grpc 1.50.0-x86_64-linux → 1.52.0.pre2-x86_64-linux

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/handshake_client.cc

@@ -1,1986 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- *
- * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- *
- * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license provided above.
- *
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
- * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
- */
-
-#include <openssl/ssl.h>
-
-#include <assert.h>
-#include <limits.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <utility>
-
-#include <openssl/aead.h>
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
-#include <openssl/ec_key.h>
-#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/hpke.h>
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-#include <openssl/mem.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
-
-#include "../crypto/internal.h"
-#include "internal.h"
-
-
-BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
-
-enum ssl_client_hs_state_t {
-  state_start_connect = 0,
-  state_enter_early_data,
-  state_early_reverify_server_certificate,
-  state_read_hello_verify_request,
-  state_read_server_hello,
-  state_tls13,
-  state_read_server_certificate,
-  state_read_certificate_status,
-  state_verify_server_certificate,
-  state_reverify_server_certificate,
-  state_read_server_key_exchange,
-  state_read_certificate_request,
-  state_read_server_hello_done,
-  state_send_client_certificate,
-  state_send_client_key_exchange,
-  state_send_client_certificate_verify,
-  state_send_client_finished,
-  state_finish_flight,
-  state_read_session_ticket,
-  state_process_change_cipher_spec,
-  state_read_server_finished,
-  state_finish_client_handshake,
-  state_done,
-};
-
-// ssl_get_client_disabled sets |*out_mask_a| and |*out_mask_k| to masks of
-// disabled algorithms.
-static void ssl_get_client_disabled(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
-                                    uint32_t *out_mask_a,
-                                    uint32_t *out_mask_k) {
-  *out_mask_a = 0;
-  *out_mask_k = 0;
-
-  // PSK requires a client callback.
-  if (hs->config->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
-    *out_mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
-    *out_mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
-  }
-}
-
-static bool ssl_write_client_cipher_list(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out,
-                                         ssl_client_hello_type_t type) {
-  const SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  uint32_t mask_a, mask_k;
-  ssl_get_client_disabled(hs, &mask_a, &mask_k);
-
-  CBB child;
-  if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &child)) {
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  // Add a fake cipher suite. See RFC 8701.
-  if (ssl->ctx->grease_enabled &&
-      !CBB_add_u16(&child, ssl_get_grease_value(hs, ssl_grease_cipher))) {
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  // Add TLS 1.3 ciphers. Order ChaCha20-Poly1305 relative to AES-GCM based on
-  // hardware support.
-  if (hs->max_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
-    if (!EVP_has_aes_hardware() &&
-        !CBB_add_u16(&child, TLS1_CK_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 & 0xffff)) {
-      return false;
-    }
-    if (!CBB_add_u16(&child, TLS1_CK_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 & 0xffff) ||
-        !CBB_add_u16(&child, TLS1_CK_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 & 0xffff)) {
-      return false;
-    }
-    if (EVP_has_aes_hardware() &&
-        !CBB_add_u16(&child, TLS1_CK_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 & 0xffff)) {
-      return false;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (hs->min_version < TLS1_3_VERSION && type != ssl_client_hello_inner) {
-    bool any_enabled = false;
-    for (const SSL_CIPHER *cipher : SSL_get_ciphers(ssl)) {
-      // Skip disabled ciphers
-      if ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & mask_k) ||
-          (cipher->algorithm_auth & mask_a)) {
-        continue;
-      }
-      if (SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(cipher) > hs->max_version ||
-          SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(cipher) < hs->min_version) {
-        continue;
-      }
-      any_enabled = true;
-      if (!CBB_add_u16(&child, SSL_CIPHER_get_protocol_id(cipher))) {
-        return false;
-      }
-    }
-
-    // If all ciphers were disabled, return the error to the caller.
-    if (!any_enabled && hs->max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
-      return false;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
-    if (!CBB_add_u16(&child, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xffff)) {
-      return false;
-    }
-  }
-
-  return CBB_flush(out);
-}
-
-bool ssl_write_client_hello_without_extensions(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
-                                               CBB *cbb,
-                                               ssl_client_hello_type_t type,
-                                               bool empty_session_id) {
-  const SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  CBB child;
-  if (!CBB_add_u16(cbb, hs->client_version) ||
-      !CBB_add_bytes(cbb,
-                     type == ssl_client_hello_inner ? hs->inner_client_random
-                                                    : ssl->s3->client_random,
-                     SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
-      !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb, &child)) {
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  // Do not send a session ID on renegotiation.
-  if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete &&
-      !empty_session_id &&
-      !CBB_add_bytes(&child, hs->session_id, hs->session_id_len)) {
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
-    if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb, &child) ||
-        !CBB_add_bytes(&child, ssl->d1->cookie, ssl->d1->cookie_len)) {
-      return false;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl_write_client_cipher_list(hs, cbb, type) ||
-      !CBB_add_u8(cbb, 1 /* one compression method */) ||
-      !CBB_add_u8(cbb, 0 /* null compression */)) {
-    return false;
-  }
-  return true;
-}
-
-bool ssl_add_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  ScopedCBB cbb;
-  CBB body;
-  ssl_client_hello_type_t type = hs->selected_ech_config
-                                     ? ssl_client_hello_outer
-                                     : ssl_client_hello_unencrypted;
-  bool needs_psk_binder;
-  Array<uint8_t> msg;
-  if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) ||
-      !ssl_write_client_hello_without_extensions(hs, &body, type,
-                                                 /*empty_session_id*/ false) ||
-      !ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(hs, &body, /*out_encoded=*/nullptr,
-                                  &needs_psk_binder, type, CBB_len(&body)) ||
-      !ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &msg)) {
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  // Now that the length prefixes have been computed, fill in the placeholder
-  // PSK binder.
-  if (needs_psk_binder) {
-    // ClientHelloOuter cannot have a PSK binder. Otherwise the
-    // ClientHellOuterAAD computation would break.
-    assert(type != ssl_client_hello_outer);
-    if (!tls13_write_psk_binder(hs, hs->transcript, MakeSpan(msg),
-                                /*out_binder_len=*/0)) {
-      return false;
-    }
-  }
-
-  return ssl->method->add_message(ssl, std::move(msg));
-}
-
-static bool parse_server_version(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint16_t *out_version,
-                                 uint8_t *out_alert,
-                                 const ParsedServerHello &server_hello) {
-  // If the outer version is not TLS 1.2, use it.
-  // TODO(davidben): This function doesn't quite match the RFC8446 formulation.
