grpc 1.35.0 → 1.38.0

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/tls13_both.cc

@@ -580,10 +580,40 @@ enum ssl_private_key_result_t tls13_add_certificate_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
     return ssl_private_key_failure;
   }
 
-  enum ssl_private_key_result_t sign_result = ssl_private_key_sign(
-      hs, sig, &sig_len, max_sig_len, signature_algorithm, msg);
-  if (sign_result != ssl_private_key_success) {
-    return sign_result;
+  SSL_HANDSHAKE_HINTS *const hints = hs->hints.get();
+  Array<uint8_t> spki;
+  if (hints) {
+    ScopedCBB spki_cbb;
+    if (!CBB_init(spki_cbb.get(), 64) ||
+        !EVP_marshal_public_key(spki_cbb.get(), hs->local_pubkey.get()) ||
+        !CBBFinishArray(spki_cbb.get(), &spki)) {
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return ssl_private_key_failure;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (hints && !hs->hints_requested &&
+      signature_algorithm == hints->signature_algorithm &&
+      MakeConstSpan(msg) == hints->signature_input &&
+      MakeConstSpan(spki) == hints->signature_spki &&
+      !hints->signature.empty() && hints->signature.size() <= max_sig_len) {
+    // Signature algorithm and input both match. Reuse the signature from hints.
+    sig_len = hints->signature.size();
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(sig, hints->signature.data(), sig_len);
+  } else {
+    enum ssl_private_key_result_t sign_result = ssl_private_key_sign(
+        hs, sig, &sig_len, max_sig_len, signature_algorithm, msg);
+    if (sign_result != ssl_private_key_success) {
+      return sign_result;
+    }
+    if (hints && hs->hints_requested) {
+      hints->signature_algorithm = signature_algorithm;
+      hints->signature_input = std::move(msg);
+      hints->signature_spki = std::move(spki);
+      if (!hints->signature.CopyFrom(MakeSpan(sig, sig_len))) {
+        return ssl_private_key_failure;
+      }
+    }
   }
 
   if (!CBB_did_write(&child, sig_len) ||

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/tls13_client.cc

@@ -414,8 +414,8 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
   // Set up the key schedule and incorporate the PSK into the running secret.
   if (ssl->s3->session_reused) {
     if (!tls13_init_key_schedule(
-            hs, MakeConstSpan(hs->new_session->master_key,
-                              hs->new_session->master_key_length))) {
+            hs, MakeConstSpan(hs->new_session->secret,
+                              hs->new_session->secret_length))) {
       return ssl_hs_error;
     }
   } else if (!tls13_init_key_schedule(hs, MakeConstSpan(kZeroes, hash_len))) {

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/tls13_enc.cc

@@ -303,10 +303,9 @@ bool tls13_derive_resumption_secret(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
     return false;
   }
-  hs->new_session->master_key_length = hs->transcript.DigestLen();
+  hs->new_session->secret_length = hs->transcript.DigestLen();
   return derive_secret(
-      hs,
-      MakeSpan(hs->new_session->master_key, hs->new_session->master_key_length),
+      hs, MakeSpan(hs->new_session->secret, hs->new_session->secret_length),
       label_to_span(kTLS13LabelResumption));
 }
 
@@ -354,8 +353,8 @@ bool tls13_derive_session_psk(SSL_SESSION *session, Span<const uint8_t> nonce) {
   const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_session_get_digest(session);
   // The session initially stores the resumption_master_secret, which we
   // override with the PSK.
-  auto session_key = MakeSpan(session->master_key, session->master_key_length);
-  return hkdf_expand_label(session_key, digest, session_key,
+  auto session_secret = MakeSpan(session->secret, session->secret_length);
+  return hkdf_expand_label(session_secret, digest, session_secret,
                            label_to_span(kTLS13LabelResumptionPSK), nonce);
 }
 
