@contember/engine-tenant-api 2.2.0-alpha.3 → 2.2.0-alpha.6

package/dist/production/src/model/service/idp/providers/OIDCHelpers.cjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"OIDCHelpers.cjs","sources":["../../../../../../../../packages/engine-tenant-api/src/model/service/idp/providers/OIDCHelpers.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { Client, custom, errors, generators, Issuer, TokenSet } from 'openid-client'\nimport { createRemoteJWKSet, jwtVerify } from 'jose'\nimport { OIDCClaimMapping, OIDCResponseData } from './OIDCTypes.js'\nimport { IDPValidationError } from '../IDPValidationError.js'\nimport { IDPResponseError } from '../IDPResponseError.js'\nimport {\n\tIDPResponse,\n\tIDPSessionState,\n\tInitIDPAuthResult,\n\tLogoutTokenClaims,\n\tLogoutUrlRequest,\n\tRevalidationResult,\n} from '../IdentityProviderHandler.js'\n\n/**\n * Build the persisted session state from an OIDC token set. Stores the tokens needed for\n * later re-validation (refresh/access) and SLO (id_token); the whole `tokens` blob is\n * encrypted at rest by the command layer.\n *\n * `prevTokens` carries the previously stored tokens forward: a refresh-grant response MAY omit\n * the refresh token (RFC 6749 §6 — IdPs that don't rotate just don't re-send it), in which case\n * the client must keep using the old one. Without this fallback a non-rotating IdP would persist\n * a session with no refresh token and be revoked (`no_refresh_token`) on the very next tick.\n */\nexport const tokenSetToSessionState = (tokenSet: TokenSet, sessionId?: string, prevTokens?: Record<string, unknown>): IDPSessionState => {\n\tconst refreshToken = tokenSet.refresh_token ?? (typeof prevTokens?.refresh_token === 'string' ? prevTokens.refresh_token : undefined)\n\tconst idToken = tokenSet.id_token ?? (typeof prevTokens?.id_token === 'string' ? prevTokens.id_token : undefined)\n\treturn {\n\t\tsessionId,\n\t\ttokens: {\n\t\t\t...(refreshToken ? { refresh_token: refreshToken } : {}),\n\t\t\t...(tokenSet.access_token ? { access_token: tokenSet.access_token } : {}),\n\t\t\t...(idToken ? { id_token: idToken } : {}),\n\t\t},\n\t\texpiresAt: tokenSet.expires_at ? new Date(tokenSet.expires_at * 1000) : undefined,\n\t}\n}\n\nexport const initOIDCAuth = async (\n\tclient: Client,\n\t{ redirectUrl, scope, responseMode }: { redirectUrl: string; scope?: string; responseMode?: string },\n): Promise<InitIDPAuthResult> => {\n\tconst nonce = generators.nonce()\n\tconst state = generators.state()\n\tconst url = client.authorizationUrl({\n\t\tredirect_uri: redirectUrl,\n\t\tresponse_mode: responseMode,\n\t\tscope: scope ?? 'openid email',\n\t\tnonce,\n\t\tstate,\n\t})\n\n\treturn {\n\t\tauthUrl: url,\n\t\tsessionData: { nonce, state },\n\t}\n}\n\nexport type HandleOIDCResponseOptions = {\n\tfetchUserInfo?: boolean\n\treturnOIDCResult?: boolean\n\tcaptureSession?: boolean\n\tclaimMapping?: OIDCClaimMapping\n}\n\n/** Read a claim by name, supporting dot-paths into nested objects (`a.b.c`). */\nconst getClaim = (source: Record<string, unknown>, path: string): unknown =>\n\tpath.split('.').reduce<unknown>(\n\t\t(acc, key) => (acc != null && typeof acc === 'object' ? (acc as Record<string, unknown>)[key] : undefined),\n\t\tsource,\n\t)\n\nexport const handleOIDCResponse = async (\n\tclient: Client,\n\t{ sessionData, redirectUrl, ...otherData }: OIDCResponseData,\n\t{ fetchUserInfo, returnOIDCResult, captureSession, claimMapping }: HandleOIDCResponseOptions = {},\n): Promise<IDPResponse> => {\n\tconst params = 'parameters' in otherData ? otherData.parameters : client.callbackParams(otherData.url)\n\tif (params.state && !sessionData?.state) {\n\t\tthrow new IDPValidationError(`state is present in parameters, but missing in session data`)\n\t}\n\ttry {\n\t\tconst result = await client.callback(redirectUrl, params, sessionData)\n\t\tconst claims = result.claims()\n\t\tconst { at_hash, c_hash, nonce, ...claimsWithoutHashes } = claims\n\t\tconst userInfo = result.access_token && fetchUserInfo ? await client.userinfo(result) : {}\n\t\tconst oidcResult = returnOIDCResult ? result : {}\n\t\tconst idpSession = captureSession ? tokenSetToSessionState(result, typeof claims.sid === 'string' ? claims.sid : undefined) : undefined\n\n\t\t// Merge ID-token claims with userInfo (userInfo wins, per spec). Then optionally lift a\n\t\t// nested attributes object to the top level so providers that nest their claims (notably\n\t\t// Apereo CAS userinfo, which returns them under `attributes`) map without a code change.\n\t\t// The nested attributes are UNSIGNED, so they must not override a claim already present in\n\t\t// the (signature-verified) ID-token / userInfo merge — spread them UNDER `source`, not over\n\t\t// it, so a signed `sub` / `email_verified` keeps precedence over an attributes-level value.\n\t\tlet source: Record<string, unknown> = { ...claimsWithoutHashes, ...userInfo }\n\t\tconst attributesKey = claimMapping?.attributesKey\n\t\tif (attributesKey) {\n\t\t\tconst nested = source[attributesKey]\n\t\t\tif (nested && typeof nested === 'object' && !Array.isArray(nested)) {\n\t\t\t\tsource = { ...(nested as Record<string, unknown>), ...source }\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// The OIDC `email_verified` claim is a boolean per spec, but some providers send the\n\t\t// string \"true\". userInfo (and any unwrapped attributes) take precedence over the ID token.\n\t\tconst rawEmailVerified = source.email_verified\n\t\tconst emailVerified = rawEmailVerified === true || rawEmailVerified === 'true'\n\n\t\t// `externalIdentifier` is the federation key persisted in `person_identity_provider` and\n\t\t// matched on the next sign-in, so it must be a stable scalar. A `claimMapping` that pointed\n\t\t// it at an object/array would otherwise be coerced by `String(...)` to `'[object Object]'` /\n\t\t// a comma-join — collapsing every user of the provider onto one key (account takeover). Fail\n\t\t// closed instead. The default `sub` path is safe (openid-client guarantees `sub` is a string).\n\t\tconst mappedSubject = getClaim(source, claimMapping?.externalIdentifier ?? 'sub')\n\t\tlet externalIdentifier: string\n\t\tif (mappedSubject === undefined || mappedSubject === null) {\n\t\t\texternalIdentifier = claims.sub\n\t\t} else if (typeof mappedSubject === 'string' || typeof mappedSubject === 'number') {\n\t\t\texternalIdentifier = String(mappedSubject)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tthrow new IDPValidationError(`The mapped externalIdentifier claim is not a scalar value`)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif (externalIdentifier === '') {\n\t\t\tthrow new IDPValidationError(`The mapped externalIdentifier claim resolved to an empty value`)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// `email` / `name` are typed `string | undefined` on IDPResponse and feed the by-e-mail\n\t\t// account lookup (which crashes on a non-string). `...source` already placed the raw claim\n\t\t// of whatever type, so OVERWRITE (don't conditionally add) with the mapped value when it is\n\t\t// a string, otherwise `undefined` — a non-string claim must not leak through `...source`.\n\t\tconst email = getClaim(source, claimMapping?.email ?? 'email')\n\t\tconst name = getClaim(source, claimMapping?.name ?? 'name')\n\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t...oidcResult,\n\t\t\t...source,\n\t\t\texternalIdentifier,\n\t\t\temail: typeof email === 'string' ? email : undefined,\n\t\t\tname: typeof name === 'string' ? name : undefined,\n\t\t\temailVerified,\n\t\t\t...(idpSession ? { idpSession } : {}),\n\t\t}\n\t} catch (e: any) {\n\t\tif (e instanceof errors.RPError) {\n\t\t\tthrow new IDPValidationError(e.message)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif (e instanceof errors.OPError) {\n\t\t\tconst body = e.response?.body as any\n\t\t\tif (typeof body === 'object' && typeof body?.error === 'object' && typeof body.error?.message === 'string') {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new IDPResponseError(body.error.message)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tthrow new IDPResponseError(e.message)\n\t\t}\n\t\tthrow e\n\t}\n}\n\n/** OIDC errors that definitively mean \"this session is no longer valid at the IdP\". */\nconst REVOKED_OIDC_ERRORS = new Set(['invalid_grant', 'invalid_token', 'expired_token'])\n\n/**\n * Re-validate a stored OIDC session against the IdP. Returns `revoked` only for definitive\n * IdP responses (invalid/expired grant or inactive introspection). Transient failures\n * (network, IdP down) re-throw so the caller can fail-open and keep the session — IdP\n * downtime must not log everyone out.\n */\nexport const revalidateOIDC = async (\n\tclient: Client,\n\tmethod: 'refresh' | 'userinfo' | 'introspection',\n\tsession: IDPSessionState,\n): Promise<RevalidationResult> => {\n\tconst tokens = session.tokens ?? {}\n\tconst refreshToken = typeof tokens.refresh_token === 'string' ? tokens.refresh_token : undefined\n\tconst accessToken = typeof tokens.access_token === 'string' ? tokens.access_token : undefined\n\ttry {\n\t\tif (method === 'refresh') {\n\t\t\tif (!refreshToken) {\n\t\t\t\treturn { status: 'revoked', reason: 'no_refresh_token' }\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tconst tokenSet = await client.refresh(refreshToken)\n\t\t\tlet claims: Record<string, unknown> | undefined\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\tclaims = tokenSet.id_token ? tokenSet.claims() : undefined\n\t\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t\tclaims = undefined\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t\tstatus: 'valid',\n\t\t\t\tclaims,\n\t\t\t\t// carry the stored tokens forward: a non-rotating IdP omits the refresh token here\n\t\t\t\tidpSession: tokenSetToSessionState(tokenSet, session.sessionId, tokens),\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tif (method === 'userinfo') {\n\t\t\tif (!accessToken) {\n\t\t\t\treturn { status: 'revoked', reason: 'no_access_token' }\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tconst userInfo = await client.userinfo(accessToken)\n\t\t\treturn { status: 'valid', claims: userInfo }\n\t\t}\n\t\t// introspection\n\t\tconst token = accessToken ?? refreshToken\n\t\tif (!token) {\n\t\t\treturn { status: 'revoked', reason: 'no_token' }\n\t\t}\n\t\tconst result = await client.introspect(token, accessToken ? 'access_token' : 'refresh_token')\n\t\tif (!result.active) {\n\t\t\treturn { status: 'revoked', reason: 'inactive' }\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn { status: 'valid' }\n\t} catch (e: any) {\n\t\tif (e instanceof errors.OPError) {\n\t\t\tif (typeof e.error === 'string' && REVOKED_OIDC_ERRORS.has(e.error)) {\n\t\t\t\treturn { status: 'revoked', reason: e.error }\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// The userinfo endpoint signals a rejected access token with a bare HTTP 401 — per\n\t\t\t// RFC 6750 the `WWW-Authenticate` error code is optional, so openid-client may not\n\t\t\t// surface a parseable `error` here. A 401 is still definitive: the token is no\n\t\t\t// longer accepted → revoked. (Introspection is NOT treated this way: it returns 200\n\t\t\t// `{active:false}` for revoked tokens, so a 401/400 there means client-auth/config\n\t\t\t// failure — transient, must not log users out.)\n\t\t\tif (method === 'userinfo' && e.response?.statusCode === 401) {\n\t\t\t\treturn { status: 'revoked', reason: 'userinfo_unauthorized' }\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\t// transient (network / IdP unavailable) — propagate, do not revoke\n\t\tthrow e\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Build an RP-initiated (front-channel) logout URL (OIDC RP-Initiated Logout 1.0). Returns null\n * when the IdP advertises no `end_session_endpoint` — the caller then degrades to a local-only\n * logout (legacy-IdP graceful fallback). The `id_token_hint` lets the IdP identify and confirm the\n * session to terminate; `post_logout_redirect_uri` is where the IdP returns the browser afterwards.\n */\nexport const buildOIDCLogoutUrl = (client: Client, { idToken, postLogoutRedirectUri }: LogoutUrlRequest): string | null => {\n\tif (!client.issuer.metadata.end_session_endpoint) {\n\t\treturn null\n\t}\n\treturn client.endSessionUrl({\n\t\t...(idToken ? { id_token_hint: idToken } : {}),\n\t\t...(postLogoutRedirectUri ? { post_logout_redirect_uri: postLogoutRedirectUri } : {}),\n\t})\n}\n\n/**\n * The OIDC Back-Channel Logout 1.0 event member that MUST be present in a logout token's `events`\n * claim. Its presence (and the absence of a `nonce`) is what distinguishes a logout token from an\n * ID token — both are signed by the same IdP, so without this check an ID token could be replayed\n * to forcibly log a user out.\n */\nconst BACKCHANNEL_LOGOUT_EVENT = 'http://schemas.openid.net/event/backchannel-logout'\n\n/**\n * Max accepted age of a back-channel logout token, derived from its `iat`. OIDC Back-Channel Logout\n * tokens are single-use and short-lived; bounding the age (together with requiring `exp`) limits the\n * window in which a captured token could be replayed to force a logout.\n */\nconst LOGOUT_TOKEN_MAX_AGE_SECONDS = 120\nconst LOGOUT_TOKEN_CLOCK_TOLERANCE_SECONDS = 5\n\n/**\n * Remote JWKS sets keyed by `jwks_uri`. `createRemoteJWKSet` returns a function with its own internal\n * key cache + fetch cooldown, so it MUST be reused across requests — re-creating it per call (as the\n * unauthenticated back-channel endpoint would otherwise do) defeats the cache and turns every request\n * into a potential outbound JWKS fetch. Keyed by URL, so two providers sharing an IdP share the set.\n */\nconst remoteJwksCache = new Map<string, ReturnType<typeof createRemoteJWKSet>>()\n\nconst getRemoteJwks = (jwksUri: string): ReturnType<typeof createRemoteJWKSet> => {\n\tlet jwks = remoteJwksCache.get(jwksUri)\n\tif (!jwks) {\n\t\tjwks = createRemoteJWKSet(new URL(jwksUri))\n\t\tremoteJwksCache.set(jwksUri, jwks)\n\t}\n\treturn jwks\n}\n\n/**\n * Validate an OIDC back-channel logout token (OIDC Back-Channel Logout 1.0 §2.4–2.6) and extract\n * the targeted `sid` / `sub`. The token is a JWT signed by the IdP; we verify the signature against\n * the issuer's JWKS and enforce the issuer + audience (client_id) the same way ID tokens are\n * verified, pinning the signing algorithm to the provider's configured one, then assert the\n * back-channel-specific claims:\n *   - `iat` is present and recent and `exp` is present (§2.4 requires both) — bounds the replay window;\n *   - `events` contains the back-channel-logout member (it really is a logout token);\n *   - it carries a `sid` and/or `sub` (otherwise there is nothing to act on);\n *   - it does NOT carry a `nonce` (a `nonce` means it is an ID token being replayed).