grpc 1.62.0 → 1.68.1

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/fipsmodule/cipher/e_aes.c.inc

@@ -0,0 +1,1464 @@
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2011 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ==================================================================== */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/aead.h>
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#include <openssl/cipher.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/nid.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "../../internal.h"
+#include "../aes/internal.h"
+#include "../bcm_interface.h"
+#include "../modes/internal.h"
+#include "../service_indicator/internal.h"
+#include "../delocate.h"
+
+
+OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(push))
+OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(disable: 4702))  // Unreachable code.
+
+#define AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH 12
+
+#if defined(BSAES)
+static void vpaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks_with_bsaes(const uint8_t *in,
+                                                  uint8_t *out, size_t blocks,
+                                                  const AES_KEY *key,
+                                                  const uint8_t ivec[16]) {
+  // |bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks| is faster than |vpaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks|,
+  // but it takes at least one full 8-block batch to amortize the conversion.
+  if (blocks < 8) {
+    vpaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks(in, out, blocks, key, ivec);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  size_t bsaes_blocks = blocks;
+  if (bsaes_blocks % 8 < 6) {
+    // |bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks| internally works in 8-block batches. If the
+    // final batch is too small (under six blocks), it is faster to loop over
+    // |vpaes_encrypt|. Round |bsaes_blocks| down to a multiple of 8.
+    bsaes_blocks -= bsaes_blocks % 8;
+  }
+
+  AES_KEY bsaes;
+  vpaes_encrypt_key_to_bsaes(&bsaes, key);
+  bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks(in, out, bsaes_blocks, &bsaes, ivec);
+  OPENSSL_cleanse(&bsaes, sizeof(bsaes));
+
+  in += 16 * bsaes_blocks;
+  out += 16 * bsaes_blocks;
+  blocks -= bsaes_blocks;
+
+  uint8_t new_ivec[16];
+  memcpy(new_ivec, ivec, 12);
+  uint32_t ctr = CRYPTO_load_u32_be(ivec + 12) + bsaes_blocks;
+  CRYPTO_store_u32_be(new_ivec + 12, ctr);
+
+  // Finish any remaining blocks with |vpaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks|.
+  vpaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks(in, out, blocks, key, new_ivec);
+}
+#endif  // BSAES
+
+typedef struct {
+  union {
+    double align;
+    AES_KEY ks;
+  } ks;
+  block128_f block;
+  union {
+    cbc128_f cbc;
+    ctr128_f ctr;
+  } stream;
+} EVP_AES_KEY;
+
+typedef struct {
+  GCM128_CONTEXT gcm;
+  union {
+    double align;
+    AES_KEY ks;
+  } ks;         // AES key schedule to use
+  int key_set;  // Set if key initialised
+  int iv_set;   // Set if an iv is set
+  uint8_t *iv;  // Temporary IV store
+  int ivlen;         // IV length
+  int taglen;
+  int iv_gen;      // It is OK to generate IVs
+  ctr128_f ctr;
+} EVP_AES_GCM_CTX;
+
+static int aes_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
+                        const uint8_t *iv, int enc) {
+  int ret;
+  EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *)ctx->cipher_data;
+  const int mode = ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_MODE_MASK;
+
+  if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) {
+    switch (ctx->key_len) {
+      case 16:
+        boringssl_fips_inc_counter(fips_counter_evp_aes_128_ctr);
+        break;
+
+      case 32:
+        boringssl_fips_inc_counter(fips_counter_evp_aes_256_ctr);
+        break;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) && !enc) {
+    if (hwaes_capable()) {
+      ret = aes_hw_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks.ks);
+      dat->block = aes_hw_decrypt;
+      dat->stream.cbc = NULL;
+      if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
+        dat->stream.cbc = aes_hw_cbc_encrypt;
+      }
+    } else if (bsaes_capable() && mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
+      assert(vpaes_capable());
+      ret = vpaes_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks.ks);
+      if (ret == 0) {
+        vpaes_decrypt_key_to_bsaes(&dat->ks.ks, &dat->ks.ks);
+      }
+      // If |dat->stream.cbc| is provided, |dat->block| is never used.
