grpc 1.0.1 → 1.1.2

data/third_party/boringssl/ssl/pqueue/pqueue.c

@@ -1,197 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
- * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
-
-#include <openssl/pqueue.h>
-
-#include <assert.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <openssl/mem.h>
-
-
-typedef struct _pqueue {
-  pitem *items;
-  unsigned count;
-} pqueue_s;
-
-
-pitem *pitem_new(uint8_t prio64be[8], void *data) {
-  pitem *item = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(pitem));
-  if (item == NULL) {
-    return NULL;
-  }
-
-  memcpy(item->priority, prio64be, sizeof(item->priority));
-
-  item->data = data;
-  item->next = NULL;
-
-  return item;
-}
-
-void pitem_free(pitem *item) {
-  if (item == NULL) {
-    return;
-  }
-
-  OPENSSL_free(item);
-}
-
-pqueue pqueue_new(void) {
-  pqueue_s *pq = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(pqueue_s));
-  if (pq == NULL) {
-    return NULL;
-  }
-
-  memset(pq, 0, sizeof(pqueue_s));
-  return pq;
-}
-
-void pqueue_free(pqueue_s *pq) {
-  if (pq == NULL) {
-    return;
-  }
-
-  /* The queue must be empty. */
-  assert(pq->items == NULL);
-  OPENSSL_free(pq);
-}
-
-pitem *pqueue_peek(pqueue_s *pq) { return pq->items; }
-
-pitem *pqueue_find(pqueue_s *pq, uint8_t *prio64be) {
-  pitem *curr;
-
-  for (curr = pq->items; curr; curr = curr->next) {
-    if (memcmp(curr->priority, prio64be, sizeof(curr->priority)) == 0) {
-      return curr;
-    }
-  }
-
-  return NULL;
-}
-
-size_t pqueue_size(pqueue_s *pq) {
-  pitem *item = pq->items;
-  size_t count = 0;
-
-  while (item != NULL) {
-    count++;
-    item = item->next;
-  }
-  return count;
-}
-
-piterator pqueue_iterator(pqueue_s *pq) { return pq->items; }
-
-pitem *pqueue_next(piterator *item) {
-  pitem *ret;
-
-  if (item == NULL || *item == NULL) {
-    return NULL;
-  }
-
-  ret = *item;
-  *item = (*item)->next;
-
-  return ret;
-}
-
-pitem *pqueue_insert(pqueue_s *pq, pitem *item) {
-  pitem *curr, *next;
-
-  if (pq->items == NULL) {
-    pq->items = item;
-    return item;
-  }
-
-  for (curr = NULL, next = pq->items; next != NULL;
-       curr = next, next = next->next) {
-    /* we can compare 64-bit value in big-endian encoding with memcmp. */
-    int cmp = memcmp(next->priority, item->priority, sizeof(item->priority));
-    if (cmp > 0) {
-      /* next > item */
-      item->next = next;
-
-      if (curr == NULL) {
-        pq->items = item;
-      } else {
-        curr->next = item;
-      }
-
-      return item;
-    } else if (cmp == 0) {
-      /* duplicates not allowed */
-      return NULL;
-    }
-  }
-
-  item->next = NULL;
-  curr->next = item;
-
-  return item;
-}
-
-
-pitem *pqueue_pop(pqueue_s *pq) {
-  pitem *item = pq->items;
-
-  if (pq->items != NULL) {
-    pq->items = pq->items->next;
-  }
-
-  return item;
-}

data/third_party/boringssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c

@@ -1,2272 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- *
- * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- *
- * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license provided above.
- *
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
- * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE. */
-
-#include <openssl/ssl.h>
-
-#include <assert.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/buf.h>
-#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
-#include <openssl/cipher.h>
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
-#include <openssl/ec.h>
-#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/hmac.h>
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-#include <openssl/mem.h>
-#include <openssl/obj.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-
-#include "internal.h"
-#include "../crypto/internal.h"
-#include "../crypto/dh/internal.h"
-
-
-int ssl3_accept(SSL *ssl) {
-  BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
-  uint32_t alg_a;
-  void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value) = NULL;
-  int ret = -1;
-  int new_state, state, skip = 0;
-
-  assert(ssl->handshake_func == ssl3_accept);
-  assert(ssl->server);
-  assert(!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl));
-
-  ERR_clear_error();
-  ERR_clear_system_error();
-
-  if (ssl->info_callback != NULL) {
-    cb = ssl->info_callback;
-  } else if (ssl->ctx->info_callback != NULL) {
-    cb = ssl->ctx->info_callback;
-  }
-
-  ssl->in_handshake++;
-
-  if (ssl->cert == NULL) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  for (;;) {
-    state = ssl->state;
-
-    switch (ssl->state) {
-      case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
-        if (cb != NULL) {
-          cb(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
-        }
-
-        if (ssl->init_buf == NULL) {
-          buf = BUF_MEM_new();
-          if (!buf || !BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
-            ret = -1;
-            goto end;
-          }
-          ssl->init_buf = buf;
-          buf = NULL;
-        }
-        ssl->init_num = 0;
-
-        /* Enable a write buffer. This groups handshake messages within a flight
-         * into a single write. */
-        if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(ssl, 1)) {
-          ret = -1;
-          goto end;
-        }
-
-        if (!ssl3_init_handshake_buffer(ssl)) {
-          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-          ret = -1;
-          goto end;
-        }
-
-        if (!ssl->s3->have_version) {
-          ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_INITIAL_BYTES;
-        } else {
-          ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
-        }
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SR_INITIAL_BYTES:
-        ret = ssl3_get_initial_bytes(ssl);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-        /* ssl3_get_initial_bytes sets ssl->state to one of
-         * SSL3_ST_SR_V2_CLIENT_HELLO or SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A on success. */
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SR_V2_CLIENT_HELLO:
-        ret = ssl3_get_v2_client_hello(ssl);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-        ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
-      case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
-      case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
-      case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
-        ssl->shutdown = 0;
-        ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(ssl);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-        ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
-        ssl->init_num = 0;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
-      case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
-        ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(ssl);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-        if (ssl->hit) {
-          if (ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
-            ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
-          } else {
-            ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
-          }
-        } else {
-          ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
-        }
-        ssl->init_num = 0;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
-      case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
-        if (ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
-          ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(ssl);
-          if (ret <= 0) {
-            goto end;
-          }
-          if (ssl->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected) {
-            ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
-          } else {
-            ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
-          }
-        } else {
-          skip = 1;
-          ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
-        }
-        ssl->init_num = 0;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
-      case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
-        ret = ssl3_send_certificate_status(ssl);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-        ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
-        ssl->init_num = 0;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
-      case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
-      case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_C:
-        alg_a = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-
-        /* Send a ServerKeyExchange message if:
-         * - The key exchange is ephemeral or anonymous
-         *   Diffie-Hellman.
-         * - There is a PSK identity hint.
