grpc 1.84.0 → 1.85.0.pre1

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/mul.cc.inc

@@ -25,16 +25,7 @@
 #include "internal.h"
 
 
-#define BN_MUL_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL 16
-#define BN_SQR_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL BN_MUL_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL
-
-
-static void bn_abs_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
-                             size_t num, BN_ULONG *tmp) {
-  BN_ULONG borrow = bn_sub_words(tmp, a, b, num);
-  bn_sub_words(r, b, a, num);
-  bn_select_words(r, 0 - borrow, r /* tmp < 0 */, tmp /* tmp >= 0 */, num);
-}
+using namespace bssl;
 
 static void bn_mul_normal(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t na,
                           const BN_ULONG *b, size_t nb) {
@@ -77,12 +68,12 @@ static void bn_mul_normal(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t na,
 }
 
 // bn_sub_part_words sets |r| to |a| - |b|. It returns the borrow bit, which is
-// one if the operation underflowed and zero otherwise. |cl| is the common
-// length, that is, the shorter of len(a) or len(b). |dl| is the delta length,
+// one if the operation underflowed and zero otherwise. `cl` is the common
+// length, that is, the shorter of len(a) or len(b). `dl` is the delta length,
 // that is, len(a) - len(b). |r|'s length matches the larger of |a| and |b|, or
 // cl + abs(dl).
 //
-// TODO(davidben): Make this take |size_t|. The |cl| + |dl| calling convention
+// TODO(davidben): Make this take `size_t`. The `cl` + `dl` calling convention
 // is confusing.
 static BN_ULONG bn_sub_part_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a,
                                   const BN_ULONG *b, int cl, int dl) {
@@ -97,15 +88,15 @@ static BN_ULONG bn_sub_part_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a,
   b += cl;
 
   if (dl < 0) {
-    // |a| is shorter than |b|. Complete the subtraction as if the excess words
-    // in |a| were zeros.
+    // `a` is shorter than `b`. Complete the subtraction as if the excess words
+    // in `a` were zeros.
     dl = -dl;
     for (int i = 0; i < dl; i++) {
       r[i] = CRYPTO_subc_w(0, b[i], borrow, &borrow);
     }
   } else {
-    // |b| is shorter than |a|. Complete the subtraction as if the excess words
-    // in |b| were zeros.
+    // `b` is shorter than `a`. Complete the subtraction as if the excess words
+    // in `b` were zeros.
     for (int i = 0; i < dl; i++) {
       r[i] = CRYPTO_subc_w(a[i], 0, borrow, &borrow);
     }
@@ -116,11 +107,16 @@ static BN_ULONG bn_sub_part_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a,
 
 // bn_abs_sub_part_words computes |r| = |a| - |b|, storing the absolute value
 // and returning a mask of all ones if the result was negative and all zeros if
-// the result was positive. |cl| and |dl| follow the |bn_sub_part_words| calling
+// the result was positive. `cl` and `dl` follow the `bn_sub_part_words` calling
 // convention.
 //
-// TODO(davidben): Make this take |size_t|. The |cl| + |dl| calling convention
+// TODO(davidben): Make this take `size_t`. The `cl` + `dl` calling convention
 // is confusing.
+//
+// TODO(davidben): This function used to be used as part of a general Karatsuba
+// multiplication implementation, which had to account for differently-sized
+// inputs. Now it is only used as part of RSA key generation, which does not
+// need all this.
 static BN_ULONG bn_abs_sub_part_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a,
                                       const BN_ULONG *b, int cl, int dl,
                                       BN_ULONG *tmp) {
@@ -132,241 +128,24 @@ static BN_ULONG bn_abs_sub_part_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a,
   return borrow;
 }
 
