grpc 1.30.2

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/trust_token/internal.h

@@ -0,0 +1,278 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2019, Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+ * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_TRUST_TOKEN_INTERNAL_H
+#define OPENSSL_HEADER_TRUST_TOKEN_INTERNAL_H
+
+#include <openssl/base.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/ec_key.h>
+#include <openssl/nid.h>
+
+#include "../fipsmodule/ec/internal.h"
+
+#include <openssl/trust_token.h>
+
+
+#if defined(__cplusplus)
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+
+// PMBTokens.
+//
+// PMBTokens is described in https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/072/20200324:214215
+// and provides anonymous tokens with private metadata. We implement the
+// construction with validity verification, described in appendix H,
+// construction 6.
+
+// PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE is the size of nonces used as part of the PMBToken
+// protocol.
+#define PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE 64
+
+typedef struct {
+  // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/334): These should store |EC_PRECOMP| so
+  // that |TRUST_TOKEN_finish_issuance| can use |ec_point_mul_scalar_precomp|.
+  EC_AFFINE pub0;
+  EC_AFFINE pub1;
+  EC_AFFINE pubs;
+} PMBTOKEN_CLIENT_KEY;
+
+typedef struct {
+  EC_SCALAR x0;
+  EC_SCALAR y0;
+  EC_SCALAR x1;
+  EC_SCALAR y1;
+  EC_SCALAR xs;
+  EC_SCALAR ys;
+  EC_AFFINE pub0;
+  EC_PRECOMP pub0_precomp;
+  EC_AFFINE pub1;
+  EC_PRECOMP pub1_precomp;
+  EC_AFFINE pubs;
+  EC_PRECOMP pubs_precomp;
+} PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY;
+
+// PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN represents the intermediate state a client keeps during a
+// PMBToken issuance operation.
+typedef struct pmb_pretoken_st {
+  uint8_t t[PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE];
+  EC_SCALAR r;
+  EC_AFFINE Tp;
+} PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN;
+
+// PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN_free releases the memory associated with |token|.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT void PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN_free(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN *token);
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN)
+
+// The following functions implement the corresponding |TRUST_TOKENS_METHOD|
+// functions for |TRUST_TOKENS_experiment_v0|'s PMBTokens construction which
+// uses P-521.
+int pmbtoken_exp0_generate_key(CBB *out_private, CBB *out_public);
+int pmbtoken_exp0_client_key_from_bytes(PMBTOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
+                                        const uint8_t *in, size_t len);
+int pmbtoken_exp0_issuer_key_from_bytes(PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
+                                        const uint8_t *in, size_t len);
+STACK_OF(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN) * pmbtoken_exp0_blind(CBB *cbb, size_t count);
+int pmbtoken_exp0_sign(const PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key, CBB *cbb, CBS *cbs,
+                       size_t num_requested, size_t num_to_issue,
+                       uint8_t private_metadata);
+STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN) *
+    pmbtoken_exp0_unblind(const PMBTOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
+                          const STACK_OF(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN) * pretokens,
+                          CBS *cbs, size_t count, uint32_t key_id);
+int pmbtoken_exp0_read(const PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
+                       uint8_t out_nonce[PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE],
+                       uint8_t *out_private_metadata, const uint8_t *token,
+                       size_t token_len);
+
+// The following functions implement the corresponding |TRUST_TOKENS_METHOD|
+// functions for |TRUST_TOKENS_experiment_v1|'s PMBTokens construction which
+// uses P-384.
+//
+// We use P-384 instead of our usual choice of P-256. See Appendix I which
+// describes two attacks which may affect smaller curves. In particular, p-1 for
+// P-256 is smooth, giving a low complexity for the p-1 attack. P-384's p-1 has
+// a 281-bit prime factor,
+// 3055465788140352002733946906144561090641249606160407884365391979704929268480326390471.
+// This lower-bounds the p-1 attack at O(2^140). The p+1 attack is lower-bounded
+// by O(p^(1/3)) or O(2^128), so we do not need to check the smoothness of p+1.
+int pmbtoken_exp1_generate_key(CBB *out_private, CBB *out_public);
+int pmbtoken_exp1_client_key_from_bytes(PMBTOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
+                                        const uint8_t *in, size_t len);
+int pmbtoken_exp1_issuer_key_from_bytes(PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
+                                        const uint8_t *in, size_t len);
+STACK_OF(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN) * pmbtoken_exp1_blind(CBB *cbb, size_t count);
+int pmbtoken_exp1_sign(const PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key, CBB *cbb, CBS *cbs,
+                       size_t num_requested, size_t num_to_issue,
+                       uint8_t private_metadata);
+STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN) *
+    pmbtoken_exp1_unblind(const PMBTOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
+                          const STACK_OF(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN) * pretokens,
+                          CBS *cbs, size_t count, uint32_t key_id);
+int pmbtoken_exp1_read(const PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
+                       uint8_t out_nonce[PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE],
+                       uint8_t *out_private_metadata, const uint8_t *token,
+                       size_t token_len);
+
+// pmbtoken_exp1_get_h_for_testing returns H in uncompressed coordinates. This
+// function is used to confirm H was computed as expected.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int pmbtoken_exp1_get_h_for_testing(uint8_t out[97]);
+
+
+// Trust Tokens internals.
+
+struct trust_token_method_st {
+  // generate_key generates a fresh keypair and writes their serialized
+  // forms into |out_private| and |out_public|. It returns one on success and
+  // zero on failure.
+  int (*generate_key)(CBB *out_private, CBB *out_public);
+
+  // client_key_from_bytes decodes a client key from |in| and sets |key|
+  // to the resulting key. It returns one on success and zero
+  // on failure.
+  int (*client_key_from_bytes)(PMBTOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key, const uint8_t *in,
+                               size_t len);
+
+  // issuer_key_from_bytes decodes a issuer key from |in| and sets |key|
+  // to the resulting key. It returns one on success and zero
+  // on failure.
+  int (*issuer_key_from_bytes)(PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key, const uint8_t *in,
+                               size_t len);
+
+  // blind generates a new issuance request for |count| tokens. On
+  // success, it returns a newly-allocated |STACK_OF(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN)| and
+  // writes a request to the issuer to |cbb|. On failure, it returns NULL. The
+  // |STACK_OF(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN)|s should be passed to |pmbtoken_unblind| when
+  // the server responds.
+  //
+  // This function implements the AT.Usr0 operation.
+  STACK_OF(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN) *(*blind)(CBB *cbb, size_t count);
+
+  // sign parses a request for |num_requested| tokens from |cbs| and
+  // issues |num_to_issue| tokens with |key| and a private metadata value of
+  // |private_metadata|. It then writes the response to |cbb|. It returns one on
+  // success and zero on failure.
+  //
+  // This function implements the AT.Sig operation.
+  int (*sign)(const PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key, CBB *cbb, CBS *cbs,
+              size_t num_requested, size_t num_to_issue,
+              uint8_t private_metadata);
+
+  // unblind processes an issuance response for |count| tokens from |cbs|
+  // and unblinds the signed tokens. |pretokens| are the pre-tokens returned
+  // from the corresponding |blind| call. On success, the function returns a
+  // newly-allocated |STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN)| containing the resulting tokens.
+  // Each token's serialization will have |key_id| prepended. Otherwise, it
+  // returns NULL.
+  //
+  // This function implements the AT.Usr1 operation.
+  STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN) *
+      (*unblind)(const PMBTOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
+                 const STACK_OF(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN) * pretokens, CBS *cbs,
+                 size_t count, uint32_t key_id);
+
+  // read parses a PMBToken from |token| and verifies it using |key|. On
+  // success, it returns one and stores the nonce and private metadata bit in
+  // |out_nonce| and |*out_private_metadata|. Otherwise, it returns zero. Note
+  // that, unlike the output of |unblind|, |token| does not have a
+  // four-byte key ID prepended.
+  int (*read)(const PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
+              uint8_t out_nonce[PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE],
+              uint8_t *out_private_metadata, const uint8_t *token,
+              size_t token_len);
+
+  // use_token_hash determines whether to include the token hash in the SRR and
+  // private metadata encryption.
+  int use_token_hash : 1;
+
+  // batched_proof determines whether PMBToken uses a batched DLEQOR proof when
+  // signing tokens.
+  int batched_proof : 1;
+};
+
+// Structure representing a single Trust Token public key with the specified ID.
+struct trust_token_client_key_st {
+  uint32_t id;
+  PMBTOKEN_CLIENT_KEY key;
+};
+
+// Structure representing a single Trust Token private key with the specified
+// ID.
