quarchpy 2.2.9.dev4__py2.py3-none-any.whl → 2.2.9.dev5__py2.py3-none-any.whl

quarchpy/connection_specific/jdk_j21_jres/mac_amd64_jdk_21_jre/conf/security/java.security

@@ -1,1510 +1,1510 @@
-#
-# This is the "master security properties file".
-#
-# An alternate java.security properties file may be specified
-# from the command line via the system property
-#
-#    -Djava.security.properties=<URL>
-#
-# This properties file appends to the master security properties file.
-# If both properties files specify values for the same key, the value
-# from the command-line properties file is selected, as it is the last
-# one loaded.
-#
-# Also, if you specify
-#
-#    -Djava.security.properties==<URL> (2 equals),
-#
-# then that properties file completely overrides the master security
-# properties file.
-#
-# To disable the ability to specify an additional properties file from
-# the command line, set the key security.overridePropertiesFile
-# to false in the master security properties file. It is set to true
-# by default.
-#
-# If this properties file fails to load, the JDK implementation will throw
-# an unspecified error when initializing the java.security.Security class.
-# Properties in this file are typically parsed only once. If any of the
-# properties are modified, applications should be restarted to ensure the
-# changes are properly reflected.
-
-# In this file, various security properties are set for use by
-# java.security classes. This is where users can statically register
-# Cryptography Package Providers ("providers" for short). The term
-# "provider" refers to a package or set of packages that supply a
-# concrete implementation of a subset of the cryptography aspects of
-# the Java Security API. A provider may, for example, implement one or
-# more digital signature algorithms or message digest algorithms.
-#
-# Each provider must implement a subclass of the Provider class.
-# To register a provider in this master security properties file,
-# specify the provider and priority in the format
-#
-#    security.provider.<n>=<provName | className>
-#
-# This declares a provider, and specifies its preference
-# order n. The preference order is the order in which providers are
-# searched for requested algorithms (when no specific provider is
-# requested). The order is 1-based; 1 is the most preferred, followed
-# by 2, and so on.
-#
-# <provName> must specify the name of the Provider as passed to its super
-# class java.security.Provider constructor. This is for providers loaded
-# through the ServiceLoader mechanism.
-#
-# <className> must specify the subclass of the Provider class whose
-# constructor sets the values of various properties that are required
-# for the Java Security API to look up the algorithms or other
-# facilities implemented by the provider. This is for providers loaded
-# through classpath.
-#
-# Note: Providers can be dynamically registered instead by calls to
-# either the addProvider or insertProviderAt method in the Security
-# class.
-
-#
-# List of providers and their preference orders (see above):
-#
-security.provider.1=SUN
-security.provider.2=SunRsaSign
-security.provider.3=SunEC
-security.provider.4=SunJSSE
-security.provider.5=SunJCE
-security.provider.6=SunJGSS
-security.provider.7=SunSASL
-security.provider.8=XMLDSig
-security.provider.9=SunPCSC
-security.provider.10=JdkLDAP
-security.provider.11=JdkSASL
-security.provider.12=Apple
-security.provider.13=SunPKCS11
-
-#
-# A list of preferred providers for specific algorithms. These providers will
-# be searched for matching algorithms before the list of registered providers.
-# Entries containing errors (parsing, etc) will be ignored. Use the
-# -Djava.security.debug=jca property to debug these errors.
-#
-# The property is a comma-separated list of serviceType.algorithm:provider
-# entries. The serviceType (example: "MessageDigest") is optional, and if
-# not specified, the algorithm applies to all service types that support it.
-# The algorithm is the standard algorithm name or transformation.
-# Transformations can be specified in their full standard name
-# (ex: AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding), or as partial matches (ex: AES, AES/CBC).
-# The provider is the name of the provider. Any provider that does not
-# also appear in the registered list will be ignored.
-#
-# There is a special serviceType for this property only to group a set of
-# algorithms together. The type is "Group" and is followed by an algorithm
-# keyword. Groups are to simplify and lessen the entries on the property
-# line. Current groups are:
-#   Group.SHA2 = SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224, SHA-512/256
-#   Group.HmacSHA2 = HmacSHA224, HmacSHA256, HmacSHA384, HmacSHA512
-#   Group.SHA2RSA = SHA224withRSA, SHA256withRSA, SHA384withRSA, SHA512withRSA
-#   Group.SHA2DSA = SHA224withDSA, SHA256withDSA, SHA384withDSA, SHA512withDSA
-#   Group.SHA2ECDSA = SHA224withECDSA, SHA256withECDSA, SHA384withECDSA, \
-#                     SHA512withECDSA
-#   Group.SHA3 = SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512
-#   Group.HmacSHA3 = HmacSHA3-224, HmacSHA3-256, HmacSHA3-384, HmacSHA3-512
-#
-# Example:
-#   jdk.security.provider.preferred=AES/GCM/NoPadding:SunJCE, \
-#         MessageDigest.SHA-256:SUN, Group.HmacSHA2:SunJCE
-#
-#jdk.security.provider.preferred=
-
-
-#
-# Sun Provider SecureRandom seed source.