-int bn_abs_sub_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
-                         BN_CTX *ctx) {
+int bssl::bn_abs_sub_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                               BN_CTX *ctx) {
   int cl = a->width < b->width ? a->width : b->width;
   int dl = a->width - b->width;
   int r_len = a->width < b->width ? b->width : a->width;
-  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+  BN_CTXScope scope(ctx);
   BIGNUM *tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  int ok = tmp != NULL && bn_wexpand(r, r_len) && bn_wexpand(tmp, r_len);
-  if (ok) {
-    bn_abs_sub_part_words(r->d, a->d, b->d, cl, dl, tmp->d);
-    r->width = r_len;
-  }
-  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-  return ok;
-}
-
-// Karatsuba recursive multiplication algorithm
-// (cf. Knuth, The Art of Computer Programming, Vol. 2)
-
-// bn_mul_recursive sets |r| to |a| * |b|, using |t| as scratch space. |r| has
-// length 2*|n2|, |a| has length |n2| + |dna|, |b| has length |n2| + |dnb|, and
-// |t| has length 4*|n2|. |n2| must be a power of two. Finally, we must have
-// -|BN_MUL_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL|/2 <= |dna| <= 0 and
-// -|BN_MUL_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL|/2 <= |dnb| <= 0.
-//
-// TODO(davidben): Simplify and |size_t| the calling convention around lengths
-// here.
-static void bn_mul_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
-                             int n2, int dna, int dnb, BN_ULONG *t) {
-  // |n2| is a power of two.
-  assert(n2 != 0 && (n2 & (n2 - 1)) == 0);
-  // Check |dna| and |dnb| are in range.
-  assert(-BN_MUL_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL / 2 <= dna && dna <= 0);
-  assert(-BN_MUL_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL / 2 <= dnb && dnb <= 0);
-
-  // Only call bn_mul_comba 8 if n2 == 8 and the
-  // two arrays are complete [steve]
-  if (n2 == 8 && dna == 0 && dnb == 0) {
-    bn_mul_comba8(r, a, b);
-    return;
-  }
-
-  // Else do normal multiply
-  if (n2 < BN_MUL_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL) {
-    bn_mul_normal(r, a, n2 + dna, b, n2 + dnb);
-    if (dna + dnb < 0) {
-      OPENSSL_memset(&r[2 * n2 + dna + dnb], 0,
-                     sizeof(BN_ULONG) * -(dna + dnb));
-    }
-    return;
-  }
-
-  // Split |a| and |b| into a0,a1 and b0,b1, where a0 and b0 have size |n|.
-  // Split |t| into t0,t1,t2,t3, each of size |n|, with the remaining 4*|n| used
-  // for recursive calls.
-  // Split |r| into r0,r1,r2,r3. We must contribute a0*b0 to r0,r1, a0*a1+b0*b1
-  // to r1,r2, and a1*b1 to r2,r3. The middle term we will compute as:
-  //
-  //   a0*a1 + b0*b1 = (a0 - a1)*(b1 - b0) + a1*b1 + a0*b0
-  //
-  // Note that we know |n| >= |BN_MUL_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL|/2 above, so
-  // |tna| and |tnb| are non-negative.
-  int n = n2 / 2, tna = n + dna, tnb = n + dnb;
-
-  // t0 = a0 - a1 and t1 = b1 - b0. The result will be multiplied, so we XOR
-  // their sign masks, giving the sign of (a0 - a1)*(b1 - b0). t0 and t1
-  // themselves store the absolute value.
-  BN_ULONG neg = bn_abs_sub_part_words(t, a, &a[n], tna, n - tna, &t[n2]);
-  neg ^= bn_abs_sub_part_words(&t[n], &b[n], b, tnb, tnb - n, &t[n2]);
-
