grpc 1.30.2

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/t1_enc.cc

@@ -0,0 +1,365 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE. */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <utility>
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/nid.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#include "../crypto/fipsmodule/tls/internal.h"
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+bool tls1_prf(const EVP_MD *digest, Span<uint8_t> out,
+              Span<const uint8_t> secret, Span<const char> label,
+              Span<const uint8_t> seed1, Span<const uint8_t> seed2) {
+  return 1 == CRYPTO_tls1_prf(digest, out.data(), out.size(), secret.data(),
+                              secret.size(), label.data(), label.size(),
+                              seed1.data(), seed1.size(), seed2.data(),
+                              seed2.size());
+}
+
+static bool get_key_block_lengths(const SSL *ssl, size_t *out_mac_secret_len,
+                                  size_t *out_key_len, size_t *out_iv_len,
+                                  const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  const EVP_AEAD *aead = NULL;
+  if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(&aead, out_mac_secret_len, out_iv_len, cipher,
+                               ssl_protocol_version(ssl), SSL_is_dtls(ssl))) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  *out_key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead);
+  if (*out_mac_secret_len > 0) {
+    // For "stateful" AEADs (i.e. compatibility with pre-AEAD cipher suites) the
+    // key length reported by |EVP_AEAD_key_length| will include the MAC key
+    // bytes and initial implicit IV.
+    if (*out_key_len < *out_mac_secret_len + *out_iv_len) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return false;
+    }
+    *out_key_len -= *out_mac_secret_len + *out_iv_len;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+int tls1_configure_aead(SSL *ssl, evp_aead_direction_t direction,
+                        Array<uint8_t> *key_block_cache,
+                        const SSL_CIPHER *cipher,
+                        Span<const uint8_t> iv_override) {
+  size_t mac_secret_len, key_len, iv_len;
+  if (!get_key_block_lengths(ssl, &mac_secret_len, &key_len, &iv_len, cipher)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Ensure that |key_block_cache| is set up.
+  const size_t key_block_size = 2 * (mac_secret_len + key_len + iv_len);
+  if (key_block_cache->empty()) {
+    if (!key_block_cache->Init(key_block_size) ||
+        !SSL_generate_key_block(ssl, key_block_cache->data(), key_block_size)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+  assert(key_block_cache->size() == key_block_size);
+
+  Span<const uint8_t> key_block = *key_block_cache;
+  Span<const uint8_t> mac_secret, key, iv;
+  if (direction == (ssl->server ? evp_aead_open : evp_aead_seal)) {
+    // Use the client write (server read) keys.
+    mac_secret = key_block.subspan(0, mac_secret_len);
+    key = key_block.subspan(2 * mac_secret_len, key_len);
+    iv = key_block.subspan(2 * mac_secret_len + 2 * key_len, iv_len);
+  } else {
+    // Use the server write (client read) keys.
+    mac_secret = key_block.subspan(mac_secret_len, mac_secret_len);
+    key = key_block.subspan(2 * mac_secret_len + key_len, key_len);
+    iv = key_block.subspan(2 * mac_secret_len + 2 * key_len + iv_len, iv_len);
+  }
+
+  if (!iv_override.empty()) {
+    if (iv_override.size() != iv_len) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    iv = iv_override;
+  }
+
+  UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> aead_ctx = SSLAEADContext::Create(
+      direction, ssl->version, SSL_is_dtls(ssl), cipher, key, mac_secret, iv);
+  if (!aead_ctx) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (direction == evp_aead_open) {
+    return ssl->method->set_read_state(ssl, ssl_encryption_application,
+                                       std::move(aead_ctx),
+                                       /*secret_for_quic=*/{});
+  }
+
+  return ssl->method->set_write_state(ssl, ssl_encryption_application,
+                                      std::move(aead_ctx),
+                                      /*secret_for_quic=*/{});
+}
+
+int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                             evp_aead_direction_t direction) {
+  return tls1_configure_aead(hs->ssl, direction, &hs->key_block,
+                             hs->new_cipher, {});
+}
+
+int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out,
+                                Span<const uint8_t> premaster) {
+  static const char kMasterSecretLabel[] = "master secret";
+  static const char kExtendedMasterSecretLabel[] = "extended master secret";
+
+  const SSL *ssl = hs->ssl;
+  auto out_span = MakeSpan(out, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
+  if (hs->extended_master_secret) {
+    auto label = MakeConstSpan(kExtendedMasterSecretLabel,
+                               sizeof(kExtendedMasterSecretLabel) - 1);
+    uint8_t digests[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    size_t digests_len;
+    if (!hs->transcript.GetHash(digests, &digests_len) ||
+        !tls1_prf(hs->transcript.Digest(), out_span, premaster, label,
+                  MakeConstSpan(digests, digests_len), {})) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  } else {
+    auto label =
+        MakeConstSpan(kMasterSecretLabel, sizeof(kMasterSecretLabel) - 1);
+    if (!tls1_prf(hs->transcript.Digest(), out_span, premaster, label,
+                  ssl->s3->client_random, ssl->s3->server_random)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE;
+}
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
+
+using namespace bssl;
+
+size_t SSL_get_key_block_len(const SSL *ssl) {
+  size_t mac_secret_len, key_len, fixed_iv_len;
+  if (!get_key_block_lengths(ssl, &mac_secret_len, &key_len, &fixed_iv_len,
+                             SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl))) {
+    ERR_clear_error();
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 2 * (mac_secret_len + key_len + fixed_iv_len);
+}
+
+int SSL_generate_key_block(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len) {
+  const SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
+  auto out_span = MakeSpan(out, out_len);
+  auto master_key =
+      MakeConstSpan(session->master_key, session->master_key_length);
+  static const char kLabel[] = "key expansion";
+  auto label = MakeConstSpan(kLabel, sizeof(kLabel) - 1);
+
+  const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_session_get_digest(session);
+  return tls1_prf(digest, out_span, master_key, label, ssl->s3->server_random,
+                  ssl->s3->client_random);
+}
+
+int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
+                               const char *label, size_t label_len,
+                               const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len,
+                               int use_context) {
+  // Exporters may be used in False Start and server 0-RTT, where the handshake
+  // has progressed enough. Otherwise, they may not be used during a handshake.
+  if (SSL_in_init(ssl) &&
+      !SSL_in_false_start(ssl) &&
+      !(SSL_is_server(ssl) && SSL_in_early_data(ssl))) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HANDSHAKE_NOT_COMPLETE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    if (!use_context) {
+      context = nullptr;
+      context_len = 0;
+    }
+    return tls13_export_keying_material(
+        ssl, MakeSpan(out, out_len),
+        MakeConstSpan(ssl->s3->exporter_secret, ssl->s3->exporter_secret_len),
+        MakeConstSpan(label, label_len), MakeConstSpan(context, context_len));
+  }
+
+  size_t seed_len = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+  if (use_context) {
+    if (context_len >= 1u << 16) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+      return 0;
+    }
+    seed_len += 2 + context_len;
+  }
+  Array<uint8_t> seed;
+  if (!seed.Init(seed_len)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(seed.data(), ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(seed.data() + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, ssl->s3->server_random,
+                 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+  if (use_context) {
+    seed[2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE] = static_cast<uint8_t>(context_len >> 8);
+    seed[2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1] = static_cast<uint8_t>(context_len);
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(seed.data() + 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 2, context, context_len);
+  }
+
+  const SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
+  const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_session_get_digest(session);
+  return tls1_prf(
+      digest, MakeSpan(out, out_len),
+      MakeConstSpan(session->master_key, session->master_key_length),
+      MakeConstSpan(label, label_len), seed, {});
+}

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/t1_lib.cc

@@ -0,0 +1,3870 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <utility>
+
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/chacha.h>
+#include <openssl/digest.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/nid.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+static bool ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+static int compare_uint16_t(const void *p1, const void *p2) {
+  uint16_t u1 = *((const uint16_t *)p1);
+  uint16_t u2 = *((const uint16_t *)p2);
+  if (u1 < u2) {
+    return -1;
+  } else if (u1 > u2) {
+    return 1;
+  } else {
+    return 0;
+  }
+}
+
+// Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
+// more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
+// This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
+// out.
+static bool tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const CBS *cbs) {
+  // First pass: count the extensions.
+  size_t num_extensions = 0;
+  CBS extensions = *cbs;
+  while (CBS_len(&extensions) > 0) {
+    uint16_t type;
+    CBS extension;
+
+    if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
+        !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    num_extensions++;
+  }
+
+  if (num_extensions == 0) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  Array<uint16_t> extension_types;
+  if (!extension_types.Init(num_extensions)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Second pass: gather the extension types.
+  extensions = *cbs;
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < extension_types.size(); i++) {
+    CBS extension;
+
+    if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
+        !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) {
+      // This should not happen.
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+  assert(CBS_len(&extensions) == 0);
+
+  // Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates.
+  qsort(extension_types.data(), extension_types.size(), sizeof(uint16_t),
+        compare_uint16_t);
+  for (size_t i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
+    if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i]) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool is_post_quantum_group(uint16_t id) {
+  return id == SSL_CURVE_CECPQ2;
+}
+
+bool ssl_client_hello_init(const SSL *ssl, SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *out,
+                           const SSLMessage &msg) {
+  OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, sizeof(*out));
+  out->ssl = const_cast<SSL *>(ssl);
+  out->client_hello = CBS_data(&msg.body);
+  out->client_hello_len = CBS_len(&msg.body);
+
+  CBS client_hello, random, session_id;
+  CBS_init(&client_hello, out->client_hello, out->client_hello_len);
+  if (!CBS_get_u16(&client_hello, &out->version) ||
+      !CBS_get_bytes(&client_hello, &random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+      !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &session_id) ||
+      CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  out->random = CBS_data(&random);
+  out->random_len = CBS_len(&random);
+  out->session_id = CBS_data(&session_id);
+  out->session_id_len = CBS_len(&session_id);
+
+  // Skip past DTLS cookie
+  if (SSL_is_dtls(out->ssl)) {
+    CBS cookie;
+    if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cookie) ||
+        CBS_len(&cookie) > DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  CBS cipher_suites, compression_methods;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cipher_suites) ||
+      CBS_len(&cipher_suites) < 2 || (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) & 1) != 0 ||
+      !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &compression_methods) ||
+      CBS_len(&compression_methods) < 1) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  out->cipher_suites = CBS_data(&cipher_suites);
+  out->cipher_suites_len = CBS_len(&cipher_suites);
+  out->compression_methods = CBS_data(&compression_methods);
+  out->compression_methods_len = CBS_len(&compression_methods);
+
+  // If the ClientHello ends here then it's valid, but doesn't have any
+  // extensions.
+  if (CBS_len(&client_hello) == 0) {
+    out->extensions = NULL;
+    out->extensions_len = 0;
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // Extract extensions and check it is valid.
+  CBS extensions;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &extensions) ||
+      !tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions) ||
+      CBS_len(&client_hello) != 0) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  out->extensions = CBS_data(&extensions);
+  out->extensions_len = CBS_len(&extensions);
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool ssl_client_hello_get_extension(const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello,
+                                    CBS *out, uint16_t extension_type) {
+  CBS extensions;
+  CBS_init(&extensions, client_hello->extensions, client_hello->extensions_len);
+  while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0) {
+    // Decode the next extension.
