grpc 1.62.0 → 1.68.1

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/fipsmodule/rsa/rsa.c.inc

@@ -0,0 +1,1038 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
+
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/digest.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/ex_data.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/nid.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <openssl/thread.h>
+
+#include "../bn/internal.h"
+#include "../delocate.h"
+#include "../../internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+// RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02 is part of the legacy SSLv23 padding scheme.
+// Cryptography.io depends on this error code.
+OPENSSL_DECLARE_ERROR_REASON(RSA, BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02)
+
+DEFINE_STATIC_EX_DATA_CLASS(g_rsa_ex_data_class)
+
+static int bn_dup_into(BIGNUM **dst, const BIGNUM *src) {
+  if (src == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  BN_free(*dst);
+  *dst = BN_dup(src);
+  return *dst != NULL;
+}
+
+RSA *RSA_new_public_key(const BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *e) {
+  RSA *rsa = RSA_new();
+  if (rsa == NULL ||               //
+      !bn_dup_into(&rsa->n, n) ||  //
+      !bn_dup_into(&rsa->e, e) ||  //
+      !RSA_check_key(rsa)) {
+    RSA_free(rsa);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  return rsa;
+}
+
+RSA *RSA_new_private_key(const BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *e, const BIGNUM *d,
+                         const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q, const BIGNUM *dmp1,
+                         const BIGNUM *dmq1, const BIGNUM *iqmp) {
+  RSA *rsa = RSA_new();
+  if (rsa == NULL ||                     //
+      !bn_dup_into(&rsa->n, n) ||        //
+      !bn_dup_into(&rsa->e, e) ||        //
+      !bn_dup_into(&rsa->d, d) ||        //
+      !bn_dup_into(&rsa->p, p) ||        //
+      !bn_dup_into(&rsa->q, q) ||        //
+      !bn_dup_into(&rsa->dmp1, dmp1) ||  //
+      !bn_dup_into(&rsa->dmq1, dmq1) ||  //
+      !bn_dup_into(&rsa->iqmp, iqmp) ||  //
+      !RSA_check_key(rsa)) {
+    RSA_free(rsa);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  return rsa;
+}
+
+RSA *RSA_new_private_key_no_crt(const BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *e,
+                                const BIGNUM *d) {
+  RSA *rsa = RSA_new();
+  if (rsa == NULL ||               //
+      !bn_dup_into(&rsa->n, n) ||  //
+      !bn_dup_into(&rsa->e, e) ||  //
+      !bn_dup_into(&rsa->d, d) ||  //
+      !RSA_check_key(rsa)) {
+    RSA_free(rsa);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  return rsa;
+}
+
+RSA *RSA_new_private_key_no_e(const BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *d) {
+  RSA *rsa = RSA_new();
+  if (rsa == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT;
+  if (!bn_dup_into(&rsa->n, n) ||  //
+      !bn_dup_into(&rsa->d, d) ||  //
+      !RSA_check_key(rsa)) {
+    RSA_free(rsa);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  return rsa;
+}
+
+RSA *RSA_new_public_key_large_e(const BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *e) {
+  RSA *rsa = RSA_new();
+  if (rsa == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_LARGE_PUBLIC_EXPONENT;
+  if (!bn_dup_into(&rsa->n, n) ||  //
+      !bn_dup_into(&rsa->e, e) ||  //
+      !RSA_check_key(rsa)) {
+    RSA_free(rsa);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  return rsa;
+}
+
+RSA *RSA_new_private_key_large_e(const BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *e,
+                                 const BIGNUM *d, const BIGNUM *p,
+                                 const BIGNUM *q, const BIGNUM *dmp1,
+                                 const BIGNUM *dmq1, const BIGNUM *iqmp) {
+  RSA *rsa = RSA_new();
+  if (rsa == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_LARGE_PUBLIC_EXPONENT;
+  if (!bn_dup_into(&rsa->n, n) ||        //
+      !bn_dup_into(&rsa->e, e) ||        //
+      !bn_dup_into(&rsa->d, d) ||        //