-  // Compute:
-  // t2,t3 = t0 * t1 = |(a0 - a1)*(b1 - b0)|
-  // r0,r1 = a0 * b0
-  // r2,r3 = a1 * b1
-  if (n == 4 && dna == 0 && dnb == 0) {
-    bn_mul_comba4(&t[n2], t, &t[n]);
-
-    bn_mul_comba4(r, a, b);
-    bn_mul_comba4(&r[n2], &a[n], &b[n]);
-  } else if (n == 8 && dna == 0 && dnb == 0) {
-    bn_mul_comba8(&t[n2], t, &t[n]);
-
-    bn_mul_comba8(r, a, b);
-    bn_mul_comba8(&r[n2], &a[n], &b[n]);
-  } else {
-    BN_ULONG *p = &t[n2 * 2];
-    bn_mul_recursive(&t[n2], t, &t[n], n, 0, 0, p);
-    bn_mul_recursive(r, a, b, n, 0, 0, p);
-    bn_mul_recursive(&r[n2], &a[n], &b[n], n, dna, dnb, p);
-  }
-
-  // t0,t1,c = r0,r1 + r2,r3 = a0*b0 + a1*b1
-  BN_ULONG c = bn_add_words(t, r, &r[n2], n2);
-
-  // t2,t3,c = t0,t1,c + neg*t2,t3 = (a0 - a1)*(b1 - b0) + a1*b1 + a0*b0.
-  // The second term is stored as the absolute value, so we do this with a
-  // constant-time select.
-  BN_ULONG c_neg = c - bn_sub_words(&t[n2 * 2], t, &t[n2], n2);
-  BN_ULONG c_pos = c + bn_add_words(&t[n2], t, &t[n2], n2);
-  bn_select_words(&t[n2], neg, &t[n2 * 2], &t[n2], n2);
-  static_assert(sizeof(BN_ULONG) <= sizeof(crypto_word_t),
-                "crypto_word_t is too small");
-  c = constant_time_select_w(neg, c_neg, c_pos);
-
-  // We now have our three components. Add them together.
-  // r1,r2,c = r1,r2 + t2,t3,c
-  c += bn_add_words(&r[n], &r[n], &t[n2], n2);
-
-  // Propagate the carry bit to the end.
-  for (int i = n + n2; i < n2 + n2; i++) {
-    BN_ULONG old = r[i];
-    r[i] = old + c;
-    c = r[i] < old;
-  }
-
-  // The product should fit without carries.
-  declassify_assert(c == 0);
-}
-
-// bn_mul_part_recursive sets |r| to |a| * |b|, using |t| as scratch space. |r|
-// has length 4*|n|, |a| has length |n| + |tna|, |b| has length |n| + |tnb|, and
-// |t| has length 8*|n|. |n| must be a power of two. Additionally, we must have
-// 0 <= tna < n and 0 <= tnb < n, and |tna| and |tnb| must differ by at most
-// one.
-//
-// TODO(davidben): Make this take |size_t| and perhaps the actual lengths of |a|
-// and |b|.
-static void bn_mul_part_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a,
-                                  const BN_ULONG *b, int n, int tna, int tnb,
-                                  BN_ULONG *t) {
-  // |n| is a power of two.
-  assert(n != 0 && (n & (n - 1)) == 0);
-  // Check |tna| and |tnb| are in range.
-  assert(0 <= tna && tna < n);
-  assert(0 <= tnb && tnb < n);
-  assert(-1 <= tna - tnb && tna - tnb <= 1);
-
-  int n2 = n * 2;
-  if (n < 8) {
-    bn_mul_normal(r, a, n + tna, b, n + tnb);
-    OPENSSL_memset(r + n2 + tna + tnb, 0, n2 - tna - tnb);
-    return;
-  }
-
-  // Split |a| and |b| into a0,a1 and b0,b1, where a0 and b0 have size |n|. |a1|
-  // and |b1| have size |tna| and |tnb|, respectively.
-  // Split |t| into t0,t1,t2,t3, each of size |n|, with the remaining 4*|n| used
-  // for recursive calls.
-  // Split |r| into r0,r1,r2,r3. We must contribute a0*b0 to r0,r1, a0*a1+b0*b1
-  // to r1,r2, and a1*b1 to r2,r3. The middle term we will compute as:
-  //
-  //   a0*a1 + b0*b1 = (a0 - a1)*(b1 - b0) + a1*b1 + a0*b0
-
-  // t0 = a0 - a1 and t1 = b1 - b0. The result will be multiplied, so we XOR
-  // their sign masks, giving the sign of (a0 - a1)*(b1 - b0). t0 and t1
-  // themselves store the absolute value.