-  if (server_hello.legacy_version != TLS1_2_VERSION) {
-    *out_version = server_hello.legacy_version;
-    return true;
-  }
-
-  SSLExtension supported_versions(TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions);
-  CBS extensions = server_hello.extensions;
-  if (!ssl_parse_extensions(&extensions, out_alert, {&supported_versions},
-                            /*ignore_unknown=*/true)) {
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  if (!supported_versions.present) {
-    *out_version = server_hello.legacy_version;
-    return true;
-  }
-
-  if (!CBS_get_u16(&supported_versions.data, out_version) ||
-       CBS_len(&supported_versions.data) != 0) {
-    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  return true;
-}
-
-// should_offer_early_data returns |ssl_early_data_accepted| if |hs| should
-// offer early data, and some other reason code otherwise.
-static ssl_early_data_reason_t should_offer_early_data(
-    const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  const SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  assert(!ssl->server);
-  if (!ssl->enable_early_data) {
-    return ssl_early_data_disabled;
-  }
-
-  if (hs->max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
-    // We discard inapplicable sessions, so this is redundant with the session
-    // checks below, but reporting that TLS 1.3 was disabled is more useful.
-    return ssl_early_data_protocol_version;
-  }
-
-  if (ssl->session == nullptr) {
-    return ssl_early_data_no_session_offered;
-  }
-
-  if (ssl_session_protocol_version(ssl->session.get()) < TLS1_3_VERSION ||
-      ssl->session->ticket_max_early_data == 0) {
-    return ssl_early_data_unsupported_for_session;
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl->session->early_alpn.empty()) {
-    if (!ssl_is_alpn_protocol_allowed(hs, ssl->session->early_alpn)) {
-      // Avoid reporting a confusing value in |SSL_get0_alpn_selected|.
-      return ssl_early_data_alpn_mismatch;
-    }
-
-    // If the previous connection negotiated ALPS, only offer 0-RTT when the
-    // local are settings are consistent with what we'd offer for this
-    // connection.
-    if (ssl->session->has_application_settings) {
-      Span<const uint8_t> settings;
-      if (!ssl_get_local_application_settings(hs, &settings,
-                                              ssl->session->early_alpn) ||
-          settings != ssl->session->local_application_settings) {
-        return ssl_early_data_alps_mismatch;
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Early data has not yet been accepted, but we use it as a success code.
-  return ssl_early_data_accepted;
-}
-
-void ssl_done_writing_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  hs->ech_client_outer.Reset();
-  hs->cookie.Reset();
-  hs->key_share_bytes.Reset();
-}
-
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_start_connect(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-
-  ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
-  // |session_reused| must be reset in case this is a renegotiation.
-  ssl->s3->session_reused = false;
-
-  // Freeze the version range.
-  if (!ssl_get_version_range(hs, &hs->min_version, &hs->max_version)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  uint8_t ech_enc[EVP_HPKE_MAX_ENC_LENGTH];
-  size_t ech_enc_len;
-  if (!ssl_select_ech_config(hs, ech_enc, &ech_enc_len)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  // Always advertise the ClientHello version from the original maximum version,
-  // even on renegotiation. The static RSA key exchange uses this field, and
-  // some servers fail when it changes across handshakes.
-  if (SSL_is_dtls(hs->ssl)) {
-    hs->client_version =
-        hs->max_version >= TLS1_2_VERSION ? DTLS1_2_VERSION : DTLS1_VERSION;
-  } else {
-    hs->client_version =
-        hs->max_version >= TLS1_2_VERSION ? TLS1_2_VERSION : hs->max_version;
-  }
-
-  // If the configured session has expired or is not usable, drop it. We also do
-  // not offer sessions on renegotiation.
-  if (ssl->session != nullptr) {
-    if (ssl->session->is_server ||
-        !ssl_supports_version(hs, ssl->session->ssl_version) ||
-        // Do not offer TLS 1.2 sessions with ECH. ClientHelloInner does not
-        // offer TLS 1.2, and the cleartext session ID may leak the server
-        // identity.
-        (hs->selected_ech_config &&
-         ssl_session_protocol_version(ssl->session.get()) < TLS1_3_VERSION) ||
-        !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(ssl->session.get()) ||
-        !ssl_session_is_time_valid(ssl, ssl->session.get()) ||
-        (ssl->quic_method != nullptr) != ssl->session->is_quic ||
-        ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) {
-      ssl_set_session(ssl, nullptr);
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (!RAND_bytes(ssl->s3->client_random, sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random))) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-  if (hs->selected_ech_config &&
-      !RAND_bytes(hs->inner_client_random, sizeof(hs->inner_client_random))) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  // Never send a session ID in QUIC. QUIC uses TLS 1.3 at a minimum and
-  // disables TLS 1.3 middlebox compatibility mode.
-  if (ssl->quic_method == nullptr) {
-    const bool has_id_session = ssl->session != nullptr &&
-                                ssl->session->session_id_length > 0 &&
-                                ssl->session->ticket.empty();
-    const bool has_ticket_session =
-        ssl->session != nullptr && !ssl->session->ticket.empty();
-    if (has_id_session) {
-      hs->session_id_len = ssl->session->session_id_length;
-      OPENSSL_memcpy(hs->session_id, ssl->session->session_id,
-                     hs->session_id_len);
-    } else if (has_ticket_session || hs->max_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
-      // Send a random session ID. TLS 1.3 always sends one, and TLS 1.2 session
-      // tickets require a placeholder value to signal resumption.
-      hs->session_id_len = sizeof(hs->session_id);
-      if (!RAND_bytes(hs->session_id, hs->session_id_len)) {
-        return ssl_hs_error;
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  ssl_early_data_reason_t reason = should_offer_early_data(hs);
-  if (reason != ssl_early_data_accepted) {
-    ssl->s3->early_data_reason = reason;
-  } else {
-    hs->early_data_offered = true;
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl_setup_key_shares(hs, /*override_group_id=*/0) ||
-      !ssl_setup_extension_permutation(hs) ||
-      !ssl_encrypt_client_hello(hs, MakeConstSpan(ech_enc, ech_enc_len)) ||
-      !ssl_add_client_hello(hs)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  hs->state = state_enter_early_data;
-  return ssl_hs_flush;
-}
-
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_enter_early_data(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-
-  if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
-    hs->state = state_read_hello_verify_request;
-    return ssl_hs_ok;
-  }
-
-  if (!hs->early_data_offered) {
-    hs->state = state_read_server_hello;
-    return ssl_hs_ok;
-  }
-
-  ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->SetVersionIfNullCipher(ssl->session->ssl_version);
-  if (!ssl->method->add_change_cipher_spec(ssl)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  if (!tls13_init_early_key_schedule(hs, ssl->session.get()) ||
-      !tls13_derive_early_secret(hs)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  // Stash the early data session, so connection properties may be queried out
-  // of it.