-         *
-         * TODO(davidben): This logic is currently duplicated in d1_srvr.c. Fix
-         * this. In the meantime, keep them in sync. */
-        if (ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ||
-            ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && ssl->psk_identity_hint)) {
-          ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(ssl);
-          if (ret <= 0) {
-            goto end;
-          }
-        } else {
-          skip = 1;
-        }
-
-        ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
-        ssl->init_num = 0;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
-      case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
-        if (ssl->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
-          ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(ssl);
-          if (ret <= 0) {
-            goto end;
-          }
-        } else {
-          skip = 1;
-        }
-        ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
-        ssl->init_num = 0;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
-      case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
-        ret = ssl3_send_server_done(ssl);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-        ssl->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
-        ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
-        ssl->init_num = 0;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
-        /* This code originally checked to see if any data was pending using
-         * BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as documented
-         * in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
-         * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead
-         * we just flush unconditionally. */
-        ssl->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
-        if (BIO_flush(ssl->wbio) <= 0) {
-          ret = -1;
-          goto end;
-        }
-        ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
-
-        ssl->state = ssl->s3->tmp.next_state;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
-      case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
-        if (ssl->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
-          ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(ssl);
-          if (ret <= 0) {
-            goto end;
-          }
-        }
-        ssl->init_num = 0;
-        ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
-      case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
-      case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_C:
-        ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(ssl);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-        ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
-        ssl->init_num = 0;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
-      case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
-        ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(ssl);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-
-        ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE;
-        ssl->init_num = 0;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE:
-        ret = ssl->method->ssl_read_change_cipher_spec(ssl);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-
-        if (!tls1_change_cipher_state(ssl, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
-          ret = -1;
-          goto end;
-        }
-
-        if (ssl->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
-          ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
-        } else if (ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
-          ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A;
-        } else {
-          ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-        }
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
-      case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
-        ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(ssl);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-        ssl->init_num = 0;
-        if (ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
-          ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A;
-        } else {
-          ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-        }
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A:
-      case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_B:
-        ret = ssl3_get_channel_id(ssl);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-        ssl->init_num = 0;
-        ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
-      case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
-        ret = ssl3_get_finished(ssl, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
-                                SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-
-        if (ssl->hit) {
-          ssl->state = SSL_ST_OK;
-        } else if (ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
-          ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
-        } else {
-          ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
-        }
-        /* If this is a full handshake with ChannelID then record the hashshake
-         * hashes in |ssl->session| in case we need them to verify a ChannelID
-         * signature on a resumption of this session in the future. */
-        if (!ssl->hit && ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
-          ret = tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(ssl);
-          if (ret <= 0) {
-            goto end;
-          }
-        }
-        ssl->init_num = 0;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
-      case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
-        ret = ssl3_send_new_session_ticket(ssl);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-        ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
-        ssl->init_num = 0;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
-      case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
-        ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(ssl, SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,
-                                           SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-        ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
-        ssl->init_num = 0;
-
-        if (!tls1_change_cipher_state(ssl, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
-          ret = -1;
-          goto end;
-        }
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
-      case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
-        ret = ssl3_send_finished(ssl, SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
-                                 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-        ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
-        if (ssl->hit) {
-          ssl->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE;
-        } else {
-          ssl->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
-        }
-        ssl->init_num = 0;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL_ST_OK:
-        /* clean a few things up */
-        ssl3_cleanup_key_block(ssl);
-
-        BUF_MEM_free(ssl->init_buf);
-        ssl->init_buf = NULL;
-
-        /* remove buffering on output */
-        ssl_free_wbio_buffer(ssl);
-
-        ssl->init_num = 0;
-
-        /* If we aren't retaining peer certificates then we can discard it
-         * now. */
-        if (ssl->ctx->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs) {
-          X509_free(ssl->session->peer);
-          ssl->session->peer = NULL;
-          sk_X509_pop_free(ssl->session->cert_chain, X509_free);
-          ssl->session->cert_chain = NULL;
-        }
-
-        ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete = 1;
-
-        ssl_update_cache(ssl, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
-
-        if (cb != NULL) {
-          cb(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
-        }
-
-        ret = 1;
-        goto end;
-
-      default:
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
-        ret = -1;
-        goto end;
-    }
-
-    if (!ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip && cb != NULL &&
-        ssl->state != state) {
-      new_state = ssl->state;
-      ssl->state = state;
-      cb(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
-      ssl->state = new_state;
-    }
-    skip = 0;
-  }
-
-end:
-  ssl->in_handshake--;
-  BUF_MEM_free(buf);
-  if (cb != NULL) {
-    cb(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
-  }
-  return ret;
-}
-
-int ssl3_get_initial_bytes(SSL *ssl) {
-  /* Read the first 5 bytes, the size of the TLS record header. This is
-   * sufficient to detect a V2ClientHello and ensures that we never read beyond
-   * the first record. */
-  int ret = ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
-  if (ret <= 0) {
-    return ret;
-  }
-  assert(ssl_read_buffer_len(ssl) == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
-  const uint8_t *p = ssl_read_buffer(ssl);
-
-  /* Some dedicated error codes for protocol mixups should the application wish
-   * to interpret them differently. (These do not overlap with ClientHello or
-   * V2ClientHello.) */
-  if (strncmp("GET ", (const char *)p, 4) == 0 ||
-      strncmp("POST ", (const char *)p, 5) == 0 ||
-      strncmp("HEAD ", (const char *)p, 5) == 0 ||
-      strncmp("PUT ", (const char *)p, 4) == 0) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST);
-    return -1;
-  }