+    uint16_t type;
+    CBS extension;
+    if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
+        !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    if (type == extension_type) {
+      *out = extension;
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+static const uint16_t kDefaultGroups[] = {
+    SSL_CURVE_X25519,
+    SSL_CURVE_SECP256R1,
+    SSL_CURVE_SECP384R1,
+};
+
+Span<const uint16_t> tls1_get_grouplist(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  if (!hs->config->supported_group_list.empty()) {
+    return hs->config->supported_group_list;
+  }
+  return Span<const uint16_t>(kDefaultGroups);
+}
+
+bool tls1_get_shared_group(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint16_t *out_group_id) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  assert(ssl->server);
+
+  // Clients are not required to send a supported_groups extension. In this
+  // case, the server is free to pick any group it likes. See RFC 4492,
+  // section 4, paragraph 3.
+  //
+  // However, in the interests of compatibility, we will skip ECDH if the
+  // client didn't send an extension because we can't be sure that they'll
+  // support our favoured group. Thus we do not special-case an emtpy
+  // |peer_supported_group_list|.
+
+  Span<const uint16_t> groups = tls1_get_grouplist(hs);
+  Span<const uint16_t> pref, supp;
+  if (ssl->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
+    pref = groups;
+    supp = hs->peer_supported_group_list;
+  } else {
+    pref = hs->peer_supported_group_list;
+    supp = groups;
+  }
+
+  for (uint16_t pref_group : pref) {
+    for (uint16_t supp_group : supp) {
+      if (pref_group == supp_group &&
+          // CECPQ2(b) doesn't fit in the u8-length-prefixed ECPoint field in
+          // TLS 1.2 and below.
+          (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION ||
+           !is_post_quantum_group(pref_group))) {
+        *out_group_id = pref_group;
+        return true;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+bool tls1_set_curves(Array<uint16_t> *out_group_ids, Span<const int> curves) {
+  Array<uint16_t> group_ids;
+  if (!group_ids.Init(curves.size())) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < curves.size(); i++) {
+    if (!ssl_nid_to_group_id(&group_ids[i], curves[i])) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  *out_group_ids = std::move(group_ids);
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool tls1_set_curves_list(Array<uint16_t> *out_group_ids, const char *curves) {
+  // Count the number of curves in the list.
+  size_t count = 0;
+  const char *ptr = curves, *col;
+  do {
+    col = strchr(ptr, ':');
+    count++;
+    if (col) {
+      ptr = col + 1;
+    }
+  } while (col);
+
+  Array<uint16_t> group_ids;
+  if (!group_ids.Init(count)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  size_t i = 0;
+  ptr = curves;
+  do {
+    col = strchr(ptr, ':');
+    if (!ssl_name_to_group_id(&group_ids[i++], ptr,
+                              col ? (size_t)(col - ptr) : strlen(ptr))) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    if (col) {
+      ptr = col + 1;
+    }
+  } while (col);
+
+  assert(i == count);
+  *out_group_ids = std::move(group_ids);
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool tls1_check_group_id(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint16_t group_id) {
+  if (is_post_quantum_group(group_id) &&
+      ssl_protocol_version(hs->ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    // CECPQ2(b) requires TLS 1.3.
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  for (uint16_t supported : tls1_get_grouplist(hs)) {
+    if (supported == group_id) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+// kVerifySignatureAlgorithms is the default list of accepted signature
+// algorithms for verifying.
+static const uint16_t kVerifySignatureAlgorithms[] = {
+    // List our preferred algorithms first.
+    SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256,
+    SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256,
+    SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256,
+
+    // Larger hashes are acceptable.
+    SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384,
+    SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384,
+    SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384,
+
+    SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512,
+    SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512,
+
+    // For now, SHA-1 is still accepted but least preferable.
+    SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1,
+};
+
+// kSignSignatureAlgorithms is the default list of supported signature
+// algorithms for signing.
+static const uint16_t kSignSignatureAlgorithms[] = {
+    // List our preferred algorithms first.
+    SSL_SIGN_ED25519,
+    SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256,
+    SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256,
+    SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256,
+
+    // If needed, sign larger hashes.
+    //
+    // TODO(davidben): Determine which of these may be pruned.
+    SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384,
+    SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384,
+    SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384,
+
+    SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512,
+    SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512,
+    SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512,
+
+    // If the peer supports nothing else, sign with SHA-1.
+    SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1,
+    SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1,
+};
+
+static Span<const uint16_t> tls12_get_verify_sigalgs(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  if (hs->config->verify_sigalgs.empty()) {
+    return Span<const uint16_t>(kVerifySignatureAlgorithms);
+  }
+  return hs->config->verify_sigalgs;
+}
+
+bool tls12_add_verify_sigalgs(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  for (uint16_t sigalg : tls12_get_verify_sigalgs(hs)) {
+    if (!CBB_add_u16(out, sigalg)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                             uint16_t sigalg) {
+  for (uint16_t verify_sigalg : tls12_get_verify_sigalgs(hs)) {
+    if (verify_sigalg == sigalg) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+  *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+  return false;
+}
+
+// tls_extension represents a TLS extension that is handled internally. The
+// |init| function is called for each handshake, before any other functions of
+// the extension. Then the add and parse callbacks are called as needed.
+//
+// The parse callbacks receive a |CBS| that contains the contents of the
+// extension (i.e. not including the type and length bytes). If an extension is
+// not received then the parse callbacks will be called with a NULL CBS so that
+// they can do any processing needed to handle the absence of an extension.
+//
+// The add callbacks receive a |CBB| to which the extension can be appended but
+// the function is responsible for appending the type and length bytes too.
+//
+// All callbacks return true for success and false for error. If a parse
+// function returns zero then a fatal alert with value |*out_alert| will be
+// sent. If |*out_alert| isn't set, then a |decode_error| alert will be sent.
+struct tls_extension {
+  uint16_t value;
+  void (*init)(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+  bool (*add_clienthello)(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out);
+  bool (*parse_serverhello)(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                            CBS *contents);
+
+  bool (*parse_clienthello)(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                            CBS *contents);
+  bool (*add_serverhello)(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out);
+};
+
+static bool forbid_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                    CBS *contents) {
+  if (contents != NULL) {
+    // Servers MUST NOT send this extension.
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ignore_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                    CBS *contents) {
+  // This extension from the client is handled elsewhere.
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool dont_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  return true;
+}
+
+// Server name indication (SNI).
+//
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6066#section-3.
+
+static bool ext_sni_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (ssl->hostname == nullptr) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  CBB contents, server_name_list, name;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &server_name_list) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8(&server_name_list, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&server_name_list, &name) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&name, (const uint8_t *)ssl->hostname.get(),
+                     strlen(ssl->hostname.get())) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ext_sni_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                      CBS *contents) {
+  // The server may acknowledge SNI with an empty extension. We check the syntax
+  // but otherwise ignore this signal.
+  return contents == NULL || CBS_len(contents) == 0;
+}
+
+static bool ext_sni_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                      CBS *contents) {
+  // SNI has already been parsed earlier in the handshake. See |extract_sni|.
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ext_sni_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  if (hs->ssl->s3->session_reused ||
+      !hs->should_ack_sni) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+
+// Renegotiation indication.
+//
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5746
+
+static bool ext_ri_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  // Renegotiation indication is not necessary in TLS 1.3.
+  if (hs->min_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  assert(ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete ==
+         (ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len != 0));
+
+  CBB contents, prev_finished;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&contents, &prev_finished) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&prev_finished, ssl->s3->previous_client_finished,
+                     ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ext_ri_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                     CBS *contents) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (contents != NULL && ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Servers may not switch between omitting the extension and supporting it.
+  // See RFC 5746, sections 3.5 and 4.2.
+  if (ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete &&
+      (contents != NULL) != ssl->s3->send_connection_binding) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (contents == NULL) {
+    // Strictly speaking, if we want to avoid an attack we should *always* see
+    // RI even on initial ServerHello because the client doesn't see any
+    // renegotiation during an attack. However this would mean we could not
+    // connect to any server which doesn't support RI.
+    //
+    // OpenSSL has |SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT| to control this, but in
+    // practical terms every client sets it so it's just assumed here.
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  const size_t expected_len = ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len +
+                              ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len;
+
+  // Check for logic errors
+  assert(!expected_len || ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len);
+  assert(!expected_len || ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len);
+  assert(ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete ==
+         (ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len != 0));
+  assert(ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete ==
+         (ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len != 0));
+
+  // Parse out the extension contents.
+  CBS renegotiated_connection;
+  if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &renegotiated_connection) ||
+      CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Check that the extension matches.
+  if (CBS_len(&renegotiated_connection) != expected_len) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  const uint8_t *d = CBS_data(&renegotiated_connection);
+  bool ok = CRYPTO_memcmp(d, ssl->s3->previous_client_finished,
+                          ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len) == 0;
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
+  ok = true;
+#endif
+  if (!ok) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+    return false;
+  }
+  d += ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len;
+
+  ok = CRYPTO_memcmp(d, ssl->s3->previous_server_finished,
+                     ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len) == 0;
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
+  ok = true;
+#endif
+  if (!ok) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+    return false;
+  }
+  ssl->s3->send_connection_binding = true;
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ext_ri_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                     CBS *contents) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  // Renegotiation isn't supported as a server so this function should never be
+  // called after the initial handshake.
+  assert(!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete);
+
+  if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (contents == NULL) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  CBS renegotiated_connection;
+  if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &renegotiated_connection) ||
+      CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Check that the extension matches. We do not support renegotiation as a
+  // server, so this must be empty.
+  if (CBS_len(&renegotiated_connection) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  ssl->s3->send_connection_binding = true;
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ext_ri_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  // Renegotiation isn't supported as a server so this function should never be
+  // called after the initial handshake.
+  assert(!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete);
+
+  if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(out, 1 /* length */) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8(out, 0 /* empty renegotiation info */)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+
+// Extended Master Secret.
+//
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7627
+
+static bool ext_ems_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  // Extended master secret is not necessary in TLS 1.3.
+  if (hs->min_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ext_ems_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                      CBS *contents) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
+  if (contents != NULL) {
+    if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION ||
+        CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    hs->extended_master_secret = true;
+  }
+
+  // Whether EMS is negotiated may not change on renegotiation.
+  if (ssl->s3->established_session != nullptr &&
+      hs->extended_master_secret !=
+          !!ssl->s3->established_session->extended_master_secret) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_EMS_MISMATCH);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ext_ems_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                      CBS *contents) {
+  if (ssl_protocol_version(hs->ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (contents == NULL) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  hs->extended_master_secret = true;
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ext_ems_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  if (!hs->extended_master_secret) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+
+// Session tickets.
+//
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5077
+
+static bool ext_ticket_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  // TLS 1.3 uses a different ticket extension.
+  if (hs->min_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION ||
+      SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  Span<const uint8_t> ticket;
+
+  // Renegotiation does not participate in session resumption. However, still
+  // advertise the extension to avoid potentially breaking servers which carry
+  // over the state from the previous handshake, such as OpenSSL servers
+  // without upstream's 3c3f0259238594d77264a78944d409f2127642c4.
+  if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete &&
+      ssl->session != nullptr &&
+      !ssl->session->ticket.empty() &&
+      // Don't send TLS 1.3 session tickets in the ticket extension.
+      ssl_session_protocol_version(ssl->session.get()) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    ticket = ssl->session->ticket;
+  }
+
+  CBB ticket_cbb;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &ticket_cbb) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&ticket_cbb, ticket.data(), ticket.size()) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ext_ticket_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                         CBS *contents) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (contents == NULL) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // If |SSL_OP_NO_TICKET| is set then no extension will have been sent and
+  // this function should never be called, even if the server tries to send the
+  // extension.