-  hs->early_session = UpRef(ssl->session);
-  hs->state = state_early_reverify_server_certificate;
-  return ssl_hs_ok;
-}
-
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_early_reverify_server_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  if (hs->ssl->ctx->reverify_on_resume) {
-    // Don't send an alert on error. The alert be in early data, which the
-    // server may not accept anyway. It would also be a mismatch between QUIC
-    // and TCP because the QUIC early keys are deferred below.
-    //
-    // TODO(davidben): The client behavior should be to verify the certificate
-    // before deciding whether to offer the session and, if invalid, decline to
-    // send the session.
-    switch (ssl_reverify_peer_cert(hs, /*send_alert=*/false)) {
-      case ssl_verify_ok:
-        break;
-      case ssl_verify_invalid:
-        return ssl_hs_error;
-      case ssl_verify_retry:
-        hs->state = state_early_reverify_server_certificate;
-        return ssl_hs_certificate_verify;
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Defer releasing the 0-RTT key to after certificate reverification, so the
-  // QUIC implementation does not accidentally write data too early.
-  if (!tls13_set_traffic_key(hs->ssl, ssl_encryption_early_data, evp_aead_seal,
-                             hs->early_session.get(),
-                             hs->early_traffic_secret())) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  hs->in_early_data = true;
-  hs->can_early_write = true;
-  hs->state = state_read_server_hello;
-  return ssl_hs_early_return;
-}
-
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_hello_verify_request(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-
-  assert(SSL_is_dtls(ssl));
-
-  // When implementing DTLS 1.3, we need to handle the interactions between
-  // HelloVerifyRequest, DTLS 1.3's HelloVerifyRequest removal, and ECH.
-  assert(hs->max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION);
-
-  SSLMessage msg;
-  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
-    return ssl_hs_read_message;
-  }
-
-  if (msg.type != DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
-    hs->state = state_read_server_hello;
-    return ssl_hs_ok;
-  }
-
-  CBS hello_verify_request = msg.body, cookie;
-  uint16_t server_version;
-  if (!CBS_get_u16(&hello_verify_request, &server_version) ||
-      !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&hello_verify_request, &cookie) ||
-      CBS_len(&cookie) > sizeof(ssl->d1->cookie) ||
-      CBS_len(&hello_verify_request) != 0) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->d1->cookie, CBS_data(&cookie), CBS_len(&cookie));
-  ssl->d1->cookie_len = CBS_len(&cookie);
-
-  ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
-
-  // DTLS resets the handshake buffer after HelloVerifyRequest.
-  if (!hs->transcript.Init()) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl_add_client_hello(hs)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  hs->state = state_read_server_hello;
-  return ssl_hs_flush;
-}
-
-bool ssl_parse_server_hello(ParsedServerHello *out, uint8_t *out_alert,
-                            const SSLMessage &msg) {
-  if (msg.type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-    *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-    return false;
-  }
-  out->raw = msg.raw;
-  CBS body = msg.body;
-  if (!CBS_get_u16(&body, &out->legacy_version) ||
-      !CBS_get_bytes(&body, &out->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
-      !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &out->session_id) ||
-      CBS_len(&out->session_id) > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE ||
-      !CBS_get_u16(&body, &out->cipher_suite) ||
-      !CBS_get_u8(&body, &out->compression_method)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-    return false;
-  }
-  // In TLS 1.2 and below, empty extensions blocks may be omitted. In TLS 1.3,
-  // ServerHellos always have extensions, so this can be applied generically.
-  CBS_init(&out->extensions, nullptr, 0);
-  if ((CBS_len(&body) != 0 &&
-       !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &out->extensions)) ||
-      CBS_len(&body) != 0) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-    return false;
-  }
-  return true;
-}
-
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  SSLMessage msg;
-  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
-    return ssl_hs_read_server_hello;
-  }
-
-  ParsedServerHello server_hello;
-  uint16_t server_version;
-  uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-  if (!ssl_parse_server_hello(&server_hello, &alert, msg) ||
-      !parse_server_version(hs, &server_version, &alert, server_hello)) {
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl_supports_version(hs, server_version)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  assert(ssl->s3->have_version == ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete);
-  if (!ssl->s3->have_version) {
-    ssl->version = server_version;
-    // At this point, the connection's version is known and ssl->version is
-    // fixed. Begin enforcing the record-layer version.
-    ssl->s3->have_version = true;
-    ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->SetVersionIfNullCipher(ssl->version);
-  } else if (server_version != ssl->version) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
-    hs->state = state_tls13;
-    return ssl_hs_ok;
-  }
-
-  // Clear some TLS 1.3 state that no longer needs to be retained.
-  hs->key_shares[0].reset();
-  hs->key_shares[1].reset();
-  ssl_done_writing_client_hello(hs);
-
-  // A TLS 1.2 server would not know to skip the early data we offered. Report
-  // an error code sooner. The caller may use this error code to implement the
-  // fallback described in RFC 8446 appendix D.3.
-  if (hs->early_data_offered) {
-    // Disconnect early writes. This ensures subsequent |SSL_write| calls query
-    // the handshake which, in turn, will replay the error code rather than fail
-    // at the |write_shutdown| check. See https://crbug.com/1078515.
-    // TODO(davidben): Should all handshake errors do this? What about record
-    // decryption failures?
-    hs->can_early_write = false;
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_ON_EARLY_DATA);
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  // TLS 1.2 handshakes cannot accept ECH.
-  if (hs->selected_ech_config) {
-    ssl->s3->ech_status = ssl_ech_rejected;
-  }
-
-  // Copy over the server random.
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->server_random, CBS_data(&server_hello.random),
-                 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-
-  // Enforce the TLS 1.3 anti-downgrade feature.
-  if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete &&
-      ssl_supports_version(hs, TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
-    static_assert(
-        sizeof(kTLS12DowngradeRandom) == sizeof(kTLS13DowngradeRandom),
-        "downgrade signals have different size");
-    static_assert(
-        sizeof(kJDK11DowngradeRandom) == sizeof(kTLS13DowngradeRandom),
-        "downgrade signals have different size");
-    auto suffix =
-        MakeConstSpan(ssl->s3->server_random, sizeof(ssl->s3->server_random))
-            .subspan(SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - sizeof(kTLS13DowngradeRandom));
-    if (suffix == kTLS12DowngradeRandom || suffix == kTLS13DowngradeRandom ||
-        suffix == kJDK11DowngradeRandom) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_TLS13_DOWNGRADE);
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-  }
-
-  // The cipher must be allowed in the selected version and enabled.
