grpc 1.53.0 → 1.56.0

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c

@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-/* v3_purp.c */
 /*
  * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
  * 2001.
@@ -59,8 +58,8 @@
 
 #include <string.h>
 
-#include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/digest.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/mem.h>
 #include <openssl/obj.h>
 #include <openssl/thread.h>
@@ -70,13 +69,13 @@
 #include "../x509/internal.h"
 #include "internal.h"
 
-#define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS)
+#define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1 | EXFLAG_SS)
 #define ku_reject(x, usage) \
-        (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
+  (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
 #define xku_reject(x, usage) \
-        (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage)))
+  (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage)))
 #define ns_reject(x, usage) \
-        (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage)))
+  (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage)))
 
 static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
                                     int ca);
@@ -96,16 +95,14 @@ static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
 static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
 static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
 
-static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE **a, const X509_PURPOSE **b);
+static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE *const *a, const X509_PURPOSE *const *b);
 static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p);
 
 static X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = {
     {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0,
-     check_purpose_ssl_client, (char *)"SSL client", (char *)"sslclient",
-     NULL},
+     check_purpose_ssl_client, (char *)"SSL client", (char *)"sslclient", NULL},
     {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0,
-     check_purpose_ssl_server, (char *)"SSL server", (char *)"sslserver",
-     NULL},
+     check_purpose_ssl_server, (char *)"SSL server", (char *)"sslserver", NULL},
     {X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0,
      check_purpose_ns_ssl_server, (char *)"Netscape SSL server",
      (char *)"nssslserver", NULL},
@@ -125,805 +122,769 @@ static X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = {
      (char *)"timestampsign", NULL},
 };
 
-#define X509_PURPOSE_COUNT (sizeof(xstandard)/sizeof(X509_PURPOSE))
+#define X509_PURPOSE_COUNT (sizeof(xstandard) / sizeof(X509_PURPOSE))
 
 static STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) *xptable = NULL;
 
-static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE **a, const X509_PURPOSE **b)
-{
-    return (*a)->purpose - (*b)->purpose;
+static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE *const *a, const X509_PURPOSE *const *b) {
+  return (*a)->purpose - (*b)->purpose;
 }
 
-/*
- * As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509* I
- * really can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const
- * things.
- */
-int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca)
-{
-    int idx;
-    const X509_PURPOSE *pt;
-    if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) {
-        return -1;
-    }
+// As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509* I
+// really can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const
+// things.
+int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca) {
+  int idx;
+  const X509_PURPOSE *pt;
+  if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
 
-    if (id == -1)
-        return 1;
-    idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
-    if (idx == -1)
-        return -1;
-    pt = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
-    return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, ca);
+  if (id == -1) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+  idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
+  if (idx == -1) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+  pt = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
+  return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, ca);
 }
 
-int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose)
-{
-    if (X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    *p = purpose;
-    return 1;
+int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose) {
+  if (X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  *p = purpose;
+  return 1;
 }
 
-int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void)
-{
-    if (!xptable)
-        return X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
-    return sk_X509_PURPOSE_num(xptable) + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
+int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void) {
+  if (!xptable) {
+    return X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
+  }
+  return sk_X509_PURPOSE_num(xptable) + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
 }
 
-X509_PURPOSE *X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx)
-{
-    if (idx < 0)
-        return NULL;
-    if (idx < (int)X509_PURPOSE_COUNT)
-        return xstandard + idx;
-    return sk_X509_PURPOSE_value(xptable, idx - X509_PURPOSE_COUNT);
+X509_PURPOSE *X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx) {
+  if (idx < 0) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  if (idx < (int)X509_PURPOSE_COUNT) {
+    return xstandard + idx;
+  }
+  return sk_X509_PURPOSE_value(xptable, idx - X509_PURPOSE_COUNT);
 }
 
-int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(char *sname)
-{
-    int i;
-    X509_PURPOSE *xptmp;
-    for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) {
-        xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i);
-        if (!strcmp(xptmp->sname, sname))
-            return i;
+int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(char *sname) {
+  int i;
+  X509_PURPOSE *xptmp;
+  for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) {
+    xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i);
+    if (!strcmp(xptmp->sname, sname)) {
+      return i;
     }
-    return -1;
+  }
+  return -1;
 }
 
-int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose)
-{
-    X509_PURPOSE tmp;
-    size_t idx;
+int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose) {
+  X509_PURPOSE tmp;
+  size_t idx;
 
-    if ((purpose >= X509_PURPOSE_MIN) && (purpose <= X509_PURPOSE_MAX))
-        return purpose - X509_PURPOSE_MIN;
-    tmp.purpose = purpose;
-    if (!xptable)
-        return -1;
+  if ((purpose >= X509_PURPOSE_MIN) && (purpose <= X509_PURPOSE_MAX)) {
+    return purpose - X509_PURPOSE_MIN;
+  }
+  tmp.purpose = purpose;
+  if (!xptable) {
+    return -1;
+  }
 