-  BN_ULONG neg = bn_abs_sub_part_words(t, a, &a[n], tna, n - tna, &t[n2]);
-  neg ^= bn_abs_sub_part_words(&t[n], &b[n], b, tnb, tnb - n, &t[n2]);
-
-  // Compute:
-  // t2,t3 = t0 * t1 = |(a0 - a1)*(b1 - b0)|
-  // r0,r1 = a0 * b0
-  // r2,r3 = a1 * b1
-  if (n == 8) {
-    bn_mul_comba8(&t[n2], t, &t[n]);
-    bn_mul_comba8(r, a, b);
-
-    bn_mul_normal(&r[n2], &a[n], tna, &b[n], tnb);
-    // |bn_mul_normal| only writes |tna| + |tna| words. Zero the rest.
-    OPENSSL_memset(&r[n2 + tna + tnb], 0, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * (n2 - tna - tnb));
-  } else {
-    BN_ULONG *p = &t[n2 * 2];
-    bn_mul_recursive(&t[n2], t, &t[n], n, 0, 0, p);
-    bn_mul_recursive(r, a, b, n, 0, 0, p);
-
-    OPENSSL_memset(&r[n2], 0, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * n2);
-    if (tna < BN_MUL_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL &&
-        tnb < BN_MUL_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL) {
-      bn_mul_normal(&r[n2], &a[n], tna, &b[n], tnb);
-    } else {
-      int i = n;
-      for (;;) {
-        i /= 2;
-        if (i < tna || i < tnb) {
-          // E.g., n == 16, i == 8 and tna == 11. |tna| and |tnb| are within one
-          // of each other, so if |tna| is larger and tna > i, then we know
-          // tnb >= i, and this call is valid.
-          bn_mul_part_recursive(&r[n2], &a[n], &b[n], i, tna - i, tnb - i, p);
-          break;
-        }
-        if (i == tna || i == tnb) {
-          // If there is only a bottom half to the number, just do it. We know
-          // the larger of |tna - i| and |tnb - i| is zero. The other is zero or
-          // -1 by because of |tna| and |tnb| differ by at most one.
-          bn_mul_recursive(&r[n2], &a[n], &b[n], i, tna - i, tnb - i, p);
-          break;
-        }
-
-        // This loop will eventually terminate when |i| falls below
-        // |BN_MUL_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL| because we know one of |tna| and |tnb|
-        // exceeds that.
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  // t0,t1,c = r0,r1 + r2,r3 = a0*b0 + a1*b1
-  BN_ULONG c = bn_add_words(t, r, &r[n2], n2);
-
-  // t2,t3,c = t0,t1,c + neg*t2,t3 = (a0 - a1)*(b1 - b0) + a1*b1 + a0*b0.
-  // The second term is stored as the absolute value, so we do this with a
-  // constant-time select.
-  BN_ULONG c_neg = c - bn_sub_words(&t[n2 * 2], t, &t[n2], n2);
-  BN_ULONG c_pos = c + bn_add_words(&t[n2], t, &t[n2], n2);
-  bn_select_words(&t[n2], neg, &t[n2 * 2], &t[n2], n2);
-  static_assert(sizeof(BN_ULONG) <= sizeof(crypto_word_t),
-                "crypto_word_t is too small");
-  c = constant_time_select_w(neg, c_neg, c_pos);
-
-  // We now have our three components. Add them together.
-  // r1,r2,c = r1,r2 + t2,t3,c
-  c += bn_add_words(&r[n], &r[n], &t[n2], n2);
-
-  // Propagate the carry bit to the end.
-  for (int i = n + n2; i < n2 + n2; i++) {
-    BN_ULONG old = r[i];
-    r[i] = old + c;
-    c = r[i] < old;
+  if (tmp == nullptr || !bn_wexpand(r, r_len) || !bn_wexpand(tmp, r_len)) {
+    return 0;
   }
-
-  // The product should fit without carries.
-  declassify_assert(c == 0);
+  bn_abs_sub_part_words(r->d, a->d, b->d, cl, dl, tmp->d);
+  r->width = r_len;
+  r->neg = 0;
+  return 1;
 }
 
