grpc 1.50.0-x86_64-linux → 1.52.0.pre2-x86_64-linux

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/fipsmodule/rsa/rsa_impl.c

@@ -1,1416 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
-
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-
-#include <assert.h>
-#include <limits.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/mem.h>
-#include <openssl/thread.h>
-#include <openssl/type_check.h>
-
-#include "internal.h"
-#include "../bn/internal.h"
-#include "../../internal.h"
-#include "../delocate.h"
-#include "../rand/fork_detect.h"
-
-
-int rsa_check_public_key(const RSA *rsa) {
-  if (rsa->n == NULL || rsa->e == NULL) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  unsigned n_bits = BN_num_bits(rsa->n);
-  if (n_bits > 16 * 1024) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  // Mitigate DoS attacks by limiting the exponent size. 33 bits was chosen as
-  // the limit based on the recommendations in [1] and [2]. Windows CryptoAPI
-  // doesn't support values larger than 32 bits [3], so it is unlikely that
-  // exponents larger than 32 bits are being used for anything Windows commonly
-  // does.
-  //
-  // [1] https://www.imperialviolet.org/2012/03/16/rsae.html
-  // [2] https://www.imperialviolet.org/2012/03/17/rsados.html
-  // [3] https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa387685(VS.85).aspx
-  static const unsigned kMaxExponentBits = 33;
-  unsigned e_bits = BN_num_bits(rsa->e);
-  if (e_bits > kMaxExponentBits ||
-      // Additionally reject e = 1 or even e. e must be odd to be relatively
-      // prime with phi(n).
-      e_bits < 2 ||
-      !BN_is_odd(rsa->e)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  // Verify |n > e|. Comparing |n_bits| to |kMaxExponentBits| is a small
-  // shortcut to comparing |n| and |e| directly. In reality, |kMaxExponentBits|
-  // is much smaller than the minimum RSA key size that any application should
-  // accept.
-  if (n_bits <= kMaxExponentBits) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
-    return 0;
-  }
-  assert(BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) > 0);
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int ensure_fixed_copy(BIGNUM **out, const BIGNUM *in, int width) {
-  if (*out != NULL) {
-    return 1;
-  }
-  BIGNUM *copy = BN_dup(in);
-  if (copy == NULL ||
-      !bn_resize_words(copy, width)) {
-    BN_free(copy);
-    return 0;
-  }
-  *out = copy;
-  CONSTTIME_SECRET(copy->d, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * width);
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-// freeze_private_key finishes initializing |rsa|'s private key components.
-// After this function has returned, |rsa| may not be changed. This is needed
-// because |RSA| is a public struct and, additionally, OpenSSL 1.1.0 opaquified
-// it wrong (see https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/5158).
-static int freeze_private_key(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_read(&rsa->lock);
-  int frozen = rsa->private_key_frozen;
-  CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_read(&rsa->lock);
-  if (frozen) {
-    return 1;
-  }
-
-  int ret = 0;
-  CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&rsa->lock);
-  if (rsa->private_key_frozen) {
-    ret = 1;
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  // Pre-compute various intermediate values, as well as copies of private
-  // exponents with correct widths. Note that other threads may concurrently
-  // read from |rsa->n|, |rsa->e|, etc., so any fixes must be in separate
-  // copies. We use |mont_n->N|, |mont_p->N|, and |mont_q->N| as copies of |n|,
-  // |p|, and |q| with the correct minimal widths.
-
-  if (rsa->mont_n == NULL) {
-    rsa->mont_n = BN_MONT_CTX_new_for_modulus(rsa->n, ctx);
-    if (rsa->mont_n == NULL) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-  }
-  const BIGNUM *n_fixed = &rsa->mont_n->N;
-
-  // The only public upper-bound of |rsa->d| is the bit length of |rsa->n|. The
-  // ASN.1 serialization of RSA private keys unfortunately leaks the byte length
-  // of |rsa->d|, but normalize it so we only leak it once, rather than per
-  // operation.
-  if (rsa->d != NULL &&
-      !ensure_fixed_copy(&rsa->d_fixed, rsa->d, n_fixed->width)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  if (rsa->p != NULL && rsa->q != NULL) {
-    // TODO: p and q are also CONSTTIME_SECRET but not yet marked as such
-    // because the Montgomery code does things like test whether or not values
-    // are zero. So the secret marking probably needs to happen inside that
-    // code.
-
-    if (rsa->mont_p == NULL) {
-      rsa->mont_p = BN_MONT_CTX_new_consttime(rsa->p, ctx);
-      if (rsa->mont_p == NULL) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-    }
-    const BIGNUM *p_fixed = &rsa->mont_p->N;
-
-    if (rsa->mont_q == NULL) {
-      rsa->mont_q = BN_MONT_CTX_new_consttime(rsa->q, ctx);
-      if (rsa->mont_q == NULL) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-    }
-    const BIGNUM *q_fixed = &rsa->mont_q->N;
-
-    if (rsa->dmp1 != NULL && rsa->dmq1 != NULL) {
-      // Key generation relies on this function to compute |iqmp|.
-      if (rsa->iqmp == NULL) {
-        BIGNUM *iqmp = BN_new();
-        if (iqmp == NULL ||
-            !bn_mod_inverse_secret_prime(iqmp, rsa->q, rsa->p, ctx,
-                                         rsa->mont_p)) {
-          BN_free(iqmp);
-          goto err;
-        }
-        rsa->iqmp = iqmp;
-      }
-
-      // CRT components are only publicly bounded by their corresponding
-      // moduli's bit lengths. |rsa->iqmp| is unused outside of this one-time
-      // setup, so we do not compute a fixed-width version of it.