-  const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(server_hello.cipher_suite);
-  uint32_t mask_a, mask_k;
-  ssl_get_client_disabled(hs, &mask_a, &mask_k);
-  if (cipher == nullptr ||
-      (cipher->algorithm_mkey & mask_k) ||
-      (cipher->algorithm_auth & mask_a) ||
-      SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(cipher) > ssl_protocol_version(ssl) ||
-      SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(cipher) < ssl_protocol_version(ssl) ||
-      !sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(ssl), nullptr, cipher)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  hs->new_cipher = cipher;
-
-  if (hs->session_id_len != 0 &&
-      CBS_mem_equal(&server_hello.session_id, hs->session_id,
-                    hs->session_id_len)) {
-    // Echoing the ClientHello session ID in TLS 1.2, whether from the session
-    // or a synthetic one, indicates resumption. If there was no session (or if
-    // the session was only offered in ECH ClientHelloInner), this was the
-    // TLS 1.3 compatibility mode session ID. As we know this is not a session
-    // the server knows about, any server resuming it is in error. Reject the
-    // first connection deterministicly, rather than installing an invalid
-    // session into the session cache. https://crbug.com/796910
-    if (ssl->session == nullptr || ssl->s3->ech_status == ssl_ech_rejected) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVER_ECHOED_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-    if (ssl->session->ssl_version != ssl->version) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_VERSION_NOT_RETURNED);
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-    if (ssl->session->cipher != hs->new_cipher) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-    if (!ssl_session_is_context_valid(hs, ssl->session.get())) {
-      // This is actually a client application bug.
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL,
-                        SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-    // We never offer sessions on renegotiation.
-    assert(!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete);
-    ssl->s3->session_reused = true;
-  } else {
-    // The session wasn't resumed. Create a fresh SSL_SESSION to fill out.
-    ssl_set_session(ssl, NULL);
-    if (!ssl_get_new_session(hs)) {
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-    // Note: session_id could be empty.
-    hs->new_session->session_id_length = CBS_len(&server_hello.session_id);
-    OPENSSL_memcpy(hs->new_session->session_id,
-                   CBS_data(&server_hello.session_id),
-                   CBS_len(&server_hello.session_id));
-    hs->new_session->cipher = hs->new_cipher;
-  }
-
-  // Now that the cipher is known, initialize the handshake hash and hash the
-  // ServerHello.
-  if (!hs->transcript.InitHash(ssl_protocol_version(ssl), hs->new_cipher) ||
-      !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  // If doing a full handshake, the server may request a client certificate
-  // which requires hashing the handshake transcript. Otherwise, the handshake
-  // buffer may be released.
-  if (ssl->session != NULL ||
-      !ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
-    hs->transcript.FreeBuffer();
-  }
-
-  // Only the NULL compression algorithm is supported.
-  if (server_hello.compression_method != 0) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(hs, &server_hello.extensions)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  if (ssl->session != NULL &&
-      hs->extended_master_secret != ssl->session->extended_master_secret) {
-    if (ssl->session->extended_master_secret) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_EMS_SESSION_WITHOUT_EMS_EXTENSION);
-    } else {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_NON_EMS_SESSION_WITH_EMS_EXTENSION);
-    }
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
-
-  if (ssl->session != NULL) {
-    if (ssl->ctx->reverify_on_resume &&
-        ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
-      hs->state = state_reverify_server_certificate;
-    } else {
-      hs->state = state_read_session_ticket;
-    }
-    return ssl_hs_ok;
-  }
-
-  hs->state = state_read_server_certificate;
-  return ssl_hs_ok;
-}
-
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_tls13(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  enum ssl_hs_wait_t wait = tls13_client_handshake(hs);
-  if (wait == ssl_hs_ok) {
-    hs->state = state_finish_client_handshake;
-    return ssl_hs_ok;
-  }
-
-  return wait;
-}
-
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-
-  if (!ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
-    hs->state = state_read_certificate_status;
-    return ssl_hs_ok;
-  }
-
-  SSLMessage msg;
-  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
-    return ssl_hs_read_message;
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) ||
-      !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  CBS body = msg.body;
-  uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-  if (!ssl_parse_cert_chain(&alert, &hs->new_session->certs, &hs->peer_pubkey,
-                            NULL, &body, ssl->ctx->pool)) {
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs.get()) == 0 ||
-      CBS_len(&body) != 0 ||
-      !ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_cache_objects(hs->new_session.get())) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl_check_leaf_certificate(
-          hs, hs->peer_pubkey.get(),
-          sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(hs->new_session->certs.get(), 0))) {
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
-
-  hs->state = state_read_certificate_status;
-  return ssl_hs_ok;
-}
-
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_certificate_status(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-
-  if (!hs->certificate_status_expected) {
-    hs->state = state_verify_server_certificate;
-    return ssl_hs_ok;
-  }
-
-  SSLMessage msg;
-  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
-    return ssl_hs_read_message;
-  }
-
-  if (msg.type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
-    // A server may send status_request in ServerHello and then change its mind
-    // about sending CertificateStatus.
-    hs->state = state_verify_server_certificate;
-    return ssl_hs_ok;
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  CBS certificate_status = msg.body, ocsp_response;
-  uint8_t status_type;
-  if (!CBS_get_u8(&certificate_status, &status_type) ||
-      status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp ||
-      !CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_status, &ocsp_response) ||
-      CBS_len(&ocsp_response) == 0 ||
-      CBS_len(&certificate_status) != 0) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  hs->new_session->ocsp_response.reset(
-      CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_from_CBS(&ocsp_response, ssl->ctx->pool));
-  if (hs->new_session->ocsp_response == nullptr) {
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
-
-  hs->state = state_verify_server_certificate;
-  return ssl_hs_ok;
-}
-
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_verify_server_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  if (!ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
-    hs->state = state_read_server_key_exchange;
-    return ssl_hs_ok;
-  }
-
-  switch (ssl_verify_peer_cert(hs)) {
-    case ssl_verify_ok:
-      break;
-    case ssl_verify_invalid:
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    case ssl_verify_retry:
-      hs->state = state_verify_server_certificate;
-      return ssl_hs_certificate_verify;
-  }
-
-  hs->state = state_read_server_key_exchange;
-  return ssl_hs_ok;
-}
-
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_reverify_server_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  assert(hs->ssl->ctx->reverify_on_resume);
-
-  switch (ssl_reverify_peer_cert(hs, /*send_alert=*/true)) {
-    case ssl_verify_ok:
-      break;
-    case ssl_verify_invalid:
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    case ssl_verify_retry:
-      hs->state = state_reverify_server_certificate;
-      return ssl_hs_certificate_verify;
-  }
-
-  hs->state = state_read_session_ticket;
-  return ssl_hs_ok;
-}
-
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  SSLMessage msg;
-  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
-    return ssl_hs_read_message;
-  }
-
-  if (msg.type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
-    // Some ciphers (pure PSK) have an optional ServerKeyExchange message.
