grpc 1.44.0.pre2-x86_64-linux → 1.46.3-x86_64-linux

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/fipsmodule/ec/ec.c

@@ -0,0 +1,1268 @@
+/* Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project.
+ * ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by
+ * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems
+ * Laboratories. */
+
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/nid.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "../../internal.h"
+#include "../bn/internal.h"
+#include "../delocate.h"
+
+
+static void ec_point_free(EC_POINT *point, int free_group);
+
+static const uint8_t kP224Params[6 * 28] = {
+    // p = 2^224 - 2^96 + 1
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+    // a
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE,
+    // b
+    0xB4, 0x05, 0x0A, 0x85, 0x0C, 0x04, 0xB3, 0xAB, 0xF5, 0x41, 0x32, 0x56,
+    0x50, 0x44, 0xB0, 0xB7, 0xD7, 0xBF, 0xD8, 0xBA, 0x27, 0x0B, 0x39, 0x43,
+    0x23, 0x55, 0xFF, 0xB4,
+    // x
+    0xB7, 0x0E, 0x0C, 0xBD, 0x6B, 0xB4, 0xBF, 0x7F, 0x32, 0x13, 0x90, 0xB9,
+    0x4A, 0x03, 0xC1, 0xD3, 0x56, 0xC2, 0x11, 0x22, 0x34, 0x32, 0x80, 0xD6,
+    0x11, 0x5C, 0x1D, 0x21,
+    // y
+    0xbd, 0x37, 0x63, 0x88, 0xb5, 0xf7, 0x23, 0xfb, 0x4c, 0x22, 0xdf, 0xe6,
+    0xcd, 0x43, 0x75, 0xa0, 0x5a, 0x07, 0x47, 0x64, 0x44, 0xd5, 0x81, 0x99,
+    0x85, 0x00, 0x7e, 0x34,
+    // order
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0x16, 0xA2, 0xE0, 0xB8, 0xF0, 0x3E, 0x13, 0xDD, 0x29, 0x45,
+    0x5C, 0x5C, 0x2A, 0x3D,
+};
+
+static const uint8_t kP256Params[6 * 32] = {
+    // p = 2^256 - 2^224 + 2^192 + 2^96 - 1
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    // a
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC,
+    // b
+    0x5A, 0xC6, 0x35, 0xD8, 0xAA, 0x3A, 0x93, 0xE7, 0xB3, 0xEB, 0xBD, 0x55,
+    0x76, 0x98, 0x86, 0xBC, 0x65, 0x1D, 0x06, 0xB0, 0xCC, 0x53, 0xB0, 0xF6,
+    0x3B, 0xCE, 0x3C, 0x3E, 0x27, 0xD2, 0x60, 0x4B,
+    // x
+    0x6B, 0x17, 0xD1, 0xF2, 0xE1, 0x2C, 0x42, 0x47, 0xF8, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xE5,
+    0x63, 0xA4, 0x40, 0xF2, 0x77, 0x03, 0x7D, 0x81, 0x2D, 0xEB, 0x33, 0xA0,
+    0xF4, 0xA1, 0x39, 0x45, 0xD8, 0x98, 0xC2, 0x96,
+    // y
+    0x4f, 0xe3, 0x42, 0xe2, 0xfe, 0x1a, 0x7f, 0x9b, 0x8e, 0xe7, 0xeb, 0x4a,
+    0x7c, 0x0f, 0x9e, 0x16, 0x2b, 0xce, 0x33, 0x57, 0x6b, 0x31, 0x5e, 0xce,
+    0xcb, 0xb6, 0x40, 0x68, 0x37, 0xbf, 0x51, 0xf5,
+    // order
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xFA, 0xAD, 0xA7, 0x17, 0x9E, 0x84,
+    0xF3, 0xB9, 0xCA, 0xC2, 0xFC, 0x63, 0x25, 0x51,
+};
+
+static const uint8_t kP384Params[6 * 48] = {
+    // p = 2^384 - 2^128 - 2^96 + 2^32 - 1
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    // a
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC,
+    // b
+    0xB3, 0x31, 0x2F, 0xA7, 0xE2, 0x3E, 0xE7, 0xE4, 0x98, 0x8E, 0x05, 0x6B,
+    0xE3, 0xF8, 0x2D, 0x19, 0x18, 0x1D, 0x9C, 0x6E, 0xFE, 0x81, 0x41, 0x12,
+    0x03, 0x14, 0x08, 0x8F, 0x50, 0x13, 0x87, 0x5A, 0xC6, 0x56, 0x39, 0x8D,
+    0x8A, 0x2E, 0xD1, 0x9D, 0x2A, 0x85, 0xC8, 0xED, 0xD3, 0xEC, 0x2A, 0xEF,
+    // x
+    0xAA, 0x87, 0xCA, 0x22, 0xBE, 0x8B, 0x05, 0x37, 0x8E, 0xB1, 0xC7, 0x1E,
+    0xF3, 0x20, 0xAD, 0x74, 0x6E, 0x1D, 0x3B, 0x62, 0x8B, 0xA7, 0x9B, 0x98,
+    0x59, 0xF7, 0x41, 0xE0, 0x82, 0x54, 0x2A, 0x38, 0x55, 0x02, 0xF2, 0x5D,
+    0xBF, 0x55, 0x29, 0x6C, 0x3A, 0x54, 0x5E, 0x38, 0x72, 0x76, 0x0A, 0xB7,
+    // y
+    0x36, 0x17, 0xde, 0x4a, 0x96, 0x26, 0x2c, 0x6f, 0x5d, 0x9e, 0x98, 0xbf,
+    0x92, 0x92, 0xdc, 0x29, 0xf8, 0xf4, 0x1d, 0xbd, 0x28, 0x9a, 0x14, 0x7c,
+    0xe9, 0xda, 0x31, 0x13, 0xb5, 0xf0, 0xb8, 0xc0, 0x0a, 0x60, 0xb1, 0xce,
+    0x1d, 0x7e, 0x81, 0x9d, 0x7a, 0x43, 0x1d, 0x7c, 0x90, 0xea, 0x0e, 0x5f,
+    // order
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    0xC7, 0x63, 0x4D, 0x81, 0xF4, 0x37, 0x2D, 0xDF, 0x58, 0x1A, 0x0D, 0xB2,
