grpc 1.62.0 → 1.68.1

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/exponentiation.c

@@ -1,1276 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
-
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-
-#include <assert.h>
-#include <limits.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/mem.h>
-
-#include "internal.h"
-#include "rsaz_exp.h"
-
-
-int BN_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  int i, bits, ret = 0;
-  BIGNUM *v, *rr;
-
-  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-  if (r == a || r == p) {
-    rr = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  } else {
-    rr = r;
-  }
-
-  v = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  if (rr == NULL || v == NULL) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  if (BN_copy(v, a) == NULL) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  bits = BN_num_bits(p);
-
-  if (BN_is_odd(p)) {
-    if (BN_copy(rr, a) == NULL) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-  } else {
-    if (!BN_one(rr)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-  }
-
-  for (i = 1; i < bits; i++) {
-    if (!BN_sqr(v, v, ctx)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-    if (BN_is_bit_set(p, i)) {
-      if (!BN_mul(rr, rr, v, ctx)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (r != rr && !BN_copy(r, rr)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  ret = 1;
-
-err:
-  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-  return ret;
-}
-
-typedef struct bn_recp_ctx_st {
-  BIGNUM N;   // the divisor
-  BIGNUM Nr;  // the reciprocal
-  int num_bits;
-  int shift;
-  int flags;
-} BN_RECP_CTX;
-
-static void BN_RECP_CTX_init(BN_RECP_CTX *recp) {
-  BN_init(&recp->N);
-  BN_init(&recp->Nr);
-  recp->num_bits = 0;
-  recp->shift = 0;
-  recp->flags = 0;
-}
-
-static void BN_RECP_CTX_free(BN_RECP_CTX *recp) {
-  if (recp == NULL) {
-    return;
-  }
-
-  BN_free(&recp->N);
-  BN_free(&recp->Nr);
-}
-
-static int BN_RECP_CTX_set(BN_RECP_CTX *recp, const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  if (!BN_copy(&(recp->N), d)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-  BN_zero(&recp->Nr);
-  recp->num_bits = BN_num_bits(d);
-  recp->shift = 0;
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-// len is the expected size of the result We actually calculate with an extra
-// word of precision, so we can do faster division if the remainder is not
-// required.
-// r := 2^len / m
-static int BN_reciprocal(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *m, int len, BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  int ret = -1;
-  BIGNUM *t;
-
-  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-  t = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  if (t == NULL) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  if (!BN_set_bit(t, len)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  if (!BN_div(r, NULL, t, m, ctx)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  ret = len;
-
-err:
-  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-  return ret;
-}
-
-static int BN_div_recp(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m,
-                       BN_RECP_CTX *recp, BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  int i, j, ret = 0;
-  BIGNUM *a, *b, *d, *r;
-
-  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-  a = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  b = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  if (dv != NULL) {
-    d = dv;
-  } else {
-    d = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  }
-
-  if (rem != NULL) {
-    r = rem;
-  } else {
-    r = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  }
-
-  if (a == NULL || b == NULL || d == NULL || r == NULL) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  if (BN_ucmp(m, &recp->N) < 0) {
-    BN_zero(d);
-    if (!BN_copy(r, m)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-    return 1;
-  }
-
-  // We want the remainder
-  // Given input of ABCDEF / ab
-  // we need multiply ABCDEF by 3 digests of the reciprocal of ab
-
-  // i := max(BN_num_bits(m), 2*BN_num_bits(N))
-  i = BN_num_bits(m);
-  j = recp->num_bits << 1;
-  if (j > i) {
-    i = j;
-  }
-
-  // Nr := round(2^i / N)
-  if (i != recp->shift) {
-    recp->shift =
-        BN_reciprocal(&(recp->Nr), &(recp->N), i,
-                      ctx);  // BN_reciprocal returns i, or -1 for an error
-  }
-
-  if (recp->shift == -1) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  // d := |round(round(m / 2^BN_num_bits(N)) * recp->Nr / 2^(i -
-  // BN_num_bits(N)))|
-  //    = |round(round(m / 2^BN_num_bits(N)) * round(2^i / N) / 2^(i -
-  // BN_num_bits(N)))|
-  //   <= |(m / 2^BN_num_bits(N)) * (2^i / N) * (2^BN_num_bits(N) / 2^i)|
-  //    = |m/N|
-  if (!BN_rshift(a, m, recp->num_bits)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  if (!BN_mul(b, a, &(recp->Nr), ctx)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  if (!BN_rshift(d, b, i - recp->num_bits)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  d->neg = 0;
-
-  if (!BN_mul(b, &(recp->N), d, ctx)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  if (!BN_usub(r, m, b)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  r->neg = 0;
