grpc 1.53.0 → 1.56.0

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/x509/x_x509.c

@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-/* crypto/asn1/x_x509.c */
 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
  * All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -68,327 +67,486 @@
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
 
+#include "../asn1/internal.h"
+#include "../bytestring/internal.h"
 #include "../internal.h"
 #include "internal.h"
 
 static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class = CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT;
 
 ASN1_SEQUENCE_enc(X509_CINF, enc, 0) = {
-        ASN1_EXP_OPT(X509_CINF, version, ASN1_INTEGER, 0),
-        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, serialNumber, ASN1_INTEGER),
-        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, signature, X509_ALGOR),
-        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, issuer, X509_NAME),
-        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, validity, X509_VAL),
-        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, subject, X509_NAME),
-        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, key, X509_PUBKEY),
-        ASN1_IMP_OPT(X509_CINF, issuerUID, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 1),
-        ASN1_IMP_OPT(X509_CINF, subjectUID, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 2),
-        ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CINF, extensions, X509_EXTENSION, 3)
+    ASN1_EXP_OPT(X509_CINF, version, ASN1_INTEGER, 0),
+    ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, serialNumber, ASN1_INTEGER),
+    ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, signature, X509_ALGOR),
+    ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, issuer, X509_NAME),
+    ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, validity, X509_VAL),
+    ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, subject, X509_NAME),
+    ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, key, X509_PUBKEY),
+    ASN1_IMP_OPT(X509_CINF, issuerUID, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 1),
+    ASN1_IMP_OPT(X509_CINF, subjectUID, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 2),
+    ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CINF, extensions, X509_EXTENSION, 3),
 } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_enc(X509_CINF, X509_CINF)
 
 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CINF)
-/* X509 top level structure needs a bit of customisation */
-
-extern void policy_cache_free(X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache);
-
-static int x509_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
-                   void *exarg)
-{
-    X509 *ret = (X509 *)*pval;
-
-    switch (operation) {
-
-    case ASN1_OP_NEW_POST:
-        ret->ex_flags = 0;
-        ret->ex_pathlen = -1;
-        ret->skid = NULL;
-        ret->akid = NULL;
-        ret->aux = NULL;
-        ret->crldp = NULL;
-        ret->buf = NULL;
-        CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ret->ex_data);
-        CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&ret->lock);
-        break;
-
-    case ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE:
-        CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(ret->buf);
-        ret->buf = NULL;
-        break;
-
-    case ASN1_OP_D2I_POST: {
-        /* The version must be one of v1(0), v2(1), or v3(2). */
-        long version = 0;
-        if (ret->cert_info->version != NULL) {
-            version = ASN1_INTEGER_get(ret->cert_info->version);
-            /* TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/364): |version| = 0 should also
-             * be rejected. This means an explicitly-encoded X.509v1 version.
-             * v1 is DEFAULT, so DER requires it be omitted. */
-            if (version < 0 || version > 2) {
-                OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_VERSION);
-                return 0;
-            }
-        }
-
-        /* Per RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.8, these fields require v2 or v3. */
-        if (version == 0 && (ret->cert_info->issuerUID != NULL ||
-                             ret->cert_info->subjectUID != NULL)) {
-            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_FIELD_FOR_VERSION);
-            return 0;
-        }
-
-        /* Per RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.9, extensions require v3. */
-        if (version != 2 && ret->cert_info->extensions != NULL) {
-            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_FIELD_FOR_VERSION);
-            return 0;
-        }
-
-        break;
-    }
 