+    0x48, 0xB0, 0xA7, 0x7A, 0xEC, 0xEC, 0x19, 0x6A, 0xCC, 0xC5, 0x29, 0x73,
+};
+
+static const uint8_t kP521Params[6 * 66] = {
+    // p = 2^521 - 1
+    0x01, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    // a
+    0x01, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC,
+    // b
+    0x00, 0x51, 0x95, 0x3E, 0xB9, 0x61, 0x8E, 0x1C, 0x9A, 0x1F, 0x92, 0x9A,
+    0x21, 0xA0, 0xB6, 0x85, 0x40, 0xEE, 0xA2, 0xDA, 0x72, 0x5B, 0x99, 0xB3,
+    0x15, 0xF3, 0xB8, 0xB4, 0x89, 0x91, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x09, 0xE1, 0x56, 0x19,
+    0x39, 0x51, 0xEC, 0x7E, 0x93, 0x7B, 0x16, 0x52, 0xC0, 0xBD, 0x3B, 0xB1,
+    0xBF, 0x07, 0x35, 0x73, 0xDF, 0x88, 0x3D, 0x2C, 0x34, 0xF1, 0xEF, 0x45,
+    0x1F, 0xD4, 0x6B, 0x50, 0x3F, 0x00,
+    // x
+    0x00, 0xC6, 0x85, 0x8E, 0x06, 0xB7, 0x04, 0x04, 0xE9, 0xCD, 0x9E, 0x3E,
+    0xCB, 0x66, 0x23, 0x95, 0xB4, 0x42, 0x9C, 0x64, 0x81, 0x39, 0x05, 0x3F,
+    0xB5, 0x21, 0xF8, 0x28, 0xAF, 0x60, 0x6B, 0x4D, 0x3D, 0xBA, 0xA1, 0x4B,
+    0x5E, 0x77, 0xEF, 0xE7, 0x59, 0x28, 0xFE, 0x1D, 0xC1, 0x27, 0xA2, 0xFF,
+    0xA8, 0xDE, 0x33, 0x48, 0xB3, 0xC1, 0x85, 0x6A, 0x42, 0x9B, 0xF9, 0x7E,
+    0x7E, 0x31, 0xC2, 0xE5, 0xBD, 0x66,
+    // y
+    0x01, 0x18, 0x39, 0x29, 0x6a, 0x78, 0x9a, 0x3b, 0xc0, 0x04, 0x5c, 0x8a,
+    0x5f, 0xb4, 0x2c, 0x7d, 0x1b, 0xd9, 0x98, 0xf5, 0x44, 0x49, 0x57, 0x9b,
+    0x44, 0x68, 0x17, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x17, 0x27, 0x3e, 0x66, 0x2c, 0x97, 0xee,
+    0x72, 0x99, 0x5e, 0xf4, 0x26, 0x40, 0xc5, 0x50, 0xb9, 0x01, 0x3f, 0xad,
+    0x07, 0x61, 0x35, 0x3c, 0x70, 0x86, 0xa2, 0x72, 0xc2, 0x40, 0x88, 0xbe,
+    0x94, 0x76, 0x9f, 0xd1, 0x66, 0x50,
+    // order
+    0x01, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFA, 0x51, 0x86,
+    0x87, 0x83, 0xBF, 0x2F, 0x96, 0x6B, 0x7F, 0xCC, 0x01, 0x48, 0xF7, 0x09,
+    0xA5, 0xD0, 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xC9, 0xB8, 0x89, 0x9C, 0x47, 0xAE, 0xBB, 0x6F,
+    0xB7, 0x1E, 0x91, 0x38, 0x64, 0x09,
+};
+
+DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(struct built_in_curves, OPENSSL_built_in_curves) {
+  // 1.3.132.0.35
+  static const uint8_t kOIDP521[] = {0x2b, 0x81, 0x04, 0x00, 0x23};
+  out->curves[0].nid = NID_secp521r1;
+  out->curves[0].oid = kOIDP521;
+  out->curves[0].oid_len = sizeof(kOIDP521);
+  out->curves[0].comment = "NIST P-521";
+  out->curves[0].param_len = 66;
+  out->curves[0].params = kP521Params;
+  out->curves[0].method = EC_GFp_mont_method();
+
+  // 1.3.132.0.34
+  static const uint8_t kOIDP384[] = {0x2b, 0x81, 0x04, 0x00, 0x22};
+  out->curves[1].nid = NID_secp384r1;
+  out->curves[1].oid = kOIDP384;
+  out->curves[1].oid_len = sizeof(kOIDP384);
+  out->curves[1].comment = "NIST P-384";
+  out->curves[1].param_len = 48;
+  out->curves[1].params = kP384Params;
+  out->curves[1].method = EC_GFp_mont_method();
+
+  // 1.2.840.10045.3.1.7
+  static const uint8_t kOIDP256[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce,
+                                     0x3d, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07};
+  out->curves[2].nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
+  out->curves[2].oid = kOIDP256;
+  out->curves[2].oid_len = sizeof(kOIDP256);
+  out->curves[2].comment = "NIST P-256";
+  out->curves[2].param_len = 32;
+  out->curves[2].params = kP256Params;
+  out->curves[2].method =
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) && \
+    !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL)
+      EC_GFp_nistz256_method();
+#else
+      EC_GFp_nistp256_method();
+#endif
+
+  // 1.3.132.0.33
+  static const uint8_t kOIDP224[] = {0x2b, 0x81, 0x04, 0x00, 0x21};
+  out->curves[3].nid = NID_secp224r1;
+  out->curves[3].oid = kOIDP224;
+  out->curves[3].oid_len = sizeof(kOIDP224);
+  out->curves[3].comment = "NIST P-224";
+  out->curves[3].param_len = 28;
+  out->curves[3].params = kP224Params;
+  out->curves[3].method =
