grpc 1.84.0 → 1.85.0.pre1

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/crypto/fipsmodule/rsa/rsa_impl.cc.inc

@@ -18,62 +18,67 @@
 #include <limits.h>
 #include <string.h>
 
+#include <utility>
+
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/mem.h>
-#include <openssl/thread.h>
 
 #include "../../bcm_support.h"
 #include "../../internal.h"
+#include "../../mem_internal.h"
 #include "../bn/internal.h"
 #include "../delocate.h"
 #include "../service_indicator/internal.h"
 #include "internal.h"
 
 
+using namespace bssl;
+
 static_assert(OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS <=
                   BN_MONTGOMERY_MAX_WORDS * BN_BITS2,
               "Max RSA size too big for Montgomery arithmetic");
 
-int rsa_check_public_key(const RSA *rsa) {
-  if (rsa->n == NULL) {
+int bssl::rsa_check_public_key(const RSA *rsa) {
+  auto *impl = FromOpaque(rsa);
+
+  if (impl->n == nullptr) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
     return 0;
   }
 
-  unsigned n_bits = BN_num_bits(rsa->n);
+  unsigned n_bits = BN_num_bits(impl->n.get());
   if (n_bits > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
     return 0;
   }
 
-  // TODO(crbug.com/boringssl/607): Raise this limit. 512-bit RSA was factored
-  // in 1999.
-  if (n_bits < 512) {
+  if (n_bits < OPENSSL_RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
     return 0;
   }
 
   // RSA moduli must be positive and odd. In addition to being necessary for RSA
   // in general, we cannot setup Montgomery reduction with even moduli.
-  if (!BN_is_odd(rsa->n) || BN_is_negative(rsa->n)) {
+  if (!BN_is_odd(impl->n.get()) || BN_is_negative(impl->n.get())) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_RSA_PARAMETERS);
     return 0;
   }
 
   static const unsigned kMaxExponentBits = 33;
-  if (rsa->e != NULL) {
+  if (impl->e != nullptr) {
     // Reject e = 1, negative e, and even e. e must be odd to be relatively
     // prime with phi(n).
-    unsigned e_bits = BN_num_bits(rsa->e);
-    if (e_bits < 2 || BN_is_negative(rsa->e) || !BN_is_odd(rsa->e)) {
+    unsigned e_bits = BN_num_bits(impl->e.get());
+    if (e_bits < 2 || BN_is_negative(impl->e.get()) ||
+        !BN_is_odd(impl->e.get())) {
       OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
       return 0;
     }
-    if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_LARGE_PUBLIC_EXPONENT) {
+    if (impl->flags & RSA_FLAG_LARGE_PUBLIC_EXPONENT) {
       // The caller has requested disabling DoS protections. Still, e must be
       // less than n.
-      if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) {
+      if (BN_ucmp(impl->n.get(), impl->e.get()) <= 0) {
         OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
         return 0;
       }
@@ -92,11 +97,11 @@ int rsa_check_public_key(const RSA *rsa) {
         return 0;
       }
 
-      // The upper bound on |e_bits| and lower bound on |n_bits| imply e is
+      // The upper bound on `e_bits` and lower bound on `n_bits` imply e is
       // bounded by n.
-      assert(BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) > 0);
+      assert(BN_ucmp(impl->n.get(), impl->e.get()) > 0);
     }
-  } else if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT)) {
+  } else if (!(impl->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
     return 0;
   }
@@ -104,290 +109,134 @@ int rsa_check_public_key(const RSA *rsa) {
   return 1;
 }
 
-static int ensure_fixed_copy(BIGNUM **out, const BIGNUM *in, int width) {
-  if (*out != NULL) {
+static int ensure_fixed_copy(UniquePtr<BIGNUM> *out, const BIGNUM *in,
+                             int width) {
+  if (*out != nullptr) {
     return 1;
   }
-  BIGNUM *copy = BN_dup(in);
-  if (copy == NULL || !bn_resize_words(copy, width)) {
-    BN_free(copy);
+  UniquePtr<BIGNUM> copy(BN_dup(in));
+  if (copy == nullptr || !bn_resize_words(copy.get(), width)) {
     return 0;
   }
-  *out = copy;
-  bn_secret(copy);
-
+  bn_secret(copy.get());
+  *out = std::move(copy);
   return 1;
 }
 
-// freeze_private_key finishes initializing |rsa|'s private key components.
-// After this function has returned, |rsa| may not be changed. This is needed
-// because |RSA| is a public struct and, additionally, OpenSSL 1.1.0 opaquified
+// freeze_private_key finishes initializing `rsa`'s private key components.
+// After this function has returned, `rsa` may not be changed. This is needed
+// because `RSA` is a public struct and, additionally, OpenSSL 1.1.0 opaquified
 // it wrong (see https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/5158).
-static int freeze_private_key(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_read(&rsa->lock);
+static int freeze_private_key(RSAImpl *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  rsa->lock.LockRead();
   int frozen = rsa->private_key_frozen;
-  CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_read(&rsa->lock);
+  rsa->lock.UnlockRead();
   if (frozen) {
     return 1;
   }
 
-  int ret = 0;
   const BIGNUM *n_fixed;
-  CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&rsa->lock);
+  MutexWriteLock lock(&rsa->lock);
   if (rsa->private_key_frozen) {
-    ret = 1;
-    goto err;
+    return 1;
   }
 
   // Check the public components are within DoS bounds.
   if (!rsa_check_public_key(rsa)) {
-    goto err;
+    return 0;
   }
 
   // Pre-compute various intermediate values, as well as copies of private
   // exponents with correct widths. Note that other threads may concurrently
-  // read from |rsa->n|, |rsa->e|, etc., so any fixes must be in separate
-  // copies. We use |mont_n->N|, |mont_p->N|, and |mont_q->N| as copies of |n|,
-  // |p|, and |q| with the correct minimal widths.
+  // read from `rsa->n`, `rsa->e`, etc., so any fixes must be in separate
+  // copies. We use `mont_n->N`, `mont_p->N`, and `mont_q->N` as copies of `n`,
+  // `p`, and `q` with the correct minimal widths.
 
-  if (rsa->mont_n == NULL) {
-    rsa->mont_n = BN_MONT_CTX_new_for_modulus(rsa->n, ctx);
-    if (rsa->mont_n == NULL) {
-      goto err;
+  if (rsa->mont_n == nullptr) {
+    rsa->mont_n.reset(BN_MONT_CTX_new_for_modulus(rsa->n.get(), ctx));
+    if (rsa->mont_n == nullptr) {
+      return 0;
     }
   }
   n_fixed = &rsa->mont_n->N;
 
-  // The only public upper-bound of |rsa->d| is the bit length of |rsa->n|. The
+  // The only public upper-bound of `rsa->d` is the bit length of `rsa->n`. The
   // ASN.1 serialization of RSA private keys unfortunately leaks the byte length
-  // of |rsa->d|, but normalize it so we only leak it once, rather than per
+  // of `rsa->d`, but normalize it so we only leak it once, rather than per
   // operation.
-  if (rsa->d != NULL &&
-      !ensure_fixed_copy(&rsa->d_fixed, rsa->d, n_fixed->width)) {
-    goto err;
+  if (rsa->d != nullptr &&
+      !ensure_fixed_copy(&rsa->d_fixed, rsa->d.get(), n_fixed->width)) {
+    return 0;
   }
 
-  if (rsa->e != NULL && rsa->p != NULL && rsa->q != NULL) {
+  if (rsa->e != nullptr && rsa->p != nullptr && rsa->q != nullptr) {
     // TODO: p and q are also CONSTTIME_SECRET but not yet marked as such
     // because the Montgomery code does things like test whether or not values
     // are zero. So the secret marking probably needs to happen inside that
     // code.
 
