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data/books/machiavelli-the_prince.txt

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+Nicolo Machiavelli was born at Florence on 3rd May 1469. He was the
+second son of Bernardo di Nicolo Machiavelli, a lawyer of some repute,
+and of Bartolommea di Stefano Nelli, his wife. Both parents were
+members of the old Florentine nobility.
+
+His life falls naturally into three periods, each of which singularly
+enough constitutes a distinct and important era in the history of
+Florence. His youth was concurrent with the greatness of Florence as an
+Italian power under the guidance of Lorenzo de’ Medici, Il Magnifico.
+The downfall of the Medici in Florence occurred in 1494, in which year
+Machiavelli entered the public service. During his official career
+Florence was free under the government of a Republic, which lasted
+until 1512, when the Medici returned to power, and Machiavelli lost his
+office. The Medici again ruled Florence from 1512 until 1527, when they
+were once more driven out. This was the period of Machiavelli’s
+literary activity and increasing influence; but he died, within a few
+weeks of the expulsion of the Medici, on 22nd June 1527, in his
+fifty-eighth year, without having regained office.
+
+Although there is little recorded of the youth of Machiavelli, the
+Florence of those days is so well known that the early environment of
+this representative citizen may be easily imagined. Florence has been
+described as a city with two opposite currents of life, one directed by
+the fervent and austere Savonarola, the other by the splendour-loving
+Lorenzo. Savonarola’s influence upon the young Machiavelli must have
+been slight, for although at one time he wielded immense power over the
+fortunes of Florence, he only furnished Machiavelli with a subject of a
+gibe in _The Prince_, where he is cited as an example of an unarmed
+prophet who came to a bad end. Whereas the magnificence of the Medicean
+rule during the life of Lorenzo appeared to have impressed Machiavelli
+strongly, for he frequently recurs to it in his writings, and it is to
+Lorenzo’s grandson that he dedicates _The Prince_.
+
+Machiavelli, in his “History of Florence,” gives us a picture of the
+young men among whom his youth was passed. He writes: “They were freer
+than their forefathers in dress and living, and spent more in other
+kinds of excesses, consuming their time and money in idleness, gaming,
+and women; their chief aim was to appear well dressed and to speak with
+wit and acuteness, whilst he who could wound others the most cleverly
+was thought the wisest.” In a letter to his son Guido, Machiavelli
+shows why youth should avail itself of its opportunities for study, and
+leads us to infer that his own youth had been so occupied. He writes:
+“I have received your letter, which has given me the greatest pleasure,
+especially because you tell me you are quite restored in health, than
+which I could have no better news; for if God grant life to you, and to
+me, I hope to make a good man of you if you are willing to do your
+share.” Then, writing of a new patron, he continues: “This will turn
+out well for you, but it is necessary for you to study; since, then,
+you have no longer the excuse of illness, take pains to study letters
+and music, for you see what honour is done to me for the little skill I
+have. Therefore, my son, if you wish to please me, and to bring success
+and honour to yourself, do right and study, because others will help
+you if you help yourself.”
+
+The second period of Machiavelli’s life was spent in the service of the
+free Republic of Florence, which flourished, as stated above, from the
+expulsion of the Medici in 1494 until their return in 1512. After
+serving four years in one of the public offices he was appointed
+Chancellor and Secretary to the Second Chancery, the Ten of Liberty and
+Peace. Here we are on firm ground when dealing with the events of
+Machiavelli’s life, for during this time he took a leading part in the
+affairs of the Republic, and we have its decrees, records, and
+dispatches to guide us, as well as his own writings. A mere
+recapitulation of a few of his transactions with the statesmen and
+soldiers of his time gives a fair indication of his activities, and
+supplies the sources from which he drew the experiences and characters
+which illustrate _The Prince_.
+
+His first mission was in 1499 to Catherina Sforza, “my lady of Forli”
+of _The Prince_, from whose conduct and fate he drew the moral that it
+is far better to earn the confidence of the people than to rely on
+fortresses. This is a very noticeable principle in Machiavelli, and is
+urged by him in many ways as a matter of vital importance to princes.
+
+In 1500 he was sent to France to obtain terms from Louis XII for
+continuing the war against Pisa: this king it was who, in his conduct
+of affairs in Italy, committed the five capital errors in statecraft
+summarized in _The Prince_, and was consequently driven out. He, also,
+it was who made the dissolution of his marriage a condition of support
+to Pope Alexander VI; which leads Machiavelli to refer those who urge
+that such promises should be kept to what he has written concerning the
+faith of princes.
+
+Machiavelli’s public life was largely occupied with events arising out
+of the ambitions of Pope Alexander VI and his son, Cesare Borgia, the
+Duke Valentino, and these characters fill a large space of _The
+Prince_. Machiavelli never hesitates to cite the actions of the duke
+for the benefit of usurpers who wish to keep the states they have
+seized; he can, indeed, find no precepts to offer so good as the
+pattern of Cesare Borgia’s conduct, insomuch that Cesare is acclaimed
+by some critics as the “hero” of _The Prince_. Yet in _The Prince_ the
+duke is in point of fact cited as a type of the man who rises on the
+fortune of others, and falls with them; who takes every course that
+might be expected from a prudent man but the course which will save
+him; who is prepared for all eventualities but the one which happens;
+and who, when all his abilities fail to carry him through, exclaims
+that it was not his fault, but an extraordinary and unforeseen
+fatality.
+
+On the death of Pius III, in 1503, Machiavelli was sent to Rome to
+watch the election of his successor, and there he saw Cesare Borgia
+cheated into allowing the choice of the College to fall on Giuliano
+delle Rovere (Julius II), who was one of the cardinals that had most
+reason to fear the duke. Machiavelli, when commenting on this election,
+says that he who thinks new favours will cause great personages to
+forget old injuries deceives himself. Julius did not rest until he had
+ruined Cesare.
+
+It was to Julius II that Machiavelli was sent in 1506, when that
+pontiff was commencing his enterprise against Bologna; which he brought
+to a successful issue, as he did many of his other adventures, owing
+chiefly to his impetuous character. It is in reference to Pope Julius
+that Machiavelli moralizes on the resemblance between Fortune and
+women, and concludes that it is the bold rather than the cautious man
+that will win and hold them both.
+
+It is impossible to follow here the varying fortunes of the Italian
+states, which in 1507 were controlled by France, Spain, and Germany,
+with results that have lasted to our day; we are concerned with those
+events, and with the three great actors in them, so far only as they
+impinge on the personality of Machiavelli. He had several meetings with
+Louis XII of France, and his estimate of that monarch’s character has
+already been alluded to. Machiavelli has painted Ferdinand of Aragon as
+the man who accomplished great things under the cloak of religion, but
+who in reality had no mercy, faith, humanity, or integrity; and who,
+had he allowed himself to be influenced by such motives, would have
+been ruined. The Emperor Maximilian was one of the most interesting men
+of the age, and his character has been drawn by many hands; but
+Machiavelli, who was an envoy at his court in 1507-8, reveals the
+secret of his many failures when he describes him as a secretive man,
+without force of character—ignoring the human agencies necessary to
+carry his schemes into effect, and never insisting on the fulfilment of
+his wishes.
+
+The remaining years of Machiavelli’s official career were filled with
+events arising out of the League of Cambrai, made in 1508 between the
+three great European powers already mentioned and the pope, with the
+object of crushing the Venetian Republic. This result was attained in
+the battle of Vaila, when Venice lost in one day all that she had won
+in eight hundred years. Florence had a difficult part to play during
+these events, complicated as they were by the feud which broke out
+between the pope and the French, because friendship with France had
+dictated the entire policy of the Republic. When, in 1511, Julius II
+finally formed the Holy League against France, and with the assistance
+of the Swiss drove the French out of Italy, Florence lay at the mercy
+of the Pope, and had to submit to his terms, one of which was that the
+Medici should be restored. The return of the Medici to Florence on 1st
+September 1512, and the consequent fall of the Republic, was the signal
+for the dismissal of Machiavelli and his friends, and thus put an end
+to his public career, for, as we have seen, he died without regaining
+office.
+
+On the return of the Medici, Machiavelli, who for a few weeks had
+vainly hoped to retain his office under the new masters of Florence,
+was dismissed by decree dated 7th November 1512. Shortly after this he
+was accused of complicity in an abortive conspiracy against the Medici,
+imprisoned, and put to the question by torture. The new Medicean pope,
+Leo X, procured his release, and he retired to his small property at
+San Casciano, near Florence, where he devoted himself to literature. In
+a letter to Francesco Vettori, dated 13th December 1513, he has left a
+very interesting description of his life at this period, which
+elucidates his methods and his motives in writing _The Prince_. After
+describing his daily occupations with his family and neighbours, he
+writes: “The evening being come, I return home and go to my study; at
+the entrance I pull off my peasant-clothes, covered with dust and dirt,
+and put on my noble court dress, and thus becomingly re-clothed I pass
+into the ancient courts of the men of old, where, being lovingly
+received by them, I am fed with that food which is mine alone; where I
+do not hesitate to speak with them, and to ask for the reason of their
+actions, and they in their benignity answer me; and for four hours I
+feel no weariness, I forget every trouble, poverty does not dismay,
+death does not terrify me; I am possessed entirely by those great men.
+And because Dante says:
+
+Knowledge doth come of learning well retained,
+Unfruitful else,
+
+I have noted down what I have gained from their conversation, and have
+composed a small work on ‘Principalities,’ where I pour myself out as
+fully as I can in meditation on the subject, discussing what a
+principality is, what kinds there are, how they can be acquired, how
+they can be kept, why they are lost: and if any of my fancies ever
+pleased you, this ought not to displease you: and to a prince,
+especially to a new one, it should be welcome: therefore I dedicate it
+to his Magnificence Giuliano. Filippo Casavecchio has seen it; he will
+be able to tell you what is in it, and of the discourses I have had
+with him; nevertheless, I am still enriching and polishing it.”
+
+The “little book” suffered many vicissitudes before attaining the form
+in which it has reached us. Various mental influences were at work
+during its composition; its title and patron were changed; and for some
+unknown reason it was finally dedicated to Lorenzo de’ Medici. Although
+Machiavelli discussed with Casavecchio whether it should be sent or
+presented in person to the patron, there is no evidence that Lorenzo
+ever received or even read it: he certainly never gave Machiavelli any
+employment. Although it was plagiarized during Machiavelli’s lifetime,
+_The Prince_ was never published by him, and its text is still
+disputable.
+
+Machiavelli concludes his letter to Vettori thus: “And as to this
+little thing [his book], when it has been read it will be seen that
+during the fifteen years I have given to the study of statecraft I have
+neither slept nor idled; and men ought ever to desire to be served by
+one who has reaped experience at the expense of others. And of my
+loyalty none could doubt, because having always kept faith I could not
+now learn how to break it; for he who has been faithful and honest, as
+I have, cannot change his nature; and my poverty is a witness to my
+honesty.”
+
+Before Machiavelli had got _The Prince_ off his hands he commenced his
+“Discourse on the First Decade of Titus Livius,” which should be read
+concurrently with _The Prince_. These and several minor works occupied
+him until the year 1518, when he accepted a small commission to look
+after the affairs of some Florentine merchants at Genoa. In 1519 the
+Medicean rulers of Florence granted a few political concessions to her
+citizens, and Machiavelli with others was consulted upon a new
+constitution under which the Great Council was to be restored; but on
+one pretext or another it was not promulgated.
+
+In 1520 the Florentine merchants again had recourse to Machiavelli to
+settle their difficulties with Lucca, but this year was chiefly
+remarkable for his re-entry into Florentine literary society, where he
+was much sought after, and also for the production of his “Art of War.”
+It was in the same year that he received a commission at the instance
+of Cardinal de’ Medici to write the “History of Florence,” a task which
+occupied him until 1525. His return to popular favour may have
+determined the Medici to give him this employment, for an old writer
+observes that “an able statesman out of work, like a huge whale, will
+endeavour to overturn the ship unless he has an empty cask to play
+with.”
+
+When the “History of Florence” was finished, Machiavelli took it to
+Rome for presentation to his patron, Giuliano de’ Medici, who had in
+the meanwhile become pope under the title of Clement VII. It is
+somewhat remarkable that, as, in 1513, Machiavelli had written _The
+Prince_ for the instruction of the Medici after they had just regained
+power in Florence, so, in 1525, he dedicated the “History of Florence”
+to the head of the family when its ruin was now at hand. In that year
+the battle of Pavia destroyed the French rule in Italy, and left
+Francis I a prisoner in the hands of his great rival, Charles V. This
+was followed by the sack of Rome, upon the news of which the popular
+party at Florence threw off the yoke of the Medici, who were once more
+banished.
+
+Machiavelli was absent from Florence at this time, but hastened his
+return, hoping to secure his former office of secretary to the “Ten of
+Liberty and Peace.” Unhappily he was taken ill soon after he reached
+Florence, where he died on 22nd June 1527.
+
+No one can say where the bones of Machiavelli rest, but modern Florence
+has decreed him a stately cenotaph in Santa Croce, by the side of her
+most famous sons; recognizing that, whatever other nations may have
+found in his works, Italy found in them the idea of her unity and the
+germs of her renaissance among the nations of Europe. Whilst it is idle
+to protest against the world-wide and evil signification of his name,
+it may be pointed out that the harsh construction of his doctrine which
+this sinister reputation implies was unknown to his own day, and that
+the researches of recent times have enabled us to interpret him more
+reasonably. It is due to these inquiries that the shape of an “unholy
+necromancer,” which so long haunted men’s vision, has begun to fade.
+
+Machiavelli was undoubtedly a man of great observation, acuteness, and
+industry; noting with appreciative eye whatever passed before him, and
+with his supreme literary gift turning it to account in his enforced
+retirement from affairs. He does not present himself, nor is he
+depicted by his contemporaries, as a type of that rare combination, the
+successful statesman and author, for he appears to have been only
+moderately prosperous in his several embassies and political
+employments. He was misled by Catherina Sforza, ignored by Louis XII,
+overawed by Cesare Borgia; several of his embassies were quite barren
+of results; his attempts to fortify Florence failed, and the soldiery
+that he raised astonished everybody by their cowardice. In the conduct
+of his own affairs he was timid and time-serving; he dared not appear
+by the side of Soderini, to whom he owed so much, for fear of
+compromising himself; his connection with the Medici was open to
+suspicion, and Giuliano appears to have recognized his real forte when
+he set him to write the “History of Florence,” rather than employ him
+in the state. And it is on the literary side of his character, and
+there alone, that we find no weakness and no failure.
+
+Although the light of almost four centuries has been focused on _The
+Prince_, its problems are still debatable and interesting, because they
+are the eternal problems between the ruled and their rulers. Such as
+they are, its ethics are those of Machiavelli’s contemporaries; yet
+they cannot be said to be out of date so long as the governments of
+Europe rely on material rather than on moral forces. Its historical
+incidents and personages become interesting by reason of the uses which
+Machiavelli makes of them to illustrate his theories of government and
+conduct.
+
+Leaving out of consideration those maxims of state which still furnish
+some European and eastern statesmen with principles of action, _The
+Prince_ is bestrewn with truths that can be proved at every turn. Men
+are still the dupes of their simplicity and greed, as they were in the
+days of Alexander VI. The cloak of religion still conceals the vices
+which Machiavelli laid bare in the character of Ferdinand of Aragon.
+Men will not look at things as they really are, but as they wish them
+to be—and are ruined. In politics there are no perfectly safe courses;
+prudence consists in choosing the least dangerous ones. Then—to pass to
+a higher plane—Machiavelli reiterates that, although crimes may win an
+empire, they do not win glory. Necessary wars are just wars, and the
+arms of a nation are hallowed when it has no other resource but to
+fight.
+
+It is the cry of a far later day than Machiavelli’s that government
+should be elevated into a living moral force, capable of inspiring the
+people with a just recognition of the fundamental principles of
+society; to this “high argument” _The Prince_ contributes but little.
+Machiavelli always refused to write either of men or of governments
+otherwise than as he found them, and he writes with such skill and
+insight that his work is of abiding value. But what invests _The
+Prince_ with more than a merely artistic or historical interest is the
+incontrovertible truth that it deals with the great principles which
+still guide nations and rulers in their relationship with each other
+and their neighbours.
+
+In translating _The Prince_ my aim has been to achieve at all costs an
+exact literal rendering of the original, rather than a fluent
+paraphrase adapted to the modern notions of style and expression.
+Machiavelli was no facile phrasemonger; the conditions under which he
+wrote obliged him to weigh every word; his themes were lofty, his
+substance grave, his manner nobly plain and serious. _Quis eo fuit
+unquam in partiundis rebus, in definiendis, in explanandis pressior?_
+In _The Prince_, it may be truly said, there is reason assignable, not
+only for every word, but for the position of every word. To an
+Englishman of Shakespeare’s time the translation of such a treatise was
+in some ways a comparatively easy task, for in those times the genius
+of the English more nearly resembled that of the Italian language; to
+the Englishman of to-day it is not so simple. To take a single example:
+the word _intrattenere_, employed by Machiavelli to indicate the policy
+adopted by the Roman Senate towards the weaker states of Greece, would
+by an Elizabethan be correctly rendered “entertain,” and every
+contemporary reader would understand what was meant by saying that
+“Rome _entertained_ the Ætolians and the Achaeans without augmenting
+their power.” But to-day such a phrase would seem obsolete and
+ambiguous, if not unmeaning: we are compelled to say that “_Rome
+maintained friendly relations with the Ætolians_,” etc., using four
+words to do the work of one. I have tried to preserve the pithy brevity
+of the Italian so far as was consistent with an absolute fidelity to
+the sense. If the result be an occasional asperity I can only hope that
+the reader, in his eagerness to reach the author’s meaning, may
+overlook the roughness of the road that leads him to it.
+
+Principal works. Discorso sopra le cose di Pisa, 1499; Del modo di
+trattare i popoli della Valdichiana ribellati, 1502; Del modo tenuto
+dal duca Valentino nell’ ammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da
+Fermo, etc., 1502; Discorso sopra la provisione del danaro, 1502;
+Decennale primo (poem in terza rima), 1506; Ritratti delle cose dell’
+Alemagna, 1508-12; Decennale secondo, 1509; Ritratti delle cose di
+Francia, 1510; Discorsi sopra la prima deca di T. Livio, 3 vols.,
+1512-17; Il Principe, 1513; Andria, comedy translated from Terence,
+1513 (?); Mandragola, prose comedy in five acts, with prologue in
+verse, 1513; Della lingua (dialogue), 1514; Clizia, comedy in prose,
+1515 (?); Belfagor arcidiavolo (novel), 1515; Asino d’oro (poem in
+terza rima), 1517; Dell’ arte della guerra, 1519-20; Discorso sopra il
+riformare lo stato di Firenze, 1520; Sommario delle cose della citta di
+Lucca, 1520; Vita di Castruccio Castracani da Lucca, 1520; Istorie
+fiorentine, 8 books, 1521-5; Frammenti storici, 1525.
+
+To the Magnificent Lorenzo Di Piero De’ Medici
+
+Those who strive to obtain the good graces of a prince are accustomed
+to come before him with such things as they hold most precious, or in
+which they see him take most delight; whence one often sees horses,
+arms, cloth of gold, precious stones, and similar ornaments presented
+to princes, worthy of their greatness.
+
+Desiring therefore to present myself to your Magnificence with some
+testimony of my devotion towards you, I have not found among my
+possessions anything which I hold more dear than, or value so much as,
+the knowledge of the actions of great men, acquired by long experience
+in contemporary affairs, and a continual study of antiquity; which,
+having reflected upon it with great and prolonged diligence, I now
+send, digested into a little volume, to your Magnificence.
+
+And although I may consider this work unworthy of your countenance,
+nevertheless I trust much to your benignity that it may be acceptable,
+seeing that it is not possible for me to make a better gift than to
+offer you the opportunity of understanding in the shortest time all
+that I have learnt in so many years, and with so many troubles and
+dangers; which work I have not embellished with swelling or magnificent
+words, nor stuffed with rounded periods, nor with any extrinsic
+allurements or adornments whatever, with which so many are accustomed
+to embellish their works; for I have wished either that no honour
+should be given it, or else that the truth of the matter and the
+weightiness of the theme shall make it acceptable.
+
+Nor do I hold with those who regard it as a presumption if a man of low
+and humble condition dare to discuss and settle the concerns of
+princes; because, just as those who draw landscapes place themselves
+below in the plain to contemplate the nature of the mountains and of
+lofty places, and in order to contemplate the plains place themselves
+upon high mountains, even so to understand the nature of the people it
+needs to be a prince, and to understand that of princes it needs to be
+of the people.
+
+Take then, your Magnificence, this little gift in the spirit in which I
+send it; wherein, if it be diligently read and considered by you, you
+will learn my extreme desire that you should attain that greatness
+which fortune and your other attributes promise. And if your
+Magnificence from the summit of your greatness will sometimes turn your
+eyes to these lower regions, you will see how unmeritedly I suffer a
+great and continued malignity of fortune.
+
+All states, all powers, that have held and hold rule over men have been
+and are either republics or principalities.
+
+Principalities are either hereditary, in which the family has been long
+established; or they are new.
+
+The new are either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or
+they are, as it were, members annexed to the hereditary state of the
+prince who has acquired them, as was the kingdom of Naples to that of
+the King of Spain.
+
+Such dominions thus acquired are either accustomed to live under a
+prince, or to live in freedom; and are acquired either by the arms of
+the prince himself, or of others, or else by fortune or by ability.
+
+I will leave out all discussion on republics, inasmuch as in another
+place I have written of them at length, and will address myself only to
+principalities. In doing so I will keep to the order indicated above,
+and discuss how such principalities are to be ruled and preserved.
+
+I say at once there are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary
+states, and those long accustomed to the family of their prince, than
+new ones; for it is sufficient only not to transgress the customs of
+his ancestors, and to deal prudently with circumstances as they arise,
+for a prince of average powers to maintain himself in his state, unless
+he be deprived of it by some extraordinary and excessive force; and if
+he should be so deprived of it, whenever anything sinister happens to
+the usurper, he will regain it.
+
+We have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara, who could not have
+withstood the attacks of the Venetians in ’84, nor those of Pope Julius
+in ’10, unless he had been long established in his dominions. For the
+hereditary prince has less cause and less necessity to offend; hence it
+happens that he will be more loved; and unless extraordinary vices
+cause him to be hated, it is reasonable to expect that his subjects
+will be naturally well disposed towards him; and in the antiquity and
+duration of his rule the memories and motives that make for change are
+lost, for one change always leaves the toothing for another.
+
+But the difficulties occur in a new principality. And firstly, if it be
+not entirely new, but is, as it were, a member of a state which, taken
+collectively, may be called composite, the changes arise chiefly from
+an inherent difficulty which there is in all new principalities; for
+men change their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves, and
+this hope induces them to take up arms against him who rules: wherein
+they are deceived, because they afterwards find by experience they have
+gone from bad to worse. This follows also on another natural and common
+necessity, which always causes a new prince to burden those who have
+submitted to him with his soldiery and with infinite other hardships
+which he must put upon his new acquisition.
+
+In this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in
+seizing that principality, and you are not able to keep those friends
+who put you there because of your not being able to satisfy them in the
+way they expected, and you cannot take strong measures against them,
+feeling bound to them. For, although one may be very strong in armed
+forces, yet in entering a province one has always need of the goodwill
+of the natives.
+
+For these reasons Louis the Twelfth, King of France, quickly occupied
+Milan, and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out the first time it
+only needed Lodovico’s own forces; because those who had opened the
+gates to him, finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future
+benefit, would not endure the ill-treatment of the new prince. It is
+very true that, after acquiring rebellious provinces a second time,
+they are not so lightly lost afterwards, because the prince, with
+little reluctance, takes the opportunity of the rebellion to punish the
+delinquents, to clear out the suspects, and to strengthen himself in
+the weakest places. Thus to cause France to lose Milan the first time
+it was enough for the Duke Lodovico[1] to raise insurrections on the
+borders; but to cause him to lose it a second time it was necessary to
+bring the whole world against him, and that his armies should be
+defeated and driven out of Italy; which followed from the causes above
+mentioned.
+
+ [1] Duke Lodovico was Lodovico Moro, a son of Francesco Sforza, who
+ married Beatrice d’Este. He ruled over Milan from 1494 to 1500, and
+ died in 1510.
+
+Nevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and the second
+time. The general reasons for the first have been discussed; it remains
+to name those for the second, and to see what resources he had, and
+what any one in his situation would have had for maintaining himself
+more securely in his acquisition than did the King of France.
+
+Now I say that those dominions which, when acquired, are added to an
+ancient state by him who acquires them, are either of the same country
+and language, or they are not. When they are, it is easier to hold
+them, especially when they have not been accustomed to self-government;
+and to hold them securely it is enough to have destroyed the family of
+the prince who was ruling them; because the two peoples, preserving in
+other things the old conditions, and not being unlike in customs, will
+live quietly together, as one has seen in Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony,
+and Normandy, which have been bound to France for so long a time: and,
+although there may be some difference in language, nevertheless the
+customs are alike, and the people will easily be able to get on amongst
+themselves. He who has annexed them, if he wishes to hold them, has
+only to bear in mind two considerations: the one, that the family of
+their former lord is extinguished; the other, that neither their laws
+nor their taxes are altered, so that in a very short time they will
+become entirely one body with the old principality.
+
+But when states are acquired in a country differing in language,
+customs, or laws, there are difficulties, and good fortune and great
+energy are needed to hold them, and one of the greatest and most real
+helps would be that he who has acquired them should go and reside
+there. This would make his position more secure and durable, as it has
+made that of the Turk in Greece, who, notwithstanding all the other
+measures taken by him for holding that state, if he had not settled
+there, would not have been able to keep it. Because, if one is on the
+spot, disorders are seen as they spring up, and one can quickly remedy
+them; but if one is not at hand, they are heard of only when they are
+great, and then one can no longer remedy them. Besides this, the
+country is not pillaged by your officials; the subjects are satisfied
+by prompt recourse to the prince; thus, wishing to be good, they have
+more cause to love him, and wishing to be otherwise, to fear him. He
+who would attack that state from the outside must have the utmost
+caution; as long as the prince resides there it can only be wrested
+from him with the greatest difficulty.
+
+The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places,
+which may be as keys to that state, for it is necessary either to do
+this or else to keep there a great number of cavalry and infantry. A
+prince does not spend much on colonies, for with little or no expense
+he can send them out and keep them there, and he offends a minority
+only of the citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them
+to the new inhabitants; and those whom he offends, remaining poor and
+scattered, are never able to injure him; whilst the rest being
+uninjured are easily kept quiet, and at the same time are anxious not
+to err for fear it should happen to them as it has to those who have
+been despoiled. In conclusion, I say that these colonies are not
+costly, they are more faithful, they injure less, and the injured, as
+has been said, being poor and scattered, cannot hurt. Upon this, one
+has to remark that men ought either to be well treated or crushed,
+because they can avenge themselves of lighter injuries, of more serious
+ones they cannot; therefore the injury that is to be done to a man
+ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in fear of revenge.
+
+But in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends much
+more, having to consume on the garrison all the income from the state,
+so that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are
+exasperated, because the whole state is injured; through the shifting
+of the garrison up and down all become acquainted with hardship, and
+all become hostile, and they are enemies who, whilst beaten on their
+own ground, are yet able to do hurt. For every reason, therefore, such
+guards are as useless as a colony is useful.
+
+Again, the prince who holds a country differing in the above respects
+ought to make himself the head and defender of his less powerful
+neighbours, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking care
+that no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get a
+footing there; for it will always happen that such a one will be
+introduced by those who are discontented, either through excess of
+ambition or through fear, as one has seen already. The Romans were
+brought into Greece by the Ætolians; and in every other country where
+they obtained a footing they were brought in by the inhabitants. And
+the usual course of affairs is that, as soon as a powerful foreigner
+enters a country, all the subject states are drawn to him, moved by the
+hatred which they feel against the ruling power. So that in respect to
+those subject states he has not to take any trouble to gain them over
+to himself, for the whole of them quickly rally to the state which he
+has acquired there. He has only to take care that they do not get hold
+of too much power and too much authority, and then with his own forces,
+and with their goodwill, he can easily keep down the more powerful of
+them, so as to remain entirely master in the country. And he who does
+not properly manage this business will soon lose what he has acquired,
+and whilst he does hold it he will have endless difficulties and
+troubles.