-    sk_X509_PURPOSE_sort(xptable);
-    if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_find(xptable, &idx, &tmp))
-        return -1;
-    return idx + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
+  if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_find(xptable, &idx, &tmp)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+  return idx + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
 }
 
 int X509_PURPOSE_add(int id, int trust, int flags,
-                     int (*ck) (const X509_PURPOSE *, const X509 *, int),
-                     char *name, char *sname, void *arg)
-{
-    int idx;
-    X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
-    char *name_dup, *sname_dup;
-
-    /*
-     * This is set according to what we change: application can't set it
-     */
-    flags &= ~X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
-    /* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */
-    flags |= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME;
-    /* Get existing entry if any */
-    idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
-    /* Need a new entry */
-    if (idx == -1) {
-        if (!(ptmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_PURPOSE)))) {
-            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-            return 0;
-        }
-        ptmp->flags = X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
-    } else
-        ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
-
-    /* Duplicate the supplied names. */
-    name_dup = OPENSSL_strdup(name);
-    sname_dup = OPENSSL_strdup(sname);
-    if (name_dup == NULL || sname_dup == NULL) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        if (name_dup != NULL)
-            OPENSSL_free(name_dup);
-        if (sname_dup != NULL)
-            OPENSSL_free(sname_dup);
-        if (idx == -1)
-            OPENSSL_free(ptmp);
-        return 0;
+                     int (*ck)(const X509_PURPOSE *, const X509 *, int),
+                     char *name, char *sname, void *arg) {
+  int idx;
+  X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
+  char *name_dup, *sname_dup;
+
+  // This is set according to what we change: application can't set it
+  flags &= ~X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
+  // This will always be set for application modified trust entries
+  flags |= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME;
+  // Get existing entry if any
+  idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
+  // Need a new entry
+  if (idx == -1) {
+    if (!(ptmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_PURPOSE)))) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    ptmp->flags = X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
+  } else {
+    ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
+  }
+
+  // Duplicate the supplied names.
+  name_dup = OPENSSL_strdup(name);
+  sname_dup = OPENSSL_strdup(sname);
+  if (name_dup == NULL || sname_dup == NULL) {
+    if (name_dup != NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_free(name_dup);
+    }
+    if (sname_dup != NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_free(sname_dup);
     }
-
-    /* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */
-    if (ptmp->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
-        OPENSSL_free(ptmp->name);
-        OPENSSL_free(ptmp->sname);
-    }
-    /* dup supplied name */
-    ptmp->name = name_dup;
-    ptmp->sname = sname_dup;
-    /* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */
-    ptmp->flags &= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
-    /* Set all other flags */
-    ptmp->flags |= flags;
-
-    ptmp->purpose = id;
-    ptmp->trust = trust;
-    ptmp->check_purpose = ck;
-    ptmp->usr_data = arg;
-
-    /* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */
     if (idx == -1) {
-        if (!xptable && !(xptable = sk_X509_PURPOSE_new(xp_cmp))) {
-            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-            xptable_free(ptmp);
-            return 0;
-        }
-        if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_push(xptable, ptmp)) {
-            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-            xptable_free(ptmp);
-            return 0;
-        }
+      OPENSSL_free(ptmp);
     }
-    return 1;
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic
+  if (ptmp->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
+    OPENSSL_free(ptmp->name);
+    OPENSSL_free(ptmp->sname);
+  }
+  // dup supplied name
+  ptmp->name = name_dup;
+  ptmp->sname = sname_dup;
+  // Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry
+  ptmp->flags &= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
+  // Set all other flags
+  ptmp->flags |= flags;
+
+  ptmp->purpose = id;
+  ptmp->trust = trust;
+  ptmp->check_purpose = ck;
+  ptmp->usr_data = arg;
+
+  // If its a new entry manage the dynamic table
+  if (idx == -1) {
+    // TODO(davidben): This should be locked. Alternatively, remove the dynamic
+    // registration mechanism entirely. The trouble is there no way to pass in
+    // the various parameters into an |X509_VERIFY_PARAM| directly. You can only
+    // register it in the global table and get an ID.
+    if (!xptable && !(xptable = sk_X509_PURPOSE_new(xp_cmp))) {
+      xptable_free(ptmp);
+      return 0;
+    }
+    if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_push(xptable, ptmp)) {
+      xptable_free(ptmp);
+      return 0;
+    }
+    sk_X509_PURPOSE_sort(xptable);
+  }
+  return 1;
 }
 
