grpc 1.30.2

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/handshake.cc

@@ -0,0 +1,703 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include <utility>
+
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+SSL_HANDSHAKE::SSL_HANDSHAKE(SSL *ssl_arg)
+    : ssl(ssl_arg),
+      scts_requested(false),
+      needs_psk_binder(false),
+      handshake_finalized(false),
+      accept_psk_mode(false),
+      cert_request(false),
+      certificate_status_expected(false),
+      ocsp_stapling_requested(false),
+      delegated_credential_requested(false),
+      should_ack_sni(false),
+      in_false_start(false),
+      in_early_data(false),
+      early_data_offered(false),
+      can_early_read(false),
+      can_early_write(false),
+      next_proto_neg_seen(false),
+      ticket_expected(false),
+      extended_master_secret(false),
+      pending_private_key_op(false),
+      grease_seeded(false),
+      handback(false),
+      cert_compression_negotiated(false),
+      apply_jdk11_workaround(false) {
+  assert(ssl);
+}
+
+SSL_HANDSHAKE::~SSL_HANDSHAKE() {
+  ssl->ctx->x509_method->hs_flush_cached_ca_names(this);
+}
+
+void SSL_HANDSHAKE::ResizeSecrets(size_t hash_len) {
+  if (hash_len > SSL_MAX_MD_SIZE) {
+    abort();
+  }
+  hash_len_ = hash_len;
+}
+
+UniquePtr<SSL_HANDSHAKE> ssl_handshake_new(SSL *ssl) {
+  UniquePtr<SSL_HANDSHAKE> hs = MakeUnique<SSL_HANDSHAKE>(ssl);
+  if (!hs || !hs->transcript.Init()) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  hs->config = ssl->config.get();
+  if (!hs->config) {
+    assert(hs->config);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  return hs;
+}
+
+bool ssl_check_message_type(SSL *ssl, const SSLMessage &msg, int type) {
+  if (msg.type != type) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+    ERR_add_error_dataf("got type %d, wanted type %d", msg.type, type);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool ssl_add_message_cbb(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) {
+  Array<uint8_t> msg;
+  if (!ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, cbb, &msg) ||
+      !ssl->method->add_message(ssl, std::move(msg))) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+size_t ssl_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *ssl) {
+  // kMaxMessageLen is the default maximum message size for handshakes which do
+  // not accept peer certificate chains.
+  static const size_t kMaxMessageLen = 16384;
+
+  if (SSL_in_init(ssl)) {
+    SSL_CONFIG *config = ssl->config.get();  // SSL_in_init() implies not NULL.
+    if ((!ssl->server || (config->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) &&
+        kMaxMessageLen < ssl->max_cert_list) {
+      return ssl->max_cert_list;
+    }
+    return kMaxMessageLen;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    // In TLS 1.2 and below, the largest acceptable post-handshake message is
+    // a HelloRequest.
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->server) {
+    // The largest acceptable post-handshake message for a server is a
+    // KeyUpdate. We will never initiate post-handshake auth.
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  // Clients must accept NewSessionTicket, so allow the default size.
+  return kMaxMessageLen;
+}
+
+bool ssl_hash_message(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg) {
+  // V2ClientHello messages are pre-hashed.
+  if (msg.is_v2_hello) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  return hs->transcript.Update(msg.raw);
+}
+
+int ssl_parse_extensions(const CBS *cbs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                         const SSL_EXTENSION_TYPE *ext_types,
+                         size_t num_ext_types, int ignore_unknown) {
+  // Reset everything.
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < num_ext_types; i++) {
+    *ext_types[i].out_present = 0;
+    CBS_init(ext_types[i].out_data, NULL, 0);
+  }
+
+  CBS copy = *cbs;
+  while (CBS_len(&copy) != 0) {
+    uint16_t type;
+    CBS data;
+    if (!CBS_get_u16(&copy, &type) ||
+        !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&copy, &data)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    const SSL_EXTENSION_TYPE *ext_type = NULL;
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < num_ext_types; i++) {
+      if (type == ext_types[i].type) {
+        ext_type = &ext_types[i];
+        break;
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (ext_type == NULL) {
+      if (ignore_unknown) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    // Duplicate ext_types are forbidden.