+
+The Romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed closely these
+measures; they sent colonies and maintained friendly relations with[2]
+the minor powers, without increasing their strength; they kept down the
+greater, and did not allow any strong foreign powers to gain authority.
+Greece appears to me sufficient for an example. The Achaeans and
+Ætolians were kept friendly by them, the kingdom of Macedonia was
+humbled, Antiochus was driven out; yet the merits of the Achaeans and
+Ætolians never secured for them permission to increase their power, nor
+did the persuasions of Philip ever induce the Romans to be his friends
+without first humbling him, nor did the influence of Antiochus make
+them agree that he should retain any lordship over the country. Because
+the Romans did in these instances what all prudent princes ought to do,
+who have to regard not only present troubles, but also future ones, for
+which they must prepare with every energy, because, when foreseen, it
+is easy to remedy them; but if you wait until they approach, the
+medicine is no longer in time because the malady has become incurable;
+for it happens in this, as the physicians say it happens in hectic
+fever, that in the beginning of the malady it is easy to cure but
+difficult to detect, but in the course of time, not having been either
+detected or treated in the beginning, it becomes easy to detect but
+difficult to cure. Thus it happens in affairs of state, for when the
+evils that arise have been foreseen (which it is only given to a wise
+man to see), they can be quickly redressed, but when, through not
+having been foreseen, they have been permitted to grow in a way that
+every one can see them, there is no longer a remedy. Therefore, the
+Romans, foreseeing troubles, dealt with them at once, and, even to
+avoid a war, would not let them come to a head, for they knew that war
+is not to be avoided, but is only to be put off to the advantage of
+others; moreover they wished to fight with Philip and Antiochus in
+Greece so as not to have to do it in Italy; they could have avoided
+both, but this they did not wish; nor did that ever please them which
+is forever in the mouths of the wise ones of our time:—Let us enjoy the
+benefits of the time—but rather the benefits of their own valour and
+prudence, for time drives everything before it, and is able to bring
+with it good as well as evil, and evil as well as good.
+
+ [2] See remark in the introduction on the word “intrattenere.”
+
+But let us turn to France and inquire whether she has done any of the
+things mentioned. I will speak of Louis[3] (and not of Charles)[4] as
+the one whose conduct is the better to be observed, he having held
+possession of Italy for the longest period; and you will see that he
+has done the opposite to those things which ought to be done to retain
+a state composed of divers elements.
+
+ [3] Louis XII, King of France, “The Father of the People,” born 1462,
+ died 1515.
+
+ [4] Charles VIII, King of France, born 1470, died 1498.
+
+King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians, who
+desired to obtain half the state of Lombardy by his intervention. I
+will not blame the course taken by the king, because, wishing to get a
+foothold in Italy, and having no friends there—seeing rather that every
+door was shut to him owing to the conduct of Charles—he was forced to
+accept those friendships which he could get, and he would have
+succeeded very quickly in his design if in other matters he had not
+made some mistakes. The king, however, having acquired Lombardy,
+regained at once the authority which Charles had lost: Genoa yielded;
+the Florentines became his friends; the Marquess of Mantua, the Duke of
+Ferrara, the Bentivogli, my lady of Forli, the Lords of Faenza, of
+Pesaro, of Rimini, of Camerino, of Piombino, the Lucchese, the Pisans,
+the Sienese—everybody made advances to him to become his friend. Then
+could the Venetians realize the rashness of the course taken by them,
+which, in order that they might secure two towns in Lombardy, had made
+the king master of two-thirds of Italy.
+
+Let any one now consider with what little difficulty the king could
+have maintained his position in Italy had he observed the rules above
+laid down, and kept all his friends secure and protected; for although
+they were numerous they were both weak and timid, some afraid of the
+Church, some of the Venetians, and thus they would always have been
+forced to stand in with him, and by their means he could easily have
+made himself secure against those who remained powerful. But he was no
+sooner in Milan than he did the contrary by assisting Pope Alexander to
+occupy the Romagna. It never occurred to him that by this action he was
+weakening himself, depriving himself of friends and of those who had
+thrown themselves into his lap, whilst he aggrandized the Church by
+adding much temporal power to the spiritual, thus giving it greater
+authority. And having committed this prime error, he was obliged to
+follow it up, so much so that, to put an end to the ambition of
+Alexander, and to prevent his becoming the master of Tuscany, he was
+himself forced to come into Italy.
+
+And as if it were not enough to have aggrandized the Church, and
+deprived himself of friends, he, wishing to have the kingdom of Naples,
+divided it with the King of Spain, and where he was the prime arbiter
+in Italy he takes an associate, so that the ambitious of that country
+and the malcontents of his own should have somewhere to shelter; and
+whereas he could have left in the kingdom his own pensioner as king, he
+drove him out, to put one there who was able to drive him, Louis, out
+in turn.
+
+The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men always
+do so when they can, and for this they will be praised not blamed; but
+when they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means, then there is
+folly and blame. Therefore, if France could have attacked Naples with
+her own forces she ought to have done so; if she could not, then she
+ought not to have divided it. And if the partition which she made with
+the Venetians in Lombardy was justified by the excuse that by it she
+got a foothold in Italy, this other partition merited blame, for it had
+not the excuse of that necessity.
+
+Therefore Louis made these five errors: he destroyed the minor powers,
+he increased the strength of one of the greater powers in Italy, he
+brought in a foreign power, he did not settle in the country, he did
+not send colonies. Which errors, had he lived, were not enough to
+injure him had he not made a sixth by taking away their dominions from
+the Venetians; because, had he not aggrandized the Church, nor brought
+Spain into Italy, it would have been very reasonable and necessary to
+humble them; but having first taken these steps, he ought never to have
+consented to their ruin, for they, being powerful, would always have
+kept off others from designs on Lombardy, to which the Venetians would
+never have consented except to become masters themselves there; also
+because the others would not wish to take Lombardy from France in order
+to give it to the Venetians, and to run counter to both they would not
+have had the courage.
+
+And if any one should say: “King Louis yielded the Romagna to Alexander
+and the kingdom to Spain to avoid war,” I answer for the reasons given
+above that a blunder ought never to be perpetrated to avoid war,
+because it is not to be avoided, but is only deferred to your
+disadvantage. And if another should allege the pledge which the king
+had given to the Pope that he would assist him in the enterprise, in
+exchange for the dissolution of his marriage[5] and for the cap to
+Rouen,[6] to that I reply what I shall write later on concerning the
+faith of princes, and how it ought to be kept.
+
+ [5] Louis XII divorced his wife, Jeanne, daughter of Louis XI, and
+ married in 1499 Anne of Brittany, widow of Charles VIII, in order to
+ retain the Duchy of Brittany for the crown.
+
+ [6] The Archbishop of Rouen. He was Georges d’Amboise, created a
+ cardinal by Alexander VI. Born 1460, died 1510.
+
+Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the
+conditions observed by those who have taken possession of countries and
+wished to retain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, but much that
+is reasonable and quite natural. And on these matters I spoke at Nantes
+with Rouen, when Valentino, as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope
+Alexander, was usually called, occupied the Romagna, and on Cardinal
+Rouen observing to me that the Italians did not understand war, I
+replied to him that the French did not understand statecraft, meaning
+that otherwise they would not have allowed the Church to reach such
+greatness. And in fact it has been seen that the greatness of the
+Church and of Spain in Italy has been caused by France, and her ruin
+may be attributed to them. From this a general rule is drawn which
+never or rarely fails: that he who is the cause of another becoming
+powerful is ruined; because that predominancy has been brought about
+either by astuteness or else by force, and both are distrusted by him
+who has been raised to power.
+
+Considering the difficulties which men have had to hold to a newly
+acquired state, some might wonder how, seeing that Alexander the Great
+became the master of Asia in a few years, and died whilst it was
+scarcely settled (whence it might appear reasonable that the whole
+empire would have rebelled), nevertheless his successors maintained
+themselves, and had to meet no other difficulty than that which arose
+among themselves from their own ambitions.
+
+I answer that the principalities of which one has record are found to
+be governed in two different ways; either by a prince, with a body of
+servants, who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by his
+favour and permission; or by a prince and barons, who hold that dignity
+by antiquity of blood and not by the grace of the prince. Such barons
+have states and their own subjects, who recognize them as lords and
+hold them in natural affection. Those states that are governed by a
+prince and his servants hold their prince in more consideration,
+because in all the country there is no one who is recognized as
+superior to him, and if they yield obedience to another they do it as
+to a minister and official, and they do not bear him any particular
+affection.
+
+The examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and the
+King of France. The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one
+lord, the others are his servants; and, dividing his kingdom into
+sanjaks, he sends there different administrators, and shifts and
+changes them as he chooses. But the King of France is placed in the
+midst of an ancient body of lords, acknowledged by their own subjects,
+and beloved by them; they have their own prerogatives, nor can the king
+take these away except at his peril. Therefore, he who considers both
+of these states will recognize great difficulties in seizing the state
+of the Turk, but, once it is conquered, great ease in holding it. The
+causes of the difficulties in seizing the kingdom of the Turk are that
+the usurper cannot be called in by the princes of the kingdom, nor can
+he hope to be assisted in his designs by the revolt of those whom the
+lord has around him. This arises from the reasons given above; for his
+ministers, being all slaves and bondmen, can only be corrupted with
+great difficulty, and one can expect little advantage from them when
+they have been corrupted, as they cannot carry the people with them,
+for the reasons assigned. Hence, he who attacks the Turk must bear in
+mind that he will find him united, and he will have to rely more on his
+own strength than on the revolt of others; but, if once the Turk has
+been conquered, and routed in the field in such a way that he cannot
+replace his armies, there is nothing to fear but the family of this
+prince, and, this being exterminated, there remains no one to fear, the
+others having no credit with the people; and as the conqueror did not
+rely on them before his victory, so he ought not to fear them after it.
+
+The contrary happens in kingdoms governed like that of France, because
+one can easily enter there by gaining over some baron of the kingdom,
+for one always finds malcontents and such as desire a change. Such men,
+for the reasons given, can open the way into the state and render the
+victory easy; but if you wish to hold it afterwards, you meet with
+infinite difficulties, both from those who have assisted you and from
+those you have crushed. Nor is it enough for you to have exterminated
+the family of the prince, because the lords that remain make themselves
+the heads of fresh movements against you, and as you are unable either
+to satisfy or exterminate them, that state is lost whenever time brings
+the opportunity.
+
+Now if you will consider what was the nature of the government of
+Darius, you will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk, and
+therefore it was only necessary for Alexander, first to overthrow him
+in the field, and then to take the country from him. After which
+victory, Darius being killed, the state remained secure to Alexander,
+for the above reasons. And if his successors had been united they would
+have enjoyed it securely and at their ease, for there were no tumults
+raised in the kingdom except those they provoked themselves.
+
+But it is impossible to hold with such tranquillity states constituted
+like that of France. Hence arose those frequent rebellions against the
+Romans in Spain, France, and Greece, owing to the many principalities
+there were in these states, of which, as long as the memory of them
+endured, the Romans always held an insecure possession; but with the
+power and long continuance of the empire the memory of them passed
+away, and the Romans then became secure possessors. And when fighting
+afterwards amongst themselves, each one was able to attach to himself
+his own parts of the country, according to the authority he had assumed
+there; and the family of the former lord being exterminated, none other
+than the Romans were acknowledged.
+
+When these things are remembered no one will marvel at the ease with
+which Alexander held the Empire of Asia, or at the difficulties which
+others have had to keep an acquisition, such as Pyrrhus and many more;
+this is not occasioned by the little or abundance of ability in the
+conqueror, but by the want of uniformity in the subject state.
+
+Whenever those states which have been acquired as stated have been
+accustomed to live under their own laws and in freedom, there are three
+courses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruin them, the
+next is to reside there in person, the third is to permit them to live
+under their own laws, drawing a tribute, and establishing within it an
+oligarchy which will keep it friendly to you. Because such a
+government, being created by the prince, knows that it cannot stand
+without his friendship and interest, and does its utmost to support
+him; and therefore he who would keep a city accustomed to freedom will
+hold it more easily by the means of its own citizens than in any other
+way.
+
+There are, for example, the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans held
+Athens and Thebes, establishing there an oligarchy: nevertheless they
+lost them. The Romans, in order to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia,
+dismantled them, and did not lose them. They wished to hold Greece as
+the Spartans held it, making it free and permitting its laws, and did
+not succeed. So to hold it they were compelled to dismantle many cities
+in the country, for in truth there is no safe way to retain them
+otherwise than by ruining them. And he who becomes master of a city
+accustomed to freedom and does not destroy it, may expect to be
+destroyed by it, for in rebellion it has always the watchword of
+liberty and its ancient privileges as a rallying point, which neither
+time nor benefits will ever cause it to forget. And whatever you may do
+or provide against, they never forget that name or their privileges
+unless they are disunited or dispersed, but at every chance they
+immediately rally to them, as Pisa after the hundred years she had been
+held in bondage by the Florentines.
+
+But when cities or countries are accustomed to live under a prince, and
+his family is exterminated, they, being on the one hand accustomed to
+obey and on the other hand not having the old prince, cannot agree in
+making one from amongst themselves, and they do not know how to govern
+themselves. For this reason they are very slow to take up arms, and a
+prince can gain them to himself and secure them much more easily. But
+in republics there is more vitality, greater hatred, and more desire
+for vengeance, which will never permit them to allow the memory of
+their former liberty to rest; so that the safest way is to destroy them
+or to reside there.
+
+Let no one be surprised if, in speaking of entirely new principalities
+as I shall do, I adduce the highest examples both of prince and of
+state; because men, walking almost always in paths beaten by others,
+and following by imitation their deeds, are yet unable to keep entirely
+to the ways of others or attain to the power of those they imitate. A
+wise man ought always to follow the paths beaten by great men, and to
+imitate those who have been supreme, so that if his ability does not
+equal theirs, at least it will savour of it. Let him act like the
+clever archers who, designing to hit the mark which yet appears too far
+distant, and knowing the limits to which the strength of their bow
+attains, take aim much higher than the mark, not to reach by their
+strength or arrow to so great a height, but to be able with the aid of
+so high an aim to hit the mark they wish to reach.
+
+I say, therefore, that in entirely new principalities, where there is a
+new prince, more or less difficulty is found in keeping them,
+accordingly as there is more or less ability in him who has acquired
+the state. Now, as the fact of becoming a prince from a private station
+presupposes either ability or fortune, it is clear that one or other of
+these things will mitigate in some degree many difficulties.
+Nevertheless, he who has relied least on fortune is established the
+strongest. Further, it facilitates matters when the prince, having no
+other state, is compelled to reside there in person.
+
+But to come to those who, by their own ability and not through fortune,
+have risen to be princes, I say that Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus,
+and such like are the most excellent examples. And although one may not
+discuss Moses, he having been a mere executor of the will of God, yet
+he ought to be admired, if only for that favour which made him worthy
+to speak with God. But in considering Cyrus and others who have
+acquired or founded kingdoms, all will be found admirable; and if their
+particular deeds and conduct shall be considered, they will not be
+found inferior to those of Moses, although he had so great a preceptor.
+And in examining their actions and lives one cannot see that they owed
+anything to fortune beyond opportunity, which brought them the material
+to mould into the form which seemed best to them. Without that
+opportunity their powers of mind would have been extinguished, and
+without those powers the opportunity would have come in vain.
+
+It was necessary, therefore, to Moses that he should find the people of
+Israel in Egypt enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, in order that
+they should be disposed to follow him so as to be delivered out of
+bondage. It was necessary that Romulus should not remain in Alba, and
+that he should be abandoned at his birth, in order that he should
+become King of Rome and founder of the fatherland. It was necessary
+that Cyrus should find the Persians discontented with the government of
+the Medes, and the Medes soft and effeminate through their long peace.
+Theseus could not have shown his ability had he not found the Athenians
+dispersed. These opportunities, therefore, made those men fortunate,
+and their high ability enabled them to recognize the opportunity
+whereby their country was ennobled and made famous.
+
+Those who by valorous ways become princes, like these men, acquire a
+principality with difficulty, but they keep it with ease. The
+difficulties they have in acquiring it rise in part from the new rules
+and methods which they are forced to introduce to establish their
+government and its security. And it ought to be remembered that there
+is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or
+more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the
+introduction of a new order of things, because the innovator has for
+enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and
+lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. This
+coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws on
+their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not readily
+believe in new things until they have had a long experience of them.
+Thus it happens that whenever those who are hostile have the
+opportunity to attack they do it like partisans, whilst the others
+defend lukewarmly, in such wise that the prince is endangered along
+with them.
+
+It is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss this matter
+thoroughly, to inquire whether these innovators can rely on themselves
+or have to depend on others: that is to say, whether, to consummate
+their enterprise, have they to use prayers or can they use force? In
+the first instance they always succeed badly, and never compass
+anything; but when they can rely on themselves and use force, then they
+are rarely endangered. Hence it is that all armed prophets have
+conquered, and the unarmed ones have been destroyed. Besides the
+reasons mentioned, the nature of the people is variable, and whilst it
+is easy to persuade them, it is difficult to fix them in that
+persuasion. And thus it is necessary to take such measures that, when
+they believe no longer, it may be possible to make them believe by
+force.
+
+If Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus had been unarmed they could not
+have enforced their constitutions for long—as happened in our time to
+Fra Girolamo Savonarola, who was ruined with his new order of things
+immediately the multitude believed in him no longer, and he had no
+means of keeping steadfast those who believed or of making the
+unbelievers to believe. Therefore such as these have great difficulties
+in consummating their enterprise, for all their dangers are in the
+ascent, yet with ability they will overcome them; but when these are
+overcome, and those who envied them their success are exterminated,
+they will begin to be respected, and they will continue afterwards
+powerful, secure, honoured, and happy.
+
+To these great examples I wish to add a lesser one; still it bears some
+resemblance to them, and I wish it to suffice me for all of a like
+kind: it is Hiero the Syracusan.[1] This man rose from a private
+station to be Prince of Syracuse, nor did he, either, owe anything to
+fortune but opportunity; for the Syracusans, being oppressed, chose him
+for their captain, afterwards he was rewarded by being made their
+prince. He was of so great ability, even as a private citizen, that one
+who writes of him says he wanted nothing but a kingdom to be a king.
+This man abolished the old soldiery, organized the new, gave up old
+alliances, made new ones; and as he had his own soldiers and allies, on
+such foundations he was able to build any edifice: thus, whilst he had
+endured much trouble in acquiring, he had but little in keeping.
+
+ [1] Hiero II, born about 307 B.C., died 216 B.C.
+
+Those who solely by good fortune become princes from being private
+citizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop; they
+have not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they
+have many when they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some state
+is given either for money or by the favour of him who bestows it; as
+happened to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the
+Hellespont, where princes were made by Darius, in order that they might
+hold the cities both for his security and his glory; as also were those
+emperors who, by the corruption of the soldiers, from being citizens
+came to empire. Such stand simply elevated upon the goodwill and the
+fortune of him who has elevated them—two most inconstant and unstable
+things. Neither have they the knowledge requisite for the position;
+because, unless they are men of great worth and ability, it is not
+reasonable to expect that they should know how to command, having
+always lived in a private condition; besides, they cannot hold it
+because they have not forces which they can keep friendly and faithful.
+
+States that rise unexpectedly, then, like all other things in nature
+which are born and grow rapidly, cannot leave their foundations and
+correspondencies[1] fixed in such a way that the first storm will not
+overthrow them; unless, as is said, those who unexpectedly become
+princes are men of so much ability that they know they have to be
+prepared at once to hold that which fortune has thrown into their laps,
+and that those foundations, which others have laid _before_ they became
+princes, they must lay _afterwards_.
+
+ [1] “Le radici e corrispondenze,” their roots (i.e. foundations) and
+ correspondencies or relations with other states—a common meaning of
+ “correspondence” and “correspondency” in the sixteenth and seventeenth
+ centuries.
+
+Concerning these two methods of rising to be a prince by ability or
+fortune, I wish to adduce two examples within our own recollection, and
+these are Francesco Sforza[2] and Cesare Borgia. Francesco, by proper
+means and with great ability, from being a private person rose to be
+Duke of Milan, and that which he had acquired with a thousand anxieties
+he kept with little trouble. On the other hand, Cesare Borgia, called
+by the people Duke Valentino, acquired his state during the ascendancy
+of his father, and on its decline he lost it, notwithstanding that he
+had taken every measure and done all that ought to be done by a wise
+and able man to fix firmly his roots in the states which the arms and
+fortunes of others had bestowed on him.
+
+ [2] Francesco Sforza, born 1401, died 1466. He married Bianca Maria
+ Visconti, a natural daughter of Filippo Visconti, the Duke of Milan,
+ on whose death he procured his own elevation to the duchy. Machiavelli
+ was the accredited agent of the Florentine Republic to Cesare Borgia
+ (1478-1507) during the transactions which led up to the assassinations
+ of the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia, and along with his letters to
+ his chiefs in Florence he has left an account, written ten years
+ before _The Prince_, of the proceedings of the duke in his
+ “Descritione del modo tenuto dal duca Valentino nello ammazzare
+ Vitellozzo Vitelli,” etc., a translation of which is appended to the
+ present work.
+
+Because, as is stated above, he who has not first laid his foundations
+may be able with great ability to lay them afterwards, but they will be
+laid with trouble to the architect and danger to the building. If,
+therefore, all the steps taken by the duke be considered, it will be
+seen that he laid solid foundations for his future power, and I do not
+consider it superfluous to discuss them, because I do not know what
+better precepts to give a new prince than the example of his actions;
+and if his dispositions were of no avail, that was not his fault, but
+the extraordinary and extreme malignity of fortune.
+
+Alexander the Sixth, in wishing to aggrandize the duke, his son, had
+many immediate and prospective difficulties. Firstly, he did not see
+his way to make him master of any state that was not a state of the
+Church; and if he was willing to rob the Church he knew that the Duke
+of Milan and the Venetians would not consent, because Faenza and Rimini
+were already under the protection of the Venetians. Besides this, he
+saw the arms of Italy, especially those by which he might have been
+assisted, in hands that would fear the aggrandizement of the Pope,
+namely, the Orsini and the Colonnesi and their following. It behoved
+him, therefore, to upset this state of affairs and embroil the powers,
+so as to make himself securely master of part of their states. This was
+easy for him to do, because he found the Venetians, moved by other
+reasons, inclined to bring back the French into Italy; he would not
+only not oppose this, but he would render it more easy by dissolving
+the former marriage of King Louis. Therefore the king came into Italy
+with the assistance of the Venetians and the consent of Alexander. He
+was no sooner in Milan than the Pope had soldiers from him for the
+attempt on the Romagna, which yielded to him on the reputation of the
+king. The duke, therefore, having acquired the Romagna and beaten the
+Colonnesi, while wishing to hold that and to advance further, was
+hindered by two things: the one, his forces did not appear loyal to
+him, the other, the goodwill of France: that is to say, he feared that
+the forces of the Orsini, which he was using, would not stand to him,
+that not only might they hinder him from winning more, but might
+themselves seize what he had won, and that the king might also do the
+same. Of the Orsini he had a warning when, after taking Faenza and
+attacking Bologna, he saw them go very unwillingly to that attack. And
+as to the king, he learned his mind when he himself, after taking the
+Duchy of Urbino, attacked Tuscany, and the king made him desist from
+that undertaking; hence the duke decided to depend no more upon the
+arms and the luck of others.
+
+For the first thing he weakened the Orsini and Colonnesi parties in
+Rome, by gaining to himself all their adherents who were gentlemen,
+making them his gentlemen, giving them good pay, and, according to
+their rank, honouring them with office and command in such a way that
+in a few months all attachment to the factions was destroyed and turned
+entirely to the duke. After this he awaited an opportunity to crush the
+Orsini, having scattered the adherents of the Colonna house. This came
+to him soon and he used it well; for the Orsini, perceiving at length
+that the aggrandizement of the duke and the Church was ruin to them,
+called a meeting of the Magione in Perugia. From this sprung the
+rebellion at Urbino and the tumults in the Romagna, with endless
+dangers to the duke, all of which he overcame with the help of the
+French. Having restored his authority, not to leave it at risk by
+trusting either to the French or other outside forces, he had recourse
+to his wiles, and he knew so well how to conceal his mind that, by the
+mediation of Signor Pagolo—whom the duke did not fail to secure with
+all kinds of attention, giving him money, apparel, and horses—the
+Orsini were reconciled, so that their simplicity brought them into his
+power at Sinigalia.[3] Having exterminated the leaders, and turned
+their partisans into his friends, the duke laid sufficiently good
+foundations to his power, having all the Romagna and the Duchy of
+Urbino; and the people now beginning to appreciate their prosperity, he
+gained them all over to himself. And as this point is worthy of notice,
+and to be imitated by others, I am not willing to leave it out.
+
+ [3] Sinigalia, 31st December 1502.
+
+When the duke occupied the Romagna he found it under the rule of weak
+masters, who rather plundered their subjects than ruled them, and gave
+them more cause for disunion than for union, so that the country was
+full of robbery, quarrels, and every kind of violence; and so, wishing
+to bring back peace and obedience to authority, he considered it
+necessary to give it a good governor. Thereupon he promoted Messer
+Ramiro d’Orco,[4] a swift and cruel man, to whom he gave the fullest
+power. This man in a short time restored peace and unity with the
+greatest success. Afterwards the duke considered that it was not
+advisable to confer such excessive authority, for he had no doubt but
+that he would become odious, so he set up a court of judgment in the
+country, under a most excellent president, wherein all cities had their
+advocates. And because he knew that the past severity had caused some
+hatred against himself, so, to clear himself in the minds of the
+people, and gain them entirely to himself, he desired to show that, if
+any cruelty had been practised, it had not originated with him, but in
+the natural sternness of the minister. Under this pretence he took
+Ramiro, and one morning caused him to be executed and left on the
+piazza at Cesena with the block and a bloody knife at his side. The
+barbarity of this spectacle caused the people to be at once satisfied
+and dismayed.
+
+ [4] Ramiro d’Orco. Ramiro de Lorqua.
+
+But let us return whence we started. I say that the duke, finding
+himself now sufficiently powerful and partly secured from immediate
+dangers by having armed himself in his own way, and having in a great
+measure crushed those forces in his vicinity that could injure him if
+he wished to proceed with his conquest, had next to consider France,
+for he knew that the king, who too late was aware of his mistake, would
+not support him. And from this time he began to seek new alliances and
+to temporize with France in the expedition which she was making towards
+the kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards who were besieging Gaeta.
+It was his intention to secure himself against them, and this he would
+have quickly accomplished had Alexander lived.
+
+Such was his line of action as to present affairs. But as to the future
+he had to fear, in the first place, that a new successor to the Church
+might not be friendly to him and might seek to take from him that which
+Alexander had given him, so he decided to act in four ways. Firstly, by
+exterminating the families of those lords whom he had despoiled, so as
+to take away that pretext from the Pope. Secondly, by winning to
+himself all the gentlemen of Rome, so as to be able to curb the Pope
+with their aid, as has been observed. Thirdly, by converting the
+college more to himself. Fourthly, by acquiring so much power before
+the Pope should die that he could by his own measures resist the first
+shock. Of these four things, at the death of Alexander, he had
+accomplished three. For he had killed as many of the dispossessed lords
+as he could lay hands on, and few had escaped; he had won over the
+Roman gentlemen, and he had the most numerous party in the college. And
+as to any fresh acquisition, he intended to become master of Tuscany,
+for he already possessed Perugia and Piombino, and Pisa was under his
+protection. And as he had no longer to study France (for the French
+were already driven out of the kingdom of Naples by the Spaniards, and
+in this way both were compelled to buy his goodwill), he pounced down
+upon Pisa. After this, Lucca and Siena yielded at once, partly through
+hatred and partly through fear of the Florentines; and the Florentines
+would have had no remedy had he continued to prosper, as he was
+prospering the year that Alexander died, for he had acquired so much
+power and reputation that he would have stood by himself, and no longer
+have depended on the luck and the forces of others, but solely on his
+own power and ability.
+
+But Alexander died five years after he had first drawn the sword. He
+left the duke with the state of Romagna alone consolidated, with the
+rest in the air, between two most powerful hostile armies, and sick
+unto death. Yet there were in the duke such boldness and ability, and
+he knew so well how men are to be won or lost, and so firm were the
+foundations which in so short a time he had laid, that if he had not
+had those armies on his back, or if he had been in good health, he
+would have overcome all difficulties. And it is seen that his
+foundations were good, for the Romagna awaited him for more than a
+month. In Rome, although but half alive, he remained secure; and whilst
+the Baglioni, the Vitelli, and the Orsini might come to Rome, they
+could not effect anything against him. If he could not have made Pope
+him whom he wished, at least the one whom he did not wish would not
+have been elected. But if he had been in sound health at the death of
+Alexander,[5] everything would have been different to him. On the day
+that Julius the Second[6] was elected, he told me that he had thought
+of everything that might occur at the death of his father, and had
+provided a remedy for all, except that he had never anticipated that,
+when the death did happen, he himself would be on the point to die.
