grpc 1.84.0 → 1.85.0.pre1

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/crypto/fipsmodule/dh/dh.cc.inc

@@ -16,80 +16,65 @@
 
 #include <string.h>
 
+#include <iterator>
+
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include <openssl/digest.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/mem.h>
-#include <openssl/thread.h>
 
 #include "../../internal.h"
+#include "../../mem_internal.h"
 #include "../bn/internal.h"
 #include "../service_indicator/internal.h"
 #include "internal.h"
 
 
-DH *DH_new(void) {
-  DH *dh = reinterpret_cast<DH *>(OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(DH)));
-  if (dh == NULL) {
-    return NULL;
-  }
+using namespace bssl;
 
-  CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&dh->method_mont_p_lock);
-  dh->references = 1;
-  return dh;
-}
+DH *DH_new() { return New<DHImpl>(); }
 
 void DH_free(DH *dh) {
-  if (dh == NULL) {
-    return;
-  }
-
-  if (!CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&dh->references)) {
-    return;
+  if (dh != nullptr) {
+    FromOpaque(dh)->DecRefInternal();
   }
-
-  BN_MONT_CTX_free(dh->method_mont_p);
-  BN_clear_free(dh->p);
-  BN_clear_free(dh->g);
-  BN_clear_free(dh->q);
-  BN_clear_free(dh->pub_key);
-  BN_clear_free(dh->priv_key);
-  CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&dh->method_mont_p_lock);
-
-  OPENSSL_free(dh);
 }
 
-unsigned DH_bits(const DH *dh) { return BN_num_bits(dh->p); }
+unsigned DH_bits(const DH *dh) { return BN_num_bits(FromOpaque(dh)->p.get()); }
 
-const BIGNUM *DH_get0_pub_key(const DH *dh) { return dh->pub_key; }
+const BIGNUM *DH_get0_pub_key(const DH *dh) {
+  return FromOpaque(dh)->pub_key.get();
+}
 
-const BIGNUM *DH_get0_priv_key(const DH *dh) { return dh->priv_key; }
+const BIGNUM *DH_get0_priv_key(const DH *dh) {
+  return FromOpaque(dh)->priv_key.get();
+}
 
-const BIGNUM *DH_get0_p(const DH *dh) { return dh->p; }
+const BIGNUM *DH_get0_p(const DH *dh) { return FromOpaque(dh)->p.get(); }
 
-const BIGNUM *DH_get0_q(const DH *dh) { return dh->q; }
+const BIGNUM *DH_get0_q(const DH *dh) { return FromOpaque(dh)->q.get(); }
 
-const BIGNUM *DH_get0_g(const DH *dh) { return dh->g; }
+const BIGNUM *DH_get0_g(const DH *dh) { return FromOpaque(dh)->g.get(); }
 
 void DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **out_pub_key,
                  const BIGNUM **out_priv_key) {
-  if (out_pub_key != NULL) {
-    *out_pub_key = dh->pub_key;
+  auto *impl = FromOpaque(dh);
+  if (out_pub_key != nullptr) {
+    *out_pub_key = impl->pub_key.get();
   }
-  if (out_priv_key != NULL) {
-    *out_priv_key = dh->priv_key;
+  if (out_priv_key != nullptr) {
+    *out_priv_key = impl->priv_key.get();
   }
 }
 
 int DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key) {
-  if (pub_key != NULL) {
-    BN_free(dh->pub_key);
-    dh->pub_key = pub_key;
+  auto *impl = FromOpaque(dh);
+  if (pub_key != nullptr) {
+    impl->pub_key.reset(pub_key);
   }
 
-  if (priv_key != NULL) {
-    BN_free(dh->priv_key);
-    dh->priv_key = priv_key;
+  if (priv_key != nullptr) {
+    impl->priv_key.reset(priv_key);
   }
 
   return 1;
@@ -97,45 +82,45 @@ int DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key) {
 
 void DH_get0_pqg(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **out_p, const BIGNUM **out_q,
                  const BIGNUM **out_g) {
-  if (out_p != NULL) {
-    *out_p = dh->p;
+  auto *impl = FromOpaque(dh);
+  if (out_p != nullptr) {
+    *out_p = impl->p.get();
   }
-  if (out_q != NULL) {
-    *out_q = dh->q;
+  if (out_q != nullptr) {
+    *out_q = impl->q.get();
   }
-  if (out_g != NULL) {
-    *out_g = dh->g;
+  if (out_g != nullptr) {
+    *out_g = impl->g.get();
   }
 }
 
 int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g) {
-  if ((dh->p == NULL && p == NULL) || (dh->g == NULL && g == NULL)) {
+  auto *impl = FromOpaque(dh);
+  if ((impl->p == nullptr && p == nullptr) ||
+      (impl->g == nullptr && g == nullptr)) {
     return 0;
   }
 