-    case ASN1_OP_FREE_POST:
-        CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&ret->lock);
-        CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ret, &ret->ex_data);
-        X509_CERT_AUX_free(ret->aux);
-        ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ret->skid);
-        AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(ret->akid);
-        CRL_DIST_POINTS_free(ret->crldp);
-        policy_cache_free(ret->policy_cache);
-        GENERAL_NAMES_free(ret->altname);
-        NAME_CONSTRAINTS_free(ret->nc);
-        CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(ret->buf);
-        break;
+// x509_new_null returns a new |X509| object where the |cert_info|, |sig_alg|,
+// and |signature| fields are not yet filled in.
+static X509 *x509_new_null(void) {
+  X509 *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509));
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  OPENSSL_memset(ret, 0, sizeof(X509));
+
+  ret->references = 1;
+  ret->ex_pathlen = -1;
+  CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ret->ex_data);
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&ret->lock);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+X509 *X509_new(void) {
+  X509 *ret = x509_new_null();
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  ret->cert_info = X509_CINF_new();
+  ret->sig_alg = X509_ALGOR_new();
+  ret->signature = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new();
+  if (ret->cert_info == NULL || ret->sig_alg == NULL ||
+      ret->signature == NULL) {
+    X509_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+void X509_free(X509 *x509) {
+  if (x509 == NULL || !CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&x509->references)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, x509, &x509->ex_data);
+
+  X509_CINF_free(x509->cert_info);
+  X509_ALGOR_free(x509->sig_alg);
+  ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(x509->signature);
+  ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(x509->skid);
+  AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(x509->akid);
+  CRL_DIST_POINTS_free(x509->crldp);
+  GENERAL_NAMES_free(x509->altname);
+  NAME_CONSTRAINTS_free(x509->nc);
+  X509_CERT_AUX_free(x509->aux);
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&x509->lock);
+
+  OPENSSL_free(x509);
+}
+
+static X509 *x509_parse(CBS *cbs, CRYPTO_BUFFER *buf) {
+  CBS cert, tbs, sigalg, sig;
+  if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &cert, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+      // Bound the length to comfortably fit in an int. Lengths in this
+      // module often omit overflow checks.
+      CBS_len(&cert) > INT_MAX / 2 ||
+      !CBS_get_asn1_element(&cert, &tbs, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+      !CBS_get_asn1_element(&cert, &sigalg, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  // For just the signature field, we accept non-minimal BER lengths, though not
+  // indefinite-length encoding. See b/18228011.
+  //
+  // TODO(crbug.com/boringssl/354): Switch the affected callers to convert the
+  // certificate before parsing and then remove this workaround.
+  CBS_ASN1_TAG tag;
+  size_t header_len;
+  int indefinite;
+  if (!CBS_get_any_ber_asn1_element(&cert, &sig, &tag, &header_len,
+                                    /*out_ber_found=*/NULL,
+                                    &indefinite) ||
+      tag != CBS_ASN1_BITSTRING || indefinite ||  //
+      !CBS_skip(&sig, header_len) ||              //
+      CBS_len(&cert) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  X509 *ret = x509_new_null();
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  // TODO(crbug.com/boringssl/443): When the rest of the library is decoupled
+  // from the tasn_*.c implementation, replace this with |CBS|-based functions.
+  const uint8_t *inp = CBS_data(&tbs);
+  if (ASN1_item_ex_d2i((ASN1_VALUE **)&ret->cert_info, &inp, CBS_len(&tbs),
+                       ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CINF), /*tag=*/-1,
+                       /*aclass=*/0, /*opt=*/0, buf) <= 0 ||
+      inp != CBS_data(&tbs) + CBS_len(&tbs)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  inp = CBS_data(&sigalg);
+  ret->sig_alg = d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &inp, CBS_len(&sigalg));
+  if (ret->sig_alg == NULL || inp != CBS_data(&sigalg) + CBS_len(&sigalg)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  inp = CBS_data(&sig);
+  ret->signature = c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING(NULL, &inp, CBS_len(&sig));
+  if (ret->signature == NULL || inp != CBS_data(&sig) + CBS_len(&sig)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
 
+  // The version must be one of v1(0), v2(1), or v3(2).
+  long version = X509_VERSION_1;
+  if (ret->cert_info->version != NULL) {
+    version = ASN1_INTEGER_get(ret->cert_info->version);
+    // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/364): |X509_VERSION_1| should
+    // also be rejected here. This means an explicitly-encoded X.509v1
+    // version. v1 is DEFAULT, so DER requires it be omitted.
+    if (version < X509_VERSION_1 || version > X509_VERSION_3) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_VERSION);
+      goto err;
     }
+  }
 
