grpc 1.0.1 → 1.1.2

data/third_party/boringssl/ssl/ssl_stat.c

@@ -110,39 +110,21 @@ const char *SSL_state_string_long(const SSL *ssl) {
     case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
       return "SSLv3 read server hello A";
 
-    case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
-      return "SSLv3 read server hello B";
-
     case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
       return "SSLv3 read server certificate A";
 
-    case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
-      return "SSLv3 read server certificate B";
-
     case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
       return "SSLv3 read server key exchange A";
 
-    case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
-      return "SSLv3 read server key exchange B";
-
     case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
       return "SSLv3 read server certificate request A";
 
-    case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
-      return "SSLv3 read server certificate request B";
-
     case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
       return "SSLv3 read server session ticket A";
 
-    case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
-      return "SSLv3 read server session ticket B";
-
     case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
       return "SSLv3 read server done A";
 
-    case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
-      return "SSLv3 read server done B";
-
     case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
       return "SSLv3 write client certificate A";
 
@@ -152,9 +134,6 @@ const char *SSL_state_string_long(const SSL *ssl) {
     case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
       return "SSLv3 write client certificate C";
 
-    case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
-      return "SSLv3 write client certificate D";
-
     case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
       return "SSLv3 write client key exchange A";
 
@@ -167,13 +146,9 @@ const char *SSL_state_string_long(const SSL *ssl) {
     case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
       return "SSLv3 write certificate verify B";
 
-    case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
-    case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
-      return "SSLv3 write change cipher spec A";
-
-    case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
-    case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
-      return "SSLv3 write change cipher spec B";
+    case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE:
+    case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE:
+      return "SSLv3 write change cipher spec";
 
     case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
     case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
@@ -191,10 +166,6 @@ const char *SSL_state_string_long(const SSL *ssl) {
     case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
       return "SSLv3 read finished A";
 
-    case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
-    case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
-      return "SSLv3 read finished B";
-
     case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
     case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
       return "SSLv3 flush data";
@@ -208,9 +179,6 @@ const char *SSL_state_string_long(const SSL *ssl) {
     case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
       return "SSLv3 read client hello C";
 
-    case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
-      return "SSLv3 read client hello D";
-
     case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
       return "SSLv3 write hello request A";
 
@@ -259,9 +227,6 @@ const char *SSL_state_string_long(const SSL *ssl) {
     case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
       return "SSLv3 read client certificate A";
 
-    case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
-      return "SSLv3 read client certificate B";
-
     case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
       return "SSLv3 read client key exchange A";
 
@@ -271,16 +236,10 @@ const char *SSL_state_string_long(const SSL *ssl) {
     case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
       return "SSLv3 read certificate verify A";
 
-    case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
-      return "SSLv3 read certificate verify B";
-
     /* DTLS */
     case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A:
       return "DTLS1 read hello verify request A";
 
-    case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B:
-      return "DTLS1 read hello verify request B";
-
     default:
       return "unknown state";
   }
@@ -311,33 +270,18 @@ const char *SSL_state_string(const SSL *ssl) {
     case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
       return "3RSH_A";
 
-    case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
-      return "3RSH_B";
-
     case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
       return "3RSC_A";
 
-    case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
-      return "3RSC_B";
-
     case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
       return "3RSKEA";
 
-    case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
-      return "3RSKEB";
-
     case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
       return "3RCR_A";
 
-    case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
-      return "3RCR_B";
-
     case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
       return "3RSD_A";
 
-    case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
-      return "3RSD_B";
-
     case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
       return "3WCC_A";
 
@@ -347,9 +291,6 @@ const char *SSL_state_string(const SSL *ssl) {
     case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
       return "3WCC_C";
 
-    case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
-      return "3WCC_D";
-
     case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
       return "3WCKEA";
 
@@ -362,13 +303,9 @@ const char *SSL_state_string(const SSL *ssl) {
     case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
       return "3WCV_B";
 
-    case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
-    case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
-      return "3WCCSA";
-
-    case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
-    case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
-      return "3WCCSB";
+    case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE:
+    case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE:
+      return "3WCCS_";
 
     case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
     case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
@@ -386,10 +323,6 @@ const char *SSL_state_string(const SSL *ssl) {
     case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
       return "3RFINA";
 
-    case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
-    case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
-      return "3RFINB";
-
     case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
       return "3WHR_A";
 
@@ -408,9 +341,6 @@ const char *SSL_state_string(const SSL *ssl) {
     case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
       return "3RCH_C";
 
-    case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
-      return "3RCH_D";
-
     case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
       return "3WSH_A";
 
@@ -444,28 +374,16 @@ const char *SSL_state_string(const SSL *ssl) {
     case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
       return "3RCC_A";
 
-    case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
-      return "3RCC_B";
-
     case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
       return "3RCKEA";
 
-    case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
-      return "3RCKEB";
-
     case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
       return "3RCV_A";
 
-    case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
-      return "3RCV_B";
-
     /* DTLS */
     case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A:
       return "DRCHVA";
 
-    case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B:
-      return "DRCHVB";
-
     default:
       return "UNKWN ";
   }

data/third_party/boringssl/ssl/t1_enc.c

@@ -136,7 +136,6 @@
 #include <openssl/ssl.h>
 
 #include <assert.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
 #include <string.h>
 
 #include <openssl/err.h>
@@ -144,7 +143,7 @@
 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
 #include <openssl/md5.h>
 #include <openssl/mem.h>
-#include <openssl/obj.h>
+#include <openssl/nid.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 
 #include "internal.h"
@@ -314,11 +313,10 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *ssl, int which) {
   }
 
   if (is_read) {
-    ssl_set_read_state(ssl, aead_ctx);
-  } else {
-    ssl_set_write_state(ssl, aead_ctx);
+    return ssl->method->set_read_state(ssl, aead_ctx);
   }
-  return 1;
+
+  return ssl->method->set_write_state(ssl, aead_ctx);
 }
 
 size_t SSL_get_key_block_len(const SSL *ssl) {
@@ -329,8 +327,8 @@ size_t SSL_get_key_block_len(const SSL *ssl) {
 
 int SSL_generate_key_block(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len) {
   return ssl->s3->enc_method->prf(
-      ssl, out, out_len, ssl->session->master_key,
-      ssl->session->master_key_length, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
+      ssl, out, out_len, SSL_get_session(ssl)->master_key,
+      SSL_get_session(ssl)->master_key_length, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
       TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
       ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
 }
@@ -340,12 +338,16 @@ int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *ssl) {
     return 1;
   }
 
+  SSL_SESSION *session = ssl->session;
+  if (ssl->s3->new_session != NULL) {
+    session = ssl->s3->new_session;
+  }
+
   const EVP_AEAD *aead = NULL;
   size_t mac_secret_len, fixed_iv_len;
-  if (ssl->session->cipher == NULL ||
+  if (session->cipher == NULL ||
       !ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(&aead, &mac_secret_len, &fixed_iv_len,
-                               ssl->session->cipher,
-                               ssl3_protocol_version(ssl))) {
+                               session->cipher, ssl3_protocol_version(ssl))) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
     return 0;
   }
@@ -390,29 +392,6 @@ int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *ssl) {
   return 1;
 }
 
-static int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *ssl, int md_nid, uint8_t *out) {
-  const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx_template;
-  if (md_nid == NID_md5) {
-    ctx_template = &ssl->s3->handshake_md5;
-  } else if (md_nid == EVP_MD_CTX_type(&ssl->s3->handshake_hash)) {
-    ctx_template = &ssl->s3->handshake_hash;
-  } else {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
-  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-  if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, ctx_template)) {
-    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-    return 0;
-  }
-  unsigned ret;
-  EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &ret);
-  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-  return ret;
-}
-
 static int append_digest(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
                          size_t max_out) {
   int ret = 0;
@@ -479,8 +458,8 @@ static int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *ssl, int from_server, uint8_t *out) {
 
   static const size_t kFinishedLen = 12;
   if (!ssl->s3->enc_method->prf(ssl, out, kFinishedLen,
-                                ssl->session->master_key,
-                                ssl->session->master_key_length, label,
+                                SSL_get_session(ssl)->master_key,
+                                SSL_get_session(ssl)->master_key_length, label,
                                 label_len, buf, digests_len, NULL, 0)) {
     return 0;
   }
@@ -526,6 +505,11 @@ int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
     return 0;
   }
 
+  if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return tls13_export_keying_material(ssl, out, out_len, label, label_len,
+                                        context, context_len, use_context);
+  }
+
   size_t seed_len = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
   if (use_context) {
     if (context_len >= 1u << 16) {
@@ -549,8 +533,9 @@ int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
   }
 
   int ret =
-      ssl->s3->enc_method->prf(ssl, out, out_len, ssl->session->master_key,
-                               ssl->session->master_key_length, label,
+      ssl->s3->enc_method->prf(ssl, out, out_len,
+                               SSL_get_session(ssl)->master_key,
+                               SSL_get_session(ssl)->master_key_length, label,
                                label_len, seed, seed_len, NULL, 0);
   OPENSSL_free(seed);
   return ret;
@@ -559,5 +544,4 @@ int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
 const SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = {
     tls1_prf,
     tls1_final_finish_mac,
-    tls1_cert_verify_mac,
 };

data/third_party/boringssl/ssl/t1_lib.c

@@ -110,7 +110,6 @@
 
 #include <assert.h>
 #include <limits.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 
@@ -120,11 +119,12 @@
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
 #include <openssl/mem.h>
-#include <openssl/obj.h>
+#include <openssl/nid.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include <openssl/type_check.h>
 
 #include "internal.h"
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
 
 
 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *ssl);
@@ -203,45 +203,46 @@ done:
   return ret;
 }
 
-char ssl_early_callback_init(struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx) {
-  CBS client_hello, session_id, cipher_suites, compression_methods, extensions;
+int ssl_early_callback_init(SSL *ssl, struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx,
+                            const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
+  memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+  ctx->ssl = ssl;
+  ctx->client_hello = in;
+  ctx->client_hello_len = in_len;
 
+  CBS client_hello, random, session_id;
   CBS_init(&client_hello, ctx->client_hello, ctx->client_hello_len);
-
-  if (/* Skip client version. */
-      !CBS_skip(&client_hello, 2) ||
-      /* Skip client nonce. */
-      !CBS_skip(&client_hello, 32) ||
-      /* Extract session_id. */
-      !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &session_id)) {
+  if (!CBS_get_u16(&client_hello, &ctx->version) ||
+      !CBS_get_bytes(&client_hello, &random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+      !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &session_id) ||
+      CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
     return 0;
   }
 