-static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p)
-{
-    if (!p)
-        return;
-    if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC) {
-        if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
-            OPENSSL_free(p->name);
-            OPENSSL_free(p->sname);
-        }
-        OPENSSL_free(p);
+static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p) {
+  if (!p) {
+    return;
+  }
+  if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC) {
+    if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
+      OPENSSL_free(p->name);
+      OPENSSL_free(p->sname);
     }
+    OPENSSL_free(p);
+  }
 }
 
-void X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void)
-{
-    unsigned int i;
-    sk_X509_PURPOSE_pop_free(xptable, xptable_free);
-    for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; i++)
-        xptable_free(xstandard + i);
-    xptable = NULL;
+void X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void) {
+  unsigned int i;
+  sk_X509_PURPOSE_pop_free(xptable, xptable_free);
+  for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; i++) {
+    xptable_free(xstandard + i);
+  }
+  xptable = NULL;
 }
 
-int X509_PURPOSE_get_id(const X509_PURPOSE *xp)
-{
-    return xp->purpose;
-}
+int X509_PURPOSE_get_id(const X509_PURPOSE *xp) { return xp->purpose; }
 
-char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(const X509_PURPOSE *xp)
-{
-    return xp->name;
-}
+char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(const X509_PURPOSE *xp) { return xp->name; }
 
-char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(const X509_PURPOSE *xp)
-{
-    return xp->sname;
-}
+char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(const X509_PURPOSE *xp) { return xp->sname; }
 
-int X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(const X509_PURPOSE *xp)
-{
-    return xp->trust;
-}
+int X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(const X509_PURPOSE *xp) { return xp->trust; }
 
-static int nid_cmp(const void *void_a, const void *void_b)
-{
-    const int *a = void_a, *b = void_b;
+static int nid_cmp(const void *void_a, const void *void_b) {
+  const int *a = void_a, *b = void_b;
 
-    return *a - *b;
+  return *a - *b;
 }
 
-int X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ex)
-{
-    /*
-     * This table is a list of the NIDs of supported extensions: that is
-     * those which are used by the verify process. If an extension is
-     * critical and doesn't appear in this list then the verify process will
-     * normally reject the certificate. The list must be kept in numerical
-     * order because it will be searched using bsearch.
-     */
-
-    static const int supported_nids[] = {
-        NID_netscape_cert_type, /* 71 */
-        NID_key_usage,          /* 83 */
-        NID_subject_alt_name,   /* 85 */
-        NID_basic_constraints,  /* 87 */
-        NID_certificate_policies, /* 89 */
-        NID_ext_key_usage,      /* 126 */
-        NID_policy_constraints, /* 401 */
-        NID_proxyCertInfo,      /* 663 */
-        NID_name_constraints,   /* 666 */
-        NID_policy_mappings,    /* 747 */
-        NID_inhibit_any_policy  /* 748 */
-    };
+int X509_supported_extension(const X509_EXTENSION *ex) {
+  // This table is a list of the NIDs of supported extensions: that is
+  // those which are used by the verify process. If an extension is
+  // critical and doesn't appear in this list then the verify process will
+  // normally reject the certificate. The list must be kept in numerical
+  // order because it will be searched using bsearch.
 
-    int ex_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex));
+  static const int supported_nids[] = {
+      NID_netscape_cert_type,    // 71
+      NID_key_usage,             // 83
+      NID_subject_alt_name,      // 85
+      NID_basic_constraints,     // 87
+      NID_certificate_policies,  // 89
+      NID_ext_key_usage,         // 126
+      NID_policy_constraints,    // 401
+      NID_name_constraints,      // 666
+      NID_policy_mappings,       // 747
+      NID_inhibit_any_policy     // 748
+  };
 
-    if (ex_nid == NID_undef)
-        return 0;
+  int ex_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex));
 
-    if (bsearch
-        (&ex_nid, supported_nids, sizeof(supported_nids) / sizeof(int),
-         sizeof(int), nid_cmp) != NULL)
-        return 1;
+  if (ex_nid == NID_undef) {
     return 0;
-}
-
-static int setup_dp(X509 *x, DIST_POINT *dp)
-{
-    X509_NAME *iname = NULL;
-    size_t i;
-    if (dp->reasons) {
-        if (dp->reasons->length > 0)
-            dp->dp_reasons = dp->reasons->data[0];
-        if (dp->reasons->length > 1)
-            dp->dp_reasons |= (dp->reasons->data[1] << 8);
-        dp->dp_reasons &= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
-    } else
-        dp->dp_reasons = CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
-    if (!dp->distpoint || (dp->distpoint->type != 1))
-        return 1;
-    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
-        GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
-        if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) {
-            iname = gen->d.directoryName;
-            break;
-        }
-    }
-    if (!iname)
-        iname = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+  }
 
-    return DIST_POINT_set_dpname(dp->distpoint, iname);
+  if (bsearch(&ex_nid, supported_nids, sizeof(supported_nids) / sizeof(int),
+              sizeof(int), nid_cmp) != NULL) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+  return 0;
 }
 