-  if (strncmp("CONNE", (const char *)p, 5) == 0) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  /* Determine if this is a V2ClientHello. */
-  if ((p[0] & 0x80) && p[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO &&
-      p[3] >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
-    /* This is a V2ClientHello. */
-    ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_V2_CLIENT_HELLO;
-    return 1;
-  }
-
-  /* Fall through to the standard logic. */
-  ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
-  return 1;
-}
-
-int ssl3_get_v2_client_hello(SSL *ssl) {
-  const uint8_t *p;
-  int ret;
-  CBS v2_client_hello, cipher_specs, session_id, challenge;
-  size_t msg_length, rand_len, len;
-  uint8_t msg_type;
-  uint16_t version, cipher_spec_length, session_id_length, challenge_length;
-  CBB client_hello, hello_body, cipher_suites;
-  uint8_t random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
-
-  /* Determine the length of the V2ClientHello. */
-  assert(ssl_read_buffer_len(ssl) >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
-  p = ssl_read_buffer(ssl);
-  msg_length = ((p[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | p[1];
-  if (msg_length > (1024 * 4)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
-    return -1;
-  }
-  if (msg_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 2) {
-    /* Reject lengths that are too short early. We have already read
-     * |SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH| bytes, so we should not attempt to process an
-     * (invalid) V2ClientHello which would be shorter than that. */
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  /* Read the remainder of the V2ClientHello. */
-  ret = ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, 2 + msg_length);
-  if (ret <= 0) {
-    return ret;
-  }
-  assert(ssl_read_buffer_len(ssl) == msg_length + 2);
-  CBS_init(&v2_client_hello, ssl_read_buffer(ssl) + 2, msg_length);
-
-  /* The V2ClientHello without the length is incorporated into the handshake
-   * hash. */
-  if (!ssl3_update_handshake_hash(ssl, CBS_data(&v2_client_hello),
-                                  CBS_len(&v2_client_hello))) {
-    return -1;
-  }
-  if (ssl->msg_callback) {
-    ssl->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, CBS_data(&v2_client_hello),
-                    CBS_len(&v2_client_hello), ssl, ssl->msg_callback_arg);
-  }
-
-  if (!CBS_get_u8(&v2_client_hello, &msg_type) ||
-      !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &version) ||
-      !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_spec_length) ||
-      !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &session_id_length) ||
-      !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &challenge_length) ||
-      !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_specs, cipher_spec_length) ||
-      !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &session_id, session_id_length) ||
-      !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &challenge, challenge_length) ||
-      CBS_len(&v2_client_hello) != 0) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  /* msg_type has already been checked. */
-  assert(msg_type == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO);
-
-  /* The client_random is the V2ClientHello challenge. Truncate or
-   * left-pad with zeros as needed. */
-  memset(random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-  rand_len = CBS_len(&challenge);
-  if (rand_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) {
-    rand_len = SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-  }
-  memcpy(random + (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - rand_len), CBS_data(&challenge),
-         rand_len);
-
-  /* Write out an equivalent SSLv3 ClientHello. */
-  CBB_zero(&client_hello);
-  if (!CBB_init_fixed(&client_hello, (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data,
-                      ssl->init_buf->max) ||
-      !CBB_add_u8(&client_hello, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) ||
-      !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &hello_body) ||
-      !CBB_add_u16(&hello_body, version) ||
-      !CBB_add_bytes(&hello_body, random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
-      /* No session id. */
-      !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) ||
-      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&hello_body, &cipher_suites)) {
-    CBB_cleanup(&client_hello);
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  /* Copy the cipher suites. */
-  while (CBS_len(&cipher_specs) > 0) {
-    uint32_t cipher_spec;
-    if (!CBS_get_u24(&cipher_specs, &cipher_spec)) {
-      CBB_cleanup(&client_hello);
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-      return -1;
-    }
-
-    /* Skip SSLv2 ciphers. */
-    if ((cipher_spec & 0xff0000) != 0) {
-      continue;
-    }
-    if (!CBB_add_u16(&cipher_suites, cipher_spec)) {
-      CBB_cleanup(&client_hello);
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      return -1;
-    }
-  }
-
-  /* Add the null compression scheme and finish. */
-  if (!CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 1) || !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) ||
-      !CBB_finish(&client_hello, NULL, &len)) {
-    CBB_cleanup(&client_hello);
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  /* Mark the message for "re"-use by the version-specific method. */
-  ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
-  ssl->s3->tmp.message_type = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
-  /* The handshake message header is 4 bytes. */
-  ssl->s3->tmp.message_size = len - 4;
-
-  /* Consume and discard the V2ClientHello. */
-  ssl_read_buffer_consume(ssl, 2 + msg_length);
-  ssl_read_buffer_discard(ssl);
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *ssl) {
-  int ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1;
-  long n;
-  const SSL_CIPHER *c;
-  STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
-  struct ssl_early_callback_ctx early_ctx;
-  CBS client_hello;
-  uint16_t client_version;
-  CBS client_random, session_id, cipher_suites, compression_methods;
-  SSL_SESSION *session = NULL;
-
-  /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are TLSv1
-   * and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down switching should
-   * be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we will respond with
-   * SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1. */
-  switch (ssl->state) {
-    case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
-    case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
-      n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(
-          ssl, SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
-          SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
-          ssl_hash_message, &ok);
-
-      if (!ok) {
-        return n;
-      }
-
-      ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
-      /* fallthrough */
-    case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
-    case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
-      /* We have previously parsed the ClientHello message, and can't call
-       * ssl_get_message again without hashing the message into the Finished
-       * digest again. */
-      n = ssl->init_num;
-
-      memset(&early_ctx, 0, sizeof(early_ctx));
-      early_ctx.ssl = ssl;
-      early_ctx.client_hello = ssl->init_msg;
-      early_ctx.client_hello_len = n;
-      if (!ssl_early_callback_init(&early_ctx)) {
-        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_PARSE_FAILED);
-        goto f_err;
-      }
-
-      if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C &&
-          ssl->ctx->select_certificate_cb != NULL) {
-        ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
-        switch (ssl->ctx->select_certificate_cb(&early_ctx)) {
-          case 0:
-            ssl->rwstate = SSL_CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING;
-            goto err;
-
-          case -1:
-            /* Connection rejected. */
-            al = SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED;
-            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CONNECTION_REJECTED);
-            goto f_err;
-
-          default:
-            /* fallthrough */;
-        }
-      }
-      ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
-      break;
-
-    default:
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
-      return -1;
-  }
-
-  CBS_init(&client_hello, ssl->init_msg, n);
-  if (!CBS_get_u16(&client_hello, &client_version) ||
-      !CBS_get_bytes(&client_hello, &client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
-      !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &session_id) ||
-      CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
-    al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-    goto f_err;
-  }
-
-  /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may differ:
-   * see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
-  ssl->client_version = client_version;
-
-  /* Load the client random. */
-  memcpy(ssl->s3->client_random, CBS_data(&client_random), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-
-  if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
-    CBS cookie;
-
-    if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cookie) ||
-        CBS_len(&cookie) > DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH) {
-      al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-  }
-
-  /* Note: This codepath may run twice if |ssl_get_prev_session| completes
-   * asynchronously.