+  ctx->random = CBS_data(&random);
+  ctx->random_len = CBS_len(&random);
   ctx->session_id = CBS_data(&session_id);
   ctx->session_id_len = CBS_len(&session_id);
 
   /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
-  if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ctx->ssl)) {
+  if (SSL_is_dtls(ctx->ssl)) {
     CBS cookie;
-
-    if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cookie)) {
+    if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cookie) ||
+        CBS_len(&cookie) > DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH) {
       return 0;
     }
   }
 
-  /* Extract cipher_suites. */
+  CBS cipher_suites, compression_methods;
   if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cipher_suites) ||
-      CBS_len(&cipher_suites) < 2 || (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) & 1) != 0) {
+      CBS_len(&cipher_suites) < 2 || (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) & 1) != 0 ||
+      !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &compression_methods) ||
+      CBS_len(&compression_methods) < 1) {
     return 0;
   }
+
   ctx->cipher_suites = CBS_data(&cipher_suites);
   ctx->cipher_suites_len = CBS_len(&cipher_suites);
-
-  /* Extract compression_methods. */
-  if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &compression_methods) ||
-      CBS_len(&compression_methods) < 1) {
-    return 0;
-  }
   ctx->compression_methods = CBS_data(&compression_methods);
   ctx->compression_methods_len = CBS_len(&compression_methods);
 
@@ -254,37 +255,34 @@ char ssl_early_callback_init(struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx) {
   }
 
   /* Extract extensions and check it is valid. */
+  CBS extensions;
   if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &extensions) ||
       !tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions) ||
       CBS_len(&client_hello) != 0) {
     return 0;
   }
+
   ctx->extensions = CBS_data(&extensions);
   ctx->extensions_len = CBS_len(&extensions);
 
   return 1;
 }
 
-int SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get(
-    const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx, uint16_t extension_type,
-    const uint8_t **out_data, size_t *out_len) {
+int ssl_early_callback_get_extension(const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx,
+                                     CBS *out, uint16_t extension_type) {
   CBS extensions;
-
   CBS_init(&extensions, ctx->extensions, ctx->extensions_len);
-
   while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0) {
+    /* Decode the next extension. */
     uint16_t type;
     CBS extension;
-
-    /* Decode the next extension. */
     if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
         !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) {
       return 0;
     }
 
     if (type == extension_type) {
-      *out_data = CBS_data(&extension);
-      *out_len = CBS_len(&extension);
+      *out = extension;
       return 1;
     }
   }
@@ -292,7 +290,20 @@ int SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get(
   return 0;
 }
 
-static const uint16_t eccurves_default[] = {
+int SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get(
+    const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx, uint16_t extension_type,
+    const uint8_t **out_data, size_t *out_len) {
+  CBS cbs;
+  if (!ssl_early_callback_get_extension(ctx, &cbs, extension_type)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  *out_data = CBS_data(&cbs);
+  *out_len = CBS_len(&cbs);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static const uint16_t kDefaultGroups[] = {
     SSL_CURVE_X25519,
     SSL_CURVE_SECP256R1,
     SSL_CURVE_SECP384R1,
@@ -301,68 +312,65 @@ static const uint16_t eccurves_default[] = {
 #endif
 };
 
-/* tls1_get_curvelist sets |*out_curve_ids| and |*out_curve_ids_len| to the
- * list of allowed curve IDs. If |get_peer_curves| is non-zero, return the
- * peer's curve list. Otherwise, return the preferred list. */
-static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *ssl, int get_peer_curves,
-                               const uint16_t **out_curve_ids,
-                               size_t *out_curve_ids_len) {
-  if (get_peer_curves) {
-    /* Only clients send a curve list, so this function is only called
-     * on the server. */
+void tls1_get_grouplist(SSL *ssl, int get_peer_groups,
+                        const uint16_t **out_group_ids,
+                        size_t *out_group_ids_len) {
+  if (get_peer_groups) {
+    /* Only clients send a supported group list, so this function is only
+     * called on the server. */
     assert(ssl->server);
-    *out_curve_ids = ssl->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist;
-    *out_curve_ids_len = ssl->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist_length;
+    *out_group_ids = ssl->s3->tmp.peer_supported_group_list;
+    *out_group_ids_len = ssl->s3->tmp.peer_supported_group_list_len;
     return;
   }
 
-  *out_curve_ids = ssl->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
-  *out_curve_ids_len = ssl->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
-  if (!*out_curve_ids) {
-    *out_curve_ids = eccurves_default;
-    *out_curve_ids_len = sizeof(eccurves_default) / sizeof(eccurves_default[0]);
+  *out_group_ids = ssl->supported_group_list;
+  *out_group_ids_len = ssl->supported_group_list_len;
+  if (!*out_group_ids) {
+    *out_group_ids = kDefaultGroups;
+    *out_group_ids_len = OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kDefaultGroups);
   }
 }
 
-int tls1_get_shared_curve(SSL *ssl, uint16_t *out_curve_id) {
-  const uint16_t *curves, *peer_curves, *pref, *supp;
-  size_t curves_len, peer_curves_len, pref_len, supp_len, i, j;
+int tls1_get_shared_group(SSL *ssl, uint16_t *out_group_id) {
+  const uint16_t *groups, *peer_groups, *pref, *supp;
+  size_t groups_len, peer_groups_len, pref_len, supp_len, i, j;
 
   /* Can't do anything on client side */
   if (ssl->server == 0) {
     return 0;
   }
 
-  tls1_get_curvelist(ssl, 0 /* local curves */, &curves, &curves_len);
-  tls1_get_curvelist(ssl, 1 /* peer curves */, &peer_curves, &peer_curves_len);
+  tls1_get_grouplist(ssl, 0 /* local groups */, &groups, &groups_len);
+  tls1_get_grouplist(ssl, 1 /* peer groups */, &peer_groups, &peer_groups_len);
 
-  if (peer_curves_len == 0) {
-    /* Clients are not required to send a supported_curves extension. In this
-     * case, the server is free to pick any curve it likes. See RFC 4492,
+  if (peer_groups_len == 0) {
+    /* Clients are not required to send a supported_groups extension. In this
+     * case, the server is free to pick any group it likes. See RFC 4492,
      * section 4, paragraph 3.
      *
      * However, in the interests of compatibility, we will skip ECDH if the
      * client didn't send an extension because we can't be sure that they'll
-     * support our favoured curve. */
+     * support our favoured group. */
     return 0;
   }
 
   if (ssl->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
-    pref = curves;
-    pref_len = curves_len;
-    supp = peer_curves;
-    supp_len = peer_curves_len;
+    pref = groups;
+    pref_len = groups_len;
+    supp = peer_groups;
+    supp_len = peer_groups_len;
   } else {
-    pref = peer_curves;
-    pref_len = peer_curves_len;
-    supp = curves;
-    supp_len = curves_len;
+    pref = peer_groups;
+    pref_len = peer_groups_len;
+    supp = groups;
+    supp_len = groups_len;
   }
 
   for (i = 0; i < pref_len; i++) {
     for (j = 0; j < supp_len; j++) {
       if (pref[i] == supp[j]) {
-        *out_curve_id = pref[i];
+        *out_group_id = pref[i];
         return 1;
       }
     }
@@ -371,34 +379,33 @@ int tls1_get_shared_curve(SSL *ssl, uint16_t *out_curve_id) {
   return 0;
 }
 
-int tls1_set_curves(uint16_t **out_curve_ids, size_t *out_curve_ids_len,
+int tls1_set_curves(uint16_t **out_group_ids, size_t *out_group_ids_len,
                     const int *curves, size_t ncurves) {
-  uint16_t *curve_ids;
-  size_t i;
+  uint16_t *group_ids;
 
-  curve_ids = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * sizeof(uint16_t));
-  if (curve_ids == NULL) {
+  group_ids = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * sizeof(uint16_t));
+  if (group_ids == NULL) {
     return 0;
   }
 
-  for (i = 0; i < ncurves; i++) {
-    if (!ssl_nid_to_curve_id(&curve_ids[i], curves[i])) {
-      OPENSSL_free(curve_ids);
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < ncurves; i++) {
+    if (!ssl_nid_to_group_id(&group_ids[i], curves[i])) {
+      OPENSSL_free(group_ids);
       return 0;
     }
   }
 
-  OPENSSL_free(*out_curve_ids);
-  *out_curve_ids = curve_ids;
-  *out_curve_ids_len = ncurves;
+  OPENSSL_free(*out_group_ids);
+  *out_group_ids = group_ids;
+  *out_group_ids_len = ncurves;
 
   return 1;
 }
 
-/* tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key sets |*out_curve_id| and |*out_comp_id| to the
- * TLS curve ID and point format, respectively, for |ec|. It returns one on
+/* tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key sets |*out_group_id| and |*out_comp_id| to the
+ * TLS group ID and point format, respectively, for |ec|. It returns one on
  * success and zero on failure. */
-static int tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(uint16_t *out_curve_id,
+static int tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(uint16_t *out_group_id,
                                          uint8_t *out_comp_id, EC_KEY *ec) {
   int nid;
   uint16_t id;
@@ -413,14 +420,14 @@ static int tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(uint16_t *out_curve_id,
     return 0;
   }
 
-  /* Determine curve ID */
+  /* Determine group ID */
   nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
-  if (!ssl_nid_to_curve_id(&id, nid)) {
+  if (!ssl_nid_to_group_id(&id, nid)) {
     return 0;
   }
 
-  /* Set the named curve ID. Arbitrary explicit curves are not supported. */
-  *out_curve_id = id;
+  /* Set the named group ID. Arbitrary explicit groups are not supported. */
+  *out_group_id = id;
 
   if (out_comp_id) {
     if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL) {
@@ -436,35 +443,35 @@ static int tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(uint16_t *out_curve_id,
   return 1;
 }
 
-/* tls1_check_curve_id returns one if |curve_id| is consistent with both our
- * and the peer's curve preferences. Note: if called as the client, only our
+/* tls1_check_group_id returns one if |group_id| is consistent with both our
+ * and the peer's group preferences. Note: if called as the client, only our
  * preferences are checked; the peer (the server) does not send preferences. */
-int tls1_check_curve_id(SSL *ssl, uint16_t curve_id) {
-  const uint16_t *curves;
-  size_t curves_len, i, get_peer_curves;
+int tls1_check_group_id(SSL *ssl, uint16_t group_id) {
+  const uint16_t *groups;
+  size_t groups_len, i, get_peer_groups;
 