-
-  j = 0;
-  while (BN_ucmp(r, &(recp->N)) >= 0) {
-    if (j++ > 2) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_BAD_RECIPROCAL);
-      goto err;
-    }
-    if (!BN_usub(r, r, &(recp->N))) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-    if (!BN_add_word(d, 1)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-  }
-
-  r->neg = BN_is_zero(r) ? 0 : m->neg;
-  d->neg = m->neg ^ recp->N.neg;
-  ret = 1;
-
-err:
-  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-  return ret;
-}
-
-static int BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y,
-                                 BN_RECP_CTX *recp, BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  int ret = 0;
-  BIGNUM *a;
-  const BIGNUM *ca;
-
-  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-  a = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  if (a == NULL) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  if (y != NULL) {
-    if (x == y) {
-      if (!BN_sqr(a, x, ctx)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-    } else {
-      if (!BN_mul(a, x, y, ctx)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-    }
-    ca = a;
-  } else {
-    ca = x;  // Just do the mod
-  }
-
-  ret = BN_div_recp(NULL, r, ca, recp, ctx);
-
-err:
-  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-  return ret;
-}
-
-// BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size returns sliding window size for mod_exp with
-// a |b| bit exponent.
-//
-// For window size 'w' (w >= 2) and a random 'b' bits exponent, the number of
-// multiplications is a constant plus on average
-//
-//    2^(w-1) + (b-w)/(w+1);
-//
-// here 2^(w-1)  is for precomputing the table (we actually need entries only
-// for windows that have the lowest bit set), and (b-w)/(w+1)  is an
-// approximation for the expected number of w-bit windows, not counting the
-// first one.
-//
-// Thus we should use
-//
-//    w >= 6  if        b > 671
-//     w = 5  if  671 > b > 239
-//     w = 4  if  239 > b >  79
-//     w = 3  if   79 > b >  23
-//    w <= 2  if   23 > b
-//
-// (with draws in between).  Very small exponents are often selected
-// with low Hamming weight, so we use  w = 1  for b <= 23.
-static int BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size(size_t b) {
-  if (b > 671) {
-    return 6;
-  }
-  if (b > 239) {
-    return 5;
-  }
-  if (b > 79) {
-    return 4;
-  }
-  if (b > 23) {
-    return 3;
-  }
-  return 1;
-}
-
-// TABLE_SIZE is the maximum precomputation table size for *variable* sliding
-// windows. This must be 2^(max_window - 1), where max_window is the largest
-// value returned from |BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size|.
-#define TABLE_SIZE 32
-
-// TABLE_BITS_SMALL is the smallest value returned from
-// |BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size| when |b| is at most |BN_BITS2| *
-// |BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS| words.
-#define TABLE_BITS_SMALL 5
-
-// TABLE_SIZE_SMALL is the same as |TABLE_SIZE|, but when |b| is at most
-// |BN_BITS2| * |BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS|.
-#define TABLE_SIZE_SMALL (1 << (TABLE_BITS_SMALL - 1))
-
-static int mod_exp_recp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
-                        const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  int i, j, ret = 0, wstart, window;
-  int start = 1;
-  BIGNUM *aa;
-  // Table of variables obtained from 'ctx'
-  BIGNUM *val[TABLE_SIZE];
-  BN_RECP_CTX recp;
-
-  // This function is only called on even moduli.
-  assert(!BN_is_odd(m));
-
-  int bits = BN_num_bits(p);
-  if (bits == 0) {
-    return BN_one(r);
-  }
-
-  BN_RECP_CTX_init(&recp);
-  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-  aa = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  val[0] = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  if (!aa || !val[0]) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  if (m->neg) {
-    // ignore sign of 'm'
-    if (!BN_copy(aa, m)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-    aa->neg = 0;
-    if (BN_RECP_CTX_set(&recp, aa, ctx) <= 0) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-  } else {
-    if (BN_RECP_CTX_set(&recp, m, ctx) <= 0) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (!BN_nnmod(val[0], a, m, ctx)) {
-    goto err;  // 1
-  }
-  if (BN_is_zero(val[0])) {
-    BN_zero(r);
-    ret = 1;
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  window = BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size(bits);
-  if (window > 1) {
-    if (!BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(aa, val[0], val[0], &recp, ctx)) {
-      goto err;  // 2
-    }
-    j = 1 << (window - 1);
-    for (i = 1; i < j; i++) {
-      if (((val[i] = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) ||
-          !BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(val[i], val[i - 1], aa, &recp, ctx)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  start = 1;  // This is used to avoid multiplication etc
-              // when there is only the value '1' in the
-              // buffer.