-    if (ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(hs->new_cipher)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-
-    hs->state = state_read_certificate_request;
-    return ssl_hs_ok;
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  uint32_t alg_k = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-  uint32_t alg_a = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-  CBS server_key_exchange = msg.body;
-  if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
-    CBS psk_identity_hint;
-
-    // Each of the PSK key exchanges begins with a psk_identity_hint.
-    if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange,
-                                     &psk_identity_hint)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-
-    // Store the PSK identity hint for the ClientKeyExchange. Assume that the
-    // maximum length of a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum
-    // length of a PSK identity. Also do not allow NULL characters; identities
-    // are saved as C strings.
-    //
-    // TODO(davidben): Should invalid hints be ignored? It's a hint rather than
-    // a specific identity.
-    if (CBS_len(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN ||
-        CBS_contains_zero_byte(&psk_identity_hint)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-
-    // Save non-empty identity hints as a C string. Empty identity hints we
-    // treat as missing. Plain PSK makes it possible to send either no hint
-    // (omit ServerKeyExchange) or an empty hint, while ECDHE_PSK can only spell
-    // empty hint. Having different capabilities is odd, so we interpret empty
-    // and missing as identical.
-    char *raw = nullptr;
-    if (CBS_len(&psk_identity_hint) != 0 &&
-        !CBS_strdup(&psk_identity_hint, &raw)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-    hs->peer_psk_identity_hint.reset(raw);
-  }
-
-  if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
-    // Parse the server parameters.
-    uint8_t group_type;
-    uint16_t group_id;
-    CBS point;
-    if (!CBS_get_u8(&server_key_exchange, &group_type) ||
-        group_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE ||
-        !CBS_get_u16(&server_key_exchange, &group_id) ||
-        !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &point)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-    hs->new_session->group_id = group_id;
-
-    // Ensure the group is consistent with preferences.
-    if (!tls1_check_group_id(hs, group_id)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-
-    // Initialize ECDH and save the peer public key for later.
-    hs->key_shares[0] = SSLKeyShare::Create(group_id);
-    if (!hs->key_shares[0] ||
-        !hs->peer_key.CopyFrom(point)) {
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-  } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  // At this point, |server_key_exchange| contains the signature, if any, while
-  // |msg.body| contains the entire message. From that, derive a CBS containing
-  // just the parameter.
-  CBS parameter;
-  CBS_init(&parameter, CBS_data(&msg.body),
-           CBS_len(&msg.body) - CBS_len(&server_key_exchange));
-
-  // ServerKeyExchange should be signed by the server's public key.
-  if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
-    uint16_t signature_algorithm = 0;
-    if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
-      if (!CBS_get_u16(&server_key_exchange, &signature_algorithm)) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-        ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-        return ssl_hs_error;
-      }
-      uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-      if (!tls12_check_peer_sigalg(hs, &alert, signature_algorithm)) {
-        ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
-        return ssl_hs_error;
-      }
-      hs->new_session->peer_signature_algorithm = signature_algorithm;
-    } else if (!tls1_get_legacy_signature_algorithm(&signature_algorithm,
-                                                    hs->peer_pubkey.get())) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-
-    // The last field in |server_key_exchange| is the signature.
-    CBS signature;
-    if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &signature) ||
-        CBS_len(&server_key_exchange) != 0) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-
-    ScopedCBB transcript;
-    Array<uint8_t> transcript_data;
-    if (!CBB_init(transcript.get(),
-                  2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + CBS_len(&parameter)) ||
-        !CBB_add_bytes(transcript.get(), ssl->s3->client_random,
-                       SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
-        !CBB_add_bytes(transcript.get(), ssl->s3->server_random,
-                       SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
-        !CBB_add_bytes(transcript.get(), CBS_data(&parameter),
-                       CBS_len(&parameter)) ||
-        !CBBFinishArray(transcript.get(), &transcript_data)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-
-    if (!ssl_public_key_verify(ssl, signature, signature_algorithm,
-                               hs->peer_pubkey.get(), transcript_data)) {
-      // bad signature
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-  } else {
-    // PSK ciphers are the only supported certificate-less ciphers.
-    assert(alg_a == SSL_aPSK);
-
-    if (CBS_len(&server_key_exchange) > 0) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-  }
-
-  ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
-  hs->state = state_read_certificate_request;
-  return ssl_hs_ok;
-}
-
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_certificate_request(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-
-  if (!ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
-    hs->state = state_read_server_hello_done;
-    return ssl_hs_ok;
-  }
-
-  SSLMessage msg;
-  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
-    return ssl_hs_read_message;
-  }
-
-  if (msg.type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO_DONE) {
-    // If we get here we don't need the handshake buffer as we won't be doing
-    // client auth.
-    hs->transcript.FreeBuffer();
-    hs->state = state_read_server_hello_done;
-    return ssl_hs_ok;
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) ||
-      !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  // Get the certificate types.
-  CBS body = msg.body, certificate_types;
-  if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &certificate_types)) {
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  if (!hs->certificate_types.CopyFrom(certificate_types)) {
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
-    CBS supported_signature_algorithms;
-    if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &supported_signature_algorithms) ||
-        !tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(hs, &supported_signature_algorithms)) {
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-  }
-
-  uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-  UniquePtr<STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)> ca_names =
-      ssl_parse_client_CA_list(ssl, &alert, &body);
-  if (!ca_names) {
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  if (CBS_len(&body) != 0) {
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  hs->cert_request = true;
-  hs->ca_names = std::move(ca_names);
-  ssl->ctx->x509_method->hs_flush_cached_ca_names(hs);
-
-  ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
-  hs->state = state_read_server_hello_done;
-  return ssl_hs_ok;
-}
-
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_hello_done(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  SSLMessage msg;
-  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
-    return ssl_hs_read_message;
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO_DONE) ||
-      !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  // ServerHelloDone is empty.
-  if (CBS_len(&msg.body) != 0) {
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  // ServerHelloDone should be the end of the flight.