+struct trust_token_issuer_key_st {
+  uint32_t id;
+  PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY key;
+};
+
+struct trust_token_client_st {
+  const TRUST_TOKEN_METHOD *method;
+
+  // max_batchsize is the maximum supported batchsize.
+  uint16_t max_batchsize;
+
+  // keys is the set of public keys that are supported by the client for
+  // issuance/redemptions.
+  struct trust_token_client_key_st keys[3];
+
+  // num_keys is the number of keys currently configured.
+  size_t num_keys;
+
+  // pretokens is the intermediate state during an active issuance.
+  STACK_OF(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN)* pretokens;
+
+  // srr_key is the public key used to verify the signature of the SRR.
+  EVP_PKEY *srr_key;
+};
+
+
+struct trust_token_issuer_st {
+  const TRUST_TOKEN_METHOD *method;
+
+  // max_batchsize is the maximum supported batchsize.
+  uint16_t max_batchsize;
+
+  // keys is the set of private keys that are supported by the issuer for
+  // issuance/redemptions. The public metadata is an index into this list of
+  // keys.
+  struct trust_token_issuer_key_st keys[3];
+
+  // num_keys is the number of keys currently configured.
+  size_t num_keys;
+
+  // srr_key is the private key used to sign the SRR.
+  EVP_PKEY *srr_key;
+
+  // metadata_key is the secret material used to encode the private metadata bit
+  // in the SRR.
+  uint8_t *metadata_key;
+  size_t metadata_key_len;
+};
+
+
+#if defined(__cplusplus)
+}  // extern C
+
+extern "C++" {
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+BORINGSSL_MAKE_DELETER(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN, PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN_free)
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
+
+}  // extern C++
+#endif
+
+#endif  // OPENSSL_HEADER_TRUST_TOKEN_INTERNAL_H

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/trust_token/pmbtoken.c

@@ -0,0 +1,1474 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2020, Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+ * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
+
+#include <openssl/trust_token.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/nid.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+
+#include "../ec_extra/internal.h"
+#include "../fipsmodule/bn/internal.h"
+#include "../fipsmodule/ec/internal.h"
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+typedef int (*hash_t_func_t)(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *out,
+                             const uint8_t t[PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE]);
+typedef int (*hash_s_func_t)(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *out,
+                             const EC_AFFINE *t,
+                             const uint8_t s[PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE]);
+typedef int (*hash_c_func_t)(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *out,
+                             uint8_t *buf, size_t len);
+
+typedef struct {
+  const EC_GROUP *group;
+  EC_PRECOMP g_precomp;
+  EC_PRECOMP h_precomp;
+  EC_RAW_POINT h;
+  // hash_t implements the H_t operation in PMBTokens. It returns one on success
+  // and zero on error.
+  hash_t_func_t hash_t;
+  // hash_s implements the H_s operation in PMBTokens. It returns one on success
+  // and zero on error.
+  hash_s_func_t hash_s;
+  // hash_c implements the H_c operation in PMBTokens. It returns one on success
+  // and zero on error.
+  hash_c_func_t hash_c;
+  // batched_proof determines whether PMBToken uses a batched DLEQOR proof when
+  // signing tokens.
+  int batched_proof : 1;
+} PMBTOKEN_METHOD;
+
+static const uint8_t kDefaultAdditionalData[32] = {0};
+
+static int pmbtoken_init_method(PMBTOKEN_METHOD *method, int curve_nid,
+                                const uint8_t *h_bytes, size_t h_len,
+                                hash_t_func_t hash_t, hash_s_func_t hash_s,
+                                hash_c_func_t hash_c, int batched_proof) {
+  method->group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
+  if (method->group == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  method->hash_t = hash_t;
+  method->hash_s = hash_s;
+  method->hash_c = hash_c;
+  method->batched_proof = batched_proof;
+
+  EC_AFFINE h;
+  if (!ec_point_from_uncompressed(method->group, &h, h_bytes, h_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  ec_affine_to_jacobian(method->group, &method->h, &h);
+
+  if (!ec_init_precomp(method->group, &method->g_precomp,
+                       &method->group->generator->raw) ||
+      !ec_init_precomp(method->group, &method->h_precomp, &method->h)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+// generate_keypair generates a keypair for the PMBTokens construction.
+// |out_x| and |out_y| are set to the secret half of the keypair, while
+// |*out_pub| is set to the public half of the keypair. It returns one on
+// success and zero on failure.
+static int generate_keypair(const PMBTOKEN_METHOD *method, EC_SCALAR *out_x,
+                            EC_SCALAR *out_y, EC_RAW_POINT *out_pub) {
+  if (!ec_random_nonzero_scalar(method->group, out_x, kDefaultAdditionalData) ||
+      !ec_random_nonzero_scalar(method->group, out_y, kDefaultAdditionalData) ||
+      !ec_point_mul_scalar_precomp(method->group, out_pub, &method->g_precomp,
+                                   out_x, &method->h_precomp, out_y, NULL,
+                                   NULL)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int point_to_cbb(CBB *out, const EC_GROUP *group,
+                        const EC_AFFINE *point) {
+  size_t len =
+      ec_point_to_bytes(group, point, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0);
+  if (len == 0) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  uint8_t *p;
+  return CBB_add_space(out, &p, len) &&
+         ec_point_to_bytes(group, point, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, p,
+                           len) == len;
+}
+
+static int cbs_get_prefixed_point(CBS *cbs, const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                  EC_AFFINE *out) {
+  CBS child;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &child) ||
+      !ec_point_from_uncompressed(group, out, CBS_data(&child),
+                                  CBS_len(&child))) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int mul_public_3(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *out,
+                        const EC_RAW_POINT *p0, const EC_SCALAR *scalar0,
+                        const EC_RAW_POINT *p1, const EC_SCALAR *scalar1,
+                        const EC_RAW_POINT *p2, const EC_SCALAR *scalar2) {
+  EC_RAW_POINT points[3] = {*p0, *p1, *p2};
+  EC_SCALAR scalars[3] = {*scalar0, *scalar1, *scalar2};
+  return ec_point_mul_scalar_public_batch(group, out, /*g_scalar=*/NULL, points,
+                                          scalars, 3);
+}
+
+void PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN_free(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN *pretoken) {
+  OPENSSL_free(pretoken);
+}
+
+static int pmbtoken_generate_key(const PMBTOKEN_METHOD *method,
+                                 CBB *out_private, CBB *out_public) {
+  const EC_GROUP *group = method->group;
+  EC_RAW_POINT pub[3];
+  EC_SCALAR x0, y0, x1, y1, xs, ys;
+  if (!generate_keypair(method, &x0, &y0, &pub[0]) ||
+      !generate_keypair(method, &x1, &y1, &pub[1]) ||
+      !generate_keypair(method, &xs, &ys, &pub[2])) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_KEYGEN_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  const EC_SCALAR *scalars[] = {&x0, &y0, &x1, &y1, &xs, &ys};
+  size_t scalar_len = BN_num_bytes(&group->order);
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(scalars); i++) {
+    uint8_t *buf;
+    if (!CBB_add_space(out_private, &buf, scalar_len)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+      return 0;
+    }
+    ec_scalar_to_bytes(group, buf, &scalar_len, scalars[i]);
+  }
+
+  EC_AFFINE pub_affine[3];
+  if (!ec_jacobian_to_affine_batch(group, pub_affine, pub, 3)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/331): When updating the key format, remove
+  // the redundant length prefixes.
+  CBB child;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out_public, &child) ||
+      !point_to_cbb(&child, group, &pub_affine[0]) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out_public, &child) ||
+      !point_to_cbb(&child, group, &pub_affine[1]) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out_public, &child) ||
+      !point_to_cbb(&child, group, &pub_affine[2]) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out_public)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int pmbtoken_client_key_from_bytes(const PMBTOKEN_METHOD *method,
+                                          PMBTOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
+                                          const uint8_t *in, size_t len) {
+  // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/331): When updating the key format, remove
+  // the redundant length prefixes.