-      if (!ensure_fixed_copy(&rsa->dmp1_fixed, rsa->dmp1, p_fixed->width) ||
-          !ensure_fixed_copy(&rsa->dmq1_fixed, rsa->dmq1, q_fixed->width)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-
-      // Compute |inv_small_mod_large_mont|. Note that it is always modulo the
-      // larger prime, independent of what is stored in |rsa->iqmp|.
-      if (rsa->inv_small_mod_large_mont == NULL) {
-        BIGNUM *inv_small_mod_large_mont = BN_new();
-        int ok;
-        if (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) < 0) {
-          ok = inv_small_mod_large_mont != NULL &&
-               bn_mod_inverse_secret_prime(inv_small_mod_large_mont, rsa->p,
-                                           rsa->q, ctx, rsa->mont_q) &&
-               BN_to_montgomery(inv_small_mod_large_mont,
-                                inv_small_mod_large_mont, rsa->mont_q, ctx);
-        } else {
-          ok = inv_small_mod_large_mont != NULL &&
-               BN_to_montgomery(inv_small_mod_large_mont, rsa->iqmp,
-                                rsa->mont_p, ctx);
-        }
-        if (!ok) {
-          BN_free(inv_small_mod_large_mont);
-          goto err;
-        }
-        rsa->inv_small_mod_large_mont = inv_small_mod_large_mont;
-        CONSTTIME_SECRET(
-            rsa->inv_small_mod_large_mont->d,
-            sizeof(BN_ULONG) * rsa->inv_small_mod_large_mont->width);
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  rsa->private_key_frozen = 1;
-  ret = 1;
-
-err:
-  CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&rsa->lock);
-  return ret;
-}
-
-size_t rsa_default_size(const RSA *rsa) {
-  return BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-}
-
-int RSA_encrypt(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
-                const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) {
-  if (!rsa_check_public_key(rsa)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  const unsigned rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
-  BIGNUM *f, *result;
-  uint8_t *buf = NULL;
-  BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-  int i, ret = 0;
-
-  if (max_out < rsa_size) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-  if (ctx == NULL) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-  f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  result = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size);
-  if (!f || !result || !buf) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  switch (padding) {
-    case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
-      i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, rsa_size, in, in_len);
-      break;
-    case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
-      // Use the default parameters: SHA-1 for both hashes and no label.
-      i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(buf, rsa_size, in, in_len,
-                                          NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
-      break;
-    case RSA_NO_PADDING:
-      i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, rsa_size, in, in_len);
-      break;
-    default:
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
-      goto err;
-  }
-
-  if (i <= 0) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  if (BN_bin2bn(buf, rsa_size, f) == NULL) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
-    // usually the padding functions would catch this
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->mont_n, &rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx) ||
-      !BN_mod_exp_mont(result, f, rsa->e, &rsa->mont_n->N, ctx, rsa->mont_n)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  // put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the
-  // modulus
-  if (!BN_bn2bin_padded(out, rsa_size, result)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  *out_len = rsa_size;
-  ret = 1;
-
-err:
-  if (ctx != NULL) {
-    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-  }
-  OPENSSL_free(buf);
-
-  return ret;
-}
-
-// MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA defines the maximum number of cached BN_BLINDINGs per
-// RSA*. Then this limit is exceeded, BN_BLINDING objects will be created and
-// destroyed as needed.
-#if defined(OPENSSL_TSAN)
-// Smaller under TSAN so that the edge case can be hit with fewer threads.
-#define MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA 2
-#else
-#define MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA 1024
-#endif
-
-// rsa_blinding_get returns a BN_BLINDING to use with |rsa|. It does this by
-// allocating one of the cached BN_BLINDING objects in |rsa->blindings|. If
-// none are free, the cache will be extended by a extra element and the new
-// BN_BLINDING is returned.
-//
-// On success, the index of the assigned BN_BLINDING is written to
-// |*index_used| and must be passed to |rsa_blinding_release| when finished.
-static BN_BLINDING *rsa_blinding_get(RSA *rsa, unsigned *index_used,
-                                     BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  assert(ctx != NULL);
-  assert(rsa->mont_n != NULL);
-
-  BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL;
-  const uint64_t fork_generation = CRYPTO_get_fork_generation();
-  CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&rsa->lock);
-
-  // Wipe the blinding cache on |fork|.
-  if (rsa->blinding_fork_generation != fork_generation) {
-    for (unsigned i = 0; i < rsa->num_blindings; i++) {
-      // The inuse flag must be zero unless we were forked from a
-      // multi-threaded process, in which case calling back into BoringSSL is
-      // forbidden.
-      assert(rsa->blindings_inuse[i] == 0);
-      BN_BLINDING_invalidate(rsa->blindings[i]);
-    }
-    rsa->blinding_fork_generation = fork_generation;
-  }
-
-  uint8_t *const free_inuse_flag =
-      OPENSSL_memchr(rsa->blindings_inuse, 0, rsa->num_blindings);
-  if (free_inuse_flag != NULL) {
-    *free_inuse_flag = 1;
-    *index_used = free_inuse_flag - rsa->blindings_inuse;
-    ret = rsa->blindings[*index_used];
-    goto out;
-  }
-
-  if (rsa->num_blindings >= MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA) {
-    // No |BN_BLINDING| is free and nor can the cache be extended. This index
-    // value is magic and indicates to |rsa_blinding_release| that a
-    // |BN_BLINDING| was not inserted into the array.
-    *index_used = MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA;
-    ret = BN_BLINDING_new();
-    goto out;
-  }
-
-  // Double the length of the cache.