-    if (rsa->mont_p == NULL) {
-      rsa->mont_p = BN_MONT_CTX_new_consttime(rsa->p, ctx);
-      if (rsa->mont_p == NULL) {
-        goto err;
+    if (rsa->mont_p == nullptr) {
+      rsa->mont_p.reset(BN_MONT_CTX_new_consttime(rsa->p.get(), ctx));
+      if (rsa->mont_p == nullptr) {
+        return 0;
       }
     }
 
-    if (rsa->mont_q == NULL) {
-      rsa->mont_q = BN_MONT_CTX_new_consttime(rsa->q, ctx);
-      if (rsa->mont_q == NULL) {
-        goto err;
+    if (rsa->mont_q == nullptr) {
+      rsa->mont_q.reset(BN_MONT_CTX_new_consttime(rsa->q.get(), ctx));
+      if (rsa->mont_q == nullptr) {
+        return 0;
       }
     }
 
-    if (rsa->dmp1 != NULL && rsa->dmq1 != NULL && rsa->iqmp != NULL) {
+    if (rsa->dmp1 != nullptr && rsa->dmq1 != nullptr && rsa->iqmp != nullptr) {
       // CRT components are only publicly bounded by their corresponding
       // moduli's bit lengths.
       const BIGNUM *p_fixed = &rsa->mont_p->N;
       const BIGNUM *q_fixed = &rsa->mont_q->N;
-      if (!ensure_fixed_copy(&rsa->dmp1_fixed, rsa->dmp1, p_fixed->width) ||
-          !ensure_fixed_copy(&rsa->dmq1_fixed, rsa->dmq1, q_fixed->width)) {
-        goto err;
+      if (!ensure_fixed_copy(&rsa->dmp1_fixed, rsa->dmp1.get(),
+                             p_fixed->width) ||
+          !ensure_fixed_copy(&rsa->dmq1_fixed, rsa->dmq1.get(),
+                             q_fixed->width)) {
+        return 0;
       }
 
-      // Compute |iqmp_mont|, which is |iqmp| in Montgomery form and with the
+      // Compute `iqmp_mont`, which is `iqmp` in Montgomery form and with the
       // correct bit width.
-      if (rsa->iqmp_mont == NULL) {
-        BIGNUM *iqmp_mont = BN_new();
-        if (iqmp_mont == NULL ||
-            !BN_to_montgomery(iqmp_mont, rsa->iqmp, rsa->mont_p, ctx)) {
-          BN_free(iqmp_mont);
-          goto err;
+      if (rsa->iqmp_mont == nullptr) {
+        UniquePtr<BIGNUM> iqmp_mont(BN_new());
+        if (iqmp_mont == nullptr ||
+            !BN_to_montgomery(iqmp_mont.get(), rsa->iqmp.get(),
+                              rsa->mont_p.get(), ctx)) {
+          return 0;
         }
-        rsa->iqmp_mont = iqmp_mont;
-        bn_secret(rsa->iqmp_mont);
+        rsa->iqmp_mont = std::move(iqmp_mont);
+        bn_secret(rsa->iqmp_mont.get());
       }
     }
   }
 
   rsa->private_key_frozen = 1;
-  ret = 1;
-
-err:
-  CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&rsa->lock);
-  return ret;
-}
-
-void rsa_invalidate_key(RSA *rsa) {
-  rsa->private_key_frozen = 0;
-
-  BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->mont_n);
-  rsa->mont_n = NULL;
-  BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->mont_p);
-  rsa->mont_p = NULL;
-  BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->mont_q);
-  rsa->mont_q = NULL;
-
-  BN_free(rsa->d_fixed);
-  rsa->d_fixed = NULL;
-  BN_free(rsa->dmp1_fixed);
-  rsa->dmp1_fixed = NULL;
-  BN_free(rsa->dmq1_fixed);
-  rsa->dmq1_fixed = NULL;
-  BN_free(rsa->iqmp_mont);
-  rsa->iqmp_mont = NULL;
-
-  for (size_t i = 0; i < rsa->num_blindings; i++) {
-    BN_BLINDING_free(rsa->blindings[i]);
-  }
-  OPENSSL_free(rsa->blindings);
-  rsa->blindings = NULL;
-  rsa->num_blindings = 0;
-  OPENSSL_free(rsa->blindings_inuse);
-  rsa->blindings_inuse = NULL;
-  rsa->blinding_fork_generation = 0;
-}
-
-// MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA defines the maximum number of cached BN_BLINDINGs per
-// RSA*. Then this limit is exceeded, BN_BLINDING objects will be created and
-// destroyed as needed.
-#if defined(OPENSSL_TSAN)
-// Smaller under TSAN so that the edge case can be hit with fewer threads.
-#define MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA 2
-#else
-#define MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA 1024
-#endif
-
-// rsa_blinding_get returns a BN_BLINDING to use with |rsa|. It does this by
-// allocating one of the cached BN_BLINDING objects in |rsa->blindings|. If
-// none are free, the cache will be extended by a extra element and the new
-// BN_BLINDING is returned.
-//
-// On success, the index of the assigned BN_BLINDING is written to
-// |*index_used| and must be passed to |rsa_blinding_release| when finished.
-static BN_BLINDING *rsa_blinding_get(RSA *rsa, size_t *index_used,
-                                     BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  assert(ctx != NULL);
-  assert(rsa->mont_n != NULL);
-
-  BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL;
-  const uint64_t fork_generation = CRYPTO_get_fork_generation();
-  CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&rsa->lock);
-
-  // Wipe the blinding cache on |fork|.
-  if (rsa->blinding_fork_generation != fork_generation) {
-    for (size_t i = 0; i < rsa->num_blindings; i++) {
-      // The inuse flag must be zero unless we were forked from a
-      // multi-threaded process, in which case calling back into BoringSSL is
-      // forbidden.
-      assert(rsa->blindings_inuse[i] == 0);
-      BN_BLINDING_invalidate(rsa->blindings[i]);
-    }
-    rsa->blinding_fork_generation = fork_generation;
-  }
-
-  uint8_t *const free_inuse_flag = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(
-      OPENSSL_memchr(rsa->blindings_inuse, 0, rsa->num_blindings));
-  size_t new_num_blindings;
-  BN_BLINDING **new_blindings;
-  uint8_t *new_blindings_inuse;
-  if (free_inuse_flag != NULL) {
-    *free_inuse_flag = 1;
-    *index_used = free_inuse_flag - rsa->blindings_inuse;
-    ret = rsa->blindings[*index_used];
-    goto out;
-  }
-
-  if (rsa->num_blindings >= MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA) {
-    // No |BN_BLINDING| is free and nor can the cache be extended. This index
-    // value is magic and indicates to |rsa_blinding_release| that a
-    // |BN_BLINDING| was not inserted into the array.
-    *index_used = MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA;
-    ret = BN_BLINDING_new();
-    goto out;
-  }
-
-  // Double the length of the cache.
-  static_assert(MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA < UINT_MAX / 2,
-                "MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA too large");
-  new_num_blindings = rsa->num_blindings * 2;
-  if (new_num_blindings == 0) {
-    new_num_blindings = 1;
-  }
-  if (new_num_blindings > MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA) {
-    new_num_blindings = MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA;
-  }
-  assert(new_num_blindings > rsa->num_blindings);
-
-  new_blindings = reinterpret_cast<BN_BLINDING **>(
-      OPENSSL_calloc(new_num_blindings, sizeof(BN_BLINDING *)));
-  new_blindings_inuse =
-      reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(OPENSSL_malloc(new_num_blindings));
-  if (new_blindings == NULL || new_blindings_inuse == NULL) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(new_blindings, rsa->blindings,
-                 sizeof(BN_BLINDING *) * rsa->num_blindings);
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(new_blindings_inuse, rsa->blindings_inuse, rsa->num_blindings);
-
-  for (size_t i = rsa->num_blindings; i < new_num_blindings; i++) {
-    new_blindings[i] = BN_BLINDING_new();
-    if (new_blindings[i] == NULL) {
-      for (size_t j = rsa->num_blindings; j < i; j++) {
-        BN_BLINDING_free(new_blindings[j]);
-      }
-      goto err;
-    }
-  }
-  memset(&new_blindings_inuse[rsa->num_blindings], 0,
-         new_num_blindings - rsa->num_blindings);
-
-  new_blindings_inuse[rsa->num_blindings] = 1;
-  *index_used = rsa->num_blindings;
-  assert(*index_used != MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA);
-  ret = new_blindings[rsa->num_blindings];
-
-  OPENSSL_free(rsa->blindings);
-  rsa->blindings = new_blindings;
-  OPENSSL_free(rsa->blindings_inuse);
-  rsa->blindings_inuse = new_blindings_inuse;
-  rsa->num_blindings = new_num_blindings;
-
-  goto out;
-
-err:
-  OPENSSL_free(new_blindings_inuse);
-  OPENSSL_free(new_blindings);
-
-out:
-  CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&rsa->lock);
-  return ret;
+  return 1;
 }
 