+  assert((SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) == 0);
+
+  if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  hs->ticket_expected = true;
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ext_ticket_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  if (!hs->ticket_expected) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // If |SSL_OP_NO_TICKET| is set, |ticket_expected| should never be true.
+  assert((SSL_get_options(hs->ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) == 0);
+
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+
+// Signature Algorithms.
+//
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1
+
+static bool ext_sigalgs_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  if (hs->max_version < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  CBB contents, sigalgs_cbb;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &sigalgs_cbb) ||
+      !tls12_add_verify_sigalgs(hs, &sigalgs_cbb) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ext_sigalgs_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                          CBS *contents) {
+  hs->peer_sigalgs.Reset();
+  if (contents == NULL) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  CBS supported_signature_algorithms;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &supported_signature_algorithms) ||
+      CBS_len(contents) != 0 ||
+      !tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(hs, &supported_signature_algorithms)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+
+// OCSP Stapling.
+//
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6066#section-8
+
+static bool ext_ocsp_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  if (!hs->config->ocsp_stapling_enabled) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  CBB contents;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8(&contents, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(&contents, 0 /* empty responder ID list */) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(&contents, 0 /* empty request extensions */) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ext_ocsp_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                       CBS *contents) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (contents == NULL) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // TLS 1.3 OCSP responses are included in the Certificate extensions.
+  if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // OCSP stapling is forbidden on non-certificate ciphers.
+  if (CBS_len(contents) != 0 ||
+      !ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Note this does not check for resumption in TLS 1.2. Sending
+  // status_request here does not make sense, but OpenSSL does so and the
+  // specification does not say anything. Tolerate it but ignore it.
+
+  hs->certificate_status_expected = true;
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ext_ocsp_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                       CBS *contents) {
+  if (contents == NULL) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t status_type;
+  if (!CBS_get_u8(contents, &status_type)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // We cannot decide whether OCSP stapling will occur yet because the correct
+  // SSL_CTX might not have been selected.
+  hs->ocsp_stapling_requested = status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ext_ocsp_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION ||
+      !hs->ocsp_stapling_requested || hs->config->cert->ocsp_response == NULL ||
+      ssl->s3->session_reused ||
+      !ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  hs->certificate_status_expected = true;
+
+  return CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) &&
+         CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */);
+}
+
+
+// Next protocol negotiation.
+//
+// https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/agl/technotes/blob/master/nextprotoneg.html
+
+static bool ext_npn_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete ||
+      ssl->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL ||
+      SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ext_npn_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                      CBS *contents) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (contents == NULL) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // If any of these are false then we should never have sent the NPN
+  // extension in the ClientHello and thus this function should never have been
+  // called.
+  assert(!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete);
+  assert(!SSL_is_dtls(ssl));
+  assert(ssl->ctx->next_proto_select_cb != NULL);
+
+  if (!ssl->s3->alpn_selected.empty()) {
+    // NPN and ALPN may not be negotiated in the same connection.
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NEGOTIATED_BOTH_NPN_AND_ALPN);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  const uint8_t *const orig_contents = CBS_data(contents);
+  const size_t orig_len = CBS_len(contents);
+
+  while (CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    CBS proto;
+    if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &proto) ||
+        CBS_len(&proto) == 0) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  uint8_t *selected;
+  uint8_t selected_len;
+  if (ssl->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(
+          ssl, &selected, &selected_len, orig_contents, orig_len,
+          ssl->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK ||
+      !ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated.CopyFrom(
+          MakeConstSpan(selected, selected_len))) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  hs->next_proto_neg_seen = true;
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ext_npn_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                      CBS *contents) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (contents != NULL && CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (contents == NULL ||
+      ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete ||
+      ssl->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb == NULL ||
+      SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  hs->next_proto_neg_seen = true;
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ext_npn_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  // |next_proto_neg_seen| might have been cleared when an ALPN extension was
+  // parsed.
+  if (!hs->next_proto_neg_seen) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  const uint8_t *npa;
+  unsigned npa_len;
+
+  if (ssl->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(
+          ssl, &npa, &npa_len, ssl->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg) !=
+      SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
+    hs->next_proto_neg_seen = false;
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  CBB contents;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&contents, npa, npa_len) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+
+// Signed certificate timestamps.
+//
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#section-3.3.1
+
+static bool ext_sct_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  if (!hs->config->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ext_sct_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                      CBS *contents) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (contents == NULL) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // TLS 1.3 SCTs are included in the Certificate extensions.
+  if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // If this is false then we should never have sent the SCT extension in the
+  // ClientHello and thus this function should never have been called.
+  assert(hs->config->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled);
+
+  if (!ssl_is_sct_list_valid(contents)) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Session resumption uses the original session information. The extension
+  // should not be sent on resumption, but RFC 6962 did not make it a
+  // requirement, so tolerate this.
+  //
+  // TODO(davidben): Enforce this anyway.
+  if (!ssl->s3->session_reused) {
+    hs->new_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list.reset(
+        CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_from_CBS(contents, ssl->ctx->pool));
+    if (hs->new_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list == nullptr) {
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ext_sct_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                      CBS *contents) {
+  if (contents == NULL) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  hs->scts_requested = true;
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ext_sct_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  // The extension shouldn't be sent when resuming sessions.
+  if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION || ssl->s3->session_reused ||
+      hs->config->cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list == NULL) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  CBB contents;
+  return CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp) &&
+         CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) &&
+         CBB_add_bytes(
+             &contents,
+             CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(
+                 hs->config->cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list.get()),
+             CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(
+                 hs->config->cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list.get())) &&
+         CBB_flush(out);
+}
+
+
+// Application-level Protocol Negotiation.
+//
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7301
+
+static bool ext_alpn_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (hs->config->alpn_client_proto_list.empty() ||
+      ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  CBB contents, proto_list;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &proto_list) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&proto_list, hs->config->alpn_client_proto_list.data(),
+                     hs->config->alpn_client_proto_list.size()) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ext_alpn_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                       CBS *contents) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (contents == NULL) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  assert(!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete);
+  assert(!hs->config->alpn_client_proto_list.empty());
+
+  if (hs->next_proto_neg_seen) {
+    // NPN and ALPN may not be negotiated in the same connection.
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NEGOTIATED_BOTH_NPN_AND_ALPN);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // The extension data consists of a ProtocolNameList which must have
+  // exactly one ProtocolName. Each of these is length-prefixed.
+  CBS protocol_name_list, protocol_name;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &protocol_name_list) ||
+      CBS_len(contents) != 0 ||
+      !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&protocol_name_list, &protocol_name) ||
+      // Empty protocol names are forbidden.
+      CBS_len(&protocol_name) == 0 ||
+      CBS_len(&protocol_name_list) != 0) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl_is_alpn_protocol_allowed(hs, protocol_name)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_ALPN_PROTOCOL);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl->s3->alpn_selected.CopyFrom(protocol_name)) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool ssl_is_alpn_protocol_allowed(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                  Span<const uint8_t> protocol) {
+  if (hs->config->alpn_client_proto_list.empty()) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (hs->ssl->ctx->allow_unknown_alpn_protos) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // Check that the protocol name is one of the ones we advertised.
+  CBS client_protocol_name_list =
+          MakeConstSpan(hs->config->alpn_client_proto_list),
+      client_protocol_name;
+  while (CBS_len(&client_protocol_name_list) > 0) {
+    if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_protocol_name_list,
+                                    &client_protocol_name)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    if (client_protocol_name == protocol) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+bool ssl_negotiate_alpn(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                        const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  CBS contents;
+  if (ssl->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL ||
+      !ssl_client_hello_get_extension(
+          client_hello, &contents,
+          TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)) {
+    // Ignore ALPN if not configured or no extension was supplied.
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // ALPN takes precedence over NPN.
+  hs->next_proto_neg_seen = false;
+
+  CBS protocol_name_list;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &protocol_name_list) ||
+      CBS_len(&contents) != 0 ||
+      CBS_len(&protocol_name_list) < 2) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Validate the protocol list.
+  CBS protocol_name_list_copy = protocol_name_list;
+  while (CBS_len(&protocol_name_list_copy) > 0) {
+    CBS protocol_name;
+
+    if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&protocol_name_list_copy, &protocol_name) ||
+        // Empty protocol names are forbidden.
+        CBS_len(&protocol_name) == 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  const uint8_t *selected;
+  uint8_t selected_len;
+  if (ssl->ctx->alpn_select_cb(
+          ssl, &selected, &selected_len, CBS_data(&protocol_name_list),
+          CBS_len(&protocol_name_list),
+          ssl->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg) == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
+    if (selected_len == 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_ALPN_PROTOCOL);
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+      return false;
+    }
+    if (!ssl->s3->alpn_selected.CopyFrom(
+            MakeConstSpan(selected, selected_len))) {
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ext_alpn_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (ssl->s3->alpn_selected.empty()) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  CBB contents, proto_list, proto;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &proto_list) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&proto_list, &proto) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&proto, ssl->s3->alpn_selected.data(),
+                     ssl->s3->alpn_selected.size()) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+
+// Channel ID.
+//
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-balfanz-tls-channelid-01
+
+static void ext_channel_id_init(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  hs->ssl->s3->channel_id_valid = false;
+}
+
+static bool ext_channel_id_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (!hs->config->channel_id_enabled || SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ext_channel_id_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                             uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                             CBS *contents) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (contents == NULL) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  assert(!SSL_is_dtls(ssl));
+  assert(hs->config->channel_id_enabled);
+
+  if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  ssl->s3->channel_id_valid = true;
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ext_channel_id_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                             uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                             CBS *contents) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (contents == NULL || !hs->config->channel_id_enabled || SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  ssl->s3->channel_id_valid = true;
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ext_channel_id_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (!ssl->s3->channel_id_valid) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+
+// Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) extension.
+//
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5764
+
+
+static void ext_srtp_init(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  hs->ssl->s3->srtp_profile = NULL;
+}
+
+static bool ext_srtp_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *profiles = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(ssl);
+  if (profiles == NULL ||
+      sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(profiles) == 0) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  CBB contents, profile_ids;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_srtp) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &profile_ids)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  for (const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *profile : profiles) {
+    if (!CBB_add_u16(&profile_ids, profile->id)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!CBB_add_u8(&contents, 0 /* empty use_mki value */) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ext_srtp_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                       CBS *contents) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (contents == NULL) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // The extension consists of a u16-prefixed profile ID list containing a
+  // single uint16_t profile ID, then followed by a u8-prefixed srtp_mki field.
+  //
+  // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5764#section-4.1.1
+  CBS profile_ids, srtp_mki;
+  uint16_t profile_id;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &profile_ids) ||
+      !CBS_get_u16(&profile_ids, &profile_id) ||
+      CBS_len(&profile_ids) != 0 ||
+      !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &srtp_mki) ||
+      CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (CBS_len(&srtp_mki) != 0) {
+    // Must be no MKI, since we never offer one.
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *profiles = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(ssl);
+
+  // Check to see if the server gave us something we support (and presumably
+  // offered).
+  for (const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *profile : profiles) {
+    if (profile->id == profile_id) {
+      ssl->s3->srtp_profile = profile;
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
+  *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+  return false;
+}
+
+static bool ext_srtp_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                       CBS *contents) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (contents == NULL) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  CBS profile_ids, srtp_mki;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &profile_ids) ||
+      CBS_len(&profile_ids) < 2 ||
+      !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &srtp_mki) ||
+      CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
+    return false;
+  }
+  // Discard the MKI value for now.
+
+  const STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *server_profiles =
+      SSL_get_srtp_profiles(ssl);
+
+  // Pick the server's most preferred profile.