+      dat->block = NULL;
+      dat->stream.cbc = bsaes_cbc_encrypt;
+    } else if (vpaes_capable()) {
+      ret = vpaes_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks.ks);
+      dat->block = vpaes_decrypt;
+      dat->stream.cbc = NULL;
+#if defined(VPAES_CBC)
+      if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
+        dat->stream.cbc = vpaes_cbc_encrypt;
+      }
+#endif
+    } else {
+      ret = aes_nohw_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks.ks);
+      dat->block = aes_nohw_decrypt;
+      dat->stream.cbc = NULL;
+      if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
+        dat->stream.cbc = aes_nohw_cbc_encrypt;
+      }
+    }
+  } else if (hwaes_capable()) {
+    ret = aes_hw_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks.ks);
+    dat->block = aes_hw_encrypt;
+    dat->stream.cbc = NULL;
+    if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
+      dat->stream.cbc = aes_hw_cbc_encrypt;
+    } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) {
+      dat->stream.ctr = aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
+    }
+  } else if (vpaes_capable()) {
+    ret = vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks.ks);
+    dat->block = vpaes_encrypt;
+    dat->stream.cbc = NULL;
+#if defined(VPAES_CBC)
+    if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
+      dat->stream.cbc = vpaes_cbc_encrypt;
+    }
+#endif
+    if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) {
+#if defined(BSAES)
+      assert(bsaes_capable());
+      dat->stream.ctr = vpaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks_with_bsaes;
+#elif defined(VPAES_CTR32)
+      dat->stream.ctr = vpaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
+#endif
+    }
+  } else {
+    ret = aes_nohw_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks.ks);
+    dat->block = aes_nohw_encrypt;
+    dat->stream.cbc = NULL;
+    if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
+      dat->stream.cbc = aes_nohw_cbc_encrypt;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (ret < 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_AES_KEY_SETUP_FAILED);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int aes_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
+                          size_t len) {
+  EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *)ctx->cipher_data;
+
+  if (dat->stream.cbc) {
+    (*dat->stream.cbc)(in, out, len, &dat->ks.ks, ctx->iv, ctx->encrypt);
+  } else if (ctx->encrypt) {
+    CRYPTO_cbc128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks.ks, ctx->iv, dat->block);
+  } else {
+    CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks.ks, ctx->iv, dat->block);
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int aes_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
+                          size_t len) {
+  size_t bl = ctx->cipher->block_size;
+  EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *)ctx->cipher_data;
+
+  if (len < bl) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  len -= bl;
+  for (size_t i = 0; i <= len; i += bl) {
+    (*dat->block)(in + i, out + i, &dat->ks.ks);
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int aes_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
+                          size_t len) {
+  EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *)ctx->cipher_data;
+
+  if (dat->stream.ctr) {
+    CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32(in, out, len, &dat->ks.ks, ctx->iv, ctx->buf,
+                                &ctx->num, dat->stream.ctr);
+  } else {
+    CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks.ks, ctx->iv, ctx->buf,
+                          &ctx->num, dat->block);
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int aes_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
+                          size_t len) {
+  EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *)ctx->cipher_data;
+
+  CRYPTO_ofb128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks.ks, ctx->iv, &ctx->num,
+                        dat->block);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+ctr128_f aes_ctr_set_key(AES_KEY *aes_key, GCM128_KEY *gcm_key,
+                         block128_f *out_block, const uint8_t *key,
+                         size_t key_bytes) {
+  // This function assumes the key length was previously validated.
+  assert(key_bytes == 128 / 8 || key_bytes == 192 / 8 || key_bytes == 256 / 8);
+  if (hwaes_capable()) {
+    aes_hw_set_encrypt_key(key, (int)key_bytes * 8, aes_key);
+    if (gcm_key != NULL) {
+      CRYPTO_gcm128_init_key(gcm_key, aes_key, aes_hw_encrypt, 1);
+    }
+    if (out_block) {
+      *out_block = aes_hw_encrypt;
+    }
+    return aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
+  }
+
+  if (vpaes_capable()) {
+    vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, (int)key_bytes * 8, aes_key);
+    if (out_block) {
+      *out_block = vpaes_encrypt;
+    }
+    if (gcm_key != NULL) {
+      CRYPTO_gcm128_init_key(gcm_key, aes_key, vpaes_encrypt, 0);
+    }
+#if defined(BSAES)
+    assert(bsaes_capable());
+    return vpaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks_with_bsaes;
+#elif defined(VPAES_CTR32)
+    return vpaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
+#else
+    return NULL;
+#endif
+  }
+
+  aes_nohw_set_encrypt_key(key, (int)key_bytes * 8, aes_key);
+  if (gcm_key != NULL) {
+    CRYPTO_gcm128_init_key(gcm_key, aes_key, aes_nohw_encrypt, 0);
+  }
+  if (out_block) {
+    *out_block = aes_nohw_encrypt;
+  }
+  return aes_nohw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
+}
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_32_BIT)
+#define EVP_AES_GCM_CTX_PADDING (4+8)
+#else
+#define EVP_AES_GCM_CTX_PADDING 8
+#endif
+
+static EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *aes_gcm_from_cipher_ctx(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) {
+  static_assert(
+      alignof(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX) <= 16,
+      "EVP_AES_GCM_CTX needs more alignment than this function provides");
+
+  // |malloc| guarantees up to 4-byte alignment on 32-bit and 8-byte alignment
+  // on 64-bit systems, so we need to adjust to reach 16-byte alignment.