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_HAS_UINT128) && !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL)
+      EC_GFp_nistp224_method();
+#else
+      EC_GFp_mont_method();
+#endif
+}
+
+EC_GROUP *ec_group_new(const EC_METHOD *meth) {
+  EC_GROUP *ret;
+
+  if (meth == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_SLOT_FULL);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  if (meth->group_init == 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EC_GROUP));
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  OPENSSL_memset(ret, 0, sizeof(EC_GROUP));
+
+  ret->references = 1;
+  ret->meth = meth;
+  BN_init(&ret->order);
+
+  if (!meth->group_init(ret)) {
+    OPENSSL_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static int ec_group_set_generator(EC_GROUP *group, const EC_AFFINE *generator,
+                                  const BIGNUM *order) {
+  assert(group->generator == NULL);
+
+  if (!BN_copy(&group->order, order)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  // Store the order in minimal form, so it can be used with |BN_ULONG| arrays.
+  bn_set_minimal_width(&group->order);
+
+  BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->order_mont);
+  group->order_mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new_for_modulus(&group->order, NULL);
+  if (group->order_mont == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  group->field_greater_than_order = BN_cmp(&group->field, order) > 0;
+  if (group->field_greater_than_order) {
+    BIGNUM tmp;
+    BN_init(&tmp);
+    int ok =
+        BN_sub(&tmp, &group->field, order) &&
+        bn_copy_words(group->field_minus_order.words, group->field.width, &tmp);
+    BN_free(&tmp);
+    if (!ok) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  group->generator = EC_POINT_new(group);
+  if (group->generator == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  ec_affine_to_jacobian(group, &group->generator->raw, generator);
+  assert(ec_felem_equal(group, &group->one, &group->generator->raw.Z));
+
+  // Avoid a reference cycle. |group->generator| does not maintain an owning
+  // pointer to |group|.
+  int is_zero = CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&group->references);
+
+  assert(!is_zero);
+  (void)is_zero;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a,
+                                 const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  if (BN_num_bytes(p) > EC_MAX_BYTES) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INVALID_FIELD);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+      return NULL;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Historically, |a| and |b| were not required to be fully reduced.
+  // TODO(davidben): Can this be removed?
+  EC_GROUP *ret = NULL;
+  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+  BIGNUM *a_reduced = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  BIGNUM *b_reduced = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  if (a_reduced == NULL || b_reduced == NULL ||
+      !BN_nnmod(a_reduced, a, p, ctx) ||
+      !BN_nnmod(b_reduced, b, p, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ret = ec_group_new(EC_GFp_mont_method());
+  if (ret == NULL ||
+      !ret->meth->group_set_curve(ret, p, a_reduced, b_reduced, ctx)) {
+    EC_GROUP_free(ret);
+    ret = NULL;
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+err:
+  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+  BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int EC_GROUP_set_generator(EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *generator,
+                           const BIGNUM *order, const BIGNUM *cofactor) {
+  if (group->curve_name != NID_undef || group->generator != NULL ||
+      generator->group != group) {
+    // |EC_GROUP_set_generator| may only be used with |EC_GROUP|s returned by
+    // |EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp| and may only used once on each group.