-// rsa_blinding_release marks the cached BN_BLINDING at the given index as free
-// for other threads to use.
-static void rsa_blinding_release(RSA *rsa, BN_BLINDING *blinding,
-                                 size_t blinding_index) {
-  if (blinding_index == MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA) {
-    // This blinding wasn't cached.
-    BN_BLINDING_free(blinding);
-    return;
-  }
-
-  CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&rsa->lock);
-  rsa->blindings_inuse[blinding_index] = 0;
-  CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&rsa->lock);
+void bssl::rsa_invalidate_key(RSA *rsa) {
+  auto *impl = FromOpaque(rsa);
+  impl->private_key_frozen = 0;
+  impl->mont_n = nullptr;
+  impl->mont_p = nullptr;
+  impl->mont_q = nullptr;
+  impl->d_fixed = nullptr;
+  impl->dmp1_fixed = nullptr;
+  impl->dmq1_fixed = nullptr;
+  impl->iqmp_mont = nullptr;
 }
 
-// signing
-int rsa_default_sign_raw(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out,
-                         size_t max_out, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
-                         int padding) {
+int bssl::rsa_default_sign_raw(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out,
+                               size_t max_out, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+                               int padding) {
   const unsigned rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
-  uint8_t *buf = NULL;
+  uint8_t *buf = nullptr;
   int i, ret = 0;
 
   if (max_out < rsa_size) {
@@ -396,7 +245,7 @@ int rsa_default_sign_raw(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out,
   }
 
   buf = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size));
-  if (buf == NULL) {
+  if (buf == nullptr) {
     goto err;
   }
 
@@ -431,12 +280,15 @@ err:
 }
 
 
-static int rsa_mod_exp_crt(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
+static int rsa_mod_exp_crt(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSAImpl *rsa,
+                           BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+int bssl::rsa_verify_raw_no_self_test(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out,
+                                      size_t max_out, const uint8_t *in,
+                                      size_t in_len, int padding) {
+  auto *impl = FromOpaque(rsa);
 
-int rsa_verify_raw_no_self_test(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out,
-                                size_t max_out, const uint8_t *in,
-                                size_t in_len, int padding) {
-  if (rsa->n == NULL || rsa->e == NULL) {
+  if (impl->n == nullptr || impl->e == nullptr) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
     return 0;
   }
@@ -446,8 +298,6 @@ int rsa_verify_raw_no_self_test(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out,
   }
 
   const unsigned rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
-  BIGNUM *f, *result;
-
   if (max_out < rsa_size) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
     return 0;
@@ -458,18 +308,17 @@ int rsa_verify_raw_no_self_test(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out,
     return 0;
   }
 
-  BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-  if (ctx == NULL) {
+  UniquePtr<BN_CTX> ctx(BN_CTX_new());
+  if (ctx == nullptr) {
     return 0;
   }
 
   int ret = 0;
-  uint8_t *buf = NULL;
-
-  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-  f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  result = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  if (f == NULL || result == NULL) {
+  uint8_t *buf = nullptr;
+  BN_CTXScope scope(ctx.get());
+  BIGNUM *f = BN_CTX_get(ctx.get());
+  BIGNUM *result = BN_CTX_get(ctx.get());
+  if (f == nullptr || result == nullptr) {
     goto err;
   }
 
@@ -478,22 +327,24 @@ int rsa_verify_raw_no_self_test(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out,
   } else {
     // Allocate a temporary buffer to hold the padded plaintext.
     buf = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size));
-    if (buf == NULL) {
+    if (buf == nullptr) {
       goto err;
     }
   }
 
-  if (BN_bin2bn(in, in_len, f) == NULL) {
+  if (BN_bin2bn(in, in_len, f) == nullptr) {
     goto err;
   }
 
-  if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
+  if (BN_ucmp(f, impl->n.get()) >= 0) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
     goto err;
   }
 
-  if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->mont_n, &rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx) ||
-      !BN_mod_exp_mont(result, f, rsa->e, &rsa->mont_n->N, ctx, rsa->mont_n)) {
+  if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&impl->mont_n, &impl->lock, impl->n.get(),
+                              ctx.get()) ||
+      !BN_mod_exp_mont(result, f, impl->e.get(), &impl->mont_n->N, ctx.get(),
+                       impl->mont_n.get())) {
     goto err;
   }
 
@@ -522,8 +373,6 @@ int rsa_verify_raw_no_self_test(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out,
   }
 
 err:
-  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-  BN_CTX_free(ctx);
   if (buf != out) {
     OPENSSL_free(buf);
   }
@@ -532,96 +381,74 @@ err:
 
 int RSA_verify_raw(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
                    const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) {
-  boringssl_ensure_rsa_self_test();
+  boringssl_ensure_rsa_verify_self_test();
   return rsa_verify_raw_no_self_test(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len,
                                      padding);
 }
 
-int rsa_default_private_transform(RSA *rsa, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
-                                  size_t len) {
-  if (rsa->n == NULL || rsa->d == NULL) {
+int bssl::rsa_default_private_transform(RSA *rsa, uint8_t *out,
+                                        const uint8_t *in, size_t len) {
+  auto *impl = FromOpaque(rsa);
+
+  if (impl->n == nullptr || impl->d == nullptr) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
     return 0;
   }
 
-  BIGNUM *f, *result;
-  BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-  size_t blinding_index = 0;
-  BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
-  int ret = 0, do_blinding;
-
-  ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-  if (ctx == NULL) {
-    goto err;
+  UniquePtr<BN_CTX> ctx(BN_CTX_new());
+  if (ctx == nullptr) {
+    return 0;
   }
-  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-  f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  result = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-
-  if (f == NULL || result == NULL) {
-    goto err;
+  BN_CTXScope scope(ctx.get());
+  BIGNUM *f = BN_CTX_get(ctx.get());
+  BIGNUM *result = BN_CTX_get(ctx.get());
+  if (f == nullptr || result == nullptr) {
+    return 0;
   }
 
   // The caller should have ensured this.
-  assert(len == BN_num_bytes(rsa->n));
-  if (BN_bin2bn(in, len, f) == NULL) {
-    goto err;
+  assert(len == BN_num_bytes(impl->n.get()));
+  if (BN_bin2bn(in, len, f) == nullptr) {
+    return 0;
   }
 
   // The input to the RSA private transform may be secret, but padding is
   // expected to construct a value within range, so we can leak this comparison.
-  if (constant_time_declassify_int(BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)) {
+  if (constant_time_declassify_int(BN_ucmp(f, impl->n.get()) >= 0)) {
     // Usually the padding functions would catch this.
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
-    goto err;
+    return 0;
   }
 
-  if (!freeze_private_key(rsa, ctx)) {
+  if (!freeze_private_key(impl, ctx.get())) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    goto err;
+    return 0;
   }
 
-  do_blinding =
-      (rsa->flags & (RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING | RSA_FLAG_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT)) == 0;
-
-  if (rsa->e == NULL && do_blinding) {
-    // We cannot do blinding or verification without |e|, and continuing without
-    // those countermeasures is dangerous. However, the Java/Android RSA API
-    // requires support for keys where only |d| and |n| (and not |e|) are known.
-    // The callers that require that bad behavior must set
-    // |RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING| or use |RSA_new_private_key_no_e|.
-    //
-    // TODO(davidben): Update this comment when Conscrypt is updated to use
-    // |RSA_new_private_key_no_e|.
+  if (impl->e == nullptr && (impl->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT) == 0) {
+    // Unless the private key was specifically created with an API like
+    // `RSA_new_private_key_no_e`, don't allow RSA keys to be missing the public
+    // exponent, which disables some fault attack mitigations. (It should not be
+    // possible to construct such an `RSA` object in the public API.)
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  if (do_blinding) {
-    blinding = rsa_blinding_get(rsa, &blinding_index, ctx);
-    if (blinding == NULL) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      goto err;
-    }
-    if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(f, blinding, rsa->e, rsa->mont_n, ctx)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
+    return 0;
   }
 