   /* Check against our list, then the peer's list. */
-  for (get_peer_curves = 0; get_peer_curves <= 1; get_peer_curves++) {
-    if (get_peer_curves && !ssl->server) {
+  for (get_peer_groups = 0; get_peer_groups <= 1; get_peer_groups++) {
+    if (get_peer_groups && !ssl->server) {
       /* Servers do not present a preference list so, if we are a client, only
        * check our list. */
       continue;
     }
 
-    tls1_get_curvelist(ssl, get_peer_curves, &curves, &curves_len);
-    if (get_peer_curves && curves_len == 0) {
-      /* Clients are not required to send a supported_curves extension. In this
-       * case, the server is free to pick any curve it likes. See RFC 4492,
+    tls1_get_grouplist(ssl, get_peer_groups, &groups, &groups_len);
+    if (get_peer_groups && groups_len == 0) {
+      /* Clients are not required to send a supported_groups extension. In this
+       * case, the server is free to pick any group it likes. See RFC 4492,
        * section 4, paragraph 3. */
       continue;
     }
-    for (i = 0; i < curves_len; i++) {
-      if (curves[i] == curve_id) {
+    for (i = 0; i < groups_len; i++) {
+      if (groups[i] == group_id) {
         break;
       }
     }
 
-    if (i == curves_len) {
+    if (i == groups_len) {
       return 0;
     }
   }
@@ -473,18 +480,23 @@ int tls1_check_curve_id(SSL *ssl, uint16_t curve_id) {
 }
 
 int tls1_check_ec_cert(SSL *ssl, X509 *x) {
-  int ret = 0;
-  EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
-  uint16_t curve_id;
-  uint8_t comp_id;
+  if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    /* In TLS 1.3, the ECDSA curve is negotiated via signature algorithms. */
+    return 1;
+  }
 
-  if (!pkey) {
-    goto done;
+  EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+  if (pkey == NULL) {
+    return 0;
   }
+
+  int ret = 0;
+  uint16_t group_id;
+  uint8_t comp_id;
   EC_KEY *ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
   if (ec_key == NULL ||
-      !tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(&curve_id, &comp_id, ec_key) ||
-      !tls1_check_curve_id(ssl, curve_id) ||
+      !tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(&group_id, &comp_id, ec_key) ||
+      !tls1_check_group_id(ssl, group_id) ||
       comp_id != TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
     goto done;
   }
@@ -499,48 +511,65 @@ done:
 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
  * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support. */
 
-#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
+static const uint16_t kDefaultSignatureAlgorithms[] = {
+    SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512,
+    SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512,
 
-#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
+    SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384,
+    SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384,
 
-#define tlsext_sigalg(md) tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
+    SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256,
+    SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256,
 
-static const uint8_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
-    tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
-    tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
-    tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
-    tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
+    SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1,
+    SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1,
 };
 
-size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **psigs) {
-  *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
-  return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
-}
+static const uint16_t kDefaultTLS13SignatureAlgorithms[] = {
+    SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA512,
+    SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512,
+    SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512,
 
-int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *ssl, const EVP_MD **out_md, int *out_alert,
-                            uint8_t hash, uint8_t signature, EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
-  const uint8_t *sent_sigs;
-  size_t sent_sigslen, i;
-  int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey->type);
+    SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA384,
+    SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384,
+    SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384,
 
-  /* Should never happen */
-  if (sigalg == -1) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA256,
+    SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256,
+    SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256,
+
+    SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1,
+    SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1,
+};
+
+size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *ssl, const uint16_t **psigs) {
+  uint16_t min_version, max_version;
+  if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &min_version, &max_version)) {
+    assert(0);  /* This should never happen. */
+
+    /* Return an empty list. */
+    ERR_clear_error();
+    *psigs = NULL;
     return 0;
   }
 
-  /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
-  if (sigalg != signature) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
-    *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-    return 0;
+  if (max_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    *psigs = kDefaultTLS13SignatureAlgorithms;
+    return OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kDefaultTLS13SignatureAlgorithms);
   }
 
+  *psigs = kDefaultSignatureAlgorithms;
+  return OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kDefaultSignatureAlgorithms);
+}
+
+int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *ssl, int *out_alert, uint16_t sigalg) {
+  const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
+  size_t sent_sigslen, i;
+
   /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
   sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(ssl, &sent_sigs);
-  for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
-    if (hash == sent_sigs[0] && signature == sent_sigs[1]) {
+  for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++) {
+    if (sigalg == sent_sigs[i]) {
       break;
     }
   }
@@ -551,13 +580,6 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *ssl, const EVP_MD **out_md, int *out_alert,
     return 0;
   }
 
-  *out_md = tls12_get_hash(hash);
-  if (*out_md == NULL) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
-    *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-    return 0;
-  }
-
   return 1;
 }
 
@@ -567,22 +589,30 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *ssl, const EVP_MD **out_md, int *out_alert,
  * settings. */
 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *ssl) {
   CERT *c = ssl->cert;
-  const uint8_t *sigalgs;
-  size_t i, sigalgslen;
   int have_rsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
   c->mask_a = 0;
   c->mask_k = 0;
 
   /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for RSA,
    * DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. */
-  sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(ssl, &sigalgs);
-  for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
-    switch (sigalgs[1]) {
-      case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
+  const uint16_t *sigalgs;
+  size_t num_sigalgs = tls12_get_psigalgs(ssl, &sigalgs);
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < num_sigalgs; i++) {
+    switch (sigalgs[i]) {
+      case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA512:
+      case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA384:
+      case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA256:
+      case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512:
+      case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384:
+      case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256:
+      case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1:
         have_rsa = 1;
         break;
 
-      case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
+      case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512:
+      case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384:
+      case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256:
+      case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1:
         have_ecdsa = 1;
         break;
     }
@@ -629,6 +659,25 @@ struct tls_extension {
   int (*add_serverhello)(SSL *ssl, CBB *out);
 };
 
+static int forbid_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents) {
+  if (contents != NULL) {
+    /* Servers MUST NOT send this extension. */
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int ignore_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents) {
+  /* This extension from the client is handled elsewhere. */
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int dont_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  return 1;
+}
 
 /* Server name indication (SNI).
  *
@@ -670,10 +719,10 @@ static int ext_sni_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
 
   assert(ssl->tlsext_hostname != NULL);
 
-  if (!ssl->hit) {
-    assert(ssl->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL);
-    ssl->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(ssl->tlsext_hostname);
-    if (!ssl->session->tlsext_hostname) {
+  if (ssl->session == NULL) {
+    assert(ssl->s3->new_session->tlsext_hostname == NULL);
+    ssl->s3->new_session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(ssl->tlsext_hostname);
+    if (!ssl->s3->new_session->tlsext_hostname) {
       *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
       return 0;
     }
@@ -688,91 +737,53 @@ static int ext_sni_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
     return 1;
   }
 
-  /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
-   *
-   * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
-   * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, in
-   *   which case an fatal alert is generated.
-   * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
-   * - When a session is resumed, the servername callback is invoked in order
-   *   to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
-   * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
-   *   it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
-   *   Applications can control the behaviour.  They can at any time
-   *   set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
-   *   case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
-   *   a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
-   *   presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
-   *   the value of the Host: field.
-   * - Applications must  use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
-   *   if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
-   *   session,
-   *   i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
-   */
-
-  CBS server_name_list;
-  char have_seen_host_name = 0;
-
+  CBS server_name_list, host_name;
+  uint8_t name_type;
   if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &server_name_list) ||
-      CBS_len(&server_name_list) == 0 ||
+      !CBS_get_u8(&server_name_list, &name_type) ||
+      /* Although the server_name extension was intended to be extensible to
+       * new name types and multiple names, OpenSSL 1.0.x had a bug which meant
+       * different name types will cause an error. Further, RFC 4366 originally
+       * defined syntax inextensibly. RFC 6066 corrected this mistake, but
+       * adding new name types is no longer feasible.
+       *
+       * Act as if the extensibility does not exist to simplify parsing. */
+      !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_name_list, &host_name) ||
+      CBS_len(&server_name_list) != 0 ||
       CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
     return 0;
   }
 
-  /* Decode each ServerName in the extension. */
-  while (CBS_len(&server_name_list) > 0) {
-    uint8_t name_type;
-    CBS host_name;
-
-    if (!CBS_get_u8(&server_name_list, &name_type) ||
-        !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_name_list, &host_name)) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-
-    /* Only host_name is supported. */
-    if (name_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) {
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    if (have_seen_host_name) {
-      /* The ServerNameList MUST NOT contain more than one name of the same
-       * name_type. */
-      return 0;
-    }
+  if (name_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name ||
+      CBS_len(&host_name) == 0 ||
+      CBS_len(&host_name) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name ||
+      CBS_contains_zero_byte(&host_name)) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+    return 0;
+  }
 
-    have_seen_host_name = 1;
+  /* TODO(davidben): SNI should be resolved before resumption. We have the
+   * early callback as a replacement, but we should fix the current callback
+   * and avoid the need for |SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context|. */
+  if (ssl->session == NULL) {
+    assert(ssl->s3->new_session->tlsext_hostname == NULL);
 
-    if (CBS_len(&host_name) == 0 ||
-        CBS_len(&host_name) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name ||
-        CBS_contains_zero_byte(&host_name)) {
-      *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+    /* Copy the hostname as a string. */
+    if (!CBS_strdup(&host_name, &ssl->s3->new_session->tlsext_hostname)) {
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
       return 0;
     }
 
-    if (!ssl->hit) {
-      assert(ssl->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL);
-      if (ssl->session->tlsext_hostname) {
-        /* This should be impossible. */
-        return 0;
-      }
-
-      /* Copy the hostname as a string. */
-      if (!CBS_strdup(&host_name, &ssl->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-        return 0;
-      }
-
-      ssl->s3->tmp.should_ack_sni = 1;
-    }
+    ssl->s3->tmp.should_ack_sni = 1;
   }
 
   return 1;
 }
 
 static int ext_sni_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
-  if (ssl->hit ||
+  if (ssl->session != NULL ||
       !ssl->s3->tmp.should_ack_sni ||
-      ssl->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
+      ssl->s3->new_session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
     return 1;
   }
 