-    return 1;
+  // Per RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.8, these fields require v2 or v3.
+  if (version == X509_VERSION_1 && (ret->cert_info->issuerUID != NULL ||
+                                    ret->cert_info->subjectUID != NULL)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_FIELD_FOR_VERSION);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  // Per RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.9, extensions require v3.
+  if (version != X509_VERSION_3 && ret->cert_info->extensions != NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_FIELD_FOR_VERSION);
+    goto err;
+  }
 
+  return ret;
+
+err:
+  X509_free(ret);
+  return NULL;
 }
 
-ASN1_SEQUENCE_ref(X509, x509_cb) = {
-        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509, cert_info, X509_CINF),
-        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509, sig_alg, X509_ALGOR),
-        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509, signature, ASN1_BIT_STRING)
-} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(X509, X509)
+X509 *d2i_X509(X509 **out, const uint8_t **inp, long len) {
+  X509 *ret = NULL;
+  if (len < 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    goto err;
+  }
 
-IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509)
+  CBS cbs;
+  CBS_init(&cbs, *inp, (size_t)len);
+  ret = x509_parse(&cbs, NULL);
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
 
-IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509)
+  *inp = CBS_data(&cbs);
 
-X509 *X509_parse_from_buffer(CRYPTO_BUFFER *buf) {
-  if (CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(buf) > LONG_MAX) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
-    return 0;
+err:
+  if (out != NULL) {
+    X509_free(*out);
+    *out = ret;
   }
+  return ret;
+}
 
-  X509 *x509 = X509_new();
+int i2d_X509(X509 *x509, uint8_t **outp) {
   if (x509 == NULL) {
-    return NULL;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_MISSING_VALUE);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  CBB cbb, cert;
+  if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 64) ||  //
+      !CBB_add_asn1(&cbb, &cert, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  // TODO(crbug.com/boringssl/443): When the rest of the library is decoupled
+  // from the tasn_*.c implementation, replace this with |CBS|-based functions.
+  uint8_t *out;
+  int len = i2d_X509_CINF(x509->cert_info, NULL);
+  if (len < 0 ||  //
+      !CBB_add_space(&cert, &out, (size_t)len) ||
+      i2d_X509_CINF(x509->cert_info, &out) != len) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  len = i2d_X509_ALGOR(x509->sig_alg, NULL);
+  if (len < 0 ||  //
+      !CBB_add_space(&cert, &out, (size_t)len) ||
+      i2d_X509_ALGOR(x509->sig_alg, &out) != len) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  len = i2d_ASN1_BIT_STRING(x509->signature, NULL);
+  if (len < 0 ||  //
+      !CBB_add_space(&cert, &out, (size_t)len) ||
+      i2d_ASN1_BIT_STRING(x509->signature, &out) != len) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  return CBB_finish_i2d(&cbb, outp);
+
+err:
+  CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+  return -1;
+}
+
+static int x509_new_cb(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) {
+  *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)X509_new();
+  return *pval != NULL;
+}
+
+static void x509_free_cb(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) {
+  X509_free((X509 *)*pval);
+  *pval = NULL;
+}
+
+static int x509_d2i_cb(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
+                       const ASN1_ITEM *it, int opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx) {
+  if (len < 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  CBS cbs;
+  CBS_init(&cbs, *in, len);
+  if (opt && !CBS_peek_asn1_tag(&cbs, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
+    return -1;
   }
 
-  x509->cert_info->enc.alias_only_on_next_parse = 1;
+  X509 *ret = x509_parse(&cbs, NULL);
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  *in = CBS_data(&cbs);
+  X509_free((X509 *)*pval);
+  *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)ret;
+  return 1;
+}
 