+      !bn_dup_into(&rsa->p, p) ||        //
+      !bn_dup_into(&rsa->q, q) ||        //
+      !bn_dup_into(&rsa->dmp1, dmp1) ||  //
+      !bn_dup_into(&rsa->dmq1, dmq1) ||  //
+      !bn_dup_into(&rsa->iqmp, iqmp) ||  //
+      !RSA_check_key(rsa)) {
+    RSA_free(rsa);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  return rsa;
+}
+
+RSA *RSA_new(void) { return RSA_new_method(NULL); }
+
+RSA *RSA_new_method(const ENGINE *engine) {
+  RSA *rsa = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(RSA));
+  if (rsa == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  if (engine) {
+    rsa->meth = ENGINE_get_RSA_method(engine);
+  }
+
+  if (rsa->meth == NULL) {
+    rsa->meth = (RSA_METHOD *) RSA_default_method();
+  }
+  METHOD_ref(rsa->meth);
+
+  rsa->references = 1;
+  rsa->flags = rsa->meth->flags;
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&rsa->lock);
+  CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&rsa->ex_data);
+
+  if (rsa->meth->init && !rsa->meth->init(rsa)) {
+    CRYPTO_free_ex_data(g_rsa_ex_data_class_bss_get(), rsa, &rsa->ex_data);
+    CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&rsa->lock);
+    METHOD_unref(rsa->meth);
+    OPENSSL_free(rsa);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  return rsa;
+}
+
+RSA *RSA_new_method_no_e(const ENGINE *engine, const BIGNUM *n) {
+  RSA *rsa = RSA_new_method(engine);
+  if (rsa == NULL ||
+      !bn_dup_into(&rsa->n, n)) {
+    RSA_free(rsa);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT;
+  return rsa;
+}
+
+void RSA_free(RSA *rsa) {
+  if (rsa == NULL) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (!CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&rsa->references)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (rsa->meth->finish) {
+    rsa->meth->finish(rsa);
+  }
+  METHOD_unref(rsa->meth);
+
+  CRYPTO_free_ex_data(g_rsa_ex_data_class_bss_get(), rsa, &rsa->ex_data);
+
+  BN_free(rsa->n);
+  BN_free(rsa->e);
+  BN_free(rsa->d);
+  BN_free(rsa->p);
+  BN_free(rsa->q);
+  BN_free(rsa->dmp1);
+  BN_free(rsa->dmq1);
+  BN_free(rsa->iqmp);
+  rsa_invalidate_key(rsa);
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&rsa->lock);
+  OPENSSL_free(rsa);
+}
+
+int RSA_up_ref(RSA *rsa) {
+  CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&rsa->references);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+unsigned RSA_bits(const RSA *rsa) { return BN_num_bits(rsa->n); }
+
+const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_n(const RSA *rsa) { return rsa->n; }
+
+const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_e(const RSA *rsa) { return rsa->e; }
+
+const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_d(const RSA *rsa) { return rsa->d; }
+
+const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_p(const RSA *rsa) { return rsa->p; }
+
+const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_q(const RSA *rsa) { return rsa->q; }
+
+const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_dmp1(const RSA *rsa) { return rsa->dmp1; }
+
+const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_dmq1(const RSA *rsa) { return rsa->dmq1; }
+
+const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_iqmp(const RSA *rsa) { return rsa->iqmp; }
+
+void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *rsa, const BIGNUM **out_n, const BIGNUM **out_e,
+                  const BIGNUM **out_d) {
+  if (out_n != NULL) {
+    *out_n = rsa->n;
+  }
+  if (out_e != NULL) {
+    *out_e = rsa->e;
+  }
+  if (out_d != NULL) {
+    *out_d = rsa->d;
+  }
+}
+
+void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *rsa, const BIGNUM **out_p,
+                      const BIGNUM **out_q) {
+  if (out_p != NULL) {
+    *out_p = rsa->p;
+  }
+  if (out_q != NULL) {
+    *out_q = rsa->q;
+  }
+}
+
+const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *RSA_get0_pss_params(const RSA *rsa) {
+  // We do not support the id-RSASSA-PSS key encoding. If we add support later,
+  // the |maskHash| field should be filled in for OpenSSL compatibility.