+  for (const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *server_profile : server_profiles) {
+    CBS profile_ids_tmp;
+    CBS_init(&profile_ids_tmp, CBS_data(&profile_ids), CBS_len(&profile_ids));
+
+    while (CBS_len(&profile_ids_tmp) > 0) {
+      uint16_t profile_id;
+      if (!CBS_get_u16(&profile_ids_tmp, &profile_id)) {
+        return false;
+      }
+
+      if (server_profile->id == profile_id) {
+        ssl->s3->srtp_profile = server_profile;
+        return true;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ext_srtp_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (ssl->s3->srtp_profile == NULL) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  CBB contents, profile_ids;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_srtp) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &profile_ids) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(&profile_ids, ssl->s3->srtp_profile->id) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8(&contents, 0 /* empty MKI */) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+
+// EC point formats.
+//
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.1.2
+
+static bool ext_ec_point_add_extension(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  CBB contents, formats;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&contents, &formats) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8(&formats, TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ext_ec_point_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  // The point format extension is unnecessary in TLS 1.3.
+  if (hs->min_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  return ext_ec_point_add_extension(hs, out);
+}
+
+static bool ext_ec_point_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                           CBS *contents) {
+  if (contents == NULL) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl_protocol_version(hs->ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  CBS ec_point_format_list;
+  if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &ec_point_format_list) ||
+      CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Per RFC 4492, section 5.1.2, implementations MUST support the uncompressed
+  // point format.
+  if (OPENSSL_memchr(CBS_data(&ec_point_format_list),
+                     TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
+                     CBS_len(&ec_point_format_list)) == NULL) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ext_ec_point_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                          CBS *contents) {
+  if (ssl_protocol_version(hs->ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  return ext_ec_point_parse_serverhello(hs, out_alert, contents);
+}
+
+static bool ext_ec_point_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  const uint32_t alg_k = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+  const uint32_t alg_a = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+  const bool using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
+
+  if (!using_ecc) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  return ext_ec_point_add_extension(hs, out);
+}
+
+
+// Pre Shared Key
+//
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.11
+
+static size_t ext_pre_shared_key_clienthello_length(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (hs->max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION || ssl->session == nullptr ||
+      ssl_session_protocol_version(ssl->session.get()) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  size_t binder_len = EVP_MD_size(ssl_session_get_digest(ssl->session.get()));
+  return 15 + ssl->session->ticket.size() + binder_len;
+}
+
+static bool ext_pre_shared_key_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  hs->needs_psk_binder = false;
+  if (hs->max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION || ssl->session == nullptr ||
+      ssl_session_protocol_version(ssl->session.get()) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // Per RFC 8446 section 4.1.4, skip offering the session if the selected
+  // cipher in HelloRetryRequest does not match. This avoids performing the
+  // transcript hash transformation for multiple hashes.
+  if (ssl->s3 && ssl->s3->used_hello_retry_request &&
+      ssl->session->cipher->algorithm_prf != hs->new_cipher->algorithm_prf) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  struct OPENSSL_timeval now;
+  ssl_get_current_time(ssl, &now);
+  uint32_t ticket_age = 1000 * (now.tv_sec - ssl->session->time);
+  uint32_t obfuscated_ticket_age = ticket_age + ssl->session->ticket_age_add;
+
+  // Fill in a placeholder zero binder of the appropriate length. It will be
+  // computed and filled in later after length prefixes are computed.
+  uint8_t zero_binder[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
+  size_t binder_len = EVP_MD_size(ssl_session_get_digest(ssl->session.get()));
+
+  CBB contents, identity, ticket, binders, binder;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_pre_shared_key) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &identity) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&identity, &ticket) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&ticket, ssl->session->ticket.data(),
+                     ssl->session->ticket.size()) ||
+      !CBB_add_u32(&identity, obfuscated_ticket_age) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &binders) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&binders, &binder) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&binder, zero_binder, binder_len)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  hs->needs_psk_binder = true;
+  return CBB_flush(out);
+}
+
+bool ssl_ext_pre_shared_key_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                              uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                              CBS *contents) {
+  uint16_t psk_id;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16(contents, &psk_id) ||
+      CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // We only advertise one PSK identity, so the only legal index is zero.
+  if (psk_id != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool ssl_ext_pre_shared_key_parse_clienthello(
+    SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBS *out_ticket, CBS *out_binders,
+    uint32_t *out_obfuscated_ticket_age, uint8_t *out_alert,
+    const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello, CBS *contents) {
+  // Verify that the pre_shared_key extension is the last extension in
+  // ClientHello.
+  if (CBS_data(contents) + CBS_len(contents) !=
+      client_hello->extensions + client_hello->extensions_len) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PRE_SHARED_KEY_MUST_BE_LAST);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // We only process the first PSK identity since we don't support pure PSK.
+  CBS identities, binders;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &identities) ||
+      !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&identities, out_ticket) ||
+      !CBS_get_u32(&identities, out_obfuscated_ticket_age) ||
+      !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &binders) ||
+      CBS_len(&binders) == 0 ||
+      CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  *out_binders = binders;
+
+  // Check the syntax of the remaining identities, but do not process them.
+  size_t num_identities = 1;
+  while (CBS_len(&identities) != 0) {
+    CBS unused_ticket;
+    uint32_t unused_obfuscated_ticket_age;
+    if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&identities, &unused_ticket) ||
+        !CBS_get_u32(&identities, &unused_obfuscated_ticket_age)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    num_identities++;
+  }
+
+  // Check the syntax of the binders. The value will be checked later if
+  // resuming.
+  size_t num_binders = 0;
+  while (CBS_len(&binders) != 0) {
+    CBS binder;
+    if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&binders, &binder)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    num_binders++;
+  }
+
+  if (num_identities != num_binders) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_BINDER_COUNT_MISMATCH);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool ssl_ext_pre_shared_key_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  if (!hs->ssl->s3->session_reused) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  CBB contents;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_pre_shared_key) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+      // We only consider the first identity for resumption
+      !CBB_add_u16(&contents, 0) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+
+// Pre-Shared Key Exchange Modes
+//
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.9
+
+static bool ext_psk_key_exchange_modes_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                                       CBB *out) {
+  if (hs->max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  CBB contents, ke_modes;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_key_exchange_modes) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&contents, &ke_modes) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8(&ke_modes, SSL_PSK_DHE_KE)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return CBB_flush(out);
+}
+
+static bool ext_psk_key_exchange_modes_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                                         uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                                         CBS *contents) {
+  if (contents == NULL) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  CBS ke_modes;
+  if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &ke_modes) ||
+      CBS_len(&ke_modes) == 0 ||
+      CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // We only support tickets with PSK_DHE_KE.
+  hs->accept_psk_mode = OPENSSL_memchr(CBS_data(&ke_modes), SSL_PSK_DHE_KE,
+                                       CBS_len(&ke_modes)) != NULL;
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+
+// Early Data Indication
+//
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.10
+
+static bool ext_early_data_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  // The second ClientHello never offers early data, and we must have already
+  // filled in |early_data_reason| by this point.
+  if (ssl->s3->used_hello_retry_request) {
+    assert(ssl->s3->early_data_reason != ssl_early_data_unknown);
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl->enable_early_data) {
+    ssl->s3->early_data_reason = ssl_early_data_disabled;
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (hs->max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    // We discard inapplicable sessions, so this is redundant with the session
+    // checks below, but we check give a more useful reason.
+    ssl->s3->early_data_reason = ssl_early_data_protocol_version;
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->session == nullptr) {
+    ssl->s3->early_data_reason = ssl_early_data_no_session_offered;
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl_session_protocol_version(ssl->session.get()) < TLS1_3_VERSION ||
+      ssl->session->ticket_max_early_data == 0) {
+    ssl->s3->early_data_reason = ssl_early_data_unsupported_for_session;
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // In case ALPN preferences changed since this session was established, avoid
+  // reporting a confusing value in |SSL_get0_alpn_selected| and sending early
+  // data we know will be rejected.
+  if (!ssl->session->early_alpn.empty() &&
+      !ssl_is_alpn_protocol_allowed(hs, ssl->session->early_alpn)) {
+    ssl->s3->early_data_reason = ssl_early_data_alpn_mismatch;
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // |early_data_reason| will be filled in later when the server responds.
+  hs->early_data_offered = true;
+
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(out, 0) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ext_early_data_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                             uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                             CBS *contents) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (contents == NULL) {
+    if (hs->early_data_offered && !ssl->s3->used_hello_retry_request) {
+      ssl->s3->early_data_reason = ssl->s3->session_reused
+                                       ? ssl_early_data_peer_declined
+                                       : ssl_early_data_session_not_resumed;
+    } else {
+      // We already filled in |early_data_reason| when declining to offer 0-RTT
+      // or handling the implicit HelloRetryRequest reject.
+      assert(ssl->s3->early_data_reason != ssl_early_data_unknown);
+    }
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // If we received an HRR, the second ClientHello never offers early data, so
+  // the extensions logic will automatically reject early data extensions as
+  // unsolicited. This covered by the ServerAcceptsEarlyDataOnHRR test.
+  assert(!ssl->s3->used_hello_retry_request);
+
+  if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl->s3->session_reused) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  ssl->s3->early_data_reason = ssl_early_data_accepted;
+  ssl->s3->early_data_accepted = true;
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ext_early_data_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                             uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (contents == NULL ||
+      ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  hs->early_data_offered = true;
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ext_early_data_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  if (!hs->ssl->s3->early_data_accepted) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(out, 0) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+
+// Key Share
+//
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.8
+
+static bool ext_key_share_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (hs->max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  CBB contents, kse_bytes;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &kse_bytes)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  uint16_t group_id = hs->retry_group;
+  uint16_t second_group_id = 0;
+  if (ssl->s3 && ssl->s3->used_hello_retry_request) {
+    // We received a HelloRetryRequest without a new curve, so there is no new
+    // share to append. Leave |hs->key_share| as-is.
+    if (group_id == 0 &&
+        !CBB_add_bytes(&kse_bytes, hs->key_share_bytes.data(),
+                       hs->key_share_bytes.size())) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    hs->key_share_bytes.Reset();
+    if (group_id == 0) {
+      return CBB_flush(out);
+    }
+  } else {
+    // Add a fake group. See draft-davidben-tls-grease-01.
+    if (ssl->ctx->grease_enabled &&
+        (!CBB_add_u16(&kse_bytes,
+                      ssl_get_grease_value(hs, ssl_grease_group)) ||
+         !CBB_add_u16(&kse_bytes, 1 /* length */) ||
+         !CBB_add_u8(&kse_bytes, 0 /* one byte key share */))) {
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    // Predict the most preferred group.
+    Span<const uint16_t> groups = tls1_get_grouplist(hs);
+    if (groups.empty()) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_GROUPS_SPECIFIED);
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    group_id = groups[0];
+
+    if (is_post_quantum_group(group_id) && groups.size() >= 2) {
+      // CECPQ2(b) is not sent as the only initial key share. We'll include the
+      // 2nd preference group too to avoid round-trips.
+      second_group_id = groups[1];
+      assert(second_group_id != group_id);
+    }
+  }
+
+  CBB key_exchange;
+  hs->key_shares[0] = SSLKeyShare::Create(group_id);
+  if (!hs->key_shares[0] ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(&kse_bytes, group_id) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&kse_bytes, &key_exchange) ||
+      !hs->key_shares[0]->Offer(&key_exchange) ||
+      !CBB_flush(&kse_bytes)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (second_group_id != 0) {
+    hs->key_shares[1] = SSLKeyShare::Create(second_group_id);
+    if (!hs->key_shares[1] ||
+        !CBB_add_u16(&kse_bytes, second_group_id) ||
+        !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&kse_bytes, &key_exchange) ||
+        !hs->key_shares[1]->Offer(&key_exchange) ||
+        !CBB_flush(&kse_bytes)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Save the contents of the extension to repeat it in the second
+  // ClientHello.