+  assert(ctx->cipher->ctx_size ==
+         sizeof(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX) + EVP_AES_GCM_CTX_PADDING);
+
+  char *ptr = ctx->cipher_data;
+#if defined(OPENSSL_32_BIT)
+  assert((uintptr_t)ptr % 4 == 0);
+  ptr += (uintptr_t)ptr & 4;
+#endif
+  assert((uintptr_t)ptr % 8 == 0);
+  ptr += (uintptr_t)ptr & 8;
+  return (EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *)ptr;
+}
+
+static int aes_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
+                            const uint8_t *iv, int enc) {
+  EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = aes_gcm_from_cipher_ctx(ctx);
+  if (!iv && !key) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  switch (ctx->key_len) {
+    case 16:
+      boringssl_fips_inc_counter(fips_counter_evp_aes_128_gcm);
+      break;
+
+    case 32:
+      boringssl_fips_inc_counter(fips_counter_evp_aes_256_gcm);
+      break;
+  }
+
+  if (key) {
+    OPENSSL_memset(&gctx->gcm, 0, sizeof(gctx->gcm));
+    gctx->ctr = aes_ctr_set_key(&gctx->ks.ks, &gctx->gcm.gcm_key, NULL, key,
+                                ctx->key_len);
+    // If we have an iv can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV.
+    if (iv == NULL && gctx->iv_set) {
+      iv = gctx->iv;
+    }
+    if (iv) {
+      CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks.ks, iv, gctx->ivlen);
+      gctx->iv_set = 1;
+    }
+    gctx->key_set = 1;
+  } else {
+    // If key set use IV, otherwise copy
+    if (gctx->key_set) {
+      CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks.ks, iv, gctx->ivlen);
+    } else {
+      OPENSSL_memcpy(gctx->iv, iv, gctx->ivlen);
+    }
+    gctx->iv_set = 1;
+    gctx->iv_gen = 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static void aes_gcm_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c) {
+  EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = aes_gcm_from_cipher_ctx(c);
+  OPENSSL_cleanse(&gctx->gcm, sizeof(gctx->gcm));
+  if (gctx->iv != c->iv) {
+    OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv);
+  }
+}
+
+static int aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr) {
+  EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = aes_gcm_from_cipher_ctx(c);
+  switch (type) {
+    case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
+      gctx->key_set = 0;
+      gctx->iv_set = 0;
+      gctx->ivlen = c->cipher->iv_len;
+      gctx->iv = c->iv;
+      gctx->taglen = -1;
+      gctx->iv_gen = 0;
+      return 1;
+
+    case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN:
+      if (arg <= 0) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+
+      // Allocate memory for IV if needed
+      if (arg > EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH && arg > gctx->ivlen) {
+        if (gctx->iv != c->iv) {
+          OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv);
+        }
+        gctx->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(arg);
+        if (!gctx->iv) {
+          return 0;
+        }
+      }
+      gctx->ivlen = arg;
+      return 1;
+
+    case EVP_CTRL_GET_IVLEN:
+      *(int *)ptr = gctx->ivlen;
+      return 1;
+
+    case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG:
+      if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || c->encrypt) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+      OPENSSL_memcpy(c->buf, ptr, arg);
+      gctx->taglen = arg;
+      return 1;
+
+    case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG:
+      if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || !c->encrypt || gctx->taglen < 0) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+      OPENSSL_memcpy(ptr, c->buf, arg);
+      return 1;
+
+    case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IV_FIXED:
+      // Special case: -1 length restores whole IV
+      if (arg == -1) {
+        OPENSSL_memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, gctx->ivlen);
+        gctx->iv_gen = 1;
+        return 1;
+      }
+      // Fixed field must be at least 4 bytes and invocation field
+      // at least 8.
+      if (arg < 4 || (gctx->ivlen - arg) < 8) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+      OPENSSL_memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, arg);
+      if (c->encrypt) {
+        // |BCM_rand_bytes| calls within the fipsmodule should be wrapped with
+        // state lock functions to avoid updating the service indicator with the
+        // DRBG functions.
+        FIPS_service_indicator_lock_state();
+        BCM_rand_bytes(gctx->iv + arg, gctx->ivlen - arg);
+        FIPS_service_indicator_unlock_state();
+      }
+      gctx->iv_gen = 1;
+      return 1;
+
+    case EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN: {
+      if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+      CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks.ks, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
+      if (arg <= 0 || arg > gctx->ivlen) {
+        arg = gctx->ivlen;
+      }
+      OPENSSL_memcpy(ptr, gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, arg);
+      // Invocation field will be at least 8 bytes in size, so no need to check
+      // wrap around or increment more than last 8 bytes.
+      uint8_t *ctr = gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - 8;
+      CRYPTO_store_u64_be(ctr, CRYPTO_load_u64_be(ctr) + 1);
+      gctx->iv_set = 1;
+      return 1;
+    }
+
+    case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV:
+      if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0 || c->encrypt) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+      OPENSSL_memcpy(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, ptr, arg);
+      CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks.ks, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
+      gctx->iv_set = 1;
+      return 1;
+
+    case EVP_CTRL_COPY: {
+      EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr;
+      EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx_out = aes_gcm_from_cipher_ctx(out);
+      // |EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy| copies this generically, but we must redo it in
+      // case |out->cipher_data| and |in->cipher_data| are differently aligned.