+
+ [5] Alexander VI died of fever, 18th August 1503.
+
+ [6] Julius II was Giuliano della Rovere, Cardinal of San Pietro ad
+ Vincula, born 1443, died 1513.
+
+When all the actions of the duke are recalled, I do not know how to
+blame him, but rather it appears to be, as I have said, that I ought to
+offer him for imitation to all those who, by the fortune or the arms of
+others, are raised to government. Because he, having a lofty spirit and
+far-reaching aims, could not have regulated his conduct otherwise, and
+only the shortness of the life of Alexander and his own sickness
+frustrated his designs. Therefore, he who considers it necessary to
+secure himself in his new principality, to win friends, to overcome
+either by force or fraud, to make himself beloved and feared by the
+people, to be followed and revered by the soldiers, to exterminate
+those who have power or reason to hurt him, to change the old order of
+things for new, to be severe and gracious, magnanimous and liberal, to
+destroy a disloyal soldiery and to create new, to maintain friendship
+with kings and princes in such a way that they must help him with zeal
+and offend with caution, cannot find a more lively example than the
+actions of this man.
+
+Only can he be blamed for the election of Julius the Second, in whom he
+made a bad choice, because, as is said, not being able to elect a Pope
+to his own mind, he could have hindered any other from being elected
+Pope; and he ought never to have consented to the election of any
+cardinal whom he had injured or who had cause to fear him if they
+became pontiffs. For men injure either from fear or hatred. Those whom
+he had injured, amongst others, were San Pietro ad Vincula, Colonna,
+San Giorgio, and Ascanio.[7] The rest, in becoming Pope, had to fear
+him, Rouen and the Spaniards excepted; the latter from their
+relationship and obligations, the former from his influence, the
+kingdom of France having relations with him. Therefore, above
+everything, the duke ought to have created a Spaniard Pope, and,
+failing him, he ought to have consented to Rouen and not San Pietro ad
+Vincula. He who believes that new benefits will cause great personages
+to forget old injuries is deceived. Therefore, the duke erred in his
+choice, and it was the cause of his ultimate ruin.
+
+ [7] San Giorgio is Raffaello Riario. Ascanio is Ascanio Sforza.
+
+Although a prince may rise from a private station in two ways, neither
+of which can be entirely attributed to fortune or genius, yet it is
+manifest to me that I must not be silent on them, although one could be
+more copiously treated when I discuss republics. These methods are
+when, either by some wicked or nefarious ways, one ascends to the
+principality, or when by the favour of his fellow-citizens a private
+person becomes the prince of his country. And speaking of the first
+method, it will be illustrated by two examples—one ancient, the other
+modern—and without entering further into the subject, I consider these
+two examples will suffice those who may be compelled to follow them.
+
+Agathocles, the Sicilian,[1] became King of Syracuse not only from a
+private but from a low and abject position. This man, the son of a
+potter, through all the changes in his fortunes always led an infamous
+life. Nevertheless, he accompanied his infamies with so much ability of
+mind and body that, having devoted himself to the military profession,
+he rose through its ranks to be Praetor of Syracuse. Being established
+in that position, and having deliberately resolved to make himself
+prince and to seize by violence, without obligation to others, that
+which had been conceded to him by assent, he came to an understanding
+for this purpose with Amilcar, the Carthaginian, who, with his army,
+was fighting in Sicily. One morning he assembled the people and the
+senate of Syracuse, as if he had to discuss with them things relating
+to the Republic, and at a given signal the soldiers killed all the
+senators and the richest of the people; these dead, he seized and held
+the princedom of that city without any civil commotion. And although he
+was twice routed by the Carthaginians, and ultimately besieged, yet not
+only was he able to defend his city, but leaving part of his men for
+its defence, with the others he attacked Africa, and in a short time
+raised the siege of Syracuse. The Carthaginians, reduced to extreme
+necessity, were compelled to come to terms with Agathocles, and,
+leaving Sicily to him, had to be content with the possession of Africa.
+
+ [1] Agathocles the Sicilian, born 361 B.C., died 289 B.C.
+
+Therefore, he who considers the actions and the genius of this man will
+see nothing, or little, which can be attributed to fortune, inasmuch as
+he attained pre-eminence, as is shown above, not by the favour of any
+one, but step by step in the military profession, which steps were
+gained with a thousand troubles and perils, and were afterwards boldly
+held by him with many hazardous dangers. Yet it cannot be called talent
+to slay fellow-citizens, to deceive friends, to be without faith,
+without mercy, without religion; such methods may gain empire, but not
+glory. Still, if the courage of Agathocles in entering into and
+extricating himself from dangers be considered, together with his
+greatness of mind in enduring and overcoming hardships, it cannot be
+seen why he should be esteemed less than the most notable captain.
+Nevertheless, his barbarous cruelty and inhumanity with infinite
+wickedness do not permit him to be celebrated among the most excellent
+men. What he achieved cannot be attributed either to fortune or genius.
+
+In our times, during the rule of Alexander the Sixth, Oliverotto da
+Fermo, having been left an orphan many years before, was brought up by
+his maternal uncle, Giovanni Fogliani, and in the early days of his
+youth sent to fight under Pagolo Vitelli, that, being trained under his
+discipline, he might attain some high position in the military
+profession. After Pagolo died, he fought under his brother Vitellozzo,
+and in a very short time, being endowed with wit and a vigorous body
+and mind, he became the first man in his profession. But it appearing a
+paltry thing to serve under others, he resolved, with the aid of some
+citizens of Fermo, to whom the slavery of their country was dearer than
+its liberty, and with the help of the Vitelleschi, to seize Fermo. So
+he wrote to Giovanni Fogliani that, having been away from home for many
+years, he wished to visit him and his city, and in some measure to look
+upon his patrimony; and although he had not laboured to acquire
+anything except honour, yet, in order that the citizens should see he
+had not spent his time in vain, he desired to come honourably, so would
+be accompanied by one hundred horsemen, his friends and retainers; and
+he entreated Giovanni to arrange that he should be received honourably
+by the Fermians, all of which would be not only to his honour, but also
+to that of Giovanni himself, who had brought him up.
+
+Giovanni, therefore, did not fail in any attentions due to his nephew,
+and he caused him to be honourably received by the Fermians, and he
+lodged him in his own house, where, having passed some days, and having
+arranged what was necessary for his wicked designs, Oliverotto gave a
+solemn banquet to which he invited Giovanni Fogliani and the chiefs of
+Fermo. When the viands and all the other entertainments that are usual
+in such banquets were finished, Oliverotto artfully began certain grave
+discourses, speaking of the greatness of Pope Alexander and his son
+Cesare, and of their enterprises, to which discourse Giovanni and
+others answered; but he rose at once, saying that such matters ought to
+be discussed in a more private place, and he betook himself to a
+chamber, whither Giovanni and the rest of the citizens went in after
+him. No sooner were they seated than soldiers issued from secret places
+and slaughtered Giovanni and the rest. After these murders Oliverotto,
+mounted on horseback, rode up and down the town and besieged the chief
+magistrate in the palace, so that in fear the people were forced to
+obey him, and to form a government, of which he made himself the
+prince. He killed all the malcontents who were able to injure him, and
+strengthened himself with new civil and military ordinances, in such a
+way that, in the year during which he held the principality, not only
+was he secure in the city of Fermo, but he had become formidable to all
+his neighbours. And his destruction would have been as difficult as
+that of Agathocles if he had not allowed himself to be overreached by
+Cesare Borgia, who took him with the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia,
+as was stated above. Thus one year after he had committed this
+parricide, he was strangled, together with Vitellozzo, whom he had made
+his leader in valour and wickedness.
+
+Some may wonder how it can happen that Agathocles, and his like, after
+infinite treacheries and cruelties, should live for long secure in his
+country, and defend himself from external enemies, and never be
+conspired against by his own citizens; seeing that many others, by
+means of cruelty, have never been able even in peaceful times to hold
+the state, still less in the doubtful times of war. I believe that this
+follows from severities[2] being badly or properly used. Those may be
+called properly used, if of evil it is possible to speak well, that are
+applied at one blow and are necessary to one’s security, and that are
+not persisted in afterwards unless they can be turned to the advantage
+of the subjects. The badly employed are those which, notwithstanding
+they may be few in the commencement, multiply with time rather than
+decrease. Those who practise the first system are able, by aid of God
+or man, to mitigate in some degree their rule, as Agathocles did. It is
+impossible for those who follow the other to maintain themselves.
+
+ [2] Mr Burd suggests that this word probably comes near the modern
+ equivalent of Machiavelli’s thought when he speaks of “crudelta” than
+ the more obvious “cruelties.”
+
+Hence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a state, the usurper ought
+to examine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary for
+him to inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have to
+repeat them daily; and thus by not unsettling men he will be able to
+reassure them, and win them to himself by benefits. He who does
+otherwise, either from timidity or evil advice, is always compelled to
+keep the knife in his hand; neither can he rely on his subjects, nor
+can they attach themselves to him, owing to their continued and
+repeated wrongs. For injuries ought to be done all at one time, so
+that, being tasted less, they offend less; benefits ought to be given
+little by little, so that the flavour of them may last longer.
+
+And above all things, a prince ought to live amongst his people in such
+a way that no unexpected circumstances, whether of good or evil, shall
+make him change; because if the necessity for this comes in troubled
+times, you are too late for harsh measures; and mild ones will not help
+you, for they will be considered as forced from you, and no one will be
+under any obligation to you for them.
+
+But coming to the other point—where a leading citizen becomes the
+prince of his country, not by wickedness or any intolerable violence,
+but by the favour of his fellow citizens—this may be called a civil
+principality: nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain
+to it, but rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that such a
+principality is obtained either by the favour of the people or by the
+favour of the nobles. Because in all cities these two distinct parties
+are found, and from this it arises that the people do not wish to be
+ruled nor oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule and
+oppress the people; and from these two opposite desires there arises in
+cities one of three results, either a principality, self-government, or
+anarchy.
+
+A principality is created either by the people or by the nobles,
+accordingly as one or other of them has the opportunity; for the
+nobles, seeing they cannot withstand the people, begin to cry up the
+reputation of one of themselves, and they make him a prince, so that
+under his shadow they can give vent to their ambitions. The people,
+finding they cannot resist the nobles, also cry up the reputation of
+one of themselves, and make him a prince so as to be defended by his
+authority. He who obtains sovereignty by the assistance of the nobles
+maintains himself with more difficulty than he who comes to it by the
+aid of the people, because the former finds himself with many around
+him who consider themselves his equals, and because of this he can
+neither rule nor manage them to his liking. But he who reaches
+sovereignty by popular favour finds himself alone, and has none around
+him, or few, who are not prepared to obey him.
+
+Besides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to others,
+satisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for their object is
+more righteous than that of the nobles, the latter wishing to oppress,
+while the former only desire not to be oppressed. It is to be added
+also that a prince can never secure himself against a hostile people,
+because of there being too many, whilst from the nobles he can secure
+himself, as they are few in number. The worst that a prince may expect
+from a hostile people is to be abandoned by them; but from hostile
+nobles he has not only to fear abandonment, but also that they will
+rise against him; for they, being in these affairs more far-seeing and
+astute, always come forward in time to save themselves, and to obtain
+favours from him whom they expect to prevail. Further, the prince is
+compelled to live always with the same people, but he can do well
+without the same nobles, being able to make and unmake them daily, and
+to give or take away authority when it pleases him.
+
+Therefore, to make this point clearer, I say that the nobles ought to
+be looked at mainly in two ways: that is to say, they either shape
+their course in such a way as binds them entirely to your fortune, or
+they do not. Those who so bind themselves, and are not rapacious, ought
+to be honoured and loved; those who do not bind themselves may be dealt
+with in two ways; they may fail to do this through pusillanimity and a
+natural want of courage, in which case you ought to make use of them,
+especially of those who are of good counsel; and thus, whilst in
+prosperity you honour them, in adversity you do not have to fear them.
+But when for their own ambitious ends they shun binding themselves, it
+is a token that they are giving more thought to themselves than to you,
+and a prince ought to guard against such, and to fear them as if they
+were open enemies, because in adversity they always help to ruin him.
+
+Therefore, one who becomes a prince through the favour of the people
+ought to keep them friendly, and this he can easily do seeing they only
+ask not to be oppressed by him. But one who, in opposition to the
+people, becomes a prince by the favour of the nobles, ought, above
+everything, to seek to win the people over to himself, and this he may
+easily do if he takes them under his protection. Because men, when they
+receive good from him of whom they were expecting evil, are bound more
+closely to their benefactor; thus the people quickly become more
+devoted to him than if he had been raised to the principality by their
+favours; and the prince can win their affections in many ways, but as
+these vary according to the circumstances one cannot give fixed rules,
+so I omit them; but, I repeat, it is necessary for a prince to have the
+people friendly, otherwise he has no security in adversity.
+
+Nabis,[1] Prince of the Spartans, sustained the attack of all Greece,
+and of a victorious Roman army, and against them he defended his
+country and his government; and for the overcoming of this peril it was
+only necessary for him to make himself secure against a few, but this
+would not have been sufficient had the people been hostile. And do not
+let any one impugn this statement with the trite proverb that “He who
+builds on the people, builds on the mud,” for this is true when a
+private citizen makes a foundation there, and persuades himself that
+the people will free him when he is oppressed by his enemies or by the
+magistrates; wherein he would find himself very often deceived, as
+happened to the Gracchi in Rome and to Messer Giorgio Scali[2] in
+Florence. But granted a prince who has established himself as above,
+who can command, and is a man of courage, undismayed in adversity, who
+does not fail in other qualifications, and who, by his resolution and
+energy, keeps the whole people encouraged—such a one will never find
+himself deceived in them, and it will be shown that he has laid his
+foundations well.
+
+ [1] Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, conquered by the Romans under Flamininus
+ in 195 B.C.; killed 192 B.C.
+
+ [2] Messer Giorgio Scali. This event is to be found in Machiavelli’s
+ “Florentine History,” Book III.
+
+These principalities are liable to danger when they are passing from
+the civil to the absolute order of government, for such princes either
+rule personally or through magistrates. In the latter case their
+government is weaker and more insecure, because it rests entirely on
+the goodwill of those citizens who are raised to the magistracy, and
+who, especially in troubled times, can destroy the government with
+great ease, either by intrigue or open defiance; and the prince has not
+the chance amid tumults to exercise absolute authority, because the
+citizens and subjects, accustomed to receive orders from magistrates,
+are not of a mind to obey him amid these confusions, and there will
+always be in doubtful times a scarcity of men whom he can trust. For
+such a prince cannot rely upon what he observes in quiet times, when
+citizens have need of the state, because then every one agrees with
+him; they all promise, and when death is far distant they all wish to
+die for him; but in troubled times, when the state has need of its
+citizens, then he finds but few. And so much the more is this
+experiment dangerous, inasmuch as it can only be tried once. Therefore
+a wise prince ought to adopt such a course that his citizens will
+always in every sort and kind of circumstance have need of the state
+and of him, and then he will always find them faithful.
+
+It is necessary to consider another point in examining the character of
+these principalities: that is, whether a prince has such power that, in
+case of need, he can support himself with his own resources, or whether
+he has always need of the assistance of others. And to make this quite
+clear I say that I consider those who are able to support themselves by
+their own resources who can, either by abundance of men or money, raise
+a sufficient army to join battle against any one who comes to attack
+them; and I consider those always to have need of others who cannot
+show themselves against the enemy in the field, but are forced to
+defend themselves by sheltering behind walls. The first case has been
+discussed, but we will speak of it again should it recur. In the second
+case one can say nothing except to encourage such princes to provision
+and fortify their towns, and not on any account to defend the country.
+And whoever shall fortify his town well, and shall have managed the
+other concerns of his subjects in the way stated above, and to be often
+repeated, will never be attacked without great caution, for men are
+always adverse to enterprises where difficulties can be seen, and it
+will be seen not to be an easy thing to attack one who has his town
+well fortified, and is not hated by his people.
+
+The cities of Germany are absolutely free, they own but little country
+around them, and they yield obedience to the emperor when it suits
+them, nor do they fear this or any other power they may have near them,
+because they are fortified in such a way that every one thinks the
+taking of them by assault would be tedious and difficult, seeing they
+have proper ditches and walls, they have sufficient artillery, and they
+always keep in public depots enough for one year’s eating, drinking,
+and firing. And beyond this, to keep the people quiet and without loss
+to the state, they always have the means of giving work to the
+community in those labours that are the life and strength of the city,
+and on the pursuit of which the people are supported; they also hold
+military exercises in repute, and moreover have many ordinances to
+uphold them.
+
+Therefore, a prince who has a strong city, and had not made himself
+odious, will not be attacked, or if any one should attack he will only
+be driven off with disgrace; again, because that the affairs of this
+world are so changeable, it is almost impossible to keep an army a
+whole year in the field without being interfered with. And whoever
+should reply: If the people have property outside the city, and see it
+burnt, they will not remain patient, and the long siege and
+self-interest will make them forget their prince; to this I answer that
+a powerful and courageous prince will overcome all such difficulties by
+giving at one time hope to his subjects that the evil will not be for
+long, at another time fear of the cruelty of the enemy, then preserving
+himself adroitly from those subjects who seem to him to be too bold.
+
+Further, the enemy would naturally on his arrival at once burn and ruin
+the country at the time when the spirits of the people are still hot
+and ready for the defence; and, therefore, so much the less ought the
+prince to hesitate; because after a time, when spirits have cooled, the
+damage is already done, the ills are incurred, and there is no longer
+any remedy; and therefore they are so much the more ready to unite with
+their prince, he appearing to be under obligations to them now that
+their houses have been burnt and their possessions ruined in his
+defence. For it is the nature of men to be bound by the benefits they
+confer as much as by those they receive. Therefore, if everything is
+well considered, it will not be difficult for a wise prince to keep the
+minds of his citizens steadfast from first to last, when he does not
+fail to support and defend them.
+
+It only remains now to speak of ecclesiastical principalities, touching
+which all difficulties are prior to getting possession, because they
+are acquired either by capacity or good fortune, and they can be held
+without either; for they are sustained by the ancient ordinances of
+religion, which are so all-powerful, and of such a character that the
+principalities may be held no matter how their princes behave and live.
+These princes alone have states and do not defend them; and they have
+subjects and do not rule them; and the states, although unguarded, are
+not taken from them, and the subjects, although not ruled, do not care,
+and they have neither the desire nor the ability to alienate
+themselves. Such principalities only are secure and happy. But being
+upheld by powers, to which the human mind cannot reach, I shall speak
+no more of them, because, being exalted and maintained by God, it would
+be the act of a presumptuous and rash man to discuss them.
+
+Nevertheless, if any one should ask of me how comes it that the Church
+has attained such greatness in temporal power, seeing that from
+Alexander backwards the Italian potentates (not only those who have
+been called potentates, but every baron and lord, though the smallest)
+have valued the temporal power very slightly—yet now a king of France
+trembles before it, and it has been able to drive him from Italy, and
+to ruin the Venetians—although this may be very manifest, it does not
+appear to me superfluous to recall it in some measure to memory.
+
+Before Charles, King of France, passed into Italy,[1] this country was
+under the dominion of the Pope, the Venetians, the King of Naples, the
+Duke of Milan, and the Florentines. These potentates had two principal
+anxieties: the one, that no foreigner should enter Italy under arms;
+the other, that none of themselves should seize more territory. Those
+about whom there was the most anxiety were the Pope and the Venetians.
+To restrain the Venetians the union of all the others was necessary, as
+it was for the defence of Ferrara; and to keep down the Pope they made
+use of the barons of Rome, who, being divided into two factions, Orsini
+and Colonnesi, had always a pretext for disorder, and, standing with
+arms in their hands under the eyes of the Pontiff, kept the pontificate
+weak and powerless. And although there might arise sometimes a
+courageous pope, such as Sixtus, yet neither fortune nor wisdom could
+rid him of these annoyances. And the short life of a pope is also a
+cause of weakness; for in the ten years, which is the average life of a
+pope, he can with difficulty lower one of the factions; and if, so to
+speak, one people should almost destroy the Colonnesi, another would
+arise hostile to the Orsini, who would support their opponents, and yet
+would not have time to ruin the Orsini. This was the reason why the
+temporal powers of the pope were little esteemed in Italy.
+
+ [1] Charles VIII invaded Italy in 1494.
+
+Alexander the Sixth arose afterwards, who of all the pontiffs that have
+ever been showed how a pope with both money and arms was able to
+prevail; and through the instrumentality of the Duke Valentino, and by
+reason of the entry of the French, he brought about all those things
+which I have discussed above in the actions of the duke. And although
+his intention was not to aggrandize the Church, but the duke,
+nevertheless, what he did contributed to the greatness of the Church,
+which, after his death and the ruin of the duke, became the heir to all
+his labours.
+
+Pope Julius came afterwards and found the Church strong, possessing all
+the Romagna, the barons of Rome reduced to impotence, and, through the
+chastisements of Alexander, the factions wiped out; he also found the
+way open to accumulate money in a manner such as had never been
+practised before Alexander’s time. Such things Julius not only
+followed, but improved upon, and he intended to gain Bologna, to ruin
+the Venetians, and to drive the French out of Italy. All of these
+enterprises prospered with him, and so much the more to his credit,
+inasmuch as he did everything to strengthen the Church and not any
+private person. He kept also the Orsini and Colonnesi factions within
+the bounds in which he found them; and although there was among them
+some mind to make disturbance, nevertheless he held two things firm:
+the one, the greatness of the Church, with which he terrified them; and
+the other, not allowing them to have their own cardinals, who caused
+the disorders among them. For whenever these factions have their
+cardinals they do not remain quiet for long, because cardinals foster
+the factions in Rome and out of it, and the barons are compelled to
+support them, and thus from the ambitions of prelates arise disorders
+and tumults among the barons. For these reasons his Holiness Pope
+Leo[2] found the pontificate most powerful, and it is to be hoped that,
+if others made it great in arms, he will make it still greater and more
+venerated by his goodness and infinite other virtues.
+
+ [2] Pope Leo X was the Cardinal de’ Medici.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII.
+HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE, AND CONCERNING MERCENARIES
+
+
+Having discoursed particularly on the characteristics of such
+principalities as in the beginning I proposed to discuss, and having
+considered in some degree the causes of there being good or bad, and
+having shown the methods by which many have sought to acquire them and
+to hold them, it now remains for me to discuss generally the means of
+offence and defence which belong to each of them.
+
+We have seen above how necessary it is for a prince to have his
+foundations well laid, otherwise it follows of necessity he will go to
+ruin. The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or
+composite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good
+laws where the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are
+well armed they have good laws. I shall leave the laws out of the
+discussion and shall speak of the arms.
+
+I say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his state
+are either his own, or they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed.
+Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds
+his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for
+they are disunited, ambitious, and without discipline, unfaithful,
+valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have neither the
+fear of God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is deferred only so
+long as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed by them, and in war
+by the enemy. The fact is, they have no other attraction or reason for
+keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, which is not sufficient to
+make them willing to die for you. They are ready enough to be your
+soldiers whilst you do not make war, but if war comes they take
+themselves off or run from the foe; which I should have little trouble
+to prove, for the ruin of Italy has been caused by nothing else than by
+resting all her hopes for many years on mercenaries, and although they
+formerly made some display and appeared valiant amongst themselves, yet
+when the foreigners came they showed what they were. Thus it was that
+Charles, King of France, was allowed to seize Italy with chalk in
+hand;[1] and he who told us that our sins were the cause of it told the
+truth, but they were not the sins he imagined, but those which I have
+related. And as they were the sins of princes, it is the princes who
+have also suffered the penalty.
+
+ [1] “With chalk in hand,” “col gesso.” This is one of the _bons mots_
+ of Alexander VI, and refers to the ease with which Charles VIII seized
+ Italy, implying that it was only necessary for him to send his
+ quartermasters to chalk up the billets for his soldiers to conquer the
+ country. _Cf_. “The History of Henry VII,” by Lord Bacon: “King
+ Charles had conquered the realm of Naples, and lost it again, in a
+ kind of a felicity of a dream. He passed the whole length of Italy
+ without resistance: so that it was true what Pope Alexander was wont
+ to say: That the Frenchmen came into Italy with chalk in their hands,
+ to mark up their lodgings, rather than with swords to fight.”
+
+I wish to demonstrate further the infelicity of these arms. The
+mercenary captains are either capable men or they are not; if they are,
+you cannot trust them, because they always aspire to their own
+greatness, either by oppressing you, who are their master, or others
+contrary to your intentions; but if the captain is not skilful, you are
+ruined in the usual way.
+
+And if it be urged that whoever is armed will act in the same way,
+whether mercenary or not, I reply that when arms have to be resorted
+to, either by a prince or a republic, then the prince ought to go in
+person and perform the duty of a captain; the republic has to send its
+citizens, and when one is sent who does not turn out satisfactorily, it
+ought to recall him, and when one is worthy, to hold him by the laws so
+that he does not leave the command. And experience has shown princes
+and republics, single-handed, making the greatest progress, and
+mercenaries doing nothing except damage; and it is more difficult to
+bring a republic, armed with its own arms, under the sway of one of its
+citizens than it is to bring one armed with foreign arms. Rome and
+Sparta stood for many ages armed and free. The Switzers are completely
+armed and quite free.
+
+Of ancient mercenaries, for example, there are the Carthaginians, who
+were oppressed by their mercenary soldiers after the first war with the
+Romans, although the Carthaginians had their own citizens for captains.
+After the death of Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon was made captain of
+their soldiers by the Thebans, and after victory he took away their
+liberty.
+
+Duke Filippo being dead, the Milanese enlisted Francesco Sforza against
+the Venetians, and he, having overcome the enemy at Caravaggio,[2]
+allied himself with them to crush the Milanese, his masters. His
+father, Sforza, having been engaged by Queen Johanna[3] of Naples, left
+her unprotected, so that she was forced to throw herself into the arms
+of the King of Aragon, in order to save her kingdom. And if the
+Venetians and Florentines formerly extended their dominions by these
+arms, and yet their captains did not make themselves princes, but have
+defended them, I reply that the Florentines in this case have been
+favoured by chance, for of the able captains, of whom they might have
+stood in fear, some have not conquered, some have been opposed, and
+others have turned their ambitions elsewhere. One who did not conquer
+was Giovanni Acuto,[4] and since he did not conquer his fidelity cannot
+be proved; but every one will acknowledge that, had he conquered, the
+Florentines would have stood at his discretion. Sforza had the
+Bracceschi always against him, so they watched each other. Francesco
+turned his ambition to Lombardy; Braccio against the Church and the
+kingdom of Naples. But let us come to that which happened a short while
+ago. The Florentines appointed as their captain Pagolo Vitelli, a most
+prudent man, who from a private position had risen to the greatest
+renown. If this man had taken Pisa, nobody can deny that it would have
+been proper for the Florentines to keep in with him, for if he became
+the soldier of their enemies they had no means of resisting, and if
+they held to him they must obey him. The Venetians, if their
+achievements are considered, will be seen to have acted safely and
+gloriously so long as they sent to war their own men, when with armed
+gentlemen and plebians they did valiantly. This was before they turned
+to enterprises on land, but when they began to fight on land they
+forsook this virtue and followed the custom of Italy. And in the
+beginning of their expansion on land, through not having much
+territory, and because of their great reputation, they had not much to
+fear from their captains; but when they expanded, as under
+Carmignuola,[5] they had a taste of this mistake; for, having found him
+a most valiant man (they beat the Duke of Milan under his leadership),
+and, on the other hand, knowing how lukewarm he was in the war, they
+feared they would no longer conquer under him, and for this reason they
+were not willing, nor were they able, to let him go; and so, not to
+lose again that which they had acquired, they were compelled, in order
+to secure themselves, to murder him. They had afterwards for their
+captains Bartolomeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, the count of
+Pitigliano,[6] and the like, under whom they had to dread loss and not
+gain, as happened afterwards at Vaila,[7] where in one battle they lost
+that which in eight hundred years they had acquired with so much
+trouble. Because from such arms conquests come but slowly, long delayed
+and inconsiderable, but the losses sudden and portentous.