+  if (ssl->s3 && !ssl->s3->used_hello_retry_request &&
+      !hs->key_share_bytes.CopyFrom(
+          MakeConstSpan(CBB_data(&kse_bytes), CBB_len(&kse_bytes)))) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return CBB_flush(out);
+}
+
+bool ssl_ext_key_share_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                         Array<uint8_t> *out_secret,
+                                         uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents) {
+  CBS peer_key;
+  uint16_t group_id;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16(contents, &group_id) ||
+      !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &peer_key) ||
+      CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  SSLKeyShare *key_share = hs->key_shares[0].get();
+  if (key_share->GroupID() != group_id) {
+    if (!hs->key_shares[1] || hs->key_shares[1]->GroupID() != group_id) {
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
+      return false;
+    }
+    key_share = hs->key_shares[1].get();
+  }
+
+  if (!key_share->Finish(out_secret, out_alert, peer_key)) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  hs->new_session->group_id = group_id;
+  hs->key_shares[0].reset();
+  hs->key_shares[1].reset();
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool ssl_ext_key_share_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, bool *out_found,
+                                         Array<uint8_t> *out_secret,
+                                         uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents) {
+  uint16_t group_id;
+  CBS key_shares;
+  if (!tls1_get_shared_group(hs, &group_id)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_GROUP);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &key_shares) ||
+      CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Find the corresponding key share.
+  CBS peer_key;
+  CBS_init(&peer_key, NULL, 0);
+  while (CBS_len(&key_shares) > 0) {
+    uint16_t id;
+    CBS peer_key_tmp;
+    if (!CBS_get_u16(&key_shares, &id) ||
+        !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&key_shares, &peer_key_tmp) ||
+        CBS_len(&peer_key_tmp) == 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    if (id == group_id) {
+      if (CBS_len(&peer_key) != 0) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DUPLICATE_KEY_SHARE);
+        *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        return false;
+      }
+
+      peer_key = peer_key_tmp;
+      // Continue parsing the structure to keep peers honest.
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (CBS_len(&peer_key) == 0) {
+    *out_found = false;
+    out_secret->Reset();
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // Compute the DH secret.
+  Array<uint8_t> secret;
+  ScopedCBB public_key;
+  UniquePtr<SSLKeyShare> key_share = SSLKeyShare::Create(group_id);
+  if (!key_share ||
+      !CBB_init(public_key.get(), 32) ||
+      !key_share->Accept(public_key.get(), &secret, out_alert, peer_key) ||
+      !CBBFinishArray(public_key.get(), &hs->ecdh_public_key)) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  *out_secret = std::move(secret);
+  *out_found = true;
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool ssl_ext_key_share_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  uint16_t group_id;
+  CBB kse_bytes, public_key;
+  if (!tls1_get_shared_group(hs, &group_id) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &kse_bytes) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(&kse_bytes, group_id) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&kse_bytes, &public_key) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&public_key, hs->ecdh_public_key.data(),
+                     hs->ecdh_public_key.size()) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  hs->ecdh_public_key.Reset();
+
+  hs->new_session->group_id = group_id;
+  return true;
+}
+
+
+// Supported Versions
+//
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.1
+
+static bool ext_supported_versions_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (hs->max_version <= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  CBB contents, versions;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&contents, &versions)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Add a fake version. See draft-davidben-tls-grease-01.
+  if (ssl->ctx->grease_enabled &&
+      !CBB_add_u16(&versions, ssl_get_grease_value(hs, ssl_grease_version))) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl_add_supported_versions(hs, &versions) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+
+// Cookie
+//
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.2
+
+static bool ext_cookie_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  if (hs->cookie.empty()) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  CBB contents, cookie;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &cookie) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&cookie, hs->cookie.data(), hs->cookie.size()) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // The cookie is no longer needed in memory.
+  hs->cookie.Reset();
+  return true;
+}
+
+
+// Supported Groups
+//
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.1.1
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.7
+
+static bool ext_supported_groups_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  CBB contents, groups_bytes;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &groups_bytes)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Add a fake group. See draft-davidben-tls-grease-01.
+  if (ssl->ctx->grease_enabled &&
+      !CBB_add_u16(&groups_bytes,
+                   ssl_get_grease_value(hs, ssl_grease_group))) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  for (uint16_t group : tls1_get_grouplist(hs)) {
+    if (is_post_quantum_group(group) &&
+        hs->max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (!CBB_add_u16(&groups_bytes, group)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return CBB_flush(out);
+}
+
+static bool ext_supported_groups_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                                   uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                                   CBS *contents) {
+  // This extension is not expected to be echoed by servers in TLS 1.2, but some
+  // BigIP servers send it nonetheless, so do not enforce this.
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool parse_u16_array(const CBS *cbs, Array<uint16_t> *out) {
+  CBS copy = *cbs;
+  if ((CBS_len(&copy) & 1) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  Array<uint16_t> ret;
+  if (!ret.Init(CBS_len(&copy) / 2)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < ret.size(); i++) {
+    if (!CBS_get_u16(&copy, &ret[i])) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  assert(CBS_len(&copy) == 0);
+  *out = std::move(ret);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static bool ext_supported_groups_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                                  uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                                   CBS *contents) {
+  if (contents == NULL) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  CBS supported_group_list;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &supported_group_list) ||
+      CBS_len(&supported_group_list) == 0 ||
+      CBS_len(contents) != 0 ||
+      !parse_u16_array(&supported_group_list, &hs->peer_supported_group_list)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+// Token Binding
+//
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tokbind-negotiation-10
+
+// The Token Binding version number currently matches the draft number of
+// draft-ietf-tokbind-protocol, and when published as an RFC it will be 0x0100.
+// Since there are no wire changes to the protocol from draft 13 through the
+// current draft (16), this implementation supports all versions in that range.
+static uint16_t kTokenBindingMaxVersion = 16;
+static uint16_t kTokenBindingMinVersion = 13;
+
+static bool ext_token_binding_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (hs->config->token_binding_params.empty() || SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  CBB contents, params;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_token_binding) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(&contents, kTokenBindingMaxVersion) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&contents, &params) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&params, hs->config->token_binding_params.data(),
+                     hs->config->token_binding_params.size()) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ext_token_binding_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                                uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                                CBS *contents) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (contents == nullptr) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  CBS params_list;
+  uint16_t version;
+  uint8_t param;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16(contents, &version) ||
+      !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &params_list) ||
+      !CBS_get_u8(&params_list, &param) ||
+      CBS_len(&params_list) > 0 ||
+      CBS_len(contents) > 0) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // The server-negotiated version must be less than or equal to our version.
+  if (version > kTokenBindingMaxVersion) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // If the server-selected version is less than what we support, then Token
+  // Binding wasn't negotiated (but the extension was parsed successfully).
+  if (version < kTokenBindingMinVersion) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  for (uint8_t config_param : hs->config->token_binding_params) {
+    if (param == config_param) {
+      ssl->s3->negotiated_token_binding_param = param;
+      ssl->s3->token_binding_negotiated = true;
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+  return false;
+}
+
+// select_tb_param looks for the first token binding param in
+// |hs->ssl->token_binding_params| that is also in |params| and puts it in
+// |hs->ssl->negotiated_token_binding_param|. It returns true if a token binding
+// param is found, and false otherwise.
+static bool select_tb_param(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                            Span<const uint8_t> peer_params) {
+  for (uint8_t tb_param : hs->config->token_binding_params) {
+    for (uint8_t peer_param : peer_params) {
+      if (tb_param == peer_param) {
+        hs->ssl->s3->negotiated_token_binding_param = tb_param;
+        return true;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+static bool ext_token_binding_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                                uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                                CBS *contents) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (contents == nullptr || hs->config->token_binding_params.empty()) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  CBS params;
+  uint16_t version;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16(contents, &version) ||
+      !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &params) ||
+      CBS_len(&params) == 0 ||
+      CBS_len(contents) > 0) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // If the client-selected version is less than what we support, then Token
+  // Binding wasn't negotiated (but the extension was parsed successfully).
+  if (version < kTokenBindingMinVersion) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // If the client-selected version is higher than we support, use our max
+  // version. Otherwise, use the client's version.
+  hs->negotiated_token_binding_version =
+      std::min(version, kTokenBindingMaxVersion);
+  if (!select_tb_param(hs, params)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  ssl->s3->token_binding_negotiated = true;
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ext_token_binding_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
+  if (!ssl->s3->token_binding_negotiated) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  CBB contents, params;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_token_binding) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(&contents, hs->negotiated_token_binding_version) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&contents, &params) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8(&params, ssl->s3->negotiated_token_binding_param) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+// QUIC Transport Parameters
+
+static bool ext_quic_transport_params_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                                      CBB *out) {
+  if (hs->config->quic_transport_params.empty() && !hs->ssl->quic_method) {
+    return true;
+  }
+  if (hs->config->quic_transport_params.empty() || !hs->ssl->quic_method) {
+    // QUIC Transport Parameters must be sent over QUIC, and they must not be
+    // sent over non-QUIC transports. If transport params are set, then
+    // SSL(_CTX)_set_quic_method must also be called.
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_QUIC_TRANSPORT_PARAMETERS_MISCONFIGURED);
+    return false;
+  }
+  assert(hs->min_version > TLS1_2_VERSION);
+
+  CBB contents;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_quic_transport_parameters) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&contents, hs->config->quic_transport_params.data(),
+                     hs->config->quic_transport_params.size()) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ext_quic_transport_params_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                                        uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                                        CBS *contents) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (contents == nullptr) {
+    if (!ssl->quic_method) {
+      return true;
+    }
+    assert(ssl->quic_method);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION;
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (!ssl->quic_method) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+    return false;
+  }
+  // QUIC requires TLS 1.3.
+  assert(ssl_protocol_version(ssl) == TLS1_3_VERSION);
+
+  return ssl->s3->peer_quic_transport_params.CopyFrom(*contents);
+}
+
+static bool ext_quic_transport_params_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                                        uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                                        CBS *contents) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (!contents) {
+    if (!ssl->quic_method) {
+      if (hs->config->quic_transport_params.empty()) {
+        return true;
+      }
+      // QUIC transport parameters must not be set if |ssl| is not configured
+      // for QUIC.
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_QUIC_TRANSPORT_PARAMETERS_MISCONFIGURED);
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    }
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION;
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (!ssl->quic_method) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+    return false;
+  }
+  assert(ssl_protocol_version(ssl) == TLS1_3_VERSION);
+  return ssl->s3->peer_quic_transport_params.CopyFrom(*contents);
+}
+
+static bool ext_quic_transport_params_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                                      CBB *out) {
+  assert(hs->ssl->quic_method != nullptr);
+  if (hs->config->quic_transport_params.empty()) {
+    // Transport parameters must be set when using QUIC.
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_QUIC_TRANSPORT_PARAMETERS_MISCONFIGURED);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  CBB contents;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_quic_transport_parameters) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&contents, hs->config->quic_transport_params.data(),
+                     hs->config->quic_transport_params.size()) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+// Delegated credentials.