-  OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA < UINT_MAX / 2,
-                        "MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA too large");
-  unsigned new_num_blindings = rsa->num_blindings * 2;
-  if (new_num_blindings == 0) {
-    new_num_blindings = 1;
-  }
-  if (new_num_blindings > MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA) {
-    new_num_blindings = MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA;
-  }
-  assert(new_num_blindings > rsa->num_blindings);
-
-  OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(
-      MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA < UINT_MAX / sizeof(BN_BLINDING *),
-      "MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA too large");
-  BN_BLINDING **new_blindings =
-      OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BN_BLINDING *) * new_num_blindings);
-  uint8_t *new_blindings_inuse = OPENSSL_malloc(new_num_blindings);
-  if (new_blindings == NULL || new_blindings_inuse == NULL) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(new_blindings, rsa->blindings,
-                 sizeof(BN_BLINDING *) * rsa->num_blindings);
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(new_blindings_inuse, rsa->blindings_inuse, rsa->num_blindings);
-
-  for (unsigned i = rsa->num_blindings; i < new_num_blindings; i++) {
-    new_blindings[i] = BN_BLINDING_new();
-    if (new_blindings[i] == NULL) {
-      for (unsigned j = rsa->num_blindings; j < i; j++) {
-        BN_BLINDING_free(new_blindings[j]);
-      }
-      goto err;
-    }
-  }
-  memset(&new_blindings_inuse[rsa->num_blindings], 0,
-         new_num_blindings - rsa->num_blindings);
-
-  new_blindings_inuse[rsa->num_blindings] = 1;
-  *index_used = rsa->num_blindings;
-  assert(*index_used != MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA);
-  ret = new_blindings[rsa->num_blindings];
-
-  OPENSSL_free(rsa->blindings);
-  rsa->blindings = new_blindings;
-  OPENSSL_free(rsa->blindings_inuse);
-  rsa->blindings_inuse = new_blindings_inuse;
-  rsa->num_blindings = new_num_blindings;
-
-  goto out;
-
-err:
-  OPENSSL_free(new_blindings_inuse);
-  OPENSSL_free(new_blindings);
-
-out:
-  CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&rsa->lock);
-  return ret;
-}
-
-// rsa_blinding_release marks the cached BN_BLINDING at the given index as free
-// for other threads to use.
-static void rsa_blinding_release(RSA *rsa, BN_BLINDING *blinding,
-                                 unsigned blinding_index) {
-  if (blinding_index == MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA) {
-    // This blinding wasn't cached.
-    BN_BLINDING_free(blinding);
-    return;
-  }
-
-  CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&rsa->lock);
-  rsa->blindings_inuse[blinding_index] = 0;
-  CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&rsa->lock);
-}
-
-// signing
-int rsa_default_sign_raw(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out,
-                         size_t max_out, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
-                         int padding) {
-  const unsigned rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
-  uint8_t *buf = NULL;
-  int i, ret = 0;
-
-  if (max_out < rsa_size) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size);
-  if (buf == NULL) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  switch (padding) {
-    case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
-      i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, rsa_size, in, in_len);
-      break;
-    case RSA_NO_PADDING:
-      i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, rsa_size, in, in_len);
-      break;
-    default:
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
-      goto err;
-  }
-
-  if (i <= 0) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  if (!RSA_private_transform(rsa, out, buf, rsa_size)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  CONSTTIME_DECLASSIFY(out, rsa_size);
-  *out_len = rsa_size;
-  ret = 1;
-
-err:
-  OPENSSL_free(buf);
-
-  return ret;
-}
-
-int rsa_default_decrypt(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
-                        const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) {
-  const unsigned rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
-  uint8_t *buf = NULL;
-  int ret = 0;
-
-  if (max_out < rsa_size) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
-    buf = out;
-  } else {
-    // Allocate a temporary buffer to hold the padded plaintext.
-    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size);
-    if (buf == NULL) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-      goto err;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (in_len != rsa_size) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_LEN_NOT_EQUAL_TO_MOD_LEN);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  if (!RSA_private_transform(rsa, buf, in, rsa_size)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  switch (padding) {
-    case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
-      ret =
-          RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(out, out_len, rsa_size, buf, rsa_size);
-      break;
-    case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
-      // Use the default parameters: SHA-1 for both hashes and no label.
-      ret = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(out, out_len, rsa_size, buf,
-                                              rsa_size, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
-      break;
-    case RSA_NO_PADDING:
-      *out_len = rsa_size;
-      ret = 1;
-      break;
-    default:
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
-      goto err;
-  }
-
-  CONSTTIME_DECLASSIFY(&ret, sizeof(ret));
-  if (!ret) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
-  } else {
-    CONSTTIME_DECLASSIFY(out, *out_len);
-  }
-
-err:
-  if (padding != RSA_NO_PADDING) {
-    OPENSSL_free(buf);
-  }
-
-  return ret;
-}
-
-static int mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
-
-int RSA_verify_raw(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
-                   const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) {
-  if (!rsa_check_public_key(rsa)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  const unsigned rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
-  BIGNUM *f, *result;
-
-  if (max_out < rsa_size) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  if (in_len != rsa_size) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_LEN_NOT_EQUAL_TO_MOD_LEN);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-  if (ctx == NULL) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  int ret = 0;
-  uint8_t *buf = NULL;
-
-  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-  f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  result = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  if (f == NULL || result == NULL) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
-    buf = out;
-  } else {
-    // Allocate a temporary buffer to hold the padded plaintext.
-    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size);
-    if (buf == NULL) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-      goto err;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (BN_bin2bn(in, in_len, f) == NULL) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->mont_n, &rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx) ||
-      !BN_mod_exp_mont(result, f, rsa->e, &rsa->mont_n->N, ctx, rsa->mont_n)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  if (!BN_bn2bin_padded(buf, rsa_size, result)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  switch (padding) {
-    case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
-      ret =
-          RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(out, out_len, rsa_size, buf, rsa_size);
-      break;
-    case RSA_NO_PADDING:
-      ret = 1;
-      *out_len = rsa_size;
-      break;
-    default:
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
-      goto err;
-  }
-
-  if (!ret) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-err:
-  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-  BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-  if (buf != out) {
-    OPENSSL_free(buf);
-  }
-  return ret;
-}
-
-int rsa_default_private_transform(RSA *rsa, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
-                                  size_t len) {
-  if (rsa->n == NULL || rsa->d == NULL) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  BIGNUM *f, *result;
-  BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-  unsigned blinding_index = 0;
-  BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
-  int ret = 0;
-
-  ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-  if (ctx == NULL) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-  f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  result = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-
-  if (f == NULL || result == NULL) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  if (BN_bin2bn(in, len, f) == NULL) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
-    // Usually the padding functions would catch this.