+
+ [2] Battle of Caravaggio, 15th September 1448.
+
+ [3] Johanna II of Naples, the widow of Ladislao, King of Naples.
+
+ [4] Giovanni Acuto. An English knight whose name was Sir John
+ Hawkwood. He fought in the English wars in France, and was knighted by
+ Edward III; afterwards he collected a body of troops and went into
+ Italy. These became the famous “White Company.” He took part in many
+ wars, and died in Florence in 1394. He was born about 1320 at Sible
+ Hedingham, a village in Essex. He married Domnia, a daughter of
+ Bernabo Visconti.
+
+ [5] Carmignuola. Francesco Bussone, born at Carmagnola about 1390,
+ executed at Venice, 5th May 1432.
+
+ [6] Bartolomeo Colleoni of Bergamo; died 1457. Roberto of San
+ Severino; died fighting for Venice against Sigismund, Duke of Austria,
+ in 1487. “Primo capitano in Italia.”—Machiavelli. Count of Pitigliano;
+ Nicolo Orsini, born 1442, died 1510.
+
+ [7] Battle of Vaila in 1509.
+
+And as with these examples I have reached Italy, which has been ruled
+for many years by mercenaries, I wish to discuss them more seriously,
+in order that, having seen their rise and progress, one may be better
+prepared to counteract them. You must understand that the empire has
+recently come to be repudiated in Italy, that the Pope has acquired
+more temporal power, and that Italy has been divided up into more
+states, for the reason that many of the great cities took up arms
+against their nobles, who, formerly favoured by the emperor, were
+oppressing them, whilst the Church was favouring them so as to gain
+authority in temporal power: in many others their citizens became
+princes. From this it came to pass that Italy fell partly into the
+hands of the Church and of republics, and, the Church consisting of
+priests and the republic of citizens unaccustomed to arms, both
+commenced to enlist foreigners.
+
+The first who gave renown to this soldiery was Alberigo da Conio,[8]
+the Romagnian. From the school of this man sprang, among others,
+Braccio and Sforza, who in their time were the arbiters of Italy. After
+these came all the other captains who till now have directed the arms
+of Italy; and the end of all their valour has been, that she has been
+overrun by Charles, robbed by Louis, ravaged by Ferdinand, and insulted
+by the Switzers. The principle that has guided them has been, first, to
+lower the credit of infantry so that they might increase their own.
+They did this because, subsisting on their pay and without territory,
+they were unable to support many soldiers, and a few infantry did not
+give them any authority; so they were led to employ cavalry, with a
+moderate force of which they were maintained and honoured; and affairs
+were brought to such a pass that, in an army of twenty thousand
+soldiers, there were not to be found two thousand foot soldiers. They
+had, besides this, used every art to lessen fatigue and danger to
+themselves and their soldiers, not killing in the fray, but taking
+prisoners and liberating without ransom. They did not attack towns at
+night, nor did the garrisons of the towns attack encampments at night;
+they did not surround the camp either with stockade or ditch, nor did
+they campaign in the winter. All these things were permitted by their
+military rules, and devised by them to avoid, as I have said, both
+fatigue and dangers; thus they have brought Italy to slavery and
+contempt.
+
+ [8] Alberigo da Conio. Alberico da Barbiano, Count of Cunio in
+ Romagna. He was the leader of the famous “Company of St George,”
+ composed entirely of Italian soldiers. He died in 1409.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIII.
+CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE’S OWN
+
+
+Auxiliaries, which are the other useless arm, are employed when a
+prince is called in with his forces to aid and defend, as was done by
+Pope Julius in the most recent times; for he, having, in the enterprise
+against Ferrara, had poor proof of his mercenaries, turned to
+auxiliaries, and stipulated with Ferdinand, King of Spain,[1] for his
+assistance with men and arms. These arms may be useful and good in
+themselves, but for him who calls them in they are always
+disadvantageous; for losing, one is undone, and winning, one is their
+captive.
+
+ [1] Ferdinand V (F. II of Aragon and Sicily, F. III of Naples),
+ surnamed “The Catholic,” born 1452, died 1516.
+
+And although ancient histories may be full of examples, I do not wish
+to leave this recent one of Pope Julius the Second, the peril of which
+cannot fail to be perceived; for he, wishing to get Ferrara, threw
+himself entirely into the hands of the foreigner. But his good fortune
+brought about a third event, so that he did not reap the fruit of his
+rash choice; because, having his auxiliaries routed at Ravenna, and the
+Switzers having risen and driven out the conquerors (against all
+expectation, both his and others), it so came to pass that he did not
+become prisoner to his enemies, they having fled, nor to his
+auxiliaries, he having conquered by other arms than theirs.
+
+The Florentines, being entirely without arms, sent ten thousand
+Frenchmen to take Pisa, whereby they ran more danger than at any other
+time of their troubles.
+
+The Emperor of Constantinople,[2] to oppose his neighbours, sent ten
+thousand Turks into Greece, who, on the war being finished, were not
+willing to quit; this was the beginning of the servitude of Greece to
+the infidels.
+
+ [2] Joannes Cantacuzenus, born 1300, died 1383.
+
+Therefore, let him who has no desire to conquer make use of these arms,
+for they are much more hazardous than mercenaries, because with them
+the ruin is ready made; they are all united, all yield obedience to
+others; but with mercenaries, when they have conquered, more time and
+better opportunities are needed to injure you; they are not all of one
+community, they are found and paid by you, and a third party, which you
+have made their head, is not able all at once to assume enough
+authority to injure you. In conclusion, in mercenaries dastardy is most
+dangerous; in auxiliaries, valour. The wise prince, therefore, has
+always avoided these arms and turned to his own; and has been willing
+rather to lose with them than to conquer with the others, not deeming
+that a real victory which is gained with the arms of others.
+
+I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. This duke
+entered the Romagna with auxiliaries, taking there only French
+soldiers, and with them he captured Imola and Forli; but afterwards,
+such forces not appearing to him reliable, he turned to mercenaries,
+discerning less danger in them, and enlisted the Orsini and Vitelli;
+whom presently, on handling and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, and
+dangerous, he destroyed and turned to his own men. And the difference
+between one and the other of these forces can easily be seen when one
+considers the difference there was in the reputation of the duke, when
+he had the French, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli, and when he
+relied on his own soldiers, on whose fidelity he could always count and
+found it ever increasing; he was never esteemed more highly than when
+every one saw that he was complete master of his own forces.
+
+I was not intending to go beyond Italian and recent examples, but I am
+unwilling to leave out Hiero, the Syracusan, he being one of those I
+have named above. This man, as I have said, made head of the army by
+the Syracusans, soon found out that a mercenary soldiery, constituted
+like our Italian condottieri, was of no use; and it appearing to him
+that he could neither keep them nor let them go, he had them all cut to
+pieces, and afterwards made war with his own forces and not with
+aliens.
+
+I wish also to recall to memory an instance from the Old Testament
+applicable to this subject. David offered himself to Saul to fight with
+Goliath, the Philistine champion, and, to give him courage, Saul armed
+him with his own weapons; which David rejected as soon as he had them
+on his back, saying he could make no use of them, and that he wished to
+meet the enemy with his sling and his knife. In conclusion, the arms of
+others either fall from your back, or they weigh you down, or they bind
+you fast.
+
+Charles the Seventh,[3] the father of King Louis the Eleventh,[4]
+having by good fortune and valour liberated France from the English,
+recognized the necessity of being armed with forces of his own, and he
+established in his kingdom ordinances concerning men-at-arms and
+infantry. Afterwards his son, King Louis, abolished the infantry and
+began to enlist the Switzers, which mistake, followed by others, is, as
+is now seen, a source of peril to that kingdom; because, having raised
+the reputation of the Switzers, he has entirely diminished the value of
+his own arms, for he has destroyed the infantry altogether; and his
+men-at-arms he has subordinated to others, for, being as they are so
+accustomed to fight along with Switzers, it does not appear that they
+can now conquer without them. Hence it arises that the French cannot
+stand against the Switzers, and without the Switzers they do not come
+off well against others. The armies of the French have thus become
+mixed, partly mercenary and partly national, both of which arms
+together are much better than mercenaries alone or auxiliaries alone,
+but much inferior to one’s own forces. And this example proves it, for
+the kingdom of France would be unconquerable if the ordinance of
+Charles had been enlarged or maintained.
+
+ [3] Charles VII of France, surnamed “The Victorious,” born 1403, died
+ 1461.
+
+ [4] Louis XI, son of the above, born 1423, died 1483.
+
+But the scanty wisdom of man, on entering into an affair which looks
+well at first, cannot discern the poison that is hidden in it, as I
+have said above of hectic fevers. Therefore, if he who rules a
+principality cannot recognize evils until they are upon him, he is not
+truly wise; and this insight is given to few. And if the first disaster
+to the Roman Empire[5] should be examined, it will be found to have
+commenced only with the enlisting of the Goths; because from that time
+the vigour of the Roman Empire began to decline, and all that valour
+which had raised it passed away to others.
+
+ [5] “Many speakers to the House the other night in the debate on the
+ reduction of armaments seemed to show a most lamentable ignorance of
+ the conditions under which the British Empire maintains its existence.
+ When Mr Balfour replied to the allegations that the Roman Empire sank
+ under the weight of its military obligations, he said that this was
+ ‘wholly unhistorical.’ He might well have added that the Roman power
+ was at its zenith when every citizen acknowledged his liability to
+ fight for the State, but that it began to decline as soon as this
+ obligation was no longer recognised.”—_Pall Mall Gazette_, 15th May
+ 1906.
+
+I conclude, therefore, that no principality is secure without having
+its own forces; on the contrary, it is entirely dependent on good
+fortune, not having the valour which in adversity would defend it. And
+it has always been the opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing
+can be so uncertain or unstable as fame or power not founded on its own
+strength. And one’s own forces are those which are composed either of
+subjects, citizens, or dependents; all others are mercenaries or
+auxiliaries. And the way to make ready one’s own forces will be easily
+found if the rules suggested by me shall be reflected upon, and if one
+will consider how Philip, the father of Alexander the Great, and many
+republics and princes have armed and organized themselves, to which
+rules I entirely commit myself.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIV.
+THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE ART OF WAR
+
+
+A prince ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select anything
+else for his study, than war and its rules and discipline; for this is
+the sole art that belongs to him who rules, and it is of such force
+that it not only upholds those who are born princes, but it often
+enables men to rise from a private station to that rank. And, on the
+contrary, it is seen that when princes have thought more of ease than
+of arms they have lost their states. And the first cause of your losing
+it is to neglect this art; and what enables you to acquire a state is
+to be master of the art. Francesco Sforza, through being martial, from
+a private person became Duke of Milan; and the sons, through avoiding
+the hardships and troubles of arms, from dukes became private persons.
+For among other evils which being unarmed brings you, it causes you to
+be despised, and this is one of those ignominies against which a prince
+ought to guard himself, as is shown later on. Because there is nothing
+proportionate between the armed and the unarmed; and it is not
+reasonable that he who is armed should yield obedience willingly to him
+who is unarmed, or that the unarmed man should be secure among armed
+servants. Because, there being in the one disdain and in the other
+suspicion, it is not possible for them to work well together. And
+therefore a prince who does not understand the art of war, over and
+above the other misfortunes already mentioned, cannot be respected by
+his soldiers, nor can he rely on them. He ought never, therefore, to
+have out of his thoughts this subject of war, and in peace he should
+addict himself more to its exercise than in war; this he can do in two
+ways, the one by action, the other by study.
+
+As regards action, he ought above all things to keep his men well
+organized and drilled, to follow incessantly the chase, by which he
+accustoms his body to hardships, and learns something of the nature of
+localities, and gets to find out how the mountains rise, how the
+valleys open out, how the plains lie, and to understand the nature of
+rivers and marshes, and in all this to take the greatest care. Which
+knowledge is useful in two ways. Firstly, he learns to know his
+country, and is better able to undertake its defence; afterwards, by
+means of the knowledge and observation of that locality, he understands
+with ease any other which it may be necessary for him to study
+hereafter; because the hills, valleys, and plains, and rivers and
+marshes that are, for instance, in Tuscany, have a certain resemblance
+to those of other countries, so that with a knowledge of the aspect of
+one country one can easily arrive at a knowledge of others. And the
+prince that lacks this skill lacks the essential which it is desirable
+that a captain should possess, for it teaches him to surprise his
+enemy, to select quarters, to lead armies, to array the battle, to
+besiege towns to advantage.
+
+Philopoemen,[1] Prince of the Achaeans, among other praises which
+writers have bestowed on him, is commended because in time of peace he
+never had anything in his mind but the rules of war; and when he was in
+the country with friends, he often stopped and reasoned with them: “If
+the enemy should be upon that hill, and we should find ourselves here
+with our army, with whom would be the advantage? How should one best
+advance to meet him, keeping the ranks? If we should wish to retreat,
+how ought we to pursue?” And he would set forth to them, as he went,
+all the chances that could befall an army; he would listen to their
+opinion and state his, confirming it with reasons, so that by these
+continual discussions there could never arise, in time of war, any
+unexpected circumstances that he could not deal with.
+
+ [1] Philopoemen, “the last of the Greeks,” born 252 B.C., died 183
+ B.C.
+
+But to exercise the intellect the prince should read histories, and
+study there the actions of illustrious men, to see how they have borne
+themselves in war, to examine the causes of their victories and defeat,
+so as to avoid the latter and imitate the former; and above all do as
+an illustrious man did, who took as an exemplar one who had been
+praised and famous before him, and whose achievements and deeds he
+always kept in his mind, as it is said Alexander the Great imitated
+Achilles, Caesar Alexander, Scipio Cyrus. And whoever reads the life of
+Cyrus, written by Xenophon, will recognize afterwards in the life of
+Scipio how that imitation was his glory, and how in chastity,
+affability, humanity, and liberality Scipio conformed to those things
+which have been written of Cyrus by Xenophon. A wise prince ought to
+observe some such rules, and never in peaceful times stand idle, but
+increase his resources with industry in such a way that they may be
+available to him in adversity, so that if fortune chances it may find
+him prepared to resist her blows.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XV.
+CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES, ARE PRAISED OR
+BLAMED
+
+
+It remains now to see what ought to be the rules of conduct for a
+prince towards subject and friends. And as I know that many have
+written on this point, I expect I shall be considered presumptuous in
+mentioning it again, especially as in discussing it I shall depart from
+the methods of other people. But, it being my intention to write a
+thing which shall be useful to him who apprehends it, it appears to me
+more appropriate to follow up the real truth of the matter than the
+imagination of it; for many have pictured republics and principalities
+which in fact have never been known or seen, because how one lives is
+so far distant from how one ought to live, that he who neglects what is
+done for what ought to be done, sooner effects his ruin than his
+preservation; for a man who wishes to act entirely up to his
+professions of virtue soon meets with what destroys him among so much
+that is evil.
+
+Hence it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own to know how
+to do wrong, and to make use of it or not according to necessity.
+Therefore, putting on one side imaginary things concerning a prince,
+and discussing those which are real, I say that all men when they are
+spoken of, and chiefly princes for being more highly placed, are
+remarkable for some of those qualities which bring them either blame or
+praise; and thus it is that one is reputed liberal, another miserly,
+using a Tuscan term (because an avaricious person in our language is
+still he who desires to possess by robbery, whilst we call one miserly
+who deprives himself too much of the use of his own); one is reputed
+generous, one rapacious; one cruel, one compassionate; one faithless,
+another faithful; one effeminate and cowardly, another bold and brave;
+one affable, another haughty; one lascivious, another chaste; one
+sincere, another cunning; one hard, another easy; one grave, another
+frivolous; one religious, another unbelieving, and the like. And I know
+that every one will confess that it would be most praiseworthy in a
+prince to exhibit all the above qualities that are considered good; but
+because they can neither be entirely possessed nor observed, for human
+conditions do not permit it, it is necessary for him to be sufficiently
+prudent that he may know how to avoid the reproach of those vices which
+would lose him his state; and also to keep himself, if it be possible,
+from those which would not lose him it; but this not being possible, he
+may with less hesitation abandon himself to them. And again, he need
+not make himself uneasy at incurring a reproach for those vices without
+which the state can only be saved with difficulty, for if everything is
+considered carefully, it will be found that something which looks like
+virtue, if followed, would be his ruin; whilst something else, which
+looks like vice, yet followed brings him security and prosperity.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVI.
+CONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS
+
+
+Commencing then with the first of the above-named characteristics, I
+say that it would be well to be reputed liberal. Nevertheless,
+liberality exercised in a way that does not bring you the reputation
+for it, injures you; for if one exercises it honestly and as it should
+be exercised, it may not become known, and you will not avoid the
+reproach of its opposite. Therefore, any one wishing to maintain among
+men the name of liberal is obliged to avoid no attribute of
+magnificence; so that a prince thus inclined will consume in such acts
+all his property, and will be compelled in the end, if he wish to
+maintain the name of liberal, to unduly weigh down his people, and tax
+them, and do everything he can to get money. This will soon make him
+odious to his subjects, and becoming poor he will be little valued by
+any one; thus, with his liberality, having offended many and rewarded
+few, he is affected by the very first trouble and imperilled by
+whatever may be the first danger; recognizing this himself, and wishing
+to draw back from it, he runs at once into the reproach of being
+miserly.
+
+Therefore, a prince, not being able to exercise this virtue of
+liberality in such a way that it is recognized, except to his cost, if
+he is wise he ought not to fear the reputation of being mean, for in
+time he will come to be more considered than if liberal, seeing that
+with his economy his revenues are enough, that he can defend himself
+against all attacks, and is able to engage in enterprises without
+burdening his people; thus it comes to pass that he exercises
+liberality towards all from whom he does not take, who are numberless,
+and meanness towards those to whom he does not give, who are few.
+
+We have not seen great things done in our time except by those who have
+been considered mean; the rest have failed. Pope Julius the Second was
+assisted in reaching the papacy by a reputation for liberality, yet he
+did not strive afterwards to keep it up, when he made war on the King
+of France; and he made many wars without imposing any extraordinary tax
+on his subjects, for he supplied his additional expenses out of his
+long thriftiness. The present King of Spain would not have undertaken
+or conquered in so many enterprises if he had been reputed liberal. A
+prince, therefore, provided that he has not to rob his subjects, that
+he can defend himself, that he does not become poor and abject, that he
+is not forced to become rapacious, ought to hold of little account a
+reputation for being mean, for it is one of those vices which will
+enable him to govern.
+
+And if any one should say: Caesar obtained empire by liberality, and
+many others have reached the highest positions by having been liberal,
+and by being considered so, I answer: Either you are a prince in fact,
+or in a way to become one. In the first case this liberality is
+dangerous, in the second it is very necessary to be considered liberal;
+and Caesar was one of those who wished to become pre-eminent in Rome;
+but if he had survived after becoming so, and had not moderated his
+expenses, he would have destroyed his government. And if any one should
+reply: Many have been princes, and have done great things with armies,
+who have been considered very liberal, I reply: Either a prince spends
+that which is his own or his subjects’ or else that of others. In the
+first case he ought to be sparing, in the second he ought not to
+neglect any opportunity for liberality. And to the prince who goes
+forth with his army, supporting it by pillage, sack, and extortion,
+handling that which belongs to others, this liberality is necessary,
+otherwise he would not be followed by soldiers. And of that which is
+neither yours nor your subjects’ you can be a ready giver, as were
+Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander; because it does not take away your
+reputation if you squander that of others, but adds to it; it is only
+squandering your own that injures you.
+
+And there is nothing wastes so rapidly as liberality, for even whilst
+you exercise it you lose the power to do so, and so become either poor
+or despised, or else, in avoiding poverty, rapacious and hated. And a
+prince should guard himself, above all things, against being despised
+and hated; and liberality leads you to both. Therefore it is wiser to
+have a reputation for meanness which brings reproach without hatred,
+than to be compelled through seeking a reputation for liberality to
+incur a name for rapacity which begets reproach with hatred.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVII.
+CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED
+THAN FEARED
+
+
+Coming now to the other qualities mentioned above, I say that every
+prince ought to desire to be considered clement and not cruel.
+Nevertheless he ought to take care not to misuse this clemency. Cesare
+Borgia was considered cruel; notwithstanding, his cruelty reconciled
+the Romagna, unified it, and restored it to peace and loyalty. And if
+this be rightly considered, he will be seen to have been much more
+merciful than the Florentine people, who, to avoid a reputation for
+cruelty, permitted Pistoia to be destroyed.[1] Therefore a prince, so
+long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal, ought not to mind the
+reproach of cruelty; because with a few examples he will be more
+merciful than those who, through too much mercy, allow disorders to
+arise, from which follow murders or robberies; for these are wont to
+injure the whole people, whilst those executions which originate with a
+prince offend the individual only.
+
+ [1] During the rioting between the Cancellieri and Panciatichi
+ factions in 1502 and 1503.
+
+And of all princes, it is impossible for the new prince to avoid the
+imputation of cruelty, owing to new states being full of dangers. Hence
+Virgil, through the mouth of Dido, excuses the inhumanity of her reign
+owing to its being new, saying:
+
+“Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt
+Moliri, et late fines custode tueri.”[2]
+
+Nevertheless he ought to be slow to believe and to act, nor should he
+himself show fear, but proceed in a temperate manner with prudence and
+humanity, so that too much confidence may not make him incautious and
+too much distrust render him intolerable.
+
+ [2] . . . against my will, my fate
+A throne unsettled, and an infant state,
+Bid me defend my realms with all my pow’rs,
+And guard with these severities my shores.
+
+Christopher Pitt.
+
+Upon this a question arises: whether it be better to be loved than
+feared or feared than loved? It may be answered that one should wish to
+be both, but, because it is difficult to unite them in one person, it
+is much safer to be feared than loved, when, of the two, either must be
+dispensed with. Because this is to be asserted in general of men, that
+they are ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, covetous, and as long as
+you succeed they are yours entirely; they will offer you their blood,
+property, life, and children, as is said above, when the need is far
+distant; but when it approaches they turn against you. And that prince
+who, relying entirely on their promises, has neglected other
+precautions, is ruined; because friendships that are obtained by
+payments, and not by greatness or nobility of mind, may indeed be
+earned, but they are not secured, and in time of need cannot be relied
+upon; and men have less scruple in offending one who is beloved than
+one who is feared, for love is preserved by the link of obligation
+which, owing to the baseness of men, is broken at every opportunity for
+their advantage; but fear preserves you by a dread of punishment which
+never fails.
+
+Nevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if he
+does not win love, he avoids hatred; because he can endure very well
+being feared whilst he is not hated, which will always be as long as he
+abstains from the property of his citizens and subjects and from their
+women. But when it is necessary for him to proceed against the life of
+someone, he must do it on proper justification and for manifest cause,
+but above all things he must keep his hands off the property of others,
+because men more quickly forget the death of their father than the loss
+of their patrimony. Besides, pretexts for taking away the property are
+never wanting; for he who has once begun to live by robbery will always
+find pretexts for seizing what belongs to others; but reasons for
+taking life, on the contrary, are more difficult to find and sooner
+lapse. But when a prince is with his army, and has under control a
+multitude of soldiers, then it is quite necessary for him to disregard
+the reputation of cruelty, for without it he would never hold his army
+united or disposed to its duties.
+
+Among the wonderful deeds of Hannibal this one is enumerated: that
+having led an enormous army, composed of many various races of men, to
+fight in foreign lands, no dissensions arose either among them or
+against the prince, whether in his bad or in his good fortune. This
+arose from nothing else than his inhuman cruelty, which, with his
+boundless valour, made him revered and terrible in the sight of his
+soldiers, but without that cruelty, his other virtues were not
+sufficient to produce this effect. And short-sighted writers admire his
+deeds from one point of view and from another condemn the principal
+cause of them. That it is true his other virtues would not have been
+sufficient for him may be proved by the case of Scipio, that most
+excellent man, not only of his own times but within the memory of man,
+against whom, nevertheless, his army rebelled in Spain; this arose from
+nothing but his too great forbearance, which gave his soldiers more
+license than is consistent with military discipline. For this he was
+upbraided in the Senate by Fabius Maximus, and called the corrupter of
+the Roman soldiery. The Locrians were laid waste by a legate of Scipio,
+yet they were not avenged by him, nor was the insolence of the legate
+punished, owing entirely to his easy nature. Insomuch that someone in
+the Senate, wishing to excuse him, said there were many men who knew
+much better how not to err than to correct the errors of others. This
+disposition, if he had been continued in the command, would have
+destroyed in time the fame and glory of Scipio; but, he being under the
+control of the Senate, this injurious characteristic not only concealed
+itself, but contributed to his glory.
+
+Returning to the question of being feared or loved, I come to the
+conclusion that, men loving according to their own will and fearing
+according to that of the prince, a wise prince should establish himself
+on that which is in his own control and not in that of others; he must
+endeavour only to avoid hatred, as is noted.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVIII.[1]
+CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES SHOULD KEEP FAITH
+
+
+ [1] “The present chapter has given greater offence than any other
+ portion of Machiavelli’s writings.” Burd, “Il Principe,” p. 297.
+
+Every one admits how praiseworthy it is in a prince to keep faith, and
+to live with integrity and not with craft. Nevertheless our experience
+has been that those princes who have done great things have held good
+faith of little account, and have known how to circumvent the intellect
+of men by craft, and in the end have overcome those who have relied on
+their word. You must know there are two ways of contesting,[2] the one
+by the law, the other by force; the first method is proper to men, the
+second to beasts; but because the first is frequently not sufficient,
+it is necessary to have recourse to the second. Therefore it is
+necessary for a prince to understand how to avail himself of the beast
+and the man. This has been figuratively taught to princes by ancient
+writers, who describe how Achilles and many other princes of old were
+given to the Centaur Chiron to nurse, who brought them up in his
+discipline; which means solely that, as they had for a teacher one who
+was half beast and half man, so it is necessary for a prince to know
+how to make use of both natures, and that one without the other is not
+durable. A prince, therefore, being compelled knowingly to adopt the
+beast, ought to choose the fox and the lion; because the lion cannot
+defend himself against snares and the fox cannot defend himself against
+wolves. Therefore, it is necessary to be a fox to discover the snares
+and a lion to terrify the wolves. Those who rely simply on the lion do
+not understand what they are about. Therefore a wise lord cannot, nor
+ought he to, keep faith when such observance may be turned against him,
+and when the reasons that caused him to pledge it exist no longer. If
+men were entirely good this precept would not hold, but because they
+are bad, and will not keep faith with you, you too are not bound to
+observe it with them. Nor will there ever be wanting to a prince
+legitimate reasons to excuse this non-observance. Of this endless
+modern examples could be given, showing how many treaties and
+engagements have been made void and of no effect through the
+faithlessness of princes; and he who has known best how to employ the
+fox has succeeded best.
+
+ [2] “Contesting,” _i.e_. “striving for mastery.” Mr Burd points out
+ that this passage is imitated directly from Cicero’s “De Officiis”:
+ “Nam cum sint duo genera decertandi, unum per disceptationem, alterum
+ per vim; cumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc beluarum; confugiendum
+ est ad posterius, si uti non licet superiore.”
+
+But it is necessary to know well how to disguise this characteristic,
+and to be a great pretender and dissembler; and men are so simple, and
+so subject to present necessities, that he who seeks to deceive will
+always find someone who will allow himself to be deceived. One recent
+example I cannot pass over in silence. Alexander the Sixth did nothing
+else but deceive men, nor ever thought of doing otherwise, and he
+always found victims; for there never was a man who had greater power
+in asserting, or who with greater oaths would affirm a thing, yet would
+observe it less; nevertheless his deceits always succeeded according to
+his wishes,[3] because he well understood this side of mankind.
+
+ [3] “Nondimanco sempre gli succederono gli inganni (ad votum).” The
+ words “ad votum” are omitted in the Testina addition, 1550.
+
+Alexander never did what he said,
+Cesare never said what he did.
+
+Italian Proverb.
+
+Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities
+I have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to have them. And
+I shall dare to say this also, that to have them and always to observe
+them is injurious, and that to appear to have them is useful; to appear
+merciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright, and to be so, but with
+a mind so framed that should you require not to be so, you may be able
+and know how to change to the opposite.
+
+And you have to understand this, that a prince, especially a new one,
+cannot observe all those things for which men are esteemed, being often
+forced, in order to maintain the state, to act contrary to fidelity,[4]
+friendship, humanity, and religion. Therefore it is necessary for him
+to have a mind ready to turn itself accordingly as the winds and
+variations of fortune force it, yet, as I have said above, not to
+diverge from the good if he can avoid doing so, but, if compelled, then
+to know how to set about it.