-  wstart = bits - 1;  // The top bit of the window
-
-  if (!BN_one(r)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  for (;;) {
-    int wvalue;  // The 'value' of the window
-    int wend;  // The bottom bit of the window
-
-    if (!BN_is_bit_set(p, wstart)) {
-      if (!start) {
-        if (!BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(r, r, r, &recp, ctx)) {
-          goto err;
-        }
-      }
-      if (wstart == 0) {
-        break;
-      }
-      wstart--;
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    // We now have wstart on a 'set' bit, we now need to work out
-    // how bit a window to do.  To do this we need to scan
-    // forward until the last set bit before the end of the
-    // window
-    wvalue = 1;
-    wend = 0;
-    for (i = 1; i < window; i++) {
-      if (wstart - i < 0) {
-        break;
-      }
-      if (BN_is_bit_set(p, wstart - i)) {
-        wvalue <<= (i - wend);
-        wvalue |= 1;
-        wend = i;
-      }
-    }
-
-    // wend is the size of the current window
-    j = wend + 1;
-    // add the 'bytes above'
-    if (!start) {
-      for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
-        if (!BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(r, r, r, &recp, ctx)) {
-          goto err;
-        }
-      }
-    }
-
-    // wvalue will be an odd number < 2^window
-    if (!BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(r, r, val[wvalue >> 1], &recp, ctx)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-
-    // move the 'window' down further
-    wstart -= wend + 1;
-    start = 0;
-    if (wstart < 0) {
-      break;
-    }
-  }
-  ret = 1;
-
-err:
-  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-  BN_RECP_CTX_free(&recp);
-  return ret;
-}
-
-int BN_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m,
-               BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  if (m->neg) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_NEGATIVE_NUMBER);
-    return 0;
-  }
-  if (a->neg || BN_ucmp(a, m) >= 0) {
-    if (!BN_nnmod(r, a, m, ctx)) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-    a = r;
-  }
-
-  if (BN_is_odd(m)) {
-    return BN_mod_exp_mont(r, a, p, m, ctx, NULL);
-  }
-
-  return mod_exp_recp(r, a, p, m, ctx);
-}
-
-int BN_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
-                    const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont) {
-  if (!BN_is_odd(m)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS);
-    return 0;
-  }
-  if (m->neg) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_NEGATIVE_NUMBER);
-    return 0;
-  }
-  // |a| is secret, but |a < m| is not.
-  if (a->neg || constant_time_declassify_int(BN_ucmp(a, m)) >= 0) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_INPUT_NOT_REDUCED);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  int bits = BN_num_bits(p);
-  if (bits == 0) {
-    // x**0 mod 1 is still zero.
-    if (BN_abs_is_word(m, 1)) {
-      BN_zero(rr);
-      return 1;
-    }
-    return BN_one(rr);
-  }
-
-  int ret = 0;
-  BIGNUM *val[TABLE_SIZE];
-  BN_MONT_CTX *new_mont = NULL;
-
-  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-  BIGNUM *r = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  val[0] = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  if (r == NULL || val[0] == NULL) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  // Allocate a montgomery context if it was not supplied by the caller.
-  if (mont == NULL) {
-    new_mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new_consttime(m, ctx);
-    if (new_mont == NULL) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-    mont = new_mont;
-  }
-
-  // We exponentiate by looking at sliding windows of the exponent and
-  // precomputing powers of |a|. Windows may be shifted so they always end on a
-  // set bit, so only precompute odd powers. We compute val[i] = a^(2*i + 1)
-  // for i = 0 to 2^(window-1), all in Montgomery form.
-  int window = BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size(bits);
-  if (!BN_to_montgomery(val[0], a, mont, ctx)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  if (window > 1) {
-    BIGNUM *d = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-    if (d == NULL ||
-        !BN_mod_mul_montgomery(d, val[0], val[0], mont, ctx)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-    for (int i = 1; i < 1 << (window - 1); i++) {
-      val[i] = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-      if (val[i] == NULL ||
-          !BN_mod_mul_montgomery(val[i], val[i - 1], d, mont, ctx)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  // |p| is non-zero, so at least one window is non-zero. To save some
-  // multiplications, defer initializing |r| until then.
