grpc 1.84.0 → 1.85.0.pre1

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/android_entropy_client.cc.inc

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+// Copyright 2020 The BoringSSL Authors
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#include <openssl/base.h>
+
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS) && defined(OPENSSL_ANDROID)
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+int bssl_get_seed_from_daemon(uint8_t *out_entropy, size_t *inout_entropy_len) {
+  const int sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+  if (sock < 0) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  struct sockaddr_un sun;
+  memset(&sun, 0, sizeof(sun));
+  sun.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+  static const char kSocketPath[] = "/dev/socket/prng_seeder";
+  static_assert(sizeof(kSocketPath) <= UNIX_PATH_MAX, "kSocketPath too long");
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(sun.sun_path, kSocketPath, sizeof(kSocketPath));
+
+  int ret = 0;
+  size_t done = 0;
+  if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sun, sizeof(sun))) {
+    goto out;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t buffer[BSSL_ENTROPY_DAEMON_RESPONSE_LEN];
+  while (done < sizeof(buffer)) {
+    ssize_t n;
+    do {
+      n = read(sock, buffer + done, sizeof(buffer) - done);
+    } while (n == -1 && errno == EINTR);
+
+    if (n < 1) {
+      goto out;
+    }
+    done += n;
+  }
+
+  if (done != BSSL_ENTROPY_DAEMON_RESPONSE_LEN) {
+    // The daemon should always write `BSSL_ENTROPY_DAEMON_RESPONSE_LEN` bytes
+    // on every connection.
+    goto out;
+  }
+
+  if (*inout_entropy_len > sizeof(buffer)) {
+    *inout_entropy_len = sizeof(buffer);
+  }
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(out_entropy, buffer, *inout_entropy_len);
+  ret = 1;
+
+out:
+  if (sock >= 0) {
+    close(sock);
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
+
+#endif  // FIPS && ANDROID

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/ctrdrbg.cc.inc

@@ -17,54 +17,208 @@
 #include <assert.h>
 
 #include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <algorithm>
 
+#include "../../mem_internal.h"
 #include "../aes/internal.h"
 #include "../service_indicator/internal.h"
 #include "internal.h"
 
 
+using namespace bssl;
+
 // Section references in this file refer to SP 800-90Ar1:
 // http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf
 