-   *
-   * TODO(davidben): Clean up the order of events around ClientHello
-   * processing. */
-  if (!ssl->s3->have_version) {
-    /* Select version to use */
-    uint16_t version = ssl3_get_mutual_version(ssl, client_version);
-    if (version == 0) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
-      ssl->version = ssl->client_version;
-      al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-    ssl->version = version;
-    ssl->s3->enc_method = ssl3_get_enc_method(version);
-    assert(ssl->s3->enc_method != NULL);
-    /* At this point, the connection's version is known and |ssl->version| is
-     * fixed. Begin enforcing the record-layer version. */
-    ssl->s3->have_version = 1;
-  } else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl) ? (ssl->client_version > ssl->version)
-                            : (ssl->client_version < ssl->version)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
-    al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
-    goto f_err;
-  }
-
-  ssl->hit = 0;
-  int send_new_ticket = 0;
-  switch (ssl_get_prev_session(ssl, &session, &send_new_ticket, &early_ctx)) {
-    case ssl_session_success:
-      break;
-    case ssl_session_error:
-      goto err;
-    case ssl_session_retry:
-      ssl->rwstate = SSL_PENDING_SESSION;
-      goto err;
-  }
-  ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected = send_new_ticket;
-
-  /* The EMS state is needed when making the resumption decision, but
-   * extensions are not normally parsed until later. This detects the EMS
-   * extension for the resumption decision and it's checked against the result
-   * of the normal parse later in this function. */
-  const uint8_t *ems_data;
-  size_t ems_len;
-  int have_extended_master_secret =
-      ssl->version != SSL3_VERSION &&
-      SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get(&early_ctx,
-                                           TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret,
-                                           &ems_data, &ems_len) &&
-      ems_len == 0;
-
-  if (session != NULL) {
-    if (session->extended_master_secret &&
-        !have_extended_master_secret) {
-      /* A ClientHello without EMS that attempts to resume a session with EMS
-       * is fatal to the connection. */
-      al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_EMS_SESSION_WITHOUT_EMS_EXTENSION);
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-
-    ssl->hit =
-        /* Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated version:
-         * most clients do not accept a mismatch. */
-        ssl->version == session->ssl_version &&
-        /* If the client offers the EMS extension, but the previous session
-         * didn't use it, then negotiate a new session. */
-        have_extended_master_secret == session->extended_master_secret;
-  }
-
-  if (ssl->hit) {
-    /* Use the new session. */
-    SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->session);
-    ssl->session = session;
-    session = NULL;
-
-    ssl->verify_result = ssl->session->verify_result;
-  } else {
-    if (!ssl_get_new_session(ssl, 1 /* server */)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-
-    /* Clear the session ID if we want the session to be single-use. */
-    if (!(ssl->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)) {
-      ssl->session->session_id_length = 0;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (ssl->ctx->dos_protection_cb != NULL &&
-      ssl->ctx->dos_protection_cb(&early_ctx) == 0) {
-    /* Connection rejected for DOS reasons. */
-    al = SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED;
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CONNECTION_REJECTED);
-    goto f_err;
-  }
-
-  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cipher_suites) ||
-      CBS_len(&cipher_suites) == 0 ||
-      CBS_len(&cipher_suites) % 2 != 0 ||
-      !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &compression_methods) ||
-      CBS_len(&compression_methods) == 0) {
-    al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-    goto f_err;
-  }
-
-  ciphers = ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(ssl, &cipher_suites);
-  if (ciphers == NULL) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. */
-  if (ssl->hit) {
-    size_t j;
-    int found_cipher = 0;
-    uint32_t id = ssl->session->cipher->id;
-
-    for (j = 0; j < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); j++) {
-      c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, j);
-      if (c->id == id) {
-        found_cipher = 1;
-        break;
-      }
-    }
-
-    if (!found_cipher) {
-      /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked to reuse
-       * it */
-      al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-  }
-
-  /* Only null compression is supported. */
-  if (memchr(CBS_data(&compression_methods), 0,
-             CBS_len(&compression_methods)) == NULL) {
-    al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
-    goto f_err;
-  }
-
-  /* TLS extensions. */
-  if (ssl->version >= SSL3_VERSION &&
-      !ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(ssl, &client_hello)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  /* There should be nothing left over in the record. */
-  if (CBS_len(&client_hello) != 0) {
-    /* wrong packet length */
-    al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
-    goto f_err;
-  }
-
-  if (have_extended_master_secret != ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret) {
-    al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EMS_STATE_INCONSISTENT);
-    goto f_err;
-  }
-
-  /* Given ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher */
-  if (!ssl->hit) {
-    if (ciphers == NULL) {
-      al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-
-    /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
-    if (ssl->cert->cert_cb) {
-      int rv = ssl->cert->cert_cb(ssl, ssl->cert->cert_cb_arg);
-      if (rv == 0) {
-        al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
-        goto f_err;
-      }
-      if (rv < 0) {
-        ssl->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
-        goto err;
-      }
-      ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
-    }
-    c = ssl3_choose_cipher(ssl, ciphers, ssl_get_cipher_preferences(ssl));
-
-    if (c == NULL) {
-      al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-    ssl->session->cipher = c;
-    ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
-
-    /* Determine whether to request a client certificate. */
-    ssl->s3->tmp.cert_request = !!(ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER);
-    /* Only request a certificate if Channel ID isn't negotiated. */
-    if ((ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER_IF_NO_OBC) &&
-        ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
-      ssl->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
-    }
-    /* Plain PSK forbids Certificate and CertificateRequest. */
-    if (ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK) {
-      ssl->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
-    }
-  } else {
-    /* Session-id reuse */
-    ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ssl->session->cipher;
-    ssl->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
-  }
-
-  /* Now that the cipher is known, initialize the handshake hash. */
-  if (!ssl3_init_handshake_hash(ssl)) {
-    goto f_err;
-  }
-
-  /* In TLS 1.2, client authentication requires hashing the handshake transcript
-   * under a different hash. Otherwise, release the handshake buffer. */
-  if (!ssl->s3->tmp.cert_request ||
-      ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
-    ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(ssl);
-  }
-
-  /* we now have the following setup;
-   * client_random
-   * cipher_list        - our prefered list of ciphers
-   * ciphers            - the clients prefered list of ciphers
-   * compression        - basically ignored right now
-   * ssl version is set - sslv3
-   * ssl->session         - The ssl session has been setup.