@@ -460,11 +459,10 @@ bool tls13_write_psk_binder(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Span<uint8_t> msg) {
   if (!hash_transcript_and_truncated_client_hello(
           hs, context, &context_len, digest, msg,
           1 /* length prefix */ + hash_len) ||
-      !tls13_psk_binder(verify_data, &verify_data_len,
-                        ssl->session->ssl_version, digest,
-                        MakeConstSpan(ssl->session->master_key,
-                                      ssl->session->master_key_length),
-                        MakeConstSpan(context, context_len)) ||
+      !tls13_psk_binder(
+          verify_data, &verify_data_len, ssl->session->ssl_version, digest,
+          MakeConstSpan(ssl->session->secret, ssl->session->secret_length),
+          MakeConstSpan(context, context_len)) ||
       verify_data_len != hash_len) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
     return false;
@@ -485,11 +483,10 @@ bool tls13_verify_psk_binder(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, SSL_SESSION *session,
   if (!hash_transcript_and_truncated_client_hello(hs, context, &context_len,
                                                   hs->transcript.Digest(),
                                                   msg.raw, CBS_len(binders)) ||
-      !tls13_psk_binder(
-          verify_data, &verify_data_len, hs->ssl->version,
-          hs->transcript.Digest(),
-          MakeConstSpan(session->master_key, session->master_key_length),
-          MakeConstSpan(context, context_len)) ||
+      !tls13_psk_binder(verify_data, &verify_data_len, hs->ssl->version,
+                        hs->transcript.Digest(),
+                        MakeConstSpan(session->secret, session->secret_length),
+                        MakeConstSpan(context, context_len)) ||
       // We only consider the first PSK, so compare against the first binder.
       !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(binders, &binder)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
@@ -510,4 +507,40 @@ bool tls13_verify_psk_binder(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, SSL_SESSION *session,
   return true;
 }
 
+bool tls13_ech_accept_confirmation(
+    SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, bssl::Span<uint8_t> out,
+    bssl::Span<const uint8_t> server_hello_ech_conf) {
+  // Compute the hash of the transcript concatenated with
+  // |server_hello_ech_conf| without modifying |hs->transcript|.
+  uint8_t context_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  unsigned context_hash_len;
+  ScopedEVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+  if (!hs->transcript.CopyToHashContext(ctx.get(), hs->transcript.Digest()) ||
+      !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx.get(), server_hello_ech_conf.data(),
+                        server_hello_ech_conf.size()) ||
+      !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx.get(), context_hash, &context_hash_len)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Per draft-ietf-tls-esni-09, accept_confirmation is computed with
+  // Derive-Secret, which derives a secret of size Hash.length. That value is
+  // then truncated to the first 8 bytes. Note this differs from deriving an
+  // 8-byte secret because the target length is included in the derivation.
+  uint8_t accept_confirmation_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  bssl::Span<uint8_t> accept_confirmation =
+      MakeSpan(accept_confirmation_buf, hs->transcript.DigestLen());
+  if (!hkdf_expand_label(accept_confirmation, hs->transcript.Digest(),
+                         hs->secret(), label_to_span("ech accept confirmation"),
+                         MakeConstSpan(context_hash, context_hash_len))) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (out.size() > accept_confirmation.size()) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return false;
+  }
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(out.data(), accept_confirmation.data(), out.size());
+  return true;
+}
+
 BSSL_NAMESPACE_END

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/tls13_server.cc

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 #include <openssl/stack.h>
 
 #include "../crypto/internal.h"
+#include "../crypto/hpke/internal.h"
 #include "internal.h"
 
 
@@ -41,35 +42,57 @@ static const uint8_t kZeroes[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
 // See RFC 8446, section 8.3.
 static const int32_t kMaxTicketAgeSkewSeconds = 60;
 