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  if (!freeze_private_key(rsa, ctx)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  const int do_blinding = (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING) == 0;
-
-  if (rsa->e == NULL && do_blinding) {
-    // We cannot do blinding or verification without |e|, and continuing without
-    // those countermeasures is dangerous. However, the Java/Android RSA API
-    // requires support for keys where only |d| and |n| (and not |e|) are known.
-    // The callers that require that bad behavior set |RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING|.
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  if (do_blinding) {
-    blinding = rsa_blinding_get(rsa, &blinding_index, ctx);
-    if (blinding == NULL) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      goto err;
-    }
-    if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(f, blinding, rsa->e, rsa->mont_n, ctx)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (rsa->p != NULL && rsa->q != NULL && rsa->e != NULL && rsa->dmp1 != NULL &&
-      rsa->dmq1 != NULL && rsa->iqmp != NULL &&
-      // Require that we can reduce |f| by |rsa->p| and |rsa->q| in constant
-      // time, which requires primes be the same size, rounded to the Montgomery
-      // coefficient. (See |mod_montgomery|.) This is not required by RFC 8017,
-      // but it is true for keys generated by us and all common implementations.
-      bn_less_than_montgomery_R(rsa->q, rsa->mont_p) &&
-      bn_less_than_montgomery_R(rsa->p, rsa->mont_q)) {
-    if (!mod_exp(result, f, rsa, ctx)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-  } else if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(result, f, rsa->d_fixed, rsa->n, ctx,
-                                        rsa->mont_n)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  // Verify the result to protect against fault attacks as described in the
-  // 1997 paper "On the Importance of Checking Cryptographic Protocols for
-  // Faults" by Dan Boneh, Richard A. DeMillo, and Richard J. Lipton. Some
-  // implementations do this only when the CRT is used, but we do it in all
-  // cases. Section 6 of the aforementioned paper describes an attack that
-  // works when the CRT isn't used. That attack is much less likely to succeed
-  // than the CRT attack, but there have likely been improvements since 1997.
-  //
-  // This check is cheap assuming |e| is small; it almost always is.
-  if (rsa->e != NULL) {
-    BIGNUM *vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-    if (vrfy == NULL ||
-        !BN_mod_exp_mont(vrfy, result, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->mont_n) ||
-        !BN_equal_consttime(vrfy, f)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      goto err;
-    }
-
-  }
-
-  if (do_blinding &&
-      !BN_BLINDING_invert(result, blinding, rsa->mont_n, ctx)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  // The computation should have left |result| as a maximally-wide number, so
-  // that it and serializing does not leak information about the magnitude of
-  // the result.
-  //
-  // See Falko Strenzke, "Manger's Attack revisited", ICICS 2010.
-  assert(result->width == rsa->mont_n->N.width);
-  if (!BN_bn2bin_padded(out, len, result)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  ret = 1;
-
-err:
-  if (ctx != NULL) {
-    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-  }
-  if (blinding != NULL) {
-    rsa_blinding_release(rsa, blinding, blinding_index);
-  }
-
-  return ret;
-}
-
-// mod_montgomery sets |r| to |I| mod |p|. |I| must already be fully reduced
-// modulo |p| times |q|. It returns one on success and zero on error.
-static int mod_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *I, const BIGNUM *p,
-                          const BN_MONT_CTX *mont_p, const BIGNUM *q,
-                          BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  // Reducing in constant-time with Montgomery reduction requires I <= p * R. We
-  // have I < p * q, so this follows if q < R. The caller should have checked
-  // this already.
-  if (!bn_less_than_montgomery_R(q, mont_p)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  if (// Reduce mod p with Montgomery reduction. This computes I * R^-1 mod p.
-      !BN_from_montgomery(r, I, mont_p, ctx) ||
-      // Multiply by R^2 and do another Montgomery reduction to compute
-      // I * R^-1 * R^2 * R^-1 = I mod p.
-      !BN_to_montgomery(r, r, mont_p, ctx)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  // By precomputing R^3 mod p (normally |BN_MONT_CTX| only uses R^2 mod p) and
-  // adjusting the API for |BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime|, we could instead compute
-  // I * R mod p here and save a reduction per prime. But this would require
-  // changing the RSAZ code and may not be worth it. Note that the RSAZ code
-  // uses a different radix, so it uses R' = 2^1044. There we'd actually want
-  // R^2 * R', and would futher benefit from a precomputed R'^2. It currently
-  // converts |mont_p->RR| to R'^2.
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  assert(ctx != NULL);
-
-  assert(rsa->n != NULL);
-  assert(rsa->e != NULL);
-  assert(rsa->d != NULL);
-  assert(rsa->p != NULL);
-  assert(rsa->q != NULL);
-  assert(rsa->dmp1 != NULL);
-  assert(rsa->dmq1 != NULL);
-  assert(rsa->iqmp != NULL);
-
-  BIGNUM *r1, *m1;
-  int ret = 0;
-
-  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-  r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  if (r1 == NULL ||
-      m1 == NULL) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  if (!freeze_private_key(rsa, ctx)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  // Implementing RSA with CRT in constant-time is sensitive to which prime is
-  // larger. Canonicalize fields so that |p| is the larger prime.