@@ -790,6 +801,16 @@ static int ext_sni_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
  * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5746 */
 
 static int ext_ri_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  uint16_t min_version, max_version;
+  if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &min_version, &max_version)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  /* Renegotiation indication is not necessary in TLS 1.3. */
+  if (min_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
   CBB contents, prev_finished;
   if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) ||
       !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
@@ -805,6 +826,10 @@ static int ext_ri_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
 
 static int ext_ri_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
                                     CBS *contents) {
+  if (contents != NULL && ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
   /* Servers may not switch between omitting the extension and supporting it.
    * See RFC 5746, sections 3.5 and 4.2. */
   if (ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete &&
@@ -874,25 +899,15 @@ static int ext_ri_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
    * called after the initial handshake. */
   assert(!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete);
 
-  CBS fake_contents;
-  static const uint8_t kFakeExtension[] = {0};
+  if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return 1;
+  }
 
   if (contents == NULL) {
-    if (ssl->s3->send_connection_binding) {
-      /* The renegotiation SCSV was received so pretend that we received a
-       * renegotiation extension. */
-      CBS_init(&fake_contents, kFakeExtension, sizeof(kFakeExtension));
-      contents = &fake_contents;
-      /* We require that the renegotiation extension is at index zero of
-       * kExtensions. */
-      ssl->s3->tmp.extensions.received |= (1u << 0);
-    } else {
-      return 1;
-    }
+    return 1;
   }
 
   CBS renegotiated_connection;
-
   if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &renegotiated_connection) ||
       CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
@@ -914,6 +929,10 @@ static int ext_ri_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
 }
 
 static int ext_ri_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
   CBB contents, prev_finished;
   if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) ||
       !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
@@ -934,12 +953,14 @@ static int ext_ri_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
  *
  * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7627 */
 
-static void ext_ems_init(SSL *ssl) {
-  ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret = 0;
-}
-
 static int ext_ems_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
-  if (ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+  uint16_t min_version, max_version;
+  if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &min_version, &max_version)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  /* Extended master secret is not necessary in TLS 1.3. */
+  if (min_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION || max_version <= SSL3_VERSION) {
     return 1;
   }
 
@@ -953,11 +974,27 @@ static int ext_ems_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
 
 static int ext_ems_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
                                      CBS *contents) {
+  /* Whether EMS is negotiated may not change on renegotation. */
+  if (ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) {
+    if ((contents != NULL) != ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_EMS_MISMATCH);
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+  }
+
   if (contents == NULL) {
     return 1;
   }
 
-  if (ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION || CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+  if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION ||
+      ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
     return 0;
   }
 
@@ -967,7 +1004,12 @@ static int ext_ems_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
 
 static int ext_ems_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
                                      CBS *contents) {
-  if (ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION || contents == NULL) {
+  if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION ||
+      ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  if (contents == NULL) {
     return 1;
   }
 
@@ -998,7 +1040,14 @@ static int ext_ems_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
  * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5077 */
 
 static int ext_ticket_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
-  if (SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) {
+  uint16_t min_version, max_version;
+  if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &min_version, &max_version)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  /* TLS 1.3 uses a different ticket extension. */
+  if (min_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION ||
+      SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) {
     return 1;
   }
 
@@ -1009,9 +1058,14 @@ static int ext_ticket_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
    * advertise the extension to avoid potentially breaking servers which carry
    * over the state from the previous handshake, such as OpenSSL servers
    * without upstream's 3c3f0259238594d77264a78944d409f2127642c4. */
+  uint16_t session_version;
   if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete &&
       ssl->session != NULL &&
-      ssl->session->tlsext_tick != NULL) {
+      ssl->session->tlsext_tick != NULL &&
+      /* Don't send TLS 1.3 session tickets in the ticket extension. */
+      ssl->method->version_from_wire(&session_version,
+                                     ssl->session->ssl_version) &&
+      session_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
     ticket_data = ssl->session->tlsext_tick;
     ticket_len = ssl->session->tlsext_ticklen;
   }
@@ -1035,6 +1089,10 @@ static int ext_ticket_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
     return 1;
   }
 
+  if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
   /* If |SSL_OP_NO_TICKET| is set then no extension will have been sent and
    * this function should never be called, even if the server tries to send the
    * extension. */
@@ -1048,13 +1106,6 @@ static int ext_ticket_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
   return 1;
 }
 
-static int ext_ticket_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
-                                        CBS *contents) {
-  /* This function isn't used because the ticket extension from the client is
-   * handled in ssl_session.c. */
-  return 1;
-}
-
 static int ext_ticket_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
   if (!ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
     return 1;
@@ -1078,31 +1129,32 @@ static int ext_ticket_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
  * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */
 
 static int ext_sigalgs_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
-  if (ssl3_version_from_wire(ssl, ssl->client_version) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+  uint16_t min_version, max_version;
+  if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &min_version, &max_version)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (max_version < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
     return 1;
   }
 
-  const uint8_t *sigalgs_data;
-  const size_t sigalgs_len = tls12_get_psigalgs(ssl, &sigalgs_data);
+  const uint16_t *sigalgs;
+  const size_t num_sigalgs = tls12_get_psigalgs(ssl, &sigalgs);
 
-  CBB contents, sigalgs;
+  CBB contents, sigalgs_cbb;
   if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) ||
       !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
-      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &sigalgs) ||
-      !CBB_add_bytes(&sigalgs, sigalgs_data, sigalgs_len) ||
-      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &sigalgs_cbb)) {
     return 0;
   }
 
-  return 1;
-}
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < num_sigalgs; i++) {
+    if (!CBB_add_u16(&sigalgs_cbb, sigalgs[i])) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
 
-static int ext_sigalgs_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
-                                         CBS *contents) {
-  if (contents != NULL) {
-    /* Servers MUST NOT send this extension. */
-    *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXTENSION_SENT_BY_SERVER);
+  if (!CBB_flush(out)) {
     return 0;
   }
 
@@ -1111,9 +1163,9 @@ static int ext_sigalgs_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
 
 static int ext_sigalgs_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
                                          CBS *contents) {
-  OPENSSL_free(ssl->cert->peer_sigalgs);
-  ssl->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
-  ssl->cert->peer_sigalgslen = 0;
+  OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->hs->peer_sigalgs);
+  ssl->s3->hs->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
+  ssl->s3->hs->num_peer_sigalgs = 0;
 
   if (contents == NULL) {
     return 1;
@@ -1130,11 +1182,6 @@ static int ext_sigalgs_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
   return 1;
 }
 
-static int ext_sigalgs_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
-  /* Servers MUST NOT send this extension. */
-  return 1;
-}
-
 
 /* OCSP Stapling.
  *
@@ -1170,11 +1217,36 @@ static int ext_ocsp_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
     return 1;
   }
 
-  if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+  /* OCSP stapling is forbidden on a non-certificate cipher. */
+  if (!ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    ssl->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected = 1;
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t status_type;
+  CBS ocsp_response;
+  if (!CBS_get_u8(contents, &status_type) ||
+      status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp ||
+      !CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(contents, &ocsp_response) ||
+      CBS_len(&ocsp_response) == 0 ||
+      CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!CBS_stow(&ocsp_response, &ssl->s3->new_session->ocsp_response,
+                &ssl->s3->new_session->ocsp_response_length)) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
     return 0;
   }
 
-  ssl->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected = 1;
   return 1;
 }
 
@@ -1197,17 +1269,32 @@ static int ext_ocsp_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
 }
 
 static int ext_ocsp_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
-  /* The extension shouldn't be sent when resuming sessions. */
-  if (ssl->hit ||
-      !ssl->s3->tmp.ocsp_stapling_requested ||
-      ssl->ctx->ocsp_response_length == 0) {
+  if (!ssl->s3->tmp.ocsp_stapling_requested ||
+      ssl->ctx->ocsp_response_length == 0 ||
+      !ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
     return 1;
   }
 
-  ssl->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected = 1;
+  if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    /* The extension shouldn't be sent when resuming sessions. */
+    if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+      return 1;
+    }
+
+    ssl->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected = 1;
 
+    return CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) &&
+           CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */);
+  }
+
+  CBB body, ocsp_response;
   return CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) &&
-         CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */);
+         CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &body) &&
+         CBB_add_u8(&body, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) &&
+         CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&body, &ocsp_response) &&
+         CBB_add_bytes(&ocsp_response, ssl->ctx->ocsp_response,
+                       ssl->ctx->ocsp_response_length) &&
+         CBB_flush(out);
 }
 
 
@@ -1223,7 +1310,7 @@ static int ext_npn_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
   if (ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete ||
       ssl->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL ||
       (ssl->options & SSL_OP_DISABLE_NPN) ||
-      SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
+      SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
     return 1;
   }
 
@@ -1241,11 +1328,15 @@ static int ext_npn_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
     return 1;
   }
 
+  if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
   /* If any of these are false then we should never have sent the NPN
    * extension in the ClientHello and thus this function should never have been
    * called. */
   assert(!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete);
-  assert(!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl));
+  assert(!SSL_is_dtls(ssl));
   assert(ssl->ctx->next_proto_select_cb != NULL);
   assert(!(ssl->options & SSL_OP_DISABLE_NPN));
 
@@ -1291,6 +1382,10 @@ static int ext_npn_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
 
 static int ext_npn_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
                                      CBS *contents) {
+  if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
   if (contents != NULL && CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
     return 0;
   }
@@ -1302,7 +1397,7 @@ static int ext_npn_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
        * |next_proto_neg_seen|. */
       ssl->s3->alpn_selected != NULL ||
       ssl->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb == NULL ||
-      SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
+      SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
     return 1;
   }
 
@@ -1372,9 +1467,11 @@ static int ext_sct_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
   }
 
   /* Session resumption uses the original session information. */
-  if (!ssl->hit &&
-      !CBS_stow(contents, &ssl->session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list,
-                &ssl->session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length)) {
+  if (!ssl->s3->session_reused &&
+      !CBS_stow(
+          contents,
+          &ssl->s3->new_session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list,
+          &ssl->s3->new_session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length)) {
     *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
     return 0;
   }
@@ -1389,7 +1486,7 @@ static int ext_sct_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
 
 static int ext_sct_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
   /* The extension shouldn't be sent when resuming sessions. */
-  if (ssl->hit ||
+  if (ssl->s3->session_reused ||
       ssl->ctx->signed_cert_timestamp_list_length == 0) {
     return 1;
   }
@@ -1459,6 +1556,32 @@ static int ext_alpn_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
     return 0;
   }
 