-  const uint8_t *inp = CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(buf);
-  X509 *x509p = x509;
-  X509 *ret = d2i_X509(&x509p, &inp, CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(buf));
-  if (ret == NULL ||
-      inp - CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(buf) != (ptrdiff_t)CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(buf)) {
-    X509_free(x509p);
+static int x509_i2d_cb(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
+                       const ASN1_ITEM *it) {
+  return i2d_X509((X509 *)*pval, out);
+}
+
+static const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS x509_extern_funcs = {
+    x509_new_cb,
+    x509_free_cb,
+    /*asn1_ex_clear=*/NULL,
+    x509_d2i_cb,
+    x509_i2d_cb,
+};
+
+IMPLEMENT_EXTERN_ASN1(X509, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, x509_extern_funcs)
+
+X509 *X509_dup(X509 *x509) {
+  uint8_t *der = NULL;
+  int len = i2d_X509(x509, &der);
+  if (len < 0) {
     return NULL;
   }
-  assert(x509p == x509);
-  assert(ret == x509);
 
-  CRYPTO_BUFFER_up_ref(buf);
-  ret->buf = buf;
+  const uint8_t *inp = der;
+  X509 *ret = d2i_X509(NULL, &inp, len);
+  OPENSSL_free(der);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+X509 *X509_parse_from_buffer(CRYPTO_BUFFER *buf) {
+  CBS cbs;
+  CBS_init(&cbs, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(buf), CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(buf));
+  X509 *ret = x509_parse(&cbs, buf);
+  if (ret == NULL || CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
+    X509_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+  }
 
   return ret;
 }
 
-int X509_up_ref(X509 *x)
-{
-    CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&x->references);
-    return 1;
+int X509_up_ref(X509 *x) {
+  CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&x->references);
+  return 1;
 }
 
-int X509_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused * unused,
-                          CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
-{
-    int index;
-    if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp,
-                                 free_func)) {
-        return -1;
-    }
-    return index;
+int X509_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
+                          CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused,
+                          CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
+  int index;
+  if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp,
+                               free_func)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+  return index;
 }
 
-int X509_set_ex_data(X509 *r, int idx, void *arg)
-{
-    return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg));
+int X509_set_ex_data(X509 *r, int idx, void *arg) {
+  return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg));
 }
 
-void *X509_get_ex_data(X509 *r, int idx)
-{
-    return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx));
+void *X509_get_ex_data(X509 *r, int idx) {
+  return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx));
 }
 
-/*
- * X509_AUX ASN1 routines. X509_AUX is the name given to a certificate with
- * extra info tagged on the end. Since these functions set how a certificate
- * is trusted they should only be used when the certificate comes from a
- * reliable source such as local storage.
- */
-
-X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
-{
-    const unsigned char *q = *pp;
-    X509 *ret;
-    int freeret = 0;
-
-    if (!a || *a == NULL)
-        freeret = 1;
-    ret = d2i_X509(a, &q, length);
-    /* If certificate unreadable then forget it */
-    if (!ret)
-        return NULL;
-    /* update length */
-    length -= q - *pp;
-    /* Parse auxiliary information if there is any. */
-    if (length > 0 && !d2i_X509_CERT_AUX(&ret->aux, &q, length))
-        goto err;
-    *pp = q;
-    return ret;
- err:
-    if (freeret) {
-        X509_free(ret);
-        if (a)
-            *a = NULL;
-    }
+// X509_AUX ASN1 routines. X509_AUX is the name given to a certificate with
+// extra info tagged on the end. Since these functions set how a certificate
+// is trusted they should only be used when the certificate comes from a
+// reliable source such as local storage.
+
+X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length) {
+  const unsigned char *q = *pp;
+  X509 *ret;
+  int freeret = 0;
+
+  if (!a || *a == NULL) {
+    freeret = 1;
+  }
+  ret = d2i_X509(a, &q, length);
+  // If certificate unreadable then forget it
+  if (!ret) {
     return NULL;
+  }
+  // update length
+  length -= q - *pp;
+  // Parse auxiliary information if there is any.
+  if (length > 0 && !d2i_X509_CERT_AUX(&ret->aux, &q, length)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  *pp = q;
+  return ret;
+err:
+  if (freeret) {
+    X509_free(ret);
+    if (a) {
+      *a = NULL;
+    }
+  }
+  return NULL;
 }
 