-// bn_mul_impl implements |BN_mul| and |bn_mul_consttime|. Note this function
-// breaks |BIGNUM| invariants and may return a negative zero. This is handled by
+// bn_mul_impl implements `BN_mul` and `bn_mul_consttime`. Note this function
+// breaks `BIGNUM` invariants and may return a negative zero. This is handled by
 // the callers.
 static int bn_mul_impl(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
                        BN_CTX *ctx) {
@@ -377,13 +156,13 @@ static int bn_mul_impl(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
     return 1;
   }
 
-  int ret = 0, i, top;
+  int i, top;
   BIGNUM *rr;
-  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+  BN_CTXScope scope(ctx);
   if (r == a || r == b) {
     rr = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-    if (rr == NULL) {
-      goto err;
+    if (rr == nullptr) {
+      return 0;
     }
   } else {
     rr = r;
@@ -394,7 +173,7 @@ static int bn_mul_impl(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
   if (i == 0) {
     if (al == 8) {
       if (!bn_wexpand(rr, 16)) {
-        goto err;
+        return 0;
       }
       rr->width = 16;
       bn_mul_comba8(rr->d, a->d, b->d);
@@ -403,67 +182,17 @@ static int bn_mul_impl(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
   }
 
   top = al + bl;
-  // TODO(crbug.com/406497222): The recursive implementation is actually worse
-  // for cryptographic use cases, but we need to retain it in |BN_mul| for the
-  // projects misusing BIGNUM as a general-purpose calculator library with
-  // giant integers. Disconnect this code from our cryptographic primitives.
-  static const int kMulNormalSize = 16;
-  if (al >= kMulNormalSize && bl >= kMulNormalSize) {
-    if (-1 <= i && i <= 1) {
-      // Find the largest power of two less than or equal to the larger length.
-      int j;
-      if (i >= 0) {
-        j = BN_num_bits_word((BN_ULONG)al);
-      } else {
-        j = BN_num_bits_word((BN_ULONG)bl);
-      }
-      j = 1 << (j - 1);
-      assert(j <= al || j <= bl);
-      BIGNUM *t = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-      if (t == NULL) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-      if (al > j || bl > j) {
-        // We know |al| and |bl| are at most one from each other, so if al > j,
-        // bl >= j, and vice versa. Thus we can use |bn_mul_part_recursive|.
-        //
-        // TODO(davidben): This codepath is almost unused in standard
-        // algorithms. Is this optimization necessary? See notes in
-        // https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/q/I0bd604e2cd6a75c266f64476c23a730ca1721ea6
-        assert(al >= j && bl >= j);
-        if (!bn_wexpand(t, j * 8) || !bn_wexpand(rr, j * 4)) {
-          goto err;
-        }
-        bn_mul_part_recursive(rr->d, a->d, b->d, j, al - j, bl - j, t->d);
-      } else {
-        // al <= j && bl <= j. Additionally, we know j <= al or j <= bl, so one
-        // of al - j or bl - j is zero. The other, by the bound on |i| above, is
-        // zero or -1. Thus, we can use |bn_mul_recursive|.
-        if (!bn_wexpand(t, j * 4) || !bn_wexpand(rr, j * 2)) {
-          goto err;
-        }
-        bn_mul_recursive(rr->d, a->d, b->d, j, al - j, bl - j, t->d);
-      }
-      rr->width = top;
-      goto end;
-    }
-  }
-
   if (!bn_wexpand(rr, top)) {
-    goto err;
+    return 0;
   }
   rr->width = top;
   bn_mul_normal(rr->d, a->d, al, b->d, bl);
 
 end:
   if (r != rr && !BN_copy(r, rr)) {
-    goto err;
+    return 0;
   }
-  ret = 1;
-
-err:
-  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-  return ret;
+  return 1;
 }
 
 int BN_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) {
@@ -471,12 +200,13 @@ int BN_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) {
     return 0;
   }
 
-  // This additionally fixes any negative zeros created by |bn_mul_impl|.
+  // This additionally fixes any negative zeros created by `bn_mul_impl`.
   bn_set_minimal_width(r);
   return 1;
 }
 