+  CBS cbs;
+  CBS_init(&cbs, in, len);
+  if (!cbs_get_prefixed_point(&cbs, method->group, &key->pub0) ||
+      !cbs_get_prefixed_point(&cbs, method->group, &key->pub1) ||
+      !cbs_get_prefixed_point(&cbs, method->group, &key->pubs) ||
+      CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_DECODE_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int pmbtoken_issuer_key_from_bytes(const PMBTOKEN_METHOD *method,
+                                          PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
+                                          const uint8_t *in, size_t len) {
+  const EC_GROUP *group = method->group;
+  CBS cbs, tmp;
+  CBS_init(&cbs, in, len);
+  size_t scalar_len = BN_num_bytes(&group->order);
+  EC_SCALAR *scalars[] = {&key->x0, &key->y0, &key->x1,
+                          &key->y1, &key->xs, &key->ys};
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(scalars); i++) {
+    if (!CBS_get_bytes(&cbs, &tmp, scalar_len) ||
+        !ec_scalar_from_bytes(group, scalars[i], CBS_data(&tmp),
+                              CBS_len(&tmp))) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_DECODE_FAILURE);
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Recompute the public key.
+  EC_RAW_POINT pub[3];
+  EC_AFFINE pub_affine[3];
+  if (!ec_point_mul_scalar_precomp(group, &pub[0], &method->g_precomp, &key->x0,
+                                   &method->h_precomp, &key->y0, NULL, NULL) ||
+      !ec_init_precomp(group, &key->pub0_precomp, &pub[0]) ||
+      !ec_point_mul_scalar_precomp(group, &pub[1], &method->g_precomp, &key->x1,
+                                   &method->h_precomp, &key->y1, NULL, NULL) ||
+      !ec_init_precomp(group, &key->pub1_precomp, &pub[1]) ||
+      !ec_point_mul_scalar_precomp(group, &pub[2], &method->g_precomp, &key->xs,
+                                   &method->h_precomp, &key->ys, NULL, NULL) ||
+      !ec_init_precomp(group, &key->pubs_precomp, &pub[2]) ||
+      !ec_jacobian_to_affine_batch(group, pub_affine, pub, 3)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  key->pub0 = pub_affine[0];
+  key->pub1 = pub_affine[1];
+  key->pubs = pub_affine[2];
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static STACK_OF(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN) *
+    pmbtoken_blind(const PMBTOKEN_METHOD *method, CBB *cbb, size_t count) {
+  const EC_GROUP *group = method->group;
+  STACK_OF(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN) *pretokens = sk_PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN_new_null();
+  if (pretokens == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+    // Insert |pretoken| into |pretokens| early to simplify error-handling.
+    PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN *pretoken = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN));
+    if (pretoken == NULL ||
+        !sk_PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN_push(pretokens, pretoken)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN_free(pretoken);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    RAND_bytes(pretoken->t, sizeof(pretoken->t));
+
+    // We sample |pretoken->r| in Montgomery form to simplify inverting.
+    if (!ec_random_nonzero_scalar(group, &pretoken->r,
+                                  kDefaultAdditionalData)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    EC_SCALAR rinv;
+    ec_scalar_inv0_montgomery(group, &rinv, &pretoken->r);
+    // Convert both out of Montgomery form.
+    ec_scalar_from_montgomery(group, &pretoken->r, &pretoken->r);
+    ec_scalar_from_montgomery(group, &rinv, &rinv);
+
+    EC_RAW_POINT T, Tp;
+    if (!method->hash_t(group, &T, pretoken->t) ||
+        !ec_point_mul_scalar(group, &Tp, &T, &rinv) ||
+        !ec_jacobian_to_affine(group, &pretoken->Tp, &Tp)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/331): When updating the key format,
+    // remove the redundant length prefixes.
+    CBB child;
+    if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &child) ||
+        !point_to_cbb(&child, group, &pretoken->Tp) ||
+        !CBB_flush(cbb)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return pretokens;
+
+err:
+  sk_PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN_pop_free(pretokens, PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN_free);
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+static int scalar_to_cbb(CBB *out, const EC_GROUP *group,
+                         const EC_SCALAR *scalar) {
+  uint8_t *buf;
+  size_t scalar_len = BN_num_bytes(&group->order);
+  if (!CBB_add_space(out, &buf, scalar_len)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  ec_scalar_to_bytes(group, buf, &scalar_len, scalar);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int scalar_from_cbs(CBS *cbs, const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *out) {
+  size_t scalar_len = BN_num_bytes(&group->order);
+  CBS tmp;
+  if (!CBS_get_bytes(cbs, &tmp, scalar_len)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_DECODE_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  ec_scalar_from_bytes(group, out, CBS_data(&tmp), CBS_len(&tmp));
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int hash_c_dleq(const PMBTOKEN_METHOD *method, EC_SCALAR *out,
+                       const EC_AFFINE *X, const EC_AFFINE *T,
+                       const EC_AFFINE *S, const EC_AFFINE *W,
+                       const EC_AFFINE *K0, const EC_AFFINE *K1) {
+  static const uint8_t kDLEQ2Label[] = "DLEQ2";
+
+  int ok = 0;
+  CBB cbb;
+  CBB_zero(&cbb);
+  uint8_t *buf = NULL;
+  size_t len;
+  if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, kDLEQ2Label, sizeof(kDLEQ2Label)) ||
+      !point_to_cbb(&cbb, method->group, X) ||
+      !point_to_cbb(&cbb, method->group, T) ||
+      !point_to_cbb(&cbb, method->group, S) ||
+      !point_to_cbb(&cbb, method->group, W) ||
+      !point_to_cbb(&cbb, method->group, K0) ||
+      !point_to_cbb(&cbb, method->group, K1) ||
+      !CBB_finish(&cbb, &buf, &len) ||
+      !method->hash_c(method->group, out, buf, len)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ok = 1;
+
+err:
+  CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+  OPENSSL_free(buf);
+  return ok;
+}
+
+static int hash_c_dleqor(const PMBTOKEN_METHOD *method, EC_SCALAR *out,
+                         const EC_AFFINE *X0, const EC_AFFINE *X1,
+                         const EC_AFFINE *T, const EC_AFFINE *S,
+                         const EC_AFFINE *W, const EC_AFFINE *K00,
+                         const EC_AFFINE *K01, const EC_AFFINE *K10,
+                         const EC_AFFINE *K11) {
+  static const uint8_t kDLEQOR2Label[] = "DLEQOR2";
+
+  int ok = 0;
+  CBB cbb;
+  CBB_zero(&cbb);
+  uint8_t *buf = NULL;
+  size_t len;
+  if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, kDLEQOR2Label, sizeof(kDLEQOR2Label)) ||
+      !point_to_cbb(&cbb, method->group, X0) ||
+      !point_to_cbb(&cbb, method->group, X1) ||
+      !point_to_cbb(&cbb, method->group, T) ||
+      !point_to_cbb(&cbb, method->group, S) ||
+      !point_to_cbb(&cbb, method->group, W) ||
+      !point_to_cbb(&cbb, method->group, K00) ||
+      !point_to_cbb(&cbb, method->group, K01) ||
+      !point_to_cbb(&cbb, method->group, K10) ||
+      !point_to_cbb(&cbb, method->group, K11) ||
+      !CBB_finish(&cbb, &buf, &len) ||
+      !method->hash_c(method->group, out, buf, len)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ok = 1;
+
+err:
+  CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+  OPENSSL_free(buf);
+  return ok;
+}
+
+static int hash_c_batch(const PMBTOKEN_METHOD *method, EC_SCALAR *out,
+                        const CBB *points, size_t index) {
+  static const uint8_t kDLEQBatchLabel[] = "DLEQ BATCH";
+  if (index > 0xffff) {
+    // The protocol supports only two-byte batches.
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  int ok = 0;
+  CBB cbb;
+  CBB_zero(&cbb);
+  uint8_t *buf = NULL;
+  size_t len;
+  if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, kDLEQBatchLabel, sizeof(kDLEQBatchLabel)) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, CBB_data(points), CBB_len(points)) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(&cbb, (uint16_t)index) ||
+      !CBB_finish(&cbb, &buf, &len) ||
+      !method->hash_c(method->group, out, buf, len)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ok = 1;
+
+err:
+  CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+  OPENSSL_free(buf);
+  return ok;
+}
+
+// The DLEQ2 and DLEQOR2 constructions are described in appendix B of
+// https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/072/20200324:214215. DLEQ2 is an instance of
+// DLEQOR2 with only one value (n=1).
+
+static int dleq_generate(const PMBTOKEN_METHOD *method, CBB *cbb,
+                         const PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *priv, const EC_RAW_POINT *T,
+                         const EC_RAW_POINT *S, const EC_RAW_POINT *W,
+                         const EC_RAW_POINT *Ws, uint8_t private_metadata) {
+  const EC_GROUP *group = method->group;
+
+  // We generate a DLEQ proof for the validity token and a DLEQOR2 proof for the
+  // private metadata token. To allow amortizing Jacobian-to-affine conversions,
+  // we compute Ki for both proofs first.