\n * Throws {@link IDPValidationError} on any failure so the caller can answer 400.\n */\nexport const validateOIDCLogoutToken = async (client: Client, issuer: Issuer<Client>, logoutToken: string): Promise<LogoutTokenClaims> => {\n\tconst jwksUri = issuer.metadata.jwks_uri\n\tif (!jwksUri) {\n\t\tthrow new IDPValidationError('IdP has no jwks_uri; cannot verify logout token')\n\t}\n\tconst clientId = client.metadata.client_id\n\tif (typeof clientId !== 'string' || clientId === '') {\n\t\t// The `aud` check is a core anti-token-substitution defence on this unauthenticated endpoint.\n\t\t// jose treats `audience: undefined` as \"skip the aud check entirely\", so a missing client_id\n\t\t// must fail closed (reject the token) rather than fall through and accept any audience.\n\t\tthrow new IDPValidationError('cannot verify logout token audience: client_id is missing')\n\t}\n\tconst expectedAlg = typeof client.metadata.id_token_signed_response_alg === 'string'\n\t\t? client.metadata.id_token_signed_response_alg\n\t\t: 'RS256'\n\tconst jwks = getRemoteJwks(jwksUri)\n\tlet payload: Record<string, unknown>\n\ttry {\n\t\tconst verified = await jwtVerify(logoutToken, jwks, {\n\t\t\tissuer: issuer.metadata.issuer,\n\t\t\taudience: clientId,\n\t\t\t// pin to the provider's configured signing alg so a JWKS containing a symmetric/none key\n\t\t\t// can never be selected (defence-in-depth on top of jose's own key-type check).\n\t\t\talgorithms: [expectedAlg],\n\t\t\t// §2.4: `iat` and `exp` are REQUIRED. `maxTokenAge` makes `iat` required + bounds freshness;\n\t\t\t// `requiredClaims` makes `exp` required (jose only checks `exp` when present).\n\t\t\tmaxTokenAge: LOGOUT_TOKEN_MAX_AGE_SECONDS,\n\t\t\trequiredClaims: ['exp'],\n\t\t\tclockTolerance: LOGOUT_TOKEN_CLOCK_TOLERANCE_SECONDS,\n\t\t})\n\t\tpayload = verified.payload as Record<string, unknown>\n\t} catch (e: any) {\n\t\tthrow new IDPValidationError(`Invalid logout token: ${e?.message ?? 'verification failed'}`)\n\t}\n\n\t// A logout token MUST NOT contain a nonce; its presence means an ID token is being replayed.\n\tif ('nonce' in payload) {\n\t\tthrow new IDPValidationError('Logout token must not contain a nonce')\n\t}\n\n\tconst events = payload.events\n\tconst hasLogoutEvent = typeof events === 'object' && events !== null && BACKCHANNEL_LOGOUT_EVENT in (events as Record<string, unknown>)\n\tif (!hasLogoutEvent) {\n\t\tthrow new IDPValidationError('Logout token is missing the back-channel-logout event')\n\t}\n\n\tconst sid = typeof payload.sid === 'string' ? payload.sid : undefined\n\tconst sub = typeof payload.sub === 'string' ? payload.sub : undefined\n\tif (!sid && !sub) {\n\t\tthrow new IDPValidationError('Logout token must contain a sid or sub claim')\n\t}\n\n\treturn { sid, sub 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Stores the tokens needed for\n * later re-validation (refresh/access) and SLO (id_token); the whole `tokens` blob is\n * encrypted at rest by the command layer.\n *\n * `prevTokens` carries the previously stored tokens forward: a refresh-grant response MAY omit\n * the refresh token (RFC 6749 §6 — IdPs that don't rotate just don't re-send it), in which case\n * the client must keep using the old one. Without this fallback a non-rotating IdP would persist\n * a session with no refresh token and be revoked (`no_refresh_token`) on the very next tick.\n */\nexport const tokenSetToSessionState = (tokenSet: TokenSet, sessionId?: string, prevTokens?: Record<string, unknown>): IDPSessionState => {\n\tconst refreshToken = tokenSet.refresh_token ?? (typeof prevTokens?.refresh_token === 'string' ? prevTokens.refresh_token : undefined)\n\tconst idToken = tokenSet.id_token ?? (typeof prevTokens?.id_token === 'string' ? prevTokens.id_token : undefined)\n\treturn {\n\t\tsessionId,\n\t\ttokens: {\n\t\t\t...(refreshToken ? { refresh_token: refreshToken } : {}),\n\t\t\t...(tokenSet.access_token ? { access_token: tokenSet.access_token } : {}),\n\t\t\t...(idToken ? { id_token: idToken } : {}),\n\t\t},\n\t\texpiresAt: tokenSet.expires_at ? new Date(tokenSet.expires_at * 1000) : undefined,\n\t}\n}\n\nexport const initOIDCAuth = async (\n\tclient: Client,\n\t{ redirectUrl, scope, responseMode }: { redirectUrl: string; scope?: string; responseMode?: string },\n): Promise<InitIDPAuthResult> => {\n\tconst nonce = generators.nonce()\n\tconst state = generators.state()\n\tconst url = client.authorizationUrl({\n\t\tredirect_uri: redirectUrl,\n\t\tresponse_mode: responseMode,\n\t\tscope: scope ?? 'openid email',\n\t\tnonce,\n\t\tstate,\n\t})\n\n\treturn {\n\t\tauthUrl: url,\n\t\tsessionData: { nonce, state },\n\t}\n}\n\nexport type HandleOIDCResponseOptions = {\n\tfetchUserInfo?: boolean\n\treturnOIDCResult?: boolean\n\tcaptureSession?: boolean\n\tclaimMapping?: OIDCClaimMapping\n}\n\n/**\n * Read a claim by name, supporting dot-paths into nested objects (`a.b.c`). Own-property only at every\n * segment (mirrors `ClaimMappingEvaluator.resolvePath`): a configured path must never descend into an\n * inherited member, so a `__proto__` / `constructor` segment cannot surface an `Object.prototype` value\n * as the externalIdentifier / email / name.\n */\nconst getClaim = (source: Record<string, unknown>, path: string): unknown =>\n\tpath.split('.').reduce<unknown>(\n\t\t(\n\t\t\tacc,\n\t\t\tkey,\n\t\t) => (acc != null && typeof acc === 'object' && Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(acc, key) ? (acc as Record<string, unknown>)[key] : undefined),\n\t\tsource,\n\t)\n\n/**\n * Lift a configured nested attributes object (`attributesKey`, notably Apereo CAS's `attributes`) to the\n * top level so providers that nest their claims map without a code change. The nested attributes are\n * UNSIGNED, so they are spread UNDER `source` — a signed top-level claim keeps precedence over an\n * attributes-level value. Shared by the sign-in response handler ({@link handleOIDCResponse}) and the\n * session-refresh path ({@link revalidateOIDC}) so BOTH see the same claim surface; without this, an\n * `attributesKey` provider's A09 claim mapping would resolve at sign-in but silently not on refresh.\n */\nexport const liftNestedClaims = (source: Record<string, unknown>, attributesKey: string | undefined): Record<string, unknown> => {\n\tif (!attributesKey) {\n\t\treturn source\n\t}\n\tconst nested = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(source, attributesKey) ? source[attributesKey] : undefined\n\tif (nested !== null && typeof nested === 'object' && !Array.isArray(nested)) {\n\t\treturn { ...nested, ...source }\n\t}\n\treturn source\n}\n\ntype NormalizedClaims = Record<string, unknown> & {\n\texternalIdentifier: string\n\temail: string | undefined\n\tname: string | undefined\n\temailVerified: boolean\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the normalized claim surface shared by sign-in ({@link handleOIDCResponse}) and session refresh\n * ({@link revalidateOIDC}): lift any configured nested attributes object to the top level, then layer the\n * mapped identity fields (`externalIdentifier` / `email` / `name` / `emailVerified`) over the raw claims.\n * BOTH paths run this SAME normalization so an A09 claim-mapping rule resolves identically whether it\n * targets a raw provider claim or one of the normalized identity fields — without it the two surfaces\n * diverged (refresh saw the raw claim, sign-in the mapped value).\n *\n * `subFallback` is the signature-verified ID-token `sub`, used when a custom `externalIdentifier` mapping\n * resolves to nothing: at sign-in it is guaranteed present; on refresh it is the refreshed id-token's `sub`\n * (or, for the userinfo method, the userinfo `sub`). Throws (account-takeover guard) when the mapped\n * subject is a non-scalar or resolves empty — the refresh caller catches this and skips the sync.\n */\nconst normalizeClaims = (\n\trawSource: Record<string, unknown>,\n\tclaimMapping: OIDCClaimMapping | undefined,\n\tsubFallback: string | undefined,\n): NormalizedClaims => {\n\tconst source = liftNestedClaims(rawSource, claimMapping?.attributesKey)\n\n\t// The OIDC `email_verified` claim is a boolean per spec, but some providers send the\n\t// string \"true\". userInfo (and any unwrapped attributes) take precedence over the ID token.\n\tconst rawEmailVerified = source.email_verified\n\tconst emailVerified = rawEmailVerified === true || rawEmailVerified === 'true'\n\n\t// `externalIdentifier` is the federation key persisted in `person_identity_provider` and\n\t// matched on the next sign-in, so it must be a stable scalar. A `claimMapping` that pointed\n\t// it at an object/array would otherwise be coerced by `String(...)` to `'[object Object]'` /\n\t// a comma-join — collapsing every user of the provider onto one key (account takeover). Fail\n\t// closed instead. The default `sub` path is safe (openid-client guarantees `sub` is a string).\n\tconst mappedSubject = getClaim(source, claimMapping?.externalIdentifier ?? 'sub')\n\tlet externalIdentifier: string\n\tif (mappedSubject === undefined || mappedSubject === null) {\n\t\texternalIdentifier = subFallback ?? 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'email')\n\tconst name = resolveName(source, claimMapping)\n\n\treturn {\n\t\t...source,\n\t\texternalIdentifier,\n\t\temail: typeof email === 'string' ? email : undefined,\n\t\tname,\n\t\temailVerified,\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve the display name, falling back to `given_name` + `family_name` when there is no usable\n * `name` claim.\n *\n * `name` is optional in OIDC core and plenty of providers omit it while sending the parts — Apereo\n * CAS and Entra ID do, and so does Keycloak under its default mappers. Without the fallback,\n * `CreatePersonCommand` lands on its own last-resort default and a federated person ends up named\n * after the local part of their e-mail (`jan.novak`) despite the IdP having reported \"Jan Novák\".\n * A single-path `claimMapping.name` cannot express this: the value has to be composed from two\n * claims, not selected from one.\n *\n * An explicitly configured `claimMapping.name` is honoured as-is, fallback included — mapping a\n * claim is a statement about where the name lives, and quietly substituting a different source\n * would defeat it. A blank claim counts as absent: an empty string is not a display name, and\n * treating it as one would keep the fallback (and `CreatePersonCommand`'s) from ever running.\n */\nconst resolveName = (source: Record<string, unknown>, claimMapping: OIDCClaimMapping | undefined): string | undefined => {\n\tconst mapped = getClaim(source, claimMapping?.name ?? 'name')\n\tif (typeof mapped === 'string' && mapped.trim() !== '') {\n\t\treturn mapped\n\t}\n\tif (claimMapping?.name !== undefined) {\n\t\treturn undefined\n\t}\n\tconst parts = [getClaim(source, 'given_name'), getClaim(source, 'family_name')]\n\t\t.filter((part): part is string => typeof part === 'string' && part.trim() !== '')\n\t\t.map(part => part.trim())\n\treturn parts.length > 0 ? parts.join(' ') : undefined\n}\n\nexport const handleOIDCResponse = async (\n\tclient: Client,\n\t{ sessionData, redirectUrl, ...otherData }: OIDCResponseData,\n\t{ fetchUserInfo, returnOIDCResult, captureSession, claimMapping }: HandleOIDCResponseOptions = {},\n): Promise<IDPResponse> => {\n\tconst params = 'parameters' in otherData ? otherData.parameters : client.callbackParams(otherData.url)\n\tif (params.state && !sessionData?.state) {\n\t\tthrow new IDPValidationError(`state is present in parameters, but missing in session data`)\n\t}\n\ttry {\n\t\tconst result = await client.callback(redirectUrl, params, sessionData)\n\t\tconst claims = result.claims()\n\t\tconst { at_hash, c_hash, nonce, ...claimsWithoutHashes } = claims\n\t\tconst userInfo = result.access_token && fetchUserInfo ? await client.userinfo(result) : {}\n\t\tconst oidcResult = returnOIDCResult ? result : {}\n\t\tconst idpSession = captureSession ? tokenSetToSessionState(result, typeof claims.sid === 'string' ? claims.sid : undefined) : undefined\n\n\t\t// Merge ID-token claims with userInfo (userInfo wins, per spec), then normalize the surface (lift\n\t\t// nested attributes + map the identity fields). The refresh path runs the SAME normalization, so a\n\t\t// claim mapping resolves identically at sign-in and on refresh. The default `sub` fallback is safe —\n\t\t// openid-client guarantees `sub` is a string.\n\t\tconst normalized = normalizeClaims({ ...claimsWithoutHashes, ...userInfo }, claimMapping, claims.sub)\n\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t...oidcResult,\n\t\t\t...normalized,\n\t\t\t...(idpSession ? { idpSession } : {}),\n\t\t}\n\t} catch (e: any) {\n\t\tif (e instanceof errors.RPError) {\n\t\t\tthrow new IDPValidationError(e.message)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif (e instanceof errors.OPError) {\n\t\t\tconst body = e.response?.body as any\n\t\t\tif (typeof body === 'object' && typeof body?.error === 'object' && typeof body.error?.message === 'string') {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new IDPResponseError(body.error.message)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tthrow new IDPResponseError(e.message)\n\t\t}\n\t\tthrow e\n\t}\n}\n\n/** OIDC errors that definitively mean \"this session is no longer valid at the IdP\". */\nconst REVOKED_OIDC_ERRORS = new Set(['invalid_grant', 'invalid_token', 'expired_token'])\n\n/**\n * Re-validate a stored OIDC session against the IdP. Returns `revoked` only for definitive\n * IdP responses (invalid/expired grant or inactive introspection). Transient failures\n * (network, IdP down) re-throw so the caller can fail-open and keep the session — IdP\n * downtime must not log everyone out.