+      OPENSSL_memcpy(gctx_out, gctx, sizeof(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX));
+      if (gctx->iv == c->iv) {
+        gctx_out->iv = out->iv;
+      } else {
+        gctx_out->iv = OPENSSL_memdup(gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
+        if (!gctx_out->iv) {
+          return 0;
+        }
+      }
+      return 1;
+    }
+
+    default:
+      return -1;
+  }
+}
+
+static int aes_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
+                          size_t len) {
+  EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = aes_gcm_from_cipher_ctx(ctx);
+
+  // If not set up, return error
+  if (!gctx->key_set) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+  if (!gctx->iv_set) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (len > INT_MAX) {
+    // This function signature can only express up to |INT_MAX| bytes encrypted.
+    //
+    // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/494): Make the internal |EVP_CIPHER|
+    // calling convention |size_t|-clean.
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (in) {
+    if (out == NULL) {
+      if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gctx->gcm, in, len)) {
+        return -1;
+      }
+    } else if (ctx->encrypt) {
+      if (gctx->ctr) {
+        if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks.ks, in, out, len,
+                                         gctx->ctr)) {
+          return -1;
+        }
+      } else {
+        if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks.ks, in, out, len)) {
+          return -1;
+        }
+      }
+    } else {
+      if (gctx->ctr) {
+        if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks.ks, in, out, len,
+                                         gctx->ctr)) {
+          return -1;
+        }
+      } else {
+        if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks.ks, in, out, len)) {
+          return -1;
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    return (int)len;
+  } else {
+    if (!ctx->encrypt) {
+      if (gctx->taglen < 0 ||
+          !CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(&gctx->gcm, ctx->buf, gctx->taglen)) {
+        return -1;
+      }
+      gctx->iv_set = 0;
+      return 0;
+    }
+    CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, ctx->buf, 16);
+    gctx->taglen = 16;
+    // Don't reuse the IV
+    gctx->iv_set = 0;
+    return 0;
+  }
+}
+
+DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_CIPHER, EVP_aes_128_cbc) {
+  memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
+
+  out->nid = NID_aes_128_cbc;
+  out->block_size = 16;
+  out->key_len = 16;
+  out->iv_len = 16;
+  out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY);
+  out->flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE;
+  out->init = aes_init_key;
+  out->cipher = aes_cbc_cipher;
+}
+
+DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_CIPHER, EVP_aes_128_ctr) {
+  memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
+
+  out->nid = NID_aes_128_ctr;
+  out->block_size = 1;
+  out->key_len = 16;
+  out->iv_len = 16;
+  out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY);
+  out->flags = EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE;
+  out->init = aes_init_key;
+  out->cipher = aes_ctr_cipher;
+}
+
+DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_128_ecb_generic) {
+  memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
+
+  out->nid = NID_aes_128_ecb;
+  out->block_size = 16;
+  out->key_len = 16;
+  out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY);
+  out->flags = EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE;
+  out->init = aes_init_key;
+  out->cipher = aes_ecb_cipher;
+}
+
+DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_CIPHER, EVP_aes_128_ofb) {
+  memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
+
+  out->nid = NID_aes_128_ofb128;
+  out->block_size = 1;
+  out->key_len = 16;
+  out->iv_len = 16;
+  out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY);
+  out->flags = EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE;
+  out->init = aes_init_key;
+  out->cipher = aes_ofb_cipher;
+}
+
+DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_CIPHER, EVP_aes_128_gcm) {
+  memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
+
+  out->nid = NID_aes_128_gcm;
+  out->block_size = 1;
+  out->key_len = 16;
+  out->iv_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
+  out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX) + EVP_AES_GCM_CTX_PADDING;
+  out->flags = EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY |
+               EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT |
+               EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER;
+  out->init = aes_gcm_init_key;
+  out->cipher = aes_gcm_cipher;
+  out->cleanup = aes_gcm_cleanup;
+  out->ctrl = aes_gcm_ctrl;
+}
+
+DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_CIPHER, EVP_aes_192_cbc) {
+  memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
+
+  out->nid = NID_aes_192_cbc;
+  out->block_size = 16;
+  out->key_len = 24;
+  out->iv_len = 16;
+  out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY);
+  out->flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE;
+  out->init = aes_init_key;
+  out->cipher = aes_cbc_cipher;
+}
+
+DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_CIPHER, EVP_aes_192_ctr) {
+  memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
+
+  out->nid = NID_aes_192_ctr;
+  out->block_size = 1;
+  out->key_len = 24;
+  out->iv_len = 16;
+  out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY);
+  out->flags = EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE;
+  out->init = aes_init_key;
+  out->cipher = aes_ctr_cipher;
+}
+
+DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_192_ecb_generic) {
+  memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
+
+  out->nid = NID_aes_192_ecb;
+  out->block_size = 16;
+  out->key_len = 24;
+  out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY);
+  out->flags = EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE;
+  out->init = aes_init_key;
+  out->cipher = aes_ecb_cipher;
+}
+
+DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_CIPHER, EVP_aes_192_ofb) {
+  memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
+
+  out->nid = NID_aes_192_ofb128;
+  out->block_size = 1;
+  out->key_len = 24;
+  out->iv_len = 16;
+  out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY);