+
+ [4] “Contrary to fidelity” or “faith,” “contro alla fede,” and “tutto
+ fede,” “altogether faithful,” in the next paragraph. It is noteworthy
+ that these two phrases, “contro alla fede” and “tutto fede,” were
+ omitted in the Testina edition, which was published with the sanction
+ of the papal authorities. It may be that the meaning attached to the
+ word “fede” was “the faith,” _i.e_. the Catholic creed, and not as
+ rendered here “fidelity” and “faithful.” Observe that the word
+ “religione” was suffered to stand in the text of the Testina, being
+ used to signify indifferently every shade of belief, as witness “the
+ religion,” a phrase inevitably employed to designate the Huguenot
+ heresy. South in his Sermon IX, p. 69, ed. 1843, comments on this
+ passage as follows: “That great patron and Coryphaeus of this tribe,
+ Nicolo Machiavel, laid down this for a master rule in his political
+ scheme: ‘That the show of religion was helpful to the politician, but
+ the reality of it hurtful and pernicious.’”
+
+For this reason a prince ought to take care that he never lets anything
+slip from his lips that is not replete with the above-named five
+qualities, that he may appear to him who sees and hears him altogether
+merciful, faithful, humane, upright, and religious. There is nothing
+more necessary to appear to have than this last quality, inasmuch as
+men judge generally more by the eye than by the hand, because it
+belongs to everybody to see you, to few to come in touch with you.
+Every one sees what you appear to be, few really know what you are, and
+those few dare not oppose themselves to the opinion of the many, who
+have the majesty of the state to defend them; and in the actions of all
+men, and especially of princes, which it is not prudent to challenge,
+one judges by the result.
+
+For that reason, let a prince have the credit of conquering and holding
+his state, the means will always be considered honest, and he will be
+praised by everybody; because the vulgar are always taken by what a
+thing seems to be and by what comes of it; and in the world there are
+only the vulgar, for the few find a place there only when the many have
+no ground to rest on.
+
+One prince[5] of the present time, whom it is not well to name, never
+preaches anything else but peace and good faith, and to both he is most
+hostile, and either, if he had kept it, would have deprived him of
+reputation and kingdom many a time.
+
+ [5] Ferdinand of Aragon. “When Machiavelli was writing _The Prince_ it
+ would have been clearly impossible to mention Ferdinand’s name here
+ without giving offence.” Burd’s “Il Principe,” p. 308.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIX.
+THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED
+
+
+Now, concerning the characteristics of which mention is made above, I
+have spoken of the more important ones, the others I wish to discuss
+briefly under this generality, that the prince must consider, as has
+been in part said before, how to avoid those things which will make him
+hated or contemptible; and as often as he shall have succeeded he will
+have fulfilled his part, and he need not fear any danger in other
+reproaches.
+
+It makes him hated above all things, as I have said, to be rapacious,
+and to be a violator of the property and women of his subjects, from
+both of which he must abstain. And when neither their property nor
+their honor is touched, the majority of men live content, and he has
+only to contend with the ambition of a few, whom he can curb with ease
+in many ways.
+
+It makes him contemptible to be considered fickle, frivolous,
+effeminate, mean-spirited, irresolute, from all of which a prince
+should guard himself as from a rock; and he should endeavour to show in
+his actions greatness, courage, gravity, and fortitude; and in his
+private dealings with his subjects let him show that his judgments are
+irrevocable, and maintain himself in such reputation that no one can
+hope either to deceive him or to get round him.
+
+That prince is highly esteemed who conveys this impression of himself,
+and he who is highly esteemed is not easily conspired against; for,
+provided it is well known that he is an excellent man and revered by
+his people, he can only be attacked with difficulty. For this reason a
+prince ought to have two fears, one from within, on account of his
+subjects, the other from without, on account of external powers. From
+the latter he is defended by being well armed and having good allies,
+and if he is well armed he will have good friends, and affairs will
+always remain quiet within when they are quiet without, unless they
+should have been already disturbed by conspiracy; and even should
+affairs outside be disturbed, if he has carried out his preparations
+and has lived as I have said, as long as he does not despair, he will
+resist every attack, as I said Nabis the Spartan did.
+
+But concerning his subjects, when affairs outside are disturbed he has
+only to fear that they will conspire secretly, from which a prince can
+easily secure himself by avoiding being hated and despised, and by
+keeping the people satisfied with him, which it is most necessary for
+him to accomplish, as I said above at length. And one of the most
+efficacious remedies that a prince can have against conspiracies is not
+to be hated and despised by the people, for he who conspires against a
+prince always expects to please them by his removal; but when the
+conspirator can only look forward to offending them, he will not have
+the courage to take such a course, for the difficulties that confront a
+conspirator are infinite. And as experience shows, many have been the
+conspiracies, but few have been successful; because he who conspires
+cannot act alone, nor can he take a companion except from those whom he
+believes to be malcontents, and as soon as you have opened your mind to
+a malcontent you have given him the material with which to content
+himself, for by denouncing you he can look for every advantage; so
+that, seeing the gain from this course to be assured, and seeing the
+other to be doubtful and full of dangers, he must be a very rare
+friend, or a thoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince, to keep faith
+with you.
+
+And, to reduce the matter into a small compass, I say that, on the side
+of the conspirator, there is nothing but fear, jealousy, prospect of
+punishment to terrify him; but on the side of the prince there is the
+majesty of the principality, the laws, the protection of friends and
+the state to defend him; so that, adding to all these things the
+popular goodwill, it is impossible that any one should be so rash as to
+conspire. For whereas in general the conspirator has to fear before the
+execution of his plot, in this case he has also to fear the sequel to
+the crime; because on account of it he has the people for an enemy, and
+thus cannot hope for any escape.
+
+Endless examples could be given on this subject, but I will be content
+with one, brought to pass within the memory of our fathers. Messer
+Annibale Bentivogli, who was prince in Bologna (grandfather of the
+present Annibale), having been murdered by the Canneschi, who had
+conspired against him, not one of his family survived but Messer
+Giovanni,[1] who was in childhood: immediately after his assassination
+the people rose and murdered all the Canneschi. This sprung from the
+popular goodwill which the house of Bentivogli enjoyed in those days in
+Bologna; which was so great that, although none remained there after
+the death of Annibale who was able to rule the state, the Bolognese,
+having information that there was one of the Bentivogli family in
+Florence, who up to that time had been considered the son of a
+blacksmith, sent to Florence for him and gave him the government of
+their city, and it was ruled by him until Messer Giovanni came in due
+course to the government.
+
+ [1] Giovanni Bentivogli, born in Bologna 1438, died at Milan 1508. He
+ ruled Bologna from 1462 to 1506. Machiavelli’s strong condemnation of
+ conspiracies may get its edge from his own very recent experience
+ (February 1513), when he had been arrested and tortured for his
+ alleged complicity in the Boscoli conspiracy.
+
+For this reason I consider that a prince ought to reckon conspiracies
+of little account when his people hold him in esteem; but when it is
+hostile to him, and bears hatred towards him, he ought to fear
+everything and everybody. And well-ordered states and wise princes have
+taken every care not to drive the nobles to desperation, and to keep
+the people satisfied and contented, for this is one of the most
+important objects a prince can have.
+
+Among the best ordered and governed kingdoms of our times is France,
+and in it are found many good institutions on which depend the liberty
+and security of the king; of these the first is the parliament and its
+authority, because he who founded the kingdom, knowing the ambition of
+the nobility and their boldness, considered that a bit to their mouths
+would be necessary to hold them in; and, on the other side, knowing the
+hatred of the people, founded in fear, against the nobles, he wished to
+protect them, yet he was not anxious for this to be the particular care
+of the king; therefore, to take away the reproach which he would be
+liable to from the nobles for favouring the people, and from the people
+for favouring the nobles, he set up an arbiter, who should be one who
+could beat down the great and favour the lesser without reproach to the
+king. Neither could you have a better or a more prudent arrangement, or
+a greater source of security to the king and kingdom. From this one can
+draw another important conclusion, that princes ought to leave affairs
+of reproach to the management of others, and keep those of grace in
+their own hands. And further, I consider that a prince ought to cherish
+the nobles, but not so as to make himself hated by the people.
+
+It may appear, perhaps, to some who have examined the lives and deaths
+of the Roman emperors that many of them would be an example contrary to
+my opinion, seeing that some of them lived nobly and showed great
+qualities of soul, nevertheless they have lost their empire or have
+been killed by subjects who have conspired against them. Wishing,
+therefore, to answer these objections, I will recall the characters of
+some of the emperors, and will show that the causes of their ruin were
+not different to those alleged by me; at the same time I will only
+submit for consideration those things that are noteworthy to him who
+studies the affairs of those times.
+
+It seems to me sufficient to take all those emperors who succeeded to
+the empire from Marcus the philosopher down to Maximinus; they were
+Marcus and his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julian, Severus and his son
+Antoninus Caracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus.
+
+There is first to note that, whereas in other principalities the
+ambition of the nobles and the insolence of the people only have to be
+contended with, the Roman emperors had a third difficulty in having to
+put up with the cruelty and avarice of their soldiers, a matter so
+beset with difficulties that it was the ruin of many; for it was a hard
+thing to give satisfaction both to soldiers and people; because the
+people loved peace, and for this reason they loved the unaspiring
+prince, whilst the soldiers loved the warlike prince who was bold,
+cruel, and rapacious, which qualities they were quite willing he should
+exercise upon the people, so that they could get double pay and give
+vent to their own greed and cruelty. Hence it arose that those emperors
+were always overthrown who, either by birth or training, had no great
+authority, and most of them, especially those who came new to the
+principality, recognizing the difficulty of these two opposing humours,
+were inclined to give satisfaction to the soldiers, caring little about
+injuring the people. Which course was necessary, because, as princes
+cannot help being hated by someone, they ought, in the first place, to
+avoid being hated by every one, and when they cannot compass this, they
+ought to endeavour with the utmost diligence to avoid the hatred of the
+most powerful. Therefore, those emperors who through inexperience had
+need of special favour adhered more readily to the soldiers than to the
+people; a course which turned out advantageous to them or not,
+accordingly as the prince knew how to maintain authority over them.
+
+From these causes it arose that Marcus, Pertinax, and Alexander, being
+all men of modest life, lovers of justice, enemies to cruelty, humane,
+and benignant, came to a sad end except Marcus; he alone lived and died
+honoured, because he had succeeded to the throne by hereditary title,
+and owed nothing either to the soldiers or the people; and afterwards,
+being possessed of many virtues which made him respected, he always
+kept both orders in their places whilst he lived, and was neither hated
+nor despised.
+
+But Pertinax was created emperor against the wishes of the soldiers,
+who, being accustomed to live licentiously under Commodus, could not
+endure the honest life to which Pertinax wished to reduce them; thus,
+having given cause for hatred, to which hatred there was added contempt
+for his old age, he was overthrown at the very beginning of his
+administration. And here it should be noted that hatred is acquired as
+much by good works as by bad ones, therefore, as I said before, a
+prince wishing to keep his state is very often forced to do evil; for
+when that body is corrupt whom you think you have need of to maintain
+yourself—it may be either the people or the soldiers or the nobles—you
+have to submit to its humours and to gratify them, and then good works
+will do you harm.
+
+But let us come to Alexander, who was a man of such great goodness,
+that among the other praises which are accorded him is this, that in
+the fourteen years he held the empire no one was ever put to death by
+him unjudged; nevertheless, being considered effeminate and a man who
+allowed himself to be governed by his mother, he became despised, the
+army conspired against him, and murdered him.
+
+Turning now to the opposite characters of Commodus, Severus, Antoninus
+Caracalla, and Maximinus, you will find them all cruel and
+rapacious-men who, to satisfy their soldiers, did not hesitate to
+commit every kind of iniquity against the people; and all, except
+Severus, came to a bad end; but in Severus there was so much valour
+that, keeping the soldiers friendly, although the people were oppressed
+by him, he reigned successfully; for his valour made him so much
+admired in the sight of the soldiers and people that the latter were
+kept in a way astonished and awed and the former respectful and
+satisfied. And because the actions of this man, as a new prince, were
+great, I wish to show briefly that he knew well how to counterfeit the
+fox and the lion, which natures, as I said above, it is necessary for a
+prince to imitate.
+
+Knowing the sloth of the Emperor Julian, he persuaded the army in
+Sclavonia, of which he was captain, that it would be right to go to
+Rome and avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been killed by the
+praetorian soldiers; and under this pretext, without appearing to
+aspire to the throne, he moved the army on Rome, and reached Italy
+before it was known that he had started. On his arrival at Rome, the
+Senate, through fear, elected him emperor and killed Julian. After this
+there remained for Severus, who wished to make himself master of the
+whole empire, two difficulties; one in Asia, where Niger, head of the
+Asiatic army, had caused himself to be proclaimed emperor; the other in
+the west where Albinus was, who also aspired to the throne. And as he
+considered it dangerous to declare himself hostile to both, he decided
+to attack Niger and to deceive Albinus. To the latter he wrote that,
+being elected emperor by the Senate, he was willing to share that
+dignity with him and sent him the title of Caesar; and, moreover, that
+the Senate had made Albinus his colleague; which things were accepted
+by Albinus as true. But after Severus had conquered and killed Niger,
+and settled oriental affairs, he returned to Rome and complained to the
+Senate that Albinus, little recognizing the benefits that he had
+received from him, had by treachery sought to murder him, and for this
+ingratitude he was compelled to punish him. Afterwards he sought him
+out in France, and took from him his government and life. He who will,
+therefore, carefully examine the actions of this man will find him a
+most valiant lion and a most cunning fox; he will find him feared and
+respected by every one, and not hated by the army; and it need not be
+wondered at that he, a new man, was able to hold the empire so well,
+because his supreme renown always protected him from that hatred which
+the people might have conceived against him for his violence.
+
+But his son Antoninus was a most eminent man, and had very excellent
+qualities, which made him admirable in the sight of the people and
+acceptable to the soldiers, for he was a warlike man, most enduring of
+fatigue, a despiser of all delicate food and other luxuries, which
+caused him to be beloved by the armies. Nevertheless, his ferocity and
+cruelties were so great and so unheard of that, after endless single
+murders, he killed a large number of the people of Rome and all those
+of Alexandria. He became hated by the whole world, and also feared by
+those he had around him, to such an extent that he was murdered in the
+midst of his army by a centurion. And here it must be noted that
+such-like deaths, which are deliberately inflicted with a resolved and
+desperate courage, cannot be avoided by princes, because any one who
+does not fear to die can inflict them; but a prince may fear them the
+less because they are very rare; he has only to be careful not to do
+any grave injury to those whom he employs or has around him in the
+service of the state. Antoninus had not taken this care, but had
+contumeliously killed a brother of that centurion, whom also he daily
+threatened, yet retained in his bodyguard; which, as it turned out, was
+a rash thing to do, and proved the emperor’s ruin.
+
+But let us come to Commodus, to whom it should have been very easy to
+hold the empire, for, being the son of Marcus, he had inherited it, and
+he had only to follow in the footsteps of his father to please his
+people and soldiers; but, being by nature cruel and brutal, he gave
+himself up to amusing the soldiers and corrupting them, so that he
+might indulge his rapacity upon the people; on the other hand, not
+maintaining his dignity, often descending to the theatre to compete
+with gladiators, and doing other vile things, little worthy of the
+imperial majesty, he fell into contempt with the soldiers, and being
+hated by one party and despised by the other, he was conspired against
+and was killed.
+
+It remains to discuss the character of Maximinus. He was a very warlike
+man, and the armies, being disgusted with the effeminacy of Alexander,
+of whom I have already spoken, killed him and elected Maximinus to the
+throne. This he did not possess for long, for two things made him hated
+and despised; the one, his having kept sheep in Thrace, which brought
+him into contempt (it being well known to all, and considered a great
+indignity by every one), and the other, his having at the accession to
+his dominions deferred going to Rome and taking possession of the
+imperial seat; he had also gained a reputation for the utmost ferocity
+by having, through his prefects in Rome and elsewhere in the empire,
+practised many cruelties, so that the whole world was moved to anger at
+the meanness of his birth and to fear at his barbarity. First Africa
+rebelled, then the Senate with all the people of Rome, and all Italy
+conspired against him, to which may be added his own army; this latter,
+besieging Aquileia and meeting with difficulties in taking it, were
+disgusted with his cruelties, and fearing him less when they found so
+many against him, murdered him.
+
+I do not wish to discuss Heliogabalus, Macrinus, or Julian, who, being
+thoroughly contemptible, were quickly wiped out; but I will bring this
+discourse to a conclusion by saying that princes in our times have this
+difficulty of giving inordinate satisfaction to their soldiers in a far
+less degree, because, notwithstanding one has to give them some
+indulgence, that is soon done; none of these princes have armies that
+are veterans in the governance and administration of provinces, as were
+the armies of the Roman Empire; and whereas it was then more necessary
+to give satisfaction to the soldiers than to the people, it is now more
+necessary to all princes, except the Turk and the Soldan, to satisfy
+the people rather the soldiers, because the people are the more
+powerful.
+
+From the above I have excepted the Turk, who always keeps round him
+twelve thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry on which depend
+the security and strength of the kingdom, and it is necessary that,
+putting aside every consideration for the people, he should keep them
+his friends. The kingdom of the Soldan is similar; being entirely in
+the hands of soldiers, it follows again that, without regard to the
+people, he must keep them his friends. But you must note that the state
+of the Soldan is unlike all other principalities, for the reason that
+it is like the Christian pontificate, which cannot be called either an
+hereditary or a newly formed principality; because the sons of the old
+prince are not the heirs, but he who is elected to that position by
+those who have authority, and the sons remain only noblemen. And this
+being an ancient custom, it cannot be called a new principality,
+because there are none of those difficulties in it that are met with in
+new ones; for although the prince is new, the constitution of the state
+is old, and it is framed so as to receive him as if he were its
+hereditary lord.
+
+But returning to the subject of our discourse, I say that whoever will
+consider it will acknowledge that either hatred or contempt has been
+fatal to the above-named emperors, and it will be recognized also how
+it happened that, a number of them acting in one way and a number in
+another, only one in each way came to a happy end and the rest to
+unhappy ones. Because it would have been useless and dangerous for
+Pertinax and Alexander, being new princes, to imitate Marcus, who was
+heir to the principality; and likewise it would have been utterly
+destructive to Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus to have imitated
+Severus, they not having sufficient valour to enable them to tread in
+his footsteps. Therefore a prince, new to the principality, cannot
+imitate the actions of Marcus, nor, again, is it necessary to follow
+those of Severus, but he ought to take from Severus those parts which
+are necessary to found his state, and from Marcus those which are
+proper and glorious to keep a state that may already be stable and
+firm.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XX.
+ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES OFTEN RESORT,
+ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL?
+
+
+1. Some princes, so as to hold securely the state, have disarmed their
+subjects; others have kept their subject towns distracted by factions;
+others have fostered enmities against themselves; others have laid
+themselves out to gain over those whom they distrusted in the beginning
+of their governments; some have built fortresses; some have overthrown
+and destroyed them. And although one cannot give a final judgment on
+all of these things unless one possesses the particulars of those
+states in which a decision has to be made, nevertheless I will speak as
+comprehensively as the matter of itself will admit.
+
+2. There never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects; rather
+when he has found them disarmed he has always armed them, because, by
+arming them, those arms become yours, those men who were distrusted
+become faithful, and those who were faithful are kept so, and your
+subjects become your adherents. And whereas all subjects cannot be
+armed, yet when those whom you do arm are benefited, the others can be
+handled more freely, and this difference in their treatment, which they
+quite understand, makes the former your dependents, and the latter,
+considering it to be necessary that those who have the most danger and
+service should have the most reward, excuse you. But when you disarm
+them, you at once offend them by showing that you distrust them, either
+for cowardice or for want of loyalty, and either of these opinions
+breeds hatred against you. And because you cannot remain unarmed, it
+follows that you turn to mercenaries, which are of the character
+already shown; even if they should be good they would not be sufficient
+to defend you against powerful enemies and distrusted subjects.
+Therefore, as I have said, a new prince in a new principality has
+always distributed arms. Histories are full of examples. But when a
+prince acquires a new state, which he adds as a province to his old
+one, then it is necessary to disarm the men of that state, except those
+who have been his adherents in acquiring it; and these again, with time
+and opportunity, should be rendered soft and effeminate; and matters
+should be managed in such a way that all the armed men in the state
+shall be your own soldiers who in your old state were living near you.
+
+3. Our forefathers, and those who were reckoned wise, were accustomed
+to say that it was necessary to hold Pistoia by factions and Pisa by
+fortresses; and with this idea they fostered quarrels in some of their
+tributary towns so as to keep possession of them the more easily. This
+may have been well enough in those times when Italy was in a way
+balanced, but I do not believe that it can be accepted as a precept for
+to-day, because I do not believe that factions can ever be of use;
+rather it is certain that when the enemy comes upon you in divided
+cities you are quickly lost, because the weakest party will always
+assist the outside forces and the other will not be able to resist. The
+Venetians, moved, as I believe, by the above reasons, fostered the
+Guelph and Ghibelline factions in their tributary cities; and although
+they never allowed them to come to bloodshed, yet they nursed these
+disputes amongst them, so that the citizens, distracted by their
+differences, should not unite against them. Which, as we saw, did not
+afterwards turn out as expected, because, after the rout at Vaila, one
+party at once took courage and seized the state. Such methods argue,
+therefore, weakness in the prince, because these factions will never be
+permitted in a vigorous principality; such methods for enabling one the
+more easily to manage subjects are only useful in times of peace, but
+if war comes this policy proves fallacious.
+
+4. Without doubt princes become great when they overcome the
+difficulties and obstacles by which they are confronted, and therefore
+fortune, especially when she desires to make a new prince great, who
+has a greater necessity to earn renown than an hereditary one, causes
+enemies to arise and form designs against him, in order that he may
+have the opportunity of overcoming them, and by them to mount higher,
+as by a ladder which his enemies have raised. For this reason many
+consider that a wise prince, when he has the opportunity, ought with
+craft to foster some animosity against himself, so that, having crushed
+it, his renown may rise higher.
+
+5. Princes, especially new ones, have found more fidelity and
+assistance in those men who in the beginning of their rule were
+distrusted than among those who in the beginning were trusted. Pandolfo
+Petrucci, Prince of Siena, ruled his state more by those who had been
+distrusted than by others. But on this question one cannot speak
+generally, for it varies so much with the individual; I will only say
+this, that those men who at the commencement of a princedom have been
+hostile, if they are of a description to need assistance to support
+themselves, can always be gained over with the greatest ease, and they
+will be tightly held to serve the prince with fidelity, inasmuch as
+they know it to be very necessary for them to cancel by deeds the bad
+impression which he had formed of them; and thus the prince always
+extracts more profit from them than from those who, serving him in too
+much security, may neglect his affairs. And since the matter demands
+it, I must not fail to warn a prince, who by means of secret favours
+has acquired a new state, that he must well consider the reasons which
+induced those to favour him who did so; and if it be not a natural
+affection towards him, but only discontent with their government, then
+he will only keep them friendly with great trouble and difficulty, for
+it will be impossible to satisfy them. And weighing well the reasons
+for this in those examples which can be taken from ancient and modern
+affairs, we shall find that it is easier for the prince to make friends
+of those men who were contented under the former government, and are
+therefore his enemies, than of those who, being discontented with it,
+were favourable to him and encouraged him to seize it.
+
+6. It has been a custom with princes, in order to hold their states
+more securely, to build fortresses that may serve as a bridle and bit
+to those who might design to work against them, and as a place of
+refuge from a first attack. I praise this system because it has been
+made use of formerly. Notwithstanding that, Messer Nicolo Vitelli in
+our times has been seen to demolish two fortresses in Citta di Castello
+so that he might keep that state; Guido Ubaldo, Duke of Urbino, on
+returning to his dominion, whence he had been driven by Cesare Borgia,
+razed to the foundations all the fortresses in that province, and
+considered that without them it would be more difficult to lose it; the
+Bentivogli returning to Bologna came to a similar decision. Fortresses,
+therefore, are useful or not according to circumstances; if they do you
+good in one way they injure you in another. And this question can be
+reasoned thus: the prince who has more to fear from the people than
+from foreigners ought to build fortresses, but he who has more to fear
+from foreigners than from the people ought to leave them alone. The
+castle of Milan, built by Francesco Sforza, has made, and will make,
+more trouble for the house of Sforza than any other disorder in the
+state. For this reason the best possible fortress is—not to be hated by
+the people, because, although you may hold the fortresses, yet they
+will not save you if the people hate you, for there will never be
+wanting foreigners to assist a people who have taken arms against you.
+It has not been seen in our times that such fortresses have been of use
+to any prince, unless to the Countess of Forli,[1] when the Count
+Girolamo, her consort, was killed; for by that means she was able to
+withstand the popular attack and wait for assistance from Milan, and
+thus recover her state; and the posture of affairs was such at that
+time that the foreigners could not assist the people. But fortresses
+were of little value to her afterwards when Cesare Borgia attacked her,
+and when the people, her enemy, were allied with foreigners. Therefore,
+it would have been safer for her, both then and before, not to have
+been hated by the people than to have had the fortresses. All these
+things considered then, I shall praise him who builds fortresses as
+well as him who does not, and I shall blame whoever, trusting in them,
+cares little about being hated by the people.
+
+ [1] Catherine Sforza, a daughter of Galeazzo Sforza and Lucrezia
+ Landriani, born 1463, died 1509. It was to the Countess of Forli that
+ Machiavelli was sent as envoy on 1499. A letter from Fortunati to the
+ countess announces the appointment: “I have been with the signori,”
+ wrote Fortunati, “to learn whom they would send and when. They tell me
+ that Nicolo Machiavelli, a learned young Florentine noble, secretary
+ to my Lords of the Ten, is to leave with me at once.” _Cf_. “Catherine
+ Sforza,” by Count Pasolini, translated by P. Sylvester, 1898.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXI.
+HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN
+
+
+Nothing makes a prince so much esteemed as great enterprises and
+setting a fine example. We have in our time Ferdinand of Aragon, the
+present King of Spain. He can almost be called a new prince, because he
+has risen, by fame and glory, from being an insignificant king to be
+the foremost king in Christendom; and if you will consider his deeds
+you will find them all great and some of them extraordinary. In the
+beginning of his reign he attacked Granada, and this enterprise was the
+foundation of his dominions. He did this quietly at first and without
+any fear of hindrance, for he held the minds of the barons of Castile
+occupied in thinking of the war and not anticipating any innovations;
+thus they did not perceive that by these means he was acquiring power
+and authority over them. He was able with the money of the Church and
+of the people to sustain his armies, and by that long war to lay the
+foundation for the military skill which has since distinguished him.
+Further, always using religion as a plea, so as to undertake greater
+schemes, he devoted himself with pious cruelty to driving out and
+clearing his kingdom of the Moors; nor could there be a more admirable
+example, nor one more rare. Under this same cloak he assailed Africa,
+he came down on Italy, he has finally attacked France; and thus his
+achievements and designs have always been great, and have kept the
+minds of his people in suspense and admiration and occupied with the
+issue of them. And his actions have arisen in such a way, one out of
+the other, that men have never been given time to work steadily against
+him.
+
+Again, it much assists a prince to set unusual examples in internal
+affairs, similar to those which are related of Messer Bernabo da
+Milano, who, when he had the opportunity, by any one in civil life
+doing some extraordinary thing, either good or bad, would take some
+method of rewarding or punishing him, which would be much spoken about.
+And a prince ought, above all things, always endeavour in every action
+to gain for himself the reputation of being a great and remarkable man.
+
+A prince is also respected when he is either a true friend or a
+downright enemy, that is to say, when, without any reservation, he
+declares himself in favour of one party against the other; which course
+will always be more advantageous than standing neutral; because if two
+of your powerful neighbours come to blows, they are of such a character
+that, if one of them conquers, you have either to fear him or not. In
+either case it will always be more advantageous for you to declare
+yourself and to make war strenuously; because, in the first case, if
+you do not declare yourself, you will invariably fall a prey to the
+conqueror, to the pleasure and satisfaction of him who has been
+conquered, and you will have no reasons to offer, nor anything to
+protect or to shelter you. Because he who conquers does not want
+doubtful friends who will not aid him in the time of trial; and he who
+loses will not harbour you because you did not willingly, sword in
+hand, court his fate.