\n */\nexport const revalidateOIDC = async (\n\tclient: Client,\n\tmethod: 'refresh' | 'userinfo' | 'introspection',\n\tsession: IDPSessionState,\n\toptions: { claimMapping?: OIDCClaimMapping; fetchUserInfo?: boolean } = {},\n): Promise<RevalidationResult> => {\n\tconst { claimMapping, fetchUserInfo } = options\n\tconst tokens = session.tokens ?? {}\n\tconst refreshToken = typeof tokens.refresh_token === 'string' ? tokens.refresh_token : undefined\n\tconst accessToken = typeof tokens.access_token === 'string' ? tokens.access_token : undefined\n\ttry {\n\t\tif (method === 'refresh') {\n\t\t\tif (!refreshToken) {\n\t\t\t\treturn { status: 'revoked', reason: 'no_refresh_token' }\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tconst tokenSet = await client.refresh(refreshToken)\n\t\t\tlet claims: Record<string, unknown> | undefined\n\t\t\tlet claimsComplete = false\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\t// Reconstruct the SAME claim surface sign-in builds (handleOIDCResponse): the refreshed id-token\n\t\t\t\t// claims merged with userInfo when `fetchUserInfo` is set — exactly as at sign-in — then the shared\n\t\t\t\t// normalization (lift nested attributes + map identity fields). An `always` mapping therefore\n\t\t\t\t// reconciles against an identical surface on refresh, so `claimsComplete` lets the caller enable\n\t\t\t\t// `unmatched: \"remove\"` reconciliation here too (see IdpSessionRevalidator).\n\t\t\t\tif (tokenSet.id_token) {\n\t\t\t\t\tconst idClaims = tokenSet.claims()\n\t\t\t\t\tconst userInfo = tokenSet.access_token && fetchUserInfo ? await client.userinfo(tokenSet) : {}\n\t\t\t\t\tclaims = normalizeClaims({ ...idClaims, ...userInfo }, claimMapping, typeof idClaims.sub === 'string' ? idClaims.sub : undefined)\n\t\t\t\t\tclaimsComplete = true\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t\t// Building the surface failed (userinfo unreachable, a non-scalar `externalIdentifier`, …). The IdP\n\t\t\t\t// already vouched for the session via the successful refresh, so KEEP it — just skip the claim sync\n\t\t\t\t// this tick (no claims → no grant, no removal) and retry on a later refresh. Leaving claimsComplete\n\t\t\t\t// false also guarantees a half-built surface can never drive a removal.\n\t\t\t\tclaims = undefined\n\t\t\t\tclaimsComplete = false\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t\tstatus: 'valid',\n\t\t\t\tclaims,\n\t\t\t\tclaimsComplete,\n\t\t\t\t// carry the stored tokens forward: a non-rotating IdP omits the refresh token here\n\t\t\t\tidpSession: tokenSetToSessionState(tokenSet, session.sessionId, tokens),\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tif (method === 'userinfo') {\n\t\t\tif (!accessToken) {\n\t\t\t\treturn { status: 'revoked', reason: 'no_access_token' }\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tconst userInfo = await client.userinfo(accessToken)\n\t\t\tlet claims: Record<string, unknown> | undefined\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\tclaims = normalizeClaims(userInfo, claimMapping, typeof userInfo.sub === 'string' ? userInfo.sub : undefined)\n\t\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t\tclaims = undefined\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// A userinfo probe carries no id-token claims, so its surface is NARROWER than sign-in's (id-token +\n\t\t\t// userinfo): a rule keyed on an id-token-only claim would miss here. Keep refresh-time sync additive-only\n\t\t\t// (`claimsComplete: false`) so `unmatched: \"remove\"` never strips a membership off this partial surface.\n\t\t\treturn { status: 'valid', claims, claimsComplete: false }\n\t\t}\n\t\t// introspection\n\t\tconst token = accessToken ?? refreshToken\n\t\tif (!token) {\n\t\t\treturn { status: 'revoked', reason: 'no_token' }\n\t\t}\n\t\tconst result = await client.introspect(token, accessToken ? 'access_token' : 'refresh_token')\n\t\tif (!result.active) {\n\t\t\treturn { status: 'revoked', reason: 'inactive' }\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn { status: 'valid' }\n\t} catch (e: any) {\n\t\tif (e instanceof errors.OPError) {\n\t\t\tif (typeof e.error === 'string' && REVOKED_OIDC_ERRORS.has(e.error)) {\n\t\t\t\treturn { status: 'revoked', reason: e.error }\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// The userinfo endpoint signals a rejected access token with a bare HTTP 401 — per\n\t\t\t// RFC 6750 the `WWW-Authenticate` error code is optional, so openid-client may not\n\t\t\t// surface a parseable `error` here. A 401 is still definitive: the token is no\n\t\t\t// longer accepted → revoked. (Introspection is NOT treated this way: it returns 200\n\t\t\t// `{active:false}` for revoked tokens, so a 401/400 there means client-auth/config\n\t\t\t// failure — transient, must not log users out.)\n\t\t\tif (method === 'userinfo' && e.response?.statusCode === 401) {\n\t\t\t\treturn { status: 'revoked', reason: 'userinfo_unauthorized' }\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\t// transient (network / IdP unavailable) — propagate, do not revoke\n\t\tthrow e\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Build an RP-initiated (front-channel) logout URL (OIDC RP-Initiated Logout 1.0). Returns null\n * when the IdP advertises no `end_session_endpoint` — the caller then degrades to a local-only\n * logout (legacy-IdP graceful fallback). The `id_token_hint` lets the IdP identify and confirm the\n * session to terminate; `post_logout_redirect_uri` is where the IdP returns the browser afterwards.\n */\nexport const buildOIDCLogoutUrl = (client: Client, { idToken, postLogoutRedirectUri }: LogoutUrlRequest): string | null => {\n\tif (!client.issuer.metadata.end_session_endpoint) {\n\t\treturn null\n\t}\n\treturn client.endSessionUrl({\n\t\t...(idToken ? { id_token_hint: idToken } : {}),\n\t\t...(postLogoutRedirectUri ? { post_logout_redirect_uri: postLogoutRedirectUri } : {}),\n\t})\n}\n\n/**\n * The OIDC Back-Channel Logout 1.0 event member that MUST be present in a logout token's `events`\n * claim. Its presence (and the absence of a `nonce`) is what distinguishes a logout token from an\n * ID token — both are signed by the same IdP, so without this check an ID token could be replayed\n * to forcibly log a user out.\n */\nconst BACKCHANNEL_LOGOUT_EVENT = 'http://schemas.openid.net/event/backchannel-logout'\n\n/**\n * Max accepted age of a back-channel logout token, derived from its `iat`. OIDC Back-Channel Logout\n * tokens are single-use and short-lived; bounding the age (together with requiring `exp`) limits the\n * window in which a captured token could be replayed to force a logout.\n */\nconst LOGOUT_TOKEN_MAX_AGE_SECONDS = 120\nconst LOGOUT_TOKEN_CLOCK_TOLERANCE_SECONDS = 5\n\n/**\n * Remote JWKS sets keyed by `jwks_uri`. `createRemoteJWKSet` returns a function with its own internal\n * key cache + fetch cooldown, so it MUST be reused across requests — re-creating it per call (as the\n * unauthenticated back-channel endpoint would otherwise do) defeats the cache and turns every request\n * into a potential outbound JWKS fetch. Keyed by URL, so two providers sharing an IdP share the set.\n */\nconst remoteJwksCache = new Map<string, ReturnType<typeof createRemoteJWKSet>>()\n\nconst getRemoteJwks = (jwksUri: string): ReturnType<typeof createRemoteJWKSet> => {\n\tlet jwks = remoteJwksCache.get(jwksUri)\n\tif (!jwks) {\n\t\tjwks = createRemoteJWKSet(new URL(jwksUri))\n\t\tremoteJwksCache.set(jwksUri, jwks)\n\t}\n\treturn jwks\n}\n\n/**\n * Validate an OIDC back-channel logout token (OIDC Back-Channel Logout 1.0 §2.4–2.6) and extract\n * the targeted `sid` / `sub`. The token is a JWT signed by the IdP; we verify the signature against\n * the issuer's JWKS and enforce the issuer + audience (client_id) the same way ID tokens are\n * verified, pinning the signing algorithm to the provider's configured one, then assert the\n * back-channel-specific claims:\n *   - `iat` is present and recent and `exp` is present (§2.4 requires both) — bounds the replay window;\n *   - `events` contains the back-channel-logout member (it really is a logout token);\n *   - it carries a `sid` and/or `sub` (otherwise there is nothing to act on);\n *   - it does NOT carry a `nonce` (a `nonce` means it is an ID token being replayed).\n * Throws {@link IDPValidationError} on any failure so the caller can answer 400.\n */\nexport const validateOIDCLogoutToken = async (client: Client, issuer: Issuer<Client>, logoutToken: string): Promise<LogoutTokenClaims> => {\n\tconst jwksUri = issuer.metadata.jwks_uri\n\tif (!jwksUri) {\n\t\tthrow new IDPValidationError('IdP has no jwks_uri; cannot verify logout token')\n\t}\n\tconst clientId = client.metadata.client_id\n\tif (typeof clientId !== 'string' || clientId === '') {\n\t\t// The `aud` check is a core anti-token-substitution defence on this unauthenticated endpoint.\n\t\t// jose treats `audience: undefined` as \"skip the aud check entirely\", so a missing client_id\n\t\t// must fail closed (reject the token) rather than fall through and accept any audience.\n\t\tthrow new IDPValidationError('cannot verify logout token audience: client_id is missing')\n\t}\n\tconst expectedAlg = typeof client.metadata.id_token_signed_response_alg === 'string'\n\t\t? client.metadata.id_token_signed_response_alg\n\t\t: 'RS256'\n\tconst jwks = getRemoteJwks(jwksUri)\n\tlet payload: Record<string, unknown>\n\ttry {\n\t\tconst verified = await jwtVerify(logoutToken, jwks, {\n\t\t\tissuer: issuer.metadata.issuer,\n\t\t\taudience: clientId,\n\t\t\t// pin to the provider's configured signing alg so a JWKS containing a symmetric/none key\n\t\t\t// can never be selected (defence-in-depth on top of jose's own key-type check).\n\t\t\talgorithms: [expectedAlg],\n\t\t\t// §2.4: `iat` and `exp` are REQUIRED. `maxTokenAge` makes `iat` required + bounds freshness;\n\t\t\t// `requiredClaims` makes `exp` required (jose only checks `exp` when present).\n\t\t\tmaxTokenAge: LOGOUT_TOKEN_MAX_AGE_SECONDS,\n\t\t\trequiredClaims: ['exp'],\n\t\t\tclockTolerance: LOGOUT_TOKEN_CLOCK_TOLERANCE_SECONDS,\n\t\t})\n\t\tpayload = verified.payload as Record<string, unknown>\n\t} catch (e: any) {\n\t\tthrow new IDPValidationError(`Invalid logout token: ${e?.message ?? 'verification failed'}`)\n\t}\n\n\t// A logout token MUST NOT contain a nonce; its presence means an ID token is being replayed.\n\tif ('nonce' in payload) {\n\t\tthrow new IDPValidationError('Logout token must not contain a nonce')\n\t}\n\n\tconst events = payload.events\n\tconst hasLogoutEvent = typeof events === 'object' && events !== null && BACKCHANNEL_LOGOUT_EVENT in (events as Record<string, unknown>)\n\tif (!hasLogoutEvent) {\n\t\tthrow new IDPValidationError('Logout token is missing the back-channel-logout event')\n\t}\n\n\tconst sid = typeof payload.sid === 'string' ? payload.sid : undefined\n\tconst sub = typeof payload.sub === 'string' ? payload.sub : undefined\n\tif (!sid && !sub) {\n\t\tthrow new IDPValidationError('Logout token must contain a sid or sub claim')\n\t}\n\n\treturn { sid, sub 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package/dist/production/src/model/service/idp/providers/OIDCHelpers.js

@@ -31,9 +31,56 @@ const initOIDCAuth = async (client, { redirectUrl, scope, responseMode }) => {
   };
 };
 const getClaim = (source, path) => path.split(".").reduce(
-  (acc, key) => acc != null && typeof acc === "object" ? acc[key] : void 0,
+  (acc, key) => acc != null && typeof acc === "object" && Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(acc, key) ? acc[key] : void 0,
   source
 );
+const liftNestedClaims = (source, attributesKey) => {
+  if (!attributesKey) {
+    return source;
+  }
+  const nested = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(source, attributesKey) ? source[attributesKey] : void 0;
+  if (nested !== null && typeof nested === "object" && !Array.isArray(nested)) {
+    return { ...nested, ...source };
+  }
+  return source;
+};
+const normalizeClaims = (rawSource, claimMapping, subFallback) => {
+  const source = liftNestedClaims(rawSource, claimMapping?.attributesKey);
+  const rawEmailVerified = source.email_verified;
+  const emailVerified = rawEmailVerified === true || rawEmailVerified === "true";
+  const mappedSubject = getClaim(source, claimMapping?.externalIdentifier ?? "sub");
+  let externalIdentifier;
+  if (mappedSubject === void 0 || mappedSubject === null) {
+    externalIdentifier = subFallback ?? "";
+  } else if (typeof mappedSubject === "string" || typeof mappedSubject === "number") {
+    externalIdentifier = String(mappedSubject);
+  } else {
+    throw new IDPValidationError(`The mapped externalIdentifier claim is not a scalar value`);
+  }
+  if (externalIdentifier === "") {
+    throw new IDPValidationError(`The mapped externalIdentifier claim resolved to an empty value`);
+  }
+  const email = getClaim(source, claimMapping?.email ?? "email");
+  const name = resolveName(source, claimMapping);
+  return {
+    ...source,
+    externalIdentifier,
+    email: typeof email === "string" ? email : void 0,
+    name,
+    emailVerified
+  };
+};
+const resolveName = (source, claimMapping) => {
+  const mapped = getClaim(source, claimMapping?.name ?? "name");
+  if (typeof mapped === "string" && mapped.trim() !== "") {
+    return mapped;
+  }
+  if (claimMapping?.name !== void 0) {
+    return void 0;
+  }
+  const parts = [getClaim(source, "given_name"), getClaim(source, "family_name")].filter((part) => typeof part === "string" && part.trim() !== "").map((part) => part.trim());
+  return parts.length > 0 ? parts.join(" ") : void 0;
+};
 const handleOIDCResponse = async (client, { sessionData, redirectUrl, ...otherData }, { fetchUserInfo, returnOIDCResult, captureSession, claimMapping } = {}) => {
   const params = "parameters" in otherData ? otherData.parameters : client.callbackParams(otherData.url);
   if (params.state && !sessionData?.state) {
@@ -46,37 +93,10 @@ const handleOIDCResponse = async (client, { sessionData, redirectUrl, ...otherDa
     const userInfo = result.access_token && fetchUserInfo ? await client.userinfo(result) : {};
     const oidcResult = returnOIDCResult ? result : {};
     const idpSession = captureSession ? tokenSetToSessionState(result, typeof claims.sid === "string" ? claims.sid : void 0) : void 0;
-    let source = { ...claimsWithoutHashes, ...userInfo };
-    const attributesKey = claimMapping?.attributesKey;
-    if (attributesKey) {
-      const nested = source[attributesKey];
-      if (nested && typeof nested === "object" && !Array.isArray(nested)) {
-        source = { ...nested, ...source };
-      }
-    }
-    const rawEmailVerified = source.email_verified;
