grpc 1.0.1 → 1.1.2

data/third_party/boringssl/ssl/s3_both.c

@@ -114,15 +114,15 @@
 
 #include <assert.h>
 #include <limits.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
 #include <string.h>
 
 #include <openssl/buf.h>
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/mem.h>
 #include <openssl/md5.h>
-#include <openssl/obj.h>
+#include <openssl/nid.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include <openssl/sha.h>
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
@@ -130,73 +130,148 @@
 #include "internal.h"
 
 
+SSL_HANDSHAKE *ssl_handshake_new(enum ssl_hs_wait_t (*do_handshake)(SSL *ssl)) {
+  SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_HANDSHAKE));
+  if (hs == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  memset(hs, 0, sizeof(SSL_HANDSHAKE));
+  hs->do_handshake = do_handshake;
+  hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+  return hs;
+}
+
+void ssl_handshake_free(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  if (hs == NULL) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_cleanse(hs->secret, sizeof(hs->secret));
+  OPENSSL_cleanse(hs->traffic_secret_0, sizeof(hs->traffic_secret_0));
+  SSL_ECDH_CTX_cleanup(&hs->ecdh_ctx);
+  OPENSSL_free(hs->key_share_bytes);
+  OPENSSL_free(hs->public_key);
+  OPENSSL_free(hs->peer_sigalgs);
+  OPENSSL_free(hs->peer_psk_identity_hint);
+  OPENSSL_free(hs);
+}
+
 /* ssl3_do_write sends |ssl->init_buf| in records of type 'type'
- * (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC). It returns -1 on error, 1
- * on success or zero if the transmission is still incomplete. */
-int ssl3_do_write(SSL *ssl, int type) {
-  int n;
-
-  n = ssl3_write_bytes(ssl, type, &ssl->init_buf->data[ssl->init_off],
-                       ssl->init_num);
-  if (n < 0) {
-    return -1;
+ * (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC). It returns 1 on success
+ * and <= 0 on error. */
+static int ssl3_do_write(SSL *ssl, int type, const uint8_t *data, size_t len) {
+  int ret = ssl3_write_bytes(ssl, type, data, len);
+  if (ret <= 0) {
+    return ret;
   }
 
-  if (n == ssl->init_num) {
-    if (ssl->msg_callback) {
-      ssl->msg_callback(1, ssl->version, type, ssl->init_buf->data,
-                      (size_t)(ssl->init_off + ssl->init_num), ssl,
-                      ssl->msg_callback_arg);
-    }
-    return 1;
+  /* ssl3_write_bytes writes the data in its entirety. */
+  assert((size_t)ret == len);
+  ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, type, data, len);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_init_message(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb, CBB *body, uint8_t type) {
+  CBB_zero(cbb);
+  if (ssl->s3->pending_message != NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
   }
 
-  ssl->init_off += n;
-  ssl->init_num -= n;
-  return 0;
+  /* Pick a modest size hint to save most of the |realloc| calls. */
+  if (!CBB_init(cbb, 64) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8(cbb, type) ||
+      !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb, body)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_finish_message(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) {
+  if (ssl->s3->pending_message != NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t *msg = NULL;
+  size_t len;
+  if (!CBB_finish(cbb, &msg, &len) ||
+      len > 0xffffffffu) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    OPENSSL_free(msg);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  ssl3_update_handshake_hash(ssl, msg, len);
+
+  ssl->s3->pending_message = msg;
+  ssl->s3->pending_message_len = (uint32_t)len;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_write_message(SSL *ssl) {
+  if (ssl->s3->pending_message == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  int ret = ssl3_do_write(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, ssl->s3->pending_message,
+                          ssl->s3->pending_message_len);
+  if (ret <= 0) {
+    return ret;
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->pending_message);
+  ssl->s3->pending_message = NULL;
+  ssl->s3->pending_message_len = 0;
+  return 1;
 }
 
 int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *ssl, int a, int b) {
-  uint8_t *p;
-  int n;
+  if (ssl->state == b) {
+    return ssl->method->write_message(ssl);
+  }
 