-static int resolve_ecdhe_secret(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, bool *out_need_retry,
-                                SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello) {
+static bool resolve_ecdhe_secret(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                 const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello) {
   SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  *out_need_retry = false;
-
-  // We only support connections that include an ECDHE key exchange.
-  CBS key_share;
-  if (!ssl_client_hello_get_extension(client_hello, &key_share,
-                                      TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_KEY_SHARE);
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION);
-    return 0;
-  }
+  const uint16_t group_id = hs->new_session->group_id;
 
   bool found_key_share;
-  Array<uint8_t> dhe_secret;
+  Span<const uint8_t> peer_key;
   uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-  if (!ssl_ext_key_share_parse_clienthello(hs, &found_key_share, &dhe_secret,
-                                           &alert, &key_share)) {
+  if (!ssl_ext_key_share_parse_clienthello(hs, &found_key_share, &peer_key,
+                                           &alert, client_hello)) {
     ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
-    return 0;
+    return false;
   }
 
   if (!found_key_share) {
-    *out_need_retry = true;
-    return 0;
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
+    return false;
   }
 
-  return tls13_advance_key_schedule(hs, dhe_secret);
+  Array<uint8_t> secret;
+  SSL_HANDSHAKE_HINTS *const hints = hs->hints.get();
+  if (hints && !hs->hints_requested && hints->key_share_group_id == group_id &&
+      !hints->key_share_secret.empty()) {
+    // Copy DH secret from hints.
+    if (!hs->ecdh_public_key.CopyFrom(hints->key_share_public_key) ||
+        !secret.CopyFrom(hints->key_share_secret)) {
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return false;
+    }
+  } else {
+    ScopedCBB public_key;
+    UniquePtr<SSLKeyShare> key_share = SSLKeyShare::Create(group_id);
+    if (!key_share ||  //
+        !CBB_init(public_key.get(), 32) ||
+        !key_share->Accept(public_key.get(), &secret, &alert, peer_key) ||
+        !CBBFinishArray(public_key.get(), &hs->ecdh_public_key)) {
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+      return false;
+    }
+    if (hints && hs->hints_requested) {
+      hints->key_share_group_id = group_id;
+      if (!hints->key_share_public_key.CopyFrom(hs->ecdh_public_key) ||
+          !hints->key_share_secret.CopyFrom(secret)) {
+        ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return false;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return tls13_advance_key_schedule(hs, secret);
 }
 
 static int ssl_ext_supported_versions_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
@@ -186,13 +209,8 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_select_parameters(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
   // the common handshake logic. Resolve the remaining non-PSK parameters.
   SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
   SSLMessage msg;
-  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
-    return ssl_hs_read_message;
-  }
   SSL_CLIENT_HELLO client_hello;
-  if (!ssl_client_hello_init(ssl, &client_hello, msg)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_PARSE_FAILED);
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+  if (!hs->GetClientHello(&msg, &client_hello)) {
     return ssl_hs_error;
   }
 
@@ -252,6 +270,16 @@ static enum ssl_ticket_aead_result_t select_session(
     return ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket;
   }
 
+  // Per RFC8446, section 4.2.9, servers MUST abort the handshake if the client
+  // sends pre_shared_key without psk_key_exchange_modes.
+  CBS unused;
+  if (!ssl_client_hello_get_extension(client_hello, &unused,
+                                      TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_key_exchange_modes)) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_EXTENSION);
+    return ssl_ticket_aead_error;
+  }
+
   CBS ticket, binders;
   uint32_t client_ticket_age;
   if (!ssl_ext_pre_shared_key_parse_clienthello(
@@ -337,13 +365,8 @@ static bool quic_ticket_compatible(const SSL_SESSION *session,
 static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_select_session(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
   SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
   SSLMessage msg;
-  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
-    return ssl_hs_read_message;
-  }
   SSL_CLIENT_HELLO client_hello;
-  if (!ssl_client_hello_init(ssl, &client_hello, msg)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_PARSE_FAILED);
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+  if (!hs->GetClientHello(&msg, &client_hello)) {
     return ssl_hs_error;
   }
 
@@ -393,6 +416,23 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_select_session(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
     return ssl_hs_error;
   }
 