-    const emailVerified = rawEmailVerified === true || rawEmailVerified === "true";
-    const mappedSubject = getClaim(source, claimMapping?.externalIdentifier ?? "sub");
-    let externalIdentifier;
-    if (mappedSubject === void 0 || mappedSubject === null) {
-      externalIdentifier = claims.sub;
-    } else if (typeof mappedSubject === "string" || typeof mappedSubject === "number") {
-      externalIdentifier = String(mappedSubject);
-    } else {
-      throw new IDPValidationError(`The mapped externalIdentifier claim is not a scalar value`);
-    }
-    if (externalIdentifier === "") {
-      throw new IDPValidationError(`The mapped externalIdentifier claim resolved to an empty value`);
-    }
-    const email = getClaim(source, claimMapping?.email ?? "email");
-    const name = getClaim(source, claimMapping?.name ?? "name");
+    const normalized = normalizeClaims({ ...claimsWithoutHashes, ...userInfo }, claimMapping, claims.sub);
     return {
       ...oidcResult,
-      ...source,
-      externalIdentifier,
-      email: typeof email === "string" ? email : void 0,
-      name: typeof name === "string" ? name : void 0,
-      emailVerified,
+      ...normalized,
       ...idpSession ? { idpSession } : {}
     };
   } catch (e) {
@@ -94,7 +114,8 @@ const handleOIDCResponse = async (client, { sessionData, redirectUrl, ...otherDa
   }
 };
 const REVOKED_OIDC_ERRORS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["invalid_grant", "invalid_token", "expired_token"]);
-const revalidateOIDC = async (client, method, session) => {
+const revalidateOIDC = async (client, method, session, options = {}) => {
+  const { claimMapping, fetchUserInfo } = options;
   const tokens = session.tokens ?? {};
   const refreshToken = typeof tokens.refresh_token === "string" ? tokens.refresh_token : void 0;
   const accessToken = typeof tokens.access_token === "string" ? tokens.access_token : void 0;
@@ -105,14 +126,22 @@ const revalidateOIDC = async (client, method, session) => {
       }
       const tokenSet = await client.refresh(refreshToken);
       let claims;
+      let claimsComplete = false;
       try {
-        claims = tokenSet.id_token ? tokenSet.claims() : void 0;
+        if (tokenSet.id_token) {
+          const idClaims = tokenSet.claims();
+          const userInfo = tokenSet.access_token && fetchUserInfo ? await client.userinfo(tokenSet) : {};
+          claims = normalizeClaims({ ...idClaims, ...userInfo }, claimMapping, typeof idClaims.sub === "string" ? idClaims.sub : void 0);
+          claimsComplete = true;
+        }
       } catch {
         claims = void 0;
+        claimsComplete = false;
       }
       return {
         status: "valid",
         claims,
+        claimsComplete,
         // carry the stored tokens forward: a non-rotating IdP omits the refresh token here
         idpSession: tokenSetToSessionState(tokenSet, session.sessionId, tokens)
       };
@@ -122,7 +151,13 @@ const revalidateOIDC = async (client, method, session) => {
         return { status: "revoked", reason: "no_access_token" };
       }
       const userInfo = await client.userinfo(accessToken);
-      return { status: "valid", claims: userInfo };
+      let claims;
+      try {
+        claims = normalizeClaims(userInfo, claimMapping, typeof userInfo.sub === "string" ? userInfo.sub : void 0);
+      } catch {
+        claims = void 0;
+      }
+      return { status: "valid", claims, claimsComplete: false };
     }
     const token = accessToken ?? refreshToken;
     if (!token) {
@@ -214,6 +249,7 @@ export {
   buildOIDCLogoutUrl,
   handleOIDCResponse,
   initOIDCAuth,
+  liftNestedClaims,
   revalidateOIDC,
   tokenSetToSessionState,
   validateOIDCLogoutToken

package/dist/production/src/model/service/idp/providers/OIDCHelpers.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"OIDCHelpers.js","sources":["../../../../../../../../packages/engine-tenant-api/src/model/service/idp/providers/OIDCHelpers.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { Client, custom, errors, generators, Issuer, TokenSet } from 'openid-client'\nimport { createRemoteJWKSet, jwtVerify } from 'jose'\nimport { OIDCClaimMapping, OIDCResponseData } from './OIDCTypes.js'\nimport { IDPValidationError } from '../IDPValidationError.js'\nimport { IDPResponseError } from '../IDPResponseError.js'\nimport {\n\tIDPResponse,\n\tIDPSessionState,\n\tInitIDPAuthResult,\n\tLogoutTokenClaims,\n\tLogoutUrlRequest,\n\tRevalidationResult,\n} from '../IdentityProviderHandler.js'\n\n/**\n * Build the persisted session state from an OIDC token set. Stores the tokens needed for\n * later re-validation (refresh/access) and SLO (id_token); the whole `tokens` blob is\n * encrypted at rest by the command layer.\n *\n * `prevTokens` carries the previously stored tokens forward: a refresh-grant response MAY omit\n * the refresh token (RFC 6749 §6 — IdPs that don't rotate just don't re-send it), in which case\n * the client must keep using the old one. Without this fallback a non-rotating IdP would persist\n * a session with no refresh token and be revoked (`no_refresh_token`) on the very next tick.\n */\nexport const tokenSetToSessionState = (tokenSet: TokenSet, sessionId?: string, prevTokens?: Record<string, unknown>): IDPSessionState => {\n\tconst refreshToken = tokenSet.refresh_token ?? (typeof prevTokens?.refresh_token === 'string' ? prevTokens.refresh_token : undefined)\n\tconst idToken = tokenSet.id_token ?? (typeof prevTokens?.id_token === 'string' ? prevTokens.id_token : undefined)\n\treturn {\n\t\tsessionId,\n\t\ttokens: {\n\t\t\t...(refreshToken ? { refresh_token: refreshToken } : {}),\n\t\t\t...(tokenSet.access_token ? { access_token: tokenSet.access_token } : {}),\n\t\t\t...(idToken ? { id_token: idToken } : {}),\n\t\t},\n\t\texpiresAt: tokenSet.expires_at ? new Date(tokenSet.expires_at * 1000) : undefined,\n\t}\n}\n\nexport const initOIDCAuth = async (\n\tclient: Client,\n\t{ redirectUrl, scope, responseMode }: { redirectUrl: string; scope?: string; responseMode?: string },\n): Promise<InitIDPAuthResult> => {\n\tconst nonce = generators.nonce()\n\tconst state = generators.state()\n\tconst url = client.authorizationUrl({\n\t\tredirect_uri: redirectUrl,\n\t\tresponse_mode: responseMode,\n\t\tscope: scope ?? 'openid email',\n\t\tnonce,\n\t\tstate,\n\t})\n\n\treturn {\n\t\tauthUrl: url,\n\t\tsessionData: { nonce, state },\n\t}\n}\n\nexport type HandleOIDCResponseOptions = {\n\tfetchUserInfo?: boolean\n\treturnOIDCResult?: boolean\n\tcaptureSession?: boolean\n\tclaimMapping?: OIDCClaimMapping\n}\n\n/** Read a claim by name, supporting dot-paths into nested objects (`a.b.c`). */\nconst getClaim = (source: Record<string, unknown>, path: string): unknown =>\n\tpath.split('.').reduce<unknown>(\n\t\t(acc, key) => (acc != null && typeof acc === 'object' ? (acc as Record<string, unknown>)[key] : undefined),\n\t\tsource,\n\t)\n\nexport const handleOIDCResponse = async (\n\tclient: Client,\n\t{ sessionData, redirectUrl, ...otherData }: OIDCResponseData,\n\t{ fetchUserInfo, returnOIDCResult, captureSession, claimMapping }: HandleOIDCResponseOptions = {},\n): Promise<IDPResponse> => {\n\tconst params = 'parameters' in otherData ? otherData.parameters : client.callbackParams(otherData.url)\n\tif (params.state && !sessionData?.state) {\n\t\tthrow new IDPValidationError(`state is present in parameters, but missing in session data`)\n\t}\n\ttry {\n\t\tconst result = await client.callback(redirectUrl, params, sessionData)\n\t\tconst claims = result.claims()\n\t\tconst { at_hash, c_hash, nonce, ...claimsWithoutHashes } = claims\n\t\tconst userInfo = result.access_token && fetchUserInfo ? await client.userinfo(result) : {}\n\t\tconst oidcResult = returnOIDCResult ? result : {}\n\t\tconst idpSession = captureSession ? tokenSetToSessionState(result, typeof claims.sid === 'string' ? claims.sid : undefined) : undefined\n\n\t\t// Merge ID-token claims with userInfo (userInfo wins, per spec). Then optionally lift a\n\t\t// nested attributes object to the top level so providers that nest their claims (notably\n\t\t// Apereo CAS userinfo, which returns them under `attributes`) map without a code change.\n\t\t// The nested attributes are UNSIGNED, so they must not override a claim already present in\n\t\t// the (signature-verified) ID-token / userInfo merge — spread them UNDER `source`, not over\n\t\t// it, so a signed `sub` / `email_verified` keeps precedence over an attributes-level value.\n\t\tlet source: Record<string, unknown> = { ...claimsWithoutHashes, ...userInfo }\n\t\tconst attributesKey = claimMapping?.attributesKey\n\t\tif (attributesKey) {\n\t\t\tconst nested = source[attributesKey]\n\t\t\tif (nested && typeof nested === 'object' && !Array.isArray(nested)) {\n\t\t\t\tsource = { ...(nested as Record<string, unknown>), ...source }\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// The OIDC `email_verified` claim is a boolean per spec, but some providers send the\n\t\t// string \"true\". userInfo (and any unwrapped attributes) take precedence over the ID token.\n\t\tconst rawEmailVerified = source.email_verified\n\t\tconst emailVerified = rawEmailVerified === true || rawEmailVerified === 'true'\n\n\t\t// `externalIdentifier` is the federation key persisted in `person_identity_provider` and\n\t\t// matched on the next sign-in, so it must be a stable scalar. A `claimMapping` that pointed\n\t\t// it at an object/array would otherwise be coerced by `String(...)` to `'[object Object]'` /\n\t\t// a comma-join — collapsing every user of the provider onto one key (account takeover). Fail\n\t\t// closed instead. The default `sub` path is safe (openid-client guarantees `sub` is a string).\n\t\tconst mappedSubject = getClaim(source, claimMapping?.externalIdentifier ?? 'sub')\n\t\tlet externalIdentifier: string\n\t\tif (mappedSubject === undefined || mappedSubject === null) {\n\t\t\texternalIdentifier = claims.sub\n\t\t} else if (typeof mappedSubject === 'string' || typeof mappedSubject === 'number') {\n\t\t\texternalIdentifier = String(mappedSubject)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tthrow new IDPValidationError(`The mapped externalIdentifier claim is not a scalar value`)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif (externalIdentifier === '') {\n\t\t\tthrow new IDPValidationError(`The mapped externalIdentifier claim resolved to an empty value`)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// `email` / `name` are typed `string | undefined` on IDPResponse and feed the by-e-mail\n\t\t// account lookup (which crashes on a non-string). `...source` already placed the raw claim\n\t\t// of whatever type, so OVERWRITE (don't conditionally add) with the mapped value when it is\n\t\t// a string, otherwise `undefined` — a non-string claim must not leak through `...source`.\n\t\tconst email = getClaim(source, claimMapping?.email ?? 'email')\n\t\tconst name = getClaim(source, claimMapping?.name ?? 'name')\n\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t...oidcResult,\n\t\t\t...source,\n\t\t\texternalIdentifier,\n\t\t\temail: typeof email === 'string' ? email : undefined,\n\t\t\tname: typeof name === 'string' ? name : undefined,\n\t\t\temailVerified,\n\t\t\t...(idpSession ? { idpSession } : {}),\n\t\t}\n\t} catch (e: any) {\n\t\tif (e instanceof errors.RPError) {\n\t\t\tthrow new IDPValidationError(e.message)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif (e instanceof errors.OPError) {\n\t\t\tconst body = e.response?.body as any\n\t\t\tif (typeof body === 'object' && typeof body?.error === 'object' && typeof body.error?.message === 'string') {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new IDPResponseError(body.error.message)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tthrow new IDPResponseError(e.message)\n\t\t}\n\t\tthrow e\n\t}\n}\n\n/** OIDC errors that definitively mean \"this session is no longer valid at the IdP\". */\nconst REVOKED_OIDC_ERRORS = new Set(['invalid_grant', 'invalid_token', 'expired_token'])\n\n/**\n * Re-validate a stored OIDC session against the IdP. Returns `revoked` only for definitive\n * IdP responses (invalid/expired grant or inactive introspection). Transient failures\n * (network, IdP down) re-throw so the caller can fail-open and keep the session — IdP\n * downtime must not log everyone out.\n */\nexport const revalidateOIDC = async (\n\tclient: Client,\n\tmethod: 'refresh' | 'userinfo' | 'introspection',\n\tsession: IDPSessionState,\n): Promise<RevalidationResult> => {\n\tconst tokens = session.tokens ?? {}\n\tconst refreshToken = typeof tokens.refresh_token === 'string' ? tokens.refresh_token : undefined\n\tconst accessToken = typeof tokens.access_token === 'string' ? tokens.access_token : undefined\n\ttry {\n\t\tif (method === 'refresh') {\n\t\t\tif (!refreshToken) {\n\t\t\t\treturn { status: 'revoked', reason: 'no_refresh_token' }\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tconst tokenSet = await client.refresh(refreshToken)\n\t\t\tlet claims: Record<string, unknown> | undefined\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\tclaims = tokenSet.id_token ? tokenSet.claims() : undefined\n\t\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t\tclaims = undefined\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t\tstatus: 'valid',\n\t\t\t\tclaims,\n\t\t\t\t// carry the stored tokens forward: a non-rotating IdP omits the refresh token here\n\t\t\t\tidpSession: tokenSetToSessionState(tokenSet, session.sessionId, tokens),\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tif (method === 'userinfo') {\n\t\t\tif (!accessToken) {\n\t\t\t\treturn { status: 'revoked', reason: 'no_access_token' }\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tconst userInfo = await client.userinfo(accessToken)\n\t\t\treturn { status: 'valid', claims: userInfo }\n\t\t}\n\t\t// introspection\n\t\tconst token = accessToken ?? refreshToken\n\t\tif (!token) {\n\t\t\treturn { status: 'revoked', reason: 'no_token' }\n\t\t}\n\t\tconst result = await client.introspect(token, accessToken ? 