+
+Antiochus went into Greece, being sent for by the Ætolians to drive out
+the Romans. He sent envoys to the Achaeans, who were friends of the
+Romans, exhorting them to remain neutral; and on the other hand the
+Romans urged them to take up arms. This question came to be discussed
+in the council of the Achaeans, where the legate of Antiochus urged
+them to stand neutral. To this the Roman legate answered: “As for that
+which has been said, that it is better and more advantageous for your
+state not to interfere in our war, nothing can be more erroneous;
+because by not interfering you will be left, without favour or
+consideration, the guerdon of the conqueror.” Thus it will always
+happen that he who is not your friend will demand your neutrality,
+whilst he who is your friend will entreat you to declare yourself with
+arms. And irresolute princes, to avoid present dangers, generally
+follow the neutral path, and are generally ruined. But when a prince
+declares himself gallantly in favour of one side, if the party with
+whom he allies himself conquers, although the victor may be powerful
+and may have him at his mercy, yet he is indebted to him, and there is
+established a bond of amity; and men are never so shameless as to
+become a monument of ingratitude by oppressing you. Victories after all
+are never so complete that the victor must not show some regard,
+especially to justice. But if he with whom you ally yourself loses, you
+may be sheltered by him, and whilst he is able he may aid you, and you
+become companions on a fortune that may rise again.
+
+In the second case, when those who fight are of such a character that
+you have no anxiety as to who may conquer, so much the more is it
+greater prudence to be allied, because you assist at the destruction of
+one by the aid of another who, if he had been wise, would have saved
+him; and conquering, as it is impossible that he should not do with
+your assistance, he remains at your discretion. And here it is to be
+noted that a prince ought to take care never to make an alliance with
+one more powerful than himself for the purposes of attacking others,
+unless necessity compels him, as is said above; because if he conquers
+you are at his discretion, and princes ought to avoid as much as
+possible being at the discretion of any one. The Venetians joined with
+France against the Duke of Milan, and this alliance, which caused their
+ruin, could have been avoided. But when it cannot be avoided, as
+happened to the Florentines when the Pope and Spain sent armies to
+attack Lombardy, then in such a case, for the above reasons, the prince
+ought to favour one of the parties.
+
+Never let any Government imagine that it can choose perfectly safe
+courses; rather let it expect to have to take very doubtful ones,
+because it is found in ordinary affairs that one never seeks to avoid
+one trouble without running into another; but prudence consists in
+knowing how to distinguish the character of troubles, and for choice to
+take the lesser evil.
+
+A prince ought also to show himself a patron of ability, and to honour
+the proficient in every art. At the same time he should encourage his
+citizens to practise their callings peaceably, both in commerce and
+agriculture, and in every other following, so that the one should not
+be deterred from improving his possessions for fear lest they be taken
+away from him or another from opening up trade for fear of taxes; but
+the prince ought to offer rewards to whoever wishes to do these things
+and designs in any way to honour his city or state.
+
+Further, he ought to entertain the people with festivals and spectacles
+at convenient seasons of the year; and as every city is divided into
+guilds or into societies,[1] he ought to hold such bodies in esteem,
+and associate with them sometimes, and show himself an example of
+courtesy and liberality; nevertheless, always maintaining the majesty
+of his rank, for this he must never consent to abate in anything.
+
+ [1] “Guilds or societies,” “in arti o in tribu.” “Arti” were craft or
+ trade guilds, _cf_. Florio: “Arte . . . a whole company of any trade
+ in any city or corporation town.” The guilds of Florence are most
+ admirably described by Mr Edgcumbe Staley in his work on the subject
+ (Methuen, 1906). Institutions of a somewhat similar character, called
+ “artel,” exist in Russia to-day, _cf_. Sir Mackenzie Wallace’s
+ “Russia,” ed. 1905: “The sons . . . were always during the working
+ season members of an artel. In some of the larger towns there are
+ artels of a much more complex kind— permanent associations, possessing
+ large capital, and pecuniarily responsible for the acts of the
+ individual members.” The word “artel,” despite its apparent
+ similarity, has, Mr Aylmer Maude assures me, no connection with “ars”
+ or “arte.” Its root is that of the verb “rotisya,” to bind oneself by
+ an oath; and it is generally admitted to be only another form of
+ “rota,” which now signifies a “regimental company.” In both words the
+ underlying idea is that of a body of men united by an oath. “Tribu”
+ were possibly gentile groups, united by common descent, and included
+ individuals connected by marriage. Perhaps our words “sects” or
+ “clans” would be most appropriate.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXII.
+CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES
+
+
+The choice of servants is of no little importance to a prince, and they
+are good or not according to the discrimination of the prince. And the
+first opinion which one forms of a prince, and of his understanding, is
+by observing the men he has around him; and when they are capable and
+faithful he may always be considered wise, because he has known how to
+recognize the capable and to keep them faithful. But when they are
+otherwise one cannot form a good opinion of him, for the prime error
+which he made was in choosing them.
+
+There were none who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as the servant of
+Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, who would not consider Pandolfo to
+be a very clever man in having Venafro for his servant. Because there
+are three classes of intellects: one which comprehends by itself;
+another which appreciates what others comprehended; and a third which
+neither comprehends by itself nor by the showing of others; the first
+is the most excellent, the second is good, the third is useless.
+Therefore, it follows necessarily that, if Pandolfo was not in the
+first rank, he was in the second, for whenever one has judgment to know
+good and bad when it is said and done, although he himself may not have
+the initiative, yet he can recognize the good and the bad in his
+servant, and the one he can praise and the other correct; thus the
+servant cannot hope to deceive him, and is kept honest.
+
+But to enable a prince to form an opinion of his servant there is one
+test which never fails; when you see the servant thinking more of his
+own interests than of yours, and seeking inwardly his own profit in
+everything, such a man will never make a good servant, nor will you
+ever be able to trust him; because he who has the state of another in
+his hands ought never to think of himself, but always of his prince,
+and never pay any attention to matters in which the prince is not
+concerned.
+
+On the other hand, to keep his servant honest the prince ought to study
+him, honouring him, enriching him, doing him kindnesses, sharing with
+him the honours and cares; and at the same time let him see that he
+cannot stand alone, so that many honours may not make him desire more,
+many riches make him wish for more, and that many cares may make him
+dread chances. When, therefore, servants, and princes towards servants,
+are thus disposed, they can trust each other, but when it is otherwise,
+the end will always be disastrous for either one or the other.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXIII.
+HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED
+
+
+I do not wish to leave out an important branch of this subject, for it
+is a danger from which princes are with difficulty preserved, unless
+they are very careful and discriminating. It is that of flatterers, of
+whom courts are full, because men are so self-complacent in their own
+affairs, and in a way so deceived in them, that they are preserved with
+difficulty from this pest, and if they wish to defend themselves they
+run the danger of falling into contempt. Because there is no other way
+of guarding oneself from flatterers except letting men understand that
+to tell you the truth does not offend you; but when every one may tell
+you the truth, respect for you abates.
+
+Therefore a wise prince ought to hold a third course by choosing the
+wise men in his state, and giving to them only the liberty of speaking
+the truth to him, and then only of those things of which he inquires,
+and of none others; but he ought to question them upon everything, and
+listen to their opinions, and afterwards form his own conclusions. With
+these councillors, separately and collectively, he ought to carry
+himself in such a way that each of them should know that, the more
+freely he shall speak, the more he shall be preferred; outside of
+these, he should listen to no one, pursue the thing resolved on, and be
+steadfast in his resolutions. He who does otherwise is either
+overthrown by flatterers, or is so often changed by varying opinions
+that he falls into contempt.
+
+I wish on this subject to adduce a modern example. Fra Luca, the man of
+affairs to Maximilian,[1] the present emperor, speaking of his majesty,
+said: He consulted with no one, yet never got his own way in anything.
+This arose because of his following a practice the opposite to the
+above; for the emperor is a secretive man—he does not communicate his
+designs to any one, nor does he receive opinions on them. But as in
+carrying them into effect they become revealed and known, they are at
+once obstructed by those men whom he has around him, and he, being
+pliant, is diverted from them. Hence it follows that those things he
+does one day he undoes the next, and no one ever understands what he
+wishes or intends to do, and no one can rely on his resolutions.
+
+ [1] Maximilian I, born in 1459, died 1519, Emperor of the Holy Roman
+ Empire. He married, first, Mary, daughter of Charles the Bold; after
+ her death, Bianca Sforza; and thus became involved in Italian
+ politics.
+
+A prince, therefore, ought always to take counsel, but only when he
+wishes and not when others wish; he ought rather to discourage every
+one from offering advice unless he asks it; but, however, he ought to
+be a constant inquirer, and afterwards a patient listener concerning
+the things of which he inquired; also, on learning that any one, on any
+consideration, has not told him the truth, he should let his anger be
+felt.
+
+And if there are some who think that a prince who conveys an impression
+of his wisdom is not so through his own ability, but through the good
+advisers that he has around him, beyond doubt they are deceived,
+because this is an axiom which never fails: that a prince who is not
+wise himself will never take good advice, unless by chance he has
+yielded his affairs entirely to one person who happens to be a very
+prudent man. In this case indeed he may be well governed, but it would
+not be for long, because such a governor would in a short time take
+away his state from him.
+
+But if a prince who is not inexperienced should take counsel from more
+than one he will never get united counsels, nor will he know how to
+unite them. Each of the counsellors will think of his own interests,
+and the prince will not know how to control them or to see through
+them. And they are not to be found otherwise, because men will always
+prove untrue to you unless they are kept honest by constraint.
+Therefore it must be inferred that good counsels, whencesoever they
+come, are born of the wisdom of the prince, and not the wisdom of the
+prince from good counsels.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXIV.
+WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES
+
+
+The previous suggestions, carefully observed, will enable a new prince
+to appear well established, and render him at once more secure and
+fixed in the state than if he had been long seated there. For the
+actions of a new prince are more narrowly observed than those of an
+hereditary one, and when they are seen to be able they gain more men
+and bind far tighter than ancient blood; because men are attracted more
+by the present than by the past, and when they find the present good
+they enjoy it and seek no further; they will also make the utmost
+defence of a prince if he fails them not in other things. Thus it will
+be a double glory for him to have established a new principality, and
+adorned and strengthened it with good laws, good arms, good allies, and
+with a good example; so will it be a double disgrace to him who, born a
+prince, shall lose his state by want of wisdom.
+
+And if those seigniors are considered who have lost their states in
+Italy in our times, such as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and
+others, there will be found in them, firstly, one common defect in
+regard to arms from the causes which have been discussed at length; in
+the next place, some one of them will be seen, either to have had the
+people hostile, or if he has had the people friendly, he has not known
+how to secure the nobles. In the absence of these defects states that
+have power enough to keep an army in the field cannot be lost.
+
+Philip of Macedon, not the father of Alexander the Great, but he who
+was conquered by Titus Quintius, had not much territory compared to the
+greatness of the Romans and of Greece who attacked him, yet being a
+warlike man who knew how to attract the people and secure the nobles,
+he sustained the war against his enemies for many years, and if in the
+end he lost the dominion of some cities, nevertheless he retained the
+kingdom.
+
+Therefore, do not let our princes accuse fortune for the loss of their
+principalities after so many years’ possession, but rather their own
+sloth, because in quiet times they never thought there could be a
+change (it is a common defect in man not to make any provision in the
+calm against the tempest), and when afterwards the bad times came they
+thought of flight and not of defending themselves, and they hoped that
+the people, disgusted with the insolence of the conquerors, would
+recall them. This course, when others fail, may be good, but it is very
+bad to have neglected all other expedients for that, since you would
+never wish to fall because you trusted to be able to find someone later
+on to restore you. This again either does not happen, or, if it does,
+it will not be for your security, because that deliverance is of no
+avail which does not depend upon yourself; those only are reliable,
+certain, and durable that depend on yourself and your valour.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXV.
+WHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER
+
+
+It is not unknown to me how many men have had, and still have, the
+opinion that the affairs of the world are in such wise governed by
+fortune and by God that men with their wisdom cannot direct them and
+that no one can even help them; and because of this they would have us
+believe that it is not necessary to labour much in affairs, but to let
+chance govern them. This opinion has been more credited in our times
+because of the great changes in affairs which have been seen, and may
+still be seen, every day, beyond all human conjecture. Sometimes
+pondering over this, I am in some degree inclined to their opinion.
+Nevertheless, not to extinguish our free will, I hold it to be true
+that Fortune is the arbiter of one-half of our actions,[1] but that she
+still leaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a little less.
+
+ [1] Frederick the Great was accustomed to say: “The older one gets the
+ more convinced one becomes that his Majesty King Chance does
+ three-quarters of the business of this miserable universe.” Sorel’s
+ “Eastern Question.”
+
+I compare her to one of those raging rivers, which when in flood
+overflows the plains, sweeping away trees and buildings, bearing away
+the soil from place to place; everything flies before it, all yield to
+its violence, without being able in any way to withstand it; and yet,
+though its nature be such, it does not follow therefore that men, when
+the weather becomes fair, shall not make provision, both with defences
+and barriers, in such a manner that, rising again, the waters may pass
+away by canal, and their force be neither so unrestrained nor so
+dangerous. So it happens with fortune, who shows her power where valour
+has not prepared to resist her, and thither she turns her forces where
+she knows that barriers and defences have not been raised to constrain
+her.
+
+And if you will consider Italy, which is the seat of these changes, and
+which has given to them their impulse, you will see it to be an open
+country without barriers and without any defence. For if it had been
+defended by proper valour, as are Germany, Spain, and France, either
+this invasion would not have made the great changes it has made or it
+would not have come at all. And this I consider enough to say
+concerning resistance to fortune in general.
+
+But confining myself more to the particular, I say that a prince may be
+seen happy to-day and ruined to-morrow without having shown any change
+of disposition or character. This, I believe, arises firstly from
+causes that have already been discussed at length, namely, that the
+prince who relies entirely on fortune is lost when it changes. I
+believe also that he will be successful who directs his actions
+according to the spirit of the times, and that he whose actions do not
+accord with the times will not be successful. Because men are seen, in
+affairs that lead to the end which every man has before him, namely,
+glory and riches, to get there by various methods; one with caution,
+another with haste; one by force, another by skill; one by patience,
+another by its opposite; and each one succeeds in reaching the goal by
+a different method. One can also see of two cautious men the one attain
+his end, the other fail; and similarly, two men by different
+observances are equally successful, the one being cautious, the other
+impetuous; all this arises from nothing else than whether or not they
+conform in their methods to the spirit of the times. This follows from
+what I have said, that two men working differently bring about the same
+effect, and of two working similarly, one attains his object and the
+other does not.
+
+Changes in estate also issue from this, for if, to one who governs
+himself with caution and patience, times and affairs converge in such a
+way that his administration is successful, his fortune is made; but if
+times and affairs change, he is ruined if he does not change his course
+of action. But a man is not often found sufficiently circumspect to
+know how to accommodate himself to the change, both because he cannot
+deviate from what nature inclines him to do, and also because, having
+always prospered by acting in one way, he cannot be persuaded that it
+is well to leave it; and, therefore, the cautious man, when it is time
+to turn adventurous, does not know how to do it, hence he is ruined;
+but had he changed his conduct with the times fortune would not have
+changed.
+
+Pope Julius the Second went to work impetuously in all his affairs, and
+found the times and circumstances conform so well to that line of
+action that he always met with success. Consider his first enterprise
+against Bologna, Messer Giovanni Bentivogli being still alive. The
+Venetians were not agreeable to it, nor was the King of Spain, and he
+had the enterprise still under discussion with the King of France;
+nevertheless he personally entered upon the expedition with his
+accustomed boldness and energy, a move which made Spain and the
+Venetians stand irresolute and passive, the latter from fear, the
+former from desire to recover the kingdom of Naples; on the other hand,
+he drew after him the King of France, because that king, having
+observed the movement, and desiring to make the Pope his friend so as
+to humble the Venetians, found it impossible to refuse him. Therefore
+Julius with his impetuous action accomplished what no other pontiff
+with simple human wisdom could have done; for if he had waited in Rome
+until he could get away, with his plans arranged and everything fixed,
+as any other pontiff would have done, he would never have succeeded.
+Because the King of France would have made a thousand excuses, and the
+others would have raised a thousand fears.
+
+I will leave his other actions alone, as they were all alike, and they
+all succeeded, for the shortness of his life did not let him experience
+the contrary; but if circumstances had arisen which required him to go
+cautiously, his ruin would have followed, because he would never have
+deviated from those ways to which nature inclined him.
+
+I conclude, therefore that, fortune being changeful and mankind
+steadfast in their ways, so long as the two are in agreement men are
+successful, but unsuccessful when they fall out. For my part I consider
+that it is better to be adventurous than cautious, because fortune is a
+woman, and if you wish to keep her under it is necessary to beat and
+ill-use her; and it is seen that she allows herself to be mastered by
+the adventurous rather than by those who go to work more coldly. She
+is, therefore, always, woman-like, a lover of young men, because they
+are less cautious, more violent, and with more audacity command her.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXVI.
+AN EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS
+
+
+Having carefully considered the subject of the above discourses, and
+wondering within myself whether the present times were propitious to a
+new prince, and whether there were elements that would give an
+opportunity to a wise and virtuous one to introduce a new order of
+things which would do honour to him and good to the people of this
+country, it appears to me that so many things concur to favour a new
+prince that I never knew a time more fit than the present.
+
+And if, as I said, it was necessary that the people of Israel should be
+captive so as to make manifest the ability of Moses; that the Persians
+should be oppressed by the Medes so as to discover the greatness of the
+soul of Cyrus; and that the Athenians should be dispersed to illustrate
+the capabilities of Theseus: then at the present time, in order to
+discover the virtue of an Italian spirit, it was necessary that Italy
+should be reduced to the extremity that she is now in, that she should
+be more enslaved than the Hebrews, more oppressed than the Persians,
+more scattered than the Athenians; without head, without order, beaten,
+despoiled, torn, overrun; and to have endured every kind of desolation.
+
+Although lately some spark may have been shown by one, which made us
+think he was ordained by God for our redemption, nevertheless it was
+afterwards seen, in the height of his career, that fortune rejected
+him; so that Italy, left as without life, waits for him who shall yet
+heal her wounds and put an end to the ravaging and plundering of
+Lombardy, to the swindling and taxing of the kingdom and of Tuscany,
+and cleanse those sores that for long have festered. It is seen how she
+entreats God to send someone who shall deliver her from these wrongs
+and barbarous insolencies. It is seen also that she is ready and
+willing to follow a banner if only someone will raise it.
+
+Nor is there to be seen at present one in whom she can place more hope
+than in your illustrious house,[1] with its valour and fortune,
+favoured by God and by the Church of which it is now the chief, and
+which could be made the head of this redemption. This will not be
+difficult if you will recall to yourself the actions and lives of the
+men I have named. And although they were great and wonderful men, yet
+they were men, and each one of them had no more opportunity than the
+present offers, for their enterprises were neither more just nor easier
+than this, nor was God more their friend than He is yours.
+
+ [1] Giuliano de Medici. He had just been created a cardinal by Leo X.
+ In 1523 Giuliano was elected Pope, and took the title of Clement VII.
+
+With us there is great justice, because that war is just which is
+necessary, and arms are hallowed when there is no other hope but in
+them. Here there is the greatest willingness, and where the willingness
+is great the difficulties cannot be great if you will only follow those
+men to whom I have directed your attention. Further than this, how
+extraordinarily the ways of God have been manifested beyond example:
+the sea is divided, a cloud has led the way, the rock has poured forth
+water, it has rained manna, everything has contributed to your
+greatness; you ought to do the rest. God is not willing to do
+everything, and thus take away our free will and that share of glory
+which belongs to us.
+
+And it is not to be wondered at if none of the above-named Italians
+have been able to accomplish all that is expected from your illustrious
+house; and if in so many revolutions in Italy, and in so many
+campaigns, it has always appeared as if military virtue were exhausted,
+this has happened because the old order of things was not good, and
+none of us have known how to find a new one. And nothing honours a man
+more than to establish new laws and new ordinances when he himself was
+newly risen. Such things when they are well founded and dignified will
+make him revered and admired, and in Italy there are not wanting
+opportunities to bring such into use in every form.
+
+Here there is great valour in the limbs whilst it fails in the head.
+Look attentively at the duels and the hand-to-hand combats, how
+superior the Italians are in strength, dexterity, and subtlety. But
+when it comes to armies they do not bear comparison, and this springs
+entirely from the insufficiency of the leaders, since those who are
+capable are not obedient, and each one seems to himself to know, there
+having never been any one so distinguished above the rest, either by
+valour or fortune, that others would yield to him. Hence it is that for
+so long a time, and during so much fighting in the past twenty years,
+whenever there has been an army wholly Italian, it has always given a
+poor account of itself; the first witness to this is Il Taro,
+afterwards Allesandria, Capua, Genoa, Vaila, Bologna, Mestri.[2]
+
+ [2] The battles of Il Taro, 1495; Alessandria, 1499; Capua, 1501;
+ Genoa, 1507; Vaila, 1509; Bologna, 1511; Mestri, 1513.
+
+If, therefore, your illustrious house wishes to follow these remarkable
+men who have redeemed their country, it is necessary before all things,
+as a true foundation for every enterprise, to be provided with your own
+forces, because there can be no more faithful, truer, or better
+soldiers. And although singly they are good, altogether they will be
+much better when they find themselves commanded by their prince,
+honoured by him, and maintained at his expense. Therefore it is
+necessary to be prepared with such arms, so that you can be defended
+against foreigners by Italian valour.
+
+And although Swiss and Spanish infantry may be considered very
+formidable, nevertheless there is a defect in both, by reason of which
+a third order would not only be able to oppose them, but might be
+relied upon to overthrow them. For the Spaniards cannot resist cavalry,
+and the Switzers are afraid of infantry whenever they encounter them in
+close combat. Owing to this, as has been and may again be seen, the
+Spaniards are unable to resist French cavalry, and the Switzers are
+overthrown by Spanish infantry. And although a complete proof of this
+latter cannot be shown, nevertheless there was some evidence of it at
+the battle of Ravenna, when the Spanish infantry were confronted by
+German battalions, who follow the same tactics as the Swiss; when the
+Spaniards, by agility of body and with the aid of their shields, got in
+under the pikes of the Germans and stood out of danger, able to attack,
+while the Germans stood helpless, and, if the cavalry had not dashed
+up, all would have been over with them. It is possible, therefore,
+knowing the defects of both these infantries, to invent a new one,
+which will resist cavalry and not be afraid of infantry; this need not
+create a new order of arms, but a variation upon the old. And these are
+the kind of improvements which confer reputation and power upon a new
+prince.
+
+This opportunity, therefore, ought not to be allowed to pass for
+letting Italy at last see her liberator appear. Nor can one express the
+love with which he would be received in all those provinces which have
+suffered so much from these foreign scourings, with what thirst for
+revenge, with what stubborn faith, with what devotion, with what tears.
+What door would be closed to him? Who would refuse obedience to him?
+What envy would hinder him? What Italian would refuse him homage? To
+all of us this barbarous dominion stinks. Let, therefore, your
+illustrious house take up this charge with that courage and hope with
+which all just enterprises are undertaken, so that under its standard
+our native country may be ennobled, and under its auspices may be
+verified that saying of Petrarch:
+
+Virtu contro al Furore
+    Prendera l’arme, e fia il combatter corto:
+Che l’antico valore
+    Negli italici cuor non e ancor morto.
+
+Virtue against fury shall advance the fight,
+    And it i’ th’ combat soon shall put to flight:
+For the old Roman valour is not dead,
+    Nor in th’ Italians’ brests extinguished.
+
+Edward Dacre, 1640.
+
+
+
+
+DESCRIPTION OF THE METHODS ADOPTED BY THE DUKE VALENTINO WHEN MURDERING
+VITELLOZZO VITELLI, OLIVEROTTO DA FERMO, THE SIGNOR PAGOLO, AND THE
+DUKE DI GRAVINA ORSINI
+
+BY NICOLO MACHIAVELLI
+
+
+The Duke Valentino had returned from Lombardy, where he had been to
+clear himself with the King of France from the calumnies which had been
+raised against him by the Florentines concerning the rebellion of
+Arezzo and other towns in the Val di Chiana, and had arrived at Imola,
+whence he intended with his army to enter upon the campaign against
+Giovanni Bentivogli, the tyrant of Bologna: for he intended to bring
+that city under his domination, and to make it the head of his
+Romagnian duchy.
+
+These matters coming to the knowledge of the Vitelli and Orsini and
+their following, it appeared to them that the duke would become too
+powerful, and it was feared that, having seized Bologna, he would seek
+to destroy them in order that he might become supreme in Italy. Upon
+this a meeting was called at Magione in the district of Perugia, to
+which came the cardinal, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina Orsini,
+Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, Gianpagolo Baglioni, the
+tyrant of Perugia, and Messer Antonio da Venafro, sent by Pandolfo
+Petrucci, the Prince of Siena. Here were discussed the power and
+courage of the duke and the necessity of curbing his ambitions, which
+might otherwise bring danger to the rest of being ruined. And they
+decided not to abandon the Bentivogli, but to strive to win over the
+Florentines; and they sent their men to one place and another,
+promising to one party assistance and to another encouragement to unite
+with them against the common enemy. This meeting was at once reported
+throughout all Italy, and those who were discontented under the duke,
+among whom were the people of Urbino, took hope of effecting a
+revolution.
+
+Thus it arose that, men’s minds being thus unsettled, it was decided by
+certain men of Urbino to seize the fortress of San Leo, which was held
+for the duke, and which they captured by the following means. The
+castellan was fortifying the rock and causing timber to be taken there;
+so the conspirators watched, and when certain beams which were being
+carried to the rock were upon the bridge, so that it was prevented from
+being drawn up by those inside, they took the opportunity of leaping
+upon the bridge and thence into the fortress. Upon this capture being
+effected, the whole state rebelled and recalled the old duke, being
+encouraged in this, not so much by the capture of the fort, as by the
+Diet at Magione, from whom they expected to get assistance.
+
+Those who heard of the rebellion at Urbino thought they would not lose
+the opportunity, and at once assembled their men so as to take any
+town, should any remain in the hands of the duke in that state; and
+they sent again to Florence to beg that republic to join with them in
+destroying the common firebrand, showing that the risk was lessened and
+that they ought not to wait for another opportunity.
+
+But the Florentines, from hatred, for sundry reasons, of the Vitelli
+and Orsini, not only would not ally themselves, but sent Nicolo
+Machiavelli, their secretary, to offer shelter and assistance to the
+duke against his enemies. The duke was found full of fear at Imola,
+because, against everybody’s expectation, his soldiers had at once gone
+over to the enemy and he found himself disarmed and war at his door.
+But recovering courage from the offers of the Florentines, he decided
+to temporize before fighting with the few soldiers that remained to
+him, and to negotiate for a reconciliation, and also to get assistance.
+This latter he obtained in two ways, by sending to the King of France
+for men and by enlisting men-at-arms and others whom he turned into
+cavalry of a sort: to all he gave money.
+
+Notwithstanding this, his enemies drew near to him, and approached
+Fossombrone, where they encountered some men of the duke and, with the
+aid of the Orsini and Vitelli, routed them. When this happened, the
+duke resolved at once to see if he could not close the trouble with
+offers of reconciliation, and being a most perfect dissembler he did
+not fail in any practices to make the insurgents understand that he
+wished every man who had acquired anything to keep it, as it was enough
+for him to have the title of prince, whilst others might have the
+principality.
+
+And the duke succeeded so well in this that they sent Signor Pagolo to
+him to negotiate for a reconciliation, and they brought their army to a
+standstill. But the duke did not stop his preparations, and took every
+care to provide himself with cavalry and infantry, and that such
+preparations might not be apparent to the others, he sent his troops in
+separate parties to every part of the Romagna. In the meanwhile there
+came also to him five hundred French lancers, and although he found
+himself sufficiently strong to take vengeance on his enemies in open
+war, he considered that it would be safer and more advantageous to
+outwit them, and for this reason he did not stop the work of
+reconciliation.
+
+And that this might be effected the duke concluded a peace with them in
+which he confirmed their former covenants; he gave them four thousand
+ducats at once; he promised not to injure the Bentivogli; and he formed
+an alliance with Giovanni; and moreover he would not force them to come
+personally into his presence unless it pleased them to do so. On the
+other hand, they promised to restore to him the duchy of Urbino and
+other places seized by them, to serve him in all his expeditions, and
+not to make war against or ally themselves with any one without his
+permission.
