grpc 1.35.0 → 1.38.0

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/rand.c

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include <openssl/chacha.h>
 #include <openssl/cpu.h>
 #include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/type_check.h>
 
 #include "internal.h"
 #include "fork_detect.h"
@@ -63,11 +64,11 @@ struct rand_thread_state {
   // (re)seeded. This is bound by |kReseedInterval|.
   unsigned calls;
   // last_block_valid is non-zero iff |last_block| contains data from
-  // |CRYPTO_sysrand_for_seed|.
+  // |get_seed_entropy|.
   int last_block_valid;
 
 #if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
-  // last_block contains the previous block from |CRYPTO_sysrand_for_seed|.
+  // last_block contains the previous block from |get_seed_entropy|.
   uint8_t last_block[CRNGT_BLOCK_SIZE];
   // next and prev form a NULL-terminated, double-linked list of all states in
   // a process.
@@ -82,16 +83,18 @@ struct rand_thread_state {
 // called when the whole process is exiting.
 DEFINE_BSS_GET(struct rand_thread_state *, thread_states_list);
 DEFINE_STATIC_MUTEX(thread_states_list_lock);
+DEFINE_STATIC_MUTEX(state_clear_all_lock);
 
 static void rand_thread_state_clear_all(void) __attribute__((destructor));
 static void rand_thread_state_clear_all(void) {
   CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_write(thread_states_list_lock_bss_get());
+  CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_write(state_clear_all_lock_bss_get());
   for (struct rand_thread_state *cur = *thread_states_list_bss_get();
        cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
     CTR_DRBG_clear(&cur->drbg);
   }
-  // |thread_states_list_lock is deliberately left locked so that any threads
-  // that are still running will hang if they try to call |RAND_bytes|.
+  // The locks are deliberately left locked so that any threads that are still
+  // running will hang if they try to call |RAND_bytes|.
 }
 #endif
 
@@ -146,12 +149,6 @@ static int rdrand(uint8_t *buf, const size_t len) {
     OPENSSL_memcpy(buf + len_multiple8, rand_buf, remainder);
   }
 
-#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS_BREAK_CRNG)
-  // This breaks the "continuous random number generator test" defined in FIPS
-  // 140-2, section 4.9.2, and implemented in rand_get_seed().
-  OPENSSL_memset(buf, 0, len);
-#endif
-
   return 1;
 }
 