-// See table 3.
-static const uint64_t kMaxReseedCount = UINT64_C(1) << 48;
+// Also see table 3.
+constexpr uint64_t kMaxReseedCount = UINT64_C(1) << 48;
+
+// Implements the BCC function as described in Section 10.3.3.
+static void bcc(uint8_t out[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], const AES_KEY *aes_key,
+                const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len) {
+  // 1. chaining_value = 0^outlen.
+  uint8_t *chaining_value = out;
+  OPENSSL_memset(chaining_value, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+  // 2. n = len (data)/outlen.
+  BSSL_CHECK(data_len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE == 0);
+  const size_t n = data_len / AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+    const uint8_t *block = data + (i * AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+    uint8_t input_block[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+    // 4.1: input_block = chaining_value ⊕ block_i.
+    CRYPTO_xor16(input_block, chaining_value, block);
+
+    // 4.2: chaining_value = Block_Encrypt (Key, input_block).
+    BCM_aes_encrypt(input_block, chaining_value, aes_key);
+  }
+
+  // 5. output_block = chaining_value.
+}
+
+// Implements the derivation function as described in Section 10.3.2.
+static int block_cipher_df(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len, const uint8_t *input,
+                           size_t input_len) {
+  // Constants for AES-256
+  constexpr size_t kAESKeyLen = 32;
+  constexpr size_t kAESOutLen = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+  constexpr size_t kMaxNumBits = 512;
+
+  if (out_len > kMaxNumBits / 8 || input_len > (1u << 30)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // 4. S = L || N || input_string || 0x80.
+  const size_t s_rawlen = sizeof(uint32_t) + sizeof(uint32_t) + input_len + 1;
+  // S is padded up to a block size.
+  const size_t s_len = (s_rawlen + kAESOutLen - 1) & ~(kAESOutLen - 1);
+  uint8_t iv_plus_s[/* space used below */ kAESOutLen + 4 + 4 +
+                    CTR_DRBG_MAX_ENTROPY_LEN + CTR_DRBG_NONCE_LEN +
+                    CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN + 1 +
+                    /* padding */ 7];
+  if (kAESOutLen + s_len > sizeof(iv_plus_s)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  OPENSSL_memset(iv_plus_s, 0, sizeof(iv_plus_s));
+  uint8_t *s_ptr = iv_plus_s + kAESOutLen;
+  // 2. L = len (input_string)/8.
+  CRYPTO_store_u32_be(s_ptr, (uint32_t)input_len);
+  s_ptr += sizeof(uint32_t);
+  // 3. N = number_of_bits_to_return/8.
+  CRYPTO_store_u32_be(s_ptr, (uint32_t)out_len);
+  s_ptr += sizeof(uint32_t);
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(s_ptr, input, input_len);
+  s_ptr += input_len;
+  *s_ptr = 0x80;
+
+  uint8_t temp[kAESKeyLen + kAESOutLen];
+  size_t temp_len = 0;
+
+  // 8. K = leftmost (0x00010203...1D1E1F, keylen).
+  static const uint8_t kInitialKey[kAESKeyLen] = {
+      0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a,
+      0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15,
+      0x16, 0x17, 0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f};
+  AES_KEY aes_key;
+  bcm_status status =
+      BCM_aes_set_encrypt_key(kInitialKey, 8 * sizeof(kInitialKey), &aes_key);
+  BSSL_CHECK(status != bcm_status::failure);
+
+  // 7. i = 0.
+  uint32_t i = 0;
+  while (temp_len < sizeof(temp)) {
+    // 9.1 IV = i || 0^(outlen - len(i)).
+    CRYPTO_store_u32_be(iv_plus_s, i);
+
+    // 9.2 temp = temp || BCC (K, (IV || S)).
+    bcc(temp + temp_len, &aes_key, iv_plus_s, kAESOutLen + s_len);
+    temp_len += kAESOutLen;
+
+    // 9.3 i = i + 1.
+    i++;
+  }
+
+  // 10. K = leftmost (temp, keylen).
+  uint8_t *const k = temp;
+
+  // 11. X = select (temp, keylen+1, keylen+outlen).
+  uint8_t *const x = temp + kAESKeyLen;
+
+  // 12. temp = the Null string.
+  temp_len = 0;
+
+  // Create an AES key schedule for the final encryption steps.
+  status = BCM_aes_set_encrypt_key(k, kAESKeyLen * 8, &aes_key);
+  BSSL_CHECK(status != bcm_status::failure);
+
+  // 13. While len (temp) < number_of_bits_to_return, do:
+  while (temp_len < out_len) {
+    // 13.1 X = Block_Encrypt (K, X).
+    BCM_aes_encrypt(x, x, &aes_key);
+
+    // 13.2 temp = temp || X.
+    size_t to_copy = std::min(kAESOutLen, out_len - temp_len);
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(out + temp_len, x, to_copy);
+    temp_len += to_copy;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
 
 CTR_DRBG_STATE *CTR_DRBG_new(const uint8_t entropy[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN],
                              const uint8_t *personalization,
                              size_t personalization_len) {
-  CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg = reinterpret_cast<CTR_DRBG_STATE *>(
-      OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CTR_DRBG_STATE)));
-  if (drbg == NULL ||
-      !CTR_DRBG_init(drbg, entropy, personalization, personalization_len)) {
+  CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg = New<CTR_DRBG_STATE>();
+  if (drbg == nullptr ||
+      !CTR_DRBG_init(drbg, /*df=*/false, entropy, CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN,
+                     /*nonce=*/nullptr, personalization, personalization_len)) {
     CTR_DRBG_free(drbg);
-    return NULL;
+    return nullptr;
   }
 
   return drbg;
 }
 
-void CTR_DRBG_free(CTR_DRBG_STATE *state) { OPENSSL_free(state); }
+CTR_DRBG_STATE *CTR_DRBG_new_df(const uint8_t *entropy, size_t entropy_len,
+                                const uint8_t nonce[CTR_DRBG_NONCE_LEN],
+                                const uint8_t *personalization,
+                                size_t personalization_len) {
+  CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg = New<CTR_DRBG_STATE>();
+  if (drbg == nullptr ||
+      !CTR_DRBG_init(drbg, /*df=*/true, entropy, entropy_len, nonce,
+                     personalization, personalization_len)) {
+    CTR_DRBG_free(drbg);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  return drbg;
+}
 