-int bn_mul_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) {
+int bssl::bn_mul_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                           BN_CTX *ctx) {
   // Prevent negative zeros.
   if (a->neg || b->neg) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_NEGATIVE_NUMBER);
@@ -486,12 +216,12 @@ int bn_mul_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) {
   return bn_mul_impl(r, a, b, ctx);
 }
 
-void bn_mul_small(BN_ULONG *r, size_t num_r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t num_a,
-                  const BN_ULONG *b, size_t num_b) {
+void bssl::bn_mul_small(BN_ULONG *r, size_t num_r, const BN_ULONG *a,
+                        size_t num_a, const BN_ULONG *b, size_t num_b) {
   if (num_r != num_a + num_b) {
     abort();
   }
-  // TODO(davidben): Should this call |bn_mul_comba4| too? |BN_mul| does not
+  // TODO(davidben): Should this call `bn_mul_comba4` too? `BN_mul` does not
   // hit that code.
   if (num_a == 8 && num_b == 8) {
     bn_mul_comba8(r, a, b);
@@ -500,9 +230,7 @@ void bn_mul_small(BN_ULONG *r, size_t num_r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t num_a,
   }
 }
 
-// tmp must have 2*n words
-static void bn_sqr_normal(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t n,
-                          BN_ULONG *tmp) {
+static void bn_sqr_normal(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t n) {
   if (n == 0) {
     return;
   }
@@ -527,75 +255,14 @@ static void bn_sqr_normal(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t n,
     }
   }
 
-  // The final result fits in |max| words, so none of the following operations
+  // The final result fits in `max` words, so none of the following operations
   // will overflow.
 
-  // Double |r|, giving the contribution of a[i] * a[j] for all i != j.
+  // Double `r`, giving the contribution of a[i] * a[j] for all i != j.
   bn_add_words(r, r, r, max);
 
   // Add in the contribution of a[i] * a[i] for all i.
-  bn_sqr_words(tmp, a, n);
-  bn_add_words(r, r, tmp, max);
-}
-
-// bn_sqr_recursive sets |r| to |a|^2, using |t| as scratch space. |r| has
-// length 2*|n2|, |a| has length |n2|, and |t| has length 4*|n2|. |n2| must be
-// a power of two.
-static void bn_sqr_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t n2,
-                             BN_ULONG *t) {
-  // |n2| is a power of two.
-  assert(n2 != 0 && (n2 & (n2 - 1)) == 0);
-
-  if (n2 == 4) {
-    bn_sqr_comba4(r, a);
-    return;
-  }
-  if (n2 == 8) {
-    bn_sqr_comba8(r, a);
-    return;
-  }
-  if (n2 < BN_SQR_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL) {
-    bn_sqr_normal(r, a, n2, t);
-    return;
-  }
-
-  // Split |a| into a0,a1, each of size |n|.
-  // Split |t| into t0,t1,t2,t3, each of size |n|, with the remaining 4*|n| used
-  // for recursive calls.
-  // Split |r| into r0,r1,r2,r3. We must contribute a0^2 to r0,r1, 2*a0*a1 to
-  // r1,r2, and a1^2 to r2,r3.
-  size_t n = n2 / 2;
-  BN_ULONG *t_recursive = &t[n2 * 2];
-
-  // t0 = |a0 - a1|.
-  bn_abs_sub_words(t, a, &a[n], n, &t[n]);
-  // t2,t3 = t0^2 = |a0 - a1|^2 = a0^2 - 2*a0*a1 + a1^2
-  bn_sqr_recursive(&t[n2], t, n, t_recursive);
-
-  // r0,r1 = a0^2
-  bn_sqr_recursive(r, a, n, t_recursive);
-
-  // r2,r3 = a1^2
-  bn_sqr_recursive(&r[n2], &a[n], n, t_recursive);
-
-  // t0,t1,c = r0,r1 + r2,r3 = a0^2 + a1^2
-  BN_ULONG c = bn_add_words(t, r, &r[n2], n2);
-  // t2,t3,c = t0,t1,c - t2,t3 = 2*a0*a1
-  c -= bn_sub_words(&t[n2], t, &t[n2], n2);
-
-  // We now have our three components. Add them together.
-  // r1,r2,c = r1,r2 + t2,t3,c
-  c += bn_add_words(&r[n], &r[n], &t[n2], n2);
-
-  // Propagate the carry bit to the end.
-  for (size_t i = n + n2; i < n2 + n2; i++) {
-    BN_ULONG old = r[i];
-    r[i] = old + c;
-    c = r[i] < old;
-  }
-
-  // The square should fit without carries.
-  assert(c == 0);
+  bn_sqr_add_words(r, a, n);
 }
 