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *rsa, const BIGNUM **out_dmp1,
+                         const BIGNUM **out_dmq1, const BIGNUM **out_iqmp) {
+  if (out_dmp1 != NULL) {
+    *out_dmp1 = rsa->dmp1;
+  }
+  if (out_dmq1 != NULL) {
+    *out_dmq1 = rsa->dmq1;
+  }
+  if (out_iqmp != NULL) {
+    *out_iqmp = rsa->iqmp;
+  }
+}
+
+int RSA_set0_key(RSA *rsa, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d) {
+  if ((rsa->n == NULL && n == NULL) ||
+      (rsa->e == NULL && e == NULL)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (n != NULL) {
+    BN_free(rsa->n);
+    rsa->n = n;
+  }
+  if (e != NULL) {
+    BN_free(rsa->e);
+    rsa->e = e;
+  }
+  if (d != NULL) {
+    BN_free(rsa->d);
+    rsa->d = d;
+  }
+
+  rsa_invalidate_key(rsa);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *rsa, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q) {
+  if ((rsa->p == NULL && p == NULL) ||
+      (rsa->q == NULL && q == NULL)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (p != NULL) {
+    BN_free(rsa->p);
+    rsa->p = p;
+  }
+  if (q != NULL) {
+    BN_free(rsa->q);
+    rsa->q = q;
+  }
+
+  rsa_invalidate_key(rsa);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *rsa, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp) {
+  if ((rsa->dmp1 == NULL && dmp1 == NULL) ||
+      (rsa->dmq1 == NULL && dmq1 == NULL) ||
+      (rsa->iqmp == NULL && iqmp == NULL)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (dmp1 != NULL) {
+    BN_free(rsa->dmp1);
+    rsa->dmp1 = dmp1;
+  }
+  if (dmq1 != NULL) {
+    BN_free(rsa->dmq1);
+    rsa->dmq1 = dmq1;
+  }
+  if (iqmp != NULL) {
+    BN_free(rsa->iqmp);
+    rsa->iqmp = iqmp;
+  }
+
+  rsa_invalidate_key(rsa);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int rsa_sign_raw_no_self_test(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out,
+                                     size_t max_out, const uint8_t *in,
+                                     size_t in_len, int padding) {
+  if (rsa->meth->sign_raw) {
+    return rsa->meth->sign_raw(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, padding);
+  }
+
+  return rsa_default_sign_raw(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, padding);
+}
+
+int RSA_sign_raw(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
+                 const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) {
+  boringssl_ensure_rsa_self_test();
+  return rsa_sign_raw_no_self_test(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len,
+                                   padding);
+}
+
+unsigned RSA_size(const RSA *rsa) {
+  size_t ret = rsa->meth->size ? rsa->meth->size(rsa) : rsa_default_size(rsa);
+  // RSA modulus sizes are bounded by |BIGNUM|, which must fit in |unsigned|.
+  //
+  // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/516): Should we make this return |size_t|?
+  assert(ret < UINT_MAX);
+  return (unsigned)ret;
+}
+
+int RSA_is_opaque(const RSA *rsa) {
+  return rsa->meth && (rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_OPAQUE);
+}
+
+int RSA_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
+                         CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
+  return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index_ex(g_rsa_ex_data_class_bss_get(), argl, argp,
+                                 free_func);
+}
+
+int RSA_set_ex_data(RSA *rsa, int idx, void *arg) {
+  return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&rsa->ex_data, idx, arg);
+}
+
+void *RSA_get_ex_data(const RSA *rsa, int idx) {
+  return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&rsa->ex_data, idx);
+}
+
+// SSL_SIG_LENGTH is the size of an SSL/TLS (prior to TLS 1.2) signature: it's
+// the length of an MD5 and SHA1 hash.
+static const unsigned SSL_SIG_LENGTH = 36;
+
+// pkcs1_sig_prefix contains the ASN.1, DER encoded prefix for a hash that is
+// to be signed with PKCS#1.
+struct pkcs1_sig_prefix {
+  // nid identifies the hash function.
+  int nid;
+  // hash_len is the expected length of the hash function.
+  uint8_t hash_len;
+  // len is the number of bytes of |bytes| which are valid.
+  uint8_t len;
+  // bytes contains the DER bytes.
+  uint8_t bytes[19];
+};
+
+// kPKCS1SigPrefixes contains the ASN.1 prefixes for PKCS#1 signatures with
+// different hash functions.