-  int r_is_one = 1;
-  int wstart = bits - 1;  // The top bit of the window.
-  for (;;) {
-    if (!BN_is_bit_set(p, wstart)) {
-      if (!r_is_one && !BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, r, mont, ctx)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-      if (wstart == 0) {
-        break;
-      }
-      wstart--;
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    // We now have wstart on a set bit. Find the largest window we can use.
-    int wvalue = 1;
-    int wsize = 0;
-    for (int i = 1; i < window && i <= wstart; i++) {
-      if (BN_is_bit_set(p, wstart - i)) {
-        wvalue <<= (i - wsize);
-        wvalue |= 1;
-        wsize = i;
-      }
-    }
-
-    // Shift |r| to the end of the window.
-    if (!r_is_one) {
-      for (int i = 0; i < wsize + 1; i++) {
-        if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, r, mont, ctx)) {
-          goto err;
-        }
-      }
-    }
-
-    assert(wvalue & 1);
-    assert(wvalue < (1 << window));
-    if (r_is_one) {
-      if (!BN_copy(r, val[wvalue >> 1])) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-    } else if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, val[wvalue >> 1], mont, ctx)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-
-    r_is_one = 0;
-    if (wstart == wsize) {
-      break;
-    }
-    wstart -= wsize + 1;
-  }
-
-  // |p| is non-zero, so |r_is_one| must be cleared at some point.
-  assert(!r_is_one);
-
-  if (!BN_from_montgomery(rr, r, mont, ctx)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  ret = 1;
-
-err:
-  BN_MONT_CTX_free(new_mont);
-  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-  return ret;
-}
-
-void bn_mod_exp_mont_small(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t num,
-                           const BN_ULONG *p, size_t num_p,
-                           const BN_MONT_CTX *mont) {
-  if (num != (size_t)mont->N.width || num > BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS ||
-      num_p > SIZE_MAX / BN_BITS2) {
-    abort();
-  }
-  assert(BN_is_odd(&mont->N));
-
-  // Count the number of bits in |p|, skipping leading zeros. Note this function
-  // treats |p| as public.
-  while (num_p != 0 && p[num_p - 1] == 0) {
-    num_p--;
-  }
-  if (num_p == 0) {
-    bn_from_montgomery_small(r, num, mont->RR.d, num, mont);
-    return;
-  }
-  size_t bits = BN_num_bits_word(p[num_p - 1]) + (num_p - 1) * BN_BITS2;
-  assert(bits != 0);
-
-  // We exponentiate by looking at sliding windows of the exponent and
-  // precomputing powers of |a|. Windows may be shifted so they always end on a
-  // set bit, so only precompute odd powers. We compute val[i] = a^(2*i + 1) for
-  // i = 0 to 2^(window-1), all in Montgomery form.
-  unsigned window = BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size(bits);
-  if (window > TABLE_BITS_SMALL) {
-    window = TABLE_BITS_SMALL;  // Tolerate excessively large |p|.
-  }
-  BN_ULONG val[TABLE_SIZE_SMALL][BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS];
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(val[0], a, num * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
-  if (window > 1) {
-    BN_ULONG d[BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS];
-    bn_mod_mul_montgomery_small(d, val[0], val[0], num, mont);
-    for (unsigned i = 1; i < 1u << (window - 1); i++) {
-      bn_mod_mul_montgomery_small(val[i], val[i - 1], d, num, mont);
-    }
-  }
-
-  // |p| is non-zero, so at least one window is non-zero. To save some
-  // multiplications, defer initializing |r| until then.
-  int r_is_one = 1;
-  size_t wstart = bits - 1;  // The top bit of the window.
-  for (;;) {
-    if (!bn_is_bit_set_words(p, num_p, wstart)) {
-      if (!r_is_one) {
-        bn_mod_mul_montgomery_small(r, r, r, num, mont);
-      }
-      if (wstart == 0) {
-        break;
-      }
-      wstart--;
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    // We now have wstart on a set bit. Find the largest window we can use.
-    unsigned wvalue = 1;
-    unsigned wsize = 0;
-    for (unsigned i = 1; i < window && i <= wstart; i++) {
-      if (bn_is_bit_set_words(p, num_p, wstart - i)) {
-        wvalue <<= (i - wsize);
-        wvalue |= 1;
-        wsize = i;
-      }
-    }
-
-    // Shift |r| to the end of the window.