+    // |generator| must have been created from |EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp|, not a
+    // copy, so that |generator->group->generator| is set correctly.
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (BN_num_bytes(order) > EC_MAX_BYTES) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Require a cofactor of one for custom curves, which implies prime order.
+  if (!BN_is_one(cofactor)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INVALID_COFACTOR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Require that p < 2×order. This simplifies some ECDSA operations.
+  //
+  // Note any curve which did not satisfy this must have been invalid or use a
+  // tiny prime (less than 17). See the proof in |field_element_to_scalar| in
+  // the ECDSA implementation.
+  int ret = 0;
+  BIGNUM *tmp = BN_new();
+  if (tmp == NULL ||
+      !BN_lshift1(tmp, order)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (BN_cmp(tmp, &group->field) <= 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  EC_AFFINE affine;
+  if (!ec_jacobian_to_affine(group, &affine, &generator->raw) ||
+      !ec_group_set_generator(group, &affine, order)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  BN_free(tmp);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static EC_GROUP *ec_group_new_from_data(const struct built_in_curve *curve) {
+  EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
+  BIGNUM *p = NULL, *a = NULL, *b = NULL, *order = NULL;
+  int ok = 0;
+
+  BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  const unsigned param_len = curve->param_len;
+  const uint8_t *params = curve->params;
+
+  if (!(p = BN_bin2bn(params + 0 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) ||
+      !(a = BN_bin2bn(params + 1 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) ||
+      !(b = BN_bin2bn(params + 2 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) ||
+      !(order = BN_bin2bn(params + 5 * param_len, param_len, NULL))) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  group = ec_group_new(curve->method);
+  if (group == NULL ||
+      !group->meth->group_set_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  EC_AFFINE G;
+  EC_FELEM x, y;
+  if (!ec_felem_from_bytes(group, &x, params + 3 * param_len, param_len) ||
+      !ec_felem_from_bytes(group, &y, params + 4 * param_len, param_len) ||
+      !ec_point_set_affine_coordinates(group, &G, &x, &y)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!ec_group_set_generator(group, &G, order)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ok = 1;
+
+err:
+  if (!ok) {
+    EC_GROUP_free(group);
+    group = NULL;
+  }
+  BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+  BN_free(p);
+  BN_free(a);
+  BN_free(b);
+  BN_free(order);
+  return group;
+}
+
+// Built-in groups are allocated lazily and static once allocated.
+// TODO(davidben): Make these actually static. https://crbug.com/boringssl/20.
+struct built_in_groups_st {
+  EC_GROUP *groups[OPENSSL_NUM_BUILT_IN_CURVES];
+};
+DEFINE_BSS_GET(struct built_in_groups_st, built_in_groups)
+DEFINE_STATIC_MUTEX(built_in_groups_lock)
+
+EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(int nid) {
+  struct built_in_groups_st *groups = built_in_groups_bss_get();
+  EC_GROUP **group_ptr = NULL;
+  const struct built_in_curves *const curves = OPENSSL_built_in_curves();
+  const struct built_in_curve *curve = NULL;
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < OPENSSL_NUM_BUILT_IN_CURVES; i++) {
+    if (curves->curves[i].nid == nid) {
+      curve = &curves->curves[i];
+      group_ptr = &groups->groups[i];
+      break;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (curve == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_UNKNOWN_GROUP);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_read(built_in_groups_lock_bss_get());
+  EC_GROUP *ret = *group_ptr;
+  CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock_read(built_in_groups_lock_bss_get());
+  if (ret != NULL) {
+    return ret;
+  }
+
+  ret = ec_group_new_from_data(curve);
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  EC_GROUP *to_free = NULL;
+  CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_write(built_in_groups_lock_bss_get());
+  if (*group_ptr == NULL) {
+    *group_ptr = ret;
+    // Filling in |ret->curve_name| makes |EC_GROUP_free| and |EC_GROUP_dup|
+    // into no-ops. At this point, |ret| is considered static.
+    ret->curve_name = nid;
+  } else {
+    to_free = ret;
+    ret = *group_ptr;
+  }
+  CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock_write(built_in_groups_lock_bss_get());
+
+  EC_GROUP_free(to_free);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+void EC_GROUP_free(EC_GROUP *group) {
+  if (group == NULL ||
+      // Built-in curves are static.
+      group->curve_name != NID_undef ||
+      !CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&group->references)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (group->meth->group_finish != NULL) {
+    group->meth->group_finish(group);
+  }
+
+  ec_point_free(group->generator, 0 /* don't free group */);
+  BN_free(&group->order);
+  BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->order_mont);
+
+  OPENSSL_free(group);
+}
+
+EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_dup(const EC_GROUP *a) {
+  if (a == NULL ||
+      // Built-in curves are static.
+      a->curve_name != NID_undef) {
+    return (EC_GROUP *)a;
+  }
+
+  // Groups are logically immutable (but for |EC_GROUP_set_generator| which must
+  // be called early on), so we simply take a reference.