+    if (*ext_type->out_present) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DUPLICATE_EXTENSION);
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    *ext_type->out_present = 1;
+    *ext_type->out_data = data;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+enum ssl_verify_result_t ssl_verify_peer_cert(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  const SSL_SESSION *prev_session = ssl->s3->established_session.get();
+  if (prev_session != NULL) {
+    // If renegotiating, the server must not change the server certificate. See
+    // https://mitls.org/pages/attacks/3SHAKE. We never resume on renegotiation,
+    // so this check is sufficient to ensure the reported peer certificate never
+    // changes on renegotiation.
+    assert(!ssl->server);
+    if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(prev_session->certs.get()) !=
+        sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs.get())) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVER_CERT_CHANGED);
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+      return ssl_verify_invalid;
+    }
+
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs.get());
+         i++) {
+      const CRYPTO_BUFFER *old_cert =
+          sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(prev_session->certs.get(), i);
+      const CRYPTO_BUFFER *new_cert =
+          sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(hs->new_session->certs.get(), i);
+      if (CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(old_cert) != CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(new_cert) ||
+          OPENSSL_memcmp(CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(old_cert),
+                         CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(new_cert),
+                         CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(old_cert)) != 0) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVER_CERT_CHANGED);
+        ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+        return ssl_verify_invalid;
+      }
+    }
+
+    // The certificate is identical, so we may skip re-verifying the
+    // certificate. Since we only authenticated the previous one, copy other
+    // authentication from the established session and ignore what was newly
+    // received.
+    hs->new_session->ocsp_response = UpRef(prev_session->ocsp_response);
+    hs->new_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list =
+        UpRef(prev_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list);
+    hs->new_session->verify_result = prev_session->verify_result;
+    return ssl_verify_ok;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
+  enum ssl_verify_result_t ret;
+  if (hs->config->custom_verify_callback != nullptr) {
+    ret = hs->config->custom_verify_callback(ssl, &alert);
+    switch (ret) {
+      case ssl_verify_ok:
+        hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
+        break;
+      case ssl_verify_invalid:
+        // If |SSL_VERIFY_NONE|, the error is non-fatal, but we keep the result.
+        if (hs->config->verify_mode == SSL_VERIFY_NONE) {
+          ERR_clear_error();
+          ret = ssl_verify_ok;
+        }
+        hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION;
+        break;
+      case ssl_verify_retry:
+        break;
+    }
+  } else {
+    ret = ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_verify_cert_chain(
+              hs->new_session.get(), hs, &alert)
+              ? ssl_verify_ok
+              : ssl_verify_invalid;
+  }
+
+  if (ret == ssl_verify_invalid) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+  }
+
+  // Emulate OpenSSL's client OCSP callback. OpenSSL verifies certificates
+  // before it receives the OCSP, so it needs a second callback for OCSP.
+  if (ret == ssl_verify_ok && !ssl->server &&
+      hs->config->ocsp_stapling_enabled &&
+      ssl->ctx->legacy_ocsp_callback != nullptr) {
+    int cb_ret =
+        ssl->ctx->legacy_ocsp_callback(ssl, ssl->ctx->legacy_ocsp_callback_arg);
+    if (cb_ret <= 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OCSP_CB_ERROR);
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
+                     cb_ret == 0 ? SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
+                                 : SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      ret = ssl_verify_invalid;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+// Verifies a stored certificate when resuming a session. A few things are
+// different from verify_peer_cert:
+// 1. We can't be renegotiating if we're resuming a session.
+// 2. The session is immutable, so we don't support verify_mode ==
+// SSL_VERIFY_NONE
+// 3. We don't call the OCSP callback.