+  /* Check that the protcol name is one of the ones we advertised. */
+  int protocol_ok = 0;
+  CBS client_protocol_name_list, client_protocol_name;
+  CBS_init(&client_protocol_name_list, ssl->alpn_client_proto_list,
+           ssl->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
+  while (CBS_len(&client_protocol_name_list) > 0) {
+    if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_protocol_name_list,
+                                    &client_protocol_name)) {
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (CBS_len(&client_protocol_name) == CBS_len(&protocol_name) &&
+        memcmp(CBS_data(&client_protocol_name), CBS_data(&protocol_name),
+               CBS_len(&protocol_name)) == 0) {
+      protocol_ok = 1;
+      break;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!protocol_ok) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_ALPN_PROTOCOL);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    return 0;
+  }
+
   if (!CBS_stow(&protocol_name, &ssl->s3->alpn_selected,
                 &ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len)) {
     *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
@@ -1549,7 +1672,7 @@ static void ext_channel_id_init(SSL *ssl) {
 
 static int ext_channel_id_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
   if (!ssl->tlsext_channel_id_enabled ||
-      SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
+      SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
     return 1;
   }
 
@@ -1567,7 +1690,11 @@ static int ext_channel_id_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
     return 1;
   }
 
-  assert(!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl));
+  if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  assert(!SSL_is_dtls(ssl));
   assert(ssl->tlsext_channel_id_enabled);
 
   if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
@@ -1582,7 +1709,7 @@ static int ext_channel_id_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
                                             CBS *contents) {
   if (contents == NULL ||
       !ssl->tlsext_channel_id_enabled ||
-      SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
+      SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
     return 1;
   }
 
@@ -1595,6 +1722,10 @@ static int ext_channel_id_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
 }
 
 static int ext_channel_id_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
   if (!ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
     return 1;
   }
@@ -1634,8 +1765,7 @@ static int ext_srtp_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
     return 0;
   }
 
-  size_t i;
-  for (i = 0; i < num_profiles; i++) {
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < num_profiles; i++) {
     if (!CBB_add_u16(&profile_ids,
                      sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(profiles, i)->id)) {
       return 0;
@@ -1682,8 +1812,7 @@ static int ext_srtp_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
 
   /* Check to see if the server gave us something we support (and presumably
    * offered). */
-  size_t i;
-  for (i = 0; i < sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(profiles); i++) {
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(profiles); i++) {
     const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *profile =
         sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(profiles, i);
 
@@ -1718,8 +1847,7 @@ static int ext_srtp_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
       SSL_get_srtp_profiles(ssl);
 
   /* Pick the server's most preferred profile. */
-  size_t i;
-  for (i = 0; i < sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(server_profiles); i++) {
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(server_profiles); i++) {
     const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *server_profile =
         sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(server_profiles, i);
 
@@ -1766,14 +1894,13 @@ static int ext_srtp_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
  * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.1.2 */
 
 static int ssl_any_ec_cipher_suites_enabled(const SSL *ssl) {
-  if (ssl->version < TLS1_VERSION && !SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
+  if (ssl->version < TLS1_VERSION && !SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
     return 0;
   }
 
   const STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl);
 
-  size_t i;
-  for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
     const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
 
     const uint32_t alg_k = cipher->algorithm_mkey;
@@ -1813,6 +1940,10 @@ static int ext_ec_point_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
     return 1;
   }
 
+  if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
   CBS ec_point_format_list;
   if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &ec_point_format_list) ||
       CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
@@ -1832,10 +1963,18 @@ static int ext_ec_point_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
 
 static int ext_ec_point_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
                                           CBS *contents) {
+  if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
   return ext_ec_point_parse_serverhello(ssl, out_alert, contents);
 }
 
 static int ext_ec_point_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
   const uint32_t alg_k = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
   const uint32_t alg_a = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
   const int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
@@ -1847,102 +1986,439 @@ static int ext_ec_point_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
   return ext_ec_point_add_extension(ssl, out);
 }
 
-
-/* EC supported curves.
+/* Pre Shared Key
  *
- * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.1.2 */
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-14 */
 
-static void ext_ec_curves_init(SSL *ssl) {
-  OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist);
-  ssl->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist = NULL;
-  ssl->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
-}
+static int ext_pre_shared_key_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  uint16_t min_version, max_version;
+  if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &min_version, &max_version)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
 
-static int ext_ec_curves_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
-  if (!ssl_any_ec_cipher_suites_enabled(ssl)) {
+  uint16_t session_version;
+  if (max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION || ssl->session == NULL ||
+      !ssl->method->version_from_wire(&session_version,
+                                      ssl->session->ssl_version) ||
+      session_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
     return 1;
   }
 
-  CBB contents, curves_bytes;
-  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) ||
+  CBB contents, identities, identity;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_pre_shared_key) ||
       !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
-      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &curves_bytes)) {
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &identities) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&identities, &identity) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&identity, ssl->session->tlsext_tick,
+                     ssl->session->tlsext_ticklen)) {
     return 0;
   }
 
-  const uint16_t *curves;
-  size_t curves_len;
-  tls1_get_curvelist(ssl, 0, &curves, &curves_len);
+  return CBB_flush(out);
+}
 
-  size_t i;
-  for (i = 0; i < curves_len; i++) {
-    if (!CBB_add_u16(&curves_bytes, curves[i])) {
-      return 0;
-    }
+int ssl_ext_pre_shared_key_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                             CBS *contents) {
+  uint16_t psk_id;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16(contents, &psk_id) ||
+      CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    return 0;
   }
 
-  return CBB_flush(out);
-}
+  if (psk_id != 0) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
+    return 0;
+  }
 
-static int ext_ec_curves_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
-                                           CBS *contents) {
-  /* This extension is not expected to be echoed by servers and is ignored. */
   return 1;
 }
 
-static int ext_ec_curves_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
-                                           CBS *contents) {
-  if (contents == NULL) {
-    return 1;
-  }
-
-  CBS elliptic_curve_list;
-  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &elliptic_curve_list) ||
-      CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0 ||
-      (CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) & 1) != 0 ||
+int ssl_ext_pre_shared_key_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl,
+                                             SSL_SESSION **out_session,
+                                             uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                             CBS *contents) {
+  CBS identities, identity;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &identities) ||
+      !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&identities, &identity) ||
       CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
     return 0;
   }
 
-  ssl->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list));
-  if (ssl->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist == NULL) {
-    *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-    return 0;
-  }
+  /* TLS 1.3 session tickets are renewed separately as part of the
+   * NewSessionTicket. */
+  int renew;
+  return tls_process_ticket(ssl, out_session, &renew, CBS_data(&identity),
+                            CBS_len(&identity), NULL, 0);
+}
 
-  const size_t num_curves = CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) / 2;
-  size_t i;
-  for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++) {
-    if (!CBS_get_u16(&elliptic_curve_list,
-                     &ssl->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist[i])) {
-      goto err;
-    }
+int ssl_ext_pre_shared_key_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  if (!ssl->s3->session_reused) {
+    return 1;
   }
 
-  assert(CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0);
-  ssl->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist_length = num_curves;
+  CBB contents;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_pre_shared_key) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+      /* We only consider the first identity for resumption */
+      !CBB_add_u16(&contents, 0) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
 
   return 1;
-
-err:
-  OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist);
-  ssl->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist = NULL;
-  *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-  return 0;
 }
 