-/*
- * Serialize trusted certificate to *pp or just return the required buffer
- * length if pp == NULL.  We ultimately want to avoid modifying *pp in the
- * error path, but that depends on similar hygiene in lower-level functions.
- * Here we avoid compounding the problem.
- */
-static int i2d_x509_aux_internal(X509 *a, unsigned char **pp)
-{
-    int length, tmplen;
-    unsigned char *start = pp != NULL ? *pp : NULL;
-
-    assert(pp == NULL || *pp != NULL);
-
-    /*
-     * This might perturb *pp on error, but fixing that belongs in i2d_X509()
-     * not here.  It should be that if a == NULL length is zero, but we check
-     * both just in case.
-     */
-    length = i2d_X509(a, pp);
-    if (length <= 0 || a == NULL) {
-        return length;
-    }
+// Serialize trusted certificate to *pp or just return the required buffer
+// length if pp == NULL.  We ultimately want to avoid modifying *pp in the
+// error path, but that depends on similar hygiene in lower-level functions.
+// Here we avoid compounding the problem.
+static int i2d_x509_aux_internal(X509 *a, unsigned char **pp) {
+  int length, tmplen;
+  unsigned char *start = pp != NULL ? *pp : NULL;
+
+  assert(pp == NULL || *pp != NULL);
+
+  // This might perturb *pp on error, but fixing that belongs in i2d_X509()
+  // not here.  It should be that if a == NULL length is zero, but we check
+  // both just in case.
+  length = i2d_X509(a, pp);
+  if (length <= 0 || a == NULL) {
+    return length;
+  }
 
-    if (a->aux != NULL) {
-        tmplen = i2d_X509_CERT_AUX(a->aux, pp);
-        if (tmplen < 0) {
-            if (start != NULL)
-                *pp = start;
-            return tmplen;
-        }
-        length += tmplen;
+  if (a->aux != NULL) {
+    tmplen = i2d_X509_CERT_AUX(a->aux, pp);
+    if (tmplen < 0) {
+      if (start != NULL) {
+        *pp = start;
+      }
+      return tmplen;
     }
+    length += tmplen;
+  }
 
-    return length;
+  return length;
 }
 
-/*
- * Serialize trusted certificate to *pp, or just return the required buffer
- * length if pp == NULL.
- *
- * When pp is not NULL, but *pp == NULL, we allocate the buffer, but since
- * we're writing two ASN.1 objects back to back, we can't have i2d_X509() do
- * the allocation, nor can we allow i2d_X509_CERT_AUX() to increment the
- * allocated buffer.
- */
-int i2d_X509_AUX(X509 *a, unsigned char **pp)
-{
-    int length;
-    unsigned char *tmp;
-
-    /* Buffer provided by caller */
-    if (pp == NULL || *pp != NULL)
-        return i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, pp);
-
-    /* Obtain the combined length */
-    if ((length = i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, NULL)) <= 0)
-        return length;
-
-    /* Allocate requisite combined storage */
-    *pp = tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(length);
-    if (tmp == NULL)
-        return -1; /* Push error onto error stack? */
-
-    /* Encode, but keep *pp at the originally malloced pointer */
-    length = i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, &tmp);
-    if (length <= 0) {
-        OPENSSL_free(*pp);
-        *pp = NULL;
-    }
+// Serialize trusted certificate to *pp, or just return the required buffer
+// length if pp == NULL.
+//
+// When pp is not NULL, but *pp == NULL, we allocate the buffer, but since
+// we're writing two ASN.1 objects back to back, we can't have i2d_X509() do
+// the allocation, nor can we allow i2d_X509_CERT_AUX() to increment the
+// allocated buffer.
+int i2d_X509_AUX(X509 *a, unsigned char **pp) {
+  int length;
+  unsigned char *tmp;
+
+  // Buffer provided by caller
+  if (pp == NULL || *pp != NULL) {
+    return i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, pp);
+  }
+
+  // Obtain the combined length
+  if ((length = i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, NULL)) <= 0) {
     return length;
+  }
+
+  // Allocate requisite combined storage
+  *pp = tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(length);
+  if (tmp == NULL) {
+    return -1;  // Push error onto error stack?
+  }
+
+  // Encode, but keep *pp at the originally malloced pointer
+  length = i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, &tmp);
+  if (length <= 0) {
+    OPENSSL_free(*pp);
+    *pp = NULL;
+  }
+  return length;
 }
 