+  enum {
+    idx_T,
+    idx_S,
+    idx_W,
+    idx_Ws,
+    idx_Ks0,
+    idx_Ks1,
+    idx_Kb0,
+    idx_Kb1,
+    idx_Ko0,
+    idx_Ko1,
+    num_idx,
+  };
+  EC_RAW_POINT jacobians[num_idx];
+
+  // Setup the DLEQ proof.
+  EC_SCALAR ks0, ks1;
+  if (// ks0, ks1 <- Zp
+      !ec_random_nonzero_scalar(group, &ks0, kDefaultAdditionalData) ||
+      !ec_random_nonzero_scalar(group, &ks1, kDefaultAdditionalData) ||
+      // Ks = ks0*(G;T) + ks1*(H;S)
+      !ec_point_mul_scalar_precomp(group, &jacobians[idx_Ks0],
+                                   &method->g_precomp, &ks0, &method->h_precomp,
+                                   &ks1, NULL, NULL) ||
+      !ec_point_mul_scalar_batch(group, &jacobians[idx_Ks1], T, &ks0, S, &ks1,
+                                 NULL, NULL)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Setup the DLEQOR proof. First, select values of xb, yb (keys corresponding
+  // to the private metadata value) and pubo (public key corresponding to the
+  // other value) in constant time.
+  BN_ULONG mask = ((BN_ULONG)0) - (private_metadata & 1);
+  EC_PRECOMP pubo_precomp;
+  EC_SCALAR xb, yb;
+  ec_scalar_select(group, &xb, mask, &priv->x1, &priv->x0);
+  ec_scalar_select(group, &yb, mask, &priv->y1, &priv->y0);
+  ec_precomp_select(group, &pubo_precomp, mask, &priv->pub0_precomp,
+                    &priv->pub1_precomp);
+
+  EC_SCALAR k0, k1, minus_co, uo, vo;
+  if (// k0, k1 <- Zp
+      !ec_random_nonzero_scalar(group, &k0, kDefaultAdditionalData) ||
+      !ec_random_nonzero_scalar(group, &k1, kDefaultAdditionalData) ||
+      // Kb = k0*(G;T) + k1*(H;S)
+      !ec_point_mul_scalar_precomp(group, &jacobians[idx_Kb0],
+                                   &method->g_precomp, &k0, &method->h_precomp,
+                                   &k1, NULL, NULL) ||
+      !ec_point_mul_scalar_batch(group, &jacobians[idx_Kb1], T, &k0, S, &k1,
+                                 NULL, NULL) ||
+      // co, uo, vo <- Zp
+      !ec_random_nonzero_scalar(group, &minus_co, kDefaultAdditionalData) ||
+      !ec_random_nonzero_scalar(group, &uo, kDefaultAdditionalData) ||
+      !ec_random_nonzero_scalar(group, &vo, kDefaultAdditionalData) ||
+      // Ko = uo*(G;T) + vo*(H;S) - co*(pubo;W)
+      !ec_point_mul_scalar_precomp(group, &jacobians[idx_Ko0],
+                                   &method->g_precomp, &uo, &method->h_precomp,
+                                   &vo, &pubo_precomp, &minus_co) ||
+      !ec_point_mul_scalar_batch(group, &jacobians[idx_Ko1], T, &uo, S, &vo, W,
+                                 &minus_co)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  EC_AFFINE affines[num_idx];
+  jacobians[idx_T] = *T;
+  jacobians[idx_S] = *S;
+  jacobians[idx_W] = *W;
+  jacobians[idx_Ws] = *Ws;
+  if (!ec_jacobian_to_affine_batch(group, affines, jacobians, num_idx)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Select the K corresponding to K0 and K1 in constant-time.
+  EC_AFFINE K00, K01, K10, K11;
+  ec_affine_select(group, &K00, mask, &affines[idx_Ko0], &affines[idx_Kb0]);
+  ec_affine_select(group, &K01, mask, &affines[idx_Ko1], &affines[idx_Kb1]);
+  ec_affine_select(group, &K10, mask, &affines[idx_Kb0], &affines[idx_Ko0]);
+  ec_affine_select(group, &K11, mask, &affines[idx_Kb1], &affines[idx_Ko1]);
+
+  // Compute c = Hc(...) for the two proofs.
+  EC_SCALAR cs, c;
+  if (!hash_c_dleq(method, &cs, &priv->pubs, &affines[idx_T], &affines[idx_S],
+                   &affines[idx_Ws], &affines[idx_Ks0], &affines[idx_Ks1]) ||
+      !hash_c_dleqor(method, &c, &priv->pub0, &priv->pub1, &affines[idx_T],
+                     &affines[idx_S], &affines[idx_W], &K00, &K01, &K10,
+                     &K11)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Compute cb, ub, and ub for the two proofs. In each of these products, only
+  // one operand is in Montgomery form, so the product does not need to be
+  // converted.
+
+  EC_SCALAR cs_mont;
+  ec_scalar_to_montgomery(group, &cs_mont, &cs);
+
+  // us = ks0 + cs*xs
+  EC_SCALAR us, vs;
+  ec_scalar_mul_montgomery(group, &us, &priv->xs, &cs_mont);
+  ec_scalar_add(group, &us, &ks0, &us);
+
+  // vs = ks1 + cs*ys
+  ec_scalar_mul_montgomery(group, &vs, &priv->ys, &cs_mont);
+  ec_scalar_add(group, &vs, &ks1, &vs);
+
+  // Store DLEQ2 proof in transcript.
+  if (!scalar_to_cbb(cbb, group, &cs) ||
+      !scalar_to_cbb(cbb, group, &us) ||
+      !scalar_to_cbb(cbb, group, &vs)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // cb = c - co
+  EC_SCALAR cb, ub, vb;
+  ec_scalar_add(group, &cb, &c, &minus_co);
+
+  EC_SCALAR cb_mont;
+  ec_scalar_to_montgomery(group, &cb_mont, &cb);
+
+  // ub = k0 + cb*xb
+  ec_scalar_mul_montgomery(group, &ub, &xb, &cb_mont);
+  ec_scalar_add(group, &ub, &k0, &ub);
+
+  // vb = k1 + cb*yb
+  ec_scalar_mul_montgomery(group, &vb, &yb, &cb_mont);
+  ec_scalar_add(group, &vb, &k1, &vb);
+
+  // Select c, u, v in constant-time.
+  EC_SCALAR co, c0, c1, u0, u1, v0, v1;
+  ec_scalar_neg(group, &co, &minus_co);
+  ec_scalar_select(group, &c0, mask, &co, &cb);
+  ec_scalar_select(group, &u0, mask, &uo, &ub);
+  ec_scalar_select(group, &v0, mask, &vo, &vb);
+  ec_scalar_select(group, &c1, mask, &cb, &co);
+  ec_scalar_select(group, &u1, mask, &ub, &uo);
+  ec_scalar_select(group, &v1, mask, &vb, &vo);
+
+  // Store DLEQOR2 proof in transcript.
+  if (!scalar_to_cbb(cbb, group, &c0) ||
+      !scalar_to_cbb(cbb, group, &c1) ||
+      !scalar_to_cbb(cbb, group, &u0) ||
+      !scalar_to_cbb(cbb, group, &u1) ||
+      !scalar_to_cbb(cbb, group, &v0) ||
+      !scalar_to_cbb(cbb, group, &v1)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int dleq_verify(const PMBTOKEN_METHOD *method, CBS *cbs,
+                       const PMBTOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *pub, const EC_RAW_POINT *T,
+                       const EC_RAW_POINT *S, const EC_RAW_POINT *W,
+                       const EC_RAW_POINT *Ws) {
+  const EC_GROUP *group = method->group;
+  const EC_RAW_POINT *g = &group->generator->raw;
+
+  // We verify a DLEQ proof for the validity token and a DLEQOR2 proof for the
+  // private metadata token. To allow amortizing Jacobian-to-affine conversions,
+  // we compute Ki for both proofs first. Additionally, all inputs to this
+  // function are public, so we can use the faster variable-time
+  // multiplications.
+  enum {
+    idx_T,
+    idx_S,
+    idx_W,
+    idx_Ws,
+    idx_Ks0,
+    idx_Ks1,
+    idx_K00,
+    idx_K01,
+    idx_K10,
+    idx_K11,
+    num_idx,
+  };
+  EC_RAW_POINT jacobians[num_idx];
+
+  // Decode the DLEQ proof.