+  out->flags = EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE;
+  out->init = aes_init_key;
+  out->cipher = aes_ofb_cipher;
+}
+
+DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_CIPHER, EVP_aes_192_gcm) {
+  memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
+
+  out->nid = NID_aes_192_gcm;
+  out->block_size = 1;
+  out->key_len = 24;
+  out->iv_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
+  out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX) + EVP_AES_GCM_CTX_PADDING;
+  out->flags = EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY |
+               EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT |
+               EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER;
+  out->init = aes_gcm_init_key;
+  out->cipher = aes_gcm_cipher;
+  out->cleanup = aes_gcm_cleanup;
+  out->ctrl = aes_gcm_ctrl;
+}
+
+DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_CIPHER, EVP_aes_256_cbc) {
+  memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
+
+  out->nid = NID_aes_256_cbc;
+  out->block_size = 16;
+  out->key_len = 32;
+  out->iv_len = 16;
+  out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY);
+  out->flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE;
+  out->init = aes_init_key;
+  out->cipher = aes_cbc_cipher;
+}
+
+DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_CIPHER, EVP_aes_256_ctr) {
+  memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
+
+  out->nid = NID_aes_256_ctr;
+  out->block_size = 1;
+  out->key_len = 32;
+  out->iv_len = 16;
+  out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY);
+  out->flags = EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE;
+  out->init = aes_init_key;
+  out->cipher = aes_ctr_cipher;
+}
+
+DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_256_ecb_generic) {
+  memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
+
+  out->nid = NID_aes_256_ecb;
+  out->block_size = 16;
+  out->key_len = 32;
+  out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY);
+  out->flags = EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE;
+  out->init = aes_init_key;
+  out->cipher = aes_ecb_cipher;
+}
+
+DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_CIPHER, EVP_aes_256_ofb) {
+  memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
+
+  out->nid = NID_aes_256_ofb128;
+  out->block_size = 1;
+  out->key_len = 32;
+  out->iv_len = 16;
+  out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY);
+  out->flags = EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE;
+  out->init = aes_init_key;
+  out->cipher = aes_ofb_cipher;
+}
+
+DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_CIPHER, EVP_aes_256_gcm) {
+  memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
+
+  out->nid = NID_aes_256_gcm;
+  out->block_size = 1;
+  out->key_len = 32;
+  out->iv_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
+  out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX) + EVP_AES_GCM_CTX_PADDING;
+  out->flags = EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY |
+               EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT |
+               EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER;
+  out->init = aes_gcm_init_key;
+  out->cipher = aes_gcm_cipher;
+  out->cleanup = aes_gcm_cleanup;
+  out->ctrl = aes_gcm_ctrl;
+}
+
+#if defined(HWAES_ECB)
+
+static int aes_hw_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
+                             const uint8_t *in, size_t len) {
+  size_t bl = ctx->cipher->block_size;
+
+  if (len < bl) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  aes_hw_ecb_encrypt(in, out, len, ctx->cipher_data, ctx->encrypt);
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_hw_128_ecb) {
+  memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
+
+  out->nid = NID_aes_128_ecb;
+  out->block_size = 16;
+  out->key_len = 16;
+  out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY);
+  out->flags = EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE;
+  out->init = aes_init_key;
+  out->cipher = aes_hw_ecb_cipher;
+}
+
+DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_hw_192_ecb) {
+  memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
+
+  out->nid = NID_aes_192_ecb;
+  out->block_size = 16;
+  out->key_len = 24;
+  out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY);
+  out->flags = EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE;
+  out->init = aes_init_key;
+  out->cipher = aes_hw_ecb_cipher;
+}
+
+DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_hw_256_ecb) {
+  memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
+
+  out->nid = NID_aes_256_ecb;
+  out->block_size = 16;
+  out->key_len = 32;
+  out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY);
+  out->flags = EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE;
+  out->init = aes_init_key;
+  out->cipher = aes_hw_ecb_cipher;
+}
+
+#define EVP_ECB_CIPHER_FUNCTION(keybits)            \
+  const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keybits##_ecb(void) { \
+    if (hwaes_capable()) {                          \
+      return aes_hw_##keybits##_ecb();              \
+    }                                               \
+    return aes_##keybits##_ecb_generic();           \
+  }
+
+#else
+
+#define EVP_ECB_CIPHER_FUNCTION(keybits)            \
+  const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keybits##_ecb(void) { \
+    return aes_##keybits##_ecb_generic();           \
+  }
+
+#endif  // HWAES_ECB
+
+EVP_ECB_CIPHER_FUNCTION(128)
+EVP_ECB_CIPHER_FUNCTION(192)
+EVP_ECB_CIPHER_FUNCTION(256)
+
+
+#define EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN 16
+
+struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx {
+  union {
+    double align;
+    AES_KEY ks;
+  } ks;
+  GCM128_KEY gcm_key;
+  ctr128_f ctr;
+};
+
+static int aead_aes_gcm_init_impl(struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx,
+                                  size_t *out_tag_len, const uint8_t *key,
+                                  size_t key_len, size_t tag_len) {
+  const size_t key_bits = key_len * 8;
+
+  switch (key_bits) {
+    case 128:
+      boringssl_fips_inc_counter(fips_counter_evp_aes_128_gcm);
+      break;
+
+    case 256:
+      boringssl_fips_inc_counter(fips_counter_evp_aes_256_gcm);
+      break;
+  }
+
+  if (key_bits != 128 && key_bits != 192 && key_bits != 256) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_KEY_LENGTH);
+    return 0;  // EVP_AEAD_CTX_init should catch this.