-  if (rsa->p != NULL && rsa->q != NULL && rsa->e != NULL && rsa->dmp1 != NULL &&
-      rsa->dmq1 != NULL && rsa->iqmp != NULL &&
-      // Require that we can reduce |f| by |rsa->p| and |rsa->q| in constant
+  if (impl->p != nullptr && impl->q != nullptr && impl->e != nullptr &&
+      impl->dmp1 != nullptr && impl->dmq1 != nullptr && impl->iqmp != nullptr &&
+      // Require that we can reduce `f` by `impl->p` and `impl->q` in constant
       // time, which requires primes be the same size, rounded to the Montgomery
-      // coefficient. (See |mod_montgomery|.) This is not required by RFC 8017,
+      // coefficient. (See `mod_montgomery`.) This is not required by RFC 8017,
       // but it is true for keys generated by us and all common implementations.
-      bn_less_than_montgomery_R(rsa->q, rsa->mont_p) &&
-      bn_less_than_montgomery_R(rsa->p, rsa->mont_q)) {
-    if (!rsa_mod_exp_crt(result, f, rsa, ctx)) {
-      goto err;
+      bn_less_than_montgomery_R(impl->q.get(), impl->mont_p.get()) &&
+      bn_less_than_montgomery_R(impl->p.get(), impl->mont_q.get())) {
+    if (!rsa_mod_exp_crt(result, f, impl, ctx.get())) {
+      return 0;
     }
-  } else if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(result, f, rsa->d_fixed, rsa->n, ctx,
-                                        rsa->mont_n)) {
-    goto err;
+  } else if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(result, f, impl->d_fixed.get(),
+                                        impl->n.get(), ctx.get(),
+                                        impl->mont_n.get())) {
+    return 0;
   }
 
   // Verify the result to protect against fault attacks as described in the
@@ -632,50 +459,36 @@ int rsa_default_private_transform(RSA *rsa, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
   // works when the CRT isn't used. That attack is much less likely to succeed
   // than the CRT attack, but there have likely been improvements since 1997.
   //
-  // This check is cheap assuming |e| is small, which we require in
-  // |rsa_check_public_key|.
-  if (rsa->e != NULL) {
-    BIGNUM *vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-    if (vrfy == NULL ||
-        !BN_mod_exp_mont(vrfy, result, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->mont_n) ||
+  // This check is cheap assuming `e` is small, which we require in
+  // `rsa_check_public_key`.
+  if (impl->e != nullptr) {
+    BIGNUM *vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx.get());
+    if (vrfy == nullptr ||
+        !BN_mod_exp_mont(vrfy, result, impl->e.get(), impl->n.get(), ctx.get(),
+                         impl->mont_n.get()) ||
         !constant_time_declassify_int(BN_equal_consttime(vrfy, f))) {
       OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      goto err;
+      return 0;
     }
   }
 
-  if (do_blinding && !BN_BLINDING_invert(result, blinding, rsa->mont_n, ctx)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  // The computation should have left |result| as a maximally-wide number, so
+  // The computation should have left `result` as a maximally-wide number, so
   // that it and serializing does not leak information about the magnitude of
   // the result.
   //
   // See Falko Strenzke, "Manger's Attack revisited", ICICS 2010.
-  assert(result->width == rsa->mont_n->N.width);
+  assert(result->width == impl->mont_n->N.width);
   bn_assert_fits_in_bytes(result, len);
   if (!BN_bn2bin_padded(out, len, result)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  ret = 1;
-
-err:
-  if (ctx != NULL) {
-    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-  }
-  if (blinding != NULL) {
-    rsa_blinding_release(rsa, blinding, blinding_index);
+    return 0;
   }
 
-  return ret;
+  return 1;
 }
 
-// mod_montgomery sets |r| to |I| mod |p|. |I| must already be fully reduced
-// modulo |p| times |q|. It returns one on success and zero on error.
+// mod_montgomery sets `r` to `I` mod `p`. `I` must already be fully reduced
+// modulo `p` times `q`. It returns one on success and zero on error.
 static int mod_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *I, const BIGNUM *p,
                           const BN_MONT_CTX *mont_p, const BIGNUM *q,
                           BN_CTX *ctx) {
@@ -695,182 +508,106 @@ static int mod_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *I, const BIGNUM *p,
     return 0;
   }
 
-  // By precomputing R^3 mod p (normally |BN_MONT_CTX| only uses R^2 mod p) and
-  // adjusting the API for |BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime|, we could instead compute
+  // By precomputing R^3 mod p (normally `BN_MONT_CTX` only uses R^2 mod p) and
+  // adjusting the API for `BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime`, we could instead compute
   // I * R mod p here and save a reduction per prime. But this would require
   // changing the RSAZ code and may not be worth it. Note that the RSAZ code
   // uses a different radix, so it uses R' = 2^1044. There we'd actually want
-  // R^2 * R', and would futher benefit from a precomputed R'^2. It currently
-  // converts |mont_p->RR| to R'^2.
+  // R^2 * R', and would further benefit from a precomputed R'^2. It currently
+  // converts `mont_p->RR` to R'^2.
   return 1;
 }
 
-static int rsa_mod_exp_crt(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  assert(ctx != NULL);
-
-  assert(rsa->n != NULL);
-  assert(rsa->e != NULL);
-  assert(rsa->d != NULL);
-  assert(rsa->p != NULL);
-  assert(rsa->q != NULL);
-  assert(rsa->dmp1 != NULL);
-  assert(rsa->dmq1 != NULL);
-  assert(rsa->iqmp != NULL);
-
-  BIGNUM *r1, *m1;
-  int ret = 0;
-
-  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-  r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  BIGNUM *n, *p, *q;
-  if (r1 == NULL || m1 == NULL) {
-    goto err;
+static int rsa_mod_exp_crt(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSAImpl *rsa,
+                           BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  assert(ctx != nullptr);
+
+  assert(rsa->n != nullptr);
+  assert(rsa->e != nullptr);
+  assert(rsa->d != nullptr);
+  assert(rsa->p != nullptr);
+  assert(rsa->q != nullptr);
+  assert(rsa->dmp1 != nullptr);
+  assert(rsa->dmq1 != nullptr);
+  assert(rsa->iqmp != nullptr);
+
+  BN_CTXScope scope(ctx);
+  BIGNUM *r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  BIGNUM *m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  if (r1 == nullptr || m1 == nullptr) {
+    return 0;
   }
 
-  // Use the minimal-width versions of |n|, |p|, and |q|. Either works, but if
+  // Use the minimal-width versions of `n`, `p`, and `q`. Either works, but if
   // someone gives us non-minimal values, these will be slightly more efficient
   // on the non-Montgomery operations.
-  n = &rsa->mont_n->N;
-  p = &rsa->mont_p->N;
-  q = &rsa->mont_q->N;
+  BIGNUM *n = &rsa->mont_n->N;
+  BIGNUM *p = &rsa->mont_p->N;
+  BIGNUM *q = &rsa->mont_q->N;
 
-  // This is a pre-condition for |mod_montgomery|. It was already checked by the
+  // This is a pre-condition for `mod_montgomery`. It was already checked by the
   // caller.
   declassify_assert(BN_ucmp(I, n) < 0);
 