-  if (ssl->state == a) {
-    p = ssl_handshake_start(ssl);
+  int n = ssl->s3->enc_method->final_finish_mac(ssl, ssl->server,
+                                                ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md);
+  if (n == 0) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = n;
 
-    n = ssl->s3->enc_method->final_finish_mac(ssl, ssl->server,
-                                              ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md);
-    if (n == 0) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-    ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = n;
-    memcpy(p, ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md, n);
-
-    /* Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. */
-    if (!ssl_log_master_secret(ssl, ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-                               ssl->session->master_key,
-                               ssl->session->master_key_length)) {
-      return 0;
-    }
+  /* Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. */
+  if (!ssl_log_secret(ssl, "CLIENT_RANDOM",
+                      SSL_get_session(ssl)->master_key,
+                      SSL_get_session(ssl)->master_key_length)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
 
-    /* Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */
-    if (ssl->server) {
-      assert(n <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
-      memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md, n);
-      ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len = n;
-    } else {
-      assert(n <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
-      memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md, n);
-      ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len = n;
-    }
+  /* Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */
+  if (ssl->server) {
+    assert(n <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+    memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md, n);
+    ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len = n;
+  } else {
+    assert(n <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+    memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md, n);
+    ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len = n;
+  }
 
-    if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, n)) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-    ssl->state = b;
+  CBB cbb, body;
+  if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_FINISHED) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&body, ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md,
+                     ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) ||
+      !ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, &cbb)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+    return -1;
   }
 
-  /* SSL3_ST_SEND_xxxxxx_HELLO_B */
-  return ssl_do_write(ssl);
+  ssl->state = b;
+  return ssl->method->write_message(ssl);
 }
 
 /* ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
@@ -212,34 +287,29 @@ static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *ssl) {
       ssl, !ssl->server, ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
 }
 
-int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *ssl, int a, int b) {
-  int al, finished_len, ok;
-  long message_len;
-  uint8_t *p;
-
-  message_len = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(
-      ssl, a, b, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, ssl_dont_hash_message, &ok);
-
-  if (!ok) {
-    return message_len;
+int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *ssl) {
+  int al;
+  int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_MT_FINISHED,
+                                         ssl_dont_hash_message);
+  if (ret <= 0) {
+    return ret;
   }
 
   /* Snapshot the finished hash before incorporating the new message. */
   ssl3_take_mac(ssl);
-  if (!ssl3_hash_current_message(ssl)) {
+  if (!ssl->method->hash_current_message(ssl)) {
     goto err;
   }
 
-  p = ssl->init_msg;
-  finished_len = ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
+  size_t finished_len = ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
 
-  if (finished_len != message_len) {
-    al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-    goto f_err;
-  }
-
-  if (CRYPTO_memcmp(p, ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, finished_len) != 0) {
+  int finished_ok = ssl->init_num == finished_len &&
+                    CRYPTO_memcmp(ssl->init_msg, ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
+                                  finished_len) == 0;
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
+  finished_ok = 1;
+#endif
+  if (!finished_ok) {
     al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
     goto f_err;
@@ -266,208 +336,338 @@ err:
   return 0;
 }
 
-int ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl, int a, int b) {
-  if (ssl->state == a) {
-    *((uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data) = SSL3_MT_CCS;
-    ssl->init_num = 1;
-    ssl->init_off = 0;
+int ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl) {
+  static const uint8_t kChangeCipherSpec[1] = {SSL3_MT_CCS};
+
+  return ssl3_do_write(ssl, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, kChangeCipherSpec,
+                       sizeof(kChangeCipherSpec));
+}
 
-    ssl->state = b;
+int ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *ssl) {
+  CBB cbb, body;
+  if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) ||
+      !ssl_add_cert_chain(ssl, &body) ||
+      !ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, &cbb)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+    return 0;
   }
 
-  /* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */
-  return ssl3_do_write(ssl, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
+  return 1;
 }
 