+  }
+
+  if (tag_len == EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH) {
+    tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
+  }
+
+  if (tag_len > EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TAG_TOO_LARGE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  gcm_ctx->ctr =
+      aes_ctr_set_key(&gcm_ctx->ks.ks, &gcm_ctx->gcm_key, NULL, key, key_len);
+  *out_tag_len = tag_len;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static_assert(sizeof(((EVP_AEAD_CTX *)NULL)->state) >=
+                  sizeof(struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx),
+              "AEAD state is too small");
+static_assert(alignof(union evp_aead_ctx_st_state) >=
+                  alignof(struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx),
+              "AEAD state has insufficient alignment");
+
+static int aead_aes_gcm_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
+                             size_t key_len, size_t requested_tag_len) {
+  struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx = (struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *) &ctx->state;
+
+  size_t actual_tag_len;
+  if (!aead_aes_gcm_init_impl(gcm_ctx, &actual_tag_len, key, key_len,
+                              requested_tag_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  ctx->tag_len = actual_tag_len;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static void aead_aes_gcm_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) {}
+
+static int aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_impl(
+    const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx,
+    uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_tag, size_t *out_tag_len, size_t max_out_tag_len,
+    const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
+    const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+    const uint8_t *extra_in, size_t extra_in_len,
+    const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len,
+    size_t tag_len) {
+  if (extra_in_len + tag_len < tag_len) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (max_out_tag_len < extra_in_len + tag_len) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (nonce_len == 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  const AES_KEY *key = &gcm_ctx->ks.ks;
+
+  GCM128_CONTEXT gcm;
+  OPENSSL_memset(&gcm, 0, sizeof(gcm));
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(&gcm.gcm_key, &gcm_ctx->gcm_key, sizeof(gcm.gcm_key));
+  CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gcm, key, nonce, nonce_len);
+
+  if (ad_len > 0 && !CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gcm, ad, ad_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (gcm_ctx->ctr) {
+    if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(&gcm, key, in, out, in_len,
+                                     gcm_ctx->ctr)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  } else {
+    if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gcm, key, in, out, in_len)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (extra_in_len) {
+    if (gcm_ctx->ctr) {
+      if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(&gcm, key, extra_in, out_tag,
+                                       extra_in_len, gcm_ctx->ctr)) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+    } else {
+      if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gcm, key, extra_in, out_tag, extra_in_len)) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gcm, out_tag + extra_in_len, tag_len);
+  *out_tag_len = tag_len + extra_in_len;
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
+                                     uint8_t *out_tag, size_t *out_tag_len,
+                                     size_t max_out_tag_len,
+                                     const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
+                                     const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+                                     const uint8_t *extra_in,
+                                     size_t extra_in_len,
+                                     const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
+  const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx =
+      (const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *)&ctx->state;
+  return aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_impl(
+      gcm_ctx, out, out_tag, out_tag_len, max_out_tag_len, nonce, nonce_len, in,
+      in_len, extra_in, extra_in_len, ad, ad_len, ctx->tag_len);
+}
+
+static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_impl(const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx,
+                                         uint8_t *out,
+                                         const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
+                                         const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+                                         const uint8_t *in_tag,
+                                         size_t in_tag_len,
+                                         const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len,
+                                         size_t tag_len) {
+  uint8_t tag[EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN];
+
+  if (nonce_len == 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (in_tag_len != tag_len) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  const AES_KEY *key = &gcm_ctx->ks.ks;
+
+  GCM128_CONTEXT gcm;
+  OPENSSL_memset(&gcm, 0, sizeof(gcm));
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(&gcm.gcm_key, &gcm_ctx->gcm_key, sizeof(gcm.gcm_key));
+  CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gcm, key, nonce, nonce_len);
+
+  if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gcm, ad, ad_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (gcm_ctx->ctr) {
+    if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(&gcm, key, in, out, in_len,
+                                     gcm_ctx->ctr)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  } else {
+    if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gcm, key, in, out, in_len)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gcm, tag, tag_len);
+  if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, in_tag, tag_len) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
+                                    const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
+                                    const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+                                    const uint8_t *in_tag, size_t in_tag_len,
+                                    const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
+  struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx = (struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *)&ctx->state;
+  if (!aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_impl(gcm_ctx, out, nonce, nonce_len, in, in_len,
+                                     in_tag, in_tag_len, ad, ad_len,
+                                     ctx->tag_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  AEAD_GCM_verify_service_indicator(ctx);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm) {
+  memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
+
+  out->key_len = 16;
+  out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
+  out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
+  out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
+  out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
+
+  out->init = aead_aes_gcm_init;
+  out->cleanup = aead_aes_gcm_cleanup;
+  out->seal_scatter = aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter;
+  out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather;
+}
+
+DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_192_gcm) {
+  memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
+