-   * ssl->hit             - session reuse flag
-   * ssl->tmp.new_cipher  - the new cipher to use. */
-
-  ret = 1;
-
-  if (0) {
-  f_err:
-    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
-  }
-
-err:
-  sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
-  SSL_SESSION_free(session);
-  return ret;
-}
-
-int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *ssl) {
-  if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B) {
-    return ssl_do_write(ssl);
-  }
-
-  assert(ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A);
-
-  /* We only accept ChannelIDs on connections with ECDHE in order to avoid a
-   * known attack while we fix ChannelID itself. */
-  if (ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid &&
-      (ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kECDHE) == 0) {
-    ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
-  }
-
-  /* If this is a resumption and the original handshake didn't support
-   * ChannelID then we didn't record the original handshake hashes in the
-   * session and so cannot resume with ChannelIDs. */
-  if (ssl->hit && ssl->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0) {
-    ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl_fill_hello_random(ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-                             1 /* server */)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  CBB cbb, session_id;
-  size_t length;
-  CBB_zero(&cbb);
-  if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, ssl_handshake_start(ssl),
-                      ssl->init_buf->max - SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl)) ||
-      !CBB_add_u16(&cbb, ssl->version) ||
-      !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
-      !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cbb, &session_id) ||
-      !CBB_add_bytes(&session_id, ssl->session->session_id,
-                     ssl->session->session_id_length) ||
-      !CBB_add_u16(&cbb, ssl_cipher_get_value(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) ||
-      !CBB_add_u8(&cbb, 0 /* no compression */) ||
-      !ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(ssl, &cbb) ||
-      !CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &length) ||
-      !ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, length)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
-  return ssl_do_write(ssl);
-}
-
-int ssl3_send_certificate_status(SSL *ssl) {
-  if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
-    CBB out, ocsp_response;
-    size_t length;
-
-    CBB_zero(&out);
-    if (!CBB_init_fixed(&out, ssl_handshake_start(ssl),
-                        ssl->init_buf->max - SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl)) ||
-        !CBB_add_u8(&out, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) ||
-        !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&out, &ocsp_response) ||
-        !CBB_add_bytes(&ocsp_response, ssl->ctx->ocsp_response,
-                       ssl->ctx->ocsp_response_length) ||
-        !CBB_finish(&out, NULL, &length) ||
-        !ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, length)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      CBB_cleanup(&out);
-      return -1;
-    }
-
-    ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
-  }
-
-  /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
-  return ssl_do_write(ssl);
-}
-
-int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *ssl) {
-  if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
-    if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0)) {
-      return -1;
-    }
-    ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
-  }
-
-  /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
-  return ssl_do_write(ssl);
-}
-
-int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *ssl) {
-  if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_C) {
-    return ssl_do_write(ssl);
-  }
-
-  CBB cbb, child;
-  if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, ssl_handshake_start(ssl),
-                      ssl->init_buf->max - SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl))) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
-    /* This is the first iteration, so write parameters. */
-    uint32_t alg_k = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-    uint32_t alg_a = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-
-    /* PSK ciphers begin with an identity hint. */
-    if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
-      size_t len =
-          (ssl->psk_identity_hint == NULL) ? 0 : strlen(ssl->psk_identity_hint);
-      if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) ||
-          !CBB_add_bytes(&child, (const uint8_t *)ssl->psk_identity_hint,
-                         len)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-    }
-
-    if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
-      /* Determine the group to use. */
-      DH *params = ssl->cert->dh_tmp;
-      if (params == NULL && ssl->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL) {
-        params = ssl->cert->dh_tmp_cb(ssl, 0, 1024);
-      }
-      if (params == NULL) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
-        ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-        goto err;
-      }
-      ssl->session->key_exchange_info = DH_num_bits(params);
-
-      /* Set up DH, generate a key, and emit the public half. */
-      DH *dh = DHparams_dup(params);
-      if (dh == NULL) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-
-      SSL_ECDH_CTX_init_for_dhe(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx, dh);
-      if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) ||
-          !BN_bn2cbb_padded(&child, BN_num_bytes(params->p), params->p) ||
-          !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) ||
-          !BN_bn2cbb_padded(&child, BN_num_bytes(params->g), params->g) ||
-          !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) ||
-          !SSL_ECDH_CTX_generate_keypair(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx, &child)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-    } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
-      /* Determine the curve to use. */
-      uint16_t curve_id;
-      if (!tls1_get_shared_curve(ssl, &curve_id)) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
-        ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-        goto err;
-      }
-      ssl->session->key_exchange_info = curve_id;
-
-      /* Set up ECDH, generate a key, and emit the public half. */
-      if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_init(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx, curve_id) ||
-          !CBB_add_u8(&cbb, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) ||
-          !CBB_add_u16(&cbb, curve_id) ||
-          !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) ||
-          !SSL_ECDH_CTX_generate_keypair(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx, &child)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-    } else {
-      assert(alg_k & SSL_kPSK);
-    }
-
-    /* Otherwise, restore |cbb| from the previous iteration.
-     * TODO(davidben): When |ssl->init_buf| is gone, come up with a simpler
-     * pattern. Probably keep the |CBB| around in the handshake state. */
-  } else if (!CBB_did_write(&cbb, ssl->init_num - SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl))) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  /* Add a signature. */
-  if (ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
-    if (!ssl_has_private_key(ssl)) {
-      ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      goto err;
-    }
-
-    const size_t max_sig_len = ssl_private_key_max_signature_len(ssl);
-    size_t sig_len;
-    enum ssl_private_key_result_t sign_result;
-    if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
-      /* This is the first iteration, so set up the signature. Sample the
-       * parameter length before adding a signature algorithm. */
-      if (!CBB_flush(&cbb)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-      size_t params_len = CBB_len(&cbb);
-
-      /* Determine signature algorithm. */
-      const EVP_MD *md;
-      if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
-        md = tls1_choose_signing_digest(ssl);
-        if (!tls12_add_sigandhash(ssl, &cbb, md)) {
-          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-          ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-          goto err;
-        }
-      } else if (ssl_private_key_type(ssl) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
-        md = EVP_md5_sha1();
-      } else {
-        md = EVP_sha1();
-      }
-
-      /* Compute the digest and sign it. */
-      uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-      unsigned digest_len = 0;
-      EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
-      EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
-      int digest_ret =
-          EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) &&
-          EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) &&
-          EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) &&
-          EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, CBB_data(&cbb), params_len) &&
-          EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, digest, &digest_len);
-      EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
-      uint8_t *ptr;
-      if (!digest_ret ||
-          !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) ||
-          !CBB_reserve(&child, &ptr, max_sig_len)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-      sign_result = ssl_private_key_sign(ssl, ptr, &sig_len, max_sig_len, md,
-                                         digest, digest_len);
-    } else {
-      assert(ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B);
-
-      /* Retry the signature. */
-      uint8_t *ptr;
-      if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) ||
-          !CBB_reserve(&child, &ptr, max_sig_len)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-      sign_result =
-          ssl_private_key_sign_complete(ssl, ptr, &sig_len, max_sig_len);
-    }
-
-    switch (sign_result) {
-      case ssl_private_key_success:
-        ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
-        if (!CBB_did_write(&child, sig_len)) {
-          goto err;
-        }
-        break;
-      case ssl_private_key_failure:
-        ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
-        goto err;
-      case ssl_private_key_retry:
-        /* Discard the unfinished signature and save the state of |cbb| for the
-         * next iteration. */
-        CBB_discard_child(&cbb);
-        ssl->init_num = SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl) + CBB_len(&cbb);
-        ssl->rwstate = SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION;
-        ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
-        goto err;
-    }
-  }
-
-  size_t length;
-  if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &length) ||
-      !ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, length)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_C;
-  return ssl_do_write(ssl);
-
-err:
-  CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
-  return -1;
-}
-
-int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *ssl) {
-  uint8_t *p, *d;
-  size_t i;
-  int j, nl, off, n;
-  STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
-  X509_NAME *name;
-  BUF_MEM *buf;
-
-  if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
-    buf = ssl->init_buf;
-
-    d = p = ssl_handshake_start(ssl);
-
-    /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
-    p++;
-    n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(ssl, p);
-    d[0] = n;
-    p += n;
-    n++;
-
-    if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
-      const uint8_t *psigs;
-      nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(ssl, &psigs);