+//
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-subcerts
+
+static bool ext_delegated_credential_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                                     CBB *out) {
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ext_delegated_credential_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                                       uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                                       CBS *contents) {
+  assert(TLSEXT_TYPE_delegated_credential == 0xff02);
+  // TODO: Check that the extension is empty.
+  //
+  // As of draft-03, the client sends an empty extension in order indicate
+  // support for delegated credentials. This could change, however, since the
+  // spec is not yet finalized. This assertion is here to remind us to enforce
+  // this check once the extension ID is assigned.
+
+  if (contents == nullptr || ssl_protocol_version(hs->ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    // Don't use delegated credentials unless we're negotiating TLS 1.3 or
+    // higher.
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  hs->delegated_credential_requested = true;
+  return true;
+}
+
+// Certificate compression
+
+static bool cert_compression_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  bool first = true;
+  CBB contents, algs;
+
+  for (const auto &alg : hs->ssl->ctx->cert_compression_algs) {
+    if (alg.decompress == nullptr) {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    if (first && (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_cert_compression) ||
+                  !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+                  !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&contents, &algs))) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    first = false;
+    if (!CBB_add_u16(&algs, alg.alg_id)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return first || CBB_flush(out);
+}
+
+static bool cert_compression_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                               uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                               CBS *contents) {
+  if (contents == nullptr) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // The server may not echo this extension. Any server to client negotiation is
+  // advertised in the CertificateRequest message.
+  return false;
+}
+
+static bool cert_compression_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                               uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                               CBS *contents) {
+  if (contents == nullptr) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  const SSL_CTX *ctx = hs->ssl->ctx.get();
+  const size_t num_algs = ctx->cert_compression_algs.size();
+
+  CBS alg_ids;
+  if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &alg_ids) ||
+      CBS_len(contents) != 0 ||
+      CBS_len(&alg_ids) == 0 ||
+      CBS_len(&alg_ids) % 2 == 1) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  const size_t num_given_alg_ids = CBS_len(&alg_ids) / 2;
+  Array<uint16_t> given_alg_ids;
+  if (!given_alg_ids.Init(num_given_alg_ids)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  size_t best_index = num_algs;
+  size_t given_alg_idx = 0;
+
+  while (CBS_len(&alg_ids) > 0) {
+    uint16_t alg_id;
+    if (!CBS_get_u16(&alg_ids, &alg_id)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    given_alg_ids[given_alg_idx++] = alg_id;
+
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < num_algs; i++) {
+      const auto &alg = ctx->cert_compression_algs[i];
+      if (alg.alg_id == alg_id && alg.compress != nullptr) {
+        if (i < best_index) {
+          best_index = i;
+        }
+        break;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  qsort(given_alg_ids.data(), given_alg_ids.size(), sizeof(uint16_t),
+        compare_uint16_t);
+  for (size_t i = 1; i < num_given_alg_ids; i++) {
+    if (given_alg_ids[i - 1] == given_alg_ids[i]) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (best_index < num_algs &&
+      ssl_protocol_version(hs->ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    hs->cert_compression_negotiated = true;
+    hs->cert_compression_alg_id = ctx->cert_compression_algs[best_index].alg_id;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool cert_compression_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  return true;
+}
+
+
+// kExtensions contains all the supported extensions.
+static const struct tls_extension kExtensions[] = {
+  {
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,
+    NULL,
+    ext_sni_add_clienthello,
+    ext_sni_parse_serverhello,
+    ext_sni_parse_clienthello,
+    ext_sni_add_serverhello,
+  },
+  {
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret,
+    NULL,
+    ext_ems_add_clienthello,
+    ext_ems_parse_serverhello,
+    ext_ems_parse_clienthello,
+    ext_ems_add_serverhello,
+  },
+  {
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,
+    NULL,
+    ext_ri_add_clienthello,
+    ext_ri_parse_serverhello,
+    ext_ri_parse_clienthello,
+    ext_ri_add_serverhello,
+  },
+  {
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups,
+    NULL,
+    ext_supported_groups_add_clienthello,
+    ext_supported_groups_parse_serverhello,
+    ext_supported_groups_parse_clienthello,
+    dont_add_serverhello,
+  },
+  {
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,
+    NULL,
+    ext_ec_point_add_clienthello,
+    ext_ec_point_parse_serverhello,
+    ext_ec_point_parse_clienthello,
+    ext_ec_point_add_serverhello,
+  },
+  {
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,
+    NULL,
+    ext_ticket_add_clienthello,
+    ext_ticket_parse_serverhello,
+    // Ticket extension client parsing is handled in ssl_session.c
+    ignore_parse_clienthello,
+    ext_ticket_add_serverhello,
+  },
+  {
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,
+    NULL,
+    ext_alpn_add_clienthello,
+    ext_alpn_parse_serverhello,
+    // ALPN is negotiated late in |ssl_negotiate_alpn|.
+    ignore_parse_clienthello,
+    ext_alpn_add_serverhello,
+  },
+  {
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,
+    NULL,
+    ext_ocsp_add_clienthello,
+    ext_ocsp_parse_serverhello,
+    ext_ocsp_parse_clienthello,
+    ext_ocsp_add_serverhello,
+  },
+  {
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,
+    NULL,
+    ext_sigalgs_add_clienthello,
+    forbid_parse_serverhello,
+    ext_sigalgs_parse_clienthello,
+    dont_add_serverhello,
+  },
+  {
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,
+    NULL,
+    ext_npn_add_clienthello,
+    ext_npn_parse_serverhello,
+    ext_npn_parse_clienthello,
+    ext_npn_add_serverhello,
+  },
+  {
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp,
+    NULL,
+    ext_sct_add_clienthello,
+    ext_sct_parse_serverhello,
+    ext_sct_parse_clienthello,
+    ext_sct_add_serverhello,
+  },
+  {
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id,
+    ext_channel_id_init,
+    ext_channel_id_add_clienthello,
+    ext_channel_id_parse_serverhello,
+    ext_channel_id_parse_clienthello,
+    ext_channel_id_add_serverhello,
+  },
+  {
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_srtp,
+    ext_srtp_init,
+    ext_srtp_add_clienthello,
+    ext_srtp_parse_serverhello,
+    ext_srtp_parse_clienthello,
+    ext_srtp_add_serverhello,
+  },
+  {
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share,
+    NULL,
+    ext_key_share_add_clienthello,
+    forbid_parse_serverhello,
+    ignore_parse_clienthello,
+    dont_add_serverhello,
+  },
+  {
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_key_exchange_modes,
+    NULL,
+    ext_psk_key_exchange_modes_add_clienthello,
+    forbid_parse_serverhello,
+    ext_psk_key_exchange_modes_parse_clienthello,
+    dont_add_serverhello,
+  },
+  {
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data,
+    NULL,
+    ext_early_data_add_clienthello,
+    ext_early_data_parse_serverhello,
+    ext_early_data_parse_clienthello,
+    ext_early_data_add_serverhello,
+  },
+  {
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions,
+    NULL,
+    ext_supported_versions_add_clienthello,
+    forbid_parse_serverhello,
+    ignore_parse_clienthello,
+    dont_add_serverhello,
+  },
+  {
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie,
+    NULL,
+    ext_cookie_add_clienthello,
+    forbid_parse_serverhello,
+    ignore_parse_clienthello,
+    dont_add_serverhello,
+  },
+  {
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_quic_transport_parameters,
+    NULL,
+    ext_quic_transport_params_add_clienthello,
+    ext_quic_transport_params_parse_serverhello,
+    ext_quic_transport_params_parse_clienthello,
+    ext_quic_transport_params_add_serverhello,
+  },
+  {
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_token_binding,
+    NULL,
+    ext_token_binding_add_clienthello,
+    ext_token_binding_parse_serverhello,
+    ext_token_binding_parse_clienthello,
+    ext_token_binding_add_serverhello,
+  },
+  {
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_cert_compression,
+    NULL,
+    cert_compression_add_clienthello,
+    cert_compression_parse_serverhello,
+    cert_compression_parse_clienthello,
+    cert_compression_add_serverhello,
+  },
+  {
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_delegated_credential,
+    NULL,
+    ext_delegated_credential_add_clienthello,
+    forbid_parse_serverhello,
+    ext_delegated_credential_parse_clienthello,
+    dont_add_serverhello,
+  },
+};
+
+#define kNumExtensions (sizeof(kExtensions) / sizeof(struct tls_extension))
+
+static_assert(kNumExtensions <=
+                  sizeof(((SSL_HANDSHAKE *)NULL)->extensions.sent) * 8,
+              "too many extensions for sent bitset");
+static_assert(kNumExtensions <=
+                  sizeof(((SSL_HANDSHAKE *)NULL)->extensions.received) * 8,
+              "too many extensions for received bitset");
+
+static const struct tls_extension *tls_extension_find(uint32_t *out_index,
+                                                      uint16_t value) {
+  unsigned i;
+  for (i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) {
+    if (kExtensions[i].value == value) {
+      *out_index = i;
+      return &kExtensions[i];
+    }
+  }
+
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+bool ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out,
+                                size_t header_len) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  CBB extensions;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &extensions)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Note we may send multiple ClientHellos for DTLS HelloVerifyRequest and TLS
+  // 1.3 HelloRetryRequest. For the latter, the extensions may change, so it is
+  // important to reset this value.
+  hs->extensions.sent = 0;
+
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) {
+    if (kExtensions[i].init != NULL) {
+      kExtensions[i].init(hs);
+    }
+  }
+
+  uint16_t grease_ext1 = 0;
+  if (ssl->ctx->grease_enabled) {
+    // Add a fake empty extension. See draft-davidben-tls-grease-01.
+    grease_ext1 = ssl_get_grease_value(hs, ssl_grease_extension1);
+    if (!CBB_add_u16(&extensions, grease_ext1) ||
+        !CBB_add_u16(&extensions, 0 /* zero length */)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  bool last_was_empty = false;
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) {
+    const size_t len_before = CBB_len(&extensions);
+    if (!kExtensions[i].add_clienthello(hs, &extensions)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_ADDING_EXTENSION);
+      ERR_add_error_dataf("extension %u", (unsigned)kExtensions[i].value);
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    const size_t bytes_written = CBB_len(&extensions) - len_before;
+    if (bytes_written != 0) {
+      hs->extensions.sent |= (1u << i);
+    }
+    // If the difference in lengths is only four bytes then the extension had
+    // an empty body.
+    last_was_empty = (bytes_written == 4);
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->ctx->grease_enabled) {
+    // Add a fake non-empty extension. See draft-davidben-tls-grease-01.
+    uint16_t grease_ext2 = ssl_get_grease_value(hs, ssl_grease_extension2);
+
+    // The two fake extensions must not have the same value. GREASE values are
+    // of the form 0x1a1a, 0x2a2a, 0x3a3a, etc., so XOR to generate a different
+    // one.
+    if (grease_ext1 == grease_ext2) {
+      grease_ext2 ^= 0x1010;
+    }
+
+    if (!CBB_add_u16(&extensions, grease_ext2) ||
+        !CBB_add_u16(&extensions, 1 /* one byte length */) ||
+        !CBB_add_u8(&extensions, 0 /* single zero byte as contents */)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    last_was_empty = false;
+  }
+
+  if (!SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
+    size_t psk_extension_len = ext_pre_shared_key_clienthello_length(hs);
+    header_len += 2 + CBB_len(&extensions) + psk_extension_len;
+    size_t padding_len = 0;
+
+    // The final extension must be non-empty. WebSphere Application
+    // Server 7.0 is intolerant to the last extension being zero-length. See
+    // https://crbug.com/363583.