+static const struct pkcs1_sig_prefix kPKCS1SigPrefixes[] = {
+    {
+     NID_md5,
+     MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+     18,
+     {0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d,
+      0x02, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x10},
+    },
+    {
+     NID_sha1,
+     SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+     15,
+     {0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, 0x05,
+      0x00, 0x04, 0x14},
+    },
+    {
+     NID_sha224,
+     SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+     19,
+     {0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03,
+      0x04, 0x02, 0x04, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1c},
+    },
+    {
+     NID_sha256,
+     SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+     19,
+     {0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03,
+      0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20},
+    },
+    {
+     NID_sha384,
+     SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+     19,
+     {0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03,
+      0x04, 0x02, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30},
+    },
+    {
+     NID_sha512,
+     SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+     19,
+     {0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03,
+      0x04, 0x02, 0x03, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40},
+    },
+    {
+     NID_undef, 0, 0, {0},
+    },
+};
+
+static int rsa_check_digest_size(int hash_nid, size_t digest_len) {
+  if (hash_nid == NID_md5_sha1) {
+    if (digest_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+      return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  for (size_t i = 0; kPKCS1SigPrefixes[i].nid != NID_undef; i++) {
+    const struct pkcs1_sig_prefix *sig_prefix = &kPKCS1SigPrefixes[i];
+    if (sig_prefix->nid == hash_nid) {
+      if (digest_len != sig_prefix->hash_len) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+        return 0;
+      }
+      return 1;
+    }
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
+  return 0;
+
+}
+
+int RSA_add_pkcs1_prefix(uint8_t **out_msg, size_t *out_msg_len,
+                         int *is_alloced, int hash_nid, const uint8_t *digest,
+                         size_t digest_len) {
+  if (!rsa_check_digest_size(hash_nid, digest_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (hash_nid == NID_md5_sha1) {
+    // The length should already have been checked.
+    assert(digest_len == SSL_SIG_LENGTH);
+    *out_msg = (uint8_t *)digest;
+    *out_msg_len = digest_len;
+    *is_alloced = 0;
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  for (size_t i = 0; kPKCS1SigPrefixes[i].nid != NID_undef; i++) {
+    const struct pkcs1_sig_prefix *sig_prefix = &kPKCS1SigPrefixes[i];
+    if (sig_prefix->nid != hash_nid) {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    // The length should already have been checked.
+    assert(digest_len == sig_prefix->hash_len);
+    const uint8_t* prefix = sig_prefix->bytes;
+    size_t prefix_len = sig_prefix->len;
+    size_t signed_msg_len = prefix_len + digest_len;
+    if (signed_msg_len < prefix_len) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_TOO_LONG);
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    uint8_t *signed_msg = OPENSSL_malloc(signed_msg_len);
+    if (!signed_msg) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(signed_msg, prefix, prefix_len);
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(signed_msg + prefix_len, digest, digest_len);
+
+    *out_msg = signed_msg;
+    *out_msg_len = signed_msg_len;
+    *is_alloced = 1;
+
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+int rsa_sign_no_self_test(int hash_nid, const uint8_t *digest,
+                          size_t digest_len, uint8_t *out, unsigned *out_len,
+                          RSA *rsa) {
+  if (rsa->meth->sign) {
+    if (!rsa_check_digest_size(hash_nid, digest_len)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    // All supported digest lengths fit in |unsigned|.
+    assert(digest_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+    static_assert(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE <= UINT_MAX, "digest too long");
+    return rsa->meth->sign(hash_nid, digest, (unsigned)digest_len, out, out_len,
+                           rsa);
+  }
+
+  const unsigned rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
+  int ret = 0;
+  uint8_t *signed_msg = NULL;
+  size_t signed_msg_len = 0;
+  int signed_msg_is_alloced = 0;
+  size_t size_t_out_len;
+  if (!RSA_add_pkcs1_prefix(&signed_msg, &signed_msg_len,
+                            &signed_msg_is_alloced, hash_nid, digest,
+                            digest_len) ||
+      !rsa_sign_raw_no_self_test(rsa, &size_t_out_len, out, rsa_size,
+                                 signed_msg, signed_msg_len,
+                                 RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (size_t_out_len > UINT_MAX) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  *out_len = (unsigned)size_t_out_len;
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  if (signed_msg_is_alloced) {
+    OPENSSL_free(signed_msg);
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int RSA_sign(int hash_nid, const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
+             uint8_t *out, unsigned *out_len, RSA *rsa) {
+  boringssl_ensure_rsa_self_test();