-  if (  // |m1| is the result modulo |q|.
-      !mod_montgomery(r1, I, q, rsa->mont_q, p, ctx) ||
-      !BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(m1, r1, rsa->dmq1_fixed, q, ctx,
-                                 rsa->mont_q) ||
-      // |r0| is the result modulo |p|.
-      !mod_montgomery(r1, I, p, rsa->mont_p, q, ctx) ||
-      !BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(r0, r1, rsa->dmp1_fixed, p, ctx,
-                                 rsa->mont_p) ||
-      // Compute r0 = r0 - m1 mod p. |m1| is reduced mod |q|, not |p|, so we
-      // just run |mod_montgomery| again for simplicity. This could be more
-      // efficient with more cases: if |p > q|, |m1| is already reduced. If
-      // |p < q| but they have the same bit width, |bn_reduce_once| suffices.
+  if (  // `m1` is the result modulo `q`.
+      !mod_montgomery(r1, I, q, rsa->mont_q.get(), p, ctx) ||
+      !BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(m1, r1, rsa->dmq1_fixed.get(), q, ctx,
+                                 rsa->mont_q.get()) ||
+      // `r0` is the result modulo `p`.
+      !mod_montgomery(r1, I, p, rsa->mont_p.get(), q, ctx) ||
+      !BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(r0, r1, rsa->dmp1_fixed.get(), p, ctx,
+                                 rsa->mont_p.get()) ||
+      // Compute r0 = r0 - m1 mod p. `m1` is reduced mod `q`, not `p`, so we
+      // just run `mod_montgomery` again for srsaicity. This could be more
+      // efficient with more cases: if `p > q`, `m1` is already reduced. If
+      // `p < q` but they have the same bit width, `bn_reduce_once` suffices.
       // However, compared to over 2048 Montgomery multiplications above, this
       // difference is not measurable.
-      !mod_montgomery(r1, m1, p, rsa->mont_p, q, ctx) ||
+      !mod_montgomery(r1, m1, p, rsa->mont_p.get(), q, ctx) ||
       !bn_mod_sub_consttime(r0, r0, r1, p, ctx) ||
       // r0 = r0 * iqmp mod p. We use Montgomery multiplication to compute this
-      // in constant time. |iqmp_mont| is in Montgomery form and r0 is not, so
+      // in constant time. `iqmp_mont` is in Montgomery form and r0 is not, so
       // the result is taken out of Montgomery form.
-      !BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r0, r0, rsa->iqmp_mont, rsa->mont_p, ctx) ||
+      !BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r0, r0, rsa->iqmp_mont.get(), rsa->mont_p.get(),
+                             ctx) ||
       // r0 = r0 * q + m1 gives the final result. Reducing modulo q gives m1, so
       // it is correct mod p. Reducing modulo p gives (r0-m1)*iqmp*q + m1 = r0,
       // so it is correct mod q. Finally, the result is bounded by [m1, n + m1),
-      // and the result is at least |m1|, so this must be the unique answer in
+      // and the result is at least `m1`, so this must be the unique answer in
       // [0, n).
       !bn_mul_consttime(r0, r0, q, ctx) ||  //
       !bn_uadd_consttime(r0, r0, m1)) {
-    goto err;
+    return 0;
   }
 
-  // The result should be bounded by |n|, but fixed-width operations may
+  // The result should be bounded by `n`, but fixed-width operations may
   // bound the width slightly higher, so fix it. This trips constant-time checks
   // because a naive data flow analysis does not realize the excess words are
   // publicly zero.
   declassify_assert(BN_cmp(r0, n) < 0);
   bn_assert_fits_in_bytes(r0, BN_num_bytes(n));
   if (!bn_resize_words(r0, n->width)) {
-    goto err;
+    return 0;
   }
 
-  ret = 1;
-
-err:
-  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-  return ret;
+  return 1;
 }
 
-static int ensure_bignum(BIGNUM **out) {
-  if (*out == NULL) {
-    *out = BN_new();
+static int ensure_bignum(UniquePtr<BIGNUM> *out) {
+  if (*out == nullptr) {
+    out->reset(BN_new());
   }
-  return *out != NULL;
+  return *out != nullptr;
 }
 
-// kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwo is the BIGNUM representation of ⌊2²⁰⁴⁷×√2⌋. This is
-// chosen to give enough precision for 4096-bit RSA, the largest key size FIPS
-// specifies. Key sizes beyond this will round up.
-//
-// To calculate, use the following Haskell code:
-//
-// import Text.Printf (printf)
-// import Data.List (intercalate)
-//
-// pow2 = 4095
-// target = 2^pow2
-//
-// f x = x*x - (toRational target)
-//
-// fprime x = 2*x
-//
-// newtonIteration x = x - (f x) / (fprime x)
-//
-// converge x =
-//   let n = floor x in
-//   if n*n - target < 0 && (n+1)*(n+1) - target > 0
-//     then n
-//     else converge (newtonIteration x)
-//
-// divrem bits x = (x `div` (2^bits), x `rem` (2^bits))
-//
-// bnWords :: Integer -> [Integer]
-// bnWords x =
-//   if x == 0
-//     then []
-//     else let (high, low) = divrem 64 x in low : bnWords high
-//
-// showWord x = let (high, low) = divrem 32 x in printf "TOBN(0x%08x, 0x%08x)"
-// high low
-//
-// output :: String
-// output = intercalate ", " $ map showWord $ bnWords $ converge (2 ^ (pow2
-// `div` 2))
-//
-// To verify this number, check that n² < 2⁴⁰⁹⁵ < (n+1)², where n is value
-// represented here. Note the components are listed in little-endian order. Here
-// is some sample Python code to check:
-//
-//   >>> TOBN = lambda a, b: a << 32 | b
-//   >>> l = [ <paste the contents of kSqrtTwo> ]
-//   >>> n = sum(a * 2**(64*i) for i, a in enumerate(l))
-//   >>> n**2 < 2**4095 < (n+1)**2
-//   True
-const BN_ULONG kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwo[] = {
-    TOBN(0x4d7c60a5, 0xe633e3e1), TOBN(0x5fcf8f7b, 0xca3ea33b),
-    TOBN(0xc246785e, 0x92957023), TOBN(0xf9acce41, 0x797f2805),
-    TOBN(0xfdfe170f, 0xd3b1f780), TOBN(0xd24f4a76, 0x3facb882),
-    TOBN(0x18838a2e, 0xaff5f3b2), TOBN(0xc1fcbdde, 0xa2f7dc33),
-    TOBN(0xdea06241, 0xf7aa81c2), TOBN(0xf6a1be3f, 0xca221307),
-    TOBN(0x332a5e9f, 0x7bda1ebf), TOBN(0x0104dc01, 0xfe32352f),
-    TOBN(0xb8cf341b, 0x6f8236c7), TOBN(0x4264dabc, 0xd528b651),
-    TOBN(0xf4d3a02c, 0xebc93e0c), TOBN(0x81394ab6, 0xd8fd0efd),
-    TOBN(0xeaa4a089, 0x9040ca4a), TOBN(0xf52f120f, 0x836e582e),
-    TOBN(0xcb2a6343, 0x31f3c84d), TOBN(0xc6d5a8a3, 0x8bb7e9dc),
-    TOBN(0x460abc72, 0x2f7c4e33), TOBN(0xcab1bc91, 0x1688458a),
-    TOBN(0x53059c60, 0x11bc337b), TOBN(0xd2202e87, 0x42af1f4e),
-    TOBN(0x78048736, 0x3dfa2768), TOBN(0x0f74a85e, 0x439c7b4a),
-    TOBN(0xa8b1fe6f, 0xdc83db39), TOBN(0x4afc8304, 0x3ab8a2c3),
-    TOBN(0xed17ac85, 0x83339915), TOBN(0x1d6f60ba, 0x893ba84c),
-    TOBN(0x597d89b3, 0x754abe9f), TOBN(0xb504f333, 0xf9de6484),
-};
-const size_t kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwoLen = OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwo);
-
-// generate_prime sets |out| to a prime with length |bits| such that |out|-1 is
-// relatively prime to |e|. If |p| is non-NULL, |out| will also not be close to
-// |p|. |sqrt2| must be ⌊2^(bits-1)×√2⌋ (or a slightly overestimate for large
-// sizes), and |pow2_bits_100| must be 2^(bits-100).
+// generate_prime sets `out` to a prime with length `bits` such that `out`-1 is
+// relatively prime to `e`. If `p` is non-NULL, `out` will also not be close to
+// `p`. `pow2_bits_100` must be 2^(bits-100).
 //
 // This function fails with probability around 2^-21.
 static int generate_prime(BIGNUM *out, int bits, const BIGNUM *e,
-                          const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *sqrt2,
-                          const BIGNUM *pow2_bits_100, BN_CTX *ctx,
-                          BN_GENCB *cb) {
+                          const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *pow2_bits_100,
+                          BN_CTX *ctx, BN_GENCB *cb) {
   if (bits < 128 || (bits % BN_BITS2) != 0) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
     return 0;
@@ -878,14 +615,14 @@ static int generate_prime(BIGNUM *out, int bits, const BIGNUM *e,
   assert(BN_is_pow2(pow2_bits_100));
   assert(BN_is_bit_set(pow2_bits_100, bits - 100));
 
-  // See FIPS 186-4 appendix B.3.3, steps 4 and 5. Note |bits| here is nlen/2.
+  // See FIPS 186-5 appendix A.1.3, steps 4 and 5. Note `bits` here is nlen/2.
 