-      s2n(nl, p);
-      memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
-      p += nl;
-      n += nl + 2;
-    }
-
-    off = n;
-    p += 2;
-    n += 2;
-
-    sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(ssl);
-    nl = 0;
-    if (sk != NULL) {
-      for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
-        name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
-        j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
-        if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl) + n + j + 2)) {
-          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
-          goto err;
-        }
-        p = ssl_handshake_start(ssl) + n;
-        s2n(j, p);
-        i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
-        n += 2 + j;
-        nl += 2 + j;
-      }
-    }
-
-    /* else no CA names */
-    p = ssl_handshake_start(ssl) + off;
-    s2n(nl, p);
-
-    if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-    ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
-  }
-
-  /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
-  return ssl_do_write(ssl);
-
-err:
-  return -1;
-}
-
-int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *ssl) {
-  int al;
-  CBS client_key_exchange;
-  uint32_t alg_k;
-  uint32_t alg_a;
-  uint8_t *premaster_secret = NULL;
-  size_t premaster_secret_len = 0;
-  uint8_t *decrypt_buf = NULL;
-
-  unsigned psk_len = 0;
-  uint8_t psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
-
-  if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A ||
-      ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B) {
-    int ok;
-    const long n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(
-        ssl, SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
-        SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048 /* ??? */, ssl_hash_message, &ok);
-    if (!ok) {
-      return n;
-    }
-  }
-
-  CBS_init(&client_key_exchange, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num);
-  alg_k = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-  alg_a = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-
-  /* If using a PSK key exchange, prepare the pre-shared key. */
-  if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
-    CBS psk_identity;
-
-    /* If using PSK, the ClientKeyExchange contains a psk_identity. If PSK,
-     * then this is the only field in the message. */
-    if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange, &psk_identity) ||
-        ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-      al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-
-    if (ssl->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
-      al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-
-    if (CBS_len(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN ||
-        CBS_contains_zero_byte(&psk_identity)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
-      al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-
-    if (!CBS_strdup(&psk_identity, &ssl->session->psk_identity)) {
-      al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-
-    /* Look up the key for the identity. */
-    psk_len = ssl->psk_server_callback(ssl, ssl->session->psk_identity, psk,
-                                       sizeof(psk));
-    if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-      goto f_err;
-    } else if (psk_len == 0) {
-      /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
-      al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-  }
-
-  /* Depending on the key exchange method, compute |premaster_secret| and
-   * |premaster_secret_len|. */
-  if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
-    /* Allocate a buffer large enough for an RSA decryption. */
-    const size_t rsa_size = ssl_private_key_max_signature_len(ssl);
-    decrypt_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size);
-    if (decrypt_buf == NULL) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-      goto err;
-    }
-
-    enum ssl_private_key_result_t decrypt_result;
-    size_t decrypt_len;
-    if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B) {
-      if (!ssl_has_private_key(ssl) ||
-          ssl_private_key_type(ssl) != EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
-        al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
-        goto f_err;
-      }
-      CBS encrypted_premaster_secret;
-      if (ssl->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
-        if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange,
-                                         &encrypted_premaster_secret) ||
-            CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0) {
-          al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL,
-                            SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
-          goto f_err;
-        }
-      } else {
-        encrypted_premaster_secret = client_key_exchange;
-      }
-
-      /* Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of the
-       * timing-sensitive code below. */
-      decrypt_result = ssl_private_key_decrypt(
-          ssl, decrypt_buf, &decrypt_len, rsa_size,
-          CBS_data(&encrypted_premaster_secret),
-          CBS_len(&encrypted_premaster_secret));
-    } else {
-      assert(ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_C);
-      /* Complete async decrypt. */
-      decrypt_result = ssl_private_key_decrypt_complete(
-          ssl, decrypt_buf, &decrypt_len, rsa_size);
-    }
-
-    switch (decrypt_result) {
-      case ssl_private_key_success:
-        ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
-        break;
-      case ssl_private_key_failure:
-        ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
-        goto err;
-      case ssl_private_key_retry:
-        ssl->rwstate = SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION;
-        ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_C;
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    assert(decrypt_len == rsa_size);
-
-    /* Prepare a random premaster, to be used on invalid padding. See RFC 5246,
-     * section 7.4.7.1. */
-    premaster_secret_len = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
-    premaster_secret = OPENSSL_malloc(premaster_secret_len);
-    if (premaster_secret == NULL) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-      goto err;
-    }
-    if (!RAND_bytes(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-
-    /* The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys are
-     * publicly invalid. */
-    if (decrypt_len < 11 + premaster_secret_len) {
-      al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-
-    /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
-    size_t padding_len = decrypt_len - premaster_secret_len;
-    uint8_t good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_buf[0], 0) &
-                   constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_buf[1], 2);
-    size_t i;
-    for (i = 2; i < padding_len - 1; i++) {
-      good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(decrypt_buf[i]);
-    }
-    good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(decrypt_buf[padding_len - 1]);
-
-    /* The premaster secret must begin with |client_version|. This too must be
-     * checked in constant time (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/). */
-    good &= constant_time_eq_8(decrypt_buf[padding_len],
-                               (unsigned)(ssl->client_version >> 8));
-    good &= constant_time_eq_8(decrypt_buf[padding_len + 1],
-                               (unsigned)(ssl->client_version & 0xff));
-
-    /* Select, in constant time, either the decrypted premaster or the random
-     * premaster based on |good|. */
-    for (i = 0; i < premaster_secret_len; i++) {
-      premaster_secret[i] = constant_time_select_8(
-          good, decrypt_buf[padding_len + i], premaster_secret[i]);
-    }
-
-    OPENSSL_free(decrypt_buf);
-    decrypt_buf = NULL;
-  } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kDHE)) {
-    /* Parse the ClientKeyExchange. ECDHE uses a u8 length prefix while DHE uses
-     * u16. */
-    CBS peer_key;
-    int peer_key_ok;
-    if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
-      peer_key_ok = CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange, &peer_key);
-    } else {
-      peer_key_ok =
-          CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange, &peer_key);
-    }
-
-    if (!peer_key_ok || CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0) {
-      al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-
-    /* Compute the premaster. */
-    uint8_t alert;
-    if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_compute_secret(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx, &premaster_secret,
-                                     &premaster_secret_len, &alert,
-                                     CBS_data(&peer_key), CBS_len(&peer_key))) {
-      al = alert;
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-
-    /* The key exchange state may now be discarded. */
-    SSL_ECDH_CTX_cleanup(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx);
-  } else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
-    /* For plain PSK, other_secret is a block of 0s with the same length as the
-     * pre-shared key. */
-    premaster_secret_len = psk_len;
-    premaster_secret = OPENSSL_malloc(premaster_secret_len);
-    if (premaster_secret == NULL) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-      goto err;
-    }
-    memset(premaster_secret, 0, premaster_secret_len);
-  } else {
-    al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
-    goto f_err;
-  }
-
-  /* For a PSK cipher suite, the actual pre-master secret is combined with the
-   * pre-shared key. */
-  if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
-    CBB new_premaster, child;
-    uint8_t *new_data;
-    size_t new_len;
-
-    CBB_zero(&new_premaster);
-    if (!CBB_init(&new_premaster, 2 + psk_len + 2 + premaster_secret_len) ||
-        !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&new_premaster, &child) ||
-        !CBB_add_bytes(&child, premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len) ||
-        !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&new_premaster, &child) ||
-        !CBB_add_bytes(&child, psk, psk_len) ||
-        !CBB_finish(&new_premaster, &new_data, &new_len)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-      CBB_cleanup(&new_premaster);
-      goto err;
-    }
-
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
-    OPENSSL_free(premaster_secret);
-    premaster_secret = new_data;
-    premaster_secret_len = new_len;
-  }
-
-  /* Compute the master secret */
-  ssl->session->master_key_length = tls1_generate_master_secret(
-      ssl, ssl->session->master_key, premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
-  if (ssl->session->master_key_length == 0) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  ssl->session->extended_master_secret = ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret;
-
-  OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
-  OPENSSL_free(premaster_secret);
-  return 1;
-
-f_err:
-  ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
-err:
-  if (premaster_secret != NULL) {
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
-    OPENSSL_free(premaster_secret);
-  }
-  OPENSSL_free(decrypt_buf);
-
-  return -1;
-}
-
-int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *ssl) {
-  int al, ok, ret = 0;
-  long n;
-  CBS certificate_verify, signature;
-  X509 *peer = ssl->session->peer;
-  EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-  const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
-  uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-  size_t digest_length;
-  EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
-
-  /* Only RSA and ECDSA client certificates are supported, so a
-   * CertificateVerify is required if and only if there's a client certificate.