+  EC_GROUP *group = (EC_GROUP *)a;
+  CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&group->references);
+  return group;
+}
+
+int EC_GROUP_cmp(const EC_GROUP *a, const EC_GROUP *b, BN_CTX *ignored) {
+  // Note this function returns 0 if equal and non-zero otherwise.
+  if (a == b) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (a->curve_name != b->curve_name) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+  if (a->curve_name != NID_undef) {
+    // Built-in curves may be compared by curve name alone.
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // |a| and |b| are both custom curves. We compare the entire curve
+  // structure. If |a| or |b| is incomplete (due to legacy OpenSSL mistakes,
+  // custom curve construction is sadly done in two parts) but otherwise not the
+  // same object, we consider them always unequal.
+  return a->meth != b->meth ||
+         a->generator == NULL ||
+         b->generator == NULL ||
+         BN_cmp(&a->order, &b->order) != 0 ||
+         BN_cmp(&a->field, &b->field) != 0 ||
+         !ec_felem_equal(a, &a->a, &b->a) ||
+         !ec_felem_equal(a, &a->b, &b->b) ||
+         !ec_GFp_simple_points_equal(a, &a->generator->raw, &b->generator->raw);
+}
+
+const EC_POINT *EC_GROUP_get0_generator(const EC_GROUP *group) {
+  return group->generator;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *EC_GROUP_get0_order(const EC_GROUP *group) {
+  assert(!BN_is_zero(&group->order));
+  return &group->order;
+}
+
+int EC_GROUP_get_order(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *order, BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  if (BN_copy(order, EC_GROUP_get0_order(group)) == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int EC_GROUP_order_bits(const EC_GROUP *group) {
+  return BN_num_bits(&group->order);
+}
+
+int EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *cofactor,
+                          BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  // All |EC_GROUP|s have cofactor 1.
+  return BN_set_word(cofactor, 1);
+}
+
+int EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *out_p, BIGNUM *out_a,
+                           BIGNUM *out_b, BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  return ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve(group, out_p, out_a, out_b);
+}
+
+int EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(const EC_GROUP *group) { return group->curve_name; }
+
+unsigned EC_GROUP_get_degree(const EC_GROUP *group) {
+  return BN_num_bits(&group->field);
+}
+
+const char *EC_curve_nid2nist(int nid) {
+  switch (nid) {
+    case NID_secp224r1:
+      return "P-224";
+    case NID_X9_62_prime256v1:
+      return "P-256";
+    case NID_secp384r1:
+      return "P-384";
+    case NID_secp521r1:
+      return "P-521";
+  }
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+int EC_curve_nist2nid(const char *name) {
+  if (strcmp(name, "P-224") == 0) {
+    return NID_secp224r1;
+  }
+  if (strcmp(name, "P-256") == 0) {
+    return NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
+  }
+  if (strcmp(name, "P-384") == 0) {
+    return NID_secp384r1;
+  }
+  if (strcmp(name, "P-521") == 0) {
+    return NID_secp521r1;
+  }
+  return NID_undef;
+}
+
+EC_POINT *EC_POINT_new(const EC_GROUP *group) {
+  if (group == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  EC_POINT *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ret);
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  ret->group = EC_GROUP_dup(group);
+  ec_GFp_simple_point_init(&ret->raw);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static void ec_point_free(EC_POINT *point, int free_group) {
+  if (!point) {
+    return;
+  }
+  if (free_group) {
+    EC_GROUP_free(point->group);
+  }
+  OPENSSL_free(point);
+}
+
+void EC_POINT_free(EC_POINT *point) {
+  ec_point_free(point, 1 /* free group */);
+}
+
+void EC_POINT_clear_free(EC_POINT *point) { EC_POINT_free(point); }
+
+int EC_POINT_copy(EC_POINT *dest, const EC_POINT *src) {
+  if (EC_GROUP_cmp(dest->group, src->group, NULL) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (dest == src) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+  ec_GFp_simple_point_copy(&dest->raw, &src->raw);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+EC_POINT *EC_POINT_dup(const EC_POINT *a, const EC_GROUP *group) {
+  if (a == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  EC_POINT *ret = EC_POINT_new(group);
+  if (ret == NULL ||
+      !EC_POINT_copy(ret, a)) {
+    EC_POINT_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point) {
+  if (EC_GROUP_cmp(group, point->group, NULL) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity(group, &point->raw);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point) {
+  if (EC_GROUP_cmp(group, point->group, NULL) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity(group, &point->raw);
+}
+
+int EC_POINT_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point,
+                         BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  if (EC_GROUP_cmp(group, point->group, NULL) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve(group, &point->raw);
+}
+
+int EC_POINT_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b,
+                 BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  if (EC_GROUP_cmp(group, a->group, NULL) != 0 ||
+      EC_GROUP_cmp(group, b->group, NULL) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  // Note |EC_POINT_cmp| returns zero for equality and non-zero for inequality.