+  // Record connection properties in the new session.
+  hs->new_session->cipher = hs->new_cipher;
+  if (!tls1_get_shared_group(hs, &hs->new_session->group_id)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_GROUP);
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  // Determine if we need HelloRetryRequest.
+  bool found_key_share;
+  if (!ssl_ext_key_share_parse_clienthello(hs, &found_key_share,
+                                           /*out_key_share=*/nullptr, &alert,
+                                           &client_hello)) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
   // Determine if we're negotiating 0-RTT.
   if (!ssl->enable_early_data) {
     ssl->s3->early_data_reason = ssl_early_data_disabled;
@@ -423,6 +463,8 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_select_session(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
     ssl->s3->early_data_reason = ssl_early_data_ticket_age_skew;
   } else if (!quic_ticket_compatible(session.get(), hs->config)) {
     ssl->s3->early_data_reason = ssl_early_data_quic_parameter_mismatch;
+  } else if (!found_key_share) {
+    ssl->s3->early_data_reason = ssl_early_data_hello_retry_request;
   } else {
     // |ssl_session_is_resumable| forbids cross-cipher resumptions even if the
     // PRF hashes match.
@@ -432,9 +474,6 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_select_session(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
     ssl->s3->early_data_accepted = true;
   }
 
-  // Record connection properties in the new session.
-  hs->new_session->cipher = hs->new_cipher;
-
   // Store the ALPN and ALPS values in the session for 0-RTT. Note the peer
   // applications settings are not generally known until client
   // EncryptedExtensions.
@@ -477,8 +516,8 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_select_session(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
   // Set up the key schedule and incorporate the PSK into the running secret.
   if (ssl->s3->session_reused) {
     if (!tls13_init_key_schedule(
-            hs, MakeConstSpan(hs->new_session->master_key,
-                              hs->new_session->master_key_length))) {
+            hs, MakeConstSpan(hs->new_session->secret,
+                              hs->new_session->secret_length))) {
       return ssl_hs_error;
     }
   } else if (!tls13_init_key_schedule(hs, MakeConstSpan(kZeroes, hash_len))) {
@@ -497,33 +536,30 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_select_session(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
     ssl->s3->skip_early_data = true;
   }
 
-  // Resolve ECDHE and incorporate it into the secret.
-  bool need_retry;
-  if (!resolve_ecdhe_secret(hs, &need_retry, &client_hello)) {
-    if (need_retry) {
-      if (ssl->s3->early_data_accepted) {
-        ssl->s3->early_data_reason = ssl_early_data_hello_retry_request;
-        ssl->s3->early_data_accepted = false;
-      }
-      ssl->s3->skip_early_data = true;
-      ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
-      if (!hs->transcript.UpdateForHelloRetryRequest()) {
-        return ssl_hs_error;
-      }
-      hs->tls13_state = state13_send_hello_retry_request;
-      return ssl_hs_ok;
+  if (!found_key_share) {
+    ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+    if (!hs->transcript.UpdateForHelloRetryRequest()) {
+      return ssl_hs_error;
     }
+    hs->tls13_state = state13_send_hello_retry_request;
+    return ssl_hs_ok;
+  }
+
+  if (!resolve_ecdhe_secret(hs, &client_hello)) {
     return ssl_hs_error;
   }
 
   ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+  hs->ech_client_hello_buf.Reset();
   hs->tls13_state = state13_send_server_hello;
   return ssl_hs_ok;
 }
 
 static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_hello_retry_request(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
   SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-
+  if (hs->hints_requested) {
+    return ssl_hs_hints_ready;
+  }
 
   ScopedCBB cbb;
   CBB body, session_id, extensions;
@@ -566,12 +602,78 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_second_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
     return ssl_hs_error;
   }
   SSL_CLIENT_HELLO client_hello;
-  if (!ssl_client_hello_init(ssl, &client_hello, msg)) {
+  if (!ssl_client_hello_init(ssl, &client_hello, msg.body)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_PARSE_FAILED);
     ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
     return ssl_hs_error;
   }
 