@@ -165,25 +162,110 @@ static int rdrand(uint8_t *buf, size_t len) {
 
 #if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
 
+void CRYPTO_get_seed_entropy(uint8_t *out_entropy, size_t out_entropy_len,
+                             int *out_used_cpu) {
+  *out_used_cpu = 0;
+  if (have_rdrand() && rdrand(out_entropy, out_entropy_len)) {
+    *out_used_cpu = 1;
+  } else {
+    CRYPTO_sysrand_for_seed(out_entropy, out_entropy_len);
+  }
+
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS_BREAK_CRNG)
+  // This breaks the "continuous random number generator test" defined in FIPS
+  // 140-2, section 4.9.2, and implemented in |rand_get_seed|.
+  OPENSSL_memset(out_entropy, 0, out_entropy_len);
+#endif
+}
+
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS_PASSIVE_ENTROPY)
+
+// In passive entropy mode, entropy is supplied from outside of the module via
+// |RAND_load_entropy| and is stored in global instance of the following
+// structure.
+
+struct entropy_buffer {
+  // bytes contains entropy suitable for seeding a DRBG.
+  uint8_t bytes[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN * BORINGSSL_FIPS_OVERREAD];
+  // bytes_valid indicates the number of bytes of |bytes| that contain valid
+  // data.
+  size_t bytes_valid;
+  // from_cpu is true if any of the contents of |bytes| were obtained directly
+  // from the CPU.
+  int from_cpu;
+};
+
+DEFINE_BSS_GET(struct entropy_buffer, entropy_buffer);
+DEFINE_STATIC_MUTEX(entropy_buffer_lock);
+
+void RAND_load_entropy(const uint8_t *entropy, size_t entropy_len,
+                       int from_cpu) {
+  struct entropy_buffer *const buffer = entropy_buffer_bss_get();
+
+  CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_write(entropy_buffer_lock_bss_get());
+  const size_t space = sizeof(buffer->bytes) - buffer->bytes_valid;
+  if (entropy_len > space) {
+    entropy_len = space;
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(&buffer->bytes[buffer->bytes_valid], entropy, entropy_len);
+  buffer->bytes_valid += entropy_len;
+  buffer->from_cpu |= from_cpu && (entropy_len != 0);
+  CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock_write(entropy_buffer_lock_bss_get());
+}
+
+// get_seed_entropy fills |out_entropy_len| bytes of |out_entropy| from the
+// global |entropy_buffer|.
+static void get_seed_entropy(uint8_t *out_entropy, size_t out_entropy_len,
+                             int *out_used_cpu) {
+  struct entropy_buffer *const buffer = entropy_buffer_bss_get();
+  if (out_entropy_len > sizeof(buffer->bytes)) {
+    abort();
+  }
+
+  CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_write(entropy_buffer_lock_bss_get());
+  while (buffer->bytes_valid < out_entropy_len) {
+    CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock_write(entropy_buffer_lock_bss_get());
+    RAND_need_entropy(out_entropy_len - buffer->bytes_valid);
+    CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_write(entropy_buffer_lock_bss_get());
+  }
+
+  *out_used_cpu = buffer->from_cpu;
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(out_entropy, buffer->bytes, out_entropy_len);
+  OPENSSL_memmove(buffer->bytes, &buffer->bytes[out_entropy_len],
+                  buffer->bytes_valid - out_entropy_len);
+  buffer->bytes_valid -= out_entropy_len;
+  if (buffer->bytes_valid == 0) {
+    buffer->from_cpu = 0;
+  }
+
+  CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock_write(entropy_buffer_lock_bss_get());
+}
+
+#else
+
+// In the active case, |get_seed_entropy| simply calls |CRYPTO_get_seed_entropy|
+// in order to obtain entropy from the CPU or OS.
+static void get_seed_entropy(uint8_t *out_entropy, size_t out_entropy_len,
+                            int *out_used_cpu) {
+  CRYPTO_get_seed_entropy(out_entropy, out_entropy_len, out_used_cpu);
+}
+
+#endif  // !BORINGSSL_FIPS_PASSIVE_ENTROPY
+
+// rand_get_seed fills |seed| with entropy and sets |*out_used_cpu| to one if
+// that entropy came directly from the CPU and zero otherwise.
 static void rand_get_seed(struct rand_thread_state *state,
-                          uint8_t seed[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN]) {
+                          uint8_t seed[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN],
+                          int *out_used_cpu) {
   if (!state->last_block_valid) {
-    if (!have_rdrand() ||
-        !rdrand(state->last_block, sizeof(state->last_block))) {
-      CRYPTO_sysrand_for_seed(state->last_block, sizeof(state->last_block));
-    }
+    int unused;
+    get_seed_entropy(state->last_block, sizeof(state->last_block), &unused);
     state->last_block_valid = 1;
   }
 
-  // We overread from /dev/urandom or RDRAND by a factor of 10 and XOR to
-  // whiten.
-#define FIPS_OVERREAD 10
-  uint8_t entropy[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN * FIPS_OVERREAD];
-
-  int used_rdrand = have_rdrand() && rdrand(entropy, sizeof(entropy));
-  if (!used_rdrand) {
-    CRYPTO_sysrand_for_seed(entropy, sizeof(entropy));
-  }
+  uint8_t entropy[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN * BORINGSSL_FIPS_OVERREAD];
+  get_seed_entropy(entropy, sizeof(entropy), out_used_cpu);
 
   // See FIPS 140-2, section 4.9.2. This is the “continuous random number
   // generator test” which causes the program to randomly abort. Hopefully the
@@ -193,6 +275,7 @@ static void rand_get_seed(struct rand_thread_state *state,
     BORINGSSL_FIPS_abort();
   }
 
+  OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(entropy) % CRNGT_BLOCK_SIZE == 0, "");
   for (size_t i = CRNGT_BLOCK_SIZE; i < sizeof(entropy);
        i += CRNGT_BLOCK_SIZE) {
     if (CRYPTO_memcmp(entropy + i - CRNGT_BLOCK_SIZE, entropy + i,
@@ -207,31 +290,24 @@ static void rand_get_seed(struct rand_thread_state *state,
 
   OPENSSL_memcpy(seed, entropy, CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN);
 