-    if (!r_is_one) {
-      for (unsigned i = 0; i < wsize + 1; i++) {
-        bn_mod_mul_montgomery_small(r, r, r, num, mont);
-      }
-    }
-
-    assert(wvalue & 1);
-    assert(wvalue < (1u << window));
-    if (r_is_one) {
-      OPENSSL_memcpy(r, val[wvalue >> 1], num * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
-    } else {
-      bn_mod_mul_montgomery_small(r, r, val[wvalue >> 1], num, mont);
-    }
-    r_is_one = 0;
-    if (wstart == wsize) {
-      break;
-    }
-    wstart -= wsize + 1;
-  }
-
-  // |p| is non-zero, so |r_is_one| must be cleared at some point.
-  assert(!r_is_one);
-  OPENSSL_cleanse(val, sizeof(val));
-}
-
-void bn_mod_inverse0_prime_mont_small(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a,
-                                      size_t num, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont) {
-  if (num != (size_t)mont->N.width || num > BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS) {
-    abort();
-  }
-
-  // Per Fermat's Little Theorem, a^-1 = a^(p-2) (mod p) for p prime.
-  BN_ULONG p_minus_two[BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS];
-  const BN_ULONG *p = mont->N.d;
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(p_minus_two, p, num * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
-  if (p_minus_two[0] >= 2) {
-    p_minus_two[0] -= 2;
-  } else {
-    p_minus_two[0] -= 2;
-    for (size_t i = 1; i < num; i++) {
-      if (p_minus_two[i]-- != 0) {
-        break;
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  bn_mod_exp_mont_small(r, a, num, p_minus_two, num, mont);
-}
-
-static void copy_to_prebuf(const BIGNUM *b, int top, BN_ULONG *table, int idx,
-                           int window) {
-  int ret = bn_copy_words(table + idx * top, top, b);
-  assert(ret);  // |b| is guaranteed to fit.
-  (void)ret;
-}
-
-static int copy_from_prebuf(BIGNUM *b, int top, const BN_ULONG *table, int idx,
-                            int window) {
-  if (!bn_wexpand(b, top)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  OPENSSL_memset(b->d, 0, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * top);
-  const int width = 1 << window;
-  for (int i = 0; i < width; i++, table += top) {
-    // Use a value barrier to prevent Clang from adding a branch when |i != idx|
-    // and making this copy not constant time. Clang is still allowed to learn
-    // that |mask| is constant across the inner loop, so this won't inhibit any
-    // vectorization it might do.
-    BN_ULONG mask = value_barrier_w(constant_time_eq_int(i, idx));
-    for (int j = 0; j < top; j++) {
-      b->d[j] |= table[j] & mask;
-    }
-  }
-
-  b->width = top;
-  return 1;
-}
-
-// Window sizes optimized for fixed window size modular exponentiation
-// algorithm (BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime).
-//
-// TODO(davidben): These window sizes were originally set for 64-byte cache
-// lines with a cache-line-dependent constant-time mitigation. They can probably
-// be revised now that our implementation is no longer cache-time-dependent.
-#define BN_window_bits_for_ctime_exponent_size(b) \
-  ((b) > 937 ? 6 : (b) > 306 ? 5 : (b) > 89 ? 4 : (b) > 22 ? 3 : 1)
-#define BN_MAX_MOD_EXP_CTIME_WINDOW (6)
-
-// This variant of |BN_mod_exp_mont| uses fixed windows and fixed memory access
-// patterns to protect secret exponents (cf. the hyper-threading timing attacks
-// pointed out by Colin Percival,
-// http://www.daemonology.net/hyperthreading-considered-harmful/)
-int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
-                              const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
-                              const BN_MONT_CTX *mont) {
-  int i, ret = 0, wvalue;
-  BN_MONT_CTX *new_mont = NULL;
-
-  unsigned char *powerbuf_free = NULL;
-  size_t powerbuf_len = 0;
-  BN_ULONG *powerbuf = NULL;
-
-  if (!BN_is_odd(m)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS);
-    return 0;
-  }
-  if (m->neg) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_NEGATIVE_NUMBER);
-    return 0;
-  }
-  // |a| is secret, but it is required to be in range, so these comparisons may
-  // be leaked.
-  if (a->neg || constant_time_declassify_int(BN_ucmp(a, m) >= 0)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_INPUT_NOT_REDUCED);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  // Use all bits stored in |p|, rather than |BN_num_bits|, so we do not leak
-  // whether the top bits are zero.
-  int max_bits = p->width * BN_BITS2;
-  int bits = max_bits;
-  if (bits == 0) {
-    // x**0 mod 1 is still zero.