-#
-# Select the primary source of seed data for the "NativePRNG", "SHA1PRNG"
-# and "DRBG" SecureRandom implementations in the "Sun" provider.
-# (Other SecureRandom implementations might also use this property.)
-#
-# On Unix-like systems (for example, Linux/MacOS), the
-# "NativePRNG", "SHA1PRNG" and "DRBG" implementations obtains seed data from
-# special device files such as file:/dev/random.
-#
-# On Windows systems, specifying the URLs "file:/dev/random" or
-# "file:/dev/urandom" will enable the native Microsoft CryptoAPI seeding
-# mechanism for SHA1PRNG and DRBG.
-#
-# By default, an attempt is made to use the entropy gathering device
-# specified by the "securerandom.source" Security property.  If an
-# exception occurs while accessing the specified URL:
-#
-#     NativePRNG:
-#         a default value of /dev/random will be used.  If neither
-#         are available, the implementation will be disabled.
-#         "file" is the only currently supported protocol type.
-#
-#     SHA1PRNG and DRBG:
-#         the traditional system/thread activity algorithm will be used.
-#
-# The entropy gathering device can also be specified with the System
-# property "java.security.egd". For example:
-#
-#   % java -Djava.security.egd=file:/dev/random MainClass
-#
-# Specifying this System property will override the
-# "securerandom.source" Security property.
-#
-# In addition, if "file:/dev/random" or "file:/dev/urandom" is
-# specified, the "NativePRNG" implementation will be more preferred than
-# DRBG and SHA1PRNG in the Sun provider.
-#
-securerandom.source=file:/dev/random
-
-#
-# A list of known strong SecureRandom implementations.
-#
-# To help guide applications in selecting a suitable strong
-# java.security.SecureRandom implementation, Java distributions should
-# indicate a list of known strong implementations using the property.
-#
-# This is a comma-separated list of algorithm and/or algorithm:provider
-# entries.
-#
-securerandom.strongAlgorithms=NativePRNGBlocking:SUN,DRBG:SUN
-
-#
-# Sun provider DRBG configuration and default instantiation request.
-#
-# NIST SP 800-90Ar1 lists several DRBG mechanisms. Each can be configured
-# with a DRBG algorithm name, and can be instantiated with a security strength,
-# prediction resistance support, etc. This property defines the configuration
-# and the default instantiation request of "DRBG" SecureRandom implementations
-# in the SUN provider. (Other DRBG implementations can also use this property.)
-# Applications can request different instantiation parameters like security
-# strength, capability, personalization string using one of the
-# getInstance(...,SecureRandomParameters,...) methods with a
-# DrbgParameters.Instantiation argument, but other settings such as the
-# mechanism and DRBG algorithm names are not currently configurable by any API.
-#
-# Please note that the SUN implementation of DRBG always supports reseeding.
-#
-# The value of this property is a comma-separated list of all configurable
-# aspects. The aspects can appear in any order but the same aspect can only
-# appear at most once. Its BNF-style definition is:
-#
-#   Value:
-#     aspect { "," aspect }
-#
-#   aspect:
-#     mech_name | algorithm_name | strength | capability | df
-#
-#   // The DRBG mechanism to use. Default "Hash_DRBG"
-#   mech_name:
-#     "Hash_DRBG" | "HMAC_DRBG" | "CTR_DRBG"
-#
-#   // The DRBG algorithm name. The "SHA-***" names are for Hash_DRBG and
-#   // HMAC_DRBG, default "SHA-256". The "AES-***" names are for CTR_DRBG,
-#   // default "AES-128" when using the limited cryptographic or "AES-256"
-#   // when using the unlimited.
-#   algorithm_name:
-#     "SHA-224" | "SHA-512/224" | "SHA-256" |
-#     "SHA-512/256" | "SHA-384" | "SHA-512" |
-#     "AES-128" | "AES-192" | "AES-256"
-#
-#   // Security strength requested. Default "128"
-#   strength:
-#     "112" | "128" | "192" | "256"
-#
-#   // Prediction resistance and reseeding request. Default "none"
-#   //  "pr_and_reseed" - Both prediction resistance and reseeding
-#   //                    support requested
-#   //  "reseed_only"   - Only reseeding support requested
-#   //  "none"          - Neither prediction resistance not reseeding
-#   //                    support requested
-#   pr:
-#     "pr_and_reseed" | "reseed_only" | "none"
-#
-#   // Whether a derivation function should be used. only applicable
-#   // to CTR_DRBG. Default "use_df"
-#   df:
-#     "use_df" | "no_df"
-#
-# Examples,
-#   securerandom.drbg.config=Hash_DRBG,SHA-224,112,none
-#   securerandom.drbg.config=CTR_DRBG,AES-256,192,pr_and_reseed,use_df
-#
-# The default value is an empty string, which is equivalent to
-#   securerandom.drbg.config=Hash_DRBG,SHA-256,128,none
-#
-securerandom.drbg.config=
-
-#
-# Class to instantiate as the javax.security.auth.login.Configuration
-# provider.