-  if (p != NULL) {
-    BN_free(dh->p);
-    dh->p = p;
+  if (p != nullptr) {
+    impl->p.reset(p);
   }
 
-  if (q != NULL) {
-    BN_free(dh->q);
-    dh->q = q;
+  if (q != nullptr) {
+    impl->q.reset(q);
   }
 
-  if (g != NULL) {
-    BN_free(dh->g);
-    dh->g = g;
+  if (g != nullptr) {
+    impl->g.reset(g);
   }
 
   // Invalidate the cached Montgomery parameters.
-  BN_MONT_CTX_free(dh->method_mont_p);
-  dh->method_mont_p = NULL;
+  impl->method_mont_p = nullptr;
   return 1;
 }
 
 int DH_set_length(DH *dh, unsigned priv_length) {
-  dh->priv_length = priv_length;
+  auto *impl = FromOpaque(dh);
+  impl->priv_length = priv_length;
   return 1;
 }
 
@@ -146,117 +131,105 @@ int DH_generate_key(DH *dh) {
     return 0;
   }
 
-  int ok = 0;
-  int generate_new_key = 0;
-  BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-  BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL, *priv_key_limit = NULL;
-
-  ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-  if (ctx == NULL) {
-    goto err;
+  auto *impl = FromOpaque(dh);
+  UniquePtr<BN_CTX> ctx(BN_CTX_new());
+  if (ctx == nullptr) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+    return 0;
   }
 
-  if (dh->priv_key == NULL) {
-    priv_key = BN_new();
-    if (priv_key == NULL) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-    generate_new_key = 1;
-  } else {
-    priv_key = dh->priv_key;
+  if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&impl->method_mont_p, &impl->method_mont_p_lock,
+                              impl->p.get(), ctx.get())) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+    return 0;
   }
 
-  if (dh->pub_key == NULL) {
-    pub_key = BN_new();
-    if (pub_key == NULL) {
-      goto err;
+  // Only generate a private key if there's already one. Otherwise,
+  // `DH_generate_key` recomputes the public key.
+  const BIGNUM *priv_key = impl->priv_key.get();
+  UniquePtr<BIGNUM> new_priv_key;
+  if (priv_key == nullptr) {
+    new_priv_key.reset(BN_new());
+    if (new_priv_key == nullptr) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+      return 0;
     }
-  } else {
-    pub_key = dh->pub_key;
-  }
-
-  if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dh->method_mont_p, &dh->method_mont_p_lock,
-                              dh->p, ctx)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  if (generate_new_key) {
-    if (dh->q) {
+    if (impl->q) {
       // Section 5.6.1.1.4 of SP 800-56A Rev3 generates a private key uniformly
       // from [1, min(2^N-1, q-1)].
       //
       // Although SP 800-56A Rev3 now permits a private key length N,
-      // |dh->priv_length| historically was ignored when q is available. We
+      // `impl->priv_length` historically was ignored when q is available. We
       // continue to ignore it and interpret such a configuration as N = len(q).
-      if (!BN_rand_range_ex(priv_key, 1, dh->q)) {
-        goto err;
+      if (!BN_rand_range_ex(new_priv_key.get(), 1, impl->q.get())) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        return 0;
       }
     } else {
       // If q is unspecified, we expect p to be a safe prime, with g generating
       // the (p-1)/2 subgroup. So, we use q = (p-1)/2. (If g generates a smaller
       // prime-order subgroup, q will still divide (p-1)/2.)
       //
-      // We set N from |dh->priv_length|. Section 5.6.1.1.4 of SP 800-56A Rev3
+      // We set N from `impl->priv_length`. Section 5.6.1.1.4 of SP 800-56A Rev3
       // says to reject N > len(q), or N > num_bits(p) - 1. However, this logic
       // originally aligned with PKCS#3, which allows num_bits(p). Instead, we
-      // clamp |dh->priv_length| before invoking the algorithm.
+      // clamp `impl->priv_length` before invoking the algorithm.
 