-static int setup_crldp(X509 *x)
-{
-    int j;
-    x->crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, &j, NULL);
-    if (x->crldp == NULL && j != -1) {
-        return 0;
+static int setup_dp(X509 *x, DIST_POINT *dp) {
+  X509_NAME *iname = NULL;
+  size_t i;
+  if (dp->reasons) {
+    if (dp->reasons->length > 0) {
+      dp->dp_reasons = dp->reasons->data[0];
     }
-    for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
-        if (!setup_dp(x, sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i))) {
-            return 0;
-        }
+    if (dp->reasons->length > 1) {
+      dp->dp_reasons |= (dp->reasons->data[1] << 8);
     }
+    dp->dp_reasons &= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
+  } else {
+    dp->dp_reasons = CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
+  }
+  if (!dp->distpoint || (dp->distpoint->type != 1)) {
     return 1;
-}
-
-int x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
-{
-    BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs;
-    PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci;
-    ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage;
-    ASN1_BIT_STRING *ns;
-    EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage;
-    X509_EXTENSION *ex;
-    size_t i;
-    int j;
-
-    CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_read(&x->lock);
-    const int is_set = x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET;
-    CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_read(&x->lock);
-
-    if (is_set) {
-        return (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID) == 0;
+  }
+  for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
+    GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
+    if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) {
+      iname = gen->d.directoryName;
+      break;
     }
+  }
+  if (!iname) {
+    iname = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+  }
 
-    CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&x->lock);
-    if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) {
-        CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&x->lock);
-        return (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID) == 0;
-    }
+  return DIST_POINT_set_dpname(dp->distpoint, iname);
+}
 
-    if (!X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL))
-        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
-    /* V1 should mean no extensions ... */
-    if (X509_get_version(x) == X509_VERSION_1)
-        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1;
-    /* Handle basic constraints */
-    if ((bs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, &j, NULL))) {
-        if (bs->ca)
-            x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA;
-        if (bs->pathlen) {
-            if ((bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER)
-                || !bs->ca) {
-                x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
-                x->ex_pathlen = 0;
-            } else {
-                /* TODO(davidben): |ASN1_INTEGER_get| returns -1 on overflow,
-                 * which currently acts as if the constraint isn't present. This
-                 * works (an overflowing path length constraint may as well be
-                 * infinity), but Chromium's verifier simply treats values above
-                 * 255 as an error. */
-                x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen);
-            }
-        } else
-            x->ex_pathlen = -1;
-        BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs);
-        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS;
-    } else if (j != -1) {
-        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
-    }
-    /* Handle proxy certificates */
-    if ((pci = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_proxyCertInfo, &j, NULL))) {
-        if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA
-            || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_alt_name, -1) >= 0
-            || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_issuer_alt_name, -1) >= 0) {
-            x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
-        }
-        if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint) {
-            x->ex_pcpathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pci->pcPathLengthConstraint);
-        } else
-            x->ex_pcpathlen = -1;
-        PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci);
-        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY;
-    } else if (j != -1) {
-        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
-    }
-    /* Handle key usage */
-    if ((usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, &j, NULL))) {
-        if (usage->length > 0) {
-            x->ex_kusage = usage->data[0];
-            if (usage->length > 1)
-                x->ex_kusage |= usage->data[1] << 8;
-        } else
-            x->ex_kusage = 0;
-        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_KUSAGE;
-        ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage);
-    } else if (j != -1) {
-        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
-    }
-    x->ex_xkusage = 0;
-    if ((extusage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, &j, NULL))) {
-        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE;
-        for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) {
-            switch (OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage, i))) {
-            case NID_server_auth:
-                x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_SERVER;
-                break;
-
-            case NID_client_auth:
-                x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_CLIENT;
-                break;
-
-            case NID_email_protect:
-                x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SMIME;
-                break;
-
-            case NID_code_sign:
-                x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_CODE_SIGN;
-                break;
-
-            case NID_ms_sgc:
-            case NID_ns_sgc:
-                x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SGC;
-                break;
-
-            case NID_OCSP_sign:
-                x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_OCSP_SIGN;
-                break;
-
-            case NID_time_stamp:
-                x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_TIMESTAMP;
-                break;
-
-            case NID_dvcs:
-                x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_DVCS;
-                break;
-
-            case NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage:
-                x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_ANYEKU;
-                break;
-            }
-        }
-        sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
-    } else if (j != -1) {
-        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+static int setup_crldp(X509 *x) {
+  int j;
+  x->crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, &j, NULL);
+  if (x->crldp == NULL && j != -1) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
+    if (!setup_dp(x, sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i))) {
+      return 0;
     }
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
 