 int BN_mul_word(BIGNUM *bn, BN_ULONG w) {
@@ -619,7 +286,7 @@ int BN_mul_word(BIGNUM *bn, BN_ULONG w) {
   return 1;
 }
 
-int bn_sqr_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx) {
+int bssl::bn_sqr_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx) {
   int al = a->width;
   if (al <= 0) {
     r->width = 0;
@@ -627,17 +294,15 @@ int bn_sqr_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx) {
     return 1;
   }
 
-  int ret = 0, max;
-  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+  BN_CTXScope scope(ctx);
   BIGNUM *rr = (a != r) ? r : BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  BIGNUM *tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  if (!rr || !tmp) {
-    goto err;
+  if (!rr) {
+    return 0;
   }
 
-  max = 2 * al;  // Non-zero (from above)
+  int max = 2 * al;  // Non-zero (from above)
   if (!bn_wexpand(rr, max)) {
-    goto err;
+    return 0;
   }
 
   if (al == 4) {
@@ -645,42 +310,16 @@ int bn_sqr_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx) {
   } else if (al == 8) {
     bn_sqr_comba8(rr->d, a->d);
   } else {
-    if (al < BN_SQR_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL) {
-      BN_ULONG t[BN_SQR_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL * 2];
-      bn_sqr_normal(rr->d, a->d, al, t);
-    } else {
-      // If |al| is a power of two, we can use |bn_sqr_recursive|.
-      //
-      // TODO(crbug.com/406497222): The recursive implementation is actually
-      // worse for cryptographic use cases, but we need to retain it in |BN_mul|
-      // for the projects misusing BIGNUM as a general-purpose calculator
-      // library with giant integers. Disconnect this code from our
-      // cryptographic primitives.
-      if (al != 0 && (al & (al - 1)) == 0) {
-        if (!bn_wexpand(tmp, al * 4)) {
-          goto err;
-        }
-        bn_sqr_recursive(rr->d, a->d, al, tmp->d);
-      } else {
-        if (!bn_wexpand(tmp, max)) {
-          goto err;
-        }
-        bn_sqr_normal(rr->d, a->d, al, tmp->d);
-      }
-    }
+    bn_sqr_normal(rr->d, a->d, al);
   }
 
   rr->neg = 0;
   rr->width = max;
 
   if (rr != r && !BN_copy(r, rr)) {
-    goto err;
+    return 0;
   }
-  ret = 1;
-
-err:
-  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-  return ret;
+  return 1;
 }
 
 int BN_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx) {
@@ -692,8 +331,10 @@ int BN_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx) {
   return 1;
 }
 
-void bn_sqr_small(BN_ULONG *r, size_t num_r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t num_a) {
-  if (num_r != 2 * num_a || num_a > BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS) {
+void bssl::bn_sqr_small(BN_ULONG *r, size_t num_r, const BN_ULONG *a,
+                        size_t num_a) {
+  assert(r != a);
+  if (num_r != 2 * num_a) {
     abort();
   }
   if (num_a == 4) {
@@ -701,8 +342,6 @@ void bn_sqr_small(BN_ULONG *r, size_t num_r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t num_a) {
   } else if (num_a == 8) {
     bn_sqr_comba8(r, a);
   } else {
-    BN_ULONG tmp[2 * BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS];
-    bn_sqr_normal(r, a, num_a, tmp);
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp, 2 * num_a * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+    bn_sqr_normal(r, a, num_a);
   }
 }