-#
-login.configuration.provider=sun.security.provider.ConfigFile
-
-#
-# Default login configuration file
-#
-#login.config.url.1=file:${user.home}/.java.login.config
-
-#
-# Class to instantiate as the system Policy. This is the name of the class
-# that will be used as the Policy object. The system class loader is used to
-# locate this class.
-#
-policy.provider=sun.security.provider.PolicyFile
-
-# The default is to have a single system-wide policy file,
-# and a policy file in the user's home directory.
-#
-policy.url.1=file:${java.home}/conf/security/java.policy
-policy.url.2=file:${user.home}/.java.policy
-
-# Controls whether or not properties are expanded in policy and login
-# configuration files. If set to false, properties (${...}) will not
-# be expanded in policy and login configuration files. If commented out or
-# set to an empty string, the default value is "false" for policy files and
-# "true" for login configuration files.
-#
-policy.expandProperties=true
-
-# Controls whether or not an extra policy or login configuration file is
-# allowed to be passed on the command line with -Djava.security.policy=somefile
-# or -Djava.security.auth.login.config=somefile. If commented out or set to
-# an empty string, the default value is "false".
-#
-policy.allowSystemProperty=true
-
-# whether or not we look into the IdentityScope for trusted Identities
-# when encountering a 1.1 signed JAR file. If the identity is found
-# and is trusted, we grant it AllPermission. Note: the default policy
-# provider (sun.security.provider.PolicyFile) does not support this property.
-#
-policy.ignoreIdentityScope=false
-
-#
-# Default keystore type.
-#
-keystore.type=pkcs12
-
-#
-# Controls compatibility mode for JKS and PKCS12 keystore types.
-#
-# When set to 'true', both JKS and PKCS12 keystore types support loading
-# keystore files in either JKS or PKCS12 format. When set to 'false' the
-# JKS keystore type supports loading only JKS keystore files and the PKCS12
-# keystore type supports loading only PKCS12 keystore files.
-#
-keystore.type.compat=true
-
-#
-# List of comma-separated packages that start with or equal this string
-# will cause a security exception to be thrown when passed to the
-# SecurityManager::checkPackageAccess method unless the corresponding
-# RuntimePermission("accessClassInPackage."+package) has been granted.
-#
-package.access=sun.misc.,\
-               sun.reflect.
-
-#
-# List of comma-separated packages that start with or equal this string
-# will cause a security exception to be thrown when passed to the
-# SecurityManager::checkPackageDefinition method unless the corresponding
-# RuntimePermission("defineClassInPackage."+package) has been granted.
-#
-# By default, none of the class loaders supplied with the JDK call
-# checkPackageDefinition.
-#
-package.definition=sun.misc.,\
-                   sun.reflect.
-
-#
-# Determines whether this properties file can be appended to
-# or overridden on the command line via -Djava.security.properties
-#
-security.overridePropertiesFile=true
-
-#
-# Determines the default key and trust manager factory algorithms for
-# the javax.net.ssl package.
-#
-ssl.KeyManagerFactory.algorithm=SunX509
-ssl.TrustManagerFactory.algorithm=PKIX
-
-#
-# The Java-level namelookup cache policy for successful lookups:
-#
-# any negative value: caching forever
-# any positive value: the number of seconds to cache an address for
-# zero: do not cache
-#
-# default value is forever (FOREVER). For security reasons, this
-# caching is made forever when a security manager is set. When a security
-# manager is not set, the default behavior in this implementation
-# is to cache for 30 seconds.
-#
-# NOTE: setting this to anything other than the default value can have
-#       serious security implications. Do not set it unless
-#       you are sure you are not exposed to DNS spoofing attack.
-#
-#networkaddress.cache.ttl=-1
-
-#
-# The Java-level namelookup cache stale policy:
-#
-# any positive value: the number of seconds to use the stale names
-# zero: do not use stale names
-# negative values are ignored
-#
-# default value is 0 (NEVER).
-#
-#networkaddress.cache.stale.ttl=0
-
-# The Java-level namelookup cache policy for failed lookups:
-#
-# any negative value: cache forever
-# any positive value: the number of seconds to cache negative lookup results
-# zero: do not cache
-#
-# In some Microsoft Windows networking environments that employ
-# the WINS name service in addition to DNS, name service lookups
-# that fail may take a noticeably long time to return (approx. 5 seconds).
-# For this reason the default caching policy is to maintain these
-# results for 10 seconds.
-#
-networkaddress.cache.negative.ttl=10
-
-#
-# Properties to configure OCSP for certificate revocation checking
-#
-
-# Enable OCSP
-#
-# By default, OCSP is not used for certificate revocation checking.
-# This property enables the use of OCSP when set to the value "true".
-#
-# NOTE: SocketPermission is required to connect to an OCSP responder.
-#
-# Example,
-#   ocsp.enable=true
-
-#
-# Location of the OCSP responder
-#
-# By default, the location of the OCSP responder is determined implicitly
-# from the certificate being validated. This property explicitly specifies
-# the location of the OCSP responder. The property is used when the
-# Authority Information Access extension (defined in RFC 5280) is absent
-# from the certificate or when it requires overriding.
-#
-# Example,
-#   