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tpublic async updateIDP(db: DatabaseContext, slug: string, data: UpdateIdpData, mergeConfiguration: boolean): Promise<UpdateIDPResponse> {\n\t\treturn await db.transaction(async db => {\n\t\t\tconst existing = await db.queryHandler.fetch(new IdentityProviderBySlugQuery(slug))\n\t\t\tif (!existing) {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('NOT_FOUND', `IDP ${slug} not found`)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tconst newConfiguration = (() => {\n\t\t\t\tif (!data.configuration) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn existing.configuration\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tif (!mergeConfiguration) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn data.configuration\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\tconst newConfiguration = { ...existing.configuration }\n\t\t\t\tfor (const [key, value] of Object.entries(data.configuration)) {\n\t\t\t\t\tif (value === null) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdelete newConfiguration[key]\n\t\t\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tnewConfiguration[key] = value\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\treturn newConfiguration\n\t\t\t})()\n\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\tconst type = data.type ?? existing.type\n\t\t\t\tconst providerService = this.idpRegistry.getHandler(type)\n\t\t\t\tif (data.configuration !== undefined || type !== existing.type) {\n\t\t\t\t\tproviderService.validateConfiguration(newConfiguration)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t} catch (e) {\n\t\t\t\tif (e instanceof InvalidIDPConfigurationError) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_CONFIGURATION', `Invalid IDP configuration: ${e.message}`)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tthrow e\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tawait db.commandBus.execute(\n\t\t\t\tnew UpdateIdpCommand(existing.id, {\n\t\t\t\t\t...data,\n\t\t\t\t\tconfiguration: data.configuration ? newConfiguration : undefined,\n\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t)\n\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseOk(null)\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tpublic async listIDP(db: DatabaseContext): Promise<IdentityProviderDto[]> {\n\t\tconst result = await db.queryHandler.fetch(new IdentityProvidersQuery())\n\t\treturn result.map(it => {\n\t\t\tconst providerService = this.idpRegistry.getHandlerOrNull(it.type)\n\t\t\tconst configuration = providerService?.getPublicConfiguration\n\t\t\t\t? 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+{"version":3,"file":"IDPManager.js","sources":["../../../../../../../packages/engine-tenant-api/src/model/service/idp/IDPManager.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { Response, ResponseError, ResponseOk } from '../../utils/Response.js'\nimport { AddIdpErrorCode, DisableIdpErrorCode, EnableIdpErrorCode, UpdateIdpErrorCode } from '../../../schema/index.js'\nimport { DatabaseContext } from '../../utils/index.js'\nimport { IdentityProviderData } from '../../type/index.js'\nimport { IdentityProviderBySlugQuery, IdentityProvidersQuery } from '../../queries/index.js'\nimport { CreateIdpCommand } from '../../commands/idp/CreateIdpCommand.js'\nimport { IDPHandlerRegistry } from './IDPHandlerRegistry.js'\nimport { IdentityProviderNotFoundError } from './IdentityProviderNotFoundError.js'\nimport { InvalidIDPConfigurationError } from './InvalidIDPConfigurationError.js'\nimport { findClaimMappingShapeErrors, findRemovedRuleKeys, isRecord, parseClaimMapping } from './ClaimMapping.js'\nimport { validateClaimMappingMembership } from './ClaimMappingValidation.js'\nimport { ProjectSchemaResolver } from '../../type/index.js'\nimport { DisableIdpCommand } from '../../commands/idp/DisableIdpCommand.js'\nimport { EnableIdpCommand } from '../../commands/idp/EnableIdpCommand.js'\nimport { UpdateIdpCommand, UpdateIdpData } from '../../commands/idp/UpdateIdpCommand.js'\nimport { IdentityProviderDto } from '../../queries/idp/types.js'\n\nexport class IDPManager {\n\tconstructor(\n\t\tprivate readonly idpRegistry: IDPHandlerRegistry,\n\t\tprivate readonly projectSchemaResolver: ProjectSchemaResolver,\n\t) {\n\t}\n\n\tpublic async addIDP(db: DatabaseContext, idp: IdentityProviderData): Promise<RegisterIDPResponse> {\n\t\treturn await db.transaction(async (db): Promise<RegisterIDPResponse> => {\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\tconst providerService = this.idpRegistry.getHandler(idp.type)\n\t\t\t\tthis.assertNoUnknownConfigurationKeys(providerService.validateConfiguration(idp.configuration), idp.configuration)\n\t\t\t\tawait this.assertValidClaimMapping(idp.configuration)\n\t\t\t} catch (e) {\n\t\t\t\tif (e instanceof IdentityProviderNotFoundError) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('UNKNOWN_TYPE', `IDP type ${idp.type} not found`)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tif (e instanceof InvalidIDPConfigurationError) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_CONFIGURATION', `Invalid IDP configuration: ${e.message}`)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tthrow e\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tconst existing = await db.queryHandler.fetch(new IdentityProviderBySlugQuery(idp.slug))\n\t\t\tif (existing) {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('ALREADY_EXISTS', `IDP with slug ${idp.slug} already exists`)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tawait db.commandBus.execute(new CreateIdpCommand(idp))\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseOk(null)\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tpublic async disableIDP(db: DatabaseContext, slug: string): Promise<DisableIDPResponse> {\n\t\treturn await db.transaction(async db => {\n\t\t\tconst existing = await db.queryHandler.fetch(new IdentityProviderBySlugQuery(slug))\n\t\t\tif (!existing) {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('NOT_FOUND', `IDP ${slug} not found`)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif (!existing.disabledAt) {\n\t\t\t\tawait db.commandBus.execute(new DisableIdpCommand(existing.id))\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseOk(null)\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tpublic async enableIDP(db: DatabaseContext, slug: string): Promise<EnableIDPResponse> {\n\t\treturn await db.transaction(async db => {\n\t\t\tconst existing = await db.queryHandler.fetch(new IdentityProviderBySlugQuery(slug))\n\t\t\tif (!existing) {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('NOT_FOUND', `IDP ${slug} not found`)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif (existing.disabledAt) {\n\t\t\t\tawait db.commandBus.execute(new EnableIdpCommand(existing.id))\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseOk(null)\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tpublic async updateIDP(db: DatabaseContext, slug: string, data: UpdateIdpData, mergeConfiguration: boolean): Promise<UpdateIDPResponse> {\n\t\treturn await db.transaction(async db => {\n\t\t\tconst existing = await db.queryHandler.fetch(new IdentityProviderBySlugQuery(slug))\n\t\t\tif (!existing) {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('NOT_FOUND', `IDP ${slug} not found`)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tconst newConfiguration = !data.configuration\n\t\t\t\t? existing.configuration\n\t\t\t\t: (mergeConfiguration ? deepMergeConfiguration(existing.configuration, data.configuration) : data.configuration)\n\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\tconst type = data.type ?? existing.type\n\t\t\t\tconst providerService = this.idpRegistry.getHandler(type)\n\t\t\t\tif (data.configuration !== undefined || type !== existing.type) {\n\t\t\t\t\tthis.assertNoUnknownConfigurationKeys(providerService.validateConfiguration(newConfiguration), newConfiguration)\n\t\t\t\t\tawait this.assertValidClaimMapping(newConfiguration)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t} catch (e) {\n\t\t\t\tif (e instanceof InvalidIDPConfigurationError) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('INVALID_CONFIGURATION', `Invalid IDP configuration: ${e.message}`)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tthrow e\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tawait db.commandBus.execute(\n\t\t\t\tnew UpdateIdpCommand(existing.id, {\n\t\t\t\t\t...data,\n\t\t\t\t\tconfiguration: data.configuration ? newConfiguration : undefined,\n\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t)\n\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseOk(null)\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Reject top-level `configuration` keys the provider does not recognise.\n\t *\n\t * Every provider configuration is parsed with `Typesafe.partial`, which silently DROPS unknown\n\t * properties. Without this check `addIDP` / `updateIDP` answer `ok` to a configuration the\n\t * provider will never act on — a typo like `fetchUserinfo` (lowercase i) reads as a successfully\n\t * applied setting while the option stays off, and an option that a given engine version does not\n\t * support yet looks indistinguishable from one that works.\n\t *\n\t * The parsed result carries exactly the keys the provider understood, so the difference against\n\t * the submitted object is the set of ignored keys. All of them are reported at once (rather than\n\t * the first, as `Typesafe.noExtraProps` would) so a configuration with several typos takes one\n\t * round trip to fix, matching {@link findRemovedRuleKeys}.\n\t *\n\t * Only the top level is checked: nested shapes that need strictness validate themselves\n\t * (`claimMapping` via {@link parseClaimMapping}). Reading a stored configuration is deliberately\n\t * left untouched — this runs at write time only, so a row written before this check keeps\n\t * authenticating instead of locking its users out.\n\t */\n\tprivate assertNoUnknownConfigurationKeys(parsed: {}, submitted: Record<string, unknown>): void {\n\t\tconst known = new Set(Object.keys(parsed))\n\t\tconst unknown = Object.keys(submitted).filter(key => !known.has(key))\n\t\tif (unknown.length > 0) {\n\t\t\tthrow new InvalidIDPConfigurationError(\n\t\t\t\t`unknown configuration ${unknown.length === 1 ? 'property' : 'properties'} ${unknown.join(', ')}; `\n\t\t\t\t\t+ `remove ${unknown.length === 1 ? 'it' : 'them'} or check the spelling — the provider would ignore ${unknown.length === 1 ? 'it' : 'them'}`,\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Validate the optional A09 `claimMapping` embedded in an IdP `configuration`: reject a removed\n\t * `grantRoles` (global-role mapping was dropped — see {@link parseClaimMapping}), reject a\n\t * malformed shape, and validate each granted membership's role against the target project's ACL\n\t * schema (mirroring the direct add-member path). Throws {@link InvalidIDPConfigurationError},\n\t * surfaced as `INVALID_CONFIGURATION`.\n\t */\n\tprivate async assertValidClaimMapping(configuration: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<void> {\n\t\tconst removed = findRemovedRuleKeys(configuration)\n\t\tif (removed.length > 0) {\n\t\t\tthrow new InvalidIDPConfigurationError(\n\t\t\t\t`claimMapping no longer supports ${removed.join(', ')} (global-role mapping was removed); grant a project membership via grantMembership instead`,\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t}\n\t\tlet mapping\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tmapping = parseClaimMapping(configuration)\n\t\t} catch (e) {\n\t\t\tthrow new InvalidIDPConfigurationError(`Invalid claimMapping: ${e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e)}`)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif (!mapping) {\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\t// Reject contradictory / empty-by-construction rule shapes (a rule setting both equals+contains; a\n\t\t// variable's `from.where` without `from.pick`) before the per-project ACL checks, so a\n\t\t// misconfiguration is caught even when the target project does not exist yet (ACL loop skipped).\n\t\tconst shapeErrors = findClaimMappingShapeErrors(mapping)\n\t\tif (shapeErrors.length > 0) {\n\t\t\tthrow new InvalidIDPConfigurationError(shapeErrors[0])\n\t\t}\n\t\t// Validate each granted membership's role AND its variables against the target project's ACL schema,\n\t\t// via the shared {@link validateClaimMappingMembership} (the same checks `IDPClaimSyncService`\n\t\t// re-runs at apply time, so the two enforcement points can't drift). A project that does not (yet)\n\t\t// exist is skipped — it may be created later, and a sign-in referencing a missing project is\n\t\t// harmless (the grant is skipped). NOTE: this validation runs only here at add/update time and is\n\t\t// NOT re-checked when the project/role appears later; the unsafe-condition-variable case is caught\n\t\t// again at apply time by `IDPClaimSyncService`, but other drift (unknown role/variable) is not.\n\t\tfor (const rule of mapping.rules) {\n\t\t\tconst membership = rule.grantMembership\n\t\t\tif (!membership) {\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tconst schema = await this.projectSchemaResolver.getSchema(membership.project)\n\t\t\tif (!schema) {\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tconst errors = validateClaimMappingMembership(schema.acl, membership)\n\t\t\tif (errors.length > 0) {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new InvalidIDPConfigurationError(errors[0].message)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tpublic async listIDP(db: DatabaseContext): Promise<IdentityProviderDto[]> {\n\t\tconst result = await db.queryHandler.fetch(new IdentityProvidersQuery())\n\t\treturn result.map(it => {\n\t\t\tconst providerService = this.idpRegistry.getHandlerOrNull(it.type)\n\t\t\tconst configuration = providerService?.getPublicConfiguration\n\t\t\t\t? providerService.getPublicConfiguration(it.configuration)\n\t\t\t\t: it.configuration\n\n\t\t\treturn { ...it, configuration }\n\t\t})\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Recursively merge configurer-supplied `updates` into the stored `base` configuration (the\n * `mergeConfiguration: true` path of {@link IDPManager.updateIDP}), returning a new object:\n * - a plain-object value is merged INTO an existing plain-object value at the same key, so updating one\n *   field of a nested config object preserves its siblings. This matters for `configuration.claimMapping`,\n *   which holds two independent concerns in one object — the OIDC identity-remap (`email` / `name` /\n *   `externalIdentifier` / `attributesKey`) and the A09 `rules` — so a shallow replace of `claimMapping`\n *   while updating one would silently wipe the other.\n * - any non-object value (including ARRAYS, e.g. the A09 `rules` list) REPLACES wholesale — arrays are\n *   never merged element-wise.\n * - a `null` value DELETES the key (the established \"send null to unset\" convention).\n * - `__proto__` / `constructor` / `prototype` keys are skipped at EVERY level: they are never a legitimate\n *   config field and writing one through could pollute the object's prototype.\n */\nconst deepMergeConfiguration = (base: Record<string, unknown>, updates: Record<string, unknown>): Record<string, unknown> => {\n\tconst result: Record<string, unknown> = { ...base }\n\tfor (const [key, value] of Object.entries(updates)) {\n\t\tif (key === '__proto__' || key === 'constructor' || key === 'prototype') {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tif (value === null) {\n\t\t\tdelete result[key]\n\t\t} else if (isRecord(value)) {\n\t\t\tconst existingChild = result[key]\n\t\t\tresult[key] = deepMergeConfiguration(isRecord(existingChild) ? 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package/dist/development/src/model/service/idp/IdpSessionRevalidator.cjs

@@ -9,9 +9,11 @@ require("node:crypto");
 const DisableApiKeyCommand = require("../../commands/apiKey/DisableApiKeyCommand.cjs");
 const CreateAuthLogEntryCommand = require("../../commands/authLog/CreateAuthLogEntryCommand.cjs");
 const IDPRevalidation = require("./IDPRevalidation.cjs");
+const ClaimMapping = require("./ClaimMapping.cjs");
 class IdpSessionRevalidator {
-  constructor(idpRegistry) {
+  constructor(idpRegistry, claimSyncService) {
     this.idpRegistry = idpRegistry;
+    this.claimSyncService = claimSyncService;
   }
   async revalidate(dbContext, readDbContext, apiKeyRow, requestInfo) {
     const row = await readDbContext.queryHandler.fetch(new IdpSessionByApiKeyQuery.IdpSessionByApiKeyQuery(apiKeyRow.id, readDbContext.providers));
@@ -97,8 +99,60 @@ class IdpSessionRevalidator {
       } catch {
       }
     }
+    if (result.claims) {
+      await this.syncClaims(dbContext, row, apiKeyRow, result.claims, result.claimsComplete === true, requestInfo);
+    }
     return "valid";
   }
+  /**
+   * Re-apply the claim mapping on a successful refresh. Runs in its own transaction (atomic apply of
+   * the membership changes) and never throws: the IdP has already vouched for the session, so a
+   * malformed mapping or a transient apply error must not revoke or fail it. A real membership change
+   * is audited as `idp_role_mapped`; a failure is audited as `idp_role_mapping_failed` (fail-open
+   * marker), mirroring the sign-in path. `claimsComplete` carries whether the refresh rebuilt sign-in's
+   * full claim surface (so removal reconciliation is safe) — see `allowRemoval` below.