+  if (hs->ech_accept) {
+    // If we previously accepted the ClientHelloInner, check that the second
+    // ClientHello contains an encrypted_client_hello extension.
+    CBS ech_body;
+    if (!ssl_client_hello_get_extension(&client_hello, &ech_body,
+                                        TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypted_client_hello)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_EXTENSION);
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+
+    // Parse a ClientECH out of the extension body.
+    uint16_t kdf_id, aead_id;
+    CBS config_id, enc, payload;
+    if (!CBS_get_u16(&ech_body, &kdf_id) ||  //
+        !CBS_get_u16(&ech_body, &aead_id) ||
+        !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&ech_body, &config_id) ||
+        !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&ech_body, &enc) ||
+        !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&ech_body, &payload) ||
+        CBS_len(&ech_body) != 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+
+    // Check that ClientECH.cipher_suite is unchanged and that
+    // ClientECH.config_id and ClientECH.enc are empty.
+    if (kdf_id != EVP_HPKE_CTX_get_kdf_id(hs->ech_hpke_ctx.get()) ||
+        aead_id != EVP_HPKE_CTX_get_aead_id(hs->ech_hpke_ctx.get()) ||
+        CBS_len(&config_id) > 0 || CBS_len(&enc) > 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+
+    // Decrypt the payload with the HPKE context from the first ClientHello.
+    Array<uint8_t> encoded_client_hello_inner;
+    bool unused;
+    if (!ssl_client_hello_decrypt(
+            hs->ech_hpke_ctx.get(), &encoded_client_hello_inner, &unused,
+            &client_hello, kdf_id, aead_id, config_id, enc, payload)) {
+      // Decryption failure is fatal in the second ClientHello.
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+
+    // Recover the ClientHelloInner from the EncodedClientHelloInner.
+    uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    bssl::Array<uint8_t> client_hello_inner;
+    if (!ssl_decode_client_hello_inner(ssl, &alert, &client_hello_inner,
+                                       encoded_client_hello_inner,
+                                       &client_hello)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+    hs->ech_client_hello_buf = std::move(client_hello_inner);
+
+    // Reparse |client_hello| from the buffer owned by |hs|.
+    if (!hs->GetClientHello(&msg, &client_hello)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+  }
+
   // We perform all our negotiation based on the first ClientHello (for
   // consistency with what |select_certificate_cb| observed), which is in the
   // transcript, so we can ignore most of this second one.
@@ -607,13 +709,7 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_second_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
     }
   }
 
-  bool need_retry;
-  if (!resolve_ecdhe_secret(hs, &need_retry, &client_hello)) {
-    if (need_retry) {
-      // Only send one HelloRetryRequest.
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
-    }
+  if (!resolve_ecdhe_secret(hs, &client_hello)) {
     return ssl_hs_error;
   }
 
@@ -629,20 +725,19 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_second_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
   }
 
   ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+  hs->ech_client_hello_buf.Reset();
   hs->tls13_state = state13_send_server_hello;
   return ssl_hs_ok;
 }
 