-  for (size_t i = 1; i < FIPS_OVERREAD; i++) {
+  for (size_t i = 1; i < BORINGSSL_FIPS_OVERREAD; i++) {
     for (size_t j = 0; j < CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN; j++) {
       seed[j] ^= entropy[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN * i + j];
     }
   }
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_URANDOM)
-  // If we used RDRAND, also opportunistically read from the system. This avoids
-  // solely relying on the hardware once the entropy pool has been initialized.
-  if (used_rdrand) {
-    CRYPTO_sysrand_if_available(entropy, CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN);
-    for (size_t i = 0; i < CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN; i++) {
-      seed[i] ^= entropy[i];
-    }
-  }
-#endif
 }
 
 #else
 
+// rand_get_seed fills |seed| with entropy and sets |*out_used_cpu| to one if
+// that entropy came directly from the CPU and zero otherwise.
 static void rand_get_seed(struct rand_thread_state *state,
-                          uint8_t seed[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN]) {
+                          uint8_t seed[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN],
+                          int *out_used_cpu) {
   // If not in FIPS mode, we don't overread from the system entropy source and
   // we don't depend only on the hardware RDRAND.
   CRYPTO_sysrand(seed, CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN);
+  *out_used_cpu = 0;
 }
 
 #endif
@@ -290,8 +366,23 @@ void RAND_bytes_with_additional_data(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
 
     state->last_block_valid = 0;
     uint8_t seed[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN];
-    rand_get_seed(state, seed);
-    if (!CTR_DRBG_init(&state->drbg, seed, NULL, 0)) {
+    int used_cpu;
+    rand_get_seed(state, seed, &used_cpu);
+
+    uint8_t personalization[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN];
+    size_t personalization_len = 0;
+#if defined(OPENSSL_URANDOM)
+    // If we used RDRAND, also opportunistically read from the system. This
+    // avoids solely relying on the hardware once the entropy pool has been
+    // initialized.
+    if (used_cpu &&
+        CRYPTO_sysrand_if_available(personalization, sizeof(personalization))) {
+      personalization_len = sizeof(personalization);
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (!CTR_DRBG_init(&state->drbg, seed, personalization,
+                       personalization_len)) {
       abort();
     }
     state->calls = 0;
@@ -315,7 +406,8 @@ void RAND_bytes_with_additional_data(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
   if (state->calls >= kReseedInterval ||
       state->fork_generation != fork_generation) {
     uint8_t seed[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN];
-    rand_get_seed(state, seed);
+    int used_cpu;
+    rand_get_seed(state, seed, &used_cpu);
 #if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
     // Take a read lock around accesses to |state->drbg|. This is needed to
     // avoid returning bad entropy if we race with
@@ -325,7 +417,7 @@ void RAND_bytes_with_additional_data(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
     // bug on ppc64le. glibc may implement pthread locks by wrapping user code
     // in a hardware transaction, but, on some older versions of glibc and the
     // kernel, syscalls made with |syscall| did not abort the transaction.
-    CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_read(thread_states_list_lock_bss_get());
+    CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_read(state_clear_all_lock_bss_get());
 #endif
     if (!CTR_DRBG_reseed(&state->drbg, seed, NULL, 0)) {
       abort();
@@ -334,7 +426,7 @@ void RAND_bytes_with_additional_data(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
     state->fork_generation = fork_generation;
   } else {
 #if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
-    CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_read(thread_states_list_lock_bss_get());
+    CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_read(state_clear_all_lock_bss_get());
 #endif
   }
 
@@ -363,7 +455,7 @@ void RAND_bytes_with_additional_data(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
   }
 
 #if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
-  CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock_read(thread_states_list_lock_bss_get());
+  CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock_read(state_clear_all_lock_bss_get());
 #endif
 }
 

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/urandom.c

@@ -62,6 +62,15 @@
 #include <sys/random.h>
 #endif
 
+#if defined(OPENSSL_FREEBSD)
+#define URANDOM_BLOCKS_FOR_ENTROPY
+#if __FreeBSD__ >= 12
+// getrandom is supported in FreeBSD 12 and up.
+#define FREEBSD_GETRANDOM
+#include <sys/random.h>
+#endif
+#endif
+
 #include <openssl/thread.h>
 #include <openssl/mem.h>
 