-int i2d_re_X509_tbs(X509 *x509, unsigned char **outp)
-{
-    x509->cert_info->enc.modified = 1;
-    return i2d_X509_CINF(x509->cert_info, outp);
+int i2d_re_X509_tbs(X509 *x509, unsigned char **outp) {
+  asn1_encoding_clear(&x509->cert_info->enc);
+  return i2d_X509_CINF(x509->cert_info, outp);
 }
 
-int i2d_X509_tbs(X509 *x509, unsigned char **outp)
-{
-    return i2d_X509_CINF(x509->cert_info, outp);
+int i2d_X509_tbs(X509 *x509, unsigned char **outp) {
+  return i2d_X509_CINF(x509->cert_info, outp);
 }
 
-int X509_set1_signature_algo(X509 *x509, const X509_ALGOR *algo)
-{
-    /* TODO(davidben): Const-correct generated ASN.1 dup functions.
-     * Alternatively, when the types are hidden and we can embed required fields
-     * directly in structs, import |X509_ALGOR_copy| from upstream. */
-    X509_ALGOR *copy1 = X509_ALGOR_dup((X509_ALGOR *)algo);
-    X509_ALGOR *copy2 = X509_ALGOR_dup((X509_ALGOR *)algo);
-    if (copy1 == NULL || copy2 == NULL) {
-        X509_ALGOR_free(copy1);
-        X509_ALGOR_free(copy2);
-        return 0;
-    }
+int X509_set1_signature_algo(X509 *x509, const X509_ALGOR *algo) {
+  X509_ALGOR *copy1 = X509_ALGOR_dup(algo);
+  X509_ALGOR *copy2 = X509_ALGOR_dup(algo);
+  if (copy1 == NULL || copy2 == NULL) {
+    X509_ALGOR_free(copy1);
+    X509_ALGOR_free(copy2);
+    return 0;
+  }
 
-    X509_ALGOR_free(x509->sig_alg);
-    x509->sig_alg = copy1;
-    X509_ALGOR_free(x509->cert_info->signature);
-    x509->cert_info->signature = copy2;
-    return 1;
+  X509_ALGOR_free(x509->sig_alg);
+  x509->sig_alg = copy1;
+  X509_ALGOR_free(x509->cert_info->signature);
+  x509->cert_info->signature = copy2;
+  return 1;
 }
 
-int X509_set1_signature_value(X509 *x509, const uint8_t *sig, size_t sig_len)
-{
-    if (!ASN1_STRING_set(x509->signature, sig, sig_len)) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-    x509->signature->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07);
-    x509->signature->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
-    return 1;
+int X509_set1_signature_value(X509 *x509, const uint8_t *sig, size_t sig_len) {
+  if (!ASN1_STRING_set(x509->signature, sig, sig_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  x509->signature->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07);
+  x509->signature->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
+  return 1;
 }
 
 void X509_get0_signature(const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psig, const X509_ALGOR **palg,
-                         const X509 *x)
-{
-    if (psig)
-        *psig = x->signature;
-    if (palg)
-        *palg = x->sig_alg;
+                         const X509 *x) {
+  if (psig) {
+    *psig = x->signature;
+  }
+  if (palg) {
+    *palg = x->sig_alg;
+  }
 }
 
-int X509_get_signature_nid(const X509 *x)
-{
-    return OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
+int X509_get_signature_nid(const X509 *x) {
+  return OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
 }