-  const BIGNUM *dmp1 = rsa->dmp1_fixed, *dmq1 = rsa->dmq1_fixed;
-  const BN_MONT_CTX *mont_p = rsa->mont_p, *mont_q = rsa->mont_q;
-  if (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) < 0) {
-    mont_p = rsa->mont_q;
-    mont_q = rsa->mont_p;
-    dmp1 = rsa->dmq1_fixed;
-    dmq1 = rsa->dmp1_fixed;
-  }
-
-  // Use the minimal-width versions of |n|, |p|, and |q|. Either works, but if
-  // someone gives us non-minimal values, these will be slightly more efficient
-  // on the non-Montgomery operations.
-  const BIGNUM *n = &rsa->mont_n->N;
-  const BIGNUM *p = &mont_p->N;
-  const BIGNUM *q = &mont_q->N;
-
-  // This is a pre-condition for |mod_montgomery|. It was already checked by the
-  // caller.
-  assert(BN_ucmp(I, n) < 0);
-
-  if (// |m1| is the result modulo |q|.
-      !mod_montgomery(r1, I, q, mont_q, p, ctx) ||
-      !BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(m1, r1, dmq1, q, ctx, mont_q) ||
-      // |r0| is the result modulo |p|.
-      !mod_montgomery(r1, I, p, mont_p, q, ctx) ||
-      !BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(r0, r1, dmp1, p, ctx, mont_p) ||
-      // Compute r0 = r0 - m1 mod p. |p| is the larger prime, so |m1| is already
-      // fully reduced mod |p|.
-      !bn_mod_sub_consttime(r0, r0, m1, p, ctx) ||
-      // r0 = r0 * iqmp mod p. We use Montgomery multiplication to compute this
-      // in constant time. |inv_small_mod_large_mont| is in Montgomery form and
-      // r0 is not, so the result is taken out of Montgomery form.
-      !BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r0, r0, rsa->inv_small_mod_large_mont, mont_p,
-                             ctx) ||
-      // r0 = r0 * q + m1 gives the final result. Reducing modulo q gives m1, so
-      // it is correct mod p. Reducing modulo p gives (r0-m1)*iqmp*q + m1 = r0,
-      // so it is correct mod q. Finally, the result is bounded by [m1, n + m1),
-      // and the result is at least |m1|, so this must be the unique answer in
-      // [0, n).
-      !bn_mul_consttime(r0, r0, q, ctx) ||
-      !bn_uadd_consttime(r0, r0, m1) ||
-      // The result should be bounded by |n|, but fixed-width operations may
-      // bound the width slightly higher, so fix it.
-      !bn_resize_words(r0, n->width)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  ret = 1;
-
-err:
-  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-  return ret;
-}
-
-static int ensure_bignum(BIGNUM **out) {
-  if (*out == NULL) {
-    *out = BN_new();
-  }
-  return *out != NULL;
-}
-
-// kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwo is the BIGNUM representation of ⌊2²⁰⁴⁷×√2⌋. This is
-// chosen to give enough precision for 4096-bit RSA, the largest key size FIPS
-// specifies. Key sizes beyond this will round up.
-//
-// To calculate, use the following Haskell code:
-//
-// import Text.Printf (printf)
-// import Data.List (intercalate)
-//
-// pow2 = 4095
-// target = 2^pow2
-//
-// f x = x*x - (toRational target)
-//
-// fprime x = 2*x
-//
-// newtonIteration x = x - (f x) / (fprime x)
-//
-// converge x =
-//   let n = floor x in
-//   if n*n - target < 0 && (n+1)*(n+1) - target > 0
-//     then n
-//     else converge (newtonIteration x)
-//
-// divrem bits x = (x `div` (2^bits), x `rem` (2^bits))
-//
-// bnWords :: Integer -> [Integer]
-// bnWords x =
-//   if x == 0
-//     then []
-//     else let (high, low) = divrem 64 x in low : bnWords high
-//
-// showWord x = let (high, low) = divrem 32 x in printf "TOBN(0x%08x, 0x%08x)" high low
-//
-// output :: String
-// output = intercalate ", " $ map showWord $ bnWords $ converge (2 ^ (pow2 `div` 2))
-//
-// To verify this number, check that n² < 2⁴⁰⁹⁵ < (n+1)², where n is value
-// represented here. Note the components are listed in little-endian order. Here
-// is some sample Python code to check:
-//
-//   >>> TOBN = lambda a, b: a << 32 | b
-//   >>> l = [ <paste the contents of kSqrtTwo> ]
-//   >>> n = sum(a * 2**(64*i) for i, a in enumerate(l))
-//   >>> n**2 < 2**4095 < (n+1)**2
-//   True
-const BN_ULONG kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwo[] = {
-    TOBN(0x4d7c60a5, 0xe633e3e1), TOBN(0x5fcf8f7b, 0xca3ea33b),
-    TOBN(0xc246785e, 0x92957023), TOBN(0xf9acce41, 0x797f2805),
-    TOBN(0xfdfe170f, 0xd3b1f780), TOBN(0xd24f4a76, 0x3facb882),
-    TOBN(0x18838a2e, 0xaff5f3b2), TOBN(0xc1fcbdde, 0xa2f7dc33),
-    TOBN(0xdea06241, 0xf7aa81c2), TOBN(0xf6a1be3f, 0xca221307),
-    TOBN(0x332a5e9f, 0x7bda1ebf), TOBN(0x0104dc01, 0xfe32352f),
-    TOBN(0xb8cf341b, 0x6f8236c7), TOBN(0x4264dabc, 0xd528b651),
-    TOBN(0xf4d3a02c, 0xebc93e0c), TOBN(0x81394ab6, 0xd8fd0efd),
-    TOBN(0xeaa4a089, 0x9040ca4a), TOBN(0xf52f120f, 0x836e582e),
-    TOBN(0xcb2a6343, 0x31f3c84d), TOBN(0xc6d5a8a3, 0x8bb7e9dc),
-    TOBN(0x460abc72, 0x2f7c4e33), TOBN(0xcab1bc91, 0x1688458a),
-    TOBN(0x53059c60, 0x11bc337b), TOBN(0xd2202e87, 0x42af1f4e),
-    TOBN(0x78048736, 0x3dfa2768), TOBN(0x0f74a85e, 0x439c7b4a),
-    TOBN(0xa8b1fe6f, 0xdc83db39), TOBN(0x4afc8304, 0x3ab8a2c3),
-    TOBN(0xed17ac85, 0x83339915), TOBN(0x1d6f60ba, 0x893ba84c),
-    TOBN(0x597d89b3, 0x754abe9f), TOBN(0xb504f333, 0xf9de6484),
-};
-const size_t kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwoLen = OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwo);
-
-// generate_prime sets |out| to a prime with length |bits| such that |out|-1 is
-// relatively prime to |e|. If |p| is non-NULL, |out| will also not be close to
-// |p|. |sqrt2| must be ⌊2^(bits-1)×√2⌋ (or a slightly overestimate for large
-// sizes), and |pow2_bits_100| must be 2^(bits-100).