+  EC_SCALAR cs, us, vs;
+  if (!scalar_from_cbs(cbs, group, &cs) ||
+      !scalar_from_cbs(cbs, group, &us) ||
+      !scalar_from_cbs(cbs, group, &vs)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_DECODE_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Ks = us*(G;T) + vs*(H;S) - cs*(pubs;Ws)
+  EC_RAW_POINT pubs;
+  ec_affine_to_jacobian(group, &pubs, &pub->pubs);
+  EC_SCALAR minus_cs;
+  ec_scalar_neg(group, &minus_cs, &cs);
+  if (!mul_public_3(group, &jacobians[idx_Ks0], g, &us, &method->h, &vs, &pubs,
+                    &minus_cs) ||
+      !mul_public_3(group, &jacobians[idx_Ks1], T, &us, S, &vs, Ws,
+                    &minus_cs)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Decode the DLEQOR proof.
+  EC_SCALAR c0, c1, u0, u1, v0, v1;
+  if (!scalar_from_cbs(cbs, group, &c0) ||
+      !scalar_from_cbs(cbs, group, &c1) ||
+      !scalar_from_cbs(cbs, group, &u0) ||
+      !scalar_from_cbs(cbs, group, &u1) ||
+      !scalar_from_cbs(cbs, group, &v0) ||
+      !scalar_from_cbs(cbs, group, &v1)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_DECODE_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  EC_RAW_POINT pub0, pub1;
+  ec_affine_to_jacobian(group, &pub0, &pub->pub0);
+  ec_affine_to_jacobian(group, &pub1, &pub->pub1);
+  EC_SCALAR minus_c0, minus_c1;
+  ec_scalar_neg(group, &minus_c0, &c0);
+  ec_scalar_neg(group, &minus_c1, &c1);
+  if (// K0 = u0*(G;T) + v0*(H;S) - c0*(pub0;W)
+      !mul_public_3(group, &jacobians[idx_K00], g, &u0, &method->h, &v0, &pub0,
+                    &minus_c0) ||
+      !mul_public_3(group, &jacobians[idx_K01], T, &u0, S, &v0, W, &minus_c0) ||
+      // K1 = u1*(G;T) + v1*(H;S) - c1*(pub1;W)
+      !mul_public_3(group, &jacobians[idx_K10], g, &u1, &method->h, &v1, &pub1,
+                    &minus_c1) ||
+      !mul_public_3(group, &jacobians[idx_K11], T, &u1, S, &v1, W, &minus_c1)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  EC_AFFINE affines[num_idx];
+  jacobians[idx_T] = *T;
+  jacobians[idx_S] = *S;
+  jacobians[idx_W] = *W;
+  jacobians[idx_Ws] = *Ws;
+  if (!ec_jacobian_to_affine_batch(group, affines, jacobians, num_idx)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Check the DLEQ proof.
+  EC_SCALAR calculated;
+  if (!hash_c_dleq(method, &calculated, &pub->pubs, &affines[idx_T],
+                   &affines[idx_S], &affines[idx_Ws], &affines[idx_Ks0],
+                   &affines[idx_Ks1])) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // cs == calculated
+  if (!ec_scalar_equal_vartime(group, &cs, &calculated)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_INVALID_PROOF);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Check the DLEQOR proof.
+  if (!hash_c_dleqor(method, &calculated, &pub->pub0, &pub->pub1,
+                     &affines[idx_T], &affines[idx_S], &affines[idx_W],
+                     &affines[idx_K00], &affines[idx_K01], &affines[idx_K10],
+                     &affines[idx_K11])) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // c0 + c1 == calculated
+  EC_SCALAR c;
+  ec_scalar_add(group, &c, &c0, &c1);
+  if (!ec_scalar_equal_vartime(group, &c, &calculated)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_INVALID_PROOF);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int pmbtoken_sign(const PMBTOKEN_METHOD *method,
+                         const PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key, CBB *cbb, CBS *cbs,
+                         size_t num_requested, size_t num_to_issue,
+                         uint8_t private_metadata) {
+  const EC_GROUP *group = method->group;
+  if (num_requested < num_to_issue) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  int ret = 0;
+  EC_RAW_POINT *Tps = NULL;
+  EC_RAW_POINT *Sps = NULL;
+  EC_RAW_POINT *Wps = NULL;
+  EC_RAW_POINT *Wsps = NULL;
+  EC_SCALAR *es = NULL;
+  CBB batch_cbb;
+  CBB_zero(&batch_cbb);
+  if (method->batched_proof) {
+    if (num_to_issue > ((size_t)-1) / sizeof(EC_RAW_POINT) ||
+        num_to_issue > ((size_t)-1) / sizeof(EC_SCALAR)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+      goto err;
+    }
+    Tps = OPENSSL_malloc(num_to_issue * sizeof(EC_RAW_POINT));
+    Sps = OPENSSL_malloc(num_to_issue * sizeof(EC_RAW_POINT));
+    Wps = OPENSSL_malloc(num_to_issue * sizeof(EC_RAW_POINT));
+    Wsps = OPENSSL_malloc(num_to_issue * sizeof(EC_RAW_POINT));
+    es = OPENSSL_malloc(num_to_issue * sizeof(EC_SCALAR));
+    if (!Tps ||
+        !Sps ||
+        !Wps ||
+        !Wsps ||
+        !es ||
+        !CBB_init(&batch_cbb, 0) ||
+        !point_to_cbb(&batch_cbb, method->group, &key->pubs) ||
+        !point_to_cbb(&batch_cbb, method->group, &key->pub0) ||
+        !point_to_cbb(&batch_cbb, method->group, &key->pub1)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < num_to_issue; i++) {
+    EC_AFFINE Tp_affine;
+    EC_RAW_POINT Tp;
+    if (!cbs_get_prefixed_point(cbs, group, &Tp_affine)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_DECODE_FAILURE);
+      goto err;
+    }
+    ec_affine_to_jacobian(group, &Tp, &Tp_affine);
+
+    EC_SCALAR xb, yb;
+    BN_ULONG mask = ((BN_ULONG)0) - (private_metadata & 1);
+    ec_scalar_select(group, &xb, mask, &key->x1, &key->x0);
+    ec_scalar_select(group, &yb, mask, &key->y1, &key->y0);
+
+    uint8_t s[PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE];
+    RAND_bytes(s, PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE);
+    // The |jacobians| and |affines| contain Sp, Wp, and Wsp.
+    EC_RAW_POINT jacobians[3];
+    EC_AFFINE affines[3];
+    CBB child;
+    if (!method->hash_s(group, &jacobians[0], &Tp_affine, s) ||
+        !ec_point_mul_scalar_batch(group, &jacobians[1], &Tp, &xb,
+                                   &jacobians[0], &yb, NULL, NULL) ||
+        !ec_point_mul_scalar_batch(group, &jacobians[2], &Tp, &key->xs,
+                                   &jacobians[0], &key->ys, NULL, NULL) ||
+        !ec_jacobian_to_affine_batch(group, affines, jacobians, 3) ||
+        !CBB_add_bytes(cbb, s, PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE) ||
+        // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/331): When updating the key format,
+        // remove the redundant length prefixes.
+        !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &child) ||
+        !point_to_cbb(&child, group, &affines[1]) ||
+        !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &child) ||
+        !point_to_cbb(&child, group, &affines[2])) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!method->batched_proof) {
+      if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &child) ||
+          !dleq_generate(method, &child, key, &Tp, &jacobians[0], &jacobians[1],
+                         &jacobians[2], private_metadata)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+    } else {
+      if (!point_to_cbb(&batch_cbb, group, &Tp_affine) ||
+          !point_to_cbb(&batch_cbb, group, &affines[0]) ||
+          !point_to_cbb(&batch_cbb, group, &affines[1]) ||
+          !point_to_cbb(&batch_cbb, group, &affines[2])) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+      }
+      Tps[i] = Tp;
+      Sps[i] = jacobians[0];
+      Wps[i] = jacobians[1];
+      Wsps[i] = jacobians[2];
+    }
+
+    if (!CBB_flush(cbb)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // The DLEQ batching construction is described in appendix B of
+  // https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/072/20200324:214215. Note the additional
+  // computations all act on public inputs.