-  if (ssl->method->has_unprocessed_handshake_data(ssl)) {
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESS_HANDSHAKE_DATA);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
-  hs->state = state_send_client_certificate;
-  return ssl_hs_ok;
-}
-
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_client_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-
-  // The peer didn't request a certificate.
-  if (!hs->cert_request) {
-    hs->state = state_send_client_key_exchange;
-    return ssl_hs_ok;
-  }
-
-  if (ssl->s3->ech_status == ssl_ech_rejected) {
-    // Do not send client certificates on ECH reject. We have not authenticated
-    // the server for the name that can learn the certificate.
-    SSL_certs_clear(ssl);
-  } else if (hs->config->cert->cert_cb != nullptr) {
-    // Call cert_cb to update the certificate.
-    int rv = hs->config->cert->cert_cb(ssl, hs->config->cert->cert_cb_arg);
-    if (rv == 0) {
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-    if (rv < 0) {
-      hs->state = state_send_client_certificate;
-      return ssl_hs_x509_lookup;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl_has_certificate(hs)) {
-    // Without a client certificate, the handshake buffer may be released.
-    hs->transcript.FreeBuffer();
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl_on_certificate_selected(hs) ||
-      !ssl_output_cert_chain(hs)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-
-  hs->state = state_send_client_key_exchange;
-  return ssl_hs_ok;
-}
-
-static_assert(sizeof(size_t) >= sizeof(unsigned),
-              "size_t is smaller than unsigned");
-
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_client_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  ScopedCBB cbb;
-  CBB body;
-  if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body,
-                                 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  Array<uint8_t> pms;
-  uint32_t alg_k = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-  uint32_t alg_a = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-  if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
-    const CRYPTO_BUFFER *leaf =
-        sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(hs->new_session->certs.get(), 0);
-    CBS leaf_cbs;
-    CRYPTO_BUFFER_init_CBS(leaf, &leaf_cbs);
-
-    // Check the key usage matches the cipher suite. We do this unconditionally
-    // for non-RSA certificates. In particular, it's needed to distinguish ECDH
-    // certificates, which we do not support, from ECDSA certificates.
-    // Historically, we have not checked RSA key usages, so it is controlled by
-    // a flag for now. See https://crbug.com/795089.
-    ssl_key_usage_t intended_use = (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
-                                       ? key_usage_encipherment
-                                       : key_usage_digital_signature;
-    if (hs->config->enforce_rsa_key_usage ||
-        EVP_PKEY_id(hs->peer_pubkey.get()) != EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
-      if (!ssl_cert_check_key_usage(&leaf_cbs, intended_use)) {
-        return ssl_hs_error;
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  // If using a PSK key exchange, prepare the pre-shared key.
-  unsigned psk_len = 0;
-  uint8_t psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
-  if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
-    if (hs->config->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-
-    char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
-    OPENSSL_memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
-    psk_len = hs->config->psk_client_callback(
-        ssl, hs->peer_psk_identity_hint.get(), identity, sizeof(identity), psk,
-        sizeof(psk));
-    if (psk_len == 0) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-    assert(psk_len <= PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN);
-
-    hs->new_session->psk_identity.reset(OPENSSL_strdup(identity));
-    if (hs->new_session->psk_identity == nullptr) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-
-    // Write out psk_identity.
-    CBB child;
-    if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &child) ||
-        !CBB_add_bytes(&child, (const uint8_t *)identity,
-                       OPENSSL_strnlen(identity, sizeof(identity))) ||
-        !CBB_flush(&body)) {
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Depending on the key exchange method, compute |pms|.
-  if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
-    if (!pms.Init(SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)) {
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-
-    RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(hs->peer_pubkey.get());
-    if (rsa == NULL) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-
-    pms[0] = hs->client_version >> 8;
-    pms[1] = hs->client_version & 0xff;
-    if (!RAND_bytes(&pms[2], SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH - 2)) {
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-
-    CBB enc_pms;
-    uint8_t *ptr;
-    size_t enc_pms_len;
-    if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &enc_pms) ||
-        !CBB_reserve(&enc_pms, &ptr, RSA_size(rsa)) ||
-        !RSA_encrypt(rsa, &enc_pms_len, ptr, RSA_size(rsa), pms.data(),
-                     pms.size(), RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) ||
-        !CBB_did_write(&enc_pms, enc_pms_len) ||
-        !CBB_flush(&body)) {
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-  } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
-    // Generate a keypair and serialize the public half.
-    CBB child;
-    if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &child)) {
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-
-    // Compute the premaster.
-    uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-    if (!hs->key_shares[0]->Accept(&child, &pms, &alert, hs->peer_key)) {
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-    if (!CBB_flush(&body)) {
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-
-    // The key exchange state may now be discarded.
-    hs->key_shares[0].reset();
-    hs->key_shares[1].reset();
-    hs->peer_key.Reset();
-  } else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
-    // For plain PSK, other_secret is a block of 0s with the same length as
-    // the pre-shared key.
-    if (!pms.Init(psk_len)) {
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-    OPENSSL_memset(pms.data(), 0, pms.size());
-  } else {
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  // For a PSK cipher suite, other_secret is combined with the pre-shared
-  // key.
-  if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
-    ScopedCBB pms_cbb;
-    CBB child;
-    if (!CBB_init(pms_cbb.get(), 2 + psk_len + 2 + pms.size()) ||
-        !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(pms_cbb.get(), &child) ||
-        !CBB_add_bytes(&child, pms.data(), pms.size()) ||
-        !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(pms_cbb.get(), &child) ||
-        !CBB_add_bytes(&child, psk, psk_len) ||
-        !CBBFinishArray(pms_cbb.get(), &pms)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-  }
-
-  // The message must be added to the finished hash before calculating the
-  // master secret.
-  if (!ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  hs->new_session->secret_length =
-      tls1_generate_master_secret(hs, hs->new_session->secret, pms);
-  if (hs->new_session->secret_length == 0) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-  hs->new_session->extended_master_secret = hs->extended_master_secret;
-
-  hs->state = state_send_client_certificate_verify;
-  return ssl_hs_ok;
-}
-
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_client_certificate_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-
-  if (!hs->cert_request || !ssl_has_certificate(hs)) {
-    hs->state = state_send_client_finished;
-    return ssl_hs_ok;
-  }
-
-  assert(ssl_has_private_key(hs));
-  ScopedCBB cbb;
-  CBB body, child;
-  if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body,
-                                 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  uint16_t signature_algorithm;
-  if (!tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(hs, &signature_algorithm)) {
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-  if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
-    // Write out the digest type in TLS 1.2.