-    if ((ns = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_netscape_cert_type, &j, NULL))) {
-        if (ns->length > 0)
-            x->ex_nscert = ns->data[0];
-        else
-            x->ex_nscert = 0;
-        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NSCERT;
-        ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ns);
-    } else if (j != -1) {
-        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
-    }
-    x->skid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, &j, NULL);
-    if (x->skid == NULL && j != -1) {
-        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
-    }
-    x->akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, &j, NULL);
-    if (x->akid == NULL && j != -1) {
-        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
-    }
-    /* Does subject name match issuer ? */
-    if (!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x))) {
-        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI;
-        /* If SKID matches AKID also indicate self signed */
-        if (X509_check_akid(x, x->akid) == X509_V_OK &&
-            !ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
-            x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SS;
-    }
-    x->altname = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, &j, NULL);
-    if (x->altname == NULL && j != -1) {
-        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
-    }
-    x->nc = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_name_constraints, &j, NULL);
-    if (x->nc == NULL && j != -1) {
-        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
-    }
-    if (!setup_crldp(x)) {
-        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
-    }
+int x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x) {
+  BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs;
+  ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage;
+  ASN1_BIT_STRING *ns;
+  EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage;
+  size_t i;
+  int j;
 
-    for (j = 0; j < X509_get_ext_count(x); j++) {
-        ex = X509_get_ext(x, j);
-        if (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex))
-            == NID_freshest_crl)
-            x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_FRESHEST;
-        if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex))
-            continue;
-        if (!X509_supported_extension(ex)) {
-            x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;
-            break;
-        }
-    }
-    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET;
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_read(&x->lock);
+  const int is_set = x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET;
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_read(&x->lock);
 
-    CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&x->lock);
+  if (is_set) {
     return (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID) == 0;
-}
+  }
 
-/* check_ca returns one if |x| should be considered a CA certificate and zero
- * otherwise. */
-static int check_ca(const X509 *x)
-{
-    /* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */
-    if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
-        return 0;
-    /* Version 1 certificates are considered CAs and don't have extensions. */
-    if ((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT) {
-        return 1;
-    }
-    /* Otherwise, it's only a CA if basicConstraints says so. */
-    return ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) &&
-            (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA));
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&x->lock);
+  if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) {
+    CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&x->lock);
+    return (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID) == 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!X509_digest(x, EVP_sha256(), x->cert_hash, NULL)) {
+    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+  }
+  // V1 should mean no extensions ...
+  if (X509_get_version(x) == X509_VERSION_1) {
+    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1;
+  }
+  // Handle basic constraints
+  if ((bs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, &j, NULL))) {
+    if (bs->ca) {
+      x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA;
+    }
+    if (bs->pathlen) {
+      if ((bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) || !bs->ca) {
+        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+        x->ex_pathlen = 0;
+      } else {
+        // TODO(davidben): |ASN1_INTEGER_get| returns -1 on overflow,
+        // which currently acts as if the constraint isn't present. This
+        // works (an overflowing path length constraint may as well be
+        // infinity), but Chromium's verifier simply treats values above
+        // 255 as an error.
+        x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen);
+      }
+    } else {
+      x->ex_pathlen = -1;
+    }
+    BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs);
+    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS;
+  } else if (j != -1) {
+    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+  }
+  // Handle key usage
+  if ((usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, &j, NULL))) {
+    if (usage->length > 0) {
+      x->ex_kusage = usage->data[0];
+      if (usage->length > 1) {
+        x->ex_kusage |= usage->data[1] << 8;
+      }
+    } else {
+      x->ex_kusage = 0;
+    }
+    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_KUSAGE;
+    ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage);
+  } else if (j != -1) {
+    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+  }
+  x->ex_xkusage = 0;
+  if ((extusage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, &j, NULL))) {
+    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) {
+      switch (OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage, i))) {
+        case NID_server_auth:
+          x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_SERVER;
+          break;
+
+        case NID_client_auth:
+          x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_CLIENT;
+          break;
+
+        case NID_email_protect:
+          x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SMIME;
+          break;
+
+        case NID_code_sign:
+          x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_CODE_SIGN;
+          break;
+
+        case NID_ms_sgc:
+        case NID_ns_sgc:
+          x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SGC;
+          break;
+
+        case NID_OCSP_sign:
+          x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_OCSP_SIGN;
+          break;
+
+        case NID_time_stamp:
+          x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_TIMESTAMP;
+          break;
+
+        case NID_dvcs:
+          x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_DVCS;
+          break;
+
+        case NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage:
+          x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_ANYEKU;
+          break;
+      }
+    }
+    sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
+  } else if (j != -1) {
+    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+  }
+
+  if ((ns = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_netscape_cert_type, &j, NULL))) {
+    if (ns->length > 0) {
+      x->ex_nscert = ns->data[0];
+    } else {
+      x->ex_nscert = 0;
+    }
+    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NSCERT;
+    ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ns);
+  } else if (j != -1) {
+    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+  }
+  x->skid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, &j, NULL);
+  if (x->skid == NULL && j != -1) {
+    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+  }
+  x->akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, &j, NULL);
+  if (x->akid == NULL && j != -1) {
+    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+  }
+  // Does subject name match issuer ?
+  if (!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x))) {
+    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI;
+    // If SKID matches AKID also indicate self signed
+    if (X509_check_akid(x, x->akid) == X509_V_OK &&
+        !ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) {
+      x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SS;
+    }
+  }
+  x->altname = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, &j, NULL);
+  if (x->altname == NULL && j != -1) {
+    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+  }
+  x->nc = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_name_constraints, &j, NULL);
+  if (x->nc == NULL && j != -1) {
+    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+  }
+  if (!setup_crldp(x)) {
+    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+  }
+
+  for (j = 0; j < X509_get_ext_count(x); j++) {
+    const X509_EXTENSION *ex = X509_get_ext(x, j);
+    if (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex)) == NID_freshest_crl) {
+      x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_FRESHEST;
+    }
+    if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex)) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (!X509_supported_extension(ex)) {
+      x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;
+      break;
+    }
+  }
+  x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET;
+
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&x->lock);
+  return (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID) == 0;
+}
+
+// check_ca returns one if |x| should be considered a CA certificate and zero
+// otherwise.
+static int check_ca(const X509 *x) {
+  // keyUsage if present should allow cert signing
+  if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  // Version 1 certificates are considered CAs and don't have extensions.
+  if ((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+  // Otherwise, it's only a CA if basicConstraints says so.
+  return ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA));
 }
 