+
+This reconciliation being completed, Guido Ubaldo, the Duke of Urbino,
+again fled to Venice, having first destroyed all the fortresses in his
+state; because, trusting in the people, he did not wish that the
+fortresses, which he did not think he could defend, should be held by
+the enemy, since by these means a check would be kept upon his friends.
+But the Duke Valentino, having completed this convention, and dispersed
+his men throughout the Romagna, set out for Imola at the end of
+November together with his French men-at-arms: thence he went to
+Cesena, where he stayed some time to negotiate with the envoys of the
+Vitelli and Orsini, who had assembled with their men in the duchy of
+Urbino, as to the enterprise in which they should now take part; but
+nothing being concluded, Oliverotto da Fermo was sent to propose that
+if the duke wished to undertake an expedition against Tuscany they were
+ready; if he did not wish it, then they would besiege Sinigalia. To
+this the duke replied that he did not wish to enter into war with
+Tuscany, and thus become hostile to the Florentines, but that he was
+very willing to proceed against Sinigalia.
+
+It happened that not long afterwards the town surrendered, but the
+fortress would not yield to them because the castellan would not give
+it up to any one but the duke in person; therefore they exhorted him to
+come there. This appeared a good opportunity to the duke, as, being
+invited by them, and not going of his own will, he would awaken no
+suspicions. And the more to reassure them, he allowed all the French
+men-at-arms who were with him in Lombardy to depart, except the hundred
+lancers under Mons. di Candales, his brother-in-law. He left Cesena
+about the middle of December, and went to Fano, and with the utmost
+cunning and cleverness he persuaded the Vitelli and Orsini to wait for
+him at Sinigalia, pointing out to them that any lack of compliance
+would cast a doubt upon the sincerity and permanency of the
+reconciliation, and that he was a man who wished to make use of the
+arms and councils of his friends. But Vitellozzo remained very
+stubborn, for the death of his brother warned him that he should not
+offend a prince and afterwards trust him; nevertheless, persuaded by
+Pagolo Orsini, whom the duke had corrupted with gifts and promises, he
+agreed to wait.
+
+Upon this the duke, before his departure from Fano, which was to be on
+30th December 1502, communicated his designs to eight of his most
+trusted followers, among whom were Don Michele and the Monsignor
+d’Euna, who was afterwards cardinal; and he ordered that, as soon as
+Vitellozzo, Pagolo Orsini, the Duke di Gravina, and Oliverotto should
+arrive, his followers in pairs should take them one by one, entrusting
+certain men to certain pairs, who should entertain them until they
+reached Sinigalia; nor should they be permitted to leave until they
+came to the duke’s quarters, where they should be seized.
+
+The duke afterwards ordered all his horsemen and infantry, of which
+there were more than two thousand cavalry and ten thousand footmen, to
+assemble by daybreak at the Metauro, a river five miles distant from
+Fano, and await him there. He found himself, therefore, on the last day
+of December at the Metauro with his men, and having sent a cavalcade of
+about two hundred horsemen before him, he then moved forward the
+infantry, whom he accompanied with the rest of the men-at-arms.
+
+Fano and Sinigalia are two cities of La Marca situated on the shore of
+the Adriatic Sea, fifteen miles distant from each other, so that he who
+goes towards Sinigalia has the mountains on his right hand, the bases
+of which are touched by the sea in some places. The city of Sinigalia
+is distant from the foot of the mountains a little more than a bow-shot
+and from the shore about a mile. On the side opposite to the city runs
+a little river which bathes that part of the walls looking towards
+Fano, facing the high road. Thus he who draws near to Sinigalia comes
+for a good space by road along the mountains, and reaches the river
+which passes by Sinigalia. If he turns to his left hand along the bank
+of it, and goes for the distance of a bow-shot, he arrives at a bridge
+which crosses the river; he is then almost abreast of the gate that
+leads into Sinigalia, not by a straight line, but transversely. Before
+this gate there stands a collection of houses with a square to which
+the bank of the river forms one side.
+
+The Vitelli and Orsini having received orders to wait for the duke, and
+to honour him in person, sent away their men to several castles distant
+from Sinigalia about six miles, so that room could be made for the men
+of the duke; and they left in Sinigalia only Oliverotto and his band,
+which consisted of one thousand infantry and one hundred and fifty
+horsemen, who were quartered in the suburb mentioned above. Matters
+having been thus arranged, the Duke Valentino left for Sinigalia, and
+when the leaders of the cavalry reached the bridge they did not pass
+over, but having opened it, one portion wheeled towards the river and
+the other towards the country, and a way was left in the middle through
+which the infantry passed, without stopping, into the town.
+
+Vitellozzo, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina on mules, accompanied by a
+few horsemen, went towards the duke; Vitellozo, unarmed and wearing a
+cape lined with green, appeared very dejected, as if conscious of his
+approaching death—a circumstance which, in view of the ability of the
+man and his former fortune, caused some amazement. And it is said that
+when he parted from his men before setting out for Sinigalia to meet
+the duke he acted as if it were his last parting from them. He
+recommended his house and its fortunes to his captains, and advised his
+nephews that it was not the fortune of their house, but the virtues of
+their fathers that should be kept in mind. These three, therefore, came
+before the duke and saluted him respectfully, and were received by him
+with goodwill; they were at once placed between those who were
+commissioned to look after them.
+
+But the duke noticing that Oliverotto, who had remained with his band
+in Sinigalia, was missing—for Oliverotto was waiting in the square
+before his quarters near the river, keeping his men in order and
+drilling them—signalled with his eye to Don Michelle, to whom the care
+of Oliverotto had been committed, that he should take measures that
+Oliverotto should not escape. Therefore Don Michele rode off and joined
+Oliverotto, telling him that it was not right to keep his men out of
+their quarters, because these might be taken up by the men of the duke;
+and he advised him to send them at once to their quarters and to come
+himself to meet the duke. And Oliverotto, having taken this advice,
+came before the duke, who, when he saw him, called to him; and
+Oliverotto, having made his obeisance, joined the others.
+
+So the whole party entered Sinigalia, dismounted at the duke’s
+quarters, and went with him into a secret chamber, where the duke made
+them prisoners; he then mounted on horseback, and issued orders that
+the men of Oliverotto and the Orsini should be stripped of their arms.
+Those of Oliverotto, being at hand, were quickly settled, but those of
+the Orsini and Vitelli, being at a distance, and having a presentiment
+of the destruction of their masters, had time to prepare themselves,
+and bearing in mind the valour and discipline of the Orsinian and
+Vitellian houses, they stood together against the hostile forces of the
+country and saved themselves.
+
+But the duke’s soldiers, not being content with having pillaged the men
+of Oliverotto, began to sack Sinigalia, and if the duke had not
+repressed this outrage by killing some of them they would have
+completely sacked it. Night having come and the tumult being silenced,
+the duke prepared to kill Vitellozzo and Oliverotto; he led them into a
+room and caused them to be strangled. Neither of them used words in
+keeping with their past lives: Vitellozzo prayed that he might ask of
+the pope full pardon for his sins; Oliverotto cringed and laid the
+blame for all injuries against the duke on Vitellozzo. Pagolo and the
+Duke di Gravina Orsini were kept alive until the duke heard from Rome
+that the pope had taken the Cardinal Orsino, the Archbishop of
+Florence, and Messer Jacopo da Santa Croce. After which news, on 18th
+January 1502, in the castle of Pieve, they also were strangled in the
+same way.
+
+
+
+
+THE LIFE OF CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI OF LUCCA
+
+WRITTEN BY NICOLO MACHIAVELLI
+
+And sent to his friends ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI And LUIGI ALAMANNI
+
+CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI 1284-1328
+
+
+It appears, dearest Zanobi and Luigi, a wonderful thing to those who
+have considered the matter, that all men, or the larger number of them,
+who have performed great deeds in the world, and excelled all others in
+their day, have had their birth and beginning in baseness and
+obscurity; or have been aggrieved by Fortune in some outrageous way.
+They have either been exposed to the mercy of wild beasts, or they have
+had so mean a parentage that in shame they have given themselves out to
+be sons of Jove or of some other deity. It would be wearisome to relate
+who these persons may have been because they are well known to
+everybody, and, as such tales would not be particularly edifying to
+those who read them, they are omitted. I believe that these lowly
+beginnings of great men occur because Fortune is desirous of showing to
+the world that such men owe much to her and little to wisdom, because
+she begins to show her hand when wisdom can really take no part in
+their career: thus all success must be attributed to her. Castruccio
+Castracani of Lucca was one of those men who did great deeds, if he is
+measured by the times in which he lived and the city in which he was
+born; but, like many others, he was neither fortunate nor distinguished
+in his birth, as the course of this history will show. It appeared to
+be desirable to recall his memory, because I have discerned in him such
+indications of valour and fortune as should make him a great exemplar
+to men. I think also that I ought to call your attention to his
+actions, because you of all men I know delight most in noble deeds.
+
+The family of Castracani was formerly numbered among the noble families
+of Lucca, but in the days of which I speak it had somewhat fallen in
+estate, as so often happens in this world. To this family was born a
+son Antonio, who became a priest of the order of San Michele of Lucca,
+and for this reason was honoured with the title of Messer Antonio. He
+had an only sister, who had been married to Buonaccorso Cenami, but
+Buonaccorso dying she became a widow, and not wishing to marry again
+went to live with her brother. Messer Antonio had a vineyard behind the
+house where he resided, and as it was bounded on all sides by gardens,
+any person could have access to it without difficulty. One morning,
+shortly after sunrise, Madonna Dianora, as the sister of Messer Antonio
+was called, had occasion to go into the vineyard as usual to gather
+herbs for seasoning the dinner, and hearing a slight rustling among the
+leaves of a vine she turned her eyes in that direction, and heard
+something resembling the cry of an infant. Whereupon she went towards
+it, and saw the hands and face of a baby who was lying enveloped in the
+leaves and who seemed to be crying for its mother. Partly wondering and
+partly fearing, yet full of compassion, she lifted it up and carried it
+to the house, where she washed it and clothed it with clean linen as is
+customary, and showed it to Messer Antonio when he returned home. When
+he heard what had happened and saw the child he was not less surprised
+or compassionate than his sister. They discussed between themselves
+what should be done, and seeing that he was priest and that she had no
+children, they finally determined to bring it up. They had a nurse for
+it, and it was reared and loved as if it were their own child. They
+baptized it, and gave it the name of Castruccio after their father. As
+the years passed Castruccio grew very handsome, and gave evidence of
+wit and discretion, and learnt with a quickness beyond his years those
+lessons which Messer Antonio imparted to him. Messer Antonio intended
+to make a priest of him, and in time would have inducted him into his
+canonry and other benefices, and all his instruction was given with
+this object; but Antonio discovered that the character of Castruccio
+was quite unfitted for the priesthood. As soon as Castruccio reached
+the age of fourteen he began to take less notice of the chiding of
+Messer Antonio and Madonna Dianora and no longer to fear them; he left
+off reading ecclesiastical books, and turned to playing with arms,
+delighting in nothing so much as in learning their uses, and in
+running, leaping, and wrestling with other boys. In all exercises he
+far excelled his companions in courage and bodily strength, and if at
+any time he did turn to books, only those pleased him which told of
+wars and the mighty deeds of men. Messer Antonio beheld all this with
+vexation and sorrow.
+
+There lived in the city of Lucca a gentleman of the Guinigi family,
+named Messer Francesco, whose profession was arms and who in riches,
+bodily strength, and valour excelled all other men in Lucca. He had
+often fought under the command of the Visconti of Milan, and as a
+Ghibelline was the valued leader of that party in Lucca. This gentleman
+resided in Lucca and was accustomed to assemble with others most
+mornings and evenings under the balcony of the Podesta, which is at the
+top of the square of San Michele, the finest square in Lucca, and he
+had often seen Castruccio taking part with other children of the street
+in those games of which I have spoken. Noticing that Castruccio far
+excelled the other boys, and that he appeared to exercise a royal
+authority over them, and that they loved and obeyed him, Messer
+Francesco became greatly desirous of learning who he was. Being
+informed of the circumstances of the bringing up of Castruccio he felt
+a greater desire to have him near to him. Therefore he called him one
+day and asked him whether he would more willingly live in the house of
+a gentleman, where he would learn to ride horses and use arms, or in
+the house of a priest, where he would learn nothing but masses and the
+services of the Church. Messer Francesco could see that it pleased
+Castruccio greatly to hear horses and arms spoken of, even though he
+stood silent, blushing modestly; but being encouraged by Messer
+Francesco to speak, he answered that, if his master were agreeable,
+nothing would please him more than to give up his priestly studies and
+take up those of a soldier. This reply delighted Messer Francesco, and
+in a very short time he obtained the consent of Messer Antonio, who was
+driven to yield by his knowledge of the nature of the lad, and the fear
+that he would not be able to hold him much longer.
+
+Thus Castruccio passed from the house of Messer Antonio the priest to
+the house of Messer Francesco Guinigi the soldier, and it was
+astonishing to find that in a very short time he manifested all that
+virtue and bearing which we are accustomed to associate with a true
+gentleman. In the first place he became an accomplished horseman, and
+could manage with ease the most fiery charger, and in all jousts and
+tournaments, although still a youth, he was observed beyond all others,
+and he excelled in all exercises of strength and dexterity. But what
+enhanced so much the charm of these accomplishments, was the delightful
+modesty which enabled him to avoid offence in either act or word to
+others, for he was deferential to the great men, modest with his
+equals, and courteous to his inferiors. These gifts made him beloved,
+not only by all the Guinigi family, but by all Lucca. When Castruccio
+had reached his eighteenth year, the Ghibellines were driven from Pavia
+by the Guelphs, and Messer Francesco was sent by the Visconti to assist
+the Ghibellines, and with him went Castruccio, in charge of his forces.
+Castruccio gave ample proof of his prudence and courage in this
+expedition, acquiring greater reputation than any other captain, and
+his name and fame were known, not only in Pavia, but throughout all
+Lombardy.
+
+Castruccio, having returned to Lucca in far higher estimation than he
+left it, did not omit to use all the means in his power to gain as many
+friends as he could, neglecting none of those arts which are necessary
+for that purpose. About this time Messer Francesco died, leaving a son
+thirteen years of age named Pagolo, and having appointed Castruccio to
+be his son’s tutor and administrator of his estate. Before he died
+Francesco called Castruccio to him, and prayed him to show Pagolo that
+goodwill which he (Francesco) had always shown to HIM, and to render to
+the son the gratitude which he had not been able to repay to the
+father. Upon the death of Francesco, Castruccio became the governor and
+tutor of Pagolo, which increased enormously his power and position, and
+created a certain amount of envy against him in Lucca in place of the
+former universal goodwill, for many men suspected him of harbouring
+tyrannical intentions. Among these the leading man was Giorgio degli
+Opizi, the head of the Guelph party. This man hoped after the death of
+Messer Francesco to become the chief man in Lucca, but it seemed to him
+that Castruccio, with the great abilities which he already showed, and
+holding the position of governor, deprived him of his opportunity;
+therefore he began to sow those seeds which should rob Castruccio of
+his eminence. Castruccio at first treated this with scorn, but
+afterwards he grew alarmed, thinking that Messer Giorgio might be able
+to bring him into disgrace with the deputy of King Ruberto of Naples
+and have him driven out of Lucca.
+
+The Lord of Pisa at that time was Uguccione of the Faggiuola of Arezzo,
+who being in the first place elected their captain afterwards became
+their lord. There resided in Paris some exiled Ghibellines from Lucca,
+with whom Castruccio held communications with the object of effecting
+their restoration by the help of Uguccione. Castruccio also brought
+into his plans friends from Lucca who would not endure the authority of
+the Opizi. Having fixed upon a plan to be followed, Castruccio
+cautiously fortified the tower of the Onesti, filling it with supplies
+and munitions of war, in order that it might stand a siege for a few
+days in case of need. When the night came which had been agreed upon
+with Uguccione, who had occupied the plain between the mountains and
+Pisa with many men, the signal was given, and without being observed
+Uguccione approached the gate of San Piero and set fire to the
+portcullis. Castruccio raised a great uproar within the city, calling
+the people to arms and forcing open the gate from his side. Uguccione
+entered with his men, poured through the town, and killed Messer
+Giorgio with all his family and many of his friends and supporters. The
+governor was driven out, and the government reformed according to the
+wishes of Uguccione, to the detriment of the city, because it was found
+that more than one hundred families were exiled at that time. Of those
+who fled, part went to Florence and part to Pistoia, which city was the
+headquarters of the Guelph party, and for this reason it became most
+hostile to Uguccione and the Lucchese.
+
+As it now appeared to the Florentines and others of the Guelph party
+that the Ghibellines absorbed too much power in Tuscany, they
+determined to restore the exiled Guelphs to Lucca. They assembled a
+large army in the Val di Nievole, and seized Montecatini; from thence
+they marched to Montecarlo, in order to secure the free passage into
+Lucca. Upon this Uguccione assembled his Pisan and Lucchese forces, and
+with a number of German cavalry which he drew out of Lombardy, he moved
+against the quarters of the Florentines, who upon the appearance of the
+enemy withdrew from Montecarlo, and posted themselves between
+Montecatini and Pescia. Uguccione now took up a position near to
+Montecarlo, and within about two miles of the enemy, and slight
+skirmishes between the horse of both parties were of daily occurrence.
+Owing to the illness of Uguccione, the Pisans and Lucchese delayed
+coming to battle with the enemy. Uguccione, finding himself growing
+worse, went to Montecarlo to be cured, and left the command of the army
+in the hands of Castruccio. This change brought about the ruin of the
+Guelphs, who, thinking that the hostile army having lost its captain
+had lost its head, grew over-confident. Castruccio observed this, and
+allowed some days to pass in order to encourage this belief; he also
+showed signs of fear, and did not allow any of the munitions of the
+camp to be used. On the other side, the Guelphs grew more insolent the
+more they saw these evidences of fear, and every day they drew out in
+the order of battle in front of the army of Castruccio. Presently,
+deeming that the enemy was sufficiently emboldened, and having mastered
+their tactics, he decided to join battle with them. First he spoke a
+few words of encouragement to his soldiers, and pointed out to them the
+certainty of victory if they would but obey his commands. Castruccio
+had noticed how the enemy had placed all his best troops in the centre
+of the line of battle, and his less reliable men on the wings of the
+army; whereupon he did exactly the opposite, putting his most valiant
+men on the flanks, while those on whom he could not so strongly rely he
+moved to the centre. Observing this order of battle, he drew out of his
+lines and quickly came in sight of the hostile army, who, as usual, had
+come in their insolence to defy him. He then commanded his centre
+squadrons to march slowly, whilst he moved rapidly forward those on the
+wings. Thus, when they came into contact with the enemy, only the wings
+of the two armies became engaged, whilst the center battalions remained
+out of action, for these two portions of the line of battle were
+separated from each other by a long interval and thus unable to reach
+each other. By this expedient the more valiant part of Castruccio’s men
+were opposed to the weaker part of the enemy’s troops, and the most
+efficient men of the enemy were disengaged; and thus the Florentines
+were unable to fight with those who were arrayed opposite to them, or
+to give any assistance to their own flanks. So, without much
+difficulty, Castruccio put the enemy to flight on both flanks, and the
+centre battalions took to flight when they found themselves exposed to
+attack, without having a chance of displaying their valour. The defeat
+was complete, and the loss in men very heavy, there being more than ten
+thousand men killed with many officers and knights of the Guelph party
+in Tuscany, and also many princes who had come to help them, among whom
+were Piero, the brother of King Ruberto, and Carlo, his nephew, and
+Filippo, the lord of Taranto. On the part of Castruccio the loss did
+not amount to more than three hundred men, among whom was Francesco,
+the son of Uguccione, who, being young and rash, was killed in the
+first onset.
+
+This victory so greatly increased the reputation of Castruccio that
+Uguccione conceived some jealousy and suspicion of him, because it
+appeared to Uguccione that this victory had given him no increase of
+power, but rather than diminished it. Being of this mind, he only
+waited for an opportunity to give effect to it. This occurred on the
+death of Pier Agnolo Micheli, a man of great repute and abilities in
+Lucca, the murderer of whom fled to the house of Castruccio for refuge.
+On the sergeants of the captain going to arrest the murderer, they were
+driven off by Castruccio, and the murderer escaped. This affair coming
+to the knowledge of Uguccione, who was then at Pisa, it appeared to him
+a proper opportunity to punish Castruccio. He therefore sent for his
+son Neri, who was the governor of Lucca, and commissioned him to take
+Castruccio prisoner at a banquet and put him to death. Castruccio,
+fearing no evil, went to the governor in a friendly way, was
+entertained at supper, and then thrown into prison. But Neri, fearing
+to put him to death lest the people should be incensed, kept him alive,
+in order to hear further from his father concerning his intentions.
+Ugucionne cursed the hesitation and cowardice of his son, and at once
+set out from Pisa to Lucca with four hundred horsemen to finish the
+business in his own way; but he had not yet reached the baths when the
+Pisans rebelled and put his deputy to death and created Count Gaddo
+della Gherardesca their lord. Before Uguccione reached Lucca he heard
+of the occurrences at Pisa, but it did not appear wise to him to turn
+back, lest the Lucchese with the example of Pisa before them should
+close their gates against him. But the Lucchese, having heard of what
+had happened at Pisa, availed themselves of this opportunity to demand
+the liberation of Castruccio, notwithstanding that Uguccione had
+arrived in their city. They first began to speak of it in private
+circles, afterwards openly in the squares and streets; then they raised
+a tumult, and with arms in their hands went to Uguccione and demanded
+that Castruccio should be set at liberty. Uguccione, fearing that worse
+might happen, released him from prison. Whereupon Castruccio gathered
+his friends around him, and with the help of the people attacked
+Uguccione; who, finding he had no resource but in flight, rode away
+with his friends to Lombardy, to the lords of Scale, where he died in
+poverty.
+
+But Castruccio from being a prisoner became almost a prince in Lucca,
+and he carried himself so discreetly with his friends and the people
+that they appointed him captain of their army for one year. Having
+obtained this, and wishing to gain renown in war, he planned the
+recovery of the many towns which had rebelled after the departure of
+Uguccione, and with the help of the Pisans, with whom he had concluded
+a treaty, he marched to Serezzana. To capture this place he constructed
+a fort against it, which is called to-day Zerezzanello; in the course
+of two months Castruccio captured the town. With the reputation gained
+at that siege, he rapidly seized Massa, Carrara, and Lavenza, and in a
+short time had overrun the whole of Lunigiana. In order to close the
+pass which leads from Lombardy to Lunigiana, he besieged Pontremoli and
+wrested it from the hands of Messer Anastagio Palavicini, who was the
+lord of it. After this victory he returned to Lucca, and was welcomed
+by the whole people. And now Castruccio, deeming it imprudent any
+longer to defer making himself a prince, got himself created the lord
+of Lucca by the help of Pazzino del Poggio, Puccinello dal Portico,
+Francesco Boccansacchi, and Cecco Guinigi, all of whom he had
+corrupted; and he was afterwards solemnly and deliberately elected
+prince by the people. At this time Frederick of Bavaria, the King of
+the Romans, came into Italy to assume the Imperial crown, and
+Castruccio, in order that he might make friends with him, met him at
+the head of five hundred horsemen. Castruccio had left as his deputy in
+Lucca, Pagolo Guinigi, who was held in high estimation, because of the
+people’s love for the memory of his father. Castruccio was received in
+great honour by Frederick, and many privileges were conferred upon him,
+and he was appointed the emperor’s lieutenant in Tuscany. At this time
+the Pisans were in great fear of Gaddo della Gherardesca, whom they had
+driven out of Pisa, and they had recourse for assistance to Frederick.
+Frederick created Castruccio the lord of Pisa, and the Pisans, in dread
+of the Guelph party, and particularly of the Florentines, were
+constrained to accept him as their lord.
+
+Frederick, having appointed a governor in Rome to watch his Italian
+affairs, returned to Germany. All the Tuscan and Lombardian
+Ghibellines, who followed the imperial lead, had recourse to Castruccio
+for help and counsel, and all promised him the governorship of his
+country, if enabled to recover it with his assistance. Among these
+exiles were Matteo Guidi, Nardo Scolari, Lapo Uberti, Gerozzo Nardi,
+and Piero Buonaccorsi, all exiled Florentines and Ghibellines.
+Castruccio had the secret intention of becoming the master of all
+Tuscany by the aid of these men and of his own forces; and in order to
+gain greater weight in affairs, he entered into a league with Messer
+Matteo Visconti, the Prince of Milan, and organized for him the forces
+of his city and the country districts. As Lucca had five gates, he
+divided his own country districts into five parts, which he supplied
+with arms, and enrolled the men under captains and ensigns, so that he
+could quickly bring into the field twenty thousand soldiers, without
+those whom he could summon to his assistance from Pisa. While he
+surrounded himself with these forces and allies, it happened at Messer
+Matteo Visconti was attacked by the Guelphs of Piacenza, who had driven
+out the Ghibellines with the assistance of a Florentine army and the
+King Ruberto. Messer Matteo called upon Castruccio to invade the
+Florentines in their own territories, so that, being attacked at home,
+they should be compelled to draw their army out of Lombardy in order to
+defend themselves. Castruccio invaded the Valdarno, and seized
+Fucecchio and San Miniato, inflicting immense damage upon the country.
+Whereupon the Florentines recalled their army, which had scarcely
+reached Tuscany, when Castruccio was forced by other necessities to
+return to Lucca.
+
+There resided in the city of Lucca the Poggio family, who were so
+powerful that they could not only elevate Castruccio, but even advance
+him to the dignity of prince; and it appearing to them they had not
+received such rewards for their services as they deserved, they incited
+other families to rebel and to drive Castruccio out of Lucca. They
+found their opportunity one morning, and arming themselves, they set
+upon the lieutenant whom Castruccio had left to maintain order and
+killed him. They endeavoured to raise the people in revolt, but Stefano
+di Poggio, a peaceable old man who had taken no hand in the rebellion,
+intervened and compelled them by his authority to lay down their arms;
+and he offered to be their mediator with Castruccio to obtain from him
+what they desired. Therefore they laid down their arms with no greater
+intelligence than they had taken them up. Castruccio, having heard the
+news of what had happened at Lucca, at once put Pagolo Guinigi in
+command of the army, and with a troop of cavalry set out for home.
+Contrary to his expectations, he found the rebellion at an end, yet he
+posted his men in the most advantageous places throughout the city. As
+it appeared to Stefano that Castruccio ought to be very much obliged to
+him, he sought him out, and without saying anything on his own behalf,
+for he did not recognize any need for doing so, he begged Castruccio to
+pardon the other members of his family by reason of their youth, their
+former friendships, and the obligations which Castruccio was under to
+their house. To this Castruccio graciously responded, and begged
+Stefano to reassure himself, declaring that it gave him more pleasure
+to find the tumult at an end than it had ever caused him anxiety to
+hear of its inception. He encouraged Stefano to bring his family to
+him, saying that he thanked God for having given him the opportunity of
+showing his clemency and liberality. Upon the word of Stefano and
+Castruccio they surrendered, and with Stefano were immediately thrown
+into prison and put to death. Meanwhile the Florentines had recovered
+San Miniato, whereupon it seemed advisable to Castruccio to make peace,
+as it did not appear to him that he was sufficiently secure at Lucca to
+leave him. He approached the Florentines with the proposal of a truce,
+which they readily entertained, for they were weary of the war, and
+desirous of getting rid of the expenses of it. A treaty was concluded
+with them for two years, by which both parties agreed to keep the
+conquests they had made. Castruccio thus released from this trouble,
+turned his attention to affairs in Lucca, and in order that he should
+not again be subject to the perils from which he had just escaped, he,
+under various pretences and reasons, first wiped out all those who by
+their ambition might aspire to the principality; not sparing one of
+them, but depriving them of country and property, and those whom he had
+in his hands of life also, stating that he had found by experience that
+none of them were to be trusted. Then for his further security he
+raised a fortress in Lucca with the stones of the towers of those whom
+he had killed or hunted out of the state.