+
+  return rsa_sign_no_self_test(hash_nid, digest, digest_len, out, out_len, rsa);
+}
+
+int RSA_sign_pss_mgf1(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
+                      const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
+                      const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *mgf1_md, int salt_len) {
+  if (digest_len != EVP_MD_size(md)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  size_t padded_len = RSA_size(rsa);
+  uint8_t *padded = OPENSSL_malloc(padded_len);
+  if (padded == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  int ret = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, padded, digest, md, mgf1_md,
+                                           salt_len) &&
+            RSA_sign_raw(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, padded, padded_len,
+                         RSA_NO_PADDING);
+  OPENSSL_free(padded);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int rsa_verify_no_self_test(int hash_nid, const uint8_t *digest,
+                            size_t digest_len, const uint8_t *sig,
+                            size_t sig_len, RSA *rsa) {
+  if (rsa->n == NULL || rsa->e == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  const size_t rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
+  uint8_t *buf = NULL;
+  int ret = 0;
+  uint8_t *signed_msg = NULL;
+  size_t signed_msg_len = 0, len;
+  int signed_msg_is_alloced = 0;
+
+  if (hash_nid == NID_md5_sha1 && digest_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size);
+  if (!buf) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!rsa_verify_raw_no_self_test(rsa, &len, buf, rsa_size, sig, sig_len,
+                                   RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) ||
+      !RSA_add_pkcs1_prefix(&signed_msg, &signed_msg_len,
+                            &signed_msg_is_alloced, hash_nid, digest,
+                            digest_len)) {
+    goto out;
+  }
+
+  // Check that no other information follows the hash value (FIPS 186-4 Section
+  // 5.5) and it matches the expected hash.
+  if (len != signed_msg_len || OPENSSL_memcmp(buf, signed_msg, len) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+    goto out;
+  }
+
+  ret = 1;
+
+out:
+  OPENSSL_free(buf);
+  if (signed_msg_is_alloced) {
+    OPENSSL_free(signed_msg);
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int RSA_verify(int hash_nid, const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
+               const uint8_t *sig, size_t sig_len, RSA *rsa) {
+  boringssl_ensure_rsa_self_test();
+  return rsa_verify_no_self_test(hash_nid, digest, digest_len, sig, sig_len,
+                                 rsa);
+}
+
+int RSA_verify_pss_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
+                        const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *mgf1_md, int salt_len,
+                        const uint8_t *sig, size_t sig_len) {
+  if (digest_len != EVP_MD_size(md)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  size_t em_len = RSA_size(rsa);
+  uint8_t *em = OPENSSL_malloc(em_len);
+  if (em == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  int ret = 0;
+  if (!RSA_verify_raw(rsa, &em_len, em, em_len, sig, sig_len, RSA_NO_PADDING)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (em_len != RSA_size(rsa)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, digest, md, mgf1_md, em, salt_len);
+
+err:
+  OPENSSL_free(em);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static int check_mod_inverse(int *out_ok, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *ainv,
+                             const BIGNUM *m, unsigned m_min_bits,
+                             BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  if (BN_is_negative(ainv) ||
+      constant_time_declassify_int(BN_cmp(ainv, m) >= 0)) {
+    *out_ok = 0;
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  // Note |bn_mul_consttime| and |bn_div_consttime| do not scale linearly, but
+  // checking |ainv| is in range bounds the running time, assuming |m|'s bounds
+  // were checked by the caller.
+  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+  BIGNUM *tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  int ret = tmp != NULL &&
+            bn_mul_consttime(tmp, a, ainv, ctx) &&
+            bn_div_consttime(NULL, tmp, tmp, m, m_min_bits, ctx);
+  if (ret) {
+    *out_ok = constant_time_declassify_int(BN_is_one(tmp));
+  }
+  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int RSA_check_key(const RSA *key) {
+  // TODO(davidben): RSA key initialization is spread across
+  // |rsa_check_public_key|, |RSA_check_key|, |freeze_private_key|, and
+  // |BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked| as a result of API issues. See
+  // https://crbug.com/boringssl/316. As a result, we inconsistently check RSA
+  // invariants. We should fix this and integrate that logic.
+
+  if (RSA_is_opaque(key)) {
+    // Opaque keys can't be checked.
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  if (!rsa_check_public_key(key)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if ((key->p != NULL) != (key->q != NULL)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_ONLY_ONE_OF_P_Q_GIVEN);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // |key->d| must be bounded by |key->n|. This ensures bounds on |RSA_bits|
+  // translate to bounds on the running time of private key operations.