-int X509_check_ca(X509 *x)
-{
-    if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-    return check_ca(x);
+int X509_check_ca(X509 *x) {
+  if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return check_ca(x);
 }
 
 static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
-                                    int ca)
-{
-    if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_CLIENT))
-        return 0;
-    if (ca)
-        return check_ca(x);
-    /* We need to do digital signatures or key agreement */
-    if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_KEY_AGREEMENT))
-        return 0;
-    /* nsCertType if present should allow SSL client use */
-    if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_CLIENT))
-        return 0;
-    return 1;
+                                    int ca) {
+  if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_CLIENT)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (ca) {
+    return check_ca(x);
+  }
+  // We need to do digital signatures or key agreement
+  if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  // nsCertType if present should allow SSL client use
+  if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_CLIENT)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
 }
 
-/*
- * Key usage needed for TLS/SSL server: digital signature, encipherment or
- * key agreement. The ssl code can check this more thoroughly for individual
- * key types.
- */
-#define KU_TLS \
-        (KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT|KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)
+// Key usage needed for TLS/SSL server: digital signature, encipherment or
+// key agreement. The ssl code can check this more thoroughly for individual
+// key types.
+#define KU_TLS (KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT | KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)
 
 static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
-                                    int ca)
-{
-    if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_SERVER))
-        return 0;
-    if (ca)
-        return check_ca(x);
-
-    if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_SERVER))
-        return 0;
-    if (ku_reject(x, KU_TLS))
-        return 0;
+                                    int ca) {
+  if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_SERVER)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (ca) {
+    return check_ca(x);
+  }
 
-    return 1;
+  if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_SERVER)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (ku_reject(x, KU_TLS)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
 
+  return 1;
 }
 
 static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
-                                       int ca)
-{
-    int ret;
-    ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, ca);
-    if (!ret || ca)
-        return ret;
-    /* We need to encipher or Netscape complains */
-    if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT))
-        return 0;
+                                       int ca) {
+  int ret;
+  ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, ca);
+  if (!ret || ca) {
     return ret;
+  }
+  // We need to encipher or Netscape complains
+  if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return ret;
 }
 
-/* purpose_smime returns one if |x| is a valid S/MIME leaf (|ca| is zero) or CA
- * (|ca| is one) certificate, and zero otherwise. */
-static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca)
-{
-    if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SMIME))
-        return 0;
-    if (ca) {
-        /* check nsCertType if present */
-        if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) &&
-            (x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA) == 0) {
-          return 0;
-        }
-
-        return check_ca(x);
-    }
-    if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) {
-        return (x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME) == NS_SMIME;
+// purpose_smime returns one if |x| is a valid S/MIME leaf (|ca| is zero) or CA
+// (|ca| is one) certificate, and zero otherwise.
+static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca) {
+  if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SMIME)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (ca) {
+    // check nsCertType if present
+    if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && (x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA) == 0) {
+      return 0;
     }
-    return 1;
+
+    return check_ca(x);
+  }
+  if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) {
+    return (x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME) == NS_SMIME;
+  }
+  return 1;
 }
 