-  // Use the limit from steps 4.7 and 5.8 for most values of |e|. When |e| is 3,
-  // the 186-4 limit is too low, so we use a higher one. Note this case is not
-  // reachable from |RSA_generate_key_fips|.
+  // Use the limit from steps 4.7 and 5.8 for most values of `e`. When `e` is 3,
+  // the 186-5 limit is too low, so we use a higher one. Note this case is not
+  // reachable from `RSA_generate_key_fips`.
   //
-  // |limit| determines the failure probability. We must find a prime that is
-  // not 1 mod |e|. By the prime number theorem, we'll find one with probability
+  // `limit` determines the failure probability. We must find a prime that is
+  // not 1 mod `e`. By the prime number theorem, we'll find one with probability
   // p = (e-1)/e * 2/(ln(2)*bits). Note the second term is doubled because we
   // discard even numbers.
   //
@@ -914,46 +651,37 @@ static int generate_prime(BIGNUM *out, int bits, const BIGNUM *e,
   }
   int limit = BN_is_word(e, 3) ? bits * 8 : bits * 5;
 
-  int ret = 0, tries = 0, rand_tries = 0;
-  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+  int tries = 0, rand_tries = 0;
+  BN_CTXScope scope(ctx);
   BIGNUM *tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  if (tmp == NULL) {
-    goto err;
+  if (tmp == nullptr) {
+    return 0;
   }
 
   for (;;) {
-    // Generate a random number of length |bits| where the bottom bit is set
-    // (steps 4.2, 4.3, 5.2 and 5.3) and the top bit is set (implied by the
-    // bound checked below in steps 4.4 and 5.5).
-    if (!BN_rand(out, bits, BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ODD) ||
+    // Generate a random number of length `bits` where the bottom bit is set and
+    // top two bits are set (steps 4.2–4.4 and 5.2–5.4):
+    //
+    // - Setting the top two bits is permitted by steps 4.2.1 and 5.2.1. Doing
+    //   so implements steps 4.4 and 5.4 by making this case impossible because
+    //   √2 < 1.5.
+    //
+    // - Setting the bottom bit implements steps 4.3 and 5.3.
+    if (!BN_rand(out, bits, BN_RAND_TOP_TWO, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ODD) ||
         !BN_GENCB_call(cb, BN_GENCB_GENERATED, rand_tries++)) {
-      goto err;
+      return 0;
     }
 
-    if (p != NULL) {
-      // If |p| and |out| are too close, try again (step 5.4).
+    if (p != nullptr) {
+      // If `p` and `out` are too close, try again (step 5.5).
       if (!bn_abs_sub_consttime(tmp, out, p, ctx)) {
-        goto err;
+        return 0;
       }
       if (BN_cmp(tmp, pow2_bits_100) <= 0) {
         continue;
       }
     }
 
-    // If out < 2^(bits-1)×√2, try again (steps 4.4 and 5.5). This is equivalent
-    // to out <= ⌊2^(bits-1)×√2⌋, or out <= sqrt2 for FIPS key sizes.
-    //
-    // For larger keys, the comparison is approximate, leaning towards
-    // retrying. That is, we reject a negligible fraction of primes that are
-    // within the FIPS bound, but we will never accept a prime outside the
-    // bound, ensuring the resulting RSA key is the right size.
-    //
-    // Values over the threshold are discarded, so it is safe to leak this
-    // comparison.
-    if (constant_time_declassify_int(BN_cmp(out, sqrt2) <= 0)) {
-      continue;
-    }
-
     // RSA key generation's bottleneck is discarding composites. If it fails
     // trial division, do not bother computing a GCD or performing Miller-Rabin.
     if (!bn_odd_number_is_obviously_composite(out)) {
@@ -963,64 +691,59 @@ static int generate_prime(BIGNUM *out, int bits, const BIGNUM *e,
       int relatively_prime;
       if (!bn_usub_consttime(tmp, out, BN_value_one()) ||
           !bn_is_relatively_prime(&relatively_prime, tmp, e, ctx)) {
-        goto err;
+        return 0;
       }
       if (constant_time_declassify_int(relatively_prime)) {
-        // Test |out| for primality (steps 4.5.1 and 5.6.1).
+        // Test `out` for primality (steps 4.5.1 and 5.6.1).
         int is_probable_prime;
         if (!BN_primality_test(&is_probable_prime, out,
                                BN_prime_checks_for_generation, ctx, 0, cb)) {
-          goto err;
+          return 0;
         }
         if (is_probable_prime) {
-          ret = 1;
-          goto err;
+          return 1;
         }
       }
     }
 
-    // If we've tried too many times to find a prime, abort (steps 4.7 and
-    // 5.8).
+    // If we've tried too many times to find a prime, abort (steps 4.7 and 5.8).
     tries++;
     if (tries >= limit) {
       OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS);
-      goto err;
+      return 0;
     }
     if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, tries)) {
-      goto err;
+      return 0;
     }
   }
-
-err:
-  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-  return ret;
 }
 
 // rsa_generate_key_impl generates an RSA key using a generalized version of
-// FIPS 186-4 appendix B.3. |RSA_generate_key_fips| performs additional checks
+// FIPS 186-5 appendix A.1.3. `RSA_generate_key_fips` performs additional checks
 // for FIPS-compliant key generation.
 //
 // This function returns one on success and zero on failure. It has a failure
 // probability of about 2^-20.
-static int rsa_generate_key_impl(RSA *rsa, int bits, const BIGNUM *e_value,
+static int rsa_generate_key_impl(RSAImpl *rsa, int bits, const BIGNUM *e_value,
                                  BN_GENCB *cb) {
-  // See FIPS 186-4 appendix B.3. This function implements a generalized version
-  // of the FIPS algorithm. |RSA_generate_key_fips| performs additional checks
-  // for FIPS-compliant key generation.
+  if (bits > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+    return 0;
+  }
 
-  // Always generate RSA keys which are a multiple of 128 bits. Round |bits|
+  // Always generate RSA keys which are a multiple of 128 bits. Round `bits`
   // down as needed.
   bits &= ~127;
 
   // Reject excessively small keys.
-  if (bits < 256) {
+  if (bits < OPENSSL_RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
     return 0;
   }
 
   // Reject excessively large public exponents. Windows CryptoAPI and Go don't
   // support values larger than 32 bits, so match their limits for generating
-  // keys. (|rsa_check_public_key| uses a slightly more conservative value, but
+  // keys. (`rsa_check_public_key` uses a slightly more conservative value, but
   // we don't need to support generating such keys.)
   // https://github.com/golang/go/issues/3161
   // https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa387685(VS.85).aspx
@@ -1029,29 +752,45 @@ static int rsa_generate_key_impl(RSA *rsa, int bits, const BIGNUM *e_value,
     return 0;
   }
 
-  int ret = 0;
+  // The smallest reasonable RSA exponent is 3, and it definitely must be odd.
+  // Catching these here prevents endless loops or slow computation when trying
+  // to generate keys later, and results in a better error code.
+  if (
+      // Would fail in `bn_lcm_consttime` as it only allows positive integers.
+      BN_is_negative(e_value) ||
+      // Would fail in `generate_prime` as only one `rsa->p`-1 is coprime with
+      // an even `e_value` and that one is a little bit short. (The R in RSA
+      // doesn't stand for Rabin.)
+      !BN_is_odd(e_value) ||
+      // Would loop endlessly because it'll always compute an `rsa->d` exponent
+      // of 1, which is too small.
+      BN_is_one(e_value)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  UniquePtr<BN_CTX> ctx(BN_CTX_new());
+  if (ctx == nullptr) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
   int prime_bits = bits / 2;
-  BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-  BIGNUM *totient, *pm1, *qm1, *sqrt2, *pow2_prime_bits_100, *pow2_prime_bits;
-  int sqrt2_bits;
-  if (ctx == NULL) {
-    goto bn_err;
-  }
-  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-  totient = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  pm1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  qm1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  sqrt2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  pow2_prime_bits_100 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  pow2_prime_bits = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  if (totient == NULL || pm1 == NULL || qm1 == NULL || sqrt2 == NULL ||
-      pow2_prime_bits_100 == NULL || pow2_prime_bits == NULL ||
+  BN_CTXScope scope(ctx.get());
+  BIGNUM *totient = BN_CTX_get(ctx.get());
+  BIGNUM *pm1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx.get());
+  BIGNUM *qm1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx.get());
+  BIGNUM *pow2_prime_bits_100 = BN_CTX_get(ctx.get());
+  BIGNUM *pow2_prime_bits = BN_CTX_get(ctx.get());
+  if (totient == nullptr || pm1 == nullptr || qm1 == nullptr ||
+      pow2_prime_bits_100 == nullptr || pow2_prime_bits == nullptr ||
       !BN_set_bit(pow2_prime_bits_100, prime_bits - 100) ||
       !BN_set_bit(pow2_prime_bits, prime_bits)) {
-    goto bn_err;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN);
+    return 0;
   }
 