+// 4. We only support custom verify callbacks.
+enum ssl_verify_result_t ssl_reverify_peer_cert(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                                bool send_alert) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  assert(ssl->s3->established_session == nullptr);
+  assert(hs->config->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE);
+
+  uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
+  enum ssl_verify_result_t ret = ssl_verify_invalid;
+  if (hs->config->custom_verify_callback != nullptr) {
+    ret = hs->config->custom_verify_callback(ssl, &alert);
+  }
+
+  if (ret == ssl_verify_invalid) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
+    if (send_alert) {
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+    }
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+uint16_t ssl_get_grease_value(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                              enum ssl_grease_index_t index) {
+  // Draw entropy for all GREASE values at once. This avoids calling
+  // |RAND_bytes| repeatedly and makes the values consistent within a
+  // connection. The latter is so the second ClientHello matches after
+  // HelloRetryRequest and so supported_groups and key_shares are consistent.
+  if (!hs->grease_seeded) {
+    RAND_bytes(hs->grease_seed, sizeof(hs->grease_seed));
+    hs->grease_seeded = true;
+  }
+
+  // This generates a random value of the form 0xωaωa, for all 0 ≤ ω < 16.
+  uint16_t ret = hs->grease_seed[index];
+  ret = (ret & 0xf0) | 0x0a;
+  ret |= ret << 8;
+  return ret;
+}
+
+enum ssl_hs_wait_t ssl_get_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  SSLMessage msg;
+  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_read_message;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_FINISHED)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  // Snapshot the finished hash before incorporating the new message.
+  uint8_t finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  size_t finished_len;
+  if (!hs->transcript.GetFinishedMAC(finished, &finished_len,
+                                     SSL_get_session(ssl), !ssl->server) ||
+      !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  int finished_ok = CBS_mem_equal(&msg.body, finished, finished_len);
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
+  finished_ok = 1;
+#endif
+  if (!finished_ok) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  // Copy the Finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks.
+  if (finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished) ||
+      finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->server) {
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, finished, finished_len);
+    ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finished_len;
+  } else {
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, finished, finished_len);
+    ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finished_len;
+  }
+
+  // The Finished message should be the end of a flight.
+  if (ssl->method->has_unprocessed_handshake_data(ssl)) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESS_HANDSHAKE_DATA);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+bool ssl_send_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  const SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
+
+  uint8_t finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  size_t finished_len;
+  if (!hs->transcript.GetFinishedMAC(finished, &finished_len, session,
+                                     ssl->server)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Log the master secret, if logging is enabled.
+  if (!ssl_log_secret(
+          ssl, "CLIENT_RANDOM",
+          MakeConstSpan(session->master_key, session->master_key_length))) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Copy the Finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks.
+  if (finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished) ||
+      finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->server) {
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, finished, finished_len);
+    ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finished_len;
+  } else {
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, finished, finished_len);
+    ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finished_len;
+  }
+
+  ScopedCBB cbb;
+  CBB body;
+  if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_FINISHED) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&body, finished, finished_len) ||
+      !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+bool ssl_output_cert_chain(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  ScopedCBB cbb;
+  CBB body;
+  if (!hs->ssl->method->init_message(hs->ssl, cbb.get(), &body,
+                                     SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) ||
+      !ssl_add_cert_chain(hs, &body) ||
+      !ssl_add_message_cbb(hs->ssl, cbb.get())) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+int ssl_run_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, bool *out_early_return) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  for (;;) {
+    // Resolve the operation the handshake was waiting on.
+    switch (hs->wait) {
+      case ssl_hs_error:
+        ERR_restore_state(hs->error.get());
+        return -1;
+
+      case ssl_hs_flush: {
+        int ret = ssl->method->flush_flight(ssl);
+        if (ret <= 0) {
+          return ret;
+        }
+        break;
+      }
+
+      case ssl_hs_read_server_hello:
+      case ssl_hs_read_message:
+      case ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec: {
+        if (ssl->quic_method) {
+          hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+          // The change cipher spec is omitted in QUIC.