-    if (!CBB_add_u16(&body, signature_algorithm)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Set aside space for the signature.
-  const size_t max_sig_len = EVP_PKEY_size(hs->local_pubkey.get());
-  uint8_t *ptr;
-  if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &child) ||
-      !CBB_reserve(&child, &ptr, max_sig_len)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  size_t sig_len = max_sig_len;
-  switch (ssl_private_key_sign(hs, ptr, &sig_len, max_sig_len,
-                               signature_algorithm,
-                               hs->transcript.buffer())) {
-    case ssl_private_key_success:
-      break;
-    case ssl_private_key_failure:
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    case ssl_private_key_retry:
-      hs->state = state_send_client_certificate_verify;
-      return ssl_hs_private_key_operation;
-  }
-
-  if (!CBB_did_write(&child, sig_len) ||
-      !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  // The handshake buffer is no longer necessary.
-  hs->transcript.FreeBuffer();
-
-  hs->state = state_send_client_finished;
-  return ssl_hs_ok;
-}
-
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_client_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  hs->can_release_private_key = true;
-  if (!ssl->method->add_change_cipher_spec(ssl) ||
-      !tls1_change_cipher_state(hs, evp_aead_seal)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  if (hs->next_proto_neg_seen) {
-    static const uint8_t kZero[32] = {0};
-    size_t padding_len =
-        32 - ((ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated.size() + 2) % 32);
-
-    ScopedCBB cbb;
-    CBB body, child;
-    if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) ||
-        !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &child) ||
-        !CBB_add_bytes(&child, ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated.data(),
-                       ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated.size()) ||
-        !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &child) ||
-        !CBB_add_bytes(&child, kZero, padding_len) ||
-        !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (hs->channel_id_negotiated) {
-    ScopedCBB cbb;
-    CBB body;
-    if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_CHANNEL_ID) ||
-        !tls1_write_channel_id(hs, &body) ||
-        !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl_send_finished(hs)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  hs->state = state_finish_flight;
-  return ssl_hs_flush;
-}
-
-static bool can_false_start(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  const SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-
-  // False Start bypasses the Finished check's downgrade protection. This can
-  // enable attacks where we send data under weaker settings than supported
-  // (e.g. the Logjam attack). Thus we require TLS 1.2 with an ECDHE+AEAD
-  // cipher, our strongest settings before TLS 1.3.
-  //
-  // Now that TLS 1.3 exists, we would like to avoid similar attacks between
-  // TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3, but there are too many TLS 1.2 deployments to
-  // sacrifice False Start on them. Instead, we rely on the ServerHello.random
-  // downgrade signal, which we unconditionally enforce.
-  if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl) ||
-      SSL_version(ssl) != TLS1_2_VERSION ||
-      hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mkey != SSL_kECDHE ||
-      hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD) {
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  // If ECH was rejected, disable False Start. We run the handshake to
-  // completion, including the Finished downgrade check, to authenticate the
-  // recovery flow.
-  if (ssl->s3->ech_status == ssl_ech_rejected) {
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  // Additionally require ALPN or NPN by default.
-  //
-  // TODO(davidben): Can this constraint be relaxed globally now that cipher
-  // suite requirements have been tightened?
-  if (!ssl->ctx->false_start_allowed_without_alpn &&
-      ssl->s3->alpn_selected.empty() &&
-      ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated.empty()) {
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  return true;
-}
-
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_finish_flight(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  if (ssl->session != NULL) {
-    hs->state = state_finish_client_handshake;
-    return ssl_hs_ok;
-  }
-
-  // This is a full handshake. If it involves ChannelID, then record the
-  // handshake hashes at this point in the session so that any resumption of
-  // this session with ChannelID can sign those hashes.
-  if (!tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(hs)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  hs->state = state_read_session_ticket;
-
-  if ((SSL_get_mode(ssl) & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_FALSE_START) &&
-      can_false_start(hs) &&
-      // No False Start on renegotiation (would complicate the state machine).
-      !ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) {
-    hs->in_false_start = true;
-    hs->can_early_write = true;
-    return ssl_hs_early_return;
-  }
-
-  return ssl_hs_ok;
-}
-
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_session_ticket(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-
-  if (!hs->ticket_expected) {
-    hs->state = state_process_change_cipher_spec;
-    return ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec;
-  }
-
-  SSLMessage msg;
-  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
-    return ssl_hs_read_message;
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) ||
-      !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  CBS new_session_ticket = msg.body, ticket;
-  uint32_t ticket_lifetime_hint;
-  if (!CBS_get_u32(&new_session_ticket, &ticket_lifetime_hint) ||
-      !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&new_session_ticket, &ticket) ||
-      CBS_len(&new_session_ticket) != 0) {
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  if (CBS_len(&ticket) == 0) {
-    // RFC 5077 allows a server to change its mind and send no ticket after
-    // negotiating the extension. The value of |ticket_expected| is checked in
-    // |ssl_update_cache| so is cleared here to avoid an unnecessary update.
-    hs->ticket_expected = false;
-    ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
-    hs->state = state_process_change_cipher_spec;
-    return ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec;
-  }
-
-  if (ssl->session != nullptr) {
-    // The server is sending a new ticket for an existing session. Sessions are
-    // immutable once established, so duplicate all but the ticket of the
-    // existing session.
-    assert(!hs->new_session);
-    hs->new_session =
-        SSL_SESSION_dup(ssl->session.get(), SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_NONAUTH);
-    if (!hs->new_session) {
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-  }
-
-  // |ticket_lifetime_hint| is measured from when the ticket was issued.
-  ssl_session_rebase_time(ssl, hs->new_session.get());
-
-  if (!hs->new_session->ticket.CopyFrom(ticket)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-  hs->new_session->ticket_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
-
-  // Historically, OpenSSL filled in fake session IDs for ticket-based sessions.
-  // TODO(davidben): Are external callers relying on this? Try removing this.
-  SHA256(CBS_data(&ticket), CBS_len(&ticket), hs->new_session->session_id);
-  hs->new_session->session_id_length = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
-
-  ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
-  hs->state = state_process_change_cipher_spec;
-  return ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec;
-}
-
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  if (!tls1_change_cipher_state(hs, evp_aead_open)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  hs->state = state_read_server_finished;
-  return ssl_hs_ok;
-}
-
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  enum ssl_hs_wait_t wait = ssl_get_finished(hs);
-  if (wait != ssl_hs_ok) {
-    return wait;
-  }
-
-  if (ssl->session != NULL) {
-    hs->state = state_send_client_finished;
-    return ssl_hs_ok;
-  }
-
-  hs->state = state_finish_client_handshake;
-  return ssl_hs_ok;
-}
-
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_finish_client_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  if (ssl->s3->ech_status == ssl_ech_rejected) {
-    // Release the retry configs.