-   * */
-  if (peer == NULL) {
-    ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(ssl);
-    return 1;
-  }
-
-  n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(
-      ssl, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
-      SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
-      ssl_dont_hash_message, &ok);
-
-  if (!ok) {
-    return n;
-  }
-
-  /* Filter out unsupported certificate types. */
-  pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
-  if (pkey == NULL) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  if (!(X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey) & EVP_PKT_SIGN) ||
-      (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA && pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
-    al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
-    goto f_err;
-  }
-
-  CBS_init(&certificate_verify, ssl->init_msg, n);
-
-  /* Determine the digest type if needbe. */
-  if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
-    uint8_t hash, signature_type;
-    if (!CBS_get_u8(&certificate_verify, &hash) ||
-        !CBS_get_u8(&certificate_verify, &signature_type)) {
-      al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-    if (!tls12_check_peer_sigalg(ssl, &md, &al, hash, signature_type, pkey)) {
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-  }
-
-  /* Compute the digest. */
-  if (!ssl3_cert_verify_hash(ssl, digest, &digest_length, &md, pkey->type)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  /* The handshake buffer is no longer necessary, and we may hash the current
-   * message.*/
-  ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(ssl);
-  if (!ssl3_hash_current_message(ssl)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  /* Parse and verify the signature. */
-  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&certificate_verify, &signature) ||
-      CBS_len(&certificate_verify) != 0) {
-    al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-    goto f_err;
-  }
-
-  pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
-  if (pctx == NULL) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  if (!EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) ||
-      !EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, md) ||
-      !EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, CBS_data(&signature), CBS_len(&signature), digest,
-                       digest_length)) {
-    al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
-    goto f_err;
-  }
-
-  ret = 1;
-
-  if (0) {
-  f_err:
-    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
-  }
-
-err:
-  EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
-  EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-
-  return ret;
-}
-
-int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *ssl) {
-  int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
-  X509 *x = NULL;
-  unsigned long n;
-  STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
-  SHA256_CTX sha256;
-  CBS certificate_msg, certificate_list;
-  int is_first_certificate = 1;
-
-  n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
-                                   -1, (long)ssl->max_cert_list,
-                                   ssl_hash_message, &ok);
-
-  if (!ok) {
-    return n;
-  }
-
-  if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
-    if ((ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
-        (ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
-      al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-
-    /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
-    if (ssl->version > SSL3_VERSION && ssl->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL,
-                        SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
-      al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-    ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
-
-    return 1;
-  }
-
-  if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
-    al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
-    goto f_err;
-  }
-
-  CBS_init(&certificate_msg, ssl->init_msg, n);
-
-  sk = sk_X509_new_null();
-  if (sk == NULL) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_msg, &certificate_list) ||
-      CBS_len(&certificate_msg) != 0) {
-    al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-    goto f_err;
-  }
-
-  while (CBS_len(&certificate_list) > 0) {
-    CBS certificate;
-    const uint8_t *data;
-
-    if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &certificate)) {
-      al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-
-    if (is_first_certificate && ssl->ctx->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs) {
-      /* If this is the first certificate, and we don't want to keep peer
-       * certificates in memory, then we hash it right away. */
-      SHA256_Init(&sha256);
-      SHA256_Update(&sha256, CBS_data(&certificate), CBS_len(&certificate));
-      SHA256_Final(ssl->session->peer_sha256, &sha256);
-      ssl->session->peer_sha256_valid = 1;
-    }
-    is_first_certificate = 0;
-
-    /* A u24 length cannot overflow a long. */
-    data = CBS_data(&certificate);
-    x = d2i_X509(NULL, &data, (long)CBS_len(&certificate));
-    if (x == NULL) {
-      al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-    if (data != CBS_data(&certificate) + CBS_len(&certificate)) {
-      al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-    if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-      goto err;
-    }
-    x = NULL;
-  }
-
-  if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
-    /* No client certificate so the handshake buffer may be discarded. */
-    ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(ssl);
-
-    /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
-    if (ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
-      al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
-      goto f_err;
-    } else if ((ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
-             (ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
-      /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
-      al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-  } else {
-    i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(ssl, sk);
-    if (i <= 0) {
-      al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(ssl->verify_result);
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-  }
-
-  X509_free(ssl->session->peer);
-  ssl->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
-  ssl->session->verify_result = ssl->verify_result;
-
-  sk_X509_pop_free(ssl->session->cert_chain, X509_free);
-  ssl->session->cert_chain = sk;
-  /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
-   * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
-
-  sk = NULL;
-
-  ret = 1;
-
-  if (0) {
-  f_err:
-    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
-  }
-
-err:
-  X509_free(x);
-  sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
-  return ret;
-}
-
-int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *ssl) {
-  if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
-    if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(ssl)) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-    ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
-  }
-
-  /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
-  return ssl_do_write(ssl);
-}
-
-/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
-int ssl3_send_new_session_ticket(SSL *ssl) {
-  int ret = -1;
-  uint8_t *session = NULL;
-  size_t session_len;
-  EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
-  HMAC_CTX hctx;
-
-  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
-  HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
-
-  if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
-    uint8_t *p, *macstart;
-    int len;
-    unsigned int hlen;
-    SSL_CTX *tctx = ssl->initial_ctx;
-    uint8_t iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
-    uint8_t key_name[16];
-    /* The maximum overhead of encrypting the session is 16 (key name) + IV +
-     * one block of encryption overhead + HMAC.  */
-    const size_t max_ticket_overhead =
-        16 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE;
-
-    /* Serialize the SSL_SESSION to be encoded into the ticket. */
-    if (!SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_for_ticket(ssl->session, &session,
-                                         &session_len)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-