       // Compute M = min(2^N, q).
-      priv_key_limit = BN_new();
-      if (priv_key_limit == NULL) {
-        goto err;
+      UniquePtr<BIGNUM> priv_key_limit(BN_new());
+      if (priv_key_limit == nullptr) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        return 0;
       }
-      if (dh->priv_length == 0 || dh->priv_length >= BN_num_bits(dh->p) - 1) {
+      if (impl->priv_length == 0 ||
+          impl->priv_length >= BN_num_bits(impl->p.get()) - 1) {
         // M = q = (p - 1) / 2.
-        if (!BN_rshift1(priv_key_limit, dh->p)) {
-          goto err;
+        if (!BN_rshift1(priv_key_limit.get(), impl->p.get())) {
+          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+          return 0;
         }
       } else {
         // M = 2^N.
-        if (!BN_set_bit(priv_key_limit, dh->priv_length)) {
-          goto err;
+        if (!BN_set_bit(priv_key_limit.get(), impl->priv_length)) {
+          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+          return 0;
         }
       }
 
       // Choose a private key uniformly from [1, M-1].
-      if (!BN_rand_range_ex(priv_key, 1, priv_key_limit)) {
-        goto err;
+      if (!BN_rand_range_ex(new_priv_key.get(), 1, priv_key_limit.get())) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        return 0;
       }
     }
+    priv_key = new_priv_key.get();
   }
 
-  if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(pub_key, dh->g, priv_key, dh->p, ctx,
-                                 dh->method_mont_p)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  dh->pub_key = pub_key;
-  dh->priv_key = priv_key;
-  ok = 1;
-
-err:
-  if (ok != 1) {
+  UniquePtr<BIGNUM> new_pub_key(BN_new());
+  if (new_pub_key == nullptr ||
+      !BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(new_pub_key.get(), impl->g.get(), priv_key,
+                                 impl->p.get(), ctx.get(),
+                                 impl->method_mont_p.get())) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+    return 0;
   }
 
-  if (dh->pub_key == NULL) {
-    BN_free(pub_key);
-  }
-  if (dh->priv_key == NULL) {
-    BN_free(priv_key);
+  impl->pub_key = std::move(new_pub_key);
+  if (new_priv_key != nullptr) {
+    impl->priv_key = std::move(new_priv_key);
   }
-  BN_free(priv_key_limit);
-  BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-  return ok;
+  return 1;
 }
 
 static int dh_compute_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *out_shared_key,
                           const BIGNUM *peers_key, BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  auto *impl = FromOpaque(dh);
+
   if (!dh_check_params_fast(dh)) {
     return 0;
   }
 
-  if (dh->priv_key == NULL) {
+  if (impl->priv_key == nullptr) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE);
     return 0;
   }
@@ -267,56 +240,47 @@ static int dh_compute_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *out_shared_key,
     return 0;
   }
 
-  int ret = 0;
-  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+  BN_CTXScope scope(ctx);
   BIGNUM *p_minus_1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-
   if (!p_minus_1 ||
-      !BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dh->method_mont_p, &dh->method_mont_p_lock,
-                              dh->p, ctx)) {
-    goto err;
+      !BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&impl->method_mont_p, &impl->method_mont_p_lock,
+                              impl->p.get(), ctx)) {
+    return 0;
   }
 
-  if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(out_shared_key, peers_key, dh->priv_key, dh->p,
-                                 ctx, dh->method_mont_p) ||
-      !BN_copy(p_minus_1, dh->p) || !BN_sub_word(p_minus_1, 1)) {
+  if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(out_shared_key, peers_key,
+                                 impl->priv_key.get(), impl->p.get(), ctx,
+                                 impl->method_mont_p.get()) ||
+      !BN_copy(p_minus_1, impl->p.get()) || !BN_sub_word(p_minus_1, 1)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-    goto err;
+    return 0;
   }
 
   // This performs the check required by SP 800-56Ar3 section 5.7.1.1 step two.
   if (BN_cmp_word(out_shared_key, 1) <= 0 ||
       BN_cmp(out_shared_key, p_minus_1) == 0) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY);
-    goto err;
+    return 0;
   }
 
-  ret = 1;
-
-err:
-  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-  return ret;
+  return 1;
 }
 