'access_token' : 'refresh_token')\n\t\tif (!result.active) {\n\t\t\treturn { status: 'revoked', reason: 'inactive' }\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn { status: 'valid' }\n\t} catch (e: any) {\n\t\tif (e instanceof errors.OPError) {\n\t\t\tif (typeof e.error === 'string' && REVOKED_OIDC_ERRORS.has(e.error)) {\n\t\t\t\treturn { status: 'revoked', reason: e.error }\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// The userinfo endpoint signals a rejected access token with a bare HTTP 401 — per\n\t\t\t// RFC 6750 the `WWW-Authenticate` error code is optional, so openid-client may not\n\t\t\t// surface a parseable `error` here. A 401 is still definitive: the token is no\n\t\t\t// longer accepted → revoked. (Introspection is NOT treated this way: it returns 200\n\t\t\t// `{active:false}` for revoked tokens, so a 401/400 there means client-auth/config\n\t\t\t// failure — transient, must not log users out.)\n\t\t\tif (method === 'userinfo' && e.response?.statusCode === 401) {\n\t\t\t\treturn { status: 'revoked', reason: 'userinfo_unauthorized' }\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\t// transient (network / IdP unavailable) — propagate, do not revoke\n\t\tthrow e\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Build an RP-initiated (front-channel) logout URL (OIDC RP-Initiated Logout 1.0). Returns null\n * when the IdP advertises no `end_session_endpoint` — the caller then degrades to a local-only\n * logout (legacy-IdP graceful fallback). The `id_token_hint` lets the IdP identify and confirm the\n * session to terminate; `post_logout_redirect_uri` is where the IdP returns the browser afterwards.\n */\nexport const buildOIDCLogoutUrl = (client: Client, { idToken, postLogoutRedirectUri }: LogoutUrlRequest): string | null => {\n\tif (!client.issuer.metadata.end_session_endpoint) {\n\t\treturn null\n\t}\n\treturn client.endSessionUrl({\n\t\t...(idToken ? { id_token_hint: idToken } : {}),\n\t\t...(postLogoutRedirectUri ? { post_logout_redirect_uri: postLogoutRedirectUri } : {}),\n\t})\n}\n\n/**\n * The OIDC Back-Channel Logout 1.0 event member that MUST be present in a logout token's `events`\n * claim. Its presence (and the absence of a `nonce`) is what distinguishes a logout token from an\n * ID token — both are signed by the same IdP, so without this check an ID token could be replayed\n * to forcibly log a user out.\n */\nconst BACKCHANNEL_LOGOUT_EVENT = 'http://schemas.openid.net/event/backchannel-logout'\n\n/**\n * Max accepted age of a back-channel logout token, derived from its `iat`. OIDC Back-Channel Logout\n * tokens are single-use and short-lived; bounding the age (together with requiring `exp`) limits the\n * window in which a captured token could be replayed to force a logout.\n */\nconst LOGOUT_TOKEN_MAX_AGE_SECONDS = 120\nconst LOGOUT_TOKEN_CLOCK_TOLERANCE_SECONDS = 5\n\n/**\n * Remote JWKS sets keyed by `jwks_uri`. `createRemoteJWKSet` returns a function with its own internal\n * key cache + fetch cooldown, so it MUST be reused across requests — re-creating it per call (as the\n * unauthenticated back-channel endpoint would otherwise do) defeats the cache and turns every request\n * into a potential outbound JWKS fetch. Keyed by URL, so two providers sharing an IdP share the set.\n */\nconst remoteJwksCache = new Map<string, ReturnType<typeof createRemoteJWKSet>>()\n\nconst getRemoteJwks = (jwksUri: string): ReturnType<typeof createRemoteJWKSet> => {\n\tlet jwks = remoteJwksCache.get(jwksUri)\n\tif (!jwks) {\n\t\tjwks = createRemoteJWKSet(new URL(jwksUri))\n\t\tremoteJwksCache.set(jwksUri, jwks)\n\t}\n\treturn jwks\n}\n\n/**\n * Validate an OIDC back-channel logout token (OIDC Back-Channel Logout 1.0 §2.4–2.6) and extract\n * the targeted `sid` / `sub`. The token is a JWT signed by the IdP; we verify the signature against\n * the issuer's JWKS and enforce the issuer + audience (client_id) the same way ID tokens are\n * verified, pinning the signing algorithm to the provider's configured one, then assert the\n * back-channel-specific claims:\n *   - `iat` is present and recent and `exp` is present (§2.4 requires both) — bounds the replay window;\n *   - `events` contains the back-channel-logout member (it really is a logout token);\n *   - it carries a `sid` and/or `sub` (otherwise there is nothing to act on);\n *   - it does NOT carry a `nonce` (a `nonce` means it is an ID token being replayed).\n * Throws {@link IDPValidationError} on any failure so the caller can answer 400.\n */\nexport const validateOIDCLogoutToken = async (client: Client, issuer: Issuer<Client>, logoutToken: string): Promise<LogoutTokenClaims> => {\n\tconst jwksUri = issuer.metadata.jwks_uri\n\tif (!jwksUri) {\n\t\tthrow new IDPValidationError('IdP has no jwks_uri; cannot verify logout token')\n\t}\n\tconst clientId = client.metadata.client_id\n\tif (typeof clientId !== 'string' || clientId === '') {\n\t\t// The `aud` check is a core anti-token-substitution defence on this unauthenticated endpoint.\n\t\t// jose treats `audience: undefined` as \"skip the aud check entirely\", so a missing client_id\n\t\t// must fail closed (reject the token) rather than fall through and accept any audience.\n\t\tthrow new IDPValidationError('cannot verify logout token audience: client_id is missing')\n\t}\n\tconst expectedAlg = typeof client.metadata.id_token_signed_response_alg === 'string'\n\t\t? client.metadata.id_token_signed_response_alg\n\t\t: 'RS256'\n\tconst jwks = getRemoteJwks(jwksUri)\n\tlet payload: Record<string, unknown>\n\ttry {\n\t\tconst verified = await jwtVerify(logoutToken, jwks, {\n\t\t\tissuer: issuer.metadata.issuer,\n\t\t\taudience: clientId,\n\t\t\t// pin to the provider's configured signing alg so a JWKS containing a symmetric/none key\n\t\t\t// can never be selected (defence-in-depth on top of jose's own key-type check).\n\t\t\talgorithms: [expectedAlg],\n\t\t\t// §2.4: `iat` and `exp` are REQUIRED. `maxTokenAge` makes `iat` required + bounds freshness;\n\t\t\t// `requiredClaims` makes `exp` required (jose only checks `exp` when present).\n\t\t\tmaxTokenAge: LOGOUT_TOKEN_MAX_AGE_SECONDS,\n\t\t\trequiredClaims: ['exp'],\n\t\t\tclockTolerance: LOGOUT_TOKEN_CLOCK_TOLERANCE_SECONDS,\n\t\t})\n\t\tpayload = verified.payload as Record<string, unknown>\n\t} catch (e: any) {\n\t\tthrow new IDPValidationError(`Invalid logout token: ${e?.message ?? 'verification failed'}`)\n\t}\n\n\t// A logout token MUST NOT contain a nonce; its presence means an ID token is being replayed.\n\tif ('nonce' in payload) {\n\t\tthrow new IDPValidationError('Logout token must not contain a nonce')\n\t}\n\n\tconst events = payload.events\n\tconst hasLogoutEvent = typeof events === 'object' && events !== null && BACKCHANNEL_LOGOUT_EVENT in (events as Record<string, unknown>)\n\tif (!hasLogoutEvent) {\n\t\tthrow new IDPValidationError('Logout token is missing the back-channel-logout event')\n\t}\n\n\tconst sid = typeof payload.sid === 'string' ? payload.sid : undefined\n\tconst sub = typeof payload.sub === 'string' ? payload.sub : undefined\n\tif (!sid && !sub) {\n\t\tthrow new IDPValidationError('Logout token must contain a sid or sub claim')\n\t}\n\n\treturn { sid, sub 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Stores the tokens needed for\n * later re-validation (refresh/access) and SLO (id_token); the whole `tokens` blob is\n * encrypted at rest by the command layer.\n *\n * `prevTokens` carries the previously stored tokens forward: a refresh-grant response MAY omit\n * the refresh token (RFC 6749 §6 — IdPs that don't rotate just don't re-send it), in which case\n * the client must keep using the old one. Without this fallback a non-rotating IdP would persist\n * a session with no refresh token and be revoked (`no_refresh_token`) on the very next tick.\n */\nexport const tokenSetToSessionState = (tokenSet: TokenSet, sessionId?: string, prevTokens?: Record<string, unknown>): IDPSessionState => {\n\tconst refreshToken = tokenSet.refresh_token ?? (typeof prevTokens?.refresh_token === 'string' ? prevTokens.refresh_token : undefined)\n\tconst idToken = tokenSet.id_token ?? (typeof prevTokens?.id_token === 'string' ? prevTokens.id_token : undefined)\n\treturn {\n\t\tsessionId,\n\t\ttokens: {\n\t\t\t...(refreshToken ? { refresh_token: refreshToken } : {}),\n\t\t\t...(tokenSet.access_token ? { access_token: tokenSet.access_token } : {}),\n\t\t\t...(idToken ? { id_token: idToken } : {}),\n\t\t},\n\t\texpiresAt: tokenSet.expires_at ? new Date(tokenSet.expires_at * 1000) : undefined,\n\t}\n}\n\nexport const initOIDCAuth = async (\n\tclient: Client,\n\t{ redirectUrl, scope, responseMode }: { redirectUrl: string; scope?: string; responseMode?: string },\n): Promise<InitIDPAuthResult> => {\n\tconst nonce = generators.nonce()\n\tconst state = generators.state()\n\tconst url = client.authorizationUrl({\n\t\tredirect_uri: redirectUrl,\n\t\tresponse_mode: responseMode,\n\t\tscope: scope ?? 'openid email',\n\t\tnonce,\n\t\tstate,\n\t})\n\n\treturn {\n\t\tauthUrl: url,\n\t\tsessionData: { nonce, state },\n\t}\n}\n\nexport type HandleOIDCResponseOptions = {\n\tfetchUserInfo?: boolean\n\treturnOIDCResult?: boolean\n\tcaptureSession?: boolean\n\tclaimMapping?: OIDCClaimMapping\n}\n\n/**\n * Read a claim by name, supporting dot-paths into nested objects (`a.b.c`). Own-property only at every\n * segment (mirrors `ClaimMappingEvaluator.resolvePath`): a configured path must never descend into an\n * inherited member, so a `__proto__` / `constructor` segment cannot surface an `Object.prototype` value\n * as the externalIdentifier / email / name.\n */\nconst getClaim = (source: Record<string, unknown>, path: string): unknown =>\n\tpath.split('.').reduce<unknown>(\n\t\t(\n\t\t\tacc,\n\t\t\tkey,\n\t\t) => (acc != null && typeof acc === 'object' && Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(acc, key) ? (acc as Record<string, unknown>)[key] : undefined),\n\t\tsource,\n\t)\n\n/**\n * Lift a configured nested attributes object (`attributesKey`, notably Apereo CAS's `attributes`) to the\n * top level so providers that nest their claims map without a code change. The nested attributes are\n * UNSIGNED, so they are spread UNDER `source` — a signed top-level claim keeps precedence over an\n * attributes-level value. Shared by the sign-in response handler ({@link handleOIDCResponse}) and the\n * session-refresh path ({@link revalidateOIDC}) so BOTH see the same claim surface; without this, an\n * `attributesKey` provider's A09 claim mapping would resolve at sign-in but silently not on refresh.\n */\nexport const liftNestedClaims = (source: Record<string, unknown>, attributesKey: string | undefined): Record<string, unknown> => {\n\tif (!attributesKey) {\n\t\treturn source\n\t}\n\tconst nested = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(source, attributesKey) ? source[attributesKey] : undefined\n\tif (nested !== null && typeof nested === 'object' && !Array.isArray(nested)) {\n\t\treturn { ...nested, ...source }\n\t}\n\treturn source\n}\n\ntype NormalizedClaims = Record<string, unknown> & {\n\texternalIdentifier: string\n\temail: string | undefined\n\tname: string | undefined\n\temailVerified: boolean\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the normalized claim surface shared by sign-in ({@link handleOIDCResponse}) and session refresh\n * ({@link revalidateOIDC}): lift any configured nested attributes object to the top level, then layer the\n * mapped identity fields (`externalIdentifier` / `email` / `name` / `emailVerified`) over the raw claims.\n * BOTH paths run this SAME normalization so an A09 claim-mapping rule resolves identically whether it\n * targets a raw provider claim or one of the normalized identity fields — without it the two surfaces\n * diverged (refresh saw the raw claim, sign-in the mapped value).\n *\n * `subFallback` is the signature-verified ID-token `sub`, used when a custom `externalIdentifier` mapping\n * resolves to nothing: at sign-in it is guaranteed present; on refresh it is the refreshed id-token's `sub`\n * (or, for the userinfo method, the userinfo `sub`). Throws (account-takeover guard) when the mapped\n * subject is a non-scalar or resolves empty — the refresh caller catches this and skips the sync.\n */\nconst normalizeClaims = (\n\trawSource: Record<string, unknown>,\n\tclaimMapping: OIDCClaimMapping | undefined,\n\tsubFallback: string | undefined,\n): NormalizedClaims => {\n\tconst source = liftNestedClaims(rawSource, claimMapping?.attributesKey)\n\n\t// The OIDC `email_verified` claim is a boolean per spec, but some providers send the\n\t// string \"true\". userInfo (and any unwrapped attributes) take precedence over the ID token.\n\tconst rawEmailVerified = source.email_verified\n\tconst emailVerified = rawEmailVerified === true || rawEmailVerified === 'true'\n\n\t// `externalIdentifier` is the federation key persisted in `person_identity_provider` and\n\t// matched on the next sign-in, so it must be a stable scalar. A `claimMapping` that pointed\n\t// it at an object/array would otherwise be coerced by `String(...)` to `'[object Object]'` /\n\t// a comma-join — collapsing every user of the provider onto one key (account takeover). Fail\n\t// closed instead. The default `sub` path is safe (openid-client guarantees `sub` is a string).\n\tconst mappedSubject = getClaim(source, claimMapping?.externalIdentifier ?? 'sub')\n\tlet externalIdentifier: string\n\tif (mappedSubject === undefined || mappedSubject === null) {\n\t\texternalIdentifier = subFallback ?? 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'email')\n\tconst name = resolveName(source, claimMapping)\n\n\treturn {\n\t\t...source,\n\t\texternalIdentifier,\n\t\temail: typeof email === 'string' ? email : undefined,\n\t\tname,\n\t\temailVerified,\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve the display name, falling back to `given_name` + `family_name` when there is no usable\n * `name` claim.\n *\n * `name` is optional in OIDC core and plenty of providers omit it while sending the parts — Apereo\n * CAS and Entra ID do, and so does Keycloak under its default mappers. Without the fallback,\n * `CreatePersonCommand` lands on its own last-resort default and a federated person ends up named\n * after the local part of their e-mail (`jan.novak`) despite the IdP having reported \"Jan Novák\".\n * A single-path `claimMapping.name` cannot express this: the value has to be composed from two\n * claims, not selected from one.\n *\n * An explicitly configured `claimMapping.name` is honoured as-is, fallback included — mapping a\n * claim is a statement about where the name lives, and quietly substituting a different source\n * would defeat it. A blank claim counts as absent: an empty string is not a display name, and\n * treating it as one would keep the fallback (and `CreatePersonCommand`'s) from ever running.