-    if (BN_abs_is_word(m, 1)) {
-      BN_zero(rr);
-      return 1;
-    }
-    return BN_one(rr);
-  }
-
-  // Allocate a montgomery context if it was not supplied by the caller.
-  if (mont == NULL) {
-    new_mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new_consttime(m, ctx);
-    if (new_mont == NULL) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-    mont = new_mont;
-  }
-
-  // Use the width in |mont->N|, rather than the copy in |m|. The assembly
-  // implementation assumes it can use |top| to size R.
-  int top = mont->N.width;
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT5) || defined(RSAZ_ENABLED)
-  // Share one large stack-allocated buffer between the RSAZ and non-RSAZ code
-  // paths. If we were to use separate static buffers for each then there is
-  // some chance that both large buffers would be allocated on the stack,
-  // causing the stack space requirement to be truly huge (~10KB).
-  alignas(MOD_EXP_CTIME_ALIGN) BN_ULONG storage[MOD_EXP_CTIME_STORAGE_LEN];
-#endif
-#if defined(RSAZ_ENABLED)
-  // If the size of the operands allow it, perform the optimized RSAZ
-  // exponentiation. For further information see crypto/fipsmodule/bn/rsaz_exp.c
-  // and accompanying assembly modules.
-  if (a->width == 16 && p->width == 16 && BN_num_bits(m) == 1024 &&
-      rsaz_avx2_preferred()) {
-    if (!bn_wexpand(rr, 16)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-    RSAZ_1024_mod_exp_avx2(rr->d, a->d, p->d, m->d, mont->RR.d, mont->n0[0],
-                           storage);
-    rr->width = 16;
-    rr->neg = 0;
-    ret = 1;
-    goto err;
-  }
-#endif
-
-  // Get the window size to use with size of p.
-  int window = BN_window_bits_for_ctime_exponent_size(bits);
-  assert(window <= BN_MAX_MOD_EXP_CTIME_WINDOW);
-
-  // Calculating |powerbuf_len| below cannot overflow because of the bound on
-  // Montgomery reduction.
-  assert((size_t)top <= BN_MONTGOMERY_MAX_WORDS);
-  static_assert(
-      BN_MONTGOMERY_MAX_WORDS <=
-          INT_MAX / sizeof(BN_ULONG) / ((1 << BN_MAX_MOD_EXP_CTIME_WINDOW) + 3),
-      "powerbuf_len may overflow");
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT5)
-  if (window >= 5) {
-    window = 5;  // ~5% improvement for RSA2048 sign, and even for RSA4096
-    // Reserve space for the |mont->N| copy.
-    powerbuf_len += top * sizeof(mont->N.d[0]);
-  }
-#endif
-
-  // Allocate a buffer large enough to hold all of the pre-computed
-  // powers of |am|, |am| itself, and |tmp|.
-  int num_powers = 1 << window;
-  powerbuf_len += sizeof(m->d[0]) * top * (num_powers + 2);
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT5)
-  if (powerbuf_len <= sizeof(storage)) {
-    powerbuf = storage;
-  }
-  // |storage| is more than large enough to handle 1024-bit inputs.
-  assert(powerbuf != NULL || top * BN_BITS2 > 1024);
-#endif
-  if (powerbuf == NULL) {
-    powerbuf_free = OPENSSL_malloc(powerbuf_len + MOD_EXP_CTIME_ALIGN);
-    if (powerbuf_free == NULL) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-    powerbuf = align_pointer(powerbuf_free, MOD_EXP_CTIME_ALIGN);
-  }
-  OPENSSL_memset(powerbuf, 0, powerbuf_len);
-
-  // Place |tmp| and |am| right after powers table.
-  BIGNUM tmp, am;
-  tmp.d = powerbuf + top * num_powers;
-  am.d = tmp.d + top;
-  tmp.width = am.width = 0;
-  tmp.dmax = am.dmax = top;
-  tmp.neg = am.neg = 0;
-  tmp.flags = am.flags = BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA;
-
-  if (!bn_one_to_montgomery(&tmp, mont, ctx) ||
-      !bn_resize_words(&tmp, top)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  // Prepare a^1 in the Montgomery domain.
-  assert(!a->neg);
-  assert(BN_ucmp(a, m) < 0);
-  if (!BN_to_montgomery(&am, a, mont, ctx) ||
-      !bn_resize_words(&am, top)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT5)
-  // This optimization uses ideas from https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/239,
-  // specifically optimization of cache-timing attack countermeasures,
-  // pre-computation optimization, and Almost Montgomery Multiplication.