-int CTR_DRBG_init(CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg,
-                  const uint8_t entropy[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN],
-                  const uint8_t *personalization, size_t personalization_len) {
-  // Section 10.2.1.3.1
-  if (personalization_len > CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) {
+void CTR_DRBG_free(CTR_DRBG_STATE *state) { Delete(state); }
+
+int bssl::CTR_DRBG_init(CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg, int df, const uint8_t *entropy,
+                        size_t entropy_len,
+                        const uint8_t nonce[CTR_DRBG_NONCE_LEN],
+                        const uint8_t *personalization,
+                        size_t personalization_len) {
+  // Section 10.2.1.3.1 and 10.2.1.3.2
+  if (personalization_len > CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN ||
+      (!df && entropy_len != CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) ||
+      (df && (entropy_len < CTR_DRBG_MIN_ENTROPY_LEN ||
+              entropy_len > CTR_DRBG_MAX_ENTROPY_LEN)) ||  //
+      (df != (nonce != nullptr))) {
     return 0;
   }
 
-  uint8_t seed_material[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN];
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(seed_material, entropy, CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN);
-
-  for (size_t i = 0; i < personalization_len; i++) {
-    seed_material[i] ^= personalization[i];
+  uint8_t seed_material[CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN];
+  if (df) {
+    uint8_t pre_seed_material[CTR_DRBG_MAX_ENTROPY_LEN + CTR_DRBG_NONCE_LEN +
+                              CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN];
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(pre_seed_material, entropy, entropy_len);
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(pre_seed_material + entropy_len, nonce, CTR_DRBG_NONCE_LEN);
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(pre_seed_material + entropy_len + CTR_DRBG_NONCE_LEN,
+                   personalization, personalization_len);
+    const size_t pre_seed_material_length =
+        entropy_len + CTR_DRBG_NONCE_LEN + personalization_len;
+
+    if (!block_cipher_df(seed_material, sizeof(seed_material),
+                         pre_seed_material, pre_seed_material_length)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  } else {
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(seed_material, entropy, CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN);
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < personalization_len; i++) {
+      seed_material[i] ^= personalization[i];
+    }
   }
 
   // Section 10.2.1.2
 
   // kInitMask is the result of encrypting blocks with big-endian value 1, 2
   // and 3 with the all-zero AES-256 key.
-  static const uint8_t kInitMask[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN] = {
+  static const uint8_t kInitMask[CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN] = {
       0x53, 0x0f, 0x8a, 0xfb, 0xc7, 0x45, 0x36, 0xb9, 0xa9, 0x63, 0xb4, 0xf1,
       0xc4, 0xcb, 0x73, 0x8b, 0xce, 0xa7, 0x40, 0x3d, 0x4d, 0x60, 0x6b, 0x6e,
       0x07, 0x4e, 0xc5, 0xd3, 0xba, 0xf3, 0x9d, 0x18, 0x72, 0x60, 0x03, 0xca,
@@ -75,43 +229,38 @@ int CTR_DRBG_init(CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg,
     seed_material[i] ^= kInitMask[i];
   }
 
-  drbg->ctr = aes_ctr_set_key(&drbg->ks, NULL, &drbg->block, seed_material, 32);
+  drbg->df = df;
+  drbg->ctr =
+      aes_ctr_set_key(&drbg->ks, nullptr, &drbg->block, seed_material, 32);
   OPENSSL_memcpy(drbg->counter, seed_material + 32, 16);
   drbg->reseed_counter = 1;
 
   return 1;
 }
 
-static_assert(CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN % AES_BLOCK_SIZE == 0,
+static_assert(CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN % AES_BLOCK_SIZE == 0,
               "not a multiple of AES block size");
 
-// ctr_inc adds |n| to the last four bytes of |drbg->counter|, treated as a
+// ctr_inc adds `n` to the last four bytes of `drbg->counter`, treated as a
 // big-endian number.
 static void ctr32_add(CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg, uint32_t n) {
   uint32_t ctr = CRYPTO_load_u32_be(drbg->counter + 12);
   CRYPTO_store_u32_be(drbg->counter + 12, ctr + n);
 }
 
-static int ctr_drbg_update(CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg, const uint8_t *data,
-                           size_t data_len) {
-  // Per section 10.2.1.2, |data_len| must be |CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN|. Here, we
-  // allow shorter inputs and right-pad them with zeros. This is equivalent to
-  // the specified algorithm but saves a copy in |CTR_DRBG_generate|.
-  if (data_len > CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  uint8_t temp[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN];
-  for (size_t i = 0; i < CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN; i += AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+static int ctr_drbg_update(CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg,
+                           const uint8_t data[CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN]) {
+  uint8_t temp[CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN];
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN; i += AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
     ctr32_add(drbg, 1);
     drbg->block(drbg->counter, temp + i, &drbg->ks);
   }
 
-  for (size_t i = 0; i < data_len; i++) {
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN; i++) {
     temp[i] ^= data[i];
   }
 