-//
-// This function fails with probability around 2^-21.
-static int generate_prime(BIGNUM *out, int bits, const BIGNUM *e,
-                          const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *sqrt2,
-                          const BIGNUM *pow2_bits_100, BN_CTX *ctx,
-                          BN_GENCB *cb) {
-  if (bits < 128 || (bits % BN_BITS2) != 0) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    return 0;
-  }
-  assert(BN_is_pow2(pow2_bits_100));
-  assert(BN_is_bit_set(pow2_bits_100, bits - 100));
-
-  // See FIPS 186-4 appendix B.3.3, steps 4 and 5. Note |bits| here is nlen/2.
-
-  // Use the limit from steps 4.7 and 5.8 for most values of |e|. When |e| is 3,
-  // the 186-4 limit is too low, so we use a higher one. Note this case is not
-  // reachable from |RSA_generate_key_fips|.
-  //
-  // |limit| determines the failure probability. We must find a prime that is
-  // not 1 mod |e|. By the prime number theorem, we'll find one with probability
-  // p = (e-1)/e * 2/(ln(2)*bits). Note the second term is doubled because we
-  // discard even numbers.
-  //
-  // The failure probability is thus (1-p)^limit. To convert that to a power of
-  // two, we take logs. -log_2((1-p)^limit) = -limit * ln(1-p) / ln(2).
-  //
-  // >>> def f(bits, e, limit):
-  // ...   p = (e-1.0)/e * 2.0/(math.log(2)*bits)
-  // ...   return -limit * math.log(1 - p) / math.log(2)
-  // ...
-  // >>> f(1024, 65537, 5*1024)
-  // 20.842750558272634
-  // >>> f(1536, 65537, 5*1536)
-  // 20.83294549602474
-  // >>> f(2048, 65537, 5*2048)
-  // 20.828047576234948
-  // >>> f(1024, 3, 8*1024)
-  // 22.222147925962307
-  // >>> f(1536, 3, 8*1536)
-  // 22.21518251065506
-  // >>> f(2048, 3, 8*2048)
-  // 22.211701985875937
-  if (bits >= INT_MAX/32) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
-    return 0;
-  }
-  int limit = BN_is_word(e, 3) ? bits * 8 : bits * 5;
-
-  int ret = 0, tries = 0, rand_tries = 0;
-  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-  BIGNUM *tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  if (tmp == NULL) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  for (;;) {
-    // Generate a random number of length |bits| where the bottom bit is set
-    // (steps 4.2, 4.3, 5.2 and 5.3) and the top bit is set (implied by the
-    // bound checked below in steps 4.4 and 5.5).
-    if (!BN_rand(out, bits, BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ODD) ||
-        !BN_GENCB_call(cb, BN_GENCB_GENERATED, rand_tries++)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-
-    if (p != NULL) {
-      // If |p| and |out| are too close, try again (step 5.4).
-      if (!bn_abs_sub_consttime(tmp, out, p, ctx)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-      if (BN_cmp(tmp, pow2_bits_100) <= 0) {
-        continue;
-      }
-    }
-
-    // If out < 2^(bits-1)×√2, try again (steps 4.4 and 5.5). This is equivalent
-    // to out <= ⌊2^(bits-1)×√2⌋, or out <= sqrt2 for FIPS key sizes.
-    //
-    // For larger keys, the comparison is approximate, leaning towards
-    // retrying. That is, we reject a negligible fraction of primes that are
-    // within the FIPS bound, but we will never accept a prime outside the
-    // bound, ensuring the resulting RSA key is the right size.
-    if (BN_cmp(out, sqrt2) <= 0) {
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    // RSA key generation's bottleneck is discarding composites. If it fails
-    // trial division, do not bother computing a GCD or performing Miller-Rabin.
-    if (!bn_odd_number_is_obviously_composite(out)) {
-      // Check gcd(out-1, e) is one (steps 4.5 and 5.6).
-      int relatively_prime;
-      if (!BN_sub(tmp, out, BN_value_one()) ||
-          !bn_is_relatively_prime(&relatively_prime, tmp, e, ctx)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-      if (relatively_prime) {
-        // Test |out| for primality (steps 4.5.1 and 5.6.1).
-        int is_probable_prime;
-        if (!BN_primality_test(&is_probable_prime, out,
-                               BN_prime_checks_for_generation, ctx, 0, cb)) {
-          goto err;
-        }
-        if (is_probable_prime) {
-          ret = 1;
-          goto err;
-        }
-      }
-    }
-
-    // If we've tried too many times to find a prime, abort (steps 4.7 and
-    // 5.8).