-int ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *ssl) {
-  uint8_t *p;
-  unsigned long l = 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl);
+size_t ssl_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *ssl) {
+  /* kMaxMessageLen is the default maximum message size for handshakes which do
+   * not accept peer certificate chains. */
+  static const size_t kMaxMessageLen = 16384;
+
+  if (SSL_in_init(ssl)) {
+    if ((!ssl->server || (ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) &&
+        kMaxMessageLen < ssl->max_cert_list) {
+      return ssl->max_cert_list;
+    }
+    return kMaxMessageLen;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    /* In TLS 1.2 and below, the largest acceptable post-handshake message is
+     * a HelloRequest. */
+    return 0;
+  }
 
-  if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(ssl, &l)) {
+  if (ssl->server) {
+    /* The largest acceptable post-handshake message for a server is a
+     * KeyUpdate. We will never initiate post-handshake auth. */
     return 0;
   }
 
-  l -= 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl);
-  p = ssl_handshake_start(ssl);
-  l2n3(l, p);
-  l += 3;
-  return ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l);
+  /* Clients must accept NewSessionTicket and CertificateRequest, so allow the
+   * default size. */
+  return kMaxMessageLen;
 }
 
-/* Obtain handshake message of message type |msg_type| (any if |msg_type| == -1),
- * maximum acceptable body length |max|. The first four bytes (msg_type and
- * length) are read in state |header_state|, the body is read in state
- * |body_state|. */
-long ssl3_get_message(SSL *ssl, int header_state, int body_state, int msg_type,
-                      long max, enum ssl_hash_message_t hash_message, int *ok) {
-  uint8_t *p;
-  unsigned long l;
-  long n;
-  int al;
+static int extend_handshake_buffer(SSL *ssl, size_t length) {
+  if (!BUF_MEM_reserve(ssl->init_buf, length)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+  while (ssl->init_buf->length < length) {
+    int ret = ssl3_read_handshake_bytes(
+        ssl, (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data + ssl->init_buf->length,
+        length - ssl->init_buf->length);
+    if (ret <= 0) {
+      return ret;
+    }
+    ssl->init_buf->length += (size_t)ret;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int read_v2_client_hello(SSL *ssl, int *out_is_v2_client_hello) {
+  /* Read the first 5 bytes, the size of the TLS record header. This is
+   * sufficient to detect a V2ClientHello and ensures that we never read beyond
+   * the first record. */
+  int ret = ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
+  if (ret <= 0) {
+    return ret;
+  }
+  const uint8_t *p = ssl_read_buffer(ssl);
+
+  /* Some dedicated error codes for protocol mixups should the application wish
+   * to interpret them differently. (These do not overlap with ClientHello or
+   * V2ClientHello.) */
+  if (strncmp("GET ", (const char *)p, 4) == 0 ||
+      strncmp("POST ", (const char *)p, 5) == 0 ||
+      strncmp("HEAD ", (const char *)p, 5) == 0 ||
+      strncmp("PUT ", (const char *)p, 4) == 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST);
+    return -1;
+  }
+  if (strncmp("CONNE", (const char *)p, 5) == 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if ((p[0] & 0x80) == 0 || p[2] != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO ||
+      p[3] != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
+    /* Not a V2ClientHello. */
+    *out_is_v2_client_hello = 0;
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  /* Determine the length of the V2ClientHello. */
+  size_t msg_length = ((p[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | p[1];
+  if (msg_length > (1024 * 4)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
+    return -1;
+  }
+  if (msg_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 2) {
+    /* Reject lengths that are too short early. We have already read
+     * |SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH| bytes, so we should not attempt to process an
+     * (invalid) V2ClientHello which would be shorter than that. */
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  /* Read the remainder of the V2ClientHello. */
+  ret = ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, 2 + msg_length);
+  if (ret <= 0) {
+    return ret;
+  }
+
+  CBS v2_client_hello;
+  CBS_init(&v2_client_hello, ssl_read_buffer(ssl) + 2, msg_length);
+
+  /* The V2ClientHello without the length is incorporated into the handshake
+   * hash. */
+  if (!ssl3_update_handshake_hash(ssl, CBS_data(&v2_client_hello),
+                                  CBS_len(&v2_client_hello))) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, 0 /* V2ClientHello */,
+                      CBS_data(&v2_client_hello), CBS_len(&v2_client_hello));