-    hs->ech_authenticated_reject = true;
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ECH_REQUIRED);
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ECH_REJECTED);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  ssl->method->on_handshake_complete(ssl);
-
-  // Note TLS 1.2 resumptions with ticket renewal have both |ssl->session| (the
-  // resumed session) and |hs->new_session| (the session with the new ticket).
-  bool has_new_session = hs->new_session != nullptr;
-  if (has_new_session) {
-    // When False Start is enabled, the handshake reports completion early. The
-    // caller may then have passed the (then unresuable) |hs->new_session| to
-    // another thread via |SSL_get0_session| for resumption. To avoid potential
-    // race conditions in such callers, we duplicate the session before
-    // clearing |not_resumable|.
-    ssl->s3->established_session =
-        SSL_SESSION_dup(hs->new_session.get(), SSL_SESSION_DUP_ALL);
-    if (!ssl->s3->established_session) {
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-    // Renegotiations do not participate in session resumption.
-    if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) {
-      ssl->s3->established_session->not_resumable = false;
-    }
-
-    hs->new_session.reset();
-  } else {
-    assert(ssl->session != nullptr);
-    ssl->s3->established_session = UpRef(ssl->session);
-  }
-
-  hs->handshake_finalized = true;
-  ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete = true;
-  if (has_new_session) {
-    ssl_update_cache(ssl);
-  }
-
-  hs->state = state_done;
-  return ssl_hs_ok;
-}
-
-enum ssl_hs_wait_t ssl_client_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  while (hs->state != state_done) {
-    enum ssl_hs_wait_t ret = ssl_hs_error;
-    enum ssl_client_hs_state_t state =
-        static_cast<enum ssl_client_hs_state_t>(hs->state);
-    switch (state) {
-      case state_start_connect:
-        ret = do_start_connect(hs);
-        break;
-      case state_enter_early_data:
-        ret = do_enter_early_data(hs);
-        break;
-      case state_early_reverify_server_certificate:
-        ret = do_early_reverify_server_certificate(hs);
-        break;
-      case state_read_hello_verify_request:
-        ret = do_read_hello_verify_request(hs);
-        break;
-      case state_read_server_hello:
-        ret = do_read_server_hello(hs);
-        break;
-      case state_tls13:
-        ret = do_tls13(hs);
-        break;
-      case state_read_server_certificate:
-        ret = do_read_server_certificate(hs);
-        break;
-      case state_read_certificate_status:
-        ret = do_read_certificate_status(hs);
-        break;
-      case state_verify_server_certificate:
-        ret = do_verify_server_certificate(hs);
-        break;
-      case state_reverify_server_certificate:
-        ret = do_reverify_server_certificate(hs);
-        break;
-      case state_read_server_key_exchange:
-        ret = do_read_server_key_exchange(hs);
-        break;
-      case state_read_certificate_request:
-        ret = do_read_certificate_request(hs);
-        break;
-      case state_read_server_hello_done:
-        ret = do_read_server_hello_done(hs);
-        break;
-      case state_send_client_certificate:
-        ret = do_send_client_certificate(hs);
-        break;
-      case state_send_client_key_exchange:
-        ret = do_send_client_key_exchange(hs);
-        break;
-      case state_send_client_certificate_verify:
-        ret = do_send_client_certificate_verify(hs);
-        break;
-      case state_send_client_finished:
-        ret = do_send_client_finished(hs);
-        break;
-      case state_finish_flight:
-        ret = do_finish_flight(hs);
-        break;
-      case state_read_session_ticket:
-        ret = do_read_session_ticket(hs);
-        break;
-      case state_process_change_cipher_spec:
-        ret = do_process_change_cipher_spec(hs);
-        break;
-      case state_read_server_finished:
-        ret = do_read_server_finished(hs);
-        break;
-      case state_finish_client_handshake:
-        ret = do_finish_client_handshake(hs);
-        break;
-      case state_done:
-        ret = ssl_hs_ok;
-        break;
-    }
-
-    if (hs->state != state) {
-      ssl_do_info_callback(hs->ssl, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
-    }
-
-    if (ret != ssl_hs_ok) {
-      return ret;
-    }
-  }
-
-  ssl_do_info_callback(hs->ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
-  return ssl_hs_ok;
-}
-
-const char *ssl_client_handshake_state(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  enum ssl_client_hs_state_t state =
-      static_cast<enum ssl_client_hs_state_t>(hs->state);
-  switch (state) {
-    case state_start_connect:
-      return "TLS client start_connect";
-    case state_enter_early_data:
-      return "TLS client enter_early_data";
-    case state_early_reverify_server_certificate:
-      return "TLS client early_reverify_server_certificate";
-    case state_read_hello_verify_request:
-      return "TLS client read_hello_verify_request";
-    case state_read_server_hello:
-      return "TLS client read_server_hello";
-    case state_tls13:
-      return tls13_client_handshake_state(hs);
-    case state_read_server_certificate:
-      return "TLS client read_server_certificate";
-    case state_read_certificate_status:
-      return "TLS client read_certificate_status";
-    case state_verify_server_certificate:
-      return "TLS client verify_server_certificate";
-    case state_reverify_server_certificate:
-      return "TLS client reverify_server_certificate";
-    case state_read_server_key_exchange:
-      return "TLS client read_server_key_exchange";
-    case state_read_certificate_request:
-      return "TLS client read_certificate_request";
-    case state_read_server_hello_done:
-      return "TLS client read_server_hello_done";
-    case state_send_client_certificate:
-      return "TLS client send_client_certificate";
-    case state_send_client_key_exchange:
-      return "TLS client send_client_key_exchange";
-    case state_send_client_certificate_verify:
-      return "TLS client send_client_certificate_verify";
-    case state_send_client_finished:
-      return "TLS client send_client_finished";
-    case state_finish_flight:
-      return "TLS client finish_flight";
-    case state_read_session_ticket:
-      return "TLS client read_session_ticket";
-    case state_process_change_cipher_spec:
-      return "TLS client process_change_cipher_spec";
-    case state_read_server_finished:
-      return "TLS client read_server_finished";
-    case state_finish_client_handshake:
-      return "TLS client finish_client_handshake";
-    case state_done:
-      return "TLS client done";
-  }
-
-  return "TLS client unknown";
-}
-
-BSSL_NAMESPACE_END