-    /* If the session is too long, emit a dummy value rather than abort the
-     * connection. */
-    if (session_len > 0xFFFF - max_ticket_overhead) {
-      static const char kTicketPlaceholder[] = "TICKET TOO LARGE";
-      const size_t placeholder_len = strlen(kTicketPlaceholder);
-
-      OPENSSL_free(session);
-      session = NULL;
-
-      p = ssl_handshake_start(ssl);
-      /* Emit ticket_lifetime_hint. */
-      l2n(0, p);
-      /* Emit ticket. */
-      s2n(placeholder_len, p);
-      memcpy(p, kTicketPlaceholder, placeholder_len);
-      p += placeholder_len;
-
-      len = p - ssl_handshake_start(ssl);
-      if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-      ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
-      return ssl_do_write(ssl);
-    }
-
-    /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as follows:
-     * handshake_header_length + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
-     * max_ticket_overhead + * session_length */
-    if (!BUF_MEM_grow(ssl->init_buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl) + 6 +
-                                       max_ticket_overhead + session_len)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-    p = ssl_handshake_start(ssl);
-    /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does all the
-     * work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. */
-    if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
-      if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(ssl, key_name, iv, &ctx, &hctx,
-                                     1 /* encrypt */) < 0) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-    } else {
-      if (!RAND_bytes(iv, 16) ||
-          !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
-                              tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv) ||
-          !HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, tlsext_tick_md(),
-                        NULL)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-      memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
-    }
-
-    /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified for
-     * resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for new
-     * sessions will live as long as their sessions. */
-    l2n(ssl->hit ? 0 : ssl->session->timeout, p);
-
-    /* Skip ticket length for now */
-    p += 2;
-    /* Output key name */
-    macstart = p;
-    memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
-    p += 16;
-    /* output IV */
-    memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
-    p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
-    /* Encrypt session data */
-    if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, session, session_len)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-    p += len;
-    if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ctx, p, &len)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-    p += len;
-
-    if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart) ||
-        !HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-
-    p += hlen;
-    /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
-    /* Total length */
-    len = p - ssl_handshake_start(ssl);
-    /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
-    p = ssl_handshake_start(ssl) + 4;
-    s2n(len - 6, p);
-    if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-    ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
-  }
-
-  /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
-  ret = ssl_do_write(ssl);
-
-err:
-  OPENSSL_free(session);
-  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-  HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
-  return ret;
-}
-
-/* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
- * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
-int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *ssl) {
-  int ok;
-  long n;
-  CBS next_protocol, selected_protocol, padding;
-
-  /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the extension
-   * in their ClientHello */
-  if (!ssl->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
-                                 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO,
-                                 514, /* See the payload format below */
-                                 ssl_hash_message, &ok);
-
-  if (!ok) {
-    return n;
-  }
-
-  CBS_init(&next_protocol, ssl->init_msg, n);
-
-  /* The payload looks like:
-   *   uint8 proto_len;
-   *   uint8 proto[proto_len];
-   *   uint8 padding_len;
-   *   uint8 padding[padding_len]; */
-  if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&next_protocol, &selected_protocol) ||
-      !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&next_protocol, &padding) ||
-      CBS_len(&next_protocol) != 0 ||
-      !CBS_stow(&selected_protocol, &ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated,
-                &ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated_len)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-/* ssl3_get_channel_id reads and verifies a ClientID handshake message. */
-int ssl3_get_channel_id(SSL *ssl) {
-  int ret = -1, ok;
-  long n;
-  uint8_t channel_id_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-  size_t channel_id_hash_len;
-  const uint8_t *p;
-  uint16_t extension_type;
-  EC_GROUP *p256 = NULL;
-  EC_KEY *key = NULL;
-  EC_POINT *point = NULL;
-  ECDSA_SIG sig;
-  BIGNUM x, y;
-  CBS encrypted_extensions, extension;
-
-  n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(
-      ssl, SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_B,
-      SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, 2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE,
-      ssl_dont_hash_message, &ok);
-
-  if (!ok) {
-    return n;
-  }
-
-  /* Before incorporating the EncryptedExtensions message to the handshake
-   * hash, compute the hash that should have been signed. */
-  if (!tls1_channel_id_hash(ssl, channel_id_hash, &channel_id_hash_len)) {
-    return -1;
-  }
-  assert(channel_id_hash_len == SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-
-  if (!ssl3_hash_current_message(ssl)) {
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  CBS_init(&encrypted_extensions, ssl->init_msg, n);
-
-  /* EncryptedExtensions could include multiple extensions, but the only
-   * extension that could be negotiated is ChannelID, so there can only be one
-   * entry.
-   *
-   * The payload looks like:
-   *   uint16 extension_type
-   *   uint16 extension_len;
-   *   uint8 x[32];
-   *   uint8 y[32];
-   *   uint8 r[32];
-   *   uint8 s[32]; */
-
-  if (!CBS_get_u16(&encrypted_extensions, &extension_type) ||
-      !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&encrypted_extensions, &extension) ||
-      CBS_len(&encrypted_extensions) != 0 ||
-      extension_type != TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id ||
-      CBS_len(&extension) != TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_MESSAGE);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  p256 = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
-  if (!p256) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_P256_SUPPORT);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  BN_init(&x);
-  BN_init(&y);
-  sig.r = BN_new();
-  sig.s = BN_new();
-  if (sig.r == NULL || sig.s == NULL) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  p = CBS_data(&extension);
-  if (BN_bin2bn(p + 0, 32, &x) == NULL ||
-      BN_bin2bn(p + 32, 32, &y) == NULL ||
-      BN_bin2bn(p + 64, 32, sig.r) == NULL ||
-      BN_bin2bn(p + 96, 32, sig.s) == NULL) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  point = EC_POINT_new(p256);
-  if (!point ||
-      !EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(p256, point, &x, &y, NULL)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  key = EC_KEY_new();
-  if (!key || !EC_KEY_set_group(key, p256) ||
-      !EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  /* We stored the handshake hash in |tlsext_channel_id| the first time that we
-   * were called. */
-  if (!ECDSA_do_verify(channel_id_hash, channel_id_hash_len, &sig, key)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_SIGNATURE_INVALID);
-    ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  memcpy(ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id, p, 64);
-  ret = 1;
-
-err:
-  BN_free(&x);
-  BN_free(&y);
-  BN_free(sig.r);
-  BN_free(sig.s);
-  EC_KEY_free(key);
-  EC_POINT_free(point);
-  EC_GROUP_free(p256);
-  return ret;
-}