+          if (hs->wait != ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec) {
+            ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ;
+            return -1;
+          }
+          break;
+        }
+
+        uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        size_t consumed = 0;
+        ssl_open_record_t ret;
+        if (hs->wait == ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec) {
+          ret = ssl_open_change_cipher_spec(ssl, &consumed, &alert,
+                                            ssl->s3->read_buffer.span());
+        } else {
+          ret = ssl_open_handshake(ssl, &consumed, &alert,
+                                   ssl->s3->read_buffer.span());
+        }
+        if (ret == ssl_open_record_error &&
+            hs->wait == ssl_hs_read_server_hello) {
+          uint32_t err = ERR_peek_error();
+          if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_SSL &&
+              ERR_GET_REASON(err) == SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) {
+            // Add a dedicated error code to the queue for a handshake_failure
+            // alert in response to ClientHello. This matches NSS's client
+            // behavior and gives a better error on a (probable) failure to
+            // negotiate initial parameters. Note: this error code comes after
+            // the original one.
+            //
+            // See https://crbug.com/446505.
+            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ON_CLIENT_HELLO);
+          }
+        }
+        bool retry;
+        int bio_ret = ssl_handle_open_record(ssl, &retry, ret, consumed, alert);
+        if (bio_ret <= 0) {
+          return bio_ret;
+        }
+        if (retry) {
+          continue;
+        }
+        ssl->s3->read_buffer.DiscardConsumed();
+        break;
+      }
+
+      case ssl_hs_read_end_of_early_data: {
+        if (ssl->s3->hs->can_early_read) {
+          // While we are processing early data, the handshake returns early.
+          *out_early_return = true;
+          return 1;
+        }
+        hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+        break;
+      }
+
+      case ssl_hs_certificate_selection_pending:
+        ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_PENDING_CERTIFICATE;
+        hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+        return -1;
+
+      case ssl_hs_handoff:
+        ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_HANDOFF;
+        hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+        return -1;
+
+      case ssl_hs_handback: {
+        int ret = ssl->method->flush_flight(ssl);
+        if (ret <= 0) {
+          return ret;
+        }
+        ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_HANDBACK;
+        hs->wait = ssl_hs_handback;
+        return -1;
+      }
+
+      case ssl_hs_x509_lookup:
+        ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP;
+        hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+        return -1;
+
+      case ssl_hs_channel_id_lookup:
+        ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_WANT_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP;
+        hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+        return -1;
+
+      case ssl_hs_private_key_operation:
+        ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_WANT_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION;
+        hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+        return -1;
+
+      case ssl_hs_pending_session:
+        ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_PENDING_SESSION;
+        hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+        return -1;
+
+      case ssl_hs_pending_ticket:
+        ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_PENDING_TICKET;
+        hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+        return -1;
+
+      case ssl_hs_certificate_verify:
+        ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_WANT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
+        hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+        return -1;
+
+      case ssl_hs_early_data_rejected:
+        assert(ssl->s3->early_data_reason != ssl_early_data_unknown);
+        assert(!hs->can_early_write);
+        ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
+        return -1;
+
+      case ssl_hs_early_return:
+        *out_early_return = true;
+        hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+        return 1;
+
+      case ssl_hs_ok:
+        break;
+    }
+
+    // Run the state machine again.
+    hs->wait = ssl->do_handshake(hs);
+    if (hs->wait == ssl_hs_error) {
+      hs->error.reset(ERR_save_state());
+      return -1;
+    }
+    if (hs->wait == ssl_hs_ok) {
+      // The handshake has completed.
+      *out_early_return = false;
+      return 1;
+    }
+
+    // Otherwise, loop to the beginning and resolve what was blocking the
+    // handshake.
+  }
+}
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END