+  out->key_len = 24;
+  out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
+  out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
+  out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
+  out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
+
+  out->init = aead_aes_gcm_init;
+  out->cleanup = aead_aes_gcm_cleanup;
+  out->seal_scatter = aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter;
+  out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather;
+}
+
+DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm) {
+  memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
+
+  out->key_len = 32;
+  out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
+  out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
+  out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
+  out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
+
+  out->init = aead_aes_gcm_init;
+  out->cleanup = aead_aes_gcm_cleanup;
+  out->seal_scatter = aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter;
+  out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather;
+}
+
+static int aead_aes_gcm_init_randnonce(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
+                                       size_t key_len,
+                                       size_t requested_tag_len) {
+  if (requested_tag_len != EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH) {
+    if (requested_tag_len < AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+      return 0;
+    }
+    requested_tag_len -= AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
+  }
+
+  if (!aead_aes_gcm_init(ctx, key, key_len, requested_tag_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  ctx->tag_len += AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_randnonce(
+    const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx,
+    uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_tag, size_t *out_tag_len, size_t max_out_tag_len,
+    const uint8_t *external_nonce, size_t external_nonce_len,
+    const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+    const uint8_t *extra_in, size_t extra_in_len,
+    const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
+  if (external_nonce_len != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t nonce[AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH];
+  if (max_out_tag_len < sizeof(nonce)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // |BCM_rand_bytes| calls within the fipsmodule should be wrapped with state
+  // lock functions to avoid updating the service indicator with the DRBG
+  // functions.
+  FIPS_service_indicator_lock_state();
+  BCM_rand_bytes(nonce, sizeof(nonce));
+  FIPS_service_indicator_unlock_state();
+
+  const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx =
+      (const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *)&ctx->state;
+  if (!aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_impl(gcm_ctx, out, out_tag, out_tag_len,
+                                      max_out_tag_len - AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH,
+                                      nonce, sizeof(nonce), in, in_len,
+                                      extra_in, extra_in_len, ad, ad_len,
+                                      ctx->tag_len - AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  assert(*out_tag_len + sizeof(nonce) <= max_out_tag_len);
+  memcpy(out_tag + *out_tag_len, nonce, sizeof(nonce));
+  *out_tag_len += sizeof(nonce);
+
+  AEAD_GCM_verify_service_indicator(ctx);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_randnonce(
+    const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
+    const uint8_t *external_nonce, size_t external_nonce_len,
+    const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+    const uint8_t *in_tag, size_t in_tag_len,
+    const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
+  if (external_nonce_len != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (in_tag_len < AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  const uint8_t *nonce = in_tag + in_tag_len - AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
+
+  const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx =
+      (const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *)&ctx->state;
+  if (!aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_impl(
+      gcm_ctx, out, nonce, AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH, in, in_len, in_tag,
+      in_tag_len - AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH, ad, ad_len,
+      ctx->tag_len - AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  AEAD_GCM_verify_service_indicator(ctx);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_randnonce) {
+  memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
+
+  out->key_len = 16;
+  out->nonce_len = 0;
+  out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN + AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
+  out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN + AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
+  out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
+
+  out->init = aead_aes_gcm_init_randnonce;
+  out->cleanup = aead_aes_gcm_cleanup;
+  out->seal_scatter = aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_randnonce;
+  out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_randnonce;
+}
+
+DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_randnonce) {
+  memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
+
+  out->key_len = 32;
+  out->nonce_len = 0;
+  out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN + AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
+  out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN + AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
+  out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
+
+  out->init = aead_aes_gcm_init_randnonce;
+  out->cleanup = aead_aes_gcm_cleanup;
+  out->seal_scatter = aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_randnonce;
+  out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_randnonce;
+}
+
+struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx {
+  struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx gcm_ctx;
+  uint64_t min_next_nonce;
+};
+
+static_assert(sizeof(((EVP_AEAD_CTX *)NULL)->state) >=
+                  sizeof(struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx),
+              "AEAD state is too small");
+static_assert(alignof(union evp_aead_ctx_st_state) >=
+                  alignof(struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx),
+              "AEAD state has insufficient alignment");
+
+static int aead_aes_gcm_tls12_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
+                                   size_t key_len, size_t requested_tag_len) {
+  struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx *gcm_ctx =
+      (struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx *) &ctx->state;
+
+  gcm_ctx->min_next_nonce = 0;
+
+  size_t actual_tag_len;
+  if (!aead_aes_gcm_init_impl(&gcm_ctx->gcm_ctx, &actual_tag_len, key, key_len,
+                              requested_tag_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  ctx->tag_len = actual_tag_len;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int aead_aes_gcm_tls12_seal_scatter(
+    const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_tag,
+    size_t *out_tag_len, size_t max_out_tag_len, const uint8_t *nonce,
+    size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *extra_in,
+    size_t extra_in_len, const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
+  struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx *gcm_ctx =
+      (struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx *) &ctx->state;
+
+  if (nonce_len != AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // The given nonces must be strictly monotonically increasing.