+  return ec_GFp_simple_points_equal(group, &a->raw, &b->raw) ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
+int EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                        const EC_POINT *point, BIGNUM *x,
+                                        BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  if (group->meth->point_get_affine_coordinates == 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (EC_GROUP_cmp(group, point->group, NULL) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  EC_FELEM x_felem, y_felem;
+  if (!group->meth->point_get_affine_coordinates(group, &point->raw,
+                                                 x == NULL ? NULL : &x_felem,
+                                                 y == NULL ? NULL : &y_felem) ||
+      (x != NULL && !ec_felem_to_bignum(group, x, &x_felem)) ||
+      (y != NULL && !ec_felem_to_bignum(group, y, &y_felem))) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                    const EC_POINT *point, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y,
+                                    BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  return EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, ctx);
+}
+
+void ec_affine_to_jacobian(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *out,
+                           const EC_AFFINE *p) {
+  out->X = p->X;
+  out->Y = p->Y;
+  out->Z = group->one;
+}
+
+int ec_jacobian_to_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_AFFINE *out,
+                          const EC_RAW_POINT *p) {
+  return group->meth->point_get_affine_coordinates(group, p, &out->X, &out->Y);
+}
+
+int ec_jacobian_to_affine_batch(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_AFFINE *out,
+                                const EC_RAW_POINT *in, size_t num) {
+  if (group->meth->jacobian_to_affine_batch == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return group->meth->jacobian_to_affine_batch(group, out, in, num);
+}
+
+int ec_point_set_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_AFFINE *out,
+                                    const EC_FELEM *x, const EC_FELEM *y) {
+  void (*const felem_mul)(const EC_GROUP *, EC_FELEM *r, const EC_FELEM *a,
+                          const EC_FELEM *b) = group->meth->felem_mul;
+  void (*const felem_sqr)(const EC_GROUP *, EC_FELEM *r, const EC_FELEM *a) =
+      group->meth->felem_sqr;
+
+  // Check if the point is on the curve.
+  EC_FELEM lhs, rhs;
+  felem_sqr(group, &lhs, y);                   // lhs = y^2
+  felem_sqr(group, &rhs, x);                   // rhs = x^2
+  ec_felem_add(group, &rhs, &rhs, &group->a);  // rhs = x^2 + a
+  felem_mul(group, &rhs, &rhs, x);             // rhs = x^3 + ax
+  ec_felem_add(group, &rhs, &rhs, &group->b);  // rhs = x^3 + ax + b
+  if (!ec_felem_equal(group, &lhs, &rhs)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
+    // In the event of an error, defend against the caller not checking the
+    // return value by setting a known safe value. Note this may not be possible
+    // if the caller is in the process of constructing an arbitrary group and
+    // the generator is missing.
+    if (group->generator != NULL) {
+      assert(ec_felem_equal(group, &group->one, &group->generator->raw.Z));
+      out->X = group->generator->raw.X;
+      out->Y = group->generator->raw.Y;
+    }
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  out->X = *x;
+  out->Y = *y;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
+                                        const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y,
+                                        BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  if (EC_GROUP_cmp(group, point->group, NULL) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (x == NULL || y == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  EC_FELEM x_felem, y_felem;
+  EC_AFFINE affine;
+  if (!ec_bignum_to_felem(group, &x_felem, x) ||
+      !ec_bignum_to_felem(group, &y_felem, y) ||
+      !ec_point_set_affine_coordinates(group, &affine, &x_felem, &y_felem)) {
+    // In the event of an error, defend against the caller not checking the
+    // return value by setting a known safe value.
+    ec_set_to_safe_point(group, &point->raw);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  ec_affine_to_jacobian(group, &point->raw, &affine);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
+                                    const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y,
+                                    BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  return EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, ctx);
+}
+
+int EC_POINT_add(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a,
+                 const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  if (EC_GROUP_cmp(group, r->group, NULL) != 0 ||
+      EC_GROUP_cmp(group, a->group, NULL) != 0 ||
+      EC_GROUP_cmp(group, b->group, NULL) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  group->meth->add(group, &r->raw, &a->raw, &b->raw);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int EC_POINT_dbl(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a,
+                 BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  if (EC_GROUP_cmp(group, r->group, NULL) != 0 ||
+      EC_GROUP_cmp(group, a->group, NULL) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  group->meth->dbl(group, &r->raw, &a->raw);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+
+int EC_POINT_invert(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  if (EC_GROUP_cmp(group, a->group, NULL) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  ec_GFp_simple_invert(group, &a->raw);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int arbitrary_bignum_to_scalar(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *out,
+                                      const BIGNUM *in, BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  if (ec_bignum_to_scalar(group, out, in)) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  ERR_clear_error();
+
+  // This is an unusual input, so we do not guarantee constant-time processing.
+  const BIGNUM *order = &group->order;
+  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+  BIGNUM *tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  int ok = tmp != NULL &&
+           BN_nnmod(tmp, in, order, ctx) &&
+           ec_bignum_to_scalar(group, out, tmp);
+  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+  return ok;
+}
+
+int EC_POINT_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *g_scalar,
+                 const EC_POINT *p, const BIGNUM *p_scalar, BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  // Previously, this function set |r| to the point at infinity if there was
+  // nothing to multiply. But, nobody should be calling this function with
+  // nothing to multiply in the first place.