-    tries++;
-    if (tries >= limit) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS);
-      goto err;
-    }
-    if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, tries)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-  }
-
-err:
-  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-  return ret;
-}
-
-// rsa_generate_key_impl generates an RSA key using a generalized version of
-// FIPS 186-4 appendix B.3. |RSA_generate_key_fips| performs additional checks
-// for FIPS-compliant key generation.
-//
-// This function returns one on success and zero on failure. It has a failure
-// probability of about 2^-20.
-static int rsa_generate_key_impl(RSA *rsa, int bits, const BIGNUM *e_value,
-                                 BN_GENCB *cb) {
-  // See FIPS 186-4 appendix B.3. This function implements a generalized version
-  // of the FIPS algorithm. |RSA_generate_key_fips| performs additional checks
-  // for FIPS-compliant key generation.
-
-  // Always generate RSA keys which are a multiple of 128 bits. Round |bits|
-  // down as needed.
-  bits &= ~127;
-
-  // Reject excessively small keys.
-  if (bits < 256) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  // Reject excessively large public exponents. Windows CryptoAPI and Go don't
-  // support values larger than 32 bits, so match their limits for generating
-  // keys. (|rsa_check_public_key| uses a slightly more conservative value, but
-  // we don't need to support generating such keys.)
-  // https://github.com/golang/go/issues/3161
-  // https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa387685(VS.85).aspx
-  if (BN_num_bits(e_value) > 32) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  int ret = 0;
-  int prime_bits = bits / 2;
-  BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-  if (ctx == NULL) {
-    goto bn_err;
-  }
-  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-  BIGNUM *totient = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  BIGNUM *pm1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  BIGNUM *qm1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  BIGNUM *sqrt2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  BIGNUM *pow2_prime_bits_100 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  BIGNUM *pow2_prime_bits = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  if (totient == NULL || pm1 == NULL || qm1 == NULL || sqrt2 == NULL ||
-      pow2_prime_bits_100 == NULL || pow2_prime_bits == NULL ||
-      !BN_set_bit(pow2_prime_bits_100, prime_bits - 100) ||
-      !BN_set_bit(pow2_prime_bits, prime_bits)) {
-    goto bn_err;
-  }
-
-  // We need the RSA components non-NULL.
-  if (!ensure_bignum(&rsa->n) ||
-      !ensure_bignum(&rsa->d) ||
-      !ensure_bignum(&rsa->e) ||
-      !ensure_bignum(&rsa->p) ||
-      !ensure_bignum(&rsa->q) ||
-      !ensure_bignum(&rsa->dmp1) ||
-      !ensure_bignum(&rsa->dmq1)) {
-    goto bn_err;
-  }
-
-  if (!BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value)) {
-    goto bn_err;
-  }
-
-  // Compute sqrt2 >= ⌊2^(prime_bits-1)×√2⌋.
-  if (!bn_set_words(sqrt2, kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwo, kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwoLen)) {
-    goto bn_err;
-  }
-  int sqrt2_bits = kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwoLen * BN_BITS2;
-  assert(sqrt2_bits == (int)BN_num_bits(sqrt2));
-  if (sqrt2_bits > prime_bits) {
-    // For key sizes up to 4096 (prime_bits = 2048), this is exactly
-    // ⌊2^(prime_bits-1)×√2⌋.
-    if (!BN_rshift(sqrt2, sqrt2, sqrt2_bits - prime_bits)) {
-      goto bn_err;
-    }
-  } else if (prime_bits > sqrt2_bits) {
-    // For key sizes beyond 4096, this is approximate. We err towards retrying
-    // to ensure our key is the right size and round up.
-    if (!BN_add_word(sqrt2, 1) ||
-        !BN_lshift(sqrt2, sqrt2, prime_bits - sqrt2_bits)) {
-      goto bn_err;
-    }
-  }
-  assert(prime_bits == (int)BN_num_bits(sqrt2));
-
-  do {
-    // Generate p and q, each of size |prime_bits|, using the steps outlined in
-    // appendix FIPS 186-4 appendix B.3.3.
-    //
-    // Each call to |generate_prime| fails with probability p = 2^-21. The
-    // probability that either call fails is 1 - (1-p)^2, which is around 2^-20.
-    if (!generate_prime(rsa->p, prime_bits, rsa->e, NULL, sqrt2,
-                        pow2_prime_bits_100, ctx, cb) ||
-        !BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0) ||
-        !generate_prime(rsa->q, prime_bits, rsa->e, rsa->p, sqrt2,
-                        pow2_prime_bits_100, ctx, cb) ||
-        !BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1)) {
-      goto bn_err;
-    }
-
-    if (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) < 0) {
-      BIGNUM *tmp = rsa->p;
-      rsa->p = rsa->q;
-      rsa->q = tmp;
-    }
-
-    // Calculate d = e^(-1) (mod lcm(p-1, q-1)), per FIPS 186-4. This differs
-    // from typical RSA implementations which use (p-1)*(q-1).
-    //
-    // Note this means the size of d might reveal information about p-1 and
-    // q-1. However, we do operations with Chinese Remainder Theorem, so we only
-    // use d (mod p-1) and d (mod q-1) as exponents. Using a minimal totient
-    // does not affect those two values.
-    int no_inverse;
-    if (!bn_usub_consttime(pm1, rsa->p, BN_value_one()) ||
-        !bn_usub_consttime(qm1, rsa->q, BN_value_one()) ||
-        !bn_lcm_consttime(totient, pm1, qm1, ctx) ||
-        !bn_mod_inverse_consttime(rsa->d, &no_inverse, rsa->e, totient, ctx)) {
-      goto bn_err;
-    }
-
-    // Retry if |rsa->d| <= 2^|prime_bits|. See appendix B.3.1's guidance on
-    // values for d.