+
+Whilst Castruccio made peace with the Florentines, and strengthened his
+position in Lucca, he neglected no opportunity, short of open war, of
+increasing his importance elsewhere. It appeared to him that if he
+could get possession of Pistoia, he would have one foot in Florence,
+which was his great desire. He, therefore, in various ways made friends
+with the mountaineers, and worked matters so in Pistoia that both
+parties confided their secrets to him. Pistoia was divided, as it
+always had been, into the Bianchi and Neri parties; the head of the
+Bianchi was Bastiano di Possente, and of the Neri, Jacopo da Gia. Each
+of these men held secret communications with Castruccio, and each
+desired to drive the other out of the city; and, after many
+threatenings, they came to blows. Jacopo fortified himself at the
+Florentine gate, Bastiano at that of the Lucchese side of the city;
+both trusted more in Castruccio than in the Florentines, because they
+believed that Castruccio was far more ready and willing to fight than
+the Florentines, and they both sent to him for assistance. He gave
+promises to both, saying to Bastiano that he would come in person, and
+to Jacopo that he would send his pupil, Pagolo Guinigi. At the
+appointed time he sent forward Pagolo by way of Pisa, and went himself
+direct to Pistoia; at midnight both of them met outside the city, and
+both were admitted as friends. Thus the two leaders entered, and at a
+signal given by Castruccio, one killed Jacopo da Gia, and the other
+Bastiano di Possente, and both took prisoners or killed the partisans
+of either faction. Without further opposition Pistoia passed into the
+hands of Castruccio, who, having forced the Signoria to leave the
+palace, compelled the people to yield obedience to him, making them
+many promises and remitting their old debts. The countryside flocked to
+the city to see the new prince, and all were filled with hope and
+quickly settled down, influenced in a great measure by his great
+valour.
+
+About this time great disturbances arose in Rome, owing to the dearness
+of living which was caused by the absence of the pontiff at Avignon.
+The German governor, Enrico, was much blamed for what happened—murders
+and tumults following each other daily, without his being able to put
+an end to them. This caused Enrico much anxiety lest the Romans should
+call in Ruberto, the King of Naples, who would drive the Germans out of
+the city, and bring back the Pope. Having no nearer friend to whom he
+could apply for help than Castruccio, he sent to him, begging him not
+only to give him assistance, but also to come in person to Rome.
+Castruccio considered that he ought not to hesitate to render the
+emperor this service, because he believed that he himself would not be
+safe if at any time the emperor ceased to hold Rome. Leaving Pagolo
+Guinigi in command at Lucca, Castruccio set out for Rome with six
+hundred horsemen, where he was received by Enrico with the greatest
+distinction. In a short time the presence of Castruccio obtained such
+respect for the emperor that, without bloodshed or violence, good order
+was restored, chiefly by reason of Castruccio having sent by sea from
+the country round Pisa large quantities of corn, and thus removed the
+source of the trouble. When he had chastised some of the Roman leaders,
+and admonished others, voluntary obedience was rendered to Enrico.
+Castruccio received many honours, and was made a Roman senator. This
+dignity was assumed with the greatest pomp, Castruccio being clothed in
+a brocaded toga, which had the following words embroidered on its
+front: “I am what God wills.” Whilst on the back was: “What God desires
+shall be.”
+
+During this time the Florentines, who were much enraged that Castruccio
+should have seized Pistoia during the truce, considered how they could
+tempt the city to rebel, to do which they thought would not be
+difficult in his absence. Among the exiled Pistoians in Florence were
+Baldo Cecchi and Jacopo Baldini, both men of leading and ready to face
+danger. These men kept up communications with their friends in Pistoia,
+and with the aid of the Florentines entered the city by night, and
+after driving out some of Castruccio’s officials and partisans, and
+killing others, they restored the city to its freedom. The news of this
+greatly angered Castruccio, and taking leave of Enrico, he pressed on
+in great haste to Pistoia. When the Florentines heard of his return,
+knowing that he would lose no time, they decided to intercept him with
+their forces in the Val di Nievole, under the belief that by doing so
+they would cut off his road to Pistoia. Assembling a great army of the
+supporters of the Guelph cause, the Florentines entered the Pistoian
+territories. On the other hand, Castruccio reached Montecarlo with his
+army; and having heard where the Florentines’ lay, he decided not to
+encounter it in the plains of Pistoia, nor to await it in the plains of
+Pescia, but, as far as he possibly could, to attack it boldly in the
+Pass of Serravalle. He believed that if he succeeded in this design,
+victory was assured, although he was informed that the Florentines had
+thirty thousand men, whilst he had only twelve thousand. Although he
+had every confidence in his own abilities and the valour of his troops,
+yet he hesitated to attack his enemy in the open lest he should be
+overwhelmed by numbers. Serravalle is a castle between Pescia and
+Pistoia, situated on a hill which blocks the Val di Nievole, not in the
+exact pass, but about a bowshot beyond; the pass itself is in places
+narrow and steep, whilst in general it ascends gently, but is still
+narrow, especially at the summit where the waters divide, so that
+twenty men side by side could hold it. The lord of Serravalle was
+Manfred, a German, who, before Castruccio became lord of Pistoia, had
+been allowed to remain in possession of the castle, it being common to
+the Lucchese and the Pistoians, and unclaimed by either—neither of them
+wishing to displace Manfred as long as he kept his promise of
+neutrality, and came under obligations to no one. For these reasons,
+and also because the castle was well fortified, he had always been able
+to maintain his position. It was here that Castruccio had determined to
+fall upon his enemy, for here his few men would have the advantage, and
+there was no fear lest, seeing the large masses of the hostile force
+before they became engaged, they should not stand. As soon as this
+trouble with Florence arose, Castruccio saw the immense advantage which
+possession of this castle would give him, and having an intimate
+friendship with a resident in the castle, he managed matters so with
+him that four hundred of his men were to be admitted into the castle
+the night before the attack on the Florentines, and the castellan put
+to death.
+
+Castruccio, having prepared everything, had now to encourage the
+Florentines to persist in their desire to carry the seat of war away
+from Pistoia into the Val di Nievole, therefore he did not move his
+army from Montecarlo. Thus the Florentines hurried on until they
+reached their encampment under Serravalle, intending to cross the hill
+on the following morning. In the meantime, Castruccio had seized the
+castle at night, had also moved his army from Montecarlo, and marching
+from thence at midnight in dead silence, had reached the foot of
+Serravalle: thus he and the Florentines commenced the ascent of the
+hill at the same time in the morning. Castruccio sent forward his
+infantry by the main road, and a troop of four hundred horsemen by a
+path on the left towards the castle. The Florentines sent forward four
+hundred cavalry ahead of their army which was following, never
+expecting to find Castruccio in possession of the hill, nor were they
+aware of his having seized the castle. Thus it happened that the
+Florentine horsemen mounting the hill were completely taken by surprise
+when they discovered the infantry of Castruccio, and so close were they
+upon it they had scarcely time to pull down their visors. It was a case
+of unready soldiers being attacked by ready, and they were assailed
+with such vigour that with difficulty they could hold their own,
+although some few of them got through. When the noise of the fighting
+reached the Florentine camp below, it was filled with confusion. The
+cavalry and infantry became inextricably mixed: the captains were
+unable to get their men either backward or forward, owing to the
+narrowness of the pass, and amid all this tumult no one knew what ought
+to be done or what could be done. In a short time the cavalry who were
+engaged with the enemy’s infantry were scattered or killed without
+having made any effective defence because of their unfortunate
+position, although in sheer desperation they had offered a stout
+resistance. Retreat had been impossible, with the mountains on both
+flanks, whilst in front were their enemies, and in the rear their
+friends. When Castruccio saw that his men were unable to strike a
+decisive blow at the enemy and put them to flight, he sent one thousand
+infantrymen round by the castle, with orders to join the four hundred
+horsemen he had previously dispatched there, and commanded the whole
+force to fall upon the flank of the enemy. These orders they carried
+out with such fury that the Florentines could not sustain the attack,
+but gave way, and were soon in full retreat—conquered more by their
+unfortunate position than by the valour of their enemy. Those in the
+rear turned towards Pistoia, and spread through the plains, each man
+seeking only his own safety. The defeat was complete and very
+sanguinary. Many captains were taken prisoners, among whom were Bandini
+dei Rossi, Francesco Brunelleschi, and Giovanni della Tosa, all
+Florentine noblemen, with many Tuscans and Neapolitans who fought on
+the Florentine side, having been sent by King Ruberto to assist the
+Guelphs. Immediately the Pistoians heard of this defeat they drove out
+the friends of the Guelphs, and surrendered to Castruccio. He was not
+content with occupying Prato and all the castles on the plains on both
+sides of the Arno, but marched his army into the plain of Peretola,
+about two miles from Florence. Here he remained many days, dividing the
+spoils, and celebrating his victory with feasts and games, holding
+horse races, and foot races for men and women. He also struck medals in
+commemoration of the defeat of the Florentines. He endeavoured to
+corrupt some of the citizens of Florence, who were to open the city
+gates at night; but the conspiracy was discovered, and the
+participators in it taken and beheaded, among whom were Tommaso Lupacci
+and Lambertuccio Frescobaldi. This defeat caused the Florentines great
+anxiety, and despairing of preserving their liberty, they sent envoys
+to King Ruberto of Naples, offering him the dominion of their city; and
+he, knowing of what immense importance the maintenance of the Guelph
+cause was to him, accepted it. He agreed with the Florentines to
+receive from them a yearly tribute of two hundred thousand florins, and
+he sent his son Carlo to Florence with four thousand horsemen.
+
+Shortly after this the Florentines were relieved in some degree of the
+pressure of Castruccio’s army, owing to his being compelled to leave
+his positions before Florence and march on Pisa, in order to suppress a
+conspiracy that had been raised against him by Benedetto Lanfranchi,
+one of the first men in Pisa, who could not endure that his fatherland
+should be under the dominion of the Lucchese. He had formed this
+conspiracy, intending to seize the citadel, kill the partisans of
+Castruccio, and drive out the garrison. As, however, in a conspiracy
+paucity of numbers is essential to secrecy, so for its execution a few
+are not sufficient, and in seeking more adherents to his conspiracy
+Lanfranchi encountered a person who revealed the design to Castruccio.
+This betrayal cannot be passed by without severe reproach to Bonifacio
+Cerchi and Giovanni Guidi, two Florentine exiles who were suffering
+their banishment in Pisa. Thereupon Castruccio seized Benedetto and put
+him to death, and beheaded many other noble citizens, and drove their
+families into exile. It now appeared to Castruccio that both Pisa and
+Pistoia were thoroughly disaffected; he employed much thought and
+energy upon securing his position there, and this gave the Florentines
+their opportunity to reorganize their army, and to await the coming of
+Carlo, the son of the King of Naples. When Carlo arrived they decided
+to lose no more time, and assembled a great army of more than thirty
+thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry—having called to their aid
+every Guelph there was in Italy. They consulted whether they should
+attack Pistoia or Pisa first, and decided that it would be better to
+march on the latter—a course, owing to the recent conspiracy, more
+likely to succeed, and of more advantage to them, because they believed
+that the surrender of Pistoia would follow the acquisition of Pisa.
+
+In the early part of May 1328, the Florentines put in motion this army
+and quickly occupied Lastra, Signa, Montelupo, and Empoli, passing from
+thence on to San Miniato. When Castruccio heard of the enormous army
+which the Florentines were sending against him, he was in no degree
+alarmed, believing that the time had now arrived when Fortune would
+deliver the empire of Tuscany into his hands, for he had no reason to
+think that his enemy would make a better fight, or had better prospects
+of success, than at Pisa or Serravalle. He assembled twenty thousand
+foot soldiers and four thousand horsemen, and with this army went to
+Fucecchio, whilst he sent Pagolo Guinigi to Pisa with five thousand
+infantry. Fucecchio has a stronger position than any other town in the
+Pisan district, owing to its situation between the rivers Arno and
+Gusciana and its slight elevation above the surrounding plain.
+Moreover, the enemy could not hinder its being victualled unless they
+divided their forces, nor could they approach it either from the
+direction of Lucca or Pisa, nor could they get through to Pisa, or
+attack Castruccio’s forces except at a disadvantage. In one case they
+would find themselves placed between his two armies, the one under his
+own command and the other under Pagolo, and in the other case they
+would have to cross the Arno to get to close quarters with the enemy,
+an undertaking of great hazard. In order to tempt the Florentines to
+take this latter course, Castruccio withdrew his men from the banks of
+the river and placed them under the walls of Fucecchio, leaving a wide
+expanse of land between them and the river.
+
+The Florentines, having occupied San Miniato, held a council of war to
+decide whether they should attack Pisa or the army of Castruccio, and,
+having weighed the difficulties of both courses, they decided upon the
+latter. The river Arno was at that time low enough to be fordable, yet
+the water reached to the shoulders of the infantrymen and to the
+saddles of the horsemen. On the morning of 10 June 1328, the
+Florentines commenced the battle by ordering forward a number of
+cavalry and ten thousand infantry. Castruccio, whose plan of action was
+fixed, and who well knew what to do, at once attacked the Florentines
+with five thousand infantry and three thousand horsemen, not allowing
+them to issue from the river before he charged them; he also sent one
+thousand light infantry up the river bank, and the same number down the
+Arno. The infantry of the Florentines were so much impeded by their
+arms and the water that they were not able to mount the banks of the
+river, whilst the cavalry had made the passage of the river more
+difficult for the others, by reason of the few who had crossed having
+broken up the bed of the river, and this being deep with mud, many of
+the horses rolled over with their riders and many of them had stuck so
+fast that they could not move. When the Florentine captains saw the
+difficulties their men were meeting, they withdrew them and moved
+higher up the river, hoping to find the river bed less treacherous and
+the banks more adapted for landing. These men were met at the bank by
+the forces which Castruccio had already sent forward, who, being light
+armed with bucklers and javelins in their hands, let fly with
+tremendous shouts into the faces and bodies of the cavalry. The horses,
+alarmed by the noise and the wounds, would not move forward, and
+trampled each other in great confusion. The fight between the men of
+Castruccio and those of the enemy who succeeded in crossing was sharp
+and terrible; both sides fought with the utmost desperation and neither
+would yield. The soldiers of Castruccio fought to drive the others back
+into the river, whilst the Florentines strove to get a footing on land
+in order to make room for the others pressing forward, who if they
+could but get out of the water would be able to fight, and in this
+obstinate conflict they were urged on by their captains. Castruccio
+shouted to his men that these were the same enemies whom they had
+before conquered at Serravalle, whilst the Florentines reproached each
+other that the many should be overcome by the few. At length
+Castruccio, seeing how long the battle had lasted, and that both his
+men and the enemy were utterly exhausted, and that both sides had many
+killed and wounded, pushed forward another body of infantry to take up
+a position at the rear of those who were fighting; he then commanded
+these latter to open their ranks as if they intended to retreat, and
+one part of them to turn to the right and another to the left. This
+cleared a space of which the Florentines at once took advantage, and
+thus gained possession of a portion of the battlefield. But when these
+tired soldiers found themselves at close quarters with Castruccio’s
+reserves they could not stand against them and at once fell back into
+the river. The cavalry of either side had not as yet gained any
+decisive advantage over the other, because Castruccio, knowing his
+inferiority in this arm, had commanded his leaders only to stand on the
+defensive against the attacks of their adversaries, as he hoped that
+when he had overcome the infantry he would be able to make short work
+of the cavalry. This fell out as he had hoped, for when he saw the
+Florentine army driven back across the river he ordered the remainder
+of his infantry to attack the cavalry of the enemy. This they did with
+lance and javelin, and, joined by their own cavalry, fell upon the
+enemy with the greatest fury and soon put him to flight. The Florentine
+captains, having seen the difficulty their cavalry had met with in
+crossing the river, had attempted to make their infantry cross lower
+down the river, in order to attack the flanks of Castruccio’s army. But
+here, also, the banks were steep and already lined by the men of
+Castruccio, and this movement was quite useless. Thus the Florentines
+were so completely defeated at all points that scarcely a third of them
+escaped, and Castruccio was again covered with glory. Many captains
+were taken prisoners, and Carlo, the son of King Ruberto, with
+Michelagnolo Falconi and Taddeo degli Albizzi, the Florentine
+commissioners, fled to Empoli. If the spoils were great, the slaughter
+was infinitely greater, as might be expected in such a battle. Of the
+Florentines there fell twenty thousand two hundred and thirty-one men,
+whilst Castruccio lost one thousand five hundred and seventy men.
+
+But Fortune growing envious of the glory of Castruccio took away his
+life just at the time when she should have preserved it, and thus
+ruined all those plans which for so long a time he had worked to carry
+into effect, and in the successful prosecution of which nothing but
+death could have stopped him. Castruccio was in the thick of the battle
+the whole of the day; and when the end of it came, although fatigued
+and overheated, he stood at the gate of Fucecchio to welcome his men on
+their return from victory and personally thank them. He was also on the
+watch for any attempt of the enemy to retrieve the fortunes of the day;
+he being of the opinion that it was the duty of a good general to be
+the first man in the saddle and the last out of it. Here Castruccio
+stood exposed to a wind which often rises at midday on the banks of the
+Arno, and which is often very unhealthy; from this he took a chill, of
+which he thought nothing, as he was accustomed to such troubles; but it
+was the cause of his death. On the following night he was attacked with
+high fever, which increased so rapidly that the doctors saw it must
+prove fatal. Castruccio, therefore, called Pagolo Guinigi to him, and
+addressed him as follows:
+
+“If I could have believed that Fortune would have cut me off in the
+midst of the career which was leading to that glory which all my
+successes promised, I should have laboured less, and I should have left
+thee, if a smaller state, at least with fewer enemies and perils,
+because I should have been content with the governorships of Lucca and
+Pisa. I should neither have subjugated the Pistoians, nor outraged the
+Florentines with so many injuries. But I would have made both these
+peoples my friends, and I should have lived, if no longer, at least
+more peacefully, and have left you a state without a doubt smaller, but
+one more secure and established on a surer foundation. But Fortune, who
+insists upon having the arbitrament of human affairs, did not endow me
+with sufficient judgment to recognize this from the first, nor the time
+to surmount it. Thou hast heard, for many have told thee, and I have
+never concealed it, how I entered the house of thy father whilst yet a
+boy—a stranger to all those ambitions which every generous soul should
+feel—and how I was brought up by him, and loved as though I had been
+born of his blood; how under his governance I learned to be valiant and
+capable of availing myself of all that fortune, of which thou hast been
+witness. When thy good father came to die, he committed thee and all
+his possessions to my care, and I have brought thee up with that love,
+and increased thy estate with that care, which I was bound to show. And
+in order that thou shouldst not only possess the estate which thy
+father left, but also that which my fortune and abilities have gained,
+I have never married, so that the love of children should never deflect
+my mind from that gratitude which I owed to the children of thy father.
+Thus I leave thee a vast estate, of which I am well content, but I am
+deeply concerned, inasmuch as I leave it thee unsettled and insecure.
+Thou hast the city of Lucca on thy hands, which will never rest
+contented under thy government. Thou hast also Pisa, where the men are
+of nature changeable and unreliable, who, although they may be
+sometimes held in subjection, yet they will ever disdain to serve under
+a Lucchese. Pistoia is also disloyal to thee, she being eaten up with
+factions and deeply incensed against thy family by reason of the wrongs
+recently inflicted upon them. Thou hast for neighbours the offended
+Florentines, injured by us in a thousand ways, but not utterly
+destroyed, who will hail the news of my death with more delight than
+they would the acquisition of all Tuscany. In the Emperor and in the
+princes of Milan thou canst place no reliance, for they are far
+distant, slow, and their help is very long in coming. Therefore, thou
+hast no hope in anything but in thine own abilities, and in the memory
+of my valour, and in the prestige which this latest victory has brought
+thee; which, as thou knowest how to use it with prudence, will assist
+thee to come to terms with the Florentines, who, as they are suffering
+under this great defeat, should be inclined to listen to thee. And
+whereas I have sought to make them my enemies, because I believed that
+war with them would conduce to my power and glory, thou hast every
+inducement to make friends of them, because their alliance will bring
+thee advantages and security. It is of the greatest important in this
+world that a man should know himself, and the measure of his own
+strength and means; and he who knows that he has not a genius for
+fighting must learn how to govern by the arts of peace. And it will be
+well for thee to rule thy conduct by my counsel, and to learn in this
+way to enjoy what my life-work and dangers have gained; and in this
+thou wilt easily succeed when thou hast learnt to believe that what I
+have told thee is true. And thou wilt be doubly indebted to me, in that
+I have left thee this realm and have taught thee how to keep it.”
+
+After this there came to Castruccio those citizens of Pisa, Pistoia,
+and Lucca, who had been fighting at his side, and whilst recommending
+Pagolo to them, and making them swear obedience to him as his
+successor, he died. He left a happy memory to those who had known him,
+and no prince of those times was ever loved with such devotion as he
+was. His obsequies were celebrated with every sign of mourning, and he
+was buried in San Francesco at Lucca. Fortune was not so friendly to
+Pagolo Guinigi as she had been to Castruccio, for he had not the
+abilities. Not long after the death of Castruccio, Pagolo lost Pisa,
+and then Pistoia, and only with difficulty held on to Lucca. This
+latter city continued in the family of Guinigi until the time of the
+great-grandson of Pagolo.
+
+From what has been related here it will be seen that Castruccio was a
+man of exceptional abilities, not only measured by men of his own time,
+but also by those of an earlier date. In stature he was above the
+ordinary height, and perfectly proportioned. He was of a gracious
+presence, and he welcomed men with such urbanity that those who spoke
+with him rarely left him displeased. His hair was inclined to be red,
+and he wore it cut short above the ears, and, whether it rained or
+snowed, he always went without a hat. He was delightful among friends,
+but terrible to his enemies; just to his subjects; ready to play false
+with the unfaithful, and willing to overcome by fraud those whom he
+desired to subdue, because he was wont to say that it was the victory
+that brought the glory, not the methods of achieving it. No one was
+bolder in facing danger, none more prudent in extricating himself. He
+was accustomed to say that men ought to attempt everything and fear
+nothing; that God is a lover of strong men, because one always sees
+that the weak are chastised by the strong. He was also wonderfully
+sharp or biting though courteous in his answers; and as he did not look
+for any indulgence in this way of speaking from others, so he was not
+angered with others did not show it to him. It has often happened that
+he has listened quietly when others have spoken sharply to him, as on
+the following occasions. He had caused a ducat to be given for a
+partridge, and was taken to task for doing so by a friend, to whom
+Castruccio had said: “You would not have given more than a penny.”
+“That is true,” answered the friend. Then said Castruccio to him: “A
+ducat is much less to me.” Having about him a flatterer on whom he had
+spat to show that he scorned him, the flatterer said to him: “Fisherman
+are willing to let the waters of the sea saturate them in order that
+they may take a few little fishes, and I allow myself to be wetted by
+spittle that I may catch a whale”; and this was not only heard by
+Castruccio with patience but rewarded. When told by a priest that it
+was wicked for him to live so sumptuously, Castruccio said: “If that be
+a vice then you should not fare so splendidly at the feasts of our
+saints.” Passing through a street he saw a young man as he came out of
+a house of ill fame blush at being seen by Castruccio, and said to him:
+“Thou shouldst not be ashamed when thou comest out, but when thou goest
+into such places.” A friend gave him a very curiously tied knot to undo
+and was told: “Fool, do you think that I wish to untie a thing which
+gave so much trouble to fasten.” Castruccio said to one who professed
+to be a philosopher: “You are like the dogs who always run after those
+who will give them the best to eat,” and was answered: “We are rather
+like the doctors who go to the houses of those who have the greatest
+need of them.” Going by water from Pisa to Leghorn, Castruccio was much
+disturbed by a dangerous storm that sprang up, and was reproached for
+cowardice by one of those with him, who said that he did not fear
+anything. Castruccio answered that he did not wonder at that, since
+every man valued his soul for what is was worth. Being asked by one
+what he ought to do to gain estimation, he said: “When thou goest to a
+banquet take care that thou dost not seat one piece of wood upon
+another.” To a person who was boasting that he had read many things,
+Castruccio said: “He knows better than to boast of remembering many
+things.” Someone bragged that he could drink much without becoming
+intoxicated. Castruccio replied: “An ox does the same.” Castruccio was
+acquainted with a girl with whom he had intimate relations, and being
+blamed by a friend who told him that it was undignified for him to be
+taken in by a woman, he said: “She has not taken me in, I have taken
+her.” Being also blamed for eating very dainty foods, he answered:
+“Thou dost not spend as much as I do?” and being told that it was true,
+he continued: “Then thou art more avaricious than I am gluttonous.”
+Being invited by Taddeo Bernardi, a very rich and splendid citizen of
+Luca, to supper, he went to the house and was shown by Taddeo into a
+chamber hung with silk and paved with fine stones representing flowers
+and foliage of the most beautiful colouring. Castruccio gathered some
+saliva in his mouth and spat it out upon Taddeo, and seeing him much
+disturbed by this, said to him: “I knew not where to spit in order to
+offend thee less.” Being asked how Caesar died he said: “God willing I
+will die as he did.” Being one night in the house of one of his
+gentlemen where many ladies were assembled, he was reproved by one of
+his friends for dancing and amusing himself with them more than was
+usual in one of his station, so he said: “He who is considered wise by
+day will not be considered a fool at night.” A person came to demand a
+favour of Castruccio, and thinking he was not listening to his plea
+threw himself on his knees to the ground, and being sharply reproved by
+Castruccio, said: “Thou art the reason of my acting thus for thou hast
+thy ears in thy feet,” whereupon he obtained double the favour he had
+asked. Castruccio used to say that the way to hell was an easy one,
+seeing that it was in a downward direction and you travelled
+blindfolded. Being asked a favour by one who used many superfluous
+words, he said to him: “When you have another request to make, send
+someone else to make it.” Having been wearied by a similar man with a
+long oration who wound up by saying: “Perhaps I have fatigued you by
+speaking so long,” Castruccio said: “You have not, because I have not
+listened to a word you said.” He used to say of one who had been a
+beautiful child and who afterwards became a fine man, that he was
+dangerous, because he first took the husbands from the wives and now he
+took the wives from their husbands. To an envious man who laughed, he
+said: “Do you laugh because you are successful or because another is
+unfortunate?” Whilst he was still in the charge of Messer Francesco
+Guinigi, one of his companions said to him: “What shall I give you if
+you will let me give you a blow on the nose?” Castruccio answered: “A
+helmet.” Having put to death a citizen of Lucca who had been
+instrumental in raising him to power, and being told that he had done
+wrong to kill one of his old friends, he answered that people deceived
+themselves; he had only killed a new enemy. Castruccio praised greatly
+those men who intended to take a wife and then did not do so, saying
+that they were like men who said they would go to sea, and then refused
+when the time came. He said that it always struck him with surprise
+that whilst men in buying an earthen or glass vase would sound it first
+to learn if it were good, yet in choosing a wife they were content with
+only looking at her. He was once asked in what manner he would wish to
+be buried when he died, and answered: “With the face turned downwards,
+for I know when I am gone this country will be turned upside down.” On
+being asked if it had ever occurred to him to become a friar in order
+to save his soul, he answered that it had not, because it appeared
+strange to him that Fra Lazerone should go to Paradise and Uguccione
+della Faggiuola to the Inferno. He was once asked when should a man eat
+to preserve his health, and replied: “If the man be rich let him eat
+when he is hungry; if he be poor, then when he can.” Seeing one of his
+gentlemen make a member of his family lace him up, he said to him: “I
+pray God that you will let him feed you also.” Seeing that someone had
+written upon his house in Latin the words: “May God preserve this house
+from the wicked,” he said, “The owner must never go in.” Passing
+through one of the streets he saw a small house with a very large door,
+and remarked: “That house will fly through the door.” He was having a
+discussion with the ambassador of the King of Naples concerning the
+property of some banished nobles, when a dispute arose between them,
+and the ambassador asked him if he had no fear of the king. “Is this
+king of yours a bad man or a good one?” asked Castruccio, and was told
+that he was a good one, whereupon he said, “Why should you suggest that
+I should be afraid of a good man?”
+
+I could recount many other stories of his sayings both witty and
+weighty, but I think that the above will be sufficient testimony to his
+high qualities. He lived forty-four years, and was in every way a
+prince. And as he was surrounded by many evidences of his good fortune,
+so he also desired to have near him some memorials of his bad fortune;
+therefore the manacles with which he was chained in prison are to be
+seen to this day fixed up in the tower of his residence, where they
+were placed by him to testify forever to his days of adversity. As in
+his life he was inferior neither to Philip of Macedon, the father of
+Alexander, nor to Scipio of Rome, so he died in the same year of his
+age as they did, and he would doubtless have excelled both of them had
+Fortune decreed that he should be born, not in Lucca, but in Macedonia
+or Rome.