+
+  uint8_t msg_type;
+  uint16_t version, cipher_spec_length, session_id_length, challenge_length;
+  CBS cipher_specs, session_id, challenge;
+  if (!CBS_get_u8(&v2_client_hello, &msg_type) ||
+      !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &version) ||
+      !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_spec_length) ||
+      !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &session_id_length) ||
+      !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &challenge_length) ||
+      !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_specs, cipher_spec_length) ||
+      !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &session_id, session_id_length) ||
+      !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &challenge, challenge_length) ||
+      CBS_len(&v2_client_hello) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  /* msg_type has already been checked. */
+  assert(msg_type == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO);
+
+  /* The client_random is the V2ClientHello challenge. Truncate or
+   * left-pad with zeros as needed. */
+  size_t rand_len = CBS_len(&challenge);
+  if (rand_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) {
+    rand_len = SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+  }
+  uint8_t random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
+  memset(random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+  memcpy(random + (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - rand_len), CBS_data(&challenge),
+         rand_len);
+
+  /* Write out an equivalent SSLv3 ClientHello. */
+  size_t max_v3_client_hello = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2 /* version */ +
+                               SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 /* session ID length */ +
+                               2 /* cipher list length */ +
+                               CBS_len(&cipher_specs) / 3 * 2 +
+                               1 /* compression length */ + 1 /* compression */;
+  CBB client_hello, hello_body, cipher_suites;
+  CBB_zero(&client_hello);
+  if (!BUF_MEM_reserve(ssl->init_buf, max_v3_client_hello) ||
+      !CBB_init_fixed(&client_hello, (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data,
+                      ssl->init_buf->max) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8(&client_hello, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) ||
+      !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &hello_body) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(&hello_body, version) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&hello_body, random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+      /* No session id. */
+      !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&hello_body, &cipher_suites)) {
+    CBB_cleanup(&client_hello);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  /* Copy the cipher suites. */
+  while (CBS_len(&cipher_specs) > 0) {
+    uint32_t cipher_spec;
+    if (!CBS_get_u24(&cipher_specs, &cipher_spec)) {
+      CBB_cleanup(&client_hello);
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+      return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* Skip SSLv2 ciphers. */
+    if ((cipher_spec & 0xff0000) != 0) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (!CBB_add_u16(&cipher_suites, cipher_spec)) {
+      CBB_cleanup(&client_hello);
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return -1;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* Add the null compression scheme and finish. */
+  if (!CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 1) || !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) ||
+      !CBB_finish(&client_hello, NULL, &ssl->init_buf->length)) {
+    CBB_cleanup(&client_hello);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  /* Consume and discard the V2ClientHello. */
+  ssl_read_buffer_consume(ssl, 2 + msg_length);
+  ssl_read_buffer_discard(ssl);
+
+  *out_is_v2_client_hello = 1;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_get_message(SSL *ssl, int msg_type,
+                     enum ssl_hash_message_t hash_message) {
+again:
+  /* Re-create the handshake buffer if needed. */
+  if (ssl->init_buf == NULL) {
+    ssl->init_buf = BUF_MEM_new();
+    if (ssl->init_buf == NULL) {
+      return -1;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->server && !ssl->s3->v2_hello_done) {
+    /* Bypass the record layer for the first message to handle V2ClientHello. */
+    assert(hash_message == ssl_hash_message);
+    int is_v2_client_hello = 0;
+    int ret = read_v2_client_hello(ssl, &is_v2_client_hello);
+    if (ret <= 0) {
+      return ret;
+    }
+    if (is_v2_client_hello) {
+      /* V2ClientHello is hashed separately. */
+      hash_message = ssl_dont_hash_message;
+    }
+    ssl->s3->v2_hello_done = 1;
+  }
 