+  if (key->d != NULL &&
+      (BN_is_negative(key->d) || BN_cmp(key->d, key->n) >= 0)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_D_OUT_OF_RANGE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (key->d == NULL || key->p == NULL) {
+    // For a public key, or without p and q, there's nothing that can be
+    // checked.
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  BIGNUM tmp, de, pm1, qm1, dmp1, dmq1;
+  int ok = 0;
+  BN_init(&tmp);
+  BN_init(&de);
+  BN_init(&pm1);
+  BN_init(&qm1);
+  BN_init(&dmp1);
+  BN_init(&dmq1);
+
+  // Check that p * q == n. Before we multiply, we check that p and q are in
+  // bounds, to avoid a DoS vector in |bn_mul_consttime| below. Note that
+  // n was bound by |rsa_check_public_key|. This also implicitly checks p and q
+  // are odd, which is a necessary condition for Montgomery reduction.
+  if (BN_is_negative(key->p) ||
+      constant_time_declassify_int(BN_cmp(key->p, key->n) >= 0) ||
+      BN_is_negative(key->q) ||
+      constant_time_declassify_int(BN_cmp(key->q, key->n) >= 0)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_N_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q);
+    goto out;
+  }
+  if (!bn_mul_consttime(&tmp, key->p, key->q, ctx)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN);
+    goto out;
+  }
+  if (BN_cmp(&tmp, key->n) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_N_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q);
+    goto out;
+  }
+
+  // d must be an inverse of e mod the Carmichael totient, lcm(p-1, q-1), but it
+  // may be unreduced because other implementations use the Euler totient. We
+  // simply check that d * e is one mod p-1 and mod q-1. Note d and e were bound
+  // by earlier checks in this function.
+  if (!bn_usub_consttime(&pm1, key->p, BN_value_one()) ||
+      !bn_usub_consttime(&qm1, key->q, BN_value_one())) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN);
+    goto out;
+  }
+  const unsigned pm1_bits = BN_num_bits(&pm1);
+  const unsigned qm1_bits = BN_num_bits(&qm1);
+  if (!bn_mul_consttime(&de, key->d, key->e, ctx) ||
+      !bn_div_consttime(NULL, &tmp, &de, &pm1, pm1_bits, ctx) ||
+      !bn_div_consttime(NULL, &de, &de, &qm1, qm1_bits, ctx)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN);
+    goto out;
+  }
+
+  if (constant_time_declassify_int(!BN_is_one(&tmp)) ||
+      constant_time_declassify_int(!BN_is_one(&de))) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_D_E_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_1);
+    goto out;
+  }
+
+  int has_crt_values = key->dmp1 != NULL;
+  if (has_crt_values != (key->dmq1 != NULL) ||
+      has_crt_values != (key->iqmp != NULL)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_INCONSISTENT_SET_OF_CRT_VALUES);
+    goto out;
+  }
+
+  if (has_crt_values) {
+    int dmp1_ok, dmq1_ok, iqmp_ok;
+    if (!check_mod_inverse(&dmp1_ok, key->e, key->dmp1, &pm1, pm1_bits, ctx) ||
+        !check_mod_inverse(&dmq1_ok, key->e, key->dmq1, &qm1, qm1_bits, ctx) ||
+        // |p| is odd, so |pm1| and |p| have the same bit width. If they didn't,
+        // we only need a lower bound anyway.
+        !check_mod_inverse(&iqmp_ok, key->q, key->iqmp, key->p, pm1_bits,
+                           ctx)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN);
+      goto out;
+    }
+
+    if (!dmp1_ok || !dmq1_ok || !iqmp_ok) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_CRT_VALUES_INCORRECT);
+      goto out;
+    }
+  }
+
+  ok = 1;
+
+out:
+  BN_free(&tmp);
+  BN_free(&de);
+  BN_free(&pm1);
+  BN_free(&qm1);
+  BN_free(&dmp1);
+  BN_free(&dmq1);
+  BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+  return ok;
+}
+
+
+// This is the product of the 132 smallest odd primes, from 3 to 751.