-  drbg->ctr = aes_ctr_set_key(&drbg->ks, NULL, &drbg->block, temp, 32);
+  drbg->ctr = aes_ctr_set_key(&drbg->ks, nullptr, &drbg->block, temp, 32);
   OPENSSL_memcpy(drbg->counter, temp + 32, 16);
 
   return 1;
@@ -121,23 +270,46 @@ int CTR_DRBG_reseed(CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg,
                     const uint8_t entropy[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN],
                     const uint8_t *additional_data,
                     size_t additional_data_len) {
-  // Section 10.2.1.4
-  uint8_t entropy_copy[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN];
+  return CTR_DRBG_reseed_ex(drbg, entropy, CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN,
+                            additional_data, additional_data_len);
+}
+
+int CTR_DRBG_reseed_ex(CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg, const uint8_t *entropy,
+                       size_t entropy_len, const uint8_t *additional_data,
+                       size_t additional_data_len) {
+  if (additional_data_len > CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN ||
+      (drbg->df && (entropy_len > CTR_DRBG_MAX_ENTROPY_LEN ||
+                    entropy_len < CTR_DRBG_MIN_ENTROPY_LEN)) ||
+      (!drbg->df && entropy_len != CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
 
-  if (additional_data_len > 0) {
-    if (additional_data_len > CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) {
+  uint8_t seed_material[CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN];
+  if (drbg->df) {
+    // Section 10.2.1.4.2
+    uint8_t pre_seed_material[CTR_DRBG_MAX_ENTROPY_LEN + CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN];
+    static_assert(CTR_DRBG_MAX_ENTROPY_LEN <= sizeof(pre_seed_material));
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(pre_seed_material, entropy, entropy_len);
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(pre_seed_material + entropy_len, additional_data,
+                   additional_data_len);
+    const size_t pre_seed_material_len = entropy_len + additional_data_len;
+
+    if (!block_cipher_df(seed_material, sizeof(seed_material),
+                         pre_seed_material, pre_seed_material_len)) {
       return 0;
     }
-
-    OPENSSL_memcpy(entropy_copy, entropy, CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN);
-    for (size_t i = 0; i < additional_data_len; i++) {
-      entropy_copy[i] ^= additional_data[i];
+  } else {
+    // Section 10.2.1.4
+    static_assert(CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN == sizeof(seed_material));
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(seed_material, entropy, CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN);
+    if (additional_data_len > 0) {
+      for (size_t i = 0; i < additional_data_len; i++) {
+        seed_material[i] ^= additional_data[i];
+      }
     }
-
-    entropy = entropy_copy;
   }
 
-  if (!ctr_drbg_update(drbg, entropy, CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN)) {
+  if (!ctr_drbg_update(drbg, seed_material)) {
     return 0;
   }
 
@@ -159,9 +331,26 @@ int CTR_DRBG_generate(CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
     return 0;
   }
 
-  if (additional_data_len != 0 &&
-      !ctr_drbg_update(drbg, additional_data, additional_data_len)) {
-    return 0;
+  uint8_t processed_additional_data[CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN];
+  OPENSSL_memset(processed_additional_data, 0,
+                 sizeof(processed_additional_data));
+  if (additional_data_len != 0) {
+    if (drbg->df) {
+      if (!block_cipher_df(processed_additional_data,
+                           sizeof(processed_additional_data), additional_data,
+                           additional_data_len)) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+    } else {
+      if (additional_data_len > sizeof(processed_additional_data)) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+      OPENSSL_memcpy(processed_additional_data, additional_data,
+                     additional_data_len);
+    }
+    if (!ctr_drbg_update(drbg, processed_additional_data)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
   }
 
   // kChunkSize is used to interact better with the cache. Since the AES-CTR
@@ -170,7 +359,7 @@ int CTR_DRBG_generate(CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
   // the whole buffer, flushing the L1 cache, and then do another pass (missing
   // the cache every time) to “encrypt” it. The code can avoid this by
   // chunking.
-  static const size_t kChunkSize = 8 * 1024;
+  constexpr size_t kChunkSize = 8 * 1024;
 
   while (out_len >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
     size_t todo = kChunkSize;
@@ -198,9 +387,7 @@ int CTR_DRBG_generate(CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
     OPENSSL_memcpy(out, block, out_len);
   }
 
-  // Right-padding |additional_data| in step 2.2 is handled implicitly by
-  // |ctr_drbg_update|, to save a copy.
-  if (!ctr_drbg_update(drbg, additional_data, additional_data_len)) {
+  if (!ctr_drbg_update(drbg, processed_additional_data)) {
     return 0;
   }
 

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/internal.h

@@ -21,64 +21,79 @@
 #include "../../bcm_support.h"
 #include "../aes/internal.h"
 