   if (ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message) {
     /* A ssl_dont_hash_message call cannot be combined with reuse_message; the
      * ssl_dont_hash_message would have to have been applied to the previous
      * call. */
     assert(hash_message == ssl_hash_message);
-    ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 0;
-    if (msg_type >= 0 && ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != msg_type) {
-      al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-    *ok = 1;
-    ssl->state = body_state;
-    ssl->init_msg = (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data + 4;
-    ssl->init_num = (int)ssl->s3->tmp.message_size;
-    return ssl->init_num;
-  }
-
-  p = (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data;
-
-  if (ssl->state == header_state) {
-    assert(ssl->init_num < 4);
-
-    for (;;) {
-      while (ssl->init_num < 4) {
-        int bytes_read = ssl3_read_bytes(
-            ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &p[ssl->init_num], 4 - ssl->init_num, 0);
-        if (bytes_read <= 0) {
-          *ok = 0;
-          return bytes_read;
-        }
-        ssl->init_num += bytes_read;
-      }
-
-      static const uint8_t kHelloRequest[4] = {SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0, 0, 0};
-      if (ssl->server || memcmp(p, kHelloRequest, sizeof(kHelloRequest)) != 0) {
-        break;
-      }
-
-      /* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- we are doing
-       * a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if their format is correct.
-       * Does not count for 'Finished' MAC. */
-      ssl->init_num = 0;
-
-      if (ssl->msg_callback) {
-        ssl->msg_callback(0, ssl->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, p, 4, ssl,
-                        ssl->msg_callback_arg);
-      }
-    }
+    assert(ssl->init_msg != NULL);
 
-    /* ssl->init_num == 4 */
+    ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 0;
+    hash_message = ssl_dont_hash_message;
+  } else {
+    ssl3_release_current_message(ssl, 0 /* don't free buffer */);
+  }
 
-    if (msg_type >= 0 && *p != msg_type) {
-      al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-    ssl->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++);
+  /* Read the message header, if we haven't yet. */
+  int ret = extend_handshake_buffer(ssl, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+  if (ret <= 0) {
+    return ret;
+  }
 
-    n2l3(p, l);
-    if (l > (unsigned long)max) {
-      al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
-      goto f_err;
-    }
+  /* Parse out the length. Cap it so the peer cannot force us to buffer up to
+   * 2^24 bytes. */
+  const uint8_t *p = (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data;
+  size_t msg_len = (((uint32_t)p[1]) << 16) | (((uint32_t)p[2]) << 8) | p[3];
+  if (msg_len > ssl_max_handshake_message_len(ssl)) {
+    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+    return -1;
+  }
 
-    if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(ssl->init_buf, l + 4)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
-      goto err;
-    }
-    ssl->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
-    ssl->state = body_state;
+  /* Read the message body, if we haven't yet. */
+  ret = extend_handshake_buffer(ssl, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + msg_len);
+  if (ret <= 0) {
+    return ret;
+  }
 
-    ssl->init_msg = (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data + 4;
-    ssl->init_num = 0;
+  /* We have now received a complete message. */
+  ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, ssl->init_buf->data,
+                      ssl->init_buf->length);
+
+  ssl->s3->tmp.message_type = ((const uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data)[0];
+  ssl->init_msg = (uint8_t*)ssl->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+  ssl->init_num = ssl->init_buf->length - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+  /* Ignore stray HelloRequest messages in the handshake before TLS 1.3. Per RFC
+   * 5246, section 7.4.1.1, the server may send HelloRequest at any time. */
+  if (!ssl->server && SSL_in_init(ssl) &&
+      (!ssl->s3->have_version || ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) &&
+      ssl->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST &&
+      ssl->init_num == 0) {
+    goto again;
   }
 
-  /* next state (body_state) */
-  p = ssl->init_msg;
-  n = ssl->s3->tmp.message_size - ssl->init_num;
-  while (n > 0) {
-    int bytes_read =
-        ssl3_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &p[ssl->init_num], n, 0);
-    if (bytes_read <= 0) {
-      ssl->rwstate = SSL_READING;
-      *ok = 0;
-      return bytes_read;
-    }
-    ssl->init_num += bytes_read;
-    n -= bytes_read;
+  if (msg_type >= 0 && ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != msg_type) {
+    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+    return -1;
   }
 