-  } while (BN_cmp(rsa->d, pow2_prime_bits) <= 0);
-
-  assert(BN_num_bits(pm1) == (unsigned)prime_bits);
-  assert(BN_num_bits(qm1) == (unsigned)prime_bits);
-  if (// Calculate n.
-      !bn_mul_consttime(rsa->n, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx) ||
-      // Calculate d mod (p-1).
-      !bn_div_consttime(NULL, rsa->dmp1, rsa->d, pm1, prime_bits, ctx) ||
-      // Calculate d mod (q-1)
-      !bn_div_consttime(NULL, rsa->dmq1, rsa->d, qm1, prime_bits, ctx)) {
-    goto bn_err;
-  }
-  bn_set_minimal_width(rsa->n);
-
-  // Sanity-check that |rsa->n| has the specified size. This is implied by
-  // |generate_prime|'s bounds.
-  if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) != (unsigned)bits) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  // Call |freeze_private_key| to compute the inverse of q mod p, by way of
-  // |rsa->mont_p|.
-  if (!freeze_private_key(rsa, ctx)) {
-    goto bn_err;
-  }
-
-  // The key generation process is complex and thus error-prone. It could be
-  // disastrous to generate and then use a bad key so double-check that the key
-  // makes sense.
-  if (!RSA_check_key(rsa)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  ret = 1;
-
-bn_err:
-  if (!ret) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN);
-  }
-err:
-  if (ctx != NULL) {
-    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-  }
-  return ret;
-}
-
-static void replace_bignum(BIGNUM **out, BIGNUM **in) {
-  BN_free(*out);
-  *out = *in;
-  *in = NULL;
-}
-
-static void replace_bn_mont_ctx(BN_MONT_CTX **out, BN_MONT_CTX **in) {
-  BN_MONT_CTX_free(*out);
-  *out = *in;
-  *in = NULL;
-}
-
-static int RSA_generate_key_ex_maybe_fips(RSA *rsa, int bits,
-                                          const BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb,
-                                          int check_fips) {
-  RSA *tmp = NULL;
-  uint32_t err;
-  int ret = 0;
-
-  // |rsa_generate_key_impl|'s 2^-20 failure probability is too high at scale,
-  // so we run the FIPS algorithm four times, bringing it down to 2^-80. We
-  // should just adjust the retry limit, but FIPS 186-4 prescribes that value
-  // and thus results in unnecessary complexity.
-  int failures = 0;
-  do {
-    ERR_clear_error();
-    // Generate into scratch space, to avoid leaving partial work on failure.
-    tmp = RSA_new();
-    if (tmp == NULL) {
-      goto out;
-    }
-
-    if (rsa_generate_key_impl(tmp, bits, e_value, cb)) {
-      break;
-    }
-
-    err = ERR_peek_error();
-    RSA_free(tmp);
-    tmp = NULL;
-    failures++;
-
-    // Only retry on |RSA_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS|. This is so a caller-induced
-    // failure in |BN_GENCB_call| is still fatal.
-  } while (failures < 4 && ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_RSA &&
-           ERR_GET_REASON(err) == RSA_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS);
-
-  if (tmp == NULL || (check_fips && !RSA_check_fips(tmp))) {
-    goto out;
-  }
-
-  replace_bignum(&rsa->n, &tmp->n);
-  replace_bignum(&rsa->e, &tmp->e);
-  replace_bignum(&rsa->d, &tmp->d);
-  replace_bignum(&rsa->p, &tmp->p);
-  replace_bignum(&rsa->q, &tmp->q);
-  replace_bignum(&rsa->dmp1, &tmp->dmp1);
-  replace_bignum(&rsa->dmq1, &tmp->dmq1);
-  replace_bignum(&rsa->iqmp, &tmp->iqmp);
-  replace_bn_mont_ctx(&rsa->mont_n, &tmp->mont_n);
-  replace_bn_mont_ctx(&rsa->mont_p, &tmp->mont_p);
-  replace_bn_mont_ctx(&rsa->mont_q, &tmp->mont_q);
-  replace_bignum(&rsa->d_fixed, &tmp->d_fixed);
-  replace_bignum(&rsa->dmp1_fixed, &tmp->dmp1_fixed);
-  replace_bignum(&rsa->dmq1_fixed, &tmp->dmq1_fixed);
-  replace_bignum(&rsa->inv_small_mod_large_mont,
-                 &tmp->inv_small_mod_large_mont);
-  rsa->private_key_frozen = tmp->private_key_frozen;
-  ret = 1;
-
-out:
-  RSA_free(tmp);
-  return ret;
-}
-
-int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, const BIGNUM *e_value,
-                        BN_GENCB *cb) {
-  return RSA_generate_key_ex_maybe_fips(rsa, bits, e_value, cb,
-                                        /*check_fips=*/0);
-}
-
-int RSA_generate_key_fips(RSA *rsa, int bits, BN_GENCB *cb) {
-  // FIPS 186-4 allows 2048-bit and 3072-bit RSA keys (1024-bit and 1536-bit
-  // primes, respectively) with the prime generation method we use.
-  // Subsequently, IG A.14 stated that larger modulus sizes can be used and ACVP
-  // testing supports 4096 bits.
-  if (bits != 2048 && bits != 3072 && bits != 4096) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_RSA_PARAMETERS);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  BIGNUM *e = BN_new();
-  int ret = e != NULL &&
-            BN_set_word(e, RSA_F4) &&
-            RSA_generate_key_ex_maybe_fips(rsa, bits, e, cb, /*check_fips=*/1);
-  BN_free(e);
-  return ret;
-}
-
-DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(RSA_METHOD, RSA_default_method) {
-  // All of the methods are NULL to make it easier for the compiler/linker to
-  // drop unused functions. The wrapper functions will select the appropriate
-  // |rsa_default_*| implementation.
-  OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, sizeof(RSA_METHOD));
-  out->common.is_static = 1;
-}