-static int ext_ec_curves_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
-  /* Servers don't echo this extension. */
-  return 1;
+
+/* Key Share
+ *
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-12 */
+
+static int ext_key_share_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  uint16_t min_version, max_version;
+  if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &min_version, &max_version)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION || !ssl_any_ec_cipher_suites_enabled(ssl)) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  CBB contents, kse_bytes;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &kse_bytes)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  uint16_t group_id;
+  if (ssl->s3->hs->retry_group) {
+    /* Append the new key share to the old list. */
+    if (!CBB_add_bytes(&kse_bytes, ssl->s3->hs->key_share_bytes,
+                       ssl->s3->hs->key_share_bytes_len)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->hs->key_share_bytes);
+    ssl->s3->hs->key_share_bytes = NULL;
+    ssl->s3->hs->key_share_bytes_len = 0;
+
+    group_id = ssl->s3->hs->retry_group;
+  } else {
+    /* Add a fake group. See draft-davidben-tls-grease-01. */
+    if (ssl->ctx->grease_enabled &&
+        (!CBB_add_u16(&kse_bytes,
+                      ssl_get_grease_value(ssl, ssl_grease_group)) ||
+         !CBB_add_u16(&kse_bytes, 1 /* length */) ||
+         !CBB_add_u8(&kse_bytes, 0 /* one byte key share */))) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Predict the most preferred group. */
+    const uint16_t *groups;
+    size_t groups_len;
+    tls1_get_grouplist(ssl, 0 /* local groups */, &groups, &groups_len);
+    if (groups_len == 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_GROUPS_SPECIFIED);
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    group_id = groups[0];
+  }
+
+  CBB key_exchange;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(&kse_bytes, group_id) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&kse_bytes, &key_exchange) ||
+      !SSL_ECDH_CTX_init(&ssl->s3->hs->ecdh_ctx, group_id) ||
+      !SSL_ECDH_CTX_offer(&ssl->s3->hs->ecdh_ctx, &key_exchange) ||
+      !CBB_flush(&kse_bytes)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl->s3->hs->retry_group) {
+    /* Save the contents of the extension to repeat it in the second
+     * ClientHello. */
+    ssl->s3->hs->key_share_bytes_len = CBB_len(&kse_bytes);
+    ssl->s3->hs->key_share_bytes = BUF_memdup(CBB_data(&kse_bytes),
+                                              CBB_len(&kse_bytes));
+    if (ssl->s3->hs->key_share_bytes == NULL) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return CBB_flush(out);
+}
+
+int ssl_ext_key_share_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t **out_secret,
+                                        size_t *out_secret_len,
+                                        uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents) {
+  CBS peer_key;
+  uint16_t group_id;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16(contents, &group_id) ||
+      !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &peer_key) ||
+      CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (SSL_ECDH_CTX_get_id(&ssl->s3->hs->ecdh_ctx) != group_id) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_finish(&ssl->s3->hs->ecdh_ctx, out_secret, out_secret_len,
+                           out_alert, CBS_data(&peer_key),
+                           CBS_len(&peer_key))) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  ssl->s3->new_session->key_exchange_info = group_id;
+  SSL_ECDH_CTX_cleanup(&ssl->s3->hs->ecdh_ctx);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_ext_key_share_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, int *out_found,
+                                        uint8_t **out_secret,
+                                        size_t *out_secret_len,
+                                        uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents) {
+  uint16_t group_id;
+  CBS key_shares;
+  if (!tls1_get_shared_group(ssl, &group_id) ||
+      !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &key_shares) ||
+      CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  /* Find the corresponding key share. */
+  int found = 0;
+  CBS peer_key;
+  while (CBS_len(&key_shares) > 0) {
+    uint16_t id;
+    CBS peer_key_tmp;
+    if (!CBS_get_u16(&key_shares, &id) ||
+        !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&key_shares, &peer_key_tmp)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (id == group_id) {
+      if (found) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DUPLICATE_KEY_SHARE);
+        *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        return 0;
+      }
+
+      found = 1;
+      peer_key = peer_key_tmp;
+      /* Continue parsing the structure to keep peers honest. */
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!found) {
+    *out_found = 0;
+    *out_secret = NULL;
+    *out_secret_len = 0;
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  /* Compute the DH secret. */
+  uint8_t *secret = NULL;
+  size_t secret_len;
+  SSL_ECDH_CTX group;
+  memset(&group, 0, sizeof(SSL_ECDH_CTX));
+  CBB public_key;
+  if (!CBB_init(&public_key, 32) ||
+      !SSL_ECDH_CTX_init(&group, group_id) ||
+      !SSL_ECDH_CTX_accept(&group, &public_key, &secret, &secret_len,
+                           out_alert, CBS_data(&peer_key),
+                           CBS_len(&peer_key)) ||
+      !CBB_finish(&public_key, &ssl->s3->hs->public_key,
+                  &ssl->s3->hs->public_key_len)) {
+    OPENSSL_free(secret);
+    SSL_ECDH_CTX_cleanup(&group);
+    CBB_cleanup(&public_key);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  SSL_ECDH_CTX_cleanup(&group);
+
+  *out_secret = secret;
+  *out_secret_len = secret_len;
+  *out_found = 1;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_ext_key_share_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  if (ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey != SSL_kECDHE) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  uint16_t group_id;
+  CBB kse_bytes, public_key;
+  if (!tls1_get_shared_group(ssl, &group_id) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &kse_bytes) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(&kse_bytes, group_id) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&kse_bytes, &public_key) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&public_key, ssl->s3->hs->public_key,
+                     ssl->s3->hs->public_key_len) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->hs->public_key);
+  ssl->s3->hs->public_key = NULL;
+  ssl->s3->hs->public_key_len = 0;
+
+  ssl->s3->new_session->key_exchange_info = group_id;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+
+/* Supported Versions
+ *
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16#section-4.2.1 */
+
+static int ext_supported_versions_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  uint16_t min_version, max_version;
+  if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &min_version, &max_version)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (max_version <= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  CBB contents, versions;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&contents, &versions)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  /* Add a fake version. See draft-davidben-tls-grease-01. */
+  if (ssl->ctx->grease_enabled &&
+      !CBB_add_u16(&versions, ssl_get_grease_value(ssl, ssl_grease_version))) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  for (uint16_t version = max_version; version >= min_version; version--) {
+    if (!CBB_add_u16(&versions, ssl->method->version_to_wire(version))) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!CBB_flush(out)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+
+/* Negotiated Groups
+ *
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.1.2
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-12#section-6.3.2.2 */
+
+static void ext_supported_groups_init(SSL *ssl) {
+  OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->tmp.peer_supported_group_list);
+  ssl->s3->tmp.peer_supported_group_list = NULL;
+  ssl->s3->tmp.peer_supported_group_list_len = 0;
+}
+
+static int ext_supported_groups_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  if (!ssl_any_ec_cipher_suites_enabled(ssl)) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  CBB contents, groups_bytes;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &groups_bytes)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  /* Add a fake group. See draft-davidben-tls-grease-01. */
+  if (ssl->ctx->grease_enabled &&
+      !CBB_add_u16(&groups_bytes,
+                   ssl_get_grease_value(ssl, ssl_grease_group))) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  const uint16_t *groups;
+  size_t groups_len;
+  tls1_get_grouplist(ssl, 0, &groups, &groups_len);
+
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < groups_len; i++) {
+    if (!CBB_add_u16(&groups_bytes, groups[i])) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return CBB_flush(out);
+}
+
+static int ext_supported_groups_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                                  CBS *contents) {
+  /* This extension is not expected to be echoed by servers in TLS 1.2, but some
+   * BigIP servers send it nonetheless, so do not enforce this. */
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int ext_supported_groups_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                                  CBS *contents) {
+  if (contents == NULL) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  CBS supported_group_list;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &supported_group_list) ||
+      CBS_len(&supported_group_list) == 0 ||
+      (CBS_len(&supported_group_list) & 1) != 0 ||
+      CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  ssl->s3->tmp.peer_supported_group_list = OPENSSL_malloc(
+      CBS_len(&supported_group_list));
+  if (ssl->s3->tmp.peer_supported_group_list == NULL) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  const size_t num_groups = CBS_len(&supported_group_list) / 2;
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
+    if (!CBS_get_u16(&supported_group_list,
+                     &ssl->s3->tmp.peer_supported_group_list[i])) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  assert(CBS_len(&supported_group_list) == 0);
+  ssl->s3->tmp.peer_supported_group_list_len = num_groups;
+
+  return 1;
+
+err:
+  OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->tmp.peer_supported_group_list);
+  ssl->s3->tmp.peer_supported_group_list = NULL;
+  *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+static int ext_supported_groups_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
+  /* Servers don't echo this extension. */
+  return 1;
 }
 
 
 /* kExtensions contains all the supported extensions. */
 static const struct tls_extension kExtensions[] = {
   {
-    /* The renegotiation extension must always be at index zero because the
-     * |received| and |sent| bitsets need to be tweaked when the "extension" is
-     * sent as an SCSV. */
     TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,
     NULL,
     ext_ri_add_clienthello,
@@ -1960,7 +2436,7 @@ static const struct tls_extension kExtensions[] = {
   },
   {
     TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret,
-    ext_ems_init,
+    NULL,
     ext_ems_add_clienthello,
     ext_ems_parse_serverhello,
     ext_ems_parse_clienthello,
@@ -1971,16 +2447,17 @@ static const struct tls_extension kExtensions[] = {
     NULL,
     ext_ticket_add_clienthello,
     ext_ticket_parse_serverhello,
-    ext_ticket_parse_clienthello,
+    /* Ticket extension client parsing is handled in ssl_session.c */
+    ignore_parse_clienthello,
     ext_ticket_add_serverhello,
   },
   {
     TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,
     NULL,
     ext_sigalgs_add_clienthello,
-    ext_sigalgs_parse_serverhello,
+    forbid_parse_serverhello,
     ext_sigalgs_parse_clienthello,
-    ext_sigalgs_add_serverhello,
+    dont_add_serverhello,
   },
   {
     TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,
@@ -2039,12 +2516,39 @@ static const struct tls_extension kExtensions[] = {
     ext_ec_point_add_serverhello,
   },
   {
-    TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,
-    ext_ec_curves_init,
-    ext_ec_curves_add_clienthello,
-    ext_ec_curves_parse_serverhello,
-    ext_ec_curves_parse_clienthello,
-    ext_ec_curves_add_serverhello,
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share,
+    NULL,
+    ext_key_share_add_clienthello,
+    forbid_parse_serverhello,
+    ignore_parse_clienthello,
+    dont_add_serverhello,
+  },
+  {
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_pre_shared_key,
+    NULL,
+    ext_pre_shared_key_add_clienthello,
+    forbid_parse_serverhello,
+    ignore_parse_clienthello,
+    dont_add_serverhello,
+  },
+  {
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions,
+    NULL,
+    ext_supported_versions_add_clienthello,
+    forbid_parse_serverhello,
+    ignore_parse_clienthello,
+    dont_add_serverhello,
+  },
+  /* The final extension must be non-empty. WebSphere Application Server 7.0 is
+   * intolerant to the last extension being zero-length. See
+   * https://crbug.com/363583. */
+  {
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups,
+    ext_supported_groups_init,
+    ext_supported_groups_add_clienthello,
+    ext_supported_groups_parse_serverhello,
+    ext_supported_groups_parse_clienthello,
+    ext_supported_groups_add_serverhello,
   },
 };
 
@@ -2092,14 +2596,23 @@ int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *ssl, CBB *out, size_t header_len) {
   ssl->s3->tmp.extensions.sent = 0;
   ssl->s3->tmp.custom_extensions.sent = 0;
 
-  size_t i;
-  for (i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) {
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) {
     if (kExtensions[i].init != NULL) {
       kExtensions[i].init(ssl);
     }
   }
 
-  for (i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) {
+  uint16_t grease_ext1 = 0;
+  if (ssl->ctx->grease_enabled) {
+    /* Add a fake empty extension. See draft-davidben-tls-grease-01. */
+    grease_ext1 = ssl_get_grease_value(ssl, ssl_grease_extension1);
+    if (!CBB_add_u16(&extensions, grease_ext1) ||
+        !CBB_add_u16(&extensions, 0 /* zero length */)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) {
     const size_t len_before = CBB_len(&extensions);
     if (!kExtensions[i].add_clienthello(ssl, &extensions)) {
       OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_ADDING_EXTENSION);
@@ -2116,7 +2629,25 @@ int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *ssl, CBB *out, size_t header_len) {
     goto err;
   }
 