-  //
-  // The paper discusses a 4-bit window to optimize 512-bit modular
-  // exponentiation, used in RSA-1024 with CRT, but RSA-1024 is no longer
-  // important.
-  //
-  // |bn_mul_mont_gather5| and |bn_power5| implement the "almost" reduction
-  // variant, so the values here may not be fully reduced. They are bounded by R
-  // (i.e. they fit in |top| words), not |m|. Additionally, we pass these
-  // "almost" reduced inputs into |bn_mul_mont|, which implements the normal
-  // reduction variant. Given those inputs, |bn_mul_mont| may not give reduced
-  // output, but it will still produce "almost" reduced output.
-  //
-  // TODO(davidben): Using "almost" reduction complicates analysis of this code,
-  // and its interaction with other parts of the project. Determine whether this
-  // is actually necessary for performance.
-  if (window == 5 && top > 1) {
-    // Copy |mont->N| to improve cache locality.
-    BN_ULONG *np = am.d + top;
-    for (i = 0; i < top; i++) {
-      np[i] = mont->N.d[i];
-    }
-
-    // Fill |powerbuf| with the first 32 powers of |am|.
-    const BN_ULONG *n0 = mont->n0;
-    bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, 0);
-    bn_scatter5(am.d, am.width, powerbuf, 1);
-    bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, am.d, am.d, np, n0, top);
-    bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, 2);
-
-    // Square to compute powers of two.
-    for (i = 4; i < 32; i *= 2) {
-      bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
-      bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i);
-    }
-    // Compute odd powers |i| based on |i - 1|, then all powers |i * 2^j|.
-    for (i = 3; i < 32; i += 2) {
-      bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, i - 1);
-      bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i);
-      for (int j = 2 * i; j < 32; j *= 2) {
-        bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
-        bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, j);
-      }
-    }
-
-    bits--;
-    for (wvalue = 0, i = bits % 5; i >= 0; i--, bits--) {
-      wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits);
-    }
-    bn_gather5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, wvalue);
-
-    // At this point |bits| is 4 mod 5 and at least -1. (|bits| is the first bit
-    // that has not been read yet.)
-    assert(bits >= -1 && (bits == -1 || bits % 5 == 4));
-
-    // Scan the exponent one window at a time starting from the most
-    // significant bits.
-    if (top & 7) {
-      while (bits >= 0) {
-        for (wvalue = 0, i = 0; i < 5; i++, bits--) {
-          wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits);
-        }
-
-        bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
-        bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
-        bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
-        bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
-        bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
-        bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, tmp.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, wvalue);
-      }
-    } else {
-      const uint8_t *p_bytes = (const uint8_t *)p->d;
-      assert(bits < max_bits);
-      // |p = 0| has been handled as a special case, so |max_bits| is at least
-      // one word.
-      assert(max_bits >= 64);
-
-      // If the first bit to be read lands in the last byte, unroll the first
-      // iteration to avoid reading past the bounds of |p->d|. (After the first
-      // iteration, we are guaranteed to be past the last byte.) Note |bits|
-      // here is the top bit, inclusive.
-      if (bits - 4 >= max_bits - 8) {
-        // Read five bits from |bits-4| through |bits|, inclusive.
-        wvalue = p_bytes[p->width * BN_BYTES - 1];
-        wvalue >>= (bits - 4) & 7;
-        wvalue &= 0x1f;
-        bits -= 5;
-        bn_power5(tmp.d, tmp.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, wvalue);
-      }
-      while (bits >= 0) {
-        // Read five bits from |bits-4| through |bits|, inclusive.
-        int first_bit = bits - 4;
-        uint16_t val;
-        OPENSSL_memcpy(&val, p_bytes + (first_bit >> 3), sizeof(val));
-        val >>= first_bit & 7;
-        val &= 0x1f;
-        bits -= 5;
-        bn_power5(tmp.d, tmp.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, val);
-      }
-    }
-    // The result is now in |tmp| in Montgomery form, but it may not be fully
-    // reduced. This is within bounds for |BN_from_montgomery| (tmp < R <= m*R)
-    // so it will, when converting from Montgomery form, produce a fully reduced
-    // result.
-    //
-    // This differs from Figure 2 of the paper, which uses AMM(h, 1) to convert
-    // from Montgomery form with unreduced output, followed by an extra
-    // reduction step. In the paper's terminology, we replace steps 9 and 10
-    // with MM(h, 1).