+   */
+  async syncClaims(dbContext, row, apiKeyRow, claims, claimsComplete, requestInfo) {
+    try {
+      const mapping = ClaimMapping.parseClaimMapping(row.providerConfiguration);
+      if (!mapping) {
+        return;
+      }
+      const { audit, droppedUnsafeRules } = await dbContext.transaction(
+        (db) => this.claimSyncService.sync(db, mapping, claims, { id: apiKeyRow.identity_id }, false, { allowRemoval: claimsComplete })
+      );
+      if (audit) {
+        await this.logRoleMapping(dbContext, apiKeyRow, row, "idp_role_mapped", audit, requestInfo);
+      }
+      if (droppedUnsafeRules) {
+        await this.logRoleMapping(dbContext, apiKeyRow, row, "idp_role_mapping_failed", void 0, requestInfo);
+      }
+    } catch {
+      await this.logRoleMapping(dbContext, apiKeyRow, row, "idp_role_mapping_failed", void 0, requestInfo);
+    }
+  }
+  async logRoleMapping(dbContext, apiKeyRow, row, type, eventData, requestInfo) {
+    try {
+      await dbContext.commandBus.execute(
+        new CreateAuthLogEntryCommand.CreateAuthLogEntryCommand({
+          type,
+          invokedById: apiKeyRow.identity_id,
+          personId: apiKeyRow.person_id ?? void 0,
+          // The membership change affects this session's own person — record it as the target too,
+          // so an admin querying membership changes by target_person_id sees IdP-driven grants/revokes
+          // (consistent with the project_membership_* audit events).
+          targetPersonId: apiKeyRow.person_id ?? void 0,
+          identityProviderId: row.identityProviderId,
+          personTokenId: apiKeyRow.id,
+          success: true,
+          eventData,
+          ipAddress: requestInfo?.ip,
+          userAgent: requestInfo?.userAgent
+        })
+      );
+    } catch {
+    }
+  }
   async logRevalidated(dbContext, apiKeyRow, row, requestInfo) {
     await dbContext.commandBus.execute(
       new CreateAuthLogEntryCommand.CreateAuthLogEntryCommand({

package/dist/development/src/model/service/idp/IdpSessionRevalidator.cjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"IdpSessionRevalidator.cjs","sources":["../../../../../../../packages/engine-tenant-api/src/model/service/idp/IdpSessionRevalidator.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { DatabaseContext } from '../../utils/index.js'\nimport { ApiKeyRequestInfo } from '../../commands/index.js'\nimport { ApiKeyRow } from '../../queries/apiKey/ApiKeyQuery.js'\nimport { IdpSessionByApiKeyQuery, IdpSessionRow } from '../../queries/idp/IdpSessionByApiKeyQuery.js'\nimport { IDPHandlerRegistry } from './IDPHandlerRegistry.js'\nimport { ClaimIdpRevalidationCommand } from '../../commands/idp/ClaimIdpRevalidationCommand.js'\nimport { UpdateIdpSessionCommand } from '../../commands/idp/UpdateIdpSessionCommand.js'\nimport { DisableApiKeyCommand } from '../../commands/index.js'\nimport { CreateAuthLogEntryCommand } from '../../commands/authLog/CreateAuthLogEntryCommand.js'\nimport { REVALIDATION_DEFAULT_FALLBACK_INTERVAL, REVALIDATION_DEFAULT_MIN_INTERVAL, REVALIDATION_DEFAULT_SOFT_THRESHOLD } from './IDPRevalidation.js'\nimport { IdentityProviderHandler, RevalidationResult } from './IdentityProviderHandler.js'\n\nexport type RevalidationOutcome = 'valid' | 'revoked'\n\ntype ResolvedRevalidationConfig = {\n\tenabled: boolean\n\tsoftThreshold: number\n\tminInterval: string\n\tfallbackInterval: string\n\tmode: 'auto' | 'blocking'\n}\n\n/**\n * Decision for the current request: whether to attempt a revalidation, and if so whether it\n * must block the request. `claimInterval` is the single-flight floor for the atomic claim.\n */\ntype Decision = null | { blocking: boolean; claimInterval: string }\n\n/**\n * Re-validates IdP-backed sessions against their identity provider on the verify hot path\n * (A24). Invoked from `ApiKeyManager.verifyAndProlong`. Operates entirely through the supplied\n * database contexts and the command bus, so it does not depend on `ApiKeyManager` (no DI cycle).\n *\n * The cadence is driven by the **access-token lifetime**, not a fixed interval:\n *   - while the token is fresh (before `softRefreshThreshold` of its lifetime) → skip, free;\n *   - past the threshold but not yet expired → a proactive **background (SWR)** refresh, so the\n *     request keeps zero added latency and the token is renewed before it dies;\n *   - once the token has actually expired → a **blocking** refresh (we can't serve a dead token).\n * `mode: 'blocking'` forces every revalidation synchronous (zero revocation lag). When the IdP\n * returns no token expiry, falls back to a plain `fallbackInterval` background throttle.\n */\nexport class IdpSessionRevalidator {\n\tconstructor(\n\t\tprivate readonly idpRegistry: IDPHandlerRegistry,\n\t) {\n\t}\n\n\tasync revalidate(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\treadDbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tapiKeyRow: ApiKeyRow,\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t): Promise<RevalidationOutcome> {\n\t\tconst row = await readDbContext.queryHandler.fetch(new IdpSessionByApiKeyQuery(apiKeyRow.id, readDbContext.providers))\n\t\tif (!row) {\n\t\t\t// not a federated session (password / IdP without revalidation) — fast no-op\n\t\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst config = this.resolveConfig(row.providerConfiguration)\n\t\tif (!config.enabled) {\n\t\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// A disabled IdP no longer vouches for its sessions.\n\t\tif (row.providerDisabledAt) {\n\t\t\tawait this.revoke(dbContext, apiKeyRow, row, 'idp_disabled', requestInfo)\n\t\t\treturn 'revoked'\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst handler = this.idpRegistry.getHandlerOrNull(row.providerType)\n\t\tif (!handler?.revalidate) {\n\t\t\t// provider can't actively re-validate (e.g. SAML) — rely on expiry / SLO\n\t\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst decision = this.decide(row, config, dbContext.providers.now())\n\t\tif (!decision) {\n\t\t\t// token still fresh — vouched for, no IdP call\n\t\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Atomic claim = single-flight. Loser (within the floor window, or lost the race) serves stale.\n\t\tlet claimed: boolean\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tclaimed = await dbContext.commandBus.execute(new ClaimIdpRevalidationCommand(row.id, decision.claimInterval))\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t// invalid interval string or transient DB error — fail open, retry next request\n\t\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t\t}\n\t\tif (!claimed) {\n\t\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (decision.blocking) {\n\t\t\treturn await this.runRevalidation(dbContext, handler, row, apiKeyRow, requestInfo)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// SWR: serve this request from the (still valid) token, refresh after the response.\n\t\t// The work runs detached (after the response is sent), so any rejection — a transient\n\t\t// DB error in the revoke / persist writes, a corrupt-config throw — must be swallowed\n\t\t// here; otherwise it becomes an unhandledRejection and can take the worker down. The\n\t\t// session is simply kept and re-tried on a later request (the claim floor throttles).\n\t\tsetImmediate(() => {\n\t\t\tthis.runRevalidation(dbContext, handler, row, apiKeyRow, requestInfo).catch(() => {})\n\t\t})\n\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Decide whether (and how) to revalidate, purely from timestamps — no interval parsing in\n\t * JS (the claim handles intervals in SQL). Returns null to skip.\n\t */\n\tprivate decide(row: IdpSessionRow, config: ResolvedRevalidationConfig, now: Date): Decision {\n\t\tconst expiresAt = row.session.expiresAt\n\t\tconst obtainedAt = row.tokenObtainedAt\n\n\t\t// No lifetime info from the IdP → plain background throttle on fallbackInterval.\n\t\tif (!expiresAt || !obtainedAt) {\n\t\t\treturn { blocking: config.mode === 'blocking', claimInterval: config.fallbackInterval }\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst lifetimeMs = expiresAt.getTime() - obtainedAt.getTime()\n\t\tconst softAtMs = obtainedAt.getTime() + lifetimeMs * config.softThreshold\n\t\tconst nowMs = now.getTime()\n\n\t\tif (nowMs < softAtMs) {\n\t\t\treturn null // still within the trusted window\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst expired = nowMs >= expiresAt.getTime()\n\t\treturn { blocking: config.mode === 'blocking' || expired, claimInterval: config.minInterval }\n\t}\n\n\tprivate async runRevalidation(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\thandler: IdentityProviderHandler<{}>,\n\t\trow: IdpSessionRow,\n\t\tapiKeyRow: ApiKeyRow,\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t): Promise<RevalidationOutcome> {\n\t\tlet config: {}\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tconfig = handler.validateConfiguration(row.providerConfiguration)\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t// corrupt stored config — must NOT revoke; keep the session and retry later. Audit\n\t\t\t// it so the operator can tell \"vouched for\" apart from \"silently broken\" (without an\n\t\t\t// entry, a config typo disables re-validation invisibly for the life of every session).\n\t\t\tawait this.logRevalidationFailed(dbContext, apiKeyRow, row, 'config_invalid', requestInfo)\n\t\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tlet result: RevalidationResult\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tresult = await handler.revalidate!(config, row.session)\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t// transient failure (network / IdP down) — must NOT revoke; keep the session and retry\n\t\t\t// on a later request (the claim floor prevents hammering the IdP). Audited (throttled\n\t\t\t// to one entry per claim window) so a prolonged IdP outage is visible rather than a\n\t\t\t// silent fail-open.\n\t\t\tawait this.logRevalidationFailed(dbContext, apiKeyRow, row, 'revalidation_error', requestInfo)\n\t\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (result.status === 'revoked') {\n\t\t\tawait this.revoke(dbContext, apiKeyRow, row, result.reason, requestInfo)\n\t\t\treturn 'revoked'\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Still valid — persist the rotated token (resets the lifetime reference) / refreshed\n\t\t// expiry. A rotation is a real, low-frequency event (token-lifetime cadence), so we\n\t\t// audit it as `idp_session_revalidated`; the no-op userinfo/introspection probes\n\t\t// (no rotated session) are intentionally NOT logged to keep the audit log usable.\n\t\t//\n\t\t// The IdP has already vouched for the session, so these post-success writes are pure\n\t\t// best-effort bookkeeping (they only reset the SWR cadence reference). A transient DB\n\t\t// error or an `encrypt()` throw here must NOT fail the request — otherwise a blocking\n\t\t// revalidation fails closed on a successful refresh, contradicting \"fail open\" (the SWR\n\t\t// path already swallows this). Keep the existing row; the claim floor throttles a retry.\n\t\tif (result.idpSession) {\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(new UpdateIdpSessionCommand(row.id, result.idpSession))\n\t\t\t\tawait this.logRevalidated(dbContext, apiKeyRow, row, requestInfo)\n\t\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t\t// fall through — session stays valid, persist retried on a later request\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t}\n\n\tprivate async logRevalidated(dbContext: DatabaseContext, apiKeyRow: ApiKeyRow, row: IdpSessionRow, requestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo): Promise<void> {\n\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(\n\t\t\tnew CreateAuthLogEntryCommand({\n\t\t\t\ttype: 'idp_session_revalidated',\n\t\t\t\tinvokedById: apiKeyRow.identity_id,\n\t\t\t\tpersonId: apiKeyRow.person_id ?? undefined,\n\t\t\t\tidentityProviderId: row.identityProviderId,\n\t\t\t\tpersonTokenId: apiKeyRow.id,\n\t\t\t\tsuccess: true,\n\t\t\t\tipAddress: requestInfo?.ip,\n\t\t\t\tuserAgent: requestInfo?.userAgent,\n\t\t\t}),\n\t\t)\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Audit a fail-open: the IdP couldn't be consulted (transient outage) or the stored config is\n\t * corrupt, so we kept the session rather than revoking it. Naturally throttled to one entry\n\t * per claim window (we only reach here after a successful claim, which bumps\n\t * `last_validated_at`). The write is best-effort and self-contained — a failure to audit must\n\t * never propagate and fail a blocking verify request (the whole point of failing open).