+    if (last_was_empty && psk_extension_len == 0) {
+      padding_len = 1;
+      // The addition of the padding extension may push us into the F5 bug.
+      header_len += 4 + padding_len;
+    }
+
+    // Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See RFC 7685.
+    //
+    // NB: because this code works out the length of all existing extensions
+    // it MUST always appear last (save for any PSK extension).
+    if (header_len > 0xff && header_len < 0x200) {
+      // If our calculations already included a padding extension, remove that
+      // factor because we're about to change its length.
+      if (padding_len != 0) {
+        header_len -= 4 + padding_len;
+      }
+      padding_len = 0x200 - header_len;
+      // Extensions take at least four bytes to encode. Always include at least
+      // one byte of data if including the extension. WebSphere Application
+      // Server 7.0 is intolerant to the last extension being zero-length. See
+      // https://crbug.com/363583.
+      if (padding_len >= 4 + 1) {
+        padding_len -= 4;
+      } else {
+        padding_len = 1;
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (padding_len != 0) {
+      uint8_t *padding_bytes;
+      if (!CBB_add_u16(&extensions, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding) ||
+          !CBB_add_u16(&extensions, padding_len) ||
+          !CBB_add_space(&extensions, &padding_bytes, padding_len)) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return false;
+      }
+
+      OPENSSL_memset(padding_bytes, 0, padding_len);
+    }
+  }
+
+  // The PSK extension must be last, including after the padding.
+  if (!ext_pre_shared_key_add_clienthello(hs, &extensions)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Discard empty extensions blocks.
+  if (CBB_len(&extensions) == 0) {
+    CBB_discard_child(out);
+  }
+
+  return CBB_flush(out);
+}
+
+bool ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  CBB extensions;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &extensions)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  for (unsigned i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) {
+    if (!(hs->extensions.received & (1u << i))) {
+      // Don't send extensions that were not received.
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    if (!kExtensions[i].add_serverhello(hs, &extensions)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_ADDING_EXTENSION);
+      ERR_add_error_dataf("extension %u", (unsigned)kExtensions[i].value);
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Discard empty extensions blocks before TLS 1.3.
+  if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION &&
+      CBB_len(&extensions) == 0) {
+    CBB_discard_child(out);
+  }
+
+  return CBB_flush(out);
+
+err:
+  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+  return false;
+}
+
+static bool ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                        const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello,
+                                        int *out_alert) {
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) {
+    if (kExtensions[i].init != NULL) {
+      kExtensions[i].init(hs);
+    }
+  }
+
+  hs->extensions.received = 0;
+  CBS extensions;
+  CBS_init(&extensions, client_hello->extensions, client_hello->extensions_len);
+  while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0) {
+    uint16_t type;
+    CBS extension;
+
+    // Decode the next extension.
+    if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
+        !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) {
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    unsigned ext_index;
+    const struct tls_extension *const ext =
+        tls_extension_find(&ext_index, type);
+    if (ext == NULL) {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    hs->extensions.received |= (1u << ext_index);
+    uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    if (!ext->parse_clienthello(hs, &alert, &extension)) {
+      *out_alert = alert;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_PARSING_EXTENSION);
+      ERR_add_error_dataf("extension %u", (unsigned)type);
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) {
+    if (hs->extensions.received & (1u << i)) {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    CBS *contents = NULL, fake_contents;
+    static const uint8_t kFakeRenegotiateExtension[] = {0};
+    if (kExtensions[i].value == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate &&
+        ssl_client_cipher_list_contains_cipher(client_hello,
+                                               SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xffff)) {
+      // The renegotiation SCSV was received so pretend that we received a
+      // renegotiation extension.
+      CBS_init(&fake_contents, kFakeRenegotiateExtension,
+               sizeof(kFakeRenegotiateExtension));
+      contents = &fake_contents;
+      hs->extensions.received |= (1u << i);
+    }
+
+    // Extension wasn't observed so call the callback with a NULL
+    // parameter.
+    uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    if (!kExtensions[i].parse_clienthello(hs, &alert, contents)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_EXTENSION);
+      ERR_add_error_dataf("extension %u", (unsigned)kExtensions[i].value);
+      *out_alert = alert;
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                  const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  int alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+  if (!ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(hs, client_hello, &alert)) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(hs)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBS *cbs,
+                                        int *out_alert) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  // Before TLS 1.3, ServerHello extensions blocks may be omitted if empty.
+  if (CBS_len(cbs) == 0 && ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // Decode the extensions block and check it is valid.
+  CBS extensions;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &extensions) ||
+      !tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions)) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  uint32_t received = 0;
+  while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0) {
+    uint16_t type;
+    CBS extension;
+
+    // Decode the next extension.
+    if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
+        !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) {
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    unsigned ext_index;
+    const struct tls_extension *const ext =
+        tls_extension_find(&ext_index, type);
+
+    if (ext == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
+      ERR_add_error_dataf("extension %u", (unsigned)type);
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    static_assert(kNumExtensions <= sizeof(hs->extensions.sent) * 8,
+                  "too many bits");
+
+    if (!(hs->extensions.sent & (1u << ext_index))) {
+      // If the extension was never sent then it is illegal.
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
+      ERR_add_error_dataf("extension :%u", (unsigned)type);
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    received |= (1u << ext_index);
+
+    uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    if (!ext->parse_serverhello(hs, &alert, &extension)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_PARSING_EXTENSION);
+      ERR_add_error_dataf("extension %u", (unsigned)type);
+      *out_alert = alert;
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) {
+    if (!(received & (1u << i))) {
+      // Extension wasn't observed so call the callback with a NULL
+      // parameter.
+      uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      if (!kExtensions[i].parse_serverhello(hs, &alert, NULL)) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_EXTENSION);
+        ERR_add_error_dataf("extension %u", (unsigned)kExtensions[i].value);
+        *out_alert = alert;
+        return false;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
+  if (ssl->s3->token_binding_negotiated &&
+      !(SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(ssl) &&
+        SSL_get_extms_support(ssl))) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NEGOTIATED_TB_WITHOUT_EMS_OR_RI);
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+  int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+
+  if (ssl->ctx->servername_callback != 0) {
+    ret = ssl->ctx->servername_callback(ssl, &al, ssl->ctx->servername_arg);
+  } else if (ssl->session_ctx->servername_callback != 0) {
+    ret = ssl->session_ctx->servername_callback(
+        ssl, &al, ssl->session_ctx->servername_arg);
+  }
+
+  switch (ret) {
+    case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+      return false;
+
+    case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
+      hs->should_ack_sni = false;
+      return true;
+
+    default:
+      return true;
+  }
+}
+
+bool ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBS *cbs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  int alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+  if (!ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(hs, cbs, &alert)) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_ticket_aead_result_t decrypt_ticket_with_cipher_ctx(
+    Array<uint8_t> *out, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx, HMAC_CTX *hmac_ctx,
+    Span<const uint8_t> ticket) {
+  size_t iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(cipher_ctx);
+
+  // Check the MAC at the end of the ticket.
+  uint8_t mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  size_t mac_len = HMAC_size(hmac_ctx);
+  if (ticket.size() < SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN + iv_len + 1 + mac_len) {
+    // The ticket must be large enough for key name, IV, data, and MAC.
+    return ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket;
+  }
+  // Split the ticket into the ticket and the MAC.
+  auto ticket_mac = ticket.subspan(ticket.size() - mac_len);
+  ticket = ticket.subspan(0, ticket.size() - mac_len);
+  HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, ticket.data(), ticket.size());
+  HMAC_Final(hmac_ctx, mac, NULL);
+  assert(mac_len == ticket_mac.size());
+  bool mac_ok = CRYPTO_memcmp(mac, ticket_mac.data(), mac_len) == 0;
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
+  mac_ok = true;
+#endif
+  if (!mac_ok) {
+    return ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket;
+  }
+
+  // Decrypt the session data.
+  auto ciphertext = ticket.subspan(SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN + iv_len);
+  Array<uint8_t> plaintext;
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
+  if (!plaintext.CopyFrom(ciphertext)) {
+    return ssl_ticket_aead_error;
+  }
+#else
+  if (ciphertext.size() >= INT_MAX) {
+    return ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket;
+  }
+  if (!plaintext.Init(ciphertext.size())) {
+    return ssl_ticket_aead_error;
+  }
+  int len1, len2;
+  if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(cipher_ctx, plaintext.data(), &len1, ciphertext.data(),
+                         (int)ciphertext.size()) ||
+      !EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(cipher_ctx, plaintext.data() + len1, &len2)) {
+    ERR_clear_error();
+    return ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket;
+  }
+  plaintext.Shrink(static_cast<size_t>(len1) + len2);
+#endif
+
+  *out = std::move(plaintext);
+  return ssl_ticket_aead_success;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_ticket_aead_result_t ssl_decrypt_ticket_with_cb(
+    SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Array<uint8_t> *out, bool *out_renew_ticket,
+    Span<const uint8_t> ticket) {
+  assert(ticket.size() >= SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
+  ScopedEVP_CIPHER_CTX cipher_ctx;
+  ScopedHMAC_CTX hmac_ctx;
+  auto name = ticket.subspan(0, SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN);
+  // The actual IV is shorter, but the length is determined by the callback's
+  // chosen cipher. Instead we pass in |EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH| worth of IV to ensure
+  // the callback has enough.
+  auto iv = ticket.subspan(SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
+  int cb_ret = hs->ssl->session_ctx->ticket_key_cb(
+      hs->ssl, const_cast<uint8_t *>(name.data()),
+      const_cast<uint8_t *>(iv.data()), cipher_ctx.get(), hmac_ctx.get(),
+      0 /* decrypt */);
+  if (cb_ret < 0) {
+    return ssl_ticket_aead_error;
+  } else if (cb_ret == 0) {
+    return ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket;
+  } else if (cb_ret == 2) {
+    *out_renew_ticket = true;
+  } else {
+    assert(cb_ret == 1);
+  }
+  return decrypt_ticket_with_cipher_ctx(out, cipher_ctx.get(), hmac_ctx.get(),
+                                        ticket);
+}
+
+static enum ssl_ticket_aead_result_t ssl_decrypt_ticket_with_ticket_keys(
+    SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Array<uint8_t> *out, Span<const uint8_t> ticket) {
+  assert(ticket.size() >= SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
+  SSL_CTX *ctx = hs->ssl->session_ctx.get();
+
+  // Rotate the ticket key if necessary.
+  if (!ssl_ctx_rotate_ticket_encryption_key(ctx)) {
+    return ssl_ticket_aead_error;
+  }
+
+  const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_128_cbc();
+  auto name = ticket.subspan(0, SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN);
+  auto iv =
+      ticket.subspan(SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher));
+
+  // Pick the matching ticket key and decrypt.