-  } else
-#endif
-  {
-    copy_to_prebuf(&tmp, top, powerbuf, 0, window);
-    copy_to_prebuf(&am, top, powerbuf, 1, window);
-
-    // If the window size is greater than 1, then calculate
-    // val[i=2..2^winsize-1]. Powers are computed as a*a^(i-1)
-    // (even powers could instead be computed as (a^(i/2))^2
-    // to use the slight performance advantage of sqr over mul).
-    if (window > 1) {
-      if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &am, &am, mont, ctx)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-
-      copy_to_prebuf(&tmp, top, powerbuf, 2, window);
-
-      for (i = 3; i < num_powers; i++) {
-        // Calculate a^i = a^(i-1) * a
-        if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &am, &tmp, mont, ctx)) {
-          goto err;
-        }
-
-        copy_to_prebuf(&tmp, top, powerbuf, i, window);
-      }
-    }
-
-    bits--;
-    for (wvalue = 0, i = bits % window; i >= 0; i--, bits--) {
-      wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits);
-    }
-    if (!copy_from_prebuf(&tmp, top, powerbuf, wvalue, window)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-
-    // Scan the exponent one window at a time starting from the most
-    // significant bits.
-    while (bits >= 0) {
-      wvalue = 0;  // The 'value' of the window
-
-      // Scan the window, squaring the result as we go
-      for (i = 0; i < window; i++, bits--) {
-        if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &tmp, &tmp, mont, ctx)) {
-          goto err;
-        }
-        wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits);
-      }
-
-      // Fetch the appropriate pre-computed value from the pre-buf
-      if (!copy_from_prebuf(&am, top, powerbuf, wvalue, window)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-
-      // Multiply the result into the intermediate result
-      if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &tmp, &am, mont, ctx)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Convert the final result from Montgomery to standard format. If we used the
-  // |OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT5| codepath, |tmp| may not be fully reduced. It is only
-  // bounded by R rather than |m|. However, that is still within bounds for
-  // |BN_from_montgomery|, which implements full Montgomery reduction, not
-  // "almost" Montgomery reduction.
-  if (!BN_from_montgomery(rr, &tmp, mont, ctx)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  ret = 1;
-
-err:
-  BN_MONT_CTX_free(new_mont);
-  if (powerbuf != NULL && powerbuf_free == NULL) {
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(powerbuf, powerbuf_len);
-  }
-  OPENSSL_free(powerbuf_free);
-  return ret;
-}
-
-int BN_mod_exp_mont_word(BIGNUM *rr, BN_ULONG a, const BIGNUM *p,
-                         const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
-                         const BN_MONT_CTX *mont) {
-  BIGNUM a_bignum;
-  BN_init(&a_bignum);
-
-  int ret = 0;
-
-  // BN_mod_exp_mont requires reduced inputs.
-  if (bn_minimal_width(m) == 1) {
-    a %= m->d[0];
-  }
-
-  if (!BN_set_word(&a_bignum, a)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  ret = BN_mod_exp_mont(rr, &a_bignum, p, m, ctx, mont);
-
-err:
-  BN_free(&a_bignum);
-
-  return ret;
-}
-
-#define TABLE_SIZE 32
-
-int BN_mod_exp2_mont(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a1, const BIGNUM *p1,
-                     const BIGNUM *a2, const BIGNUM *p2, const BIGNUM *m,
-                     BN_CTX *ctx, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont) {
-  BIGNUM tmp;
-  BN_init(&tmp);
-
-  int ret = 0;
-  BN_MONT_CTX *new_mont = NULL;
-
-  // Allocate a montgomery context if it was not supplied by the caller.
-  if (mont == NULL) {
-    new_mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new_for_modulus(m, ctx);
-    if (new_mont == NULL) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-    mont = new_mont;
-  }
-
-  // BN_mod_mul_montgomery removes one Montgomery factor, so passing one
-  // Montgomery-encoded and one non-Montgomery-encoded value gives a
-  // non-Montgomery-encoded result.
-  if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(rr, a1, p1, m, ctx, mont) ||
-      !BN_mod_exp_mont(&tmp, a2, p2, m, ctx, mont) ||
-      !BN_to_montgomery(rr, rr, mont, ctx) ||
-      !BN_mod_mul_montgomery(rr, rr, &tmp, mont, ctx)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  ret = 1;
-
-err:
-  BN_MONT_CTX_free(new_mont);
-  BN_free(&tmp);
-
-  return ret;
-}