-  // We need the RSA components non-NULL.
+  // We need the RSA components non-null.
   if (!ensure_bignum(&rsa->n) ||     //
       !ensure_bignum(&rsa->d) ||     //
       !ensure_bignum(&rsa->e) ||     //
@@ -1060,229 +799,186 @@ static int rsa_generate_key_impl(RSA *rsa, int bits, const BIGNUM *e_value,
       !ensure_bignum(&rsa->dmp1) ||  //
       !ensure_bignum(&rsa->dmq1) ||  //
       !ensure_bignum(&rsa->iqmp)) {
-    goto bn_err;
-  }
-
-  if (!BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value)) {
-    goto bn_err;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN);
+    return 0;
   }
 
-  // Compute sqrt2 >= ⌊2^(prime_bits-1)×√2⌋.
-  if (!bn_set_words(sqrt2, kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwo, kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwoLen)) {
-    goto bn_err;
-  }
-  sqrt2_bits = kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwoLen * BN_BITS2;
-  assert(sqrt2_bits == (int)BN_num_bits(sqrt2));
-  if (sqrt2_bits > prime_bits) {
-    // For key sizes up to 4096 (prime_bits = 2048), this is exactly
-    // ⌊2^(prime_bits-1)×√2⌋.
-    if (!BN_rshift(sqrt2, sqrt2, sqrt2_bits - prime_bits)) {
-      goto bn_err;
-    }
-  } else if (prime_bits > sqrt2_bits) {
-    // For key sizes beyond 4096, this is approximate. We err towards retrying
-    // to ensure our key is the right size and round up.
-    if (!BN_add_word(sqrt2, 1) ||
-        !BN_lshift(sqrt2, sqrt2, prime_bits - sqrt2_bits)) {
-      goto bn_err;
-    }
+  if (!BN_copy(rsa->e.get(), e_value)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN);
+    return 0;
   }
-  assert(prime_bits == (int)BN_num_bits(sqrt2));
 
   do {
-    // Generate p and q, each of size |prime_bits|, using the steps outlined in
-    // appendix FIPS 186-4 appendix B.3.3.
+    // Generate p and q, each of size `prime_bits`, using the steps outlined in
+    // appendix FIPS 186-5 appendix C.3.3.
     //
-    // Each call to |generate_prime| fails with probability p = 2^-21. The
+    // Each call to `generate_prime` fails with probability p = 2^-21. The
     // probability that either call fails is 1 - (1-p)^2, which is around 2^-20.
-    if (!generate_prime(rsa->p, prime_bits, rsa->e, NULL, sqrt2,
-                        pow2_prime_bits_100, ctx, cb) ||
+    if (!generate_prime(rsa->p.get(), prime_bits, rsa->e.get(), nullptr,
+                        pow2_prime_bits_100, ctx.get(), cb) ||
         !BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0) ||
-        !generate_prime(rsa->q, prime_bits, rsa->e, rsa->p, sqrt2,
-                        pow2_prime_bits_100, ctx, cb) ||
+        !generate_prime(rsa->q.get(), prime_bits, rsa->e.get(), rsa->p.get(),
+                        pow2_prime_bits_100, ctx.get(), cb) ||
         !BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1)) {
-      goto bn_err;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN);
+      return 0;
     }
 
-    if (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) < 0) {
-      BIGNUM *tmp = rsa->p;
-      rsa->p = rsa->q;
-      rsa->q = tmp;
+    if (BN_cmp(rsa->p.get(), rsa->q.get()) < 0) {
+      std::swap(rsa->p, rsa->q);
     }
 
-    // Calculate d = e^(-1) (mod lcm(p-1, q-1)), per FIPS 186-4. This differs
-    // from typical RSA implementations which use (p-1)*(q-1).
+    // Calculate d = e^(-1) (mod lcm(p-1, q-1)), per FIPS 186-5. This differs
+    // from typical RSA rsaementations which use (p-1)*(q-1).
     //
     // Note this means the size of d might reveal information about p-1 and
     // q-1. However, we do operations with Chinese Remainder Theorem, so we only
     // use d (mod p-1) and d (mod q-1) as exponents. Using a minimal totient
     // does not affect those two values.
     int no_inverse;
-    if (!bn_usub_consttime(pm1, rsa->p, BN_value_one()) ||
-        !bn_usub_consttime(qm1, rsa->q, BN_value_one()) ||
-        !bn_lcm_consttime(totient, pm1, qm1, ctx) ||
-        !bn_mod_inverse_consttime(rsa->d, &no_inverse, rsa->e, totient, ctx)) {
-      goto bn_err;
+    if (!bn_usub_consttime(pm1, rsa->p.get(), BN_value_one()) ||
+        !bn_usub_consttime(qm1, rsa->q.get(), BN_value_one()) ||
+        !bn_lcm_consttime(totient, pm1, qm1, ctx.get()) ||
+        !bn_mod_inverse_consttime(rsa->d.get(), &no_inverse, rsa->e.get(),
+                                  totient, ctx.get())) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN);
+      return 0;
     }
 
-    // Retry if |rsa->d| <= 2^|prime_bits|. See appendix B.3.1's guidance on
+    // Retry if `rsa->d` <= 2^`prime_bits`. See appendix A.3.1's guidance on
     // values for d. When we retry, p and q are discarded, so it is safe to leak
     // this comparison.
-  } while (constant_time_declassify_int(BN_cmp(rsa->d, pow2_prime_bits) <= 0));
+  } while (
+      constant_time_declassify_int(BN_cmp(rsa->d.get(), pow2_prime_bits) <= 0));
 
   assert(BN_num_bits(pm1) == (unsigned)prime_bits);
   assert(BN_num_bits(qm1) == (unsigned)prime_bits);
   if (  // Calculate n.
-      !bn_mul_consttime(rsa->n, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx) ||
+      !bn_mul_consttime(rsa->n.get(), rsa->p.get(), rsa->q.get(), ctx.get()) ||
       // Calculate d mod (p-1).
-      !bn_div_consttime(NULL, rsa->dmp1, rsa->d, pm1, prime_bits, ctx) ||
+      !bn_div_consttime(nullptr, rsa->dmp1.get(), rsa->d.get(), pm1, prime_bits,
+                        ctx.get()) ||
       // Calculate d mod (q-1)
-      !bn_div_consttime(NULL, rsa->dmq1, rsa->d, qm1, prime_bits, ctx)) {
-    goto bn_err;
+      !bn_div_consttime(nullptr, rsa->dmq1.get(), rsa->d.get(), qm1, prime_bits,
+                        ctx.get())) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN);
+    return 0;
   }
-  bn_set_minimal_width(rsa->n);
+  bn_set_minimal_width(rsa->n.get());
 
-  // |rsa->n| is computed from the private key, but is public.
-  bn_declassify(rsa->n);
+  // `rsa->n` is computed from the private key, but is public.
+  bn_declassify(rsa->n.get());
 
   // Calculate q^-1 mod p.
-  rsa->mont_p = BN_MONT_CTX_new_consttime(rsa->p, ctx);
-  if (rsa->mont_p == NULL ||  //
-      !bn_mod_inverse_secret_prime(rsa->iqmp, rsa->q, rsa->p, ctx,
-                                   rsa->mont_p)) {
-    goto bn_err;
+  rsa->mont_p.reset(BN_MONT_CTX_new_consttime(rsa->p.get(), ctx.get()));
+  if (rsa->mont_p == nullptr ||  //
+      !bn_mod_inverse_secret_prime(rsa->iqmp.get(), rsa->q.get(), rsa->p.get(),
+                                   ctx.get(), rsa->mont_p.get())) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN);
+    return 0;
   }
 