-int dh_compute_key_padded_no_self_test(unsigned char *out,
-                                       const BIGNUM *peers_key, DH *dh) {
-  BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-  if (ctx == NULL) {
+int bssl::dh_compute_key_padded_no_self_test(unsigned char *out,
+                                             const BIGNUM *peers_key, DH *dh) {
+  UniquePtr<BN_CTX> ctx(BN_CTX_new());
+  if (ctx == nullptr) {
     return -1;
   }
-  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-
+  BN_CTXScope scope(ctx.get());
   int dh_size = DH_size(dh);
-  int ret = -1;
-  BIGNUM *shared_key = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  if (shared_key && dh_compute_key(dh, shared_key, peers_key, ctx) &&
-      BN_bn2bin_padded(out, dh_size, shared_key)) {
-    ret = dh_size;
+  BIGNUM *shared_key = BN_CTX_get(ctx.get());
+  if (shared_key == nullptr ||
+      !dh_compute_key(dh, shared_key, peers_key, ctx.get()) ||
+      !BN_bn2bin_padded(out, dh_size, shared_key)) {
+    return -1;
   }
-
-  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-  BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-  return ret;
+  return dh_size;
 }
 
 int DH_compute_key_padded(unsigned char *out, const BIGNUM *peers_key, DH *dh) {
@@ -328,22 +292,18 @@ int DH_compute_key_padded(unsigned char *out, const BIGNUM *peers_key, DH *dh) {
 int DH_compute_key(unsigned char *out, const BIGNUM *peers_key, DH *dh) {
   boringssl_ensure_ffdh_self_test();
 
-  BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-  if (ctx == NULL) {
+  UniquePtr<BN_CTX> ctx(BN_CTX_new());
+  if (ctx == nullptr) {
     return -1;
   }
-  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-
-  int ret = -1;
-  BIGNUM *shared_key = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  if (shared_key && dh_compute_key(dh, shared_key, peers_key, ctx)) {
-    // A |BIGNUM|'s byte count fits in |int|.
-    ret = (int)BN_bn2bin(shared_key, out);
+  BN_CTXScope scope(ctx.get());
+  BIGNUM *shared_key = BN_CTX_get(ctx.get());
+  if (shared_key == nullptr ||
+      !dh_compute_key(dh, shared_key, peers_key, ctx.get())) {
+    return -1;
   }
-
-  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-  BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-  return ret;
+  // A `BIGNUM`'s byte count fits in `int`.
+  return static_cast<int>(BN_bn2bin(shared_key, out));
 }
 
 int DH_compute_key_hashed(DH *dh, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
@@ -370,7 +330,8 @@ int DH_compute_key_hashed(DH *dh, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
       // Also, padded output avoids side-channels, so is always strongly
       // advisable.
       DH_compute_key_padded(shared_bytes, peers_key, dh) != (int)dh_len ||
-      !EVP_Digest(shared_bytes, dh_len, out, &out_len_unsigned, digest, NULL) ||
+      !EVP_Digest(shared_bytes, dh_len, out, &out_len_unsigned, digest,
+                  nullptr) ||
       out_len_unsigned != digest_len) {
     goto err;
   }
@@ -384,16 +345,15 @@ err:
   return ret;
 }
 
-int DH_size(const DH *dh) { return BN_num_bytes(dh->p); }
-
-unsigned DH_num_bits(const DH *dh) { return BN_num_bits(dh->p); }
+int DH_size(const DH *dh) { return BN_num_bytes(FromOpaque(dh)->p.get()); }
 
 int DH_up_ref(DH *dh) {
-  CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&dh->references);
+  auto *impl = FromOpaque(dh);
+  impl->UpRefInternal();
   return 1;
 }
 
-DH *DH_get_rfc7919_2048(void) {
+DH *DH_get_rfc7919_2048() {
   // This is the prime from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7919#appendix-A.1,
   // which is specifically approved for FIPS in appendix D of SP 800-56Ar3.
   static const BN_ULONG kFFDHE2048Data[] = {
@@ -415,29 +375,27 @@ DH *DH_get_rfc7919_2048(void) {
       TOBN(0xadf85458, 0xa2bb4a9a), TOBN(0xffffffff, 0xffffffff),
   };
 