-  if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
+  if (ssl->ctx->grease_enabled) {
+    /* Add a fake non-empty extension. See draft-davidben-tls-grease-01. */
+    uint16_t grease_ext2 = ssl_get_grease_value(ssl, ssl_grease_extension2);
+
+    /* The two fake extensions must not have the same value. GREASE values are
+     * of the form 0x1a1a, 0x2a2a, 0x3a3a, etc., so XOR to generate a different
+     * one. */
+    if (grease_ext1 == grease_ext2) {
+      grease_ext2 ^= 0x1010;
+    }
+
+    if (!CBB_add_u16(&extensions, grease_ext2) ||
+        !CBB_add_u16(&extensions, 1 /* one byte length */) ||
+        !CBB_add_u8(&extensions, 0 /* single zero byte as contents */)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
     header_len += 2 + CBB_len(&extensions);
     if (header_len > 0xff && header_len < 0x200) {
       /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See RFC 7685.
@@ -2124,9 +2655,10 @@ int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *ssl, CBB *out, size_t header_len) {
        * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing extensions
        * it MUST always appear last. */
       size_t padding_len = 0x200 - header_len;
-      /* Extensions take at least four bytes to encode. Always include least
+      /* Extensions take at least four bytes to encode. Always include at least
        * one byte of data if including the extension. WebSphere Application
-       * Server 7.0 is intolerant to the last extension being zero-length. */
+       * Server 7.0 is intolerant to the last extension being zero-length. See
+       * https://crbug.com/363583. */
       if (padding_len >= 4 + 1) {
         padding_len -= 4;
       } else {
@@ -2180,8 +2712,9 @@ int ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
     goto err;
   }
 
-  /* Discard empty extensions blocks. */
-  if (CBB_len(&extensions) == 0) {
+  /* Discard empty extensions blocks before TLS 1.3. */
+  if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION &&
+      CBB_len(&extensions) == 0) {
     CBB_discard_child(out);
   }
 
@@ -2192,9 +2725,10 @@ err:
   return 0;
 }
 
-static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *ssl, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert) {
-  size_t i;
-  for (i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) {
+static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(
+    SSL *ssl, const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *client_hello,
+    int *out_alert) {
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) {
     if (kExtensions[i].init != NULL) {
       kExtensions[i].init(ssl);
     }
@@ -2202,81 +2736,84 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *ssl, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert) {
 
   ssl->s3->tmp.extensions.received = 0;
   ssl->s3->tmp.custom_extensions.received = 0;
-  /* The renegotiation extension must always be at index zero because the
-   * |received| and |sent| bitsets need to be tweaked when the "extension" is
-   * sent as an SCSV. */
-  assert(kExtensions[0].value == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate);
-
-  /* There may be no extensions. */
-  if (CBS_len(cbs) != 0) {
-    /* Decode the extensions block and check it is valid. */
-    CBS extensions;
-    if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &extensions) ||
-        !tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions)) {
+
+  CBS extensions;
+  CBS_init(&extensions, client_hello->extensions, client_hello->extensions_len);
+  while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0) {
+    uint16_t type;
+    CBS extension;
+
+    /* Decode the next extension. */
+    if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
+        !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) {
       *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
       return 0;
     }
 
-    while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0) {
-      uint16_t type;
-      CBS extension;
-
-      /* Decode the next extension. */
-      if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
-          !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) {
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-        return 0;
-      }
-
-      /* RFC 5746 made the existence of extensions in SSL 3.0 somewhat
-       * ambiguous. Ignore all but the renegotiation_info extension. */
-      if (ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION && type != TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
-        continue;
-      }
+    /* RFC 5746 made the existence of extensions in SSL 3.0 somewhat
+     * ambiguous. Ignore all but the renegotiation_info extension. */
+    if (ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION && type != TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
+      continue;
+    }
 
-      unsigned ext_index;
-      const struct tls_extension *const ext =
-          tls_extension_find(&ext_index, type);
+    unsigned ext_index;
+    const struct tls_extension *const ext =
+        tls_extension_find(&ext_index, type);
 
-      if (ext == NULL) {
-        if (!custom_ext_parse_clienthello(ssl, out_alert, type, &extension)) {
-          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_PARSING_EXTENSION);
-          return 0;
-        }
-        continue;
-      }
-
-      ssl->s3->tmp.extensions.received |= (1u << ext_index);
-      uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-      if (!ext->parse_clienthello(ssl, &alert, &extension)) {
-        *out_alert = alert;
+    if (ext == NULL) {
+      if (!custom_ext_parse_clienthello(ssl, out_alert, type, &extension)) {
         OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_PARSING_EXTENSION);
-        ERR_add_error_dataf("extension: %u", (unsigned)type);
         return 0;
       }
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    ssl->s3->tmp.extensions.received |= (1u << ext_index);
+    uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    if (!ext->parse_clienthello(ssl, &alert, &extension)) {
+      *out_alert = alert;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_PARSING_EXTENSION);
+      ERR_add_error_dataf("extension: %u", (unsigned)type);
+      return 0;
     }
   }
 
-  for (i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) {
-    if (!(ssl->s3->tmp.extensions.received & (1u << i))) {
-      /* Extension wasn't observed so call the callback with a NULL
-       * parameter. */
-      uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-      if (!kExtensions[i].parse_clienthello(ssl, &alert, NULL)) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_EXTENSION);
-        ERR_add_error_dataf("extension: %u", (unsigned)kExtensions[i].value);
-        *out_alert = alert;
-        return 0;
-      }
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) {
+    if (ssl->s3->tmp.extensions.received & (1u << i)) {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    CBS *contents = NULL, fake_contents;
+    static const uint8_t kFakeRenegotiateExtension[] = {0};
+    if (kExtensions[i].value == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate &&
+        ssl_client_cipher_list_contains_cipher(client_hello,
+                                               SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xffff)) {
+      /* The renegotiation SCSV was received so pretend that we received a
+       * renegotiation extension. */
+      CBS_init(&fake_contents, kFakeRenegotiateExtension,
+               sizeof(kFakeRenegotiateExtension));
+      contents = &fake_contents;
+      ssl->s3->tmp.extensions.received |= (1u << i);
+    }
+
+    /* Extension wasn't observed so call the callback with a NULL
+     * parameter. */
+    uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    if (!kExtensions[i].parse_clienthello(ssl, &alert, contents)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_EXTENSION);
+      ERR_add_error_dataf("extension: %u", (unsigned)kExtensions[i].value);
+      *out_alert = alert;
+      return 0;
     }
   }
 
   return 1;
 }
 
-int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *ssl, CBS *cbs) {
+int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(
+    SSL *ssl, const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *client_hello) {
   int alert = -1;
-  if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(ssl, cbs, &alert) <= 0) {
+  if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(ssl, client_hello, &alert) <= 0) {
     ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
     return 0;
   }
@@ -2292,62 +2829,64 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *ssl, CBS *cbs) {
 OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(kNumExtensions <= sizeof(uint32_t) * 8, too_many_bits);
 
 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *ssl, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert) {
+  /* Before TLS 1.3, ServerHello extensions blocks may be omitted if empty. */
+  if (CBS_len(cbs) == 0 && ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  /* Decode the extensions block and check it is valid. */
+  CBS extensions;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &extensions) ||
+      !tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions)) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    return 0;
+  }
+
   uint32_t received = 0;
+  while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0) {
+    uint16_t type;
+    CBS extension;
 
-  if (CBS_len(cbs) != 0) {
-    /* Decode the extensions block and check it is valid. */
-    CBS extensions;
-    if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &extensions) ||
-        !tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions)) {
+    /* Decode the next extension. */
+    if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
+        !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) {
       *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
       return 0;
     }
 
+    unsigned ext_index;
+    const struct tls_extension *const ext =
+        tls_extension_find(&ext_index, type);
 
-    while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0) {
-      uint16_t type;
-      CBS extension;
-
-      /* Decode the next extension. */
-      if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
-          !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) {
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    if (ext == NULL) {
+      if (!custom_ext_parse_serverhello(ssl, out_alert, type, &extension)) {
         return 0;
       }
+      continue;
+    }
 
-      unsigned ext_index;
-      const struct tls_extension *const ext =
-          tls_extension_find(&ext_index, type);
-
-      if (ext == NULL) {
-        if (!custom_ext_parse_serverhello(ssl, out_alert, type, &extension)) {
-          return 0;
-        }
-        continue;
-      }
-
-      if (!(ssl->s3->tmp.extensions.sent & (1u << ext_index))) {
-        /* If the extension was never sent then it is illegal. */
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
-        ERR_add_error_dataf("extension :%u", (unsigned)type);
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-        return 0;
-      }
+    if (!(ssl->s3->tmp.extensions.sent & (1u << ext_index)) &&
+        type != TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
+      /* If the extension was never sent then it is illegal, except for the
+       * renegotiation extension which, in SSL 3.0, is signaled via SCSV. */
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
+      ERR_add_error_dataf("extension :%u", (unsigned)type);
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+      return 0;
+    }
 
-      received |= (1u << ext_index);
+    received |= (1u << ext_index);
 
-      uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-      if (!ext->parse_serverhello(ssl, &alert, &extension)) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_PARSING_EXTENSION);
-        ERR_add_error_dataf("extension: %u", (unsigned)type);
-        *out_alert = alert;
-        return 0;
-      }
+    uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    if (!ext->parse_serverhello(ssl, &alert, &extension)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_PARSING_EXTENSION);
+      ERR_add_error_dataf("extension: %u", (unsigned)type);
+      *out_alert = alert;
+      return 0;
     }
   }
 
-  size_t i;
-  for (i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) {
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) {
     if (!(received & (1u << i))) {
       /* Extension wasn't observed so call the callback with a NULL
        * parameter. */
@@ -2368,14 +2907,10 @@ static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *ssl) {
   int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
   int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
 
-  /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
-   * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. */
-
-  if (ssl->ctx != NULL && ssl->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) {
+  if (ssl->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) {
     ret = ssl->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(ssl, &al,
-                                             ssl->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
-  } else if (ssl->initial_ctx != NULL &&
-             ssl->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) {
+                                               ssl->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
+  } else if (ssl->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) {
     ret = ssl->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(
         ssl, &al, ssl->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
   }
@@ -2402,11 +2937,10 @@ static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *ssl) {
   int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
   int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
 
-  if (ssl->ctx != NULL && ssl->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) {
+  if (ssl->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) {
     ret = ssl->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(ssl, &al,
-                                             ssl->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
-  } else if (ssl->initial_ctx != NULL &&
-             ssl->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) {
+                                               ssl->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
+  } else if (ssl->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) {
     ret = ssl->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(
         ssl, &al, ssl->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
   }
@@ -2456,6 +2990,10 @@ int tls_process_ticket(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION **out_session,
   *out_renew_ticket = 0;
   *out_session = NULL;
 