@@ -176,6 +185,11 @@ static void init_once(void) {
   }
 #endif
 
+#if defined(FREEBSD_GETRANDOM)
+  *urandom_fd_bss_get() = kHaveGetrandom;
+  return;
+#endif
+
   // Android FIPS builds must support getrandom.
 #if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS) && defined(OPENSSL_ANDROID)
   perror("getrandom not found");
@@ -256,11 +270,11 @@ static void wait_for_entropy(void) {
     return;
   }
 
-#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
-  // In FIPS mode we ensure that the kernel has sufficient entropy before
-  // continuing. This is automatically handled by getrandom, which requires
-  // that the entropy pool has been initialised, but for urandom we have to
-  // poll.
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS) && !defined(URANDOM_BLOCKS_FOR_ENTROPY)
+  // In FIPS mode on platforms where urandom doesn't block at startup, we ensure
+  // that the kernel has sufficient entropy before continuing. This is
+  // automatically handled by getrandom, which requires that the entropy pool
+  // has been initialised, but for urandom we have to poll.
   for (;;) {
     int entropy_bits;
     if (ioctl(fd, RNDGETENTCNT, &entropy_bits)) {
@@ -277,7 +291,7 @@ static void wait_for_entropy(void) {
 
     usleep(250000);
   }
-#endif  // BORINGSSL_FIPS
+#endif  // BORINGSSL_FIPS && !URANDOM_BLOCKS_FOR_ENTROPY
 }
 
 // fill_with_entropy writes |len| bytes of entropy into |out|. It returns one
@@ -291,11 +305,14 @@ static int fill_with_entropy(uint8_t *out, size_t len, int block, int seed) {
     return 1;
   }
 
-#if defined(USE_NR_getrandom)
+#if defined(USE_NR_getrandom) || defined(FREEBSD_GETRANDOM)
   int getrandom_flags = 0;
   if (!block) {
     getrandom_flags |= GRND_NONBLOCK;
   }
+#endif
+
+#if defined (USE_NR_getrandom)
   if (seed) {
     getrandom_flags |= *extra_getrandom_flags_for_seed_bss_get();
   }
@@ -315,6 +332,8 @@ static int fill_with_entropy(uint8_t *out, size_t len, int block, int seed) {
     if (*urandom_fd_bss_get() == kHaveGetrandom) {
 #if defined(USE_NR_getrandom)
       r = boringssl_getrandom(out, len, getrandom_flags);
+#elif defined(FREEBSD_GETRANDOM)
+      r = getrandom(out, len, getrandom_flags);
 #elif defined(OPENSSL_MACOS)
       if (__builtin_available(macos 10.12, *)) {
         // |getentropy| can only request 256 bytes at a time.
@@ -366,14 +385,7 @@ void CRYPTO_sysrand_for_seed(uint8_t *out, size_t requested) {
     perror("entropy fill failed");
     abort();
   }
-
-#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS_BREAK_CRNG)
-  // This breaks the "continuous random number generator test" defined in FIPS
-  // 140-2, section 4.9.2, and implemented in rand_get_seed().
-  OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, requested);
-#endif
 }
-
 #endif  // BORINGSSL_FIPS
 
 int CRYPTO_sysrand_if_available(uint8_t *out, size_t requested) {

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/fipsmodule/rsa/rsa_impl.c

@@ -1316,52 +1316,72 @@ static void replace_bn_mont_ctx(BN_MONT_CTX **out, BN_MONT_CTX **in) {
   *in = NULL;
 }
 