-#if defined(__cplusplus)
-extern "C" {
-#endif
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
 
 // rand_fork_unsafe_buffering_enabled returns whether fork-unsafe buffering has
-// been enabled via |RAND_enable_fork_unsafe_buffering|.
-int rand_fork_unsafe_buffering_enabled(void);
+// been enabled via `RAND_enable_fork_unsafe_buffering`.
+int rand_fork_unsafe_buffering_enabled();
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
 
 // CTR_DRBG_STATE contains the state of a CTR_DRBG based on AES-256. See SP
 // 800-90Ar1.
 struct ctr_drbg_state_st {
   AES_KEY ks;
-  block128_f block;
-  ctr128_f ctr;
+  bssl::block128_f block;
+  bssl::ctr128_f ctr;
   uint8_t counter[16];
   uint64_t reseed_counter;
+  int df;
 };
 
-// CTR_DRBG_init initialises |*drbg| given |CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN| bytes of
-// entropy in |entropy| and, optionally, a personalization string up to
-// |CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN| bytes in length. It returns one on success and zero
-// on error.
-OPENSSL_EXPORT int CTR_DRBG_init(CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg,
-                                 const uint8_t entropy[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN],
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+// CTR_DRBG_init initialises `*drbg` given `entropy_len` bytes of entropy in
+// `entropy` and, optionally, a personalization string up to
+// `CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN` bytes in length. It returns one on success and zero on
+// error.
+//
+// If `df` is false then `entropy_len` must be `CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN` and
+// `nonce` must be nullptr.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int CTR_DRBG_init(CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg, int df,
+                                 const uint8_t *entropy, size_t entropy_len,
+                                 const uint8_t nonce[CTR_DRBG_NONCE_LEN],
                                  const uint8_t *personalization,
                                  size_t personalization_len);
 
+// BSSL_ENTROPY_DAEMON_RESPONSE_LEN is the number of bytes that the Android
+// entropy daemon replies with.
+#define BSSL_ENTROPY_DAEMON_RESPONSE_LEN (48 * 10 + 16)
+
+// bssl_get_seed_from_daemon fetches up to `*inout_entropy_len` bytes of
+// entropy from the Android entropy daemon, writing them to `*out_entropy`.
+// On successful exit, `*inout_entropy_len` contains the number of bytes
+// written. Returns one on success and zero on error.
+int bssl_get_seed_from_daemon(uint8_t *out_entropy, size_t *inout_entropy_len);
+
 #if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM)
 
-inline int have_rdrand(void) { return CRYPTO_is_RDRAND_capable(); }
+inline int have_rdrand() { return CRYPTO_is_RDRAND_capable(); }
 
 // have_fast_rdrand returns true if RDRAND is supported and it's reasonably
 // fast. Concretely the latter is defined by whether the chip is Intel (fast) or
 // not (assumed slow).
-inline int have_fast_rdrand(void) {
+inline int have_fast_rdrand() {
   return CRYPTO_is_RDRAND_capable() && CRYPTO_is_intel_cpu();
 }
 
 // CRYPTO_rdrand writes eight bytes of random data from the hardware RNG to
-// |out|. It returns one on success or zero on hardware failure.
-int CRYPTO_rdrand(uint8_t out[8]);
+// `out`. It returns one on success or zero on hardware failure.
+extern "C" int CRYPTO_rdrand(uint8_t out[8]);
 
-// CRYPTO_rdrand_multiple8_buf fills |len| bytes at |buf| with random data from
-// the hardware RNG. The |len| argument must be a multiple of eight. It returns
+// CRYPTO_rdrand_multiple8_buf fills `len` bytes at `buf` with random data from
+// the hardware RNG. The `len` argument must be a multiple of eight. It returns
 // one on success and zero on hardware failure.
-int CRYPTO_rdrand_multiple8_buf(uint8_t *buf, size_t len);
+extern "C" int CRYPTO_rdrand_multiple8_buf(uint8_t *buf, size_t len);
 
 #else  // OPENSSL_X86_64 && !OPENSSL_NO_ASM
 
-inline int have_rdrand(void) { return 0; }
+inline int have_rdrand() { return 0; }
 
-inline int have_fast_rdrand(void) { return 0; }
+inline int have_fast_rdrand() { return 0; }
 
 #endif  // OPENSSL_X86_64 && !OPENSSL_NO_ASM
 
-
-#if defined(__cplusplus)
-}  // extern C
-#endif
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
 
 #endif  // OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_FIPSMODULE_RAND_INTERNAL_H