\n */\nconst resolveName = (source: Record<string, unknown>, claimMapping: OIDCClaimMapping | undefined): string | undefined => {\n\tconst mapped = getClaim(source, claimMapping?.name ?? 'name')\n\tif (typeof mapped === 'string' && mapped.trim() !== '') {\n\t\treturn mapped\n\t}\n\tif (claimMapping?.name !== undefined) {\n\t\treturn undefined\n\t}\n\tconst parts = [getClaim(source, 'given_name'), getClaim(source, 'family_name')]\n\t\t.filter((part): part is string => typeof part === 'string' && part.trim() !== '')\n\t\t.map(part => part.trim())\n\treturn parts.length > 0 ? parts.join(' ') : undefined\n}\n\nexport const handleOIDCResponse = async (\n\tclient: Client,\n\t{ sessionData, redirectUrl, ...otherData }: OIDCResponseData,\n\t{ fetchUserInfo, returnOIDCResult, captureSession, claimMapping }: HandleOIDCResponseOptions = {},\n): Promise<IDPResponse> => {\n\tconst params = 'parameters' in otherData ? otherData.parameters : client.callbackParams(otherData.url)\n\tif (params.state && !sessionData?.state) {\n\t\tthrow new IDPValidationError(`state is present in parameters, but missing in session data`)\n\t}\n\ttry {\n\t\tconst result = await client.callback(redirectUrl, params, sessionData)\n\t\tconst claims = result.claims()\n\t\tconst { at_hash, c_hash, nonce, ...claimsWithoutHashes } = claims\n\t\tconst userInfo = result.access_token && fetchUserInfo ? await client.userinfo(result) : {}\n\t\tconst oidcResult = returnOIDCResult ? result : {}\n\t\tconst idpSession = captureSession ? tokenSetToSessionState(result, typeof claims.sid === 'string' ? claims.sid : undefined) : undefined\n\n\t\t// Merge ID-token claims with userInfo (userInfo wins, per spec), then normalize the surface (lift\n\t\t// nested attributes + map the identity fields). The refresh path runs the SAME normalization, so a\n\t\t// claim mapping resolves identically at sign-in and on refresh. The default `sub` fallback is safe —\n\t\t// openid-client guarantees `sub` is a string.\n\t\tconst normalized = normalizeClaims({ ...claimsWithoutHashes, ...userInfo }, claimMapping, claims.sub)\n\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t...oidcResult,\n\t\t\t...normalized,\n\t\t\t...(idpSession ? { idpSession } : {}),\n\t\t}\n\t} catch (e: any) {\n\t\tif (e instanceof errors.RPError) {\n\t\t\tthrow new IDPValidationError(e.message)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif (e instanceof errors.OPError) {\n\t\t\tconst body = e.response?.body as any\n\t\t\tif (typeof body === 'object' && typeof body?.error === 'object' && typeof body.error?.message === 'string') {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new IDPResponseError(body.error.message)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tthrow new IDPResponseError(e.message)\n\t\t}\n\t\tthrow e\n\t}\n}\n\n/** OIDC errors that definitively mean \"this session is no longer valid at the IdP\". */\nconst REVOKED_OIDC_ERRORS = new Set(['invalid_grant', 'invalid_token', 'expired_token'])\n\n/**\n * Re-validate a stored OIDC session against the IdP. Returns `revoked` only for definitive\n * IdP responses (invalid/expired grant or inactive introspection). Transient failures\n * (network, IdP down) re-throw so the caller can fail-open and keep the session — IdP\n * downtime must not log everyone out.\n */\nexport const revalidateOIDC = async (\n\tclient: Client,\n\tmethod: 'refresh' | 'userinfo' | 'introspection',\n\tsession: IDPSessionState,\n\toptions: { claimMapping?: OIDCClaimMapping; fetchUserInfo?: boolean } = {},\n): Promise<RevalidationResult> => {\n\tconst { claimMapping, fetchUserInfo } = options\n\tconst tokens = session.tokens ?? {}\n\tconst refreshToken = typeof tokens.refresh_token === 'string' ? tokens.refresh_token : undefined\n\tconst accessToken = typeof tokens.access_token === 'string' ? tokens.access_token : undefined\n\ttry {\n\t\tif (method === 'refresh') {\n\t\t\tif (!refreshToken) {\n\t\t\t\treturn { status: 'revoked', reason: 'no_refresh_token' }\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tconst tokenSet = await client.refresh(refreshToken)\n\t\t\tlet claims: Record<string, unknown> | undefined\n\t\t\tlet claimsComplete = false\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\t// Reconstruct the SAME claim surface sign-in builds (handleOIDCResponse): the refreshed id-token\n\t\t\t\t// claims merged with userInfo when `fetchUserInfo` is set — exactly as at sign-in — then the shared\n\t\t\t\t// normalization (lift nested attributes + map identity fields). An `always` mapping therefore\n\t\t\t\t// reconciles against an identical surface on refresh, so `claimsComplete` lets the caller enable\n\t\t\t\t// `unmatched: \"remove\"` reconciliation here too (see IdpSessionRevalidator).\n\t\t\t\tif (tokenSet.id_token) {\n\t\t\t\t\tconst idClaims = tokenSet.claims()\n\t\t\t\t\tconst userInfo = tokenSet.access_token && fetchUserInfo ? await client.userinfo(tokenSet) : {}\n\t\t\t\t\tclaims = normalizeClaims({ ...idClaims, ...userInfo }, claimMapping, typeof idClaims.sub === 'string' ? idClaims.sub : undefined)\n\t\t\t\t\tclaimsComplete = true\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t\t// Building the surface failed (userinfo unreachable, a non-scalar `externalIdentifier`, …). The IdP\n\t\t\t\t// already vouched for the session via the successful refresh, so KEEP it — just skip the claim sync\n\t\t\t\t// this tick (no claims → no grant, no removal) and retry on a later refresh. Leaving claimsComplete\n\t\t\t\t// false also guarantees a half-built surface can never drive a removal.\n\t\t\t\tclaims = undefined\n\t\t\t\tclaimsComplete = false\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t\tstatus: 'valid',\n\t\t\t\tclaims,\n\t\t\t\tclaimsComplete,\n\t\t\t\t// carry the stored tokens forward: a non-rotating IdP omits the refresh token here\n\t\t\t\tidpSession: tokenSetToSessionState(tokenSet, session.sessionId, tokens),\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tif (method === 'userinfo') {\n\t\t\tif (!accessToken) {\n\t\t\t\treturn { status: 'revoked', reason: 'no_access_token' }\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tconst userInfo = await client.userinfo(accessToken)\n\t\t\tlet claims: Record<string, unknown> | undefined\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\tclaims = normalizeClaims(userInfo, claimMapping, typeof userInfo.sub === 'string' ? userInfo.sub : undefined)\n\t\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t\tclaims = undefined\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// A userinfo probe carries no id-token claims, so its surface is NARROWER than sign-in's (id-token +\n\t\t\t// userinfo): a rule keyed on an id-token-only claim would miss here. Keep refresh-time sync additive-only\n\t\t\t// (`claimsComplete: false`) so `unmatched: \"remove\"` never strips a membership off this partial surface.\n\t\t\treturn { status: 'valid', claims, claimsComplete: false }\n\t\t}\n\t\t// introspection\n\t\tconst token = accessToken ?? refreshToken\n\t\tif (!token) {\n\t\t\treturn { status: 'revoked', reason: 'no_token' }\n\t\t}\n\t\tconst result = await client.introspect(token, accessToken ? 'access_token' : 'refresh_token')\n\t\tif (!result.active) {\n\t\t\treturn { status: 'revoked', reason: 'inactive' }\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn { status: 'valid' }\n\t} catch (e: any) {\n\t\tif (e instanceof errors.OPError) {\n\t\t\tif (typeof e.error === 'string' && REVOKED_OIDC_ERRORS.has(e.error)) {\n\t\t\t\treturn { status: 'revoked', reason: e.error }\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// The userinfo endpoint signals a rejected access token with a bare HTTP 401 — per\n\t\t\t// RFC 6750 the `WWW-Authenticate` error code is optional, so openid-client may not\n\t\t\t// surface a parseable `error` here. A 401 is still definitive: the token is no\n\t\t\t// longer accepted → revoked. (Introspection is NOT treated this way: it returns 200\n\t\t\t// `{active:false}` for revoked tokens, so a 401/400 there means client-auth/config\n\t\t\t// failure — transient, must not log users out.)\n\t\t\tif (method === 'userinfo' && e.response?.statusCode === 401) {\n\t\t\t\treturn { status: 'revoked', reason: 'userinfo_unauthorized' }\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\t// transient (network / IdP unavailable) — propagate, do not revoke\n\t\tthrow e\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Build an RP-initiated (front-channel) logout URL (OIDC RP-Initiated Logout 1.0). Returns null\n * when the IdP advertises no `end_session_endpoint` — the caller then degrades to a local-only\n * logout (legacy-IdP graceful fallback). The `id_token_hint` lets the IdP identify and confirm the\n * session to terminate; `post_logout_redirect_uri` is where the IdP returns the browser afterwards.\n */\nexport const buildOIDCLogoutUrl = (client: Client, { idToken, postLogoutRedirectUri }: LogoutUrlRequest): string | null => {\n\tif (!client.issuer.metadata.end_session_endpoint) {\n\t\treturn null\n\t}\n\treturn client.endSessionUrl({\n\t\t...(idToken ? { id_token_hint: idToken } : {}),\n\t\t...(postLogoutRedirectUri ? { post_logout_redirect_uri: postLogoutRedirectUri } : {}),\n\t})\n}\n\n/**\n * The OIDC Back-Channel Logout 1.0 event member that MUST be present in a logout token's `events`\n * claim. Its presence (and the absence of a `nonce`) is what distinguishes a logout token from an\n * ID token — both are signed by the same IdP, so without this check an ID token could be replayed\n * to forcibly log a user out.\n */\nconst BACKCHANNEL_LOGOUT_EVENT = 'http://schemas.openid.net/event/backchannel-logout'\n\n/**\n * Max accepted age of a back-channel logout token, derived from its `iat`. OIDC Back-Channel Logout\n * tokens are single-use and short-lived; bounding the age (together with requiring `exp`) limits the\n * window in which a captured token could be replayed to force a logout.\n */\nconst LOGOUT_TOKEN_MAX_AGE_SECONDS = 120\nconst LOGOUT_TOKEN_CLOCK_TOLERANCE_SECONDS = 5\n\n/**\n * Remote JWKS sets keyed by `jwks_uri`. `createRemoteJWKSet` returns a function with its own internal\n * key cache + fetch cooldown, so it MUST be reused across requests — re-creating it per call (as the\n * unauthenticated back-channel endpoint would otherwise do) defeats the cache and turns every request\n * into a potential outbound JWKS fetch. Keyed by URL, so two providers sharing an IdP share the set.\n */\nconst remoteJwksCache = new Map<string, ReturnType<typeof createRemoteJWKSet>>()\n\nconst getRemoteJwks = (jwksUri: string): ReturnType<typeof createRemoteJWKSet> => {\n\tlet jwks = remoteJwksCache.get(jwksUri)\n\tif (!jwks) {\n\t\tjwks = createRemoteJWKSet(new URL(jwksUri))\n\t\tremoteJwksCache.set(jwksUri, jwks)\n\t}\n\treturn jwks\n}\n\n/**\n * Validate an OIDC back-channel logout token (OIDC Back-Channel Logout 1.0 §2.4–2.6) and extract\n * the targeted `sid` / `sub`. The token is a JWT signed by the IdP; we verify the signature against\n * the issuer's JWKS and enforce the issuer + audience (client_id) the same way ID tokens are\n * verified, pinning the signing algorithm to the provider's configured one, then assert the\n * back-channel-specific claims:\n *   - `iat` is present and recent and `exp` is present (§2.4 requires both) — bounds the replay window;\n *   - `events` contains the back-channel-logout member (it really is a logout token);\n *   - it carries a `sid` and/or `sub` (otherwise there is nothing to act on);\n *   - it does NOT carry a `nonce` (a `nonce` means it is an ID token being replayed).\n * Throws {@link IDPValidationError} on any failure so the caller can answer 400.\n */\nexport const validateOIDCLogoutToken = async (client: Client, issuer: Issuer<Client>, logoutToken: string): Promise<LogoutTokenClaims> => {\n\tconst jwksUri = issuer.metadata.jwks_uri\n\tif (!jwksUri) {\n\t\tthrow new IDPValidationError('IdP has no jwks_uri; cannot verify logout token')\n\t}\n\tconst clientId = client.metadata.client_id\n\tif (typeof clientId !== 'string' || clientId === '') {\n\t\t// The `aud` check is a core anti-token-substitution defence on this unauthenticated endpoint.\n\t\t// jose treats `audience: undefined` as \"skip the aud check entirely\", so a missing client_id\n\t\t// must fail closed (reject the token) rather than fall through and accept any audience.\n\t\tthrow new IDPValidationError('cannot verify logout token audience: client_id is missing')\n\t}\n\tconst expectedAlg = typeof client.metadata.id_token_signed_response_alg === 'string'\n\t\t? client.metadata.id_token_signed_response_alg\n\t\t: 'RS256'\n\tconst jwks = getRemoteJwks(jwksUri)\n\tlet payload: Record<string, unknown>\n\ttry {\n\t\tconst verified = await jwtVerify(logoutToken, jwks, {\n\t\t\tissuer: issuer.metadata.issuer,\n\t\t\taudience: clientId,\n\t\t\t// pin to the provider's configured signing alg so a JWKS containing a symmetric/none key\n\t\t\t// can never be selected (defence-in-depth on top of jose's own key-type check).\n\t\t\talgorithms: [expectedAlg],\n\t\t\t// §2.4: `iat` and `exp` are REQUIRED. `maxTokenAge` makes `iat` required + bounds freshness;\n\t\t\t// `requiredClaims` makes `exp` required (jose only checks `exp` when present).\n\t\t\tmaxTokenAge: LOGOUT_TOKEN_MAX_AGE_SECONDS,\n\t\t\trequiredClaims: ['exp'],\n\t\t\tclockTolerance: LOGOUT_TOKEN_CLOCK_TOLERANCE_SECONDS,\n\t\t})\n\t\tpayload = verified.payload as Record<string, unknown>\n\t} catch (e: any) {\n\t\tthrow new IDPValidationError(`Invalid logout token: ${e?.message ?? 'verification failed'}`)\n\t}\n\n\t// A logout token MUST NOT contain a nonce; its presence means an ID token is being replayed.\n\tif ('nonce' in payload) {\n\t\tthrow new IDPValidationError('Logout token must not contain a nonce')\n\t}\n\n\tconst events = payload.events\n\tconst hasLogoutEvent = typeof events === 'object' && events !== null && BACKCHANNEL_LOGOUT_EVENT in (events as Record<string, unknown>)\n\tif (!hasLogoutEvent) {\n\t\tthrow new IDPValidationError('Logout token is missing the back-channel-logout event')\n\t}\n\n\tconst sid = typeof payload.sid === 'string' ? payload.sid : undefined\n\tconst sub = typeof payload.sub === 'string' ? payload.sub : undefined\n\tif (!sid && !sub) {\n\t\tthrow new IDPValidationError('Logout token must contain a sid or sub claim')\n\t}\n\n\treturn { sid, sub 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package/dist/production/src/model/service/idp/providers/OIDCProvider.cjs