 static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
-                                    int ca)
-{
-    int ret;
-    ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
-    if (!ret || ca)
-        return ret;
-    if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_NON_REPUDIATION))
-        return 0;
+                                    int ca) {
+  int ret;
+  ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
+  if (!ret || ca) {
     return ret;
+  }
+  if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_NON_REPUDIATION)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return ret;
 }
 
 static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
-                                       int ca)
-{
-    int ret;
-    ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
-    if (!ret || ca)
-        return ret;
-    if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT))
-        return 0;
+                                       int ca) {
+  int ret;
+  ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
+  if (!ret || ca) {
     return ret;
+  }
+  if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return ret;
 }
 
 static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
-                                  int ca)
-{
-    if (ca) {
-        return check_ca(x);
-    }
-    if (ku_reject(x, KU_CRL_SIGN))
-        return 0;
-    return 1;
+                                  int ca) {
+  if (ca) {
+    return check_ca(x);
+  }
+  if (ku_reject(x, KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
 }
 
-/*
- * OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that each CA
- * is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain.
- */
+// OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that each CA
+// is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain.
 
-static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
-{
-    if (ca)
-        return check_ca(x);
-    /* leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */
-    return 1;
+static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) {
+  if (ca) {
+    return check_ca(x);
+  }
+  // leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify()
+  return 1;
 }
 
 static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
-                                        int ca)
-{
-    int i_ext;
-
-    /* If ca is true we must return if this is a valid CA certificate. */
-    if (ca)
-        return check_ca(x);
-
-    /*
-     * Check the optional key usage field:
-     * if Key Usage is present, it must be one of digitalSignature
-     * and/or nonRepudiation (other values are not consistent and shall
-     * be rejected).
-     */
-    if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE)
-        && ((x->ex_kusage & ~(KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) ||
-            !(x->ex_kusage & (KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))))
-        return 0;
-
-    /* Only time stamp key usage is permitted and it's required. */
-    if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) || x->ex_xkusage != XKU_TIMESTAMP)
-        return 0;
-
-    /* Extended Key Usage MUST be critical */
-    i_ext = X509_get_ext_by_NID((X509 *)x, NID_ext_key_usage, -1);
-    if (i_ext >= 0) {
-        X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_get_ext((X509 *)x, i_ext);
-        if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext))
-            return 0;
+                                        int ca) {
+  int i_ext;
+
+  // If ca is true we must return if this is a valid CA certificate.
+  if (ca) {
+    return check_ca(x);
+  }
+
+  // Check the optional key usage field:
+  // if Key Usage is present, it must be one of digitalSignature
+  // and/or nonRepudiation (other values are not consistent and shall
+  // be rejected).
+  if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
+      ((x->ex_kusage & ~(KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) ||
+       !(x->ex_kusage & (KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)))) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Only time stamp key usage is permitted and it's required.
+  if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) || x->ex_xkusage != XKU_TIMESTAMP) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Extended Key Usage MUST be critical
+  i_ext = X509_get_ext_by_NID((X509 *)x, NID_ext_key_usage, -1);
+  if (i_ext >= 0) {
+    const X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_get_ext((X509 *)x, i_ext);
+    if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) {
+      return 0;
     }
+  }
 
-    return 1;
+  return 1;
 }
 
-static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
-{
-    return 1;
-}
+static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) { return 1; }
 
-/*
- * Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second. This can be
- * used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates which have been looked
- * up using some simple method such as by subject name. These are: 1. Check
- * issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer) 2. If akid(subject) exists
- * check it matches issuer 3. If key_usage(issuer) exists check it supports
- * certificate signing returns 0 for OK, positive for reason for mismatch,
- * reasons match codes for X509_verify_cert()
- */
+// Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second. This can be
+// used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates which have been looked
+// up using some simple method such as by subject name. These are: 1. Check
+// issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer) 2. If akid(subject) exists
+// check it matches issuer 3. If key_usage(issuer) exists check it supports
+// certificate signing returns 0 for OK, positive for reason for mismatch,
+// reasons match codes for X509_verify_cert()
 
-int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject)
-{
-    if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer),
-                      X509_get_issuer_name(subject)))
-        return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH;
-    if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer) ||
-        !x509v3_cache_extensions(subject)) {
-        return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
-    }
+int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject) {
+  if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer),
+                    X509_get_issuer_name(subject))) {
+    return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH;
+  }
+  if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer) || !x509v3_cache_extensions(subject)) {
+    return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
+  }
 
-    if (subject->akid) {
-        int ret = X509_check_akid(issuer, subject->akid);
-        if (ret != X509_V_OK)
-            return ret;
+  if (subject->akid) {
+    int ret = X509_check_akid(issuer, subject->akid);
+    if (ret != X509_V_OK) {
+      return ret;
     }
+  }
 