-int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, const BIGNUM *e_value,
-                        BN_GENCB *cb) {
+static int RSA_generate_key_ex_maybe_fips(RSA *rsa, int bits,
+                                          const BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb,
+                                          int check_fips) {
+  RSA *tmp = NULL;
+  uint32_t err;
+  int ret = 0;
+
   // |rsa_generate_key_impl|'s 2^-20 failure probability is too high at scale,
   // so we run the FIPS algorithm four times, bringing it down to 2^-80. We
   // should just adjust the retry limit, but FIPS 186-4 prescribes that value
   // and thus results in unnecessary complexity.
-  for (int i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+  int failures = 0;
+  do {
     ERR_clear_error();
     // Generate into scratch space, to avoid leaving partial work on failure.
-    RSA *tmp = RSA_new();
+    tmp = RSA_new();
     if (tmp == NULL) {
-      return 0;
+      goto out;
     }
+
     if (rsa_generate_key_impl(tmp, bits, e_value, cb)) {
-      replace_bignum(&rsa->n, &tmp->n);
-      replace_bignum(&rsa->e, &tmp->e);
-      replace_bignum(&rsa->d, &tmp->d);
-      replace_bignum(&rsa->p, &tmp->p);
-      replace_bignum(&rsa->q, &tmp->q);
-      replace_bignum(&rsa->dmp1, &tmp->dmp1);
-      replace_bignum(&rsa->dmq1, &tmp->dmq1);
-      replace_bignum(&rsa->iqmp, &tmp->iqmp);
-      replace_bn_mont_ctx(&rsa->mont_n, &tmp->mont_n);
-      replace_bn_mont_ctx(&rsa->mont_p, &tmp->mont_p);
-      replace_bn_mont_ctx(&rsa->mont_q, &tmp->mont_q);
-      replace_bignum(&rsa->d_fixed, &tmp->d_fixed);
-      replace_bignum(&rsa->dmp1_fixed, &tmp->dmp1_fixed);
-      replace_bignum(&rsa->dmq1_fixed, &tmp->dmq1_fixed);
-      replace_bignum(&rsa->inv_small_mod_large_mont,
-                     &tmp->inv_small_mod_large_mont);
-      rsa->private_key_frozen = tmp->private_key_frozen;
-      RSA_free(tmp);
-      return 1;
+      break;
     }
-    uint32_t err = ERR_peek_error();
+
+    err = ERR_peek_error();
     RSA_free(tmp);
     tmp = NULL;
+    failures++;
+
     // Only retry on |RSA_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS|. This is so a caller-induced
     // failure in |BN_GENCB_call| is still fatal.
-    if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) != ERR_LIB_RSA ||
-        ERR_GET_REASON(err) != RSA_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS) {
-      return 0;
-    }
+  } while (failures < 4 && ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_RSA &&
+           ERR_GET_REASON(err) == RSA_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS);
+
+  if (tmp == NULL || (check_fips && !RSA_check_fips(tmp))) {
+    goto out;
   }
 
-  return 0;
+  replace_bignum(&rsa->n, &tmp->n);
+  replace_bignum(&rsa->e, &tmp->e);
+  replace_bignum(&rsa->d, &tmp->d);
+  replace_bignum(&rsa->p, &tmp->p);
+  replace_bignum(&rsa->q, &tmp->q);
+  replace_bignum(&rsa->dmp1, &tmp->dmp1);
+  replace_bignum(&rsa->dmq1, &tmp->dmq1);
+  replace_bignum(&rsa->iqmp, &tmp->iqmp);
+  replace_bn_mont_ctx(&rsa->mont_n, &tmp->mont_n);
+  replace_bn_mont_ctx(&rsa->mont_p, &tmp->mont_p);
+  replace_bn_mont_ctx(&rsa->mont_q, &tmp->mont_q);
+  replace_bignum(&rsa->d_fixed, &tmp->d_fixed);
+  replace_bignum(&rsa->dmp1_fixed, &tmp->dmp1_fixed);
+  replace_bignum(&rsa->dmq1_fixed, &tmp->dmq1_fixed);
+  replace_bignum(&rsa->inv_small_mod_large_mont,
+                 &tmp->inv_small_mod_large_mont);
+  rsa->private_key_frozen = tmp->private_key_frozen;
+  ret = 1;
+
+out:
+  RSA_free(tmp);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, const BIGNUM *e_value,
+                        BN_GENCB *cb) {
+  return RSA_generate_key_ex_maybe_fips(rsa, bits, e_value, cb,
+                                        /*check_fips=*/0);
 }
 
 int RSA_generate_key_fips(RSA *rsa, int bits, BN_GENCB *cb) {
@@ -1377,8 +1397,7 @@ int RSA_generate_key_fips(RSA *rsa, int bits, BN_GENCB *cb) {
   BIGNUM *e = BN_new();
   int ret = e != NULL &&
             BN_set_word(e, RSA_F4) &&
-            RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa, bits, e, cb) &&
-            RSA_check_fips(rsa);
+            RSA_generate_key_ex_maybe_fips(rsa, bits, e, cb, /*check_fips=*/1);
   BN_free(e);
   return ret;
 }