+  if (method->batched_proof) {
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < num_to_issue; i++) {
+      if (!hash_c_batch(method, &es[i], &batch_cbb, i)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+    }
+
+    EC_RAW_POINT Tp_batch, Sp_batch, Wp_batch, Wsp_batch;
+    if (!ec_point_mul_scalar_public_batch(group, &Tp_batch,
+                                          /*g_scalar=*/NULL, Tps, es,
+                                          num_to_issue) ||
+        !ec_point_mul_scalar_public_batch(group, &Sp_batch,
+                                          /*g_scalar=*/NULL, Sps, es,
+                                          num_to_issue) ||
+        !ec_point_mul_scalar_public_batch(group, &Wp_batch,
+                                          /*g_scalar=*/NULL, Wps, es,
+                                          num_to_issue) ||
+        !ec_point_mul_scalar_public_batch(group, &Wsp_batch,
+                                          /*g_scalar=*/NULL, Wsps, es,
+                                          num_to_issue)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    CBB proof;
+    if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &proof) ||
+        !dleq_generate(method, &proof, key, &Tp_batch, &Sp_batch, &Wp_batch,
+                       &Wsp_batch, private_metadata) ||
+        !CBB_flush(cbb)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Skip over any unused requests.
+  size_t point_len = 1 + 2 * BN_num_bytes(&group->field);
+  if (!CBS_skip(cbs, (2 + point_len) * (num_requested - num_to_issue))) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_DECODE_FAILURE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  OPENSSL_free(Tps);
+  OPENSSL_free(Sps);
+  OPENSSL_free(Wps);
+  OPENSSL_free(Wsps);
+  OPENSSL_free(es);
+  CBB_cleanup(&batch_cbb);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN) *
+    pmbtoken_unblind(const PMBTOKEN_METHOD *method,
+                     const PMBTOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
+                     const STACK_OF(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN) * pretokens, CBS *cbs,
+                     size_t count, uint32_t key_id) {
+  const EC_GROUP *group = method->group;
+  if (count > sk_PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN_num(pretokens)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_DECODE_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  int ok = 0;
+  STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN) *ret = sk_TRUST_TOKEN_new_null();
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  EC_RAW_POINT *Tps = NULL;
+  EC_RAW_POINT *Sps = NULL;
+  EC_RAW_POINT *Wps = NULL;
+  EC_RAW_POINT *Wsps = NULL;
+  EC_SCALAR *es = NULL;
+  CBB batch_cbb;
+  CBB_zero(&batch_cbb);
+  if (method->batched_proof) {
+    if (count > ((size_t)-1) / sizeof(EC_RAW_POINT) ||
+        count > ((size_t)-1) / sizeof(EC_SCALAR)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+      goto err;
+    }
+    Tps = OPENSSL_malloc(count * sizeof(EC_RAW_POINT));
+    Sps = OPENSSL_malloc(count * sizeof(EC_RAW_POINT));
+    Wps = OPENSSL_malloc(count * sizeof(EC_RAW_POINT));
+    Wsps = OPENSSL_malloc(count * sizeof(EC_RAW_POINT));
+    es = OPENSSL_malloc(count * sizeof(EC_SCALAR));
+    if (!Tps ||
+        !Sps ||
+        !Wps ||
+        !Wsps ||
+        !es ||
+        !CBB_init(&batch_cbb, 0) ||
+        !point_to_cbb(&batch_cbb, method->group, &key->pubs) ||
+        !point_to_cbb(&batch_cbb, method->group, &key->pub0) ||
+        !point_to_cbb(&batch_cbb, method->group, &key->pub1)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+    const PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN *pretoken =
+        sk_PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN_value(pretokens, i);
+
+    uint8_t s[PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE];
+    EC_AFFINE Wp_affine, Wsp_affine;
+    CBS proof;
+    if (!CBS_copy_bytes(cbs, s, PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE) ||
+        !cbs_get_prefixed_point(cbs, group, &Wp_affine) ||
+        !cbs_get_prefixed_point(cbs, group, &Wsp_affine)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_DECODE_FAILURE);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    EC_RAW_POINT Tp, Wp, Wsp, Sp;
+    ec_affine_to_jacobian(group, &Tp, &pretoken->Tp);
+    ec_affine_to_jacobian(group, &Wp, &Wp_affine);
+    ec_affine_to_jacobian(group, &Wsp, &Wsp_affine);
+    if (!method->hash_s(group, &Sp, &pretoken->Tp, s)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!method->batched_proof) {
+      if(!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &proof)) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_DECODE_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+      }
+
+      if (!dleq_verify(method, &proof, key, &Tp, &Sp, &Wp, &Wsp)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+
+      if (CBS_len(&proof) != 0) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_DECODE_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+      }
+    } else {
+      EC_AFFINE Sp_affine;
+      if (!point_to_cbb(&batch_cbb, group, &pretoken->Tp) ||
+          !ec_jacobian_to_affine(group, &Sp_affine, &Sp) ||
+          !point_to_cbb(&batch_cbb, group, &Sp_affine) ||
+          !point_to_cbb(&batch_cbb, group, &Wp_affine) ||
+          !point_to_cbb(&batch_cbb, group, &Wsp_affine)) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+      }
+      Tps[i] = Tp;
+      Sps[i] = Sp;
+      Wps[i] = Wp;
+      Wsps[i] = Wsp;
+    }
+
+    // Unblind the token.
+    EC_RAW_POINT jacobians[3];
+    EC_AFFINE affines[3];
+    if (!ec_point_mul_scalar(group, &jacobians[0], &Sp, &pretoken->r) ||
+        !ec_point_mul_scalar(group, &jacobians[1], &Wp, &pretoken->r) ||
+        !ec_point_mul_scalar(group, &jacobians[2], &Wsp, &pretoken->r) ||
+        !ec_jacobian_to_affine_batch(group, affines, jacobians, 3)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    // Serialize the token. Include |key_id| to avoid an extra copy in the layer
+    // above.
+    CBB token_cbb, child;
+    size_t point_len = 1 + 2 * BN_num_bytes(&group->field);
+    if (!CBB_init(&token_cbb, 4 + PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE + 3 * (2 + point_len)) ||
+        !CBB_add_u32(&token_cbb, key_id) ||
+        !CBB_add_bytes(&token_cbb, pretoken->t, PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE) ||
+        // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/331): When updating the key format,
+        // remove the redundant length prefixes.
+        !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&token_cbb, &child) ||
+        !point_to_cbb(&child, group, &affines[0]) ||
+        !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&token_cbb, &child) ||
+        !point_to_cbb(&child, group, &affines[1]) ||
+        !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&token_cbb, &child) ||
+        !point_to_cbb(&child, group, &affines[2]) ||
+        !CBB_flush(&token_cbb)) {
+      CBB_cleanup(&token_cbb);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    TRUST_TOKEN *token =
+        TRUST_TOKEN_new(CBB_data(&token_cbb), CBB_len(&token_cbb));
+    CBB_cleanup(&token_cbb);
+    if (token == NULL ||
+        !sk_TRUST_TOKEN_push(ret, token)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      TRUST_TOKEN_free(token);
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // The DLEQ batching construction is described in appendix B of
+  // https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/072/20200324:214215. Note the additional
+  // computations all act on public inputs.
+  if (method->batched_proof) {
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+      if (!hash_c_batch(method, &es[i], &batch_cbb, i)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+    }
+
+    EC_RAW_POINT Tp_batch, Sp_batch, Wp_batch, Wsp_batch;
+    if (!ec_point_mul_scalar_public_batch(group, &Tp_batch,
+                                          /*g_scalar=*/NULL, Tps, es, count) ||
+        !ec_point_mul_scalar_public_batch(group, &Sp_batch,
+                                          /*g_scalar=*/NULL, Sps, es, count) ||
+        !ec_point_mul_scalar_public_batch(group, &Wp_batch,
+                                          /*g_scalar=*/NULL, Wps, es, count) ||
+        !ec_point_mul_scalar_public_batch(group, &Wsp_batch,
+                                          /*g_scalar=*/NULL, Wsps, es, count)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    CBS proof;
+    if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &proof) ||
+        !dleq_verify(method, &proof, key, &Tp_batch, &Sp_batch, &Wp_batch,
+                     &Wsp_batch) ||
+        CBS_len(&proof) != 0) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  ok = 1;
+
+err:
+  OPENSSL_free(Tps);
+  OPENSSL_free(Sps);
+  OPENSSL_free(Wps);
+  OPENSSL_free(Wsps);
+  OPENSSL_free(es);
+  CBB_cleanup(&batch_cbb);
+  if (!ok) {
+    sk_TRUST_TOKEN_pop_free(ret, TRUST_TOKEN_free);
+    ret = NULL;
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static int pmbtoken_read(const PMBTOKEN_METHOD *method,
+                         const PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
+                         uint8_t out_nonce[PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE],
+                         uint8_t *out_private_metadata, const uint8_t *token,
+                         size_t token_len) {
+  const EC_GROUP *group = method->group;
+  CBS cbs;
+  CBS_init(&cbs, token, token_len);
+  EC_AFFINE S, W, Ws;
+  if (!CBS_copy_bytes(&cbs, out_nonce, PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE) ||
+      !cbs_get_prefixed_point(&cbs, group, &S) ||
+      !cbs_get_prefixed_point(&cbs, group, &W) ||
+      !cbs_get_prefixed_point(&cbs, group, &Ws) ||
+      CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_INVALID_TOKEN);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+
+  EC_RAW_POINT T;
+  if (!method->hash_t(group, &T, out_nonce)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // We perform three multiplications with S and T. This is enough that it is
+  // worth using |ec_point_mul_scalar_precomp|.