+  uint64_t given_counter =
+      CRYPTO_load_u64_be(nonce + nonce_len - sizeof(uint64_t));
+  if (given_counter == UINT64_MAX || given_counter < gcm_ctx->min_next_nonce) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  gcm_ctx->min_next_nonce = given_counter + 1;
+
+  if (!aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter(ctx, out, out_tag, out_tag_len,
+                                 max_out_tag_len, nonce, nonce_len, in, in_len,
+                                 extra_in, extra_in_len, ad, ad_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  AEAD_GCM_verify_service_indicator(ctx);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_tls12) {
+  memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
+
+  out->key_len = 16;
+  out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
+  out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
+  out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
+  out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
+
+  out->init = aead_aes_gcm_tls12_init;
+  out->cleanup = aead_aes_gcm_cleanup;
+  out->seal_scatter = aead_aes_gcm_tls12_seal_scatter;
+  out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather;
+}
+
+DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_tls12) {
+  memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
+
+  out->key_len = 32;
+  out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
+  out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
+  out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
+  out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
+
+  out->init = aead_aes_gcm_tls12_init;
+  out->cleanup = aead_aes_gcm_cleanup;
+  out->seal_scatter = aead_aes_gcm_tls12_seal_scatter;
+  out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather;
+}
+
+struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx {
+  struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx gcm_ctx;
+  uint64_t min_next_nonce;
+  uint64_t mask;
+  uint8_t first;
+};
+
+static_assert(sizeof(((EVP_AEAD_CTX *)NULL)->state) >=
+                  sizeof(struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx),
+              "AEAD state is too small");
+static_assert(alignof(union evp_aead_ctx_st_state) >=
+                  alignof(struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx),
+              "AEAD state has insufficient alignment");
+
+static int aead_aes_gcm_tls13_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
+                                   size_t key_len, size_t requested_tag_len) {
+  struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx *gcm_ctx =
+      (struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx *) &ctx->state;
+
+  gcm_ctx->min_next_nonce = 0;
+  gcm_ctx->first = 1;
+
+  size_t actual_tag_len;
+  if (!aead_aes_gcm_init_impl(&gcm_ctx->gcm_ctx, &actual_tag_len, key, key_len,
+                              requested_tag_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  ctx->tag_len = actual_tag_len;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int aead_aes_gcm_tls13_seal_scatter(
+    const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_tag,
+    size_t *out_tag_len, size_t max_out_tag_len, const uint8_t *nonce,
+    size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *extra_in,
+    size_t extra_in_len, const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
+  struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx *gcm_ctx =
+      (struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx *) &ctx->state;
+
+  if (nonce_len != AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // The given nonces must be strictly monotonically increasing. See
+  // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-5.3 for details of the TLS 1.3
+  // nonce construction.
+  uint64_t given_counter =
+      CRYPTO_load_u64_be(nonce + nonce_len - sizeof(uint64_t));
+
+  if (gcm_ctx->first) {
+    // In the first call the sequence number will be zero and therefore the
+    // given nonce will be 0 ^ mask = mask.
+    gcm_ctx->mask = given_counter;
+    gcm_ctx->first = 0;
+  }
+  given_counter ^= gcm_ctx->mask;
+
+  if (given_counter == UINT64_MAX ||
+      given_counter < gcm_ctx->min_next_nonce) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  gcm_ctx->min_next_nonce = given_counter + 1;
+
+  if (!aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter(ctx, out, out_tag, out_tag_len,
+                                 max_out_tag_len, nonce, nonce_len, in, in_len,
+                                 extra_in, extra_in_len, ad, ad_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  AEAD_GCM_verify_service_indicator(ctx);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_tls13) {
+  memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
+
+  out->key_len = 16;
+  out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
+  out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
+  out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
+  out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
+
+  out->init = aead_aes_gcm_tls13_init;
+  out->cleanup = aead_aes_gcm_cleanup;
+  out->seal_scatter = aead_aes_gcm_tls13_seal_scatter;
+  out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather;
+}
+
+DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_tls13) {
+  memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
+
+  out->key_len = 32;
+  out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
+  out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
+  out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
+  out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
+
+  out->init = aead_aes_gcm_tls13_init;
+  out->cleanup = aead_aes_gcm_cleanup;
+  out->seal_scatter = aead_aes_gcm_tls13_seal_scatter;
+  out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather;
+}
+
+int EVP_has_aes_hardware(void) {
+#if defined(OPENSSL_X86) || defined(OPENSSL_X86_64)
+  return hwaes_capable() && crypto_gcm_clmul_enabled();
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_ARM) || defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64)
+  return hwaes_capable() && CRYPTO_is_ARMv8_PMULL_capable();
+#else
+  return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(pop))