+  if ((g_scalar == NULL && p_scalar == NULL) ||
+      (p == NULL) != (p_scalar == NULL))  {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (EC_GROUP_cmp(group, r->group, NULL) != 0 ||
+      (p != NULL && EC_GROUP_cmp(group, p->group, NULL) != 0)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  int ret = 0;
+  BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    if (new_ctx == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    ctx = new_ctx;
+  }
+
+  // If both |g_scalar| and |p_scalar| are non-NULL,
+  // |ec_point_mul_scalar_public| would share the doublings between the two
+  // products, which would be more efficient. However, we conservatively assume
+  // the caller needs a constant-time operation. (ECDSA verification does not
+  // use this function.)
+  //
+  // Previously, the low-level constant-time multiplication function aligned
+  // with this function's calling convention, but this was misleading. Curves
+  // which combined the two multiplications did not avoid the doubling case
+  // in the incomplete addition formula and were not constant-time.
+
+  if (g_scalar != NULL) {
+    EC_SCALAR scalar;
+    if (!arbitrary_bignum_to_scalar(group, &scalar, g_scalar, ctx) ||
+        !ec_point_mul_scalar_base(group, &r->raw, &scalar)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (p_scalar != NULL) {
+    EC_SCALAR scalar;
+    EC_RAW_POINT tmp;
+    if (!arbitrary_bignum_to_scalar(group, &scalar, p_scalar, ctx) ||
+        !ec_point_mul_scalar(group, &tmp, &p->raw, &scalar)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (g_scalar == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_memcpy(&r->raw, &tmp, sizeof(EC_RAW_POINT));
+    } else {
+      group->meth->add(group, &r->raw, &r->raw, &tmp);
+    }
+  }
+
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int ec_point_mul_scalar_public(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *r,
+                               const EC_SCALAR *g_scalar, const EC_RAW_POINT *p,
+                               const EC_SCALAR *p_scalar) {
+  if (g_scalar == NULL || p_scalar == NULL || p == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (group->meth->mul_public == NULL) {
+    return group->meth->mul_public_batch(group, r, g_scalar, p, p_scalar, 1);
+  }
+
+  group->meth->mul_public(group, r, g_scalar, p, p_scalar);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ec_point_mul_scalar_public_batch(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *r,
+                                     const EC_SCALAR *g_scalar,
+                                     const EC_RAW_POINT *points,
+                                     const EC_SCALAR *scalars, size_t num) {
+  if (group->meth->mul_public_batch == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return group->meth->mul_public_batch(group, r, g_scalar, points, scalars,
+                                       num);
+}
+
+int ec_point_mul_scalar(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *r,
+                        const EC_RAW_POINT *p, const EC_SCALAR *scalar) {
+  if (p == NULL || scalar == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  group->meth->mul(group, r, p, scalar);
+
+  // Check the result is on the curve to defend against fault attacks or bugs.
+  // This has negligible cost compared to the multiplication.
+  if (!ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve(group, r)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ec_point_mul_scalar_base(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *r,
+                             const EC_SCALAR *scalar) {
+  if (scalar == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  group->meth->mul_base(group, r, scalar);
+
+  // Check the result is on the curve to defend against fault attacks or bugs.
+  // This has negligible cost compared to the multiplication.
+  if (!ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve(group, r)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ec_point_mul_scalar_batch(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *r,
+                              const EC_RAW_POINT *p0, const EC_SCALAR *scalar0,
+                              const EC_RAW_POINT *p1, const EC_SCALAR *scalar1,
+                              const EC_RAW_POINT *p2,
+                              const EC_SCALAR *scalar2) {
+  if (group->meth->mul_batch == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  group->meth->mul_batch(group, r, p0, scalar0, p1, scalar1, p2, scalar2);
+
+  // Check the result is on the curve to defend against fault attacks or bugs.
+  // This has negligible cost compared to the multiplication.
+  if (!ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve(group, r)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ec_init_precomp(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_PRECOMP *out,
+                    const EC_RAW_POINT *p) {
+  if (group->meth->init_precomp == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return group->meth->init_precomp(group, out, p);
+}
+
+int ec_point_mul_scalar_precomp(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *r,
+                                const EC_PRECOMP *p0, const EC_SCALAR *scalar0,
+                                const EC_PRECOMP *p1, const EC_SCALAR *scalar1,
+                                const EC_PRECOMP *p2,
+                                const EC_SCALAR *scalar2) {
+  if (group->meth->mul_precomp == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  group->meth->mul_precomp(group, r, p0, scalar0, p1, scalar1, p2, scalar2);
+
+  // Check the result is on the curve to defend against fault attacks or bugs.
+  // This has negligible cost compared to the multiplication.