   /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
   if (hash_message == ssl_hash_message && !ssl3_hash_current_message(ssl)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  if (ssl->msg_callback) {
-    ssl->msg_callback(0, ssl->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, ssl->init_buf->data,
-                    (size_t)ssl->init_num + 4, ssl, ssl->msg_callback_arg);
+    return -1;
   }
-  *ok = 1;
-  return ssl->init_num;
 
-f_err:
-  ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
-
-err:
-  *ok = 0;
-  return -1;
+  return 1;
 }
 
 int ssl3_hash_current_message(SSL *ssl) {
-  /* The handshake header (different size between DTLS and TLS) is included in
-   * the hash. */
-  size_t header_len = ssl->init_msg - (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data;
   return ssl3_update_handshake_hash(ssl, (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data,
-                                    ssl->init_num + header_len);
+                                    ssl->init_buf->length);
 }
 
-/* ssl3_cert_verify_hash is documented as needing EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE because that
- * is sufficient pre-TLS1.2 as well. */
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE > MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-                       combined_tls_hash_fits_in_max);
-
-int ssl3_cert_verify_hash(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
-                          const EVP_MD **out_md, int pkey_type) {
-  /* For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using
-   * agreed digest and cached handshake records. Otherwise, use
-   * SHA1 or MD5 + SHA1 depending on key type.  */
-  if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
-    EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
-    unsigned len;
-
-    EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
-    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&mctx, *out_md, NULL) ||
-        !EVP_DigestUpdate(&mctx, ssl->s3->handshake_buffer->data,
-                          ssl->s3->handshake_buffer->length) ||
-        !EVP_DigestFinal(&mctx, out, &len)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
-      EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
-      return 0;
-    }
-    *out_len = len;
-  } else if (pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
-    if (ssl->s3->enc_method->cert_verify_mac(ssl, NID_md5, out) == 0 ||
-        ssl->s3->enc_method->cert_verify_mac(ssl, NID_sha1,
-                                             out + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) == 0) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-    *out_len = MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
-    *out_md = EVP_md5_sha1();
-  } else if (pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
-    if (ssl->s3->enc_method->cert_verify_mac(ssl, NID_sha1, out) == 0) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-    *out_len = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
-    *out_md = EVP_sha1();
-  } else {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    return 0;
+void ssl3_release_current_message(SSL *ssl, int free_buffer) {
+  if (ssl->init_msg != NULL) {
+    /* |init_buf| never contains data beyond the current message. */
+    assert(SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + ssl->init_num == ssl->init_buf->length);
+
+    /* Clear the current message. */
+    ssl->init_msg = NULL;
+    ssl->init_num = 0;
+    ssl->init_buf->length = 0;
   }
 
-  return 1;
+  if (free_buffer) {
+    BUF_MEM_free(ssl->init_buf);
+    ssl->init_buf = NULL;
+  }
 }
 
 int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) {
@@ -491,6 +691,9 @@ int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) {
     case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
     case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
     case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
+    case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH:
+    case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH:
+    case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH:
       al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
       break;
 
@@ -508,7 +711,10 @@ int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) {
       al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
       break;
 
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED:
     case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
+    case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL:
+    case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP:
       al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
       break;
 
@@ -537,21 +743,3 @@ int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) {
 
   return al;
 }
-
-int ssl_fill_hello_random(uint8_t *out, size_t len, int is_server) {
-  if (is_server) {
-    const uint32_t current_time = time(NULL);
-    uint8_t *p = out;
-
-    if (len < 4) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-    p[0] = current_time >> 24;
-    p[1] = current_time >> 16;
-    p[2] = current_time >> 8;
-    p[3] = current_time;
-    return RAND_bytes(p + 4, len - 4);
-  } else {
-    return RAND_bytes(out, len);
-  }
-}