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+static bool make_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Array<uint8_t> *out) {
   SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-
-  // Send a ServerHello.
   ScopedCBB cbb;
   CBB body, extensions, session_id;
   if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) ||
       !CBB_add_u16(&body, TLS1_2_VERSION) ||
-      !RAND_bytes(ssl->s3->server_random, sizeof(ssl->s3->server_random)) ||
-      !CBB_add_bytes(&body, ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&body, ssl->s3->server_random,
+                     sizeof(ssl->s3->server_random)) ||
       !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &session_id) ||
       !CBB_add_bytes(&session_id, hs->session_id, hs->session_id_len) ||
       !CBB_add_u16(&body, SSL_CIPHER_get_protocol_id(hs->new_cipher)) ||
@@ -651,10 +746,52 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
       !ssl_ext_pre_shared_key_add_serverhello(hs, &extensions) ||
       !ssl_ext_key_share_add_serverhello(hs, &extensions) ||
       !ssl_ext_supported_versions_add_serverhello(hs, &extensions) ||
-      !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
+      !ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, cbb.get(), out)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
+  Span<uint8_t> random(ssl->s3->server_random);
+
+  SSL_HANDSHAKE_HINTS *const hints = hs->hints.get();
+  if (hints && !hs->hints_requested &&
+      hints->server_random.size() == random.size()) {
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(random.data(), hints->server_random.data(), random.size());
+  } else {
+    RAND_bytes(random.data(), random.size());
+    if (hints && hs->hints_requested &&
+        !hints->server_random.CopyFrom(random)) {
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+  }
+
+  assert(!hs->ech_accept || hs->ech_is_inner_present);
+
+  if (hs->ech_is_inner_present) {
+    // Construct the ServerHelloECHConf message, which is the same as
+    // ServerHello, except the last 8 bytes of its random field are zeroed out.
+    Span<uint8_t> random_suffix = random.subspan(24);
+    OPENSSL_memset(random_suffix.data(), 0, random_suffix.size());
+
+    Array<uint8_t> server_hello_ech_conf;
+    if (!make_server_hello(hs, &server_hello_ech_conf) ||
+        !tls13_ech_accept_confirmation(hs, random_suffix,
+                                       server_hello_ech_conf)) {
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+  }
+
+  Array<uint8_t> server_hello;
+  if (!make_server_hello(hs, &server_hello) ||
+      !ssl->method->add_message(ssl, std::move(server_hello))) {
     return ssl_hs_error;
   }
 
+  hs->ecdh_public_key.Reset();  // No longer needed.
   if (!ssl->s3->used_hello_retry_request &&
       !ssl->method->add_change_cipher_spec(ssl)) {
     return ssl_hs_error;
@@ -669,6 +806,8 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
   }
 
   // Send EncryptedExtensions.
+  ScopedCBB cbb;
+  CBB body;
   if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body,
                                  SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) ||
       !ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(hs, &body) ||
@@ -758,6 +897,10 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_server_certificate_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
 
 static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_server_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
   SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (hs->hints_requested) {
+    return ssl_hs_hints_ready;
+  }
+
   if (!tls13_add_finished(hs) ||
       // Update the secret to the master secret and derive traffic keys.
       !tls13_advance_key_schedule(
@@ -844,7 +987,7 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_second_client_flight(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
                                hs->client_handshake_secret())) {
       return ssl_hs_error;
     }
-    hs->tls13_state = state13_read_client_certificate;
+    hs->tls13_state = state13_process_end_of_early_data;
     return ssl->s3->early_data_accepted ? ssl_hs_early_return : ssl_hs_ok;
   }
 
@@ -855,27 +998,31 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_second_client_flight(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
 
 static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_process_end_of_early_data(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
   SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  // If early data was not accepted, the EndOfEarlyData will be in the discarded
-  // early data.
-  if (hs->ssl->s3->early_data_accepted) {
-    SSLMessage msg;
-    if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
-      return ssl_hs_read_message;
-    }
-    if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA)) {
-      return ssl_hs_error;
+  // In protocols that use EndOfEarlyData, we must consume the extra message and
+  // switch to client_handshake_secret after the early return.
+  if (ssl->quic_method == nullptr) {
+    // If early data was not accepted, the EndOfEarlyData will be in the
+    // discarded early data.
+    if (hs->ssl->s3->early_data_accepted) {
+      SSLMessage msg;
+      if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+        return ssl_hs_read_message;
+      }
+      if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA)) {
+        return ssl_hs_error;
+      }
+      if (CBS_len(&msg.body) != 0) {
+        ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return ssl_hs_error;
+      }
+      ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
     }
-    if (CBS_len(&msg.body) != 0) {
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    if (!tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, ssl_encryption_handshake, evp_aead_open,
+                               hs->new_session.get(),
+                               hs->client_handshake_secret())) {
       return ssl_hs_error;
     }
-    ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
-  }
-  if (!tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, ssl_encryption_handshake, evp_aead_open,
-                             hs->new_session.get(),
-                             hs->client_handshake_secret())) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
   }
   hs->tls13_state = state13_read_client_encrypted_extensions;
   return ssl_hs_ok;