+  if (!ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve(group, r)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+void ec_point_select(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *out, BN_ULONG mask,
+                      const EC_RAW_POINT *a, const EC_RAW_POINT *b) {
+  ec_felem_select(group, &out->X, mask, &a->X, &b->X);
+  ec_felem_select(group, &out->Y, mask, &a->Y, &b->Y);
+  ec_felem_select(group, &out->Z, mask, &a->Z, &b->Z);
+}
+
+void ec_affine_select(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_AFFINE *out, BN_ULONG mask,
+                      const EC_AFFINE *a, const EC_AFFINE *b) {
+  ec_felem_select(group, &out->X, mask, &a->X, &b->X);
+  ec_felem_select(group, &out->Y, mask, &a->Y, &b->Y);
+}
+
+void ec_precomp_select(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_PRECOMP *out, BN_ULONG mask,
+                       const EC_PRECOMP *a, const EC_PRECOMP *b) {
+  OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(out->comb) == sizeof(*out),
+                        "out->comb does not span the entire structure");
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(out->comb); i++) {
+    ec_affine_select(group, &out->comb[i], mask, &a->comb[i], &b->comb[i]);
+  }
+}
+
+int ec_cmp_x_coordinate(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_RAW_POINT *p,
+                        const EC_SCALAR *r) {
+  return group->meth->cmp_x_coordinate(group, p, r);
+}
+
+int ec_get_x_coordinate_as_scalar(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *out,
+                                  const EC_RAW_POINT *p) {
+  uint8_t bytes[EC_MAX_BYTES];
+  size_t len;
+  if (!ec_get_x_coordinate_as_bytes(group, bytes, &len, sizeof(bytes), p)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // For simplicity, in case of width mismatches between |group->field| and
+  // |group->order|, zero any untouched words in |out|.
+  OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, sizeof(EC_SCALAR));
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+    out->bytes[len - i - 1] = bytes[i];
+  }
+
+  // We must have p < 2×order, assuming p is not tiny (p >= 17). Thus rather we
+  // can reduce by performing at most one subtraction.
+  //
+  // Proof: We only work with prime order curves, so the number of points on
+  // the curve is the order. Thus Hasse's theorem gives:
+  //
+  //     |order - (p + 1)| <= 2×sqrt(p)
+  //         p + 1 - order <= 2×sqrt(p)
+  //     p + 1 - 2×sqrt(p) <= order
+  //       p + 1 - 2×(p/4)  < order       (p/4 > sqrt(p) for p >= 17)
+  //         p/2 < p/2 + 1  < order
+  //                     p  < 2×order
+  //
+  // Additionally, one can manually check this property for built-in curves. It
+  // is enforced for legacy custom curves in |EC_GROUP_set_generator|.
+
+  // The above does not guarantee |group->field| is not one word larger than
+  // |group->order|, so read one extra carry word.
+  BN_ULONG tmp[EC_MAX_WORDS];
+  BN_ULONG carry =
+      group->order.width < EC_MAX_WORDS ? out->words[group->order.width] : 0;
+  bn_reduce_once_in_place(out->words, carry, group->order.d, tmp,
+                          group->order.width);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ec_get_x_coordinate_as_bytes(const EC_GROUP *group, uint8_t *out,
+                                 size_t *out_len, size_t max_out,
+                                 const EC_RAW_POINT *p) {
+  size_t len = BN_num_bytes(&group->field);
+  assert(len <= EC_MAX_BYTES);
+  if (max_out < len) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  EC_FELEM x;
+  if (!group->meth->point_get_affine_coordinates(group, p, &x, NULL)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  ec_felem_to_bytes(group, out, out_len, &x);
+  *out_len = len;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+void ec_set_to_safe_point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *out) {
+  if (group->generator != NULL) {
+    ec_GFp_simple_point_copy(out, &group->generator->raw);
+  } else {
+    // The generator can be missing if the caller is in the process of
+    // constructing an arbitrary group. In this case, we give up and use the
+    // point at infinity.
+    ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity(group, out);
+  }
+}
+
+void EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(EC_GROUP *group, int flag) {}
+
+int EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag(const EC_GROUP *group) {
+  return OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE;
+}
+
+const EC_METHOD *EC_GROUP_method_of(const EC_GROUP *group) {
+  // This function exists purely to give callers a way to call
+  // |EC_METHOD_get_field_type|. cryptography.io crashes if |EC_GROUP_method_of|
+  // returns NULL, so return some other garbage pointer.
+  return (const EC_METHOD *)0x12340000;
+}
+
+int EC_METHOD_get_field_type(const EC_METHOD *meth) {
+  return NID_X9_62_prime_field;
+}
+
+void EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(EC_GROUP *group,
+                                        point_conversion_form_t form) {
+  if (form != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
+    abort();
+  }
+}
+
+size_t EC_get_builtin_curves(EC_builtin_curve *out_curves,
+                             size_t max_num_curves) {
+  const struct built_in_curves *const curves = OPENSSL_built_in_curves();
+
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < max_num_curves && i < OPENSSL_NUM_BUILT_IN_CURVES;
+       i++) {
+    out_curves[i].comment = curves->curves[i].comment;
+    out_curves[i].nid = curves->curves[i].nid;
+  }
+
+  return OPENSSL_NUM_BUILT_IN_CURVES;
+}