-  // Sanity-check that |rsa->n| has the specified size. This is implied by
-  // |generate_prime|'s bounds.
-  if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) != (unsigned)bits) {
+  // Sanity-check that `rsa->n` has the specified size. This is rsaied by
+  // `generate_prime`'s bounds.
+  if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n.get()) != (unsigned)bits) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    goto err;
+    return 0;
   }
 
   // The key generation process is complex and thus error-prone. It could be
   // disastrous to generate and then use a bad key so double-check that the key
-  // makes sense. Also, while |rsa| is mutable, fill in the cached components.
-  if (!RSA_check_key(rsa) ||
-      !freeze_private_key(rsa, ctx)) {
+  // makes sense. Also, while `rsa` is mutable, fill in the cached components.
+  if (!RSA_check_key(rsa) || !freeze_private_key(rsa, ctx.get())) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  ret = 1;
-
-bn_err:
-  if (!ret) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN);
-  }
-err:
-  if (ctx != NULL) {
-    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return 0;
   }
-  return ret;
-}
 
-static void replace_bignum(BIGNUM **out, BIGNUM **in) {
-  BN_free(*out);
-  *out = *in;
-  *in = NULL;
-}
-
-static void replace_bn_mont_ctx(BN_MONT_CTX **out, BN_MONT_CTX **in) {
-  BN_MONT_CTX_free(*out);
-  *out = *in;
-  *in = NULL;
+  return 1;
 }
 
-static int RSA_generate_key_ex_maybe_fips(RSA *rsa, int bits,
+static int RSA_generate_key_ex_maybe_fips(RSAImpl *rsa, int bits,
                                           const BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb,
                                           int check_fips) {
-  boringssl_ensure_rsa_self_test();
+  boringssl_ensure_rsa_sign_self_test();
+  boringssl_ensure_rsa_verify_self_test();
 
-  if (rsa == NULL) {
+  if (rsa == nullptr) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
     return 0;
   }
 
-  RSA *tmp = NULL;
-  uint32_t err;
-  int ret = 0;
+  UniquePtr<RSAImpl> tmp;
 
-  // |rsa_generate_key_impl|'s 2^-20 failure probability is too high at scale,
+  // `rsa_generate_key_impl`'s 2^-20 failure probability is too high at scale,
   // so we run the FIPS algorithm four times, bringing it down to 2^-80. We
-  // should just adjust the retry limit, but FIPS 186-4 prescribes that value
+  // should just adjust the retry limit, but FIPS 186-5 prescribes that value
   // and thus results in unnecessary complexity.
   int failures = 0;
   do {
     ERR_clear_error();
     // Generate into scratch space, to avoid leaving partial work on failure.
-    tmp = RSA_new();
-    if (tmp == NULL) {
-      goto out;
+    tmp.reset(FromOpaque(RSA_new()));
+    if (tmp == nullptr) {
+      return 0;
     }
 
-    if (rsa_generate_key_impl(tmp, bits, e_value, cb)) {
+    if (rsa_generate_key_impl(tmp.get(), bits, e_value, cb)) {
       break;
     }
 
-    err = ERR_peek_error();
-    RSA_free(tmp);
-    tmp = NULL;
+    tmp = nullptr;
     failures++;
 
-    // Only retry on |RSA_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS|. This is so a caller-induced
-    // failure in |BN_GENCB_call| is still fatal.
-  } while (failures < 4 && ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_RSA &&
-           ERR_GET_REASON(err) == RSA_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS);
+    // Only retry on `RSA_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS`. This is so a caller-induced
+    // failure in `BN_GENCB_call` is still fatal.
+  } while (failures < 4 && ERR_equals(ERR_peek_error(), ERR_LIB_RSA,
+                                      RSA_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS));
 
-  if (tmp == NULL || (check_fips && !RSA_check_fips(tmp))) {
-    goto out;
+  if (tmp == nullptr || (check_fips && !RSA_check_fips(tmp.get()))) {
+    return 0;
   }
 
   rsa_invalidate_key(rsa);
-  replace_bignum(&rsa->n, &tmp->n);
-  replace_bignum(&rsa->e, &tmp->e);
-  replace_bignum(&rsa->d, &tmp->d);
-  replace_bignum(&rsa->p, &tmp->p);
-  replace_bignum(&rsa->q, &tmp->q);
-  replace_bignum(&rsa->dmp1, &tmp->dmp1);
-  replace_bignum(&rsa->dmq1, &tmp->dmq1);
-  replace_bignum(&rsa->iqmp, &tmp->iqmp);
-  replace_bn_mont_ctx(&rsa->mont_n, &tmp->mont_n);
-  replace_bn_mont_ctx(&rsa->mont_p, &tmp->mont_p);
-  replace_bn_mont_ctx(&rsa->mont_q, &tmp->mont_q);
-  replace_bignum(&rsa->d_fixed, &tmp->d_fixed);
-  replace_bignum(&rsa->dmp1_fixed, &tmp->dmp1_fixed);
-  replace_bignum(&rsa->dmq1_fixed, &tmp->dmq1_fixed);
-  replace_bignum(&rsa->iqmp_mont, &tmp->iqmp_mont);
+  rsa->n = std::move(tmp->n);
+  rsa->e = std::move(tmp->e);
+  rsa->d = std::move(tmp->d);
+  rsa->p = std::move(tmp->p);
+  rsa->q = std::move(tmp->q);
+  rsa->dmp1 = std::move(tmp->dmp1);
+  rsa->dmq1 = std::move(tmp->dmq1);
+  rsa->iqmp = std::move(tmp->iqmp);
+  rsa->mont_n = std::move(tmp->mont_n);
+  rsa->mont_p = std::move(tmp->mont_p);
+  rsa->mont_q = std::move(tmp->mont_q);
+  rsa->d_fixed = std::move(tmp->d_fixed);
+  rsa->dmp1_fixed = std::move(tmp->dmp1_fixed);
+  rsa->dmq1_fixed = std::move(tmp->dmq1_fixed);
+  rsa->iqmp_mont = std::move(tmp->iqmp_mont);
   rsa->private_key_frozen = tmp->private_key_frozen;
-  ret = 1;
-
-out:
-  RSA_free(tmp);
-  return ret;
+  return 1;
 }
 
 int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, const BIGNUM *e_value,
                         BN_GENCB *cb) {
-  return RSA_generate_key_ex_maybe_fips(rsa, bits, e_value, cb,
+  return RSA_generate_key_ex_maybe_fips(FromOpaque(rsa), bits, e_value, cb,
                                         /*check_fips=*/0);
 }
 
 int RSA_generate_key_fips(RSA *rsa, int bits, BN_GENCB *cb) {
-  // FIPS 186-4 allows 2048-bit and 3072-bit RSA keys (1024-bit and 1536-bit
+  // FIPS 186-4 allowed 2048-bit and 3072-bit RSA keys (1024-bit and 1536-bit
   // primes, respectively) with the prime generation method we use.
   // Subsequently, IG A.14 stated that larger modulus sizes can be used and ACVP
-  // testing supports 4096 bits.
+  // testing supports 4096 bits, and FIPS 186-5 allowed all key sizes at least
+  // 2048.
   if (bits != 2048 && bits != 3072 && bits != 4096) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_RSA_PARAMETERS);
     return 0;
   }
 
   BIGNUM *e = BN_new();
-  int ret = e != NULL && BN_set_word(e, RSA_F4) &&
-            RSA_generate_key_ex_maybe_fips(rsa, bits, e, cb, /*check_fips=*/1);
+  int ret = e != nullptr && BN_set_word(e, RSA_F4) &&
+            RSA_generate_key_ex_maybe_fips(FromOpaque(rsa), bits, e, cb,
+                                           /*check_fips=*/1);
   BN_free(e);
 
   if (ret) {
@@ -1291,10 +987,14 @@ int RSA_generate_key_fips(RSA *rsa, int bits, BN_GENCB *cb) {
   return ret;
 }
 
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
 DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(RSA_METHOD, RSA_default_method) {
   // All of the methods are NULL to make it easier for the compiler/linker to
   // drop unused functions. The wrapper functions will select the appropriate
-  // |rsa_default_*| implementation.
+  // `rsa_default_*` implementation.
   OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, sizeof(RSA_METHOD));
   out->common.is_static = 1;
 }
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END