+  EC_RAW_POINT S_jacobian;
+  EC_PRECOMP S_precomp, T_precomp;
+  ec_affine_to_jacobian(group, &S_jacobian, &S);
+  if (!ec_init_precomp(group, &S_precomp, &S_jacobian) ||
+      !ec_init_precomp(group, &T_precomp, &T)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  EC_RAW_POINT Ws_calculated;
+  // Check the validity of the token.
+  if (!ec_point_mul_scalar_precomp(group, &Ws_calculated, &T_precomp, &key->xs,
+                                   &S_precomp, &key->ys, NULL, NULL) ||
+      !ec_affine_jacobian_equal(group, &Ws, &Ws_calculated)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_BAD_VALIDITY_CHECK);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  EC_RAW_POINT W0, W1;
+  if (!ec_point_mul_scalar_precomp(group, &W0, &T_precomp, &key->x0, &S_precomp,
+                                   &key->y0, NULL, NULL) ||
+      !ec_point_mul_scalar_precomp(group, &W1, &T_precomp, &key->x1, &S_precomp,
+                                   &key->y1, NULL, NULL)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  const int is_W0 = ec_affine_jacobian_equal(group, &W, &W0);
+  const int is_W1 = ec_affine_jacobian_equal(group, &W, &W1);
+  const int is_valid = is_W0 ^ is_W1;
+  if (!is_valid) {
+    // Invalid tokens will fail the validity check above.
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  *out_private_metadata = is_W1;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+
+// PMBTokens experiment v0.
+
+static int pmbtoken_exp0_hash_t(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *out,
+                                const uint8_t t[PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE]) {
+  const uint8_t kHashTLabel[] = "PMBTokensV0 HashT";
+  return ec_hash_to_curve_p521_xmd_sha512_sswu_draft06(
+      group, out, kHashTLabel, sizeof(kHashTLabel), t, PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE);
+}
+
+static int pmbtoken_exp0_hash_s(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *out,
+                                const EC_AFFINE *t,
+                                const uint8_t s[PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE]) {
+  const uint8_t kHashSLabel[] = "PMBTokensV0 HashS";
+  int ret = 0;
+  CBB cbb;
+  uint8_t *buf = NULL;
+  size_t len;
+  if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0) ||
+      !point_to_cbb(&cbb, group, t) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, s, PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE) ||
+      !CBB_finish(&cbb, &buf, &len) ||
+      !ec_hash_to_curve_p521_xmd_sha512_sswu_draft06(
+          group, out, kHashSLabel, sizeof(kHashSLabel), buf, len)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  OPENSSL_free(buf);
+  CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static int pmbtoken_exp0_hash_c(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *out,
+                                uint8_t *buf, size_t len) {
+  const uint8_t kHashCLabel[] = "PMBTokensV0 HashC";
+  return ec_hash_to_scalar_p521_xmd_sha512_draft06(
+      group, out, kHashCLabel, sizeof(kHashCLabel), buf, len);
+}
+
+// H for PMBTokens v0 was generated with the following Python code.
+/*
+import hashlib
+
+SEED_H = 'PrivacyPass H'
+
+A = -3
+B = 0x051953eb9618e1c9a1f929a21a0b68540eea2da725b99b315f3b8b489918ef109e156193951ec7e937b1652c0bd3bb1bf073573df883d2c34f1ef451fd46b503f00
+P = 2**521 - 1
+
+def get_y(x):
+  y2 = (x**3 + A*x + B) % P
+  y = pow(y2, (P+1)/4, P)
+  if (y*y) % P != y2:
+    raise ValueError("point not on curve")
+  return y
+
+def bit(h,i):
+  return (ord(h[i/8]) >> (i%8)) & 1
+
+b = 521
+def decode_point(so):
+  s = hashlib.sha256(so + '0').digest() + hashlib.sha256(so + '1').digest() + \
+      hashlib.sha256(so + '2').digest()
+
+  x = 0
+  for i in range(0,b):
+    x = x + (long(bit(s,i))<<i)
+  if x >= P:
+    raise ValueError("x out of range")
+  y = get_y(x)
+  if y & 1 != bit(s,b-1): y = P-y
+  return (x, y)
+
+
+def gen_point(seed):
+  v = hashlib.sha256(seed).digest()
+  it = 1
+  while True:
+    try:
+      x,y = decode_point(v)
+    except Exception, e:
+      print e
+      it += 1
+      v = hashlib.sha256(v).digest()
+      continue
+    print "Found in %d iterations:" % it
+    print "  x = %d" % x
+    print "  y = %d" % y
+    print " Encoded (hex): (%x, %x)" % (x, y)
+    return (x, y)
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+  gen_point(SEED_H)
+*/
+static int pmbtoken_exp0_ok = 0;
+static PMBTOKEN_METHOD pmbtoken_exp0_method;
+static CRYPTO_once_t pmbtoken_exp0_method_once = CRYPTO_ONCE_INIT;
+
+static void pmbtoken_exp0_init_method_impl(void) {
+  static const uint8_t kH[] = {
+      0x04, 0x01, 0xf0, 0xa9, 0xf7, 0x9e, 0xbc, 0x12, 0x6c, 0xef, 0xd1, 0xab,
+      0x29, 0x10, 0x03, 0x6f, 0x4e, 0xf5, 0xbd, 0xeb, 0x0f, 0x6b, 0xc0, 0x5c,
+      0x0e, 0xce, 0xfe, 0x59, 0x45, 0xd1, 0x3e, 0x25, 0x33, 0x7e, 0x4c, 0xda,
+      0x64, 0x53, 0x54, 0x4e, 0xf9, 0x76, 0x0d, 0x6d, 0xc5, 0x39, 0x2a, 0xd4,
+      0xce, 0x84, 0x6e, 0x31, 0xc2, 0x86, 0x21, 0xf9, 0x5c, 0x98, 0xb9, 0x3d,
+      0x01, 0x74, 0x9f, 0xc5, 0x1e, 0x47, 0x24, 0x00, 0x5c, 0x17, 0x62, 0x51,
+      0x7d, 0x32, 0x5e, 0x29, 0xac, 0x52, 0x14, 0x75, 0x6f, 0x36, 0xd9, 0xc7,
+      0xfa, 0xbb, 0xa9, 0x3b, 0x9d, 0x70, 0x49, 0x1e, 0xb4, 0x53, 0xbc, 0x55,
+      0xea, 0xad, 0x8f, 0x26, 0x1d, 0xe0, 0xbc, 0xf3, 0x50, 0x5c, 0x7e, 0x66,
+      0x41, 0xb5, 0x61, 0x70, 0x12, 0x72, 0xac, 0x6a, 0xb0, 0x6e, 0x78, 0x3d,
+      0x17, 0x08, 0xe3, 0xdf, 0x3c, 0xff, 0xa6, 0xa0, 0xea, 0x96, 0x67, 0x92,
+      0xcd,
+  };
+
+  pmbtoken_exp0_ok =
+      pmbtoken_init_method(&pmbtoken_exp0_method, NID_secp521r1, kH, sizeof(kH),
+                           pmbtoken_exp0_hash_t, pmbtoken_exp0_hash_s,
+                           pmbtoken_exp0_hash_c, /*batched_proof=*/0);
+}
+
+static int pmbtoken_exp0_init_method(void) {
+  CRYPTO_once(&pmbtoken_exp0_method_once, pmbtoken_exp0_init_method_impl);
+  if (!pmbtoken_exp0_ok) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int pmbtoken_exp0_generate_key(CBB *out_private, CBB *out_public) {
+  if (!pmbtoken_exp0_init_method()) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return pmbtoken_generate_key(&pmbtoken_exp0_method, out_private, out_public);
+}
+
+int pmbtoken_exp0_client_key_from_bytes(PMBTOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
+                                        const uint8_t *in, size_t len) {
+  if (!pmbtoken_exp0_init_method()) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return pmbtoken_client_key_from_bytes(&pmbtoken_exp0_method, key, in, len);
+}
+
+int pmbtoken_exp0_issuer_key_from_bytes(PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
+                                        const uint8_t *in, size_t len) {
+  if (!pmbtoken_exp0_init_method()) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return pmbtoken_issuer_key_from_bytes(&pmbtoken_exp0_method, key, in, len);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN) * pmbtoken_exp0_blind(CBB *cbb, size_t count) {
+  if (!pmbtoken_exp0_init_method()) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return pmbtoken_blind(&pmbtoken_exp0_method, cbb, count);
+}
+
+int pmbtoken_exp0_sign(const PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key, CBB *cbb, CBS *cbs,
+                       size_t num_requested, size_t num_to_issue,
+                       uint8_t private_metadata) {
+  if (!pmbtoken_exp0_init_method()) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return pmbtoken_sign(&pmbtoken_exp0_method, key, cbb, cbs, num_requested,
+                       num_to_issue, private_metadata);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN) *
+    pmbtoken_exp0_unblind(const PMBTOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
+                          const STACK_OF(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN) * pretokens,
+                          CBS *cbs, size_t count, uint32_t key_id) {
+  if (!pmbtoken_exp0_init_method()) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return pmbtoken_unblind(&pmbtoken_exp0_method, key, pretokens, cbs, count,
+                          key_id);
+}
+
+int pmbtoken_exp0_read(const PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
+                       uint8_t out_nonce[PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE],
+                       uint8_t *out_private_metadata, const uint8_t *token,
+                       size_t token_len) {
+  if (!pmbtoken_exp0_init_method()) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return pmbtoken_read(&pmbtoken_exp0_method, key, out_nonce,
+                       out_private_metadata, token, token_len);
+}
+
+
+// PMBTokens experiment v1.