-    if (subject->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
-        if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
-            return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE;
-    } else if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
-        return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN;
-    return X509_V_OK;
+  if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) {
+    return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN;
+  }
+  return X509_V_OK;
 }
 
-int X509_check_akid(X509 *issuer, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid)
-{
-
-    if (!akid)
-        return X509_V_OK;
-
-    /* Check key ids (if present) */
-    if (akid->keyid && issuer->skid &&
-        ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(akid->keyid, issuer->skid))
-        return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH;
-    /* Check serial number */
-    if (akid->serial &&
-        ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer), akid->serial))
-        return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
-    /* Check issuer name */
-    if (akid->issuer) {
-        /*
-         * Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes SEQUENCE OF
-         * GeneralName. So look for a DirName. There may be more than one but
-         * we only take any notice of the first.
-         */
-        GENERAL_NAMES *gens;
-        GENERAL_NAME *gen;
-        X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
-        size_t i;
-        gens = akid->issuer;
-        for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
-            gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
-            if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) {
-                nm = gen->d.dirn;
-                break;
-            }
-        }
-        if (nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer)))
-            return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
-    }
+int X509_check_akid(X509 *issuer, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid) {
+  if (!akid) {
     return X509_V_OK;
+  }
+
+  // Check key ids (if present)
+  if (akid->keyid && issuer->skid &&
+      ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(akid->keyid, issuer->skid)) {
+    return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH;
+  }
+  // Check serial number
+  if (akid->serial &&
+      ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer), akid->serial)) {
+    return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
+  }
+  // Check issuer name
+  if (akid->issuer) {
+    // Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes SEQUENCE OF
+    // GeneralName. So look for a DirName. There may be more than one but
+    // we only take any notice of the first.
+    GENERAL_NAMES *gens;
+    GENERAL_NAME *gen;
+    X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
+    size_t i;
+    gens = akid->issuer;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
+      gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
+      if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) {
+        nm = gen->d.dirn;
+        break;
+      }
+    }
+    if (nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer))) {
+      return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
+    }
+  }
+  return X509_V_OK;
 }
 
-uint32_t X509_get_extension_flags(X509 *x)
-{
-    /* Ignore the return value. On failure, |x->ex_flags| will include
-     * |EXFLAG_INVALID|. */
-    x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
-    return x->ex_flags;
+uint32_t X509_get_extension_flags(X509 *x) {
+  // Ignore the return value. On failure, |x->ex_flags| will include
+  // |EXFLAG_INVALID|.
+  x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
+  return x->ex_flags;
 }
 
-uint32_t X509_get_key_usage(X509 *x)
-{
-    if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-    if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE)
-        return x->ex_kusage;
-    return UINT32_MAX;
+uint32_t X509_get_key_usage(X509 *x) {
+  if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) {
+    return x->ex_kusage;
+  }
+  return UINT32_MAX;
 }
 
-uint32_t X509_get_extended_key_usage(X509 *x)
-{
-    if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-    if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE)
-        return x->ex_xkusage;
-    return UINT32_MAX;
+uint32_t X509_get_extended_key_usage(X509 *x) {
+  if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) {
+    return x->ex_xkusage;
+  }
+  return UINT32_MAX;
 }
 
-const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_subject_key_id(X509 *x509)
-{
-    if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x509)) {
-        return NULL;
-    }
-    return x509->skid;
+const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_subject_key_id(X509 *x509) {
+  if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x509)) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return x509->skid;
 }
 
-const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_authority_key_id(X509 *x509)
-{
-    if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x509)) {
-        return NULL;
-    }
-    return x509->akid != NULL ? x509->akid->keyid : NULL;
+const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_authority_key_id(X509 *x509) {
+  if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x509)) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return x509->akid != NULL ? x509->akid->keyid : NULL;
 }
 
-const GENERAL_NAMES *X509_get0_authority_issuer(X509 *x509)
-{
-    if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x509)) {
-        return NULL;
-    }
-    return x509->akid != NULL ? x509->akid->issuer : NULL;
+const GENERAL_NAMES *X509_get0_authority_issuer(X509 *x509) {
+  if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x509)) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return x509->akid != NULL ? x509->akid->issuer : NULL;
 }
 
-const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_authority_serial(X509 *x509)
-{
-    if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x509)) {
-        return NULL;
-    }
-    return x509->akid != NULL ? x509->akid->serial : NULL;
+const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_authority_serial(X509 *x509) {
+  if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x509)) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return x509->akid != NULL ? x509->akid->serial : NULL;
 }
 
-long X509_get_pathlen(X509 *x509)
-{
-    if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x509) ||
-        (x509->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) == 0) {
-        return -1;
-    }
-    return x509->ex_pathlen;
+long X509_get_pathlen(X509 *x509) {
+  if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x509) || (x509->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) == 0) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+  return x509->ex_pathlen;
 }