-  BIGNUM *const ffdhe2048_p = BN_new();
-  BIGNUM *const ffdhe2048_q = BN_new();
-  BIGNUM *const ffdhe2048_g = BN_new();
-  DH *const dh = DH_new();
-
+  UniquePtr<BIGNUM> ffdhe2048_p(BN_new());
+  UniquePtr<BIGNUM> ffdhe2048_q(BN_new());
+  UniquePtr<BIGNUM> ffdhe2048_g(BN_new());
+  UniquePtr<DH> dh(DH_new());
   if (!ffdhe2048_p || !ffdhe2048_q || !ffdhe2048_g || !dh) {
-    goto err;
+    return nullptr;
   }
 
-  bn_set_static_words(ffdhe2048_p, kFFDHE2048Data,
-                      OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kFFDHE2048Data));
+  bn_set_static_words(ffdhe2048_p.get(), kFFDHE2048Data,
+                      std::size(kFFDHE2048Data));
 
-  if (!BN_rshift1(ffdhe2048_q, ffdhe2048_p) || !BN_set_word(ffdhe2048_g, 2) ||
-      !DH_set0_pqg(dh, ffdhe2048_p, ffdhe2048_q, ffdhe2048_g)) {
-    goto err;
+  if (!BN_rshift1(ffdhe2048_q.get(), ffdhe2048_p.get()) ||
+      !BN_set_word(ffdhe2048_g.get(), 2) ||
+      !DH_set0_pqg(dh.get(), ffdhe2048_p.get(), ffdhe2048_q.get(),
+                   ffdhe2048_g.get())) {
+    return nullptr;
   }
+  // `DH_set0_pqg` takes ownership on success.
+  ffdhe2048_p.release();
+  ffdhe2048_q.release();
+  ffdhe2048_g.release();
 
-  return dh;
-
-err:
-  BN_free(ffdhe2048_p);
-  BN_free(ffdhe2048_q);
-  BN_free(ffdhe2048_g);
-  DH_free(dh);
-  return NULL;
+  return dh.release();
 }

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/crypto/fipsmodule/dh/internal.h

@@ -17,47 +17,47 @@
 
 #include <openssl/base.h>
 
-#include <openssl/thread.h>
-
 #include "../../internal.h"
+#include "../../mem_internal.h"
+
 
-#if defined(__cplusplus)
-extern "C" {
-#endif
+DECLARE_OPAQUE_STRUCT(dh_st, DHImpl)
 
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
 
-struct dh_st {
-  BIGNUM *p;
-  BIGNUM *g;
-  BIGNUM *q;
-  BIGNUM *pub_key;   // g^x mod p
-  BIGNUM *priv_key;  // x
+class DHImpl : public dh_st, public RefCounted<DHImpl> {
+ public:
+  DHImpl() : RefCounted(CheckSubClass()) {}
+
+  UniquePtr<BIGNUM> p;
+  UniquePtr<BIGNUM> g;
+  UniquePtr<BIGNUM> q;
+  UniquePtr<BIGNUM> pub_key;   // g^x mod p
+  UniquePtr<BIGNUM> priv_key;  // x
 
   // priv_length contains the length, in bits, of the private value. If zero,
-  // the private value will be the same length as |p|.
-  unsigned priv_length;
+  // the private value will be the same length as `p`.
+  unsigned priv_length = 0;
 
-  CRYPTO_MUTEX method_mont_p_lock;
-  BN_MONT_CTX *method_mont_p;
+  mutable Mutex method_mont_p_lock;
+  mutable UniquePtr<BN_MONT_CTX> method_mont_p;
 
-  int flags;
-  CRYPTO_refcount_t references;
+ private:
+  friend RefCounted;
+  ~DHImpl() = default;
 };
 
-// dh_check_params_fast checks basic invariants on |dh|'s domain parameters. It
-// does not check that |dh| forms a valid group, only that the sizes are within
+// dh_check_params_fast checks basic invariants on `dh`'s domain parameters. It
+// does not check that `dh` forms a valid group, only that the sizes are within
 // DoS bounds.
 int dh_check_params_fast(const DH *dh);
 
-// dh_compute_key_padded_no_self_test does the same as |DH_compute_key_padded|,
+// dh_compute_key_padded_no_self_test does the same as `DH_compute_key_padded`,
 // but doesn't try to run the self-test first. This is for use in the self tests
 // themselves, to prevent an infinite loop.
 int dh_compute_key_padded_no_self_test(unsigned char *out,
                                        const BIGNUM *peers_key, DH *dh);
 
-
-#if defined(__cplusplus)
-}
-#endif
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
 
 #endif  // OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_FIPSMODULE_DH_INTERNAL_H