+
+static int pmbtoken_exp1_hash_t(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *out,
+                                const uint8_t t[PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE]) {
+  const uint8_t kHashTLabel[] = "PMBTokens Experiment V1 HashT";
+  return ec_hash_to_curve_p384_xmd_sha512_sswu_draft07(
+      group, out, kHashTLabel, sizeof(kHashTLabel), t, PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE);
+}
+
+static int pmbtoken_exp1_hash_s(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *out,
+                                const EC_AFFINE *t,
+                                const uint8_t s[PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE]) {
+  const uint8_t kHashSLabel[] = "PMBTokens Experiment V1 HashS";
+  int ret = 0;
+  CBB cbb;
+  uint8_t *buf = NULL;
+  size_t len;
+  if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0) ||
+      !point_to_cbb(&cbb, group, t) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, s, PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE) ||
+      !CBB_finish(&cbb, &buf, &len) ||
+      !ec_hash_to_curve_p384_xmd_sha512_sswu_draft07(
+          group, out, kHashSLabel, sizeof(kHashSLabel), buf, len)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  OPENSSL_free(buf);
+  CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static int pmbtoken_exp1_hash_c(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *out,
+                                uint8_t *buf, size_t len) {
+  const uint8_t kHashCLabel[] = "PMBTokens Experiment V1 HashC";
+  return ec_hash_to_scalar_p384_xmd_sha512_draft07(
+      group, out, kHashCLabel, sizeof(kHashCLabel), buf, len);
+}
+
+static int pmbtoken_exp1_ok = 0;
+static PMBTOKEN_METHOD pmbtoken_exp1_method;
+static CRYPTO_once_t pmbtoken_exp1_method_once = CRYPTO_ONCE_INIT;
+
+static void pmbtoken_exp1_init_method_impl(void) {
+  // This is the output of |ec_hash_to_scalar_p384_xmd_sha512_draft07| with DST
+  // "PMBTokens Experiment V1 HashH" and message "generator".
+  static const uint8_t kH[] = {
+      0x04, 0x82, 0xd5, 0x68, 0xf5, 0x39, 0xf6, 0x08, 0x19, 0xa1, 0x75,
+      0x9f, 0x98, 0xb5, 0x10, 0xf5, 0x0b, 0x9d, 0x2b, 0xe1, 0x64, 0x4d,
+      0x02, 0x76, 0x18, 0x11, 0xf8, 0x2f, 0xd3, 0x33, 0x25, 0x1f, 0x2c,
+      0xb8, 0xf6, 0xf1, 0x9e, 0x93, 0x85, 0x79, 0xb3, 0xb7, 0x81, 0xa3,
+      0xe6, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x1c, 0xff, 0x03, 0xd9, 0x40, 0x6c, 0xec, 0xe0,
+      0x4d, 0xea, 0xdf, 0x9d, 0x94, 0xd1, 0x87, 0xab, 0x27, 0xf7, 0x4f,
+      0x53, 0xea, 0xa3, 0x18, 0x72, 0xb9, 0xd1, 0x56, 0xa0, 0x4e, 0x81,
+      0xaa, 0xeb, 0x1c, 0x22, 0x6d, 0x39, 0x1c, 0x5e, 0xb1, 0x27, 0xfc,
+      0x87, 0xc3, 0x95, 0xd0, 0x13, 0xb7, 0x0b, 0x5c, 0xc7,
+  };
+
+  pmbtoken_exp1_ok =
+      pmbtoken_init_method(&pmbtoken_exp1_method, NID_secp384r1, kH, sizeof(kH),
+                           pmbtoken_exp1_hash_t, pmbtoken_exp1_hash_s,
+                           pmbtoken_exp1_hash_c, /*batched_proof=*/1);
+}
+
+static int pmbtoken_exp1_init_method(void) {
+  CRYPTO_once(&pmbtoken_exp1_method_once, pmbtoken_exp1_init_method_impl);
+  if (!pmbtoken_exp1_ok) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int pmbtoken_exp1_generate_key(CBB *out_private, CBB *out_public) {
+  if (!pmbtoken_exp1_init_method()) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return pmbtoken_generate_key(&pmbtoken_exp1_method, out_private, out_public);
+}
+
+int pmbtoken_exp1_client_key_from_bytes(PMBTOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
+                                        const uint8_t *in, size_t len) {
+  if (!pmbtoken_exp1_init_method()) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return pmbtoken_client_key_from_bytes(&pmbtoken_exp1_method, key, in, len);
+}
+
+int pmbtoken_exp1_issuer_key_from_bytes(PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
+                                        const uint8_t *in, size_t len) {
+  if (!pmbtoken_exp1_init_method()) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return pmbtoken_issuer_key_from_bytes(&pmbtoken_exp1_method, key, in, len);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN) * pmbtoken_exp1_blind(CBB *cbb, size_t count) {
+  if (!pmbtoken_exp1_init_method()) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return pmbtoken_blind(&pmbtoken_exp1_method, cbb, count);
+}
+
+int pmbtoken_exp1_sign(const PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key, CBB *cbb, CBS *cbs,
+                       size_t num_requested, size_t num_to_issue,
+                       uint8_t private_metadata) {
+  if (!pmbtoken_exp1_init_method()) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return pmbtoken_sign(&pmbtoken_exp1_method, key, cbb, cbs, num_requested,
+                       num_to_issue, private_metadata);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN) *
+    pmbtoken_exp1_unblind(const PMBTOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
+                          const STACK_OF(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN) * pretokens,
+                          CBS *cbs, size_t count, uint32_t key_id) {
+  if (!pmbtoken_exp1_init_method()) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return pmbtoken_unblind(&pmbtoken_exp1_method, key, pretokens, cbs, count,
+                          key_id);
+}
+
+int pmbtoken_exp1_read(const PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
+                       uint8_t out_nonce[PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE],
+                       uint8_t *out_private_metadata, const uint8_t *token,
+                       size_t token_len) {
+  if (!pmbtoken_exp1_init_method()) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return pmbtoken_read(&pmbtoken_exp1_method, key, out_nonce,
+                       out_private_metadata, token, token_len);
+}
+
+int pmbtoken_exp1_get_h_for_testing(uint8_t out[97]) {
+  if (!pmbtoken_exp1_init_method()) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  EC_AFFINE h;
+  return ec_jacobian_to_affine(pmbtoken_exp1_method.group, &h,
+                               &pmbtoken_exp1_method.h) &&
+         ec_point_to_bytes(pmbtoken_exp1_method.group, &h,
+                           POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, out, 97) == 97;
+}