@@ -40,7 +40,10 @@ class OIDCProvider {
   }
   async revalidate(configuration, session) {
     const client = await this.createOIDCClient(configuration);
-    return await OIDCHelpers.revalidateOIDC(client, configuration.revalidation?.method ?? "refresh", session);
+    return await OIDCHelpers.revalidateOIDC(client, configuration.revalidation?.method ?? "refresh", session, {
+      claimMapping: configuration.claimMapping,
+      fetchUserInfo: configuration.fetchUserInfo
+    });
   }
   async buildLogoutUrl(configuration, request) {
     const client = await this.createOIDCClient(configuration);

package/dist/production/src/model/service/idp/providers/OIDCProvider.cjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"OIDCProvider.cjs","sources":["../../../../../../../../packages/engine-tenant-api/src/model/service/idp/providers/OIDCProvider.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { Client, custom, Issuer } from 'openid-client'\nimport {\n\tIdentityProviderHandler,\n\tIDPResponse,\n\tIDPSessionState,\n\tInitIDPAuthResult,\n\tLogoutTokenClaims,\n\tLogoutUrlRequest,\n\tRevalidationResult,\n} from '../IdentityProviderHandler.js'\nimport { InvalidIDPConfigurationError } from '../InvalidIDPConfigurationError.js'\nimport { catchTypesafe } from './helpers.js'\nimport { OIDCConfiguration, OIDCInitData, OIDCResponseData } from './OIDCTypes.js'\nimport { buildOIDCLogoutUrl, handleOIDCResponse, initOIDCAuth, revalidateOIDC, validateOIDCLogoutToken } from './OIDCHelpers.js'\nimport { IDPValidationError } from '../IDPValidationError.js'\n\nconst DEFAULT_OIDC_TIMEOUT = 5000\nconst OFFLINE_ACCESS_SCOPE = 'offline_access'\n\nexport class OIDCProvider implements IdentityProviderHandler<OIDCConfiguration> {\n\tprivate issuerCache: Record<string, Issuer<Client>> = {}\n\n\tvalidateConfiguration = catchTypesafe(OIDCConfiguration, InvalidIDPConfigurationError)\n\n\tpublic async initAuth(configuration: OIDCConfiguration, data: unknown): Promise<InitIDPAuthResult> {\n\t\tconst initData = catchTypesafe(OIDCInitData, IDPValidationError)(data)\n\t\tconst client = await this.createOIDCClient(configuration)\n\t\treturn await initOIDCAuth(client, {\n\t\t\tscope: this.resolveScope(configuration),\n\t\t\t...initData,\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tpublic async processResponse(configuration: OIDCConfiguration, data: unknown): Promise<IDPResponse> {\n\t\tconst responseData = catchTypesafe(OIDCResponseData, IDPValidationError)(data)\n\t\tconst client = await this.createOIDCClient(configuration)\n\t\treturn await handleOIDCResponse(\n\t\t\tclient,\n\t\t\tresponseData,\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\tfetchUserInfo: configuration.fetchUserInfo,\n\t\t\t\treturnOIDCResult: configuration.returnOIDCResult,\n\t\t\t\tcaptureSession: configuration.revalidation?.enabled === true,\n\t\t\t\tclaimMapping: configuration.claimMapping,\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t)\n\t}\n\n\tpublic async revalidate(configuration: OIDCConfiguration, session: IDPSessionState): Promise<RevalidationResult> {\n\t\tconst client = await this.createOIDCClient(configuration)\n\t\treturn await revalidateOIDC(client, configuration.revalidation?.method ?? 'refresh', session)\n\t}\n\n\tpublic async buildLogoutUrl(configuration: OIDCConfiguration, request: LogoutUrlRequest): Promise<string | null> {\n\t\tconst client = await this.createOIDCClient(configuration)\n\t\treturn buildOIDCLogoutUrl(client, request)\n\t}\n\n\tpublic async validateLogoutToken(configuration: OIDCConfiguration, logoutToken: string): Promise<LogoutTokenClaims> {\n\t\tconst client = await this.createOIDCClient(configuration)\n\t\treturn await validateOIDCLogoutToken(client, client.issuer, logoutToken)\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Resolve the requested scope, appending `offline_access` when refresh-token\n\t * re-validation is enabled (so the IdP issues a refresh token to revalidate against).\n\t */\n\tprivate resolveScope(configuration: OIDCConfiguration): string {\n\t\tconst baseScope = configuration.scope ?? configuration.claims ?? 'openid email'\n\t\tconst needsOfflineAccess = configuration.revalidation?.enabled === true\n\t\t\t&& (configuration.revalidation.method ?? 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package/dist/production/src/model/service/idp/providers/OIDCProvider.js

@@ -38,7 +38,10 @@ class OIDCProvider {
   }
   async revalidate(configuration, session) {
     const client = await this.createOIDCClient(configuration);
-    return await revalidateOIDC(client, configuration.revalidation?.method ?? "refresh", session);
+    return await revalidateOIDC(client, configuration.revalidation?.method ?? "refresh", session, {
+      claimMapping: configuration.claimMapping,
+      fetchUserInfo: configuration.fetchUserInfo
+    });
   }
   async buildLogoutUrl(configuration, request) {
     const client = await this.createOIDCClient(configuration);

package/dist/production/src/model/service/idp/providers/OIDCProvider.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"OIDCProvider.js","sources":["../../../../../../../../packages/engine-tenant-api/src/model/service/idp/providers/OIDCProvider.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { Client, custom, Issuer } from 'openid-client'\nimport {\n\tIdentityProviderHandler,\n\tIDPResponse,\n\tIDPSessionState,\n\tInitIDPAuthResult,\n\tLogoutTokenClaims,\n\tLogoutUrlRequest,\n\tRevalidationResult,\n} from '../IdentityProviderHandler.js'\nimport { InvalidIDPConfigurationError } from '../InvalidIDPConfigurationError.js'\nimport { catchTypesafe } from './helpers.js'\nimport { OIDCConfiguration, OIDCInitData, OIDCResponseData } from './OIDCTypes.js'\nimport { buildOIDCLogoutUrl, handleOIDCResponse, initOIDCAuth, revalidateOIDC, validateOIDCLogoutToken } from './OIDCHelpers.js'\nimport { IDPValidationError } from '../IDPValidationError.js'\n\nconst DEFAULT_OIDC_TIMEOUT = 5000\nconst OFFLINE_ACCESS_SCOPE = 'offline_access'\n\nexport class OIDCProvider implements IdentityProviderHandler<OIDCConfiguration> {\n\tprivate issuerCache: Record<string, Issuer<Client>> = {}\n\n\tvalidateConfiguration = catchTypesafe(OIDCConfiguration, InvalidIDPConfigurationError)\n\n\tpublic async initAuth(configuration: OIDCConfiguration, data: unknown): Promise<InitIDPAuthResult> {\n\t\tconst initData = catchTypesafe(OIDCInitData, IDPValidationError)(data)\n\t\tconst client = await this.createOIDCClient(configuration)\n\t\treturn await initOIDCAuth(client, {\n\t\t\tscope: this.resolveScope(configuration),\n\t\t\t...initData,\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tpublic async processResponse(configuration: OIDCConfiguration, data: unknown): Promise<IDPResponse> {\n\t\tconst responseData = catchTypesafe(OIDCResponseData, IDPValidationError)(data)\n\t\tconst client = await this.createOIDCClient(configuration)\n\t\treturn await handleOIDCResponse(\n\t\t\tclient,\n\t\t\tresponseData,\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\tfetchUserInfo: configuration.fetchUserInfo,\n\t\t\t\treturnOIDCResult: configuration.returnOIDCResult,\n\t\t\t\tcaptureSession: configuration.revalidation?.enabled === true,\n\t\t\t\tclaimMapping: configuration.claimMapping,\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t)\n\t}\n\n\tpublic async revalidate(configuration: OIDCConfiguration, session: IDPSessionState): Promise<RevalidationResult> {\n\t\tconst client = await this.createOIDCClient(configuration)\n\t\treturn await revalidateOIDC(client, configuration.revalidation?.method ?? 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+{"version":3,"file":"OIDCProvider.js","sources":["../../../../../../../../packages/engine-tenant-api/src/model/service/idp/providers/OIDCProvider.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { Client, custom, Issuer } from 'openid-client'\nimport {\n\tIdentityProviderHandler,\n\tIDPResponse,\n\tIDPSessionState,\n\tInitIDPAuthResult,\n\tLogoutTokenClaims,\n\tLogoutUrlRequest,\n\tRevalidationResult,\n} from '../IdentityProviderHandler.js'\nimport { InvalidIDPConfigurationError } from '../InvalidIDPConfigurationError.js'\nimport { catchTypesafe } from './helpers.js'\nimport { OIDCConfiguration, OIDCInitData, OIDCResponseData } from './OIDCTypes.js'\nimport { buildOIDCLogoutUrl, handleOIDCResponse, initOIDCAuth, revalidateOIDC, validateOIDCLogoutToken } from './OIDCHelpers.js'\nimport { IDPValidationError } from '../IDPValidationError.js'\n\nconst DEFAULT_OIDC_TIMEOUT = 5000\nconst OFFLINE_ACCESS_SCOPE = 'offline_access'\n\nexport class OIDCProvider implements IdentityProviderHandler<OIDCConfiguration> {\n\tprivate issuerCache: Record<string, Issuer<Client>> = {}\n\n\tvalidateConfiguration = catchTypesafe(OIDCConfiguration, InvalidIDPConfigurationError)\n\n\tpublic async initAuth(configuration: OIDCConfiguration, data: unknown): Promise<InitIDPAuthResult> {\n\t\tconst initData = catchTypesafe(OIDCInitData, IDPValidationError)(data)\n\t\tconst client = await this.createOIDCClient(configuration)\n\t\treturn await initOIDCAuth(client, {\n\t\t\tscope: this.resolveScope(configuration),\n\t\t\t...initData,\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tpublic async processResponse(configuration: OIDCConfiguration, data: unknown): Promise<IDPResponse> {\n\t\tconst responseData = catchTypesafe(OIDCResponseData, IDPValidationError)(data)\n\t\tconst client = await this.createOIDCClient(configuration)\n\t\treturn await handleOIDCResponse(\n\t\t\tclient,\n\t\t\tresponseData,\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\tfetchUserInfo: configuration.fetchUserInfo,\n\t\t\t\treturnOIDCResult: configuration.returnOIDCResult,\n\t\t\t\tcaptureSession: configuration.revalidation?.enabled === true,\n\t\t\t\tclaimMapping: configuration.claimMapping,\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t)\n\t}\n\n\tpublic async revalidate(configuration: OIDCConfiguration, session: IDPSessionState): Promise<RevalidationResult> {\n\t\tconst client = await this.createOIDCClient(configuration)\n\t\treturn await revalidateOIDC(client, configuration.revalidation?.method ?? 'refresh', session, {\n\t\t\tclaimMapping: configuration.claimMapping,\n\t\t\tfetchUserInfo: configuration.fetchUserInfo,\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tpublic async buildLogoutUrl(configuration: OIDCConfiguration, request: LogoutUrlRequest): Promise<string | null> {\n\t\tconst client = await this.createOIDCClient(configuration)\n\t\treturn buildOIDCLogoutUrl(client, request)\n\t}\n\n\tpublic async validateLogoutToken(configuration: OIDCConfiguration, logoutToken: string): Promise<LogoutTokenClaims> {\n\t\tconst client = await this.createOIDCClient(configuration)\n\t\treturn await validateOIDCLogoutToken(client, client.issuer, logoutToken)\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Resolve the requested scope, appending `offline_access` when refresh-token\n\t * re-validation is enabled (so the IdP issues a refresh token to revalidate against).\n\t */\n\tprivate resolveScope(configuration: OIDCConfiguration): string {\n\t\tconst baseScope = configuration.scope ?? configuration.claims ?? 'openid email'\n\t\tconst needsOfflineAccess = configuration.revalidation?.enabled === true\n\t\t\t&& (configuration.revalidation.method ?? 'refresh') === 'refresh'\n\t\tif (needsOfflineAccess && !baseScope.split(/\\s+/).includes(OFFLINE_ACCESS_SCOPE)) {\n\t\t\treturn `${baseScope} ${OFFLINE_ACCESS_SCOPE}`\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn baseScope\n\t}\n\n\tgetPublicConfiguration({ clientSecret, ...config }: OIDCConfiguration): Partial<OIDCConfiguration> {\n\t\treturn config\n\t}\n\n\tprivate async createOIDCClient(configuration: OIDCConfiguration): Promise<Client> {\n\t\tthis.issuerCache[configuration.url] ??= await Issuer.discover(configuration.url)\n\n\t\tconst client = new this.issuerCache[configuration.url].Client(\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\tclient_id: configuration.clientId,\n\t\t\t\tclient_secret: configuration.clientSecret,\n\t\t\t\tresponse_types: [configuration.responseType || 'code'],\n\t\t\t\tid_token_signed_response_alg: configuration.idTokenSignedResponseAlg ?? 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package/dist/production/src/model/utils/DatabaseContext.cjs

@@ -20,11 +20,16 @@ class DatabaseContext {
   get queryHandler() {
     return this.client.createQueryHandler();
   }
-  async transaction(cb) {
-    return await this.client.transaction(async (db) => {
+  async transaction(cb, options = {}) {
+    const run = async () => await this.client.transaction(async (db) => {
       await db.query(Database.Connection.REPEATABLE_READ);
       return await cb(new DatabaseContext(db, this.providers));
     });
+    const retry = options.retry;
+    if (!retry) {
+      return await run();
+    }
+    return await Database.retryTransaction(run, (message) => retry.logger.warn(message));
   }
   async scope(cb) {
     return await this.client.scope(async (db) => {