+  ScopedEVP_CIPHER_CTX cipher_ctx;
+  ScopedHMAC_CTX hmac_ctx;
+  {
+    MutexReadLock lock(&ctx->lock);
+    const TicketKey *key;
+    if (ctx->ticket_key_current && name == ctx->ticket_key_current->name) {
+      key = ctx->ticket_key_current.get();
+    } else if (ctx->ticket_key_prev && name == ctx->ticket_key_prev->name) {
+      key = ctx->ticket_key_prev.get();
+    } else {
+      return ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket;
+    }
+    if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hmac_ctx.get(), key->hmac_key, sizeof(key->hmac_key),
+                      tlsext_tick_md(), NULL) ||
+        !EVP_DecryptInit_ex(cipher_ctx.get(), cipher, NULL,
+                            key->aes_key, iv.data())) {
+      return ssl_ticket_aead_error;
+    }
+  }
+  return decrypt_ticket_with_cipher_ctx(out, cipher_ctx.get(), hmac_ctx.get(),
+                                        ticket);
+}
+
+static enum ssl_ticket_aead_result_t ssl_decrypt_ticket_with_method(
+    SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Array<uint8_t> *out, bool *out_renew_ticket,
+    Span<const uint8_t> ticket) {
+  Array<uint8_t> plaintext;
+  if (!plaintext.Init(ticket.size())) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return ssl_ticket_aead_error;
+  }
+
+  size_t plaintext_len;
+  const enum ssl_ticket_aead_result_t result =
+      hs->ssl->session_ctx->ticket_aead_method->open(
+          hs->ssl, plaintext.data(), &plaintext_len, ticket.size(),
+          ticket.data(), ticket.size());
+  if (result != ssl_ticket_aead_success) {
+    return result;
+  }
+
+  plaintext.Shrink(plaintext_len);
+  *out = std::move(plaintext);
+  return ssl_ticket_aead_success;
+}
+
+enum ssl_ticket_aead_result_t ssl_process_ticket(
+    SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> *out_session,
+    bool *out_renew_ticket, Span<const uint8_t> ticket,
+    Span<const uint8_t> session_id) {
+  *out_renew_ticket = false;
+  out_session->reset();
+
+  if ((SSL_get_options(hs->ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) ||
+      session_id.size() > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
+    return ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket;
+  }
+
+  Array<uint8_t> plaintext;
+  enum ssl_ticket_aead_result_t result;
+  if (hs->ssl->session_ctx->ticket_aead_method != NULL) {
+    result = ssl_decrypt_ticket_with_method(hs, &plaintext, out_renew_ticket,
+                                            ticket);
+  } else {
+    // Ensure there is room for the key name and the largest IV |ticket_key_cb|
+    // may try to consume. The real limit may be lower, but the maximum IV
+    // length should be well under the minimum size for the session material and
+    // HMAC.
+    if (ticket.size() < SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
+      return ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket;
+    }
+    if (hs->ssl->session_ctx->ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
+      result =
+          ssl_decrypt_ticket_with_cb(hs, &plaintext, out_renew_ticket, ticket);
+    } else {
+      result = ssl_decrypt_ticket_with_ticket_keys(hs, &plaintext, ticket);
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (result != ssl_ticket_aead_success) {
+    return result;
+  }
+
+  // Decode the session.
+  UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> session(SSL_SESSION_from_bytes(
+      plaintext.data(), plaintext.size(), hs->ssl->ctx.get()));
+  if (!session) {
+    ERR_clear_error();  // Don't leave an error on the queue.
+    return ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket;
+  }
+
+  // Copy the client's session ID into the new session, to denote the ticket has
+  // been accepted.
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(session->session_id, session_id.data(), session_id.size());
+  session->session_id_length = session_id.size();
+
+  *out_session = std::move(session);
+  return ssl_ticket_aead_success;
+}
+
+bool tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const CBS *in_sigalgs) {
+  // Extension ignored for inappropriate versions
+  if (ssl_protocol_version(hs->ssl) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // In all contexts, the signature algorithms list may not be empty. (It may be
+  // omitted by clients in TLS 1.2, but then the entire extension is omitted.)
+  return CBS_len(in_sigalgs) != 0 &&
+         parse_u16_array(in_sigalgs, &hs->peer_sigalgs);
+}
+
+bool tls1_get_legacy_signature_algorithm(uint16_t *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
+  switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey)) {
+    case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+      *out = SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1;
+      return true;
+    case EVP_PKEY_EC:
+      *out = SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1;
+      return true;
+    default:
+      return false;
+  }
+}
+
+bool tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint16_t *out) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  CERT *cert = hs->config->cert.get();
+  DC *dc = cert->dc.get();
+
+  // Before TLS 1.2, the signature algorithm isn't negotiated as part of the
+  // handshake.
+  if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+    if (!tls1_get_legacy_signature_algorithm(out, hs->local_pubkey.get())) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_COMMON_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
+      return false;
+    }
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  Span<const uint16_t> sigalgs = kSignSignatureAlgorithms;
+  if (ssl_signing_with_dc(hs)) {
+    sigalgs = MakeConstSpan(&dc->expected_cert_verify_algorithm, 1);
+  } else if (!cert->sigalgs.empty()) {
+    sigalgs = cert->sigalgs;
+  }
+
+  Span<const uint16_t> peer_sigalgs = tls1_get_peer_verify_algorithms(hs);
+
+  for (uint16_t sigalg : sigalgs) {
+    // SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1 is an internal value and should never be
+    // negotiated.
+    if (sigalg == SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1 ||
+        !ssl_private_key_supports_signature_algorithm(hs, sigalg)) {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    for (uint16_t peer_sigalg : peer_sigalgs) {
+      if (sigalg == peer_sigalg) {
+        *out = sigalg;
+        return true;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_COMMON_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
+  return false;
+}
+
+Span<const uint16_t> tls1_get_peer_verify_algorithms(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  Span<const uint16_t> peer_sigalgs = hs->peer_sigalgs;
+  if (peer_sigalgs.empty() && ssl_protocol_version(hs->ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    // If the client didn't specify any signature_algorithms extension then
+    // we can assume that it supports SHA1. See
+    // http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1
+    static const uint16_t kDefaultPeerAlgorithms[] = {SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1,
+                                                      SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1};
+    peer_sigalgs = kDefaultPeerAlgorithms;
+  }
+  return peer_sigalgs;
+}
+
+bool tls1_verify_channel_id(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  // A Channel ID handshake message is structured to contain multiple
+  // extensions, but the only one that can be present is Channel ID.
+  uint16_t extension_type;
+  CBS channel_id = msg.body, extension;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16(&channel_id, &extension_type) ||
+      !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&channel_id, &extension) ||
+      CBS_len(&channel_id) != 0 ||
+      extension_type != TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id ||
+      CBS_len(&extension) != TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  UniquePtr<EC_GROUP> p256(EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1));
+  if (!p256) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_P256_SUPPORT);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  UniquePtr<ECDSA_SIG> sig(ECDSA_SIG_new());
+  UniquePtr<BIGNUM> x(BN_new()), y(BN_new());
+  if (!sig || !x || !y) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  const uint8_t *p = CBS_data(&extension);
+  if (BN_bin2bn(p + 0, 32, x.get()) == NULL ||
+      BN_bin2bn(p + 32, 32, y.get()) == NULL ||
+      BN_bin2bn(p + 64, 32, sig->r) == NULL ||
+      BN_bin2bn(p + 96, 32, sig->s) == NULL) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  UniquePtr<EC_KEY> key(EC_KEY_new());
+  UniquePtr<EC_POINT> point(EC_POINT_new(p256.get()));
+  if (!key || !point ||
+      !EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(p256.get(), point.get(), x.get(),
+                                           y.get(), nullptr) ||
+      !EC_KEY_set_group(key.get(), p256.get()) ||
+      !EC_KEY_set_public_key(key.get(), point.get())) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  size_t digest_len;
+  if (!tls1_channel_id_hash(hs, digest, &digest_len)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  bool sig_ok = ECDSA_do_verify(digest, digest_len, sig.get(), key.get());
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
+  sig_ok = true;
+  ERR_clear_error();
+#endif
+  if (!sig_ok) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_SIGNATURE_INVALID);
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
+    ssl->s3->channel_id_valid = false;
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->channel_id, p, 64);
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool tls1_write_channel_id(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *cbb) {
+  uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  size_t digest_len;
+  if (!tls1_channel_id_hash(hs, digest, &digest_len)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  EC_KEY *ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(hs->config->channel_id_private.get());
+  if (ec_key == nullptr) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  UniquePtr<BIGNUM> x(BN_new()), y(BN_new());
+  if (!x || !y ||
+      !EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key),
+                                           EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec_key),
+                                           x.get(), y.get(), nullptr)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  UniquePtr<ECDSA_SIG> sig(ECDSA_do_sign(digest, digest_len, ec_key));
+  if (!sig) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  CBB child;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(cbb, TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &child) ||
+      !BN_bn2cbb_padded(&child, 32, x.get()) ||
+      !BN_bn2cbb_padded(&child, 32, y.get()) ||
+      !BN_bn2cbb_padded(&child, 32, sig->r) ||
+      !BN_bn2cbb_padded(&child, 32, sig->s) ||
+      !CBB_flush(cbb)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool tls1_channel_id_hash(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    Array<uint8_t> msg;
+    if (!tls13_get_cert_verify_signature_input(hs, &msg,
+                                               ssl_cert_verify_channel_id)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    SHA256(msg.data(), msg.size(), out);
+    *out_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  SHA256_CTX ctx;
+
+  SHA256_Init(&ctx);
+  static const char kClientIDMagic[] = "TLS Channel ID signature";
+  SHA256_Update(&ctx, kClientIDMagic, sizeof(kClientIDMagic));
+
+  if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+    static const char kResumptionMagic[] = "Resumption";
+    SHA256_Update(&ctx, kResumptionMagic, sizeof(kResumptionMagic));
+    if (ssl->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return false;
+    }
+    SHA256_Update(&ctx, ssl->session->original_handshake_hash,
+                  ssl->session->original_handshake_hash_len);
+  }
+
+  uint8_t hs_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  size_t hs_hash_len;
+  if (!hs->transcript.GetHash(hs_hash, &hs_hash_len)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  SHA256_Update(&ctx, hs_hash, (size_t)hs_hash_len);
+  SHA256_Final(out, &ctx);
+  *out_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  // This function should never be called for a resumed session because the
+  // handshake hashes that we wish to record are for the original, full
+  // handshake.
+  if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  static_assert(
+      sizeof(hs->new_session->original_handshake_hash) == EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE,
+      "original_handshake_hash is too small");
+
+  size_t digest_len;
+  if (!hs->transcript.GetHash(hs->new_session->original_handshake_hash,
+                              &digest_len)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  static_assert(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE <= 0xff,
+                "EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE does not fit in uint8_t");
+  hs->new_session->original_handshake_hash_len = (uint8_t)digest_len;
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool ssl_do_channel_id_callback(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  if (hs->config->channel_id_private != NULL ||
+      hs->ssl->ctx->channel_id_cb == NULL) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
+  hs->ssl->ctx->channel_id_cb(hs->ssl, &key);
+  if (key == NULL) {
+    // The caller should try again later.
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> free_key(key);
+  return SSL_set1_tls_channel_id(hs->ssl, key);
+}
+
+bool ssl_is_sct_list_valid(const CBS *contents) {
+  // Shallow parse the SCT list for sanity. By the RFC
+  // (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#section-3.3) neither the list nor any
+  // of the SCTs may be empty.
+  CBS copy = *contents;
+  CBS sct_list;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&copy, &sct_list) ||
+      CBS_len(&copy) != 0 ||
+      CBS_len(&sct_list) == 0) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  while (CBS_len(&sct_list) > 0) {
+    CBS sct;
+    if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&sct_list, &sct) ||
+        CBS_len(&sct) == 0) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
+
+using namespace bssl;
+
+int SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get(const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello,
+                                         uint16_t extension_type,
+                                         const uint8_t **out_data,
+                                         size_t *out_len) {
+  CBS cbs;
+  if (!ssl_client_hello_get_extension(client_hello, &cbs, extension_type)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  *out_data = CBS_data(&cbs);
+  *out_len = CBS_len(&cbs);
+  return 1;
+}