+  if (SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) {
+    goto done;
+  }
+
   if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
     goto done;
   }
@@ -2509,7 +3047,12 @@ int tls_process_ticket(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION **out_session,
   }
   HMAC_Update(&hmac_ctx, ticket, ticket_len - mac_len);
   HMAC_Final(&hmac_ctx, mac, NULL);
-  if (CRYPTO_memcmp(mac, ticket + (ticket_len - mac_len), mac_len) != 0) {
+  int mac_ok =
+      CRYPTO_memcmp(mac, ticket + (ticket_len - mac_len), mac_len) == 0;
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
+  mac_ok = 1;
+#endif
+  if (!mac_ok) {
     goto done;
   }
 
@@ -2522,6 +3065,11 @@ int tls_process_ticket(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION **out_session,
     ret = 0;
     goto done;
   }
+  size_t plaintext_len;
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
+  memcpy(plaintext, ciphertext, ciphertext_len);
+  plaintext_len = ciphertext_len;
+#else
   if (ciphertext_len >= INT_MAX) {
     goto done;
   }
@@ -2532,9 +3080,11 @@ int tls_process_ticket(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION **out_session,
     ERR_clear_error(); /* Don't leave an error on the queue. */
     goto done;
   }
+  plaintext_len = (size_t)(len1 + len2);
+#endif
 
   /* Decode the session. */
-  SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_SESSION_from_bytes(plaintext, len1 + len2);
+  SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_SESSION_from_bytes(plaintext, plaintext_len);
   if (session == NULL) {
     ERR_clear_error(); /* Don't leave an error on the queue. */
     goto done;
@@ -2545,6 +3095,12 @@ int tls_process_ticket(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION **out_session,
   memcpy(session->session_id, session_id, session_id_len);
   session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
 
+  if (!ssl_session_is_context_valid(ssl, session) ||
+      !ssl_session_is_time_valid(ssl, session)) {
+    SSL_SESSION_free(session);
+    session = NULL;
+  }
+
   *out_session = session;
 
 done:
@@ -2554,99 +3110,18 @@ done:
   return ret;
 }
 
-/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
-typedef struct {
-  int nid;
-  int id;
-} tls12_lookup;
-
-static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
-    {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
-    {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
-    {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
-    {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
-};
-
-static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {{EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
-                                         {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}};
-
-static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) {
-  size_t i;
-  for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
-    if (table[i].nid == nid) {
-      return table[i].id;
-    }
-  }
-
-  return -1;
-}
-
-int tls12_get_sigid(int pkey_type) {
-  return tls12_find_id(pkey_type, tls12_sig,
-                       sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
-}
-
-int tls12_add_sigandhash(SSL *ssl, CBB *out, const EVP_MD *md) {
-  int md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
-                            sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
-  int sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(ssl_private_key_type(ssl));
-
-  return md_id != -1 &&
-         sig_id != -1 &&
-         CBB_add_u8(out, (uint8_t)md_id) &&
-         CBB_add_u8(out, (uint8_t)sig_id);
-}
-
-const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(uint8_t hash_alg) {
-  switch (hash_alg) {
-    case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
-      return EVP_sha1();
-
-    case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
-      return EVP_sha256();
-
-    case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
-      return EVP_sha384();
-
-    case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
-      return EVP_sha512();
-
-    default:
-      return NULL;
-  }
-}
-
-/* tls12_get_pkey_type returns the EVP_PKEY type corresponding to TLS signature
- * algorithm |sig_alg|. It returns -1 if the type is unknown. */
-static int tls12_get_pkey_type(uint8_t sig_alg) {
-  switch (sig_alg) {
-    case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
-      return EVP_PKEY_RSA;
-
-    case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
-      return EVP_PKEY_EC;
-
-    default:
-      return -1;
-  }
-}
-
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS) == 2,
-    sizeof_tls_sigalgs_is_not_two);
-
 int tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(SSL *ssl, const CBS *in_sigalgs) {
   /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
   if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
     return 1;
   }
 
-  CERT *const cert = ssl->cert;
-  OPENSSL_free(cert->peer_sigalgs);
-  cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
-  cert->peer_sigalgslen = 0;
+  SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs;
+  OPENSSL_free(hs->peer_sigalgs);
+  hs->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
+  hs->num_peer_sigalgs = 0;
 
   size_t num_sigalgs = CBS_len(in_sigalgs);
-
   if (num_sigalgs % 2 != 0) {
     return 0;
   }
@@ -2658,22 +3133,18 @@ int tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(SSL *ssl, const CBS *in_sigalgs) {
     return 1;
   }
 
-  /* This multiplication doesn't overflow because sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS) is two
-   * (statically asserted above) and we just divided |num_sigalgs| by two. */
-  cert->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(num_sigalgs * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
-  if (cert->peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
+  /* This multiplication doesn't overflow because sizeof(uint16_t) is two
+   * and we just divided |num_sigalgs| by two. */
+  hs->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(num_sigalgs * sizeof(uint16_t));
+  if (hs->peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
     return 0;
   }
-  cert->peer_sigalgslen = num_sigalgs;
+  hs->num_peer_sigalgs = num_sigalgs;
 
   CBS sigalgs;
   CBS_init(&sigalgs, CBS_data(in_sigalgs), CBS_len(in_sigalgs));
-
-  size_t i;
-  for (i = 0; i < num_sigalgs; i++) {
-    TLS_SIGALGS *const sigalg = &cert->peer_sigalgs[i];
-    if (!CBS_get_u8(&sigalgs, &sigalg->rhash) ||
-        !CBS_get_u8(&sigalgs, &sigalg->rsign)) {
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < num_sigalgs; i++) {
+    if (!CBS_get_u16(&sigalgs, &hs->peer_sigalgs[i])) {
       return 0;
     }
   }
@@ -2681,38 +3152,64 @@ int tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(SSL *ssl, const CBS *in_sigalgs) {
   return 1;
 }
 
-const EVP_MD *tls1_choose_signing_digest(SSL *ssl) {
+int tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(SSL *ssl, uint16_t *out) {
   CERT *cert = ssl->cert;
-  int type = ssl_private_key_type(ssl);
-  size_t i, j;
-
-  static const int kDefaultDigestList[] = {NID_sha256, NID_sha384, NID_sha512,
-                                           NID_sha1};
-
-  const int *digest_nids = kDefaultDigestList;
-  size_t num_digest_nids =
-      sizeof(kDefaultDigestList) / sizeof(kDefaultDigestList[0]);
-  if (cert->digest_nids != NULL) {
-    digest_nids = cert->digest_nids;
-    num_digest_nids = cert->num_digest_nids;
-  }
-
-  for (i = 0; i < num_digest_nids; i++) {
-    const int digest_nid = digest_nids[i];
-    for (j = 0; j < cert->peer_sigalgslen; j++) {
-      const EVP_MD *md = tls12_get_hash(cert->peer_sigalgs[j].rhash);
-      if (md == NULL ||
-          digest_nid != EVP_MD_type(md) ||
-          tls12_get_pkey_type(cert->peer_sigalgs[j].rsign) != type) {
-        continue;
-      }
+  SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs;
+
+  /* Before TLS 1.2, the signature algorithm isn't negotiated as part of the
+   * handshake. It is fixed at MD5-SHA1 for RSA and SHA1 for ECDSA. */
+  if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+    int type = ssl_private_key_type(ssl);
+    if (type == NID_rsaEncryption) {
+      *out = SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1;
+      return 1;
+    }
+    if (ssl_is_ecdsa_key_type(type)) {
+      *out = SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1;
+      return 1;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_COMMON_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
+    return 0;
+  }
 
-      return md;
+  const uint16_t *sigalgs;
+  size_t num_sigalgs = tls12_get_psigalgs(ssl, &sigalgs);
+  if (cert->sigalgs != NULL) {
+    sigalgs = cert->sigalgs;
+    num_sigalgs = cert->num_sigalgs;
+  }
+
+  const uint16_t *peer_sigalgs = hs->peer_sigalgs;
+  size_t num_peer_sigalgs = hs->num_peer_sigalgs;
+  if (num_peer_sigalgs == 0 && ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    /* If the client didn't specify any signature_algorithms extension then
+     * we can assume that it supports SHA1. See
+     * http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */
+    static const uint16_t kDefaultPeerAlgorithms[] = {SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1,
+                                                      SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1};
+    peer_sigalgs = kDefaultPeerAlgorithms;
+    num_peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kDefaultPeerAlgorithms);
+  }
+
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < num_sigalgs; i++) {
+    uint16_t sigalg = sigalgs[i];
+    /* SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1 is an internal value and should never be
+     * negotiated. */
+    if (sigalg == SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1 ||
+        !ssl_private_key_supports_signature_algorithm(ssl, sigalgs[i])) {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    for (size_t j = 0; j < num_peer_sigalgs; j++) {
+      if (sigalg == peer_sigalgs[j]) {
+        *out = sigalg;
+        return 1;
+      }
     }
   }
 
-  /* If no suitable digest may be found, default to SHA-1. */
-  return EVP_sha1();
+  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_COMMON_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
+  return 0;
 }
 
 int tls1_channel_id_hash(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len) {
@@ -2727,7 +3224,7 @@ int tls1_channel_id_hash(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len) {
   static const char kClientIDMagic[] = "TLS Channel ID signature";
   EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, kClientIDMagic, sizeof(kClientIDMagic));
 
-  if (ssl->hit) {
+  if (ssl->session != NULL) {
     static const char kResumptionMagic[] = "Resumption";
     EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, kResumptionMagic, sizeof(kResumptionMagic));
     if (ssl->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0) {
@@ -2757,25 +3254,26 @@ err:
 }
 
 /* tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id records the current handshake
- * hashes in |ssl->session| so that Channel ID resumptions can sign that
+ * hashes in |ssl->s3->new_session| so that Channel ID resumptions can sign that
  * data. */
 int tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(SSL *ssl) {
   int digest_len;
   /* This function should never be called for a resumed session because the
    * handshake hashes that we wish to record are for the original, full
    * handshake. */
-  if (ssl->hit) {
+  if (ssl->session != NULL) {
     return -1;
   }
 
   digest_len =
-      tls1_handshake_digest(ssl, ssl->session->original_handshake_hash,
-                            sizeof(ssl->session->original_handshake_hash));
+      tls1_handshake_digest(
+          ssl, ssl->s3->new_session->original_handshake_hash,
+          sizeof(ssl->s3->new_session->original_handshake_hash));
   if (digest_len < 0) {
     return -1;
   }
 
-  ssl->session->original_handshake_hash_len = digest_len;
+  ssl->s3->new_session->original_handshake_hash_len = digest_len;
 
   return 1;
 }