\n\t */\n\tprivate async logRevalidationFailed(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tapiKeyRow: ApiKeyRow,\n\t\trow: IdpSessionRow,\n\t\terrorCode: 'config_invalid' | 'revalidation_error',\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t): Promise<void> {\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(\n\t\t\t\tnew CreateAuthLogEntryCommand({\n\t\t\t\t\ttype: 'idp_session_revalidation_failed',\n\t\t\t\t\tinvokedById: apiKeyRow.identity_id,\n\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: apiKeyRow.person_id ?? undefined,\n\t\t\t\t\tidentityProviderId: row.identityProviderId,\n\t\t\t\t\tpersonTokenId: apiKeyRow.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t// not a security failure (the session is kept) — a fail-open marker the operator\n\t\t\t\t\t// can alert on. `success: true` keeps it out of the failed-login funnels.\n\t\t\t\t\tsuccess: true,\n\t\t\t\t\terrorCode,\n\t\t\t\t\tipAddress: requestInfo?.ip,\n\t\t\t\t\tuserAgent: requestInfo?.userAgent,\n\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t// best-effort observability — never fail the request because the audit write failed\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tprivate async revoke(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tapiKeyRow: ApiKeyRow,\n\t\trow: IdpSessionRow,\n\t\treason: string,\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t): Promise<void> {\n\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(new DisableApiKeyCommand(apiKeyRow.id))\n\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(\n\t\t\tnew CreateAuthLogEntryCommand({\n\t\t\t\ttype: 'idp_session_revoked',\n\t\t\t\tinvokedById: apiKeyRow.identity_id,\n\t\t\t\tpersonId: apiKeyRow.person_id ?? undefined,\n\t\t\t\tidentityProviderId: row.identityProviderId,\n\t\t\t\tpersonTokenId: apiKeyRow.id,\n\t\t\t\tsuccess: false,\n\t\t\t\terrorCode: reason,\n\t\t\t\tipAddress: requestInfo?.ip,\n\t\t\t\tuserAgent: requestInfo?.userAgent,\n\t\t\t\t// the action payload belongs in `event_data` (where every other audit event puts\n\t\t\t\t// it and where the admin UI / AuthLogQueryResolver reads it); `metadata` is for\n\t\t\t\t// transport context (forwarder IP/UA).\n\t\t\t\teventData: { reason },\n\t\t\t}),\n\t\t)\n\t}\n\n\tprivate resolveConfig(configuration: Record<string, unknown>): ResolvedRevalidationConfig {\n\t\tconst raw = (configuration.revalidation ?? {}) as Record<string, unknown>\n\t\tconst threshold = typeof raw.softRefreshThreshold === 'number' && raw.softRefreshThreshold > 0 && raw.softRefreshThreshold <= 1\n\t\t\t? raw.softRefreshThreshold\n\t\t\t: REVALIDATION_DEFAULT_SOFT_THRESHOLD\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tenabled: raw.enabled === true,\n\t\t\tsoftThreshold: threshold,\n\t\t\tminInterval: typeof raw.minInterval === 'string' ? raw.minInterval : REVALIDATION_DEFAULT_MIN_INTERVAL,\n\t\t\tfallbackInterval: typeof raw.fallbackInterval === 'string' ? raw.fallbackInterval : REVALIDATION_DEFAULT_FALLBACK_INTERVAL,\n\t\t\tmode: raw.mode === 'blocking' ? 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+{"version":3,"file":"IdpSessionRevalidator.cjs","sources":["../../../../../../../packages/engine-tenant-api/src/model/service/idp/IdpSessionRevalidator.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { DatabaseContext } from '../../utils/index.js'\nimport { ApiKeyRequestInfo } from '../../commands/index.js'\nimport { ApiKeyRow } from '../../queries/apiKey/ApiKeyQuery.js'\nimport { IdpSessionByApiKeyQuery, IdpSessionRow } from '../../queries/idp/IdpSessionByApiKeyQuery.js'\nimport { IDPHandlerRegistry } from './IDPHandlerRegistry.js'\nimport { ClaimIdpRevalidationCommand } from '../../commands/idp/ClaimIdpRevalidationCommand.js'\nimport { UpdateIdpSessionCommand } from '../../commands/idp/UpdateIdpSessionCommand.js'\nimport { DisableApiKeyCommand } from '../../commands/index.js'\nimport { CreateAuthLogEntryCommand } from '../../commands/authLog/CreateAuthLogEntryCommand.js'\nimport { REVALIDATION_DEFAULT_FALLBACK_INTERVAL, REVALIDATION_DEFAULT_MIN_INTERVAL, REVALIDATION_DEFAULT_SOFT_THRESHOLD } from './IDPRevalidation.js'\nimport { IdentityProviderHandler, RevalidationResult } from './IdentityProviderHandler.js'\nimport { IDPClaimSyncService } from './IDPClaimSyncService.js'\nimport { parseClaimMapping } from './ClaimMapping.js'\nimport { JSONValue } from '@contember/schema'\n\nexport type RevalidationOutcome = 'valid' | 'revoked'\n\ntype ResolvedRevalidationConfig = {\n\tenabled: boolean\n\tsoftThreshold: number\n\tminInterval: string\n\tfallbackInterval: string\n\tmode: 'auto' | 'blocking'\n}\n\n/**\n * Decision for the current request: whether to attempt a revalidation, and if so whether it\n * must block the request. `claimInterval` is the single-flight floor for the atomic claim.\n */\ntype Decision = null | { blocking: boolean; claimInterval: string }\n\n/**\n * Re-validates IdP-backed sessions against their identity provider on the verify hot path\n * (A24). Invoked from `ApiKeyManager.verifyAndProlong`. Operates entirely through the supplied\n * database contexts and the command bus, so it does not depend on `ApiKeyManager` (no DI cycle).\n *\n * The cadence is driven by the **access-token lifetime**, not a fixed interval:\n *   - while the token is fresh (before `softRefreshThreshold` of its lifetime) → skip, free;\n *   - past the threshold but not yet expired → a proactive **background (SWR)** refresh, so the\n *     request keeps zero added latency and the token is renewed before it dies;\n *   - once the token has actually expired → a **blocking** refresh (we can't serve a dead token).\n * `mode: 'blocking'` forces every revalidation synchronous (zero revocation lag). When the IdP\n * returns no token expiry, falls back to a plain `fallbackInterval` background throttle.\n */\nexport class IdpSessionRevalidator {\n\tconstructor(\n\t\tprivate readonly idpRegistry: IDPHandlerRegistry,\n\t\tprivate readonly claimSyncService: IDPClaimSyncService,\n\t) {\n\t}\n\n\tasync revalidate(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\treadDbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tapiKeyRow: ApiKeyRow,\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t): Promise<RevalidationOutcome> {\n\t\tconst row = await readDbContext.queryHandler.fetch(new IdpSessionByApiKeyQuery(apiKeyRow.id, readDbContext.providers))\n\t\tif (!row) {\n\t\t\t// not a federated session (password / IdP without revalidation) — fast no-op\n\t\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst config = this.resolveConfig(row.providerConfiguration)\n\t\tif (!config.enabled) {\n\t\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// A disabled IdP no longer vouches for its sessions.\n\t\tif (row.providerDisabledAt) {\n\t\t\tawait this.revoke(dbContext, apiKeyRow, row, 'idp_disabled', requestInfo)\n\t\t\treturn 'revoked'\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst handler = this.idpRegistry.getHandlerOrNull(row.providerType)\n\t\tif (!handler?.revalidate) {\n\t\t\t// provider can't actively re-validate (e.g. SAML) — rely on expiry / SLO\n\t\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst decision = this.decide(row, config, dbContext.providers.now())\n\t\tif (!decision) {\n\t\t\t// token still fresh — vouched for, no IdP call\n\t\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Atomic claim = single-flight. Loser (within the floor window, or lost the race) serves stale.\n\t\tlet claimed: boolean\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tclaimed = await dbContext.commandBus.execute(new ClaimIdpRevalidationCommand(row.id, decision.claimInterval))\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t// invalid interval string or transient DB error — fail open, retry next request\n\t\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t\t}\n\t\tif (!claimed) {\n\t\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (decision.blocking) {\n\t\t\treturn await this.runRevalidation(dbContext, handler, row, apiKeyRow, requestInfo)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// SWR: serve this request from the (still valid) token, refresh after the response.\n\t\t// The work runs detached (after the response is sent), so any rejection — a transient\n\t\t// DB error in the revoke / persist writes, a corrupt-config throw — must be swallowed\n\t\t// here; otherwise it becomes an unhandledRejection and can take the worker down. The\n\t\t// session is simply kept and re-tried on a later request (the claim floor throttles).\n\t\tsetImmediate(() => {\n\t\t\tthis.runRevalidation(dbContext, handler, row, apiKeyRow, requestInfo).catch(() => {})\n\t\t})\n\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Decide whether (and how) to revalidate, purely from timestamps — no interval parsing in\n\t * JS (the claim handles intervals in SQL). Returns null to skip.\n\t */\n\tprivate decide(row: IdpSessionRow, config: ResolvedRevalidationConfig, now: Date): Decision {\n\t\tconst expiresAt = row.session.expiresAt\n\t\tconst obtainedAt = row.tokenObtainedAt\n\n\t\t// No lifetime info from the IdP → plain background throttle on fallbackInterval.\n\t\tif (!expiresAt || !obtainedAt) {\n\t\t\treturn { blocking: config.mode === 'blocking', claimInterval: config.fallbackInterval }\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst lifetimeMs = expiresAt.getTime() - obtainedAt.getTime()\n\t\tconst softAtMs = obtainedAt.getTime() + lifetimeMs * config.softThreshold\n\t\tconst nowMs = now.getTime()\n\n\t\tif (nowMs < softAtMs) {\n\t\t\treturn null // still within the trusted window\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst expired = nowMs >= expiresAt.getTime()\n\t\treturn { blocking: config.mode === 'blocking' || expired, claimInterval: config.minInterval }\n\t}\n\n\tprivate async runRevalidation(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\thandler: IdentityProviderHandler<{}>,\n\t\trow: IdpSessionRow,\n\t\tapiKeyRow: ApiKeyRow,\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t): Promise<RevalidationOutcome> {\n\t\tlet config: {}\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tconfig = handler.validateConfiguration(row.providerConfiguration)\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t// corrupt stored config — must NOT revoke; keep the session and retry later. Audit\n\t\t\t// it so the operator can tell \"vouched for\" apart from \"silently broken\" (without an\n\t\t\t// entry, a config typo disables re-validation invisibly for the life of every session).\n\t\t\tawait this.logRevalidationFailed(dbContext, apiKeyRow, row, 'config_invalid', requestInfo)\n\t\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tlet result: RevalidationResult\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tresult = await handler.revalidate!(config, row.session)\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t// transient failure (network / IdP down) — must NOT revoke; keep the session and retry\n\t\t\t// on a later request (the claim floor prevents hammering the IdP). Audited (throttled\n\t\t\t// to one entry per claim window) so a prolonged IdP outage is visible rather than a\n\t\t\t// silent fail-open.\n\t\t\tawait this.logRevalidationFailed(dbContext, apiKeyRow, row, 'revalidation_error', requestInfo)\n\t\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (result.status === 'revoked') {\n\t\t\tawait this.revoke(dbContext, apiKeyRow, row, result.reason, requestInfo)\n\t\t\treturn 'revoked'\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Still valid — persist the rotated token (resets the lifetime reference) / refreshed\n\t\t// expiry. A rotation is a real, low-frequency event (token-lifetime cadence), so we\n\t\t// audit it as `idp_session_revalidated`; the no-op userinfo/introspection probes\n\t\t// (no rotated session) are intentionally NOT logged to keep the audit log usable.\n\t\t//\n\t\t// The IdP has already vouched for the session, so these post-success writes are pure\n\t\t// best-effort bookkeeping (they only reset the SWR cadence reference). A transient DB\n\t\t// error or an `encrypt()` throw here must NOT fail the request — otherwise a blocking\n\t\t// revalidation fails closed on a successful refresh, contradicting \"fail open\" (the SWR\n\t\t// path already swallows this). Keep the existing row; the claim floor throttles a retry.\n\t\tif (result.idpSession) {\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(new UpdateIdpSessionCommand(row.id, result.idpSession))\n\t\t\t\tawait this.logRevalidated(dbContext, apiKeyRow, row, requestInfo)\n\t\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t\t// fall through — session stays valid, persist retried on a later request\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// A09 — re-apply the IdP's claim mapping when the refresh returned fresh claims, so an `always`\n\t\t// mapping keeps an established session's project memberships in sync with the IdP's current claims\n\t\t// without requiring a full re-login. `sticky` mappings self-skip (the sync passes isNewPerson=false).\n\t\t// `claimsComplete` tells the sync whether the refresh rebuilt sign-in's full claim surface, so it can\n\t\t// reconcile (incl. `unmatched: \"remove\"`) exactly like sign-in. Strictly fail-open — see `syncClaims`.\n\t\tif (result.claims) {\n\t\t\tawait this.syncClaims(dbContext, row, apiKeyRow, result.claims, result.claimsComplete === true, requestInfo)\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Re-apply the claim mapping on a successful refresh. Runs in its own transaction (atomic apply of\n\t * the membership changes) and never throws: the IdP has already vouched for the session, so a\n\t * malformed mapping or a transient apply error must not revoke or fail it. A real membership change\n\t * is audited as `idp_role_mapped`; a failure is audited as `idp_role_mapping_failed` (fail-open\n\t * marker), mirroring the sign-in path. `claimsComplete` carries whether the refresh rebuilt sign-in's\n\t * full claim surface (so removal reconciliation is safe) — see `allowRemoval` below.\n\t */\n\tprivate async syncClaims(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\trow: IdpSessionRow,\n\t\tapiKeyRow: ApiKeyRow,\n\t\tclaims: Record<string, unknown>,\n\t\tclaimsComplete: boolean,\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t): Promise<void> {\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tconst mapping = parseClaimMapping(row.providerConfiguration)\n\t\t\tif (!mapping) {\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// Atomic apply in its own transaction (the verify path has no surrounding one). `always`-only:\n\t\t\t// the sync passes isNewPerson=false, so a `sticky` mapping self-skips and returns a null audit.\n\t\t\t// Refresh mirrors sign-in as closely as the claim surface allows: when the provider returned its\n\t\t\t// COMPLETE surface (`claimsComplete` — `method: \"refresh\"` rebuilding sign-in's id-token + userinfo\n\t\t\t// merge), `unmatched: \"remove\"` reconciliation runs here too. A partial surface (a userinfo-only\n\t\t\t// probe, or a refresh whose userinfo fetch failed) passes `allowRemoval: false`, so refresh stays\n\t\t\t// additive-only and a membership the IdP still asserts is never stripped off an incomplete surface.\n\t\t\tconst { audit, droppedUnsafeRules } = await dbContext.transaction(db =>\n\t\t\t\tthis.claimSyncService.sync(db, mapping, claims, { id: apiKeyRow.identity_id }, false, { allowRemoval: claimsComplete })\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t\tif (audit) {\n\t\t\t\tawait this.logRoleMapping(dbContext, apiKeyRow, row, 'idp_role_mapped', audit, requestInfo)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// The apply-time safety backstop dropped a configured rule — emit the fail-open marker so a broken\n\t\t\t// mapping is visible on the refresh path too, mirroring sign-in (the marker carries no claim values).\n\t\t\tif (droppedUnsafeRules) {\n\t\t\t\tawait this.logRoleMapping(dbContext, apiKeyRow, row, 'idp_role_mapping_failed', undefined, requestInfo)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t// Strictly fail-open: a malformed mapping or a transient apply error must never revoke or\n\t\t\t// fail an already-vouched-for session. The transaction rolls back any partial apply.\n\t\t\tawait this.logRoleMapping(dbContext, apiKeyRow, row, 'idp_role_mapping_failed', undefined, requestInfo)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tprivate async logRoleMapping(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tapiKeyRow: ApiKeyRow,\n\t\trow: IdpSessionRow,\n\t\ttype: 'idp_role_mapped' | 'idp_role_mapping_failed',\n\t\teventData: JSONValue | undefined,\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t): Promise<void> {\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(\n\t\t\t\tnew CreateAuthLogEntryCommand({\n\t\t\t\t\ttype,\n\t\t\t\t\tinvokedById: apiKeyRow.identity_id,\n\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: apiKeyRow.person_id ?? undefined,\n\t\t\t\t\t// The membership change affects this session's own person — record it as the target too,\n\t\t\t\t\t// so an admin querying membership changes by target_person_id sees IdP-driven grants/revokes\n\t\t\t\t\t// (consistent with the project_membership_* audit events).\n\t\t\t\t\ttargetPersonId: apiKeyRow.person_id ?? undefined,\n\t\t\t\t\tidentityProviderId: row.identityProviderId,\n\t\t\t\t\tpersonTokenId: apiKeyRow.id,\n\t\t\t\t\tsuccess: true,\n\t\t\t\t\teventData,\n\t\t\t\t\tipAddress: requestInfo?.ip,\n\t\t\t\t\tuserAgent: requestInfo?.userAgent,\n\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t// best-effort audit — never fail the request because the audit write failed\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tprivate async logRevalidated(dbContext: DatabaseContext, apiKeyRow: ApiKeyRow, row: IdpSessionRow, requestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo): Promise<void> {\n\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(\n\t\t\tnew CreateAuthLogEntryCommand({\n\t\t\t\ttype: 'idp_session_revalidated',\n\t\t\t\tinvokedById: apiKeyRow.identity_id,\n\t\t\t\tpersonId: apiKeyRow.person_id ?? undefined,\n\t\t\t\tidentityProviderId: row.identityProviderId,\n\t\t\t\tpersonTokenId: apiKeyRow.id,\n\t\t\t\tsuccess: true,\n\t\t\t\tipAddress: requestInfo?.ip,\n\t\t\t\tuserAgent: requestInfo?.userAgent,\n\t\t\t}),\n\t\t)\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Audit a fail-open: the IdP couldn't be consulted (transient outage) or the stored config is\n\t * corrupt, so we kept the session rather than revoking it. Naturally throttled to one entry\n\t * per claim window (we only reach here after a successful claim, which bumps\n\t * `last_validated_at`). The write is best-effort and self-contained — a failure to audit must\n\t * never propagate and fail a blocking verify request (the whole point of failing open).\n\t */\n\tprivate async logRevalidationFailed(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tapiKeyRow: ApiKeyRow,\n\t\trow: IdpSessionRow,\n\t\terrorCode: 'config_invalid' | 'revalidation_error',\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t): Promise<void> {\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(\n\t\t\t\tnew CreateAuthLogEntryCommand({\n\t\t\t\t\ttype: 'idp_session_revalidation_failed',\n\t\t\t\t\tinvokedById: apiKeyRow.identity_id,\n\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: apiKeyRow.person_id ?? undefined,\n\t\t\t\t\tidentityProviderId: row.identityProviderId,\n\t\t\t\t\tpersonTokenId: apiKeyRow.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t// not a security failure (the session is kept) — a fail-open marker the operator\n\t\t\t\t\t// can alert on. `success: true` keeps it out of the failed-login funnels.\n\t\t\t\t\tsuccess: true,\n\t\t\t\t\terrorCode,\n\t\t\t\t\tipAddress: requestInfo?.ip,\n\t\t\t\t\tuserAgent: requestInfo?.userAgent,\n\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t// best-effort observability — never fail the request because the audit write failed\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tprivate async revoke(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tapiKeyRow: ApiKeyRow,\n\t\trow: IdpSessionRow,\n\t\treason: string,\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t): Promise<void> {\n\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(new DisableApiKeyCommand(apiKeyRow.id))\n\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(\n\t\t\tnew CreateAuthLogEntryCommand({\n\t\t\t\ttype: 'idp_session_revoked',\n\t\t\t\tinvokedById: apiKeyRow.identity_id,\n\t\t\t\tpersonId: apiKeyRow.person_id ?? undefined,\n\t\t\t\tidentityProviderId: row.identityProviderId,\n\t\t\t\tpersonTokenId: apiKeyRow.id,\n\t\t\t\tsuccess: false,\n\t\t\t\terrorCode: reason,\n\t\t\t\tipAddress: requestInfo?.ip,\n\t\t\t\tuserAgent: requestInfo?.userAgent,\n\t\t\t\t// the action payload belongs in `event_data` (where every other audit event puts\n\t\t\t\t// it and where the admin UI / AuthLogQueryResolver reads it); `metadata` is for\n\t\t\t\t// transport context (forwarder IP/UA).\n\t\t\t\teventData: { reason },\n\t\t\t}),\n\t\t)\n\t}\n\n\tprivate resolveConfig(configuration: Record<string, unknown>): ResolvedRevalidationConfig {\n\t\tconst raw = (configuration.revalidation ?? {}) as Record<string, unknown>\n\t\tconst threshold = typeof raw.softRefreshThreshold === 'number' && raw.softRefreshThreshold > 0 && raw.softRefreshThreshold <= 1\n\t\t\t? raw.softRefreshThreshold\n\t\t\t: REVALIDATION_DEFAULT_SOFT_THRESHOLD\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tenabled: raw.enabled === true,\n\t\t\tsoftThreshold: threshold,\n\t\t\tminInterval: typeof raw.minInterval === 'string' ? raw.minInterval : REVALIDATION_DEFAULT_MIN_INTERVAL,\n\t\t\tfallbackInterval: typeof raw.fallbackInterval === 'string' ? raw.fallbackInterval : REVALIDATION_DEFAULT_FALLBACK_INTERVAL,\n\t\t\tmode: raw.mode === 'blocking' ? 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package/dist/development/src/model/service/idp/IdpSessionRevalidator.js

@@ -7,9 +7,11 @@ import "node:crypto";
 import { DisableApiKeyCommand } from "../../commands/apiKey/DisableApiKeyCommand.js";
 import { CreateAuthLogEntryCommand } from "../../commands/authLog/CreateAuthLogEntryCommand.js";
 import { REVALIDATION_DEFAULT_SOFT_THRESHOLD, REVALIDATION_DEFAULT_FALLBACK_INTERVAL, REVALIDATION_DEFAULT_MIN_INTERVAL } from "./IDPRevalidation.js";
+import { parseClaimMapping } from "./ClaimMapping.js";
 class IdpSessionRevalidator {
-  constructor(idpRegistry) {
+  constructor(idpRegistry, claimSyncService) {
     this.idpRegistry = idpRegistry;
+    this.claimSyncService = claimSyncService;
   }
   async revalidate(dbContext, readDbContext, apiKeyRow, requestInfo) {
     const row = await readDbContext.queryHandler.fetch(new IdpSessionByApiKeyQuery(apiKeyRow.id, readDbContext.providers));
@@ -95,8 +97,60 @@ class IdpSessionRevalidator {
       } catch {
       }
     }
+    if (result.claims) {
+      await this.syncClaims(dbContext, row, apiKeyRow, result.claims, result.claimsComplete === true, requestInfo);
+    }
     return "valid";
   }
+  /**
+   * Re-apply the claim mapping on a successful refresh. Runs in its own transaction (atomic apply of
+   * the membership changes) and never throws: the IdP has already vouched for the session, so a
+   * malformed mapping or a transient apply error must not revoke or fail it. A real membership change
+   * is audited as `idp_role_mapped`; a failure is audited as `idp_role_mapping_failed` (fail-open
+   * marker), mirroring the sign-in path. `claimsComplete` carries whether the refresh rebuilt sign-in's
+   * full claim surface (so removal reconciliation is safe) — see `allowRemoval` below.
+   */
+  async syncClaims(dbContext, row, apiKeyRow, claims, claimsComplete, requestInfo) {
+    try {
+      const mapping = parseClaimMapping(row.providerConfiguration);
+      if (!mapping) {
+        return;
+      }
+      const { audit, droppedUnsafeRules } = await dbContext.transaction(
+        (db) => this.claimSyncService.sync(db, mapping, claims, { id: apiKeyRow.identity_id }, false, { allowRemoval: claimsComplete })
+      );
+      if (audit) {
+        await this.logRoleMapping(dbContext, apiKeyRow, row, "idp_role_mapped", audit, requestInfo);
+      }
+      if (droppedUnsafeRules) {
+        await this.logRoleMapping(dbContext, apiKeyRow, row, "idp_role_mapping_failed", void 0, requestInfo);
+      }
+    } catch {
+      await this.logRoleMapping(dbContext, apiKeyRow, row, "idp_role_mapping_failed", void 0, requestInfo);
+    }
+  }
+  async logRoleMapping(dbContext, apiKeyRow, row, type, eventData, requestInfo) {
+    try {
+      await dbContext.commandBus.execute(
+        new CreateAuthLogEntryCommand({
+          type,
+          invokedById: apiKeyRow.identity_id,
+          personId: apiKeyRow.person_id ?? void 0,
+          // The membership change affects this session's own person — record it as the target too,
+          // so an admin querying membership changes by target_person_id sees IdP-driven grants/revokes
+          // (consistent with the project_membership_* audit events).
+          targetPersonId: apiKeyRow.person_id ?? void 0,
+          identityProviderId: row.identityProviderId,
+          personTokenId: apiKeyRow.id,
+          success: true,
+          eventData,
+          ipAddress: requestInfo?.ip,
+          userAgent: requestInfo?.userAgent
+        })
+      );
+    } catch {
+    }
+  }
   async logRevalidated(dbContext, apiKeyRow, row, requestInfo) {
     await dbContext.commandBus.execute(
       new CreateAuthLogEntryCommand({

package/dist/development/src/model/service/idp/IdpSessionRevalidator.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"IdpSessionRevalidator.js","sources":["../../../../../../../packages/engine-tenant-api/src/model/service/idp/IdpSessionRevalidator.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { DatabaseContext } from '../../utils/index.js'\nimport { ApiKeyRequestInfo } from '../../commands/index.js'\nimport { ApiKeyRow } from '../../queries/apiKey/ApiKeyQuery.js'\nimport { IdpSessionByApiKeyQuery, IdpSessionRow } from '../../queries/idp/IdpSessionByApiKeyQuery.js'\nimport { IDPHandlerRegistry } from './IDPHandlerRegistry.js'\nimport { ClaimIdpRevalidationCommand } from '../../commands/idp/ClaimIdpRevalidationCommand.js'\nimport { UpdateIdpSessionCommand } from '../../commands/idp/UpdateIdpSessionCommand.js'\nimport { DisableApiKeyCommand } from '../../commands/index.js'\nimport { CreateAuthLogEntryCommand } from '../../commands/authLog/CreateAuthLogEntryCommand.js'\nimport { REVALIDATION_DEFAULT_FALLBACK_INTERVAL, REVALIDATION_DEFAULT_MIN_INTERVAL, REVALIDATION_DEFAULT_SOFT_THRESHOLD } from './IDPRevalidation.js'\nimport { IdentityProviderHandler, RevalidationResult } from './IdentityProviderHandler.js'\n\nexport type RevalidationOutcome = 'valid' | 'revoked'\n\ntype ResolvedRevalidationConfig = {\n\tenabled: boolean\n\tsoftThreshold: number\n\tminInterval: string\n\tfallbackInterval: string\n\tmode: 'auto' | 'blocking'\n}\n\n/**\n * Decision for the current request: whether to attempt a revalidation, and if so whether it\n * must block the request. `claimInterval` is the single-flight floor for the atomic claim.\n */\ntype Decision = null | { blocking: boolean; claimInterval: string }\n\n/**\n * Re-validates IdP-backed sessions against their identity provider on the verify hot path\n * (A24). Invoked from `ApiKeyManager.verifyAndProlong`. Operates entirely through the supplied\n * database contexts and the command bus, so it does not depend on `ApiKeyManager` (no DI cycle).\n *\n * The cadence is driven by the **access-token lifetime**, not a fixed interval:\n *   - while the token is fresh (before `softRefreshThreshold` of its lifetime) → skip, free;\n *   - past the threshold but not yet expired → a proactive **background (SWR)** refresh, so the\n *     request keeps zero added latency and the token is renewed before it dies;\n *   - once the token has actually expired → a **blocking** refresh (we can't serve a dead token).\n * `mode: 'blocking'` forces every revalidation synchronous (zero revocation lag). When the IdP\n * returns no token expiry, falls back to a plain `fallbackInterval` background throttle.\n */\nexport class IdpSessionRevalidator {\n\tconstructor(\n\t\tprivate readonly idpRegistry: IDPHandlerRegistry,\n\t) {\n\t}\n\n\tasync revalidate(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\treadDbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tapiKeyRow: ApiKeyRow,\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t): Promise<RevalidationOutcome> {\n\t\tconst row = await readDbContext.queryHandler.fetch(new IdpSessionByApiKeyQuery(apiKeyRow.id, readDbContext.providers))\n\t\tif (!row) {\n\t\t\t// not a federated session (password / IdP without revalidation) — fast no-op\n\t\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst config = this.resolveConfig(row.providerConfiguration)\n\t\tif (!config.enabled) {\n\t\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// A disabled IdP no longer vouches for its sessions.\n\t\tif (row.providerDisabledAt) {\n\t\t\tawait this.revoke(dbContext, apiKeyRow, row, 'idp_disabled', requestInfo)\n\t\t\treturn 'revoked'\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst handler = this.idpRegistry.getHandlerOrNull(row.providerType)\n\t\tif (!handler?.revalidate) {\n\t\t\t// provider can't actively re-validate (e.g. SAML) — rely on expiry / SLO\n\t\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst decision = this.decide(row, config, dbContext.providers.now())\n\t\tif (!decision) {\n\t\t\t// token still fresh — vouched for, no IdP call\n\t\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Atomic claim = single-flight. Loser (within the floor window, or lost the race) serves stale.\n\t\tlet claimed: boolean\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tclaimed = await dbContext.commandBus.execute(new ClaimIdpRevalidationCommand(row.id, decision.claimInterval))\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t// invalid interval string or transient DB error — fail open, retry next request\n\t\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t\t}\n\t\tif (!claimed) {\n\t\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (decision.blocking) {\n\t\t\treturn await this.runRevalidation(dbContext, handler, row, apiKeyRow, requestInfo)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// SWR: serve this request from the (still valid) token, refresh after the response.\n\t\t// The work runs detached (after the response is sent), so any rejection — a transient\n\t\t// DB error in the revoke / persist writes, a corrupt-config throw — must be swallowed\n\t\t// here; otherwise it becomes an unhandledRejection and can take the worker down. The\n\t\t// session is simply kept and re-tried on a later request (the claim floor throttles).\n\t\tsetImmediate(() => {\n\t\t\tthis.runRevalidation(dbContext, handler, row, apiKeyRow, requestInfo).catch(() => {})\n\t\t})\n\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Decide whether (and how) to revalidate, purely from timestamps — no interval parsing in\n\t * JS (the claim handles intervals in SQL). Returns null to skip.\n\t */\n\tprivate decide(row: IdpSessionRow, config: ResolvedRevalidationConfig, now: Date): Decision {\n\t\tconst expiresAt = row.session.expiresAt\n\t\tconst obtainedAt = row.tokenObtainedAt\n\n\t\t// No lifetime info from the IdP → plain background throttle on fallbackInterval.\n\t\tif (!expiresAt || !obtainedAt) {\n\t\t\treturn { blocking: config.mode === 'blocking', claimInterval: config.fallbackInterval }\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst lifetimeMs = expiresAt.getTime() - obtainedAt.getTime()\n\t\tconst softAtMs = obtainedAt.getTime() + lifetimeMs * config.softThreshold\n\t\tconst nowMs = now.getTime()\n\n\t\tif (nowMs < softAtMs) {\n\t\t\treturn null // still within the trusted window\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst expired = nowMs >= expiresAt.getTime()\n\t\treturn { blocking: config.mode === 'blocking' || expired, claimInterval: config.minInterval }\n\t}\n\n\tprivate async runRevalidation(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\thandler: IdentityProviderHandler<{}>,\n\t\trow: IdpSessionRow,\n\t\tapiKeyRow: ApiKeyRow,\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t): Promise<RevalidationOutcome> {\n\t\tlet config: {}\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tconfig = handler.validateConfiguration(row.providerConfiguration)\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t// corrupt stored config — must NOT revoke; keep the session and retry later. Audit\n\t\t\t// it so the operator can tell \"vouched for\" apart from \"silently broken\" (without an\n\t\t\t// entry, a config typo disables re-validation invisibly for the life of every session).\n\t\t\tawait this.logRevalidationFailed(dbContext, apiKeyRow, row, 'config_invalid', requestInfo)\n\t\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tlet result: RevalidationResult\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tresult = await handler.revalidate!(config, row.session)\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t// transient failure (network / IdP down) — must NOT revoke; keep the session and retry\n\t\t\t// on a later request (the claim floor prevents hammering the IdP). Audited (throttled\n\t\t\t// to one entry per claim window) so a prolonged IdP outage is visible rather than a\n\t\t\t// silent fail-open.\n\t\t\tawait this.logRevalidationFailed(dbContext, apiKeyRow, row, 'revalidation_error', requestInfo)\n\t\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (result.status === 'revoked') {\n\t\t\tawait this.revoke(dbContext, apiKeyRow, row, result.reason, requestInfo)\n\t\t\treturn 'revoked'\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Still valid — persist the rotated token (resets the lifetime reference) / refreshed\n\t\t// expiry. A rotation is a real, low-frequency event (token-lifetime cadence), so we\n\t\t// audit it as `idp_session_revalidated`; the no-op userinfo/introspection probes\n\t\t// (no rotated session) are intentionally NOT logged to keep the audit log usable.\n\t\t//\n\t\t// The IdP has already vouched for the session, so these post-success writes are pure\n\t\t// best-effort bookkeeping (they only reset the SWR cadence reference). A transient DB\n\t\t// error or an `encrypt()` throw here must NOT fail the request — otherwise a blocking\n\t\t// revalidation fails closed on a successful refresh, contradicting \"fail open\" (the SWR\n\t\t// path already swallows this). Keep the existing row; the claim floor throttles a retry.\n\t\tif (result.idpSession) {\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(new UpdateIdpSessionCommand(row.id, result.idpSession))\n\t\t\t\tawait this.logRevalidated(dbContext, apiKeyRow, row, requestInfo)\n\t\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t\t// fall through — session stays valid, persist retried on a later request\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t}\n\n\tprivate async logRevalidated(dbContext: DatabaseContext, apiKeyRow: ApiKeyRow, row: IdpSessionRow, requestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo): Promise<void> {\n\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(\n\t\t\tnew CreateAuthLogEntryCommand({\n\t\t\t\ttype: 'idp_session_revalidated',\n\t\t\t\tinvokedById: apiKeyRow.identity_id,\n\t\t\t\tpersonId: apiKeyRow.person_id ?? undefined,\n\t\t\t\tidentityProviderId: row.identityProviderId,\n\t\t\t\tpersonTokenId: apiKeyRow.id,\n\t\t\t\tsuccess: true,\n\t\t\t\tipAddress: requestInfo?.ip,\n\t\t\t\tuserAgent: requestInfo?.userAgent,\n\t\t\t}),\n\t\t)\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Audit a fail-open: the IdP couldn't be consulted (transient outage) or the stored config is\n\t * corrupt, so we kept the session rather than revoking it. Naturally throttled to one entry\n\t * per claim window (we only reach here after a successful claim, which bumps\n\t * `last_validated_at`). The write is best-effort and self-contained — a failure to audit must\n\t * never propagate and fail a blocking verify request (the whole point of failing open).\n\t */\n\tprivate async logRevalidationFailed(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tapiKeyRow: ApiKeyRow,\n\t\trow: IdpSessionRow,\n\t\terrorCode: 'config_invalid' | 'revalidation_error',\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t): Promise<void> {\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(\n\t\t\t\tnew CreateAuthLogEntryCommand({\n\t\t\t\t\ttype: 'idp_session_revalidation_failed',\n\t\t\t\t\tinvokedById: apiKeyRow.identity_id,\n\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: apiKeyRow.person_id ?? undefined,\n\t\t\t\t\tidentityProviderId: row.identityProviderId,\n\t\t\t\t\tpersonTokenId: apiKeyRow.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t// not a security failure (the session is kept) — a fail-open marker the operator\n\t\t\t\t\t// can alert on. `success: true` keeps it out of the failed-login funnels.\n\t\t\t\t\tsuccess: true,\n\t\t\t\t\terrorCode,\n\t\t\t\t\tipAddress: requestInfo?.ip,\n\t\t\t\t\tuserAgent: requestInfo?.userAgent,\n\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t// best-effort observability — never fail the request because the audit write failed\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tprivate async revoke(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tapiKeyRow: ApiKeyRow,\n\t\trow: IdpSessionRow,\n\t\treason: string,\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t): Promise<void> {\n\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(new DisableApiKeyCommand(apiKeyRow.id))\n\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(\n\t\t\tnew CreateAuthLogEntryCommand({\n\t\t\t\ttype: 'idp_session_revoked',\n\t\t\t\tinvokedById: apiKeyRow.identity_id,\n\t\t\t\tpersonId: apiKeyRow.person_id ?? undefined,\n\t\t\t\tidentityProviderId: row.identityProviderId,\n\t\t\t\tpersonTokenId: apiKeyRow.id,\n\t\t\t\tsuccess: false,\n\t\t\t\terrorCode: reason,\n\t\t\t\tipAddress: requestInfo?.ip,\n\t\t\t\tuserAgent: requestInfo?.userAgent,\n\t\t\t\t// the action payload belongs in `event_data` (where every other audit event puts\n\t\t\t\t// it and where the admin UI / AuthLogQueryResolver reads it); `metadata` is for\n\t\t\t\t// transport context (forwarder IP/UA).\n\t\t\t\teventData: { reason },\n\t\t\t}),\n\t\t)\n\t}\n\n\tprivate resolveConfig(configuration: Record<string, unknown>): ResolvedRevalidationConfig {\n\t\tconst raw = (configuration.revalidation ?? {}) as Record<string, unknown>\n\t\tconst threshold = typeof raw.softRefreshThreshold === 'number' && raw.softRefreshThreshold > 0 && raw.softRefreshThreshold <= 1\n\t\t\t? raw.softRefreshThreshold\n\t\t\t: REVALIDATION_DEFAULT_SOFT_THRESHOLD\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tenabled: raw.enabled === true,\n\t\t\tsoftThreshold: threshold,\n\t\t\tminInterval: typeof raw.minInterval === 'string' ? raw.minInterval : REVALIDATION_DEFAULT_MIN_INTERVAL,\n\t\t\tfallbackInterval: typeof raw.fallbackInterval === 'string' ? raw.fallbackInterval : REVALIDATION_DEFAULT_FALLBACK_INTERVAL,\n\t\t\tmode: raw.mode === 'blocking' ? 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+{"version":3,"file":"IdpSessionRevalidator.js","sources":["../../../../../../../packages/engine-tenant-api/src/model/service/idp/IdpSessionRevalidator.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { DatabaseContext } from '../../utils/index.js'\nimport { ApiKeyRequestInfo } from '../../commands/index.js'\nimport { ApiKeyRow } from '../../queries/apiKey/ApiKeyQuery.js'\nimport { IdpSessionByApiKeyQuery, IdpSessionRow } from '../../queries/idp/IdpSessionByApiKeyQuery.js'\nimport { IDPHandlerRegistry } from './IDPHandlerRegistry.js'\nimport { ClaimIdpRevalidationCommand } from '../../commands/idp/ClaimIdpRevalidationCommand.js'\nimport { UpdateIdpSessionCommand } from '../../commands/idp/UpdateIdpSessionCommand.js'\nimport { DisableApiKeyCommand } from '../../commands/index.js'\nimport { CreateAuthLogEntryCommand } from '../../commands/authLog/CreateAuthLogEntryCommand.js'\nimport { REVALIDATION_DEFAULT_FALLBACK_INTERVAL, REVALIDATION_DEFAULT_MIN_INTERVAL, REVALIDATION_DEFAULT_SOFT_THRESHOLD } from './IDPRevalidation.js'\nimport { IdentityProviderHandler, RevalidationResult } from './IdentityProviderHandler.js'\nimport { IDPClaimSyncService } from './IDPClaimSyncService.js'\nimport { parseClaimMapping } from './ClaimMapping.js'\nimport { JSONValue } from '@contember/schema'\n\nexport type RevalidationOutcome = 'valid' | 'revoked'\n\ntype ResolvedRevalidationConfig = {\n\tenabled: boolean\n\tsoftThreshold: number\n\tminInterval: string\n\tfallbackInterval: string\n\tmode: 'auto' | 'blocking'\n}\n\n/**\n * Decision for the current request: whether to attempt a revalidation, and if so whether it\n * must block the request. `claimInterval` is the single-flight floor for the atomic claim.\n */\ntype Decision = null | { blocking: boolean; claimInterval: string }\n\n/**\n * Re-validates IdP-backed sessions against their identity provider on the verify hot path\n * (A24). Invoked from `ApiKeyManager.verifyAndProlong`. Operates entirely through the supplied\n * database contexts and the command bus, so it does not depend on `ApiKeyManager` (no DI cycle).\n *\n * The cadence is driven by the **access-token lifetime**, not a fixed interval:\n *   - while the token is fresh (before `softRefreshThreshold` of its lifetime) → skip, free;\n *   - past the threshold but not yet expired → a proactive **background (SWR)** refresh, so the\n *     request keeps zero added latency and the token is renewed before it dies;\n *   - once the token has actually expired → a **blocking** refresh (we can't serve a dead token).\n * `mode: 'blocking'` forces every revalidation synchronous (zero revocation lag). When the IdP\n * returns no token expiry, falls back to a plain `fallbackInterval` background throttle.\n */\nexport class IdpSessionRevalidator {\n\tconstructor(\n\t\tprivate readonly idpRegistry: IDPHandlerRegistry,\n\t\tprivate readonly claimSyncService: IDPClaimSyncService,\n\t) {\n\t}\n\n\tasync revalidate(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\treadDbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tapiKeyRow: ApiKeyRow,\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t): Promise<RevalidationOutcome> {\n\t\tconst row = await readDbContext.queryHandler.fetch(new IdpSessionByApiKeyQuery(apiKeyRow.id, readDbContext.providers))\n\t\tif (!row) {\n\t\t\t// not a federated session (password / IdP without revalidation) — fast no-op\n\t\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst config = this.resolveConfig(row.providerConfiguration)\n\t\tif (!config.enabled) {\n\t\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// A disabled IdP no longer vouches for its sessions.\n\t\tif (row.providerDisabledAt) {\n\t\t\tawait this.revoke(dbContext, apiKeyRow, row, 'idp_disabled', requestInfo)\n\t\t\treturn 'revoked'\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst handler = this.idpRegistry.getHandlerOrNull(row.providerType)\n\t\tif (!handler?.revalidate) {\n\t\t\t// provider can't actively re-validate (e.g. SAML) — rely on expiry / SLO\n\t\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst decision = this.decide(row, config, dbContext.providers.now())\n\t\tif (!decision) {\n\t\t\t// token still fresh — vouched for, no IdP call\n\t\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Atomic claim = single-flight. Loser (within the floor window, or lost the race) serves stale.\n\t\tlet claimed: boolean\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tclaimed = await dbContext.commandBus.execute(new ClaimIdpRevalidationCommand(row.id, decision.claimInterval))\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t// invalid interval string or transient DB error — fail open, retry next request\n\t\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t\t}\n\t\tif (!claimed) {\n\t\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (decision.blocking) {\n\t\t\treturn await this.runRevalidation(dbContext, handler, row, apiKeyRow, requestInfo)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// SWR: serve this request from the (still valid) token, refresh after the response.\n\t\t// The work runs detached (after the response is sent), so any rejection — a transient\n\t\t// DB error in the revoke / persist writes, a corrupt-config throw — must be swallowed\n\t\t// here; otherwise it becomes an unhandledRejection and can take the worker down. The\n\t\t// session is simply kept and re-tried on a later request (the claim floor throttles).\n\t\tsetImmediate(() => {\n\t\t\tthis.runRevalidation(dbContext, handler, row, apiKeyRow, requestInfo).catch(() => {})\n\t\t})\n\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Decide whether (and how) to revalidate, purely from timestamps — no interval parsing in\n\t * JS (the claim handles intervals in SQL). Returns null to skip.\n\t */\n\tprivate decide(row: IdpSessionRow, config: ResolvedRevalidationConfig, now: Date): Decision {\n\t\tconst expiresAt = row.session.expiresAt\n\t\tconst obtainedAt = row.tokenObtainedAt\n\n\t\t// No lifetime info from the IdP → plain background throttle on fallbackInterval.\n\t\tif (!expiresAt || !obtainedAt) {\n\t\t\treturn { blocking: config.mode === 'blocking', claimInterval: config.fallbackInterval }\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst lifetimeMs = expiresAt.getTime() - obtainedAt.getTime()\n\t\tconst softAtMs = obtainedAt.getTime() + lifetimeMs * config.softThreshold\n\t\tconst nowMs = now.getTime()\n\n\t\tif (nowMs < softAtMs) {\n\t\t\treturn null // still within the trusted window\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst expired = nowMs >= expiresAt.getTime()\n\t\treturn { blocking: config.mode === 'blocking' || expired, claimInterval: config.minInterval }\n\t}\n\n\tprivate async runRevalidation(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\thandler: IdentityProviderHandler<{}>,\n\t\trow: IdpSessionRow,\n\t\tapiKeyRow: ApiKeyRow,\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t): Promise<RevalidationOutcome> {\n\t\tlet config: {}\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tconfig = handler.validateConfiguration(row.providerConfiguration)\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t// corrupt stored config — must NOT revoke; keep the session and retry later. Audit\n\t\t\t// it so the operator can tell \"vouched for\" apart from \"silently broken\" (without an\n\t\t\t// entry, a config typo disables re-validation invisibly for the life of every session).\n\t\t\tawait this.logRevalidationFailed(dbContext, apiKeyRow, row, 'config_invalid', requestInfo)\n\t\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tlet result: RevalidationResult\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tresult = await handler.revalidate!(config, row.session)\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t// transient failure (network / IdP down) — must NOT revoke; keep the session and retry\n\t\t\t// on a later request (the claim floor prevents hammering the IdP). Audited (throttled\n\t\t\t// to one entry per claim window) so a prolonged IdP outage is visible rather than a\n\t\t\t// silent fail-open.\n\t\t\tawait this.logRevalidationFailed(dbContext, apiKeyRow, row, 'revalidation_error', requestInfo)\n\t\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (result.status === 'revoked') {\n\t\t\tawait this.revoke(dbContext, apiKeyRow, row, result.reason, requestInfo)\n\t\t\treturn 'revoked'\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Still valid — persist the rotated token (resets the lifetime reference) / refreshed\n\t\t// expiry. A rotation is a real, low-frequency event (token-lifetime cadence), so we\n\t\t// audit it as `idp_session_revalidated`; the no-op userinfo/introspection probes\n\t\t// (no rotated session) are intentionally NOT logged to keep the audit log usable.\n\t\t//\n\t\t// The IdP has already vouched for the session, so these post-success writes are pure\n\t\t// best-effort bookkeeping (they only reset the SWR cadence reference). A transient DB\n\t\t// error or an `encrypt()` throw here must NOT fail the request — otherwise a blocking\n\t\t// revalidation fails closed on a successful refresh, contradicting \"fail open\" (the SWR\n\t\t// path already swallows this). Keep the existing row; the claim floor throttles a retry.\n\t\tif (result.idpSession) {\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(new UpdateIdpSessionCommand(row.id, result.idpSession))\n\t\t\t\tawait this.logRevalidated(dbContext, apiKeyRow, row, requestInfo)\n\t\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t\t// fall through — session stays valid, persist retried on a later request\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// A09 — re-apply the IdP's claim mapping when the refresh returned fresh claims, so an `always`\n\t\t// mapping keeps an established session's project memberships in sync with the IdP's current claims\n\t\t// without requiring a full re-login. `sticky` mappings self-skip (the sync passes isNewPerson=false).\n\t\t// `claimsComplete` tells the sync whether the refresh rebuilt sign-in's full claim surface, so it can\n\t\t// reconcile (incl. `unmatched: \"remove\"`) exactly like sign-in. Strictly fail-open — see `syncClaims`.\n\t\tif (result.claims) {\n\t\t\tawait this.syncClaims(dbContext, row, apiKeyRow, result.claims, result.claimsComplete === true, requestInfo)\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn 'valid'\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Re-apply the claim mapping on a successful refresh. Runs in its own transaction (atomic apply of\n\t * the membership changes) and never throws: the IdP has already vouched for the session, so a\n\t * malformed mapping or a transient apply error must not revoke or fail it. A real membership change\n\t * is audited as `idp_role_mapped`; a failure is audited as `idp_role_mapping_failed` (fail-open\n\t * marker), mirroring the sign-in path. `claimsComplete` carries whether the refresh rebuilt sign-in's\n\t * full claim surface (so removal reconciliation is safe) — see `allowRemoval` below.\n\t */\n\tprivate async syncClaims(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\trow: IdpSessionRow,\n\t\tapiKeyRow: ApiKeyRow,\n\t\tclaims: Record<string, unknown>,\n\t\tclaimsComplete: boolean,\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t): Promise<void> {\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tconst mapping = parseClaimMapping(row.providerConfiguration)\n\t\t\tif (!mapping) {\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// Atomic apply in its own transaction (the verify path has no surrounding one). `always`-only:\n\t\t\t// the sync passes isNewPerson=false, so a `sticky` mapping self-skips and returns a null audit.\n\t\t\t// Refresh mirrors sign-in as closely as the claim surface allows: when the provider returned its\n\t\t\t// COMPLETE surface (`claimsComplete` — `method: \"refresh\"` rebuilding sign-in's id-token + userinfo\n\t\t\t// merge), `unmatched: \"remove\"` reconciliation runs here too. A partial surface (a userinfo-only\n\t\t\t// probe, or a refresh whose userinfo fetch failed) passes `allowRemoval: false`, so refresh stays\n\t\t\t// additive-only and a membership the IdP still asserts is never stripped off an incomplete surface.\n\t\t\tconst { audit, droppedUnsafeRules } = await dbContext.transaction(db =>\n\t\t\t\tthis.claimSyncService.sync(db, mapping, claims, { id: apiKeyRow.identity_id }, false, { allowRemoval: claimsComplete })\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t\tif (audit) {\n\t\t\t\tawait this.logRoleMapping(dbContext, apiKeyRow, row, 'idp_role_mapped', audit, requestInfo)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// The apply-time safety backstop dropped a configured rule — emit the fail-open marker so a broken\n\t\t\t// mapping is visible on the refresh path too, mirroring sign-in (the marker carries no claim values).\n\t\t\tif (droppedUnsafeRules) {\n\t\t\t\tawait this.logRoleMapping(dbContext, apiKeyRow, row, 'idp_role_mapping_failed', undefined, requestInfo)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t// Strictly fail-open: a malformed mapping or a transient apply error must never revoke or\n\t\t\t// fail an already-vouched-for session. The transaction rolls back any partial apply.\n\t\t\tawait this.logRoleMapping(dbContext, apiKeyRow, row, 'idp_role_mapping_failed', undefined, requestInfo)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tprivate async logRoleMapping(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tapiKeyRow: ApiKeyRow,\n\t\trow: IdpSessionRow,\n\t\ttype: 'idp_role_mapped' | 'idp_role_mapping_failed',\n\t\teventData: JSONValue | undefined,\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t): Promise<void> {\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(\n\t\t\t\tnew CreateAuthLogEntryCommand({\n\t\t\t\t\ttype,\n\t\t\t\t\tinvokedById: apiKeyRow.identity_id,\n\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: apiKeyRow.person_id ?? undefined,\n\t\t\t\t\t// The membership change affects this session's own person — record it as the target too,\n\t\t\t\t\t// so an admin querying membership changes by target_person_id sees IdP-driven grants/revokes\n\t\t\t\t\t// (consistent with the project_membership_* audit events).\n\t\t\t\t\ttargetPersonId: apiKeyRow.person_id ?? undefined,\n\t\t\t\t\tidentityProviderId: row.identityProviderId,\n\t\t\t\t\tpersonTokenId: apiKeyRow.id,\n\t\t\t\t\tsuccess: true,\n\t\t\t\t\teventData,\n\t\t\t\t\tipAddress: requestInfo?.ip,\n\t\t\t\t\tuserAgent: requestInfo?.userAgent,\n\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t// best-effort audit — never fail the request because the audit write failed\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tprivate async logRevalidated(dbContext: DatabaseContext, apiKeyRow: ApiKeyRow, row: IdpSessionRow, requestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo): Promise<void> {\n\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(\n\t\t\tnew CreateAuthLogEntryCommand({\n\t\t\t\ttype: 'idp_session_revalidated',\n\t\t\t\tinvokedById: apiKeyRow.identity_id,\n\t\t\t\tpersonId: apiKeyRow.person_id ?? undefined,\n\t\t\t\tidentityProviderId: row.identityProviderId,\n\t\t\t\tpersonTokenId: apiKeyRow.id,\n\t\t\t\tsuccess: true,\n\t\t\t\tipAddress: requestInfo?.ip,\n\t\t\t\tuserAgent: requestInfo?.userAgent,\n\t\t\t}),\n\t\t)\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Audit a fail-open: the IdP couldn't be consulted (transient outage) or the stored config is\n\t * corrupt, so we kept the session rather than revoking it. Naturally throttled to one entry\n\t * per claim window (we only reach here after a successful claim, which bumps\n\t * `last_validated_at`). The write is best-effort and self-contained — a failure to audit must\n\t * never propagate and fail a blocking verify request (the whole point of failing open).\n\t */\n\tprivate async logRevalidationFailed(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tapiKeyRow: ApiKeyRow,\n\t\trow: IdpSessionRow,\n\t\terrorCode: 'config_invalid' | 'revalidation_error',\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t): Promise<void> {\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(\n\t\t\t\tnew CreateAuthLogEntryCommand({\n\t\t\t\t\ttype: 'idp_session_revalidation_failed',\n\t\t\t\t\tinvokedById: apiKeyRow.identity_id,\n\t\t\t\t\tpersonId: apiKeyRow.person_id ?? undefined,\n\t\t\t\t\tidentityProviderId: row.identityProviderId,\n\t\t\t\t\tpersonTokenId: apiKeyRow.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t// not a security failure (the session is kept) — a fail-open marker the operator\n\t\t\t\t\t// can alert on. `success: true` keeps it out of the failed-login funnels.\n\t\t\t\t\tsuccess: true,\n\t\t\t\t\terrorCode,\n\t\t\t\t\tipAddress: requestInfo?.ip,\n\t\t\t\t\tuserAgent: requestInfo?.userAgent,\n\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t// best-effort observability — never fail the request because the audit write failed\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tprivate async revoke(\n\t\tdbContext: DatabaseContext,\n\t\tapiKeyRow: ApiKeyRow,\n\t\trow: IdpSessionRow,\n\t\treason: string,\n\t\trequestInfo?: ApiKeyRequestInfo,\n\t): Promise<void> {\n\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(new DisableApiKeyCommand(apiKeyRow.id))\n\t\tawait dbContext.commandBus.execute(\n\t\t\tnew CreateAuthLogEntryCommand({\n\t\t\t\ttype: 'idp_session_revoked',\n\t\t\t\tinvokedById: apiKeyRow.identity_id,\n\t\t\t\tpersonId: apiKeyRow.person_id ?? undefined,\n\t\t\t\tidentityProviderId: row.identityProviderId,\n\t\t\t\tpersonTokenId: apiKeyRow.id,\n\t\t\t\tsuccess: false,\n\t\t\t\terrorCode: reason,\n\t\t\t\tipAddress: requestInfo?.ip,\n\t\t\t\tuserAgent: requestInfo?.userAgent,\n\t\t\t\t// the action payload belongs in `event_data` (where every other audit event puts\n\t\t\t\t// it and where the admin UI / AuthLogQueryResolver reads it); `metadata` is for\n\t\t\t\t// transport context (forwarder IP/UA).\n\t\t\t\teventData: { reason },\n\t\t\t}),\n\t\t)\n\t}\n\n\tprivate resolveConfig(configuration: Record<string, unknown>): ResolvedRevalidationConfig {\n\t\tconst raw = (configuration.revalidation ?? {}) as Record<string, unknown>\n\t\tconst threshold = typeof raw.softRefreshThreshold === 'number' && raw.softRefreshThreshold > 0 && raw.softRefreshThreshold <= 1\n\t\t\t? raw.softRefreshThreshold\n\t\t\t: REVALIDATION_DEFAULT_SOFT_THRESHOLD\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tenabled: raw.enabled === true,\n\t\t\tsoftThreshold: threshold,\n\t\t\tminInterval: typeof raw.minInterval === 'string' ? raw.minInterval : REVALIDATION_DEFAULT_MIN_INTERVAL,\n\t\t\tfallbackInterval: typeof raw.fallbackInterval === 'string' ? raw.fallbackInterval : REVALIDATION_DEFAULT_FALLBACK_INTERVAL,\n\t\t\tmode: raw.mode === 'blocking' ? 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package/dist/development/src/model/service/idp/PersonIdentityProviderManager.cjs

@@ -24,6 +24,12 @@ class PersonIdentityProviderManager {
       if (!connection) {
         return new Response.ResponseError("NOT_FOUND", `You are not connected to the identity provider connection "${connectionId}".`);
       }
+      if (connection.identityProviderDisableLocalAuthentication) {
+        return new Response.ResponseError(
+          "IDP_REQUIRED",
+          `The identity provider "${connection.identityProviderSlug}" is the only way you may sign in; its connection cannot be removed.`
+        );
+      }
       const configuration = await db2.queryHandler.fetch(new ConfigurationQuery.ConfigurationQuery(db2.providers));
       const hasPassword = person.password_hash !== null;
       const hasPasswordless = isPasswordlessEnabled.isPasswordlessEnabled(configuration.passwordless.enabled, person.passwordless_enabled);

package/dist/development/src/model/service/idp/PersonIdentityProviderManager.cjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"PersonIdentityProviderManager.cjs","sources":["../../../../../../../packages/engine-tenant-api/src/model/service/idp/PersonIdentityProviderManager.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { Response, ResponseError, ResponseOk } from '../../utils/Response.js'\nimport { DisconnectIdpErrorCode } from '../../../schema/index.js'\nimport { DatabaseContext } from '../../utils/index.js'\nimport { ConfigurationQuery, PersonIdentityProviderRow, PersonIdentityProvidersQuery, PersonRow } from '../../queries/index.js'\nimport { DisconnectPersonIdentityProviderCommand } from '../../commands/idp/DisconnectPersonIdentityProviderCommand.js'\nimport { isPasswordlessEnabled } from '../helpers/isPasswordlessEnabled.js'\n\n/**\n * Manages the external IdP connections of the *currently authenticated* person.\n *\n * Lock-out policy: a person may always disconnect a provider as long as it does\n * not remove their last remaining sign-in method. A connection is refused only\n * when, after removal, the person would have no password, no passwordless\n * sign-in enabled and no other *usable* IdP connection left — which would lock\n * them out of their account entirely. Whether passwordless counts is decided by\n * the same tenant policy the sign-in flow applies, and connections to disabled\n * providers are not counted as a usable fallback (they cannot sign in).\n */\nexport class PersonIdentityProviderManager {\n\tpublic async listPersonIdentityProviders(db: DatabaseContext, personId: string): Promise<PersonIdentityProviderRow[]> {\n\t\treturn await db.queryHandler.fetch(new PersonIdentityProvidersQuery(personId))\n\t}\n\n\tpublic async disconnectIdentityProvider(db: DatabaseContext, person: PersonRow, connectionId: string): Promise<DisconnectIDPResponse> {\n\t\treturn await db.transaction(async db => {\n\t\t\tconst connections = await db.queryHandler.fetch(new PersonIdentityProvidersQuery(person.id))\n\t\t\tconst connection = connections.find(it => it.id === connectionId)\n\t\t\tif (!connection) {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('NOT_FOUND', `You are not connected to the identity provider connection \"${connectionId}\".`)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tconst configuration = await db.queryHandler.fetch(new ConfigurationQuery(db.providers))\n\t\t\tconst hasPassword = person.password_hash !== null\n\t\t\tconst hasPasswordless = isPasswordlessEnabled(configuration.passwordless.enabled, person.passwordless_enabled)\n\t\t\tconst otherUsableConnections = connections.filter(it => it.id !== connection.id && it.identityProviderDisabledAt === null)\n\t\t\tconst wouldLockOut = !hasPassword && !hasPasswordless && otherUsableConnections.length === 0\n\t\t\tif (wouldLockOut) {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError(\n\t\t\t\t\t'LAST_AUTH_METHOD',\n\t\t\t\t\t'Cannot disconnect the only remaining sign-in method. Set up a password or another sign-in method first.',\n\t\t\t\t)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tawait db.commandBus.execute(new DisconnectPersonIdentityProviderCommand(person.id, connection.id))\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseOk({ slug: connection.identityProviderSlug })\n\t\t})\n\t}\n}\n\nexport interface DisconnectIDPResult {\n\treadonly slug: string\n}\n\nexport type DisconnectIDPResponse = Response<DisconnectIDPResult, DisconnectIdpErrorCode>\n"],"names":["PersonIdentityProvidersQuery","db","ResponseError","ConfigurationQuery","isPasswordlessEnabled","DisconnectPersonIdentityProviderCommand","ResponseOk"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAkBO,MAAM,8BAA8B;AAAA,EAC1C,MAAa,4BAA4B,IAAqB,UAAwD;AACrH,WAAO,MAAM,GAAG,aAAa,MAAM,IAAIA,6BAAAA,6BAA6B,QAAQ,CAAC;AAAA,EAC9E;AAAA,EAEA,MAAa,2BAA2B,IAAqB,QAAmB,cAAsD;AACrI,WAAO,MAAM,GAAG,YAAY,OAAMC,QAAM;AACvC,YAAM,cAAc,MAAMA,IAAG,aAAa,MAAM,IAAID,6BAAAA,6BAA6B,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;AAC3F,YAAM,aAAa,YAAY,KAAK,CAAA,OAAM,GAAG,OAAO,YAAY;AAChE,UAAI,CAAC,YAAY;AAChB,eAAO,IAAIE,SAAAA,cAAc,aAAa,8DAA8D,YAAY,IAAI;AAAA,MACrH;AAEA,YAAM,gBAAgB,MAAMD,IAAG,aAAa,MAAM,IAAIE,mBAAAA,mBAAmBF,IAAG,SAAS,CAAC;AACtF,YAAM,cAAc,OAAO,kBAAkB;AAC7C,YAAM,kBAAkBG,sBAAAA,sBAAsB,cAAc,aAAa,SAAS,OAAO,oBAAoB;AAC7G,YAAM,yBAAyB,YAAY,OAAO,CAAA,OAAM,GAAG,OAAO,WAAW,MAAM,GAAG,+BAA+B,IAAI;AACzH,YAAM,eAAe,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,mBAAmB,uBAAuB,WAAW;AAC3F,UAAI,cAAc;AACjB,eAAO,IAAIF,SAAAA;AAAAA,UACV;AAAA,UACA;AAAA,QAAA;AAAA,MAEF;AAEA,YAAMD,IAAG,WAAW,QAAQ,IAAII,wCAAAA,wCAAwC,OAAO,IAAI,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;AACjG,aAAO,IAAIC,SAAAA,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,sBAAsB;AAAA,IAChE,CAAC;AAAA,EACF;AACD;;"}
+{"version":3,"file":"PersonIdentityProviderManager.cjs","sources":["../../../../../../../packages/engine-tenant-api/src/model/service/idp/PersonIdentityProviderManager.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { Response, ResponseError, ResponseOk } from '../../utils/Response.js'\nimport { DisconnectIdpErrorCode } from '../../../schema/index.js'\nimport { DatabaseContext } from '../../utils/index.js'\nimport { ConfigurationQuery, PersonIdentityProviderRow, PersonIdentityProvidersQuery, PersonRow } from '../../queries/index.js'\nimport { DisconnectPersonIdentityProviderCommand } from '../../commands/idp/DisconnectPersonIdentityProviderCommand.js'\nimport { isPasswordlessEnabled } from '../helpers/isPasswordlessEnabled.js'\n\n/**\n * Manages the external IdP connections of the *currently authenticated* person.\n *\n * Lock-out policy: a person may always disconnect a provider as long as it does\n * not remove their last remaining sign-in method. A connection is refused only\n * when, after removal, the person would have no password, no passwordless\n * sign-in enabled and no other *usable* IdP connection left — which would lock\n * them out of their account entirely. Whether passwordless counts is decided by\n * the same tenant policy the sign-in flow applies, and connections to disabled\n * providers are not counted as a usable fallback (they cannot sign in).\n */\nexport class PersonIdentityProviderManager {\n\tpublic async listPersonIdentityProviders(db: DatabaseContext, personId: string): Promise<PersonIdentityProviderRow[]> {\n\t\treturn await db.queryHandler.fetch(new PersonIdentityProvidersQuery(personId))\n\t}\n\n\tpublic async disconnectIdentityProvider(db: DatabaseContext, person: PersonRow, connectionId: string): Promise<DisconnectIDPResponse> {\n\t\treturn await db.transaction(async db => {\n\t\t\tconst connections = await db.queryHandler.fetch(new PersonIdentityProvidersQuery(person.id))\n\t\t\tconst connection = connections.find(it => it.id === connectionId)\n\t\t\tif (!connection) {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError('NOT_FOUND', `You are not connected to the identity provider connection \"${connectionId}\".`)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// The link is what binds the person to the provider's policy, so they cannot remove it themselves.\n\t\t\tif (connection.identityProviderDisableLocalAuthentication) {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError(\n\t\t\t\t\t'IDP_REQUIRED',\n\t\t\t\t\t`The identity provider \"${connection.identityProviderSlug}\" is the only way you may sign in; its connection cannot be removed.`,\n\t\t\t\t)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tconst configuration = await db.queryHandler.fetch(new ConfigurationQuery(db.providers))\n\t\t\tconst hasPassword = person.password_hash !== null\n\t\t\tconst hasPasswordless = isPasswordlessEnabled(configuration.passwordless.enabled, person.passwordless_enabled)\n\t\t\tconst otherUsableConnections = connections.filter(it => it.id !== connection.id && it.identityProviderDisabledAt === null)\n\t\t\tconst wouldLockOut = !hasPassword && !hasPasswordless && otherUsableConnections.length === 0\n\t\t\tif (wouldLockOut) {\n\t\t\t\treturn new ResponseError(\n\t\t\t\t\t'LAST_AUTH_METHOD',\n\t\t\t\t\t'Cannot disconnect the only remaining sign-in method. Set up a password or another sign-in method first.',\n\t\t\t\t)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tawait db.commandBus.execute(new DisconnectPersonIdentityProviderCommand(person.id, connection.id))\n\t\t\treturn new ResponseOk({ slug: connection.identityProviderSlug })\n\t\t})\n\t}\n}\n\nexport interface DisconnectIDPResult {\n\treadonly slug: string\n}\n\nexport type DisconnectIDPResponse = Response<DisconnectIDPResult, DisconnectIdpErrorCode>\n"],"names":["PersonIdentityProvidersQuery","db","ResponseError","ConfigurationQuery","isPasswordlessEnabled","DisconnectPersonIdentityProviderCommand","ResponseOk"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAkBO,MAAM,8BAA8B;AAAA,EAC1C,MAAa,4BAA4B,IAAqB,UAAwD;AACrH,WAAO,MAAM,GAAG,aAAa,MAAM,IAAIA,6BAAAA,6BAA6B,QAAQ,CAAC;AAAA,EAC9E;AAAA,EAEA,MAAa,2BAA2B,IAAqB,QAAmB,cAAsD;AACrI,WAAO,MAAM,GAAG,YAAY,OAAMC,QAAM;AACvC,YAAM,cAAc,MAAMA,IAAG,aAAa,MAAM,IAAID,6BAAAA,6BAA6B,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;AAC3F,YAAM,aAAa,YAAY,KAAK,CAAA,OAAM,GAAG,OAAO,YAAY;AAChE,UAAI,CAAC,YAAY;AAChB,eAAO,IAAIE,SAAAA,cAAc,aAAa,8DAA8D,YAAY,IAAI;AAAA,MACrH;AAGA,UAAI,WAAW,4CAA4C;AAC1D,eAAO,IAAIA,SAAAA;AAAAA,UACV;AAAA,UACA,0BAA0B,WAAW,oBAAoB;AAAA,QAAA;AAAA,MAE3D;AAEA,YAAM,gBAAgB,MAAMD,IAAG,aAAa,MAAM,IAAIE,mBAAAA,mBAAmBF,IAAG,SAAS,CAAC;AACtF,YAAM,cAAc,OAAO,kBAAkB;AAC7C,YAAM,kBAAkBG,sBAAAA,sBAAsB,cAAc,aAAa,SAAS,OAAO,oBAAoB;AAC7G,YAAM,yBAAyB,YAAY,OAAO,CAAA,OAAM,GAAG,OAAO,WAAW,MAAM,GAAG,+BAA+B,IAAI;AACzH,YAAM,eAAe,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,mBAAmB,uBAAuB,WAAW;AAC3F,UAAI,cAAc;AACjB,eAAO,IAAIF,SAAAA;AAAAA,UACV;AAAA,UACA;AAAA,QAAA;AAAA,MAEF;AAEA,YAAMD,IAAG,WAAW,QAAQ,IAAII,wCAAAA,wCAAwC,OAAO,IAAI,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;AACjG,aAAO,IAAIC,SAAAA,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,sBAAsB;AAAA,IAChE,CAAC;AAAA,EACF;AACD;;"}

package/dist/development/src/model/service/idp/PersonIdentityProviderManager.js

@@ -22,6 +22,12 @@ class PersonIdentityProviderManager {
       if (!connection) {
         return new ResponseError("NOT_FOUND", `You are not connected to the identity provider connection "${connectionId}".`);
       }
+      if (connection.identityProviderDisableLocalAuthentication) {
+        return new ResponseError(
+          "IDP_REQUIRED",
+          `The identity provider "${connection.identityProviderSlug}" is the only way you may sign in; its connection cannot be removed.`
+        );
+      }
       const configuration = await db2.queryHandler.fetch(new ConfigurationQuery(db2.providers));
       const hasPassword = person.password_hash !== null;
       const hasPasswordless = isPasswordlessEnabled(configuration.passwordless.enabled, person.passwordless_enabled);