package/dist/production/src/model/utils/DatabaseContext.cjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"DatabaseContext.cjs","sources":["../../../../../../packages/engine-tenant-api/src/model/utils/DatabaseContext.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { Client, Connection } from '@contember/database'\nimport { Providers } from '../providers.js'\nimport { CommandBus } from '../commands/index.js'\nimport { BatchLoaderArgs, initBatchLoader, ItemLoader } from '../../utils/batchQuery.js'\n\nexport class DatabaseContext<Conn extends Connection.ConnectionLike = Connection.ConnectionLike> {\n\tprivate loaders = new Map<BatchLoaderArgs<any, any, any>, ItemLoader<any, any>>()\n\n\tconstructor(\n\t\tpublic readonly client: Client<Conn>,\n\t\tpublic readonly providers: Providers,\n\t) {\n\t}\n\n\tpublic get commandBus() {\n\t\treturn new CommandBus(this.client, this.providers)\n\t}\n\n\tpublic get queryHandler() {\n\t\treturn this.client.createQueryHandler()\n\t}\n\n\tpublic async transaction<T>(cb: (dbContext: DatabaseContext<Connection.TransactionLike>) => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {\n\t\treturn await this.client.transaction(async db => {\n\t\t\tawait db.query(Connection.REPEATABLE_READ)\n\t\t\treturn await cb(new DatabaseContext(db, this.providers))\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tpublic async scope<T>(cb: (dbContext: DatabaseContext<Connection.AcquiredConnectionLike>) => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {\n\t\treturn await this.client.scope(async db => {\n\t\t\treturn await cb(new DatabaseContext(db, this.providers))\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tpublic batchLoad<Arg, Result, Item>(loaderArgs: BatchLoaderArgs<Arg, Result, Item>, arg: Arg): Promise<Item> {\n\t\tconst existing = this.loaders.get(loaderArgs)\n\t\tif (existing) {\n\t\t\treturn existing(arg)\n\t\t}\n\t\tconst newLoader = initBatchLoader(loaderArgs, this)\n\t\tthis.loaders.set(loaderArgs, newLoader)\n\t\treturn newLoader(arg)\n\t}\n}\n"],"names":["CommandBus","Connection","initBatchLoader"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;AAKO,MAAM,gBAAoF;AAAA,EAGhG,YACiB,QACA,WACf;AAFe,SAAA,SAAA;AACA,SAAA,YAAA;AAJjB,kBAAA,MAAQ,+BAAc,IAAA,CAA0D;AAAA,EAMhF;AAAA,EAEA,IAAW,aAAa;AACvB,WAAO,IAAIA,WAAAA,WAAW,KAAK,QAAQ,KAAK,SAAS;AAAA,EAClD;AAAA,EAEA,IAAW,eAAe;AACzB,WAAO,KAAK,OAAO,mBAAA;AAAA,EACpB;AAAA,EAEA,MAAa,YAAe,IAAwF;AACnH,WAAO,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,YAAY,OAAM,OAAM;AAChD,YAAM,GAAG,MAAMC,SAAAA,WAAW,eAAe;AACzC,aAAO,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,gBAAgB,IAAI,KAAK,SAAS,CAAC;AAAA,IACxD,CAAC;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EAEA,MAAa,MAAS,IAA+F;AACpH,WAAO,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,MAAM,OAAM,OAAM;AAC1C,aAAO,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,gBAAgB,IAAI,KAAK,SAAS,CAAC;AAAA,IACxD,CAAC;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EAEO,UAA6B,YAAgD,KAAyB;AAC5G,UAAM,WAAW,KAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,UAAU;AAC5C,QAAI,UAAU;AACb,aAAO,SAAS,GAAG;AAAA,IACpB;AACA,UAAM,YAAYC,WAAAA,gBAAgB,YAAY,IAAI;AAClD,SAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,YAAY,SAAS;AACtC,WAAO,UAAU,GAAG;AAAA,EACrB;AACD;;"}
+{"version":3,"file":"DatabaseContext.cjs","sources":["../../../../../../packages/engine-tenant-api/src/model/utils/DatabaseContext.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { Client, Connection, retryTransaction } from '@contember/database'\nimport { Logger } from '@contember/logger'\nimport { Providers } from '../providers.js'\nimport { CommandBus } from '../commands/index.js'\nimport { BatchLoaderArgs, initBatchLoader, ItemLoader } from '../../utils/batchQuery.js'\n\nexport interface TransactionOptions {\n\t/**\n\t * Repeat the transaction when postgres aborts it with a serialization failure (40001) — the standing cost of the\n\t * repeatable-read level every transaction here runs at.\n\t *\n\t * Opt in only when the callback has no effect outside the transaction: several managers send a mail from inside\n\t * one (InviteManager, EmailChangeManager, PasswordlessSignInManager) and a retry would send it twice.\n\t */\n\tretry?: { logger: Logger }\n}\n\nexport class DatabaseContext<Conn extends Connection.ConnectionLike = Connection.ConnectionLike> {\n\tprivate loaders = new Map<BatchLoaderArgs<any, any, any>, ItemLoader<any, any>>()\n\n\tconstructor(\n\t\tpublic readonly client: Client<Conn>,\n\t\tpublic readonly providers: Providers,\n\t) {\n\t}\n\n\tpublic get commandBus() {\n\t\treturn new CommandBus(this.client, this.providers)\n\t}\n\n\tpublic get queryHandler() {\n\t\treturn this.client.createQueryHandler()\n\t}\n\n\tpublic async transaction<T>(\n\t\tcb: (dbContext: DatabaseContext<Connection.TransactionLike>) => Promise<T>,\n\t\toptions: TransactionOptions = {},\n\t): Promise<T> {\n\t\tconst run = async () =>\n\t\t\tawait this.client.transaction(async db => {\n\t\t\t\tawait db.query(Connection.REPEATABLE_READ)\n\t\t\t\treturn await cb(new DatabaseContext(db, this.providers))\n\t\t\t})\n\t\tconst retry = options.retry\n\t\tif (!retry) {\n\t\t\treturn await run()\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn await retryTransaction(run, message => retry.logger.warn(message))\n\t}\n\n\tpublic async scope<T>(cb: (dbContext: DatabaseContext<Connection.AcquiredConnectionLike>) => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {\n\t\treturn await this.client.scope(async db => {\n\t\t\treturn await cb(new DatabaseContext(db, this.providers))\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tpublic batchLoad<Arg, Result, Item>(loaderArgs: BatchLoaderArgs<Arg, Result, Item>, arg: Arg): Promise<Item> {\n\t\tconst existing = this.loaders.get(loaderArgs)\n\t\tif (existing) {\n\t\t\treturn existing(arg)\n\t\t}\n\t\tconst newLoader = initBatchLoader(loaderArgs, this)\n\t\tthis.loaders.set(loaderArgs, newLoader)\n\t\treturn newLoader(arg)\n\t}\n}\n"],"names":["CommandBus","Connection","retryTransaction","initBatchLoader"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;AAiBO,MAAM,gBAAoF;AAAA,EAGhG,YACiB,QACA,WACf;AAFe,SAAA,SAAA;AACA,SAAA,YAAA;AAJjB,kBAAA,MAAQ,+BAAc,IAAA,CAA0D;AAAA,EAMhF;AAAA,EAEA,IAAW,aAAa;AACvB,WAAO,IAAIA,WAAAA,WAAW,KAAK,QAAQ,KAAK,SAAS;AAAA,EAClD;AAAA,EAEA,IAAW,eAAe;AACzB,WAAO,KAAK,OAAO,mBAAA;AAAA,EACpB;AAAA,EAEA,MAAa,YACZ,IACA,UAA8B,IACjB;AACb,UAAM,MAAM,YACX,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,YAAY,OAAM,OAAM;AACzC,YAAM,GAAG,MAAMC,SAAAA,WAAW,eAAe;AACzC,aAAO,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,gBAAgB,IAAI,KAAK,SAAS,CAAC;AAAA,IACxD,CAAC;AACF,UAAM,QAAQ,QAAQ;AACtB,QAAI,CAAC,OAAO;AACX,aAAO,MAAM,IAAA;AAAA,IACd;AACA,WAAO,MAAMC,SAAAA,iBAAiB,KAAK,CAAA,YAAW,MAAM,OAAO,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC;AAAA,EACzE;AAAA,EAEA,MAAa,MAAS,IAA+F;AACpH,WAAO,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,MAAM,OAAM,OAAM;AAC1C,aAAO,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,gBAAgB,IAAI,KAAK,SAAS,CAAC;AAAA,IACxD,CAAC;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EAEO,UAA6B,YAAgD,KAAyB;AAC5G,UAAM,WAAW,KAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,UAAU;AAC5C,QAAI,UAAU;AACb,aAAO,SAAS,GAAG;AAAA,IACpB;AACA,UAAM,YAAYC,WAAAA,gBAAgB,YAAY,IAAI;AAClD,SAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,YAAY,SAAS;AACtC,WAAO,UAAU,GAAG;AAAA,EACrB;AACD;;"}

package/dist/production/src/model/utils/DatabaseContext.js

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { Connection } from "@contember/database";
+import { retryTransaction, Connection } from "@contember/database";
 import "../type/ApiKey.js";
 import { initBatchLoader } from "../../utils/batchQuery.js";
 import "node:crypto";
@@ -18,11 +18,16 @@ class DatabaseContext {
   get queryHandler() {
     return this.client.createQueryHandler();
   }
-  async transaction(cb) {
-    return await this.client.transaction(async (db) => {
+  async transaction(cb, options = {}) {
+    const run = async () => await this.client.transaction(async (db) => {
       await db.query(Connection.REPEATABLE_READ);
       return await cb(new DatabaseContext(db, this.providers));
     });
+    const retry = options.retry;
+    if (!retry) {
+      return await run();
+    }
+    return await retryTransaction(run, (message) => retry.logger.warn(message));
   }
   async scope(cb) {
     return await this.client.scope(async (db) => {

package/dist/production/src/model/utils/DatabaseContext.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"DatabaseContext.js","sources":["../../../../../../packages/engine-tenant-api/src/model/utils/DatabaseContext.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { Client, Connection } from '@contember/database'\nimport { Providers } from '../providers.js'\nimport { CommandBus } from '../commands/index.js'\nimport { BatchLoaderArgs, initBatchLoader, ItemLoader } from '../../utils/batchQuery.js'\n\nexport class DatabaseContext<Conn extends Connection.ConnectionLike = Connection.ConnectionLike> {\n\tprivate loaders = new Map<BatchLoaderArgs<any, any, any>, ItemLoader<any, any>>()\n\n\tconstructor(\n\t\tpublic readonly client: Client<Conn>,\n\t\tpublic readonly providers: Providers,\n\t) {\n\t}\n\n\tpublic get commandBus() {\n\t\treturn new CommandBus(this.client, this.providers)\n\t}\n\n\tpublic get queryHandler() {\n\t\treturn this.client.createQueryHandler()\n\t}\n\n\tpublic async transaction<T>(cb: (dbContext: DatabaseContext<Connection.TransactionLike>) => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {\n\t\treturn await this.client.transaction(async db => {\n\t\t\tawait db.query(Connection.REPEATABLE_READ)\n\t\t\treturn await cb(new DatabaseContext(db, this.providers))\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tpublic async scope<T>(cb: (dbContext: DatabaseContext<Connection.AcquiredConnectionLike>) => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {\n\t\treturn await this.client.scope(async db => {\n\t\t\treturn await cb(new DatabaseContext(db, this.providers))\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tpublic batchLoad<Arg, Result, Item>(loaderArgs: BatchLoaderArgs<Arg, Result, Item>, arg: Arg): Promise<Item> {\n\t\tconst existing = this.loaders.get(loaderArgs)\n\t\tif (existing) {\n\t\t\treturn existing(arg)\n\t\t}\n\t\tconst newLoader = initBatchLoader(loaderArgs, this)\n\t\tthis.loaders.set(loaderArgs, newLoader)\n\t\treturn newLoader(arg)\n\t}\n}\n"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;;;;;;AAKO,MAAM,gBAAoF;AAAA,EAGhG,YACiB,QACA,WACf;AAFe,SAAA,SAAA;AACA,SAAA,YAAA;AAJjB,kBAAA,MAAQ,+BAAc,IAAA,CAA0D;AAAA,EAMhF;AAAA,EAEA,IAAW,aAAa;AACvB,WAAO,IAAI,WAAW,KAAK,QAAQ,KAAK,SAAS;AAAA,EAClD;AAAA,EAEA,IAAW,eAAe;AACzB,WAAO,KAAK,OAAO,mBAAA;AAAA,EACpB;AAAA,EAEA,MAAa,YAAe,IAAwF;AACnH,WAAO,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,YAAY,OAAM,OAAM;AAChD,YAAM,GAAG,MAAM,WAAW,eAAe;AACzC,aAAO,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,gBAAgB,IAAI,KAAK,SAAS,CAAC;AAAA,IACxD,CAAC;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EAEA,MAAa,MAAS,IAA+F;AACpH,WAAO,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,MAAM,OAAM,OAAM;AAC1C,aAAO,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,gBAAgB,IAAI,KAAK,SAAS,CAAC;AAAA,IACxD,CAAC;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EAEO,UAA6B,YAAgD,KAAyB;AAC5G,UAAM,WAAW,KAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,UAAU;AAC5C,QAAI,UAAU;AACb,aAAO,SAAS,GAAG;AAAA,IACpB;AACA,UAAM,YAAY,gBAAgB,YAAY,IAAI;AAClD,SAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,YAAY,SAAS;AACtC,WAAO,UAAU,GAAG;AAAA,EACrB;AACD;"}
+{"version":3,"file":"DatabaseContext.js","sources":["../../../../../../packages/engine-tenant-api/src/model/utils/DatabaseContext.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { Client, Connection, retryTransaction } from '@contember/database'\nimport { Logger } from '@contember/logger'\nimport { Providers } from '../providers.js'\nimport { CommandBus } from '../commands/index.js'\nimport { BatchLoaderArgs, initBatchLoader, ItemLoader } from '../../utils/batchQuery.js'\n\nexport interface TransactionOptions {\n\t/**\n\t * Repeat the transaction when postgres aborts it with a serialization failure (40001) — the standing cost of the\n\t * repeatable-read level every transaction here runs at.\n\t *\n\t * Opt in only when the callback has no effect outside the transaction: several managers send a mail from inside\n\t * one (InviteManager, EmailChangeManager, PasswordlessSignInManager) and a retry would send it twice.\n\t */\n\tretry?: { logger: Logger }\n}\n\nexport class DatabaseContext<Conn extends Connection.ConnectionLike = Connection.ConnectionLike> {\n\tprivate loaders = new Map<BatchLoaderArgs<any, any, any>, ItemLoader<any, any>>()\n\n\tconstructor(\n\t\tpublic readonly client: Client<Conn>,\n\t\tpublic readonly providers: Providers,\n\t) {\n\t}\n\n\tpublic get commandBus() {\n\t\treturn new CommandBus(this.client, this.providers)\n\t}\n\n\tpublic get queryHandler() {\n\t\treturn this.client.createQueryHandler()\n\t}\n\n\tpublic async transaction<T>(\n\t\tcb: (dbContext: DatabaseContext<Connection.TransactionLike>) => Promise<T>,\n\t\toptions: TransactionOptions = {},\n\t): Promise<T> {\n\t\tconst run = async () =>\n\t\t\tawait this.client.transaction(async db => {\n\t\t\t\tawait db.query(Connection.REPEATABLE_READ)\n\t\t\t\treturn await cb(new DatabaseContext(db, this.providers))\n\t\t\t})\n\t\tconst retry = options.retry\n\t\tif (!retry) {\n\t\t\treturn await run()\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn await retryTransaction(run, message => retry.logger.warn(message))\n\t}\n\n\tpublic async scope<T>(cb: (dbContext: DatabaseContext<Connection.AcquiredConnectionLike>) => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {\n\t\treturn await this.client.scope(async db => {\n\t\t\treturn await cb(new DatabaseContext(db, this.providers))\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tpublic batchLoad<Arg, Result, Item>(loaderArgs: BatchLoaderArgs<Arg, Result, Item>, arg: Arg): Promise<Item> {\n\t\tconst existing = this.loaders.get(loaderArgs)\n\t\tif (existing) {\n\t\t\treturn existing(arg)\n\t\t}\n\t\tconst newLoader = initBatchLoader(loaderArgs, this)\n\t\tthis.loaders.set(loaderArgs, newLoader)\n\t\treturn newLoader(arg)\n\t}\n}\n"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;;;;;;AAiBO,MAAM,gBAAoF;AAAA,EAGhG,YACiB,QACA,WACf;AAFe,SAAA,SAAA;AACA,SAAA,YAAA;AAJjB,kBAAA,MAAQ,+BAAc,IAAA,CAA0D;AAAA,EAMhF;AAAA,EAEA,IAAW,aAAa;AACvB,WAAO,IAAI,WAAW,KAAK,QAAQ,KAAK,SAAS;AAAA,EAClD;AAAA,EAEA,IAAW,eAAe;AACzB,WAAO,KAAK,OAAO,mBAAA;AAAA,EACpB;AAAA,EAEA,MAAa,YACZ,IACA,UAA8B,IACjB;AACb,UAAM,MAAM,YACX,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,YAAY,OAAM,OAAM;AACzC,YAAM,GAAG,MAAM,WAAW,eAAe;AACzC,aAAO,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,gBAAgB,IAAI,KAAK,SAAS,CAAC;AAAA,IACxD,CAAC;AACF,UAAM,QAAQ,QAAQ;AACtB,QAAI,CAAC,OAAO;AACX,aAAO,MAAM,IAAA;AAAA,IACd;AACA,WAAO,MAAM,iBAAiB,KAAK,CAAA,YAAW,MAAM,OAAO,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC;AAAA,EACzE;AAAA,EAEA,MAAa,MAAS,IAA+F;AACpH,WAAO,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,MAAM,OAAM,OAAM;AAC1C,aAAO,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,gBAAgB,IAAI,KAAK,SAAS,CAAC;AAAA,IACxD,CAAC;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EAEO,UAA6B,YAAgD,KAAyB;AAC5G,UAAM,WAAW,KAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,UAAU;AAC5C,QAAI,UAAU;AACb,aAAO,SAAS,GAAG;AAAA,IACpB;AACA,UAAM,YAAY,gBAAgB,YAAY,IAAI;AAClD,SAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,YAAY,SAAS;AACtC,WAAO,UAAU,GAAG;AAAA,EACrB;AACD;"}