+static const BN_ULONG kSmallFactorsLimbs[] = {
+    TOBN(0xc4309333, 0x3ef4e3e1), TOBN(0x71161eb6, 0xcd2d655f),
+    TOBN(0x95e2238c, 0x0bf94862), TOBN(0x3eb233d3, 0x24f7912b),
+    TOBN(0x6b55514b, 0xbf26c483), TOBN(0x0a84d817, 0x5a144871),
+    TOBN(0x77d12fee, 0x9b82210a), TOBN(0xdb5b93c2, 0x97f050b3),
+    TOBN(0x4acad6b9, 0x4d6c026b), TOBN(0xeb7751f3, 0x54aec893),
+    TOBN(0xdba53368, 0x36bc85c4), TOBN(0xd85a1b28, 0x7f5ec78e),
+    TOBN(0x2eb072d8, 0x6b322244), TOBN(0xbba51112, 0x5e2b3aea),
+    TOBN(0x36ed1a6c, 0x0e2486bf), TOBN(0x5f270460, 0xec0c5727),
+    0x000017b1
+};
+
+DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(BIGNUM, g_small_factors) {
+  out->d = (BN_ULONG *) kSmallFactorsLimbs;
+  out->width = OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kSmallFactorsLimbs);
+  out->dmax = out->width;
+  out->neg = 0;
+  out->flags = BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA;
+}
+
+int RSA_check_fips(RSA *key) {
+  if (RSA_is_opaque(key)) {
+    // Opaque keys can't be checked.
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_PUBLIC_KEY_VALIDATION_FAILED);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!RSA_check_key(key)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  BIGNUM small_gcd;
+  BN_init(&small_gcd);
+
+  int ret = 1;
+
+  // Perform partial public key validation of RSA keys (SP 800-89 5.3.3).
+  // Although this is not for primality testing, SP 800-89 cites an RSA
+  // primality testing algorithm, so we use |BN_prime_checks_for_generation| to
+  // match. This is only a plausibility test and we expect the value to be
+  // composite, so too few iterations will cause us to reject the key, not use
+  // an implausible one.
+  enum bn_primality_result_t primality_result;
+  if (BN_num_bits(key->e) <= 16 ||
+      BN_num_bits(key->e) > 256 ||
+      !BN_is_odd(key->n) ||
+      !BN_is_odd(key->e) ||
+      !BN_gcd(&small_gcd, key->n, g_small_factors(), ctx) ||
+      !BN_is_one(&small_gcd) ||
+      !BN_enhanced_miller_rabin_primality_test(&primality_result, key->n,
+                                               BN_prime_checks_for_generation,
+                                               ctx, NULL) ||
+      primality_result != bn_non_prime_power_composite) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_PUBLIC_KEY_VALIDATION_FAILED);
+    ret = 0;
+  }
+
+  BN_free(&small_gcd);
+  BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+  if (!ret || key->d == NULL || key->p == NULL) {
+    // On a failure or on only a public key, there's nothing else can be
+    // checked.
+    return ret;
+  }
+
+  // FIPS pairwise consistency test (FIPS 140-2 4.9.2). Per FIPS 140-2 IG,
+  // section 9.9, it is not known whether |rsa| will be used for signing or
+  // encryption, so either pair-wise consistency self-test is acceptable. We
+  // perform a signing test.
+  uint8_t data[32] = {0};
+  unsigned sig_len = RSA_size(key);
+  uint8_t *sig = OPENSSL_malloc(sig_len);
+  if (sig == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!RSA_sign(NID_sha256, data, sizeof(data), sig, &sig_len, key)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    ret = 0;
+    goto cleanup;
+  }
+  if (boringssl_fips_break_test("RSA_PWCT")) {
+    data[0] = ~data[0];
+  }
+  if (!RSA_verify(NID_sha256, data, sizeof(data), sig, sig_len, key)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    ret = 0;
+  }
+
+cleanup:
+  OPENSSL_free(sig);
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int rsa_private_transform_no_self_test(RSA *rsa, uint8_t *out,
+                                       const uint8_t *in, size_t len) {
+  if (rsa->meth->private_transform) {
+    return rsa->meth->private_transform(rsa, out, in, len);
+  }
+
+  return rsa_default_private_transform(rsa, out, in, len);
+}
+
+int rsa_private_transform(RSA *rsa, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
+                          size_t len) {
+  boringssl_ensure_rsa_self_test();
+  return rsa_private_transform_no_self_test(rsa, out, in, len);
+}
+
+int RSA_flags(const RSA *rsa) { return rsa->flags; }
+
+int RSA_test_flags(const RSA *rsa, int flags) { return rsa->flags & flags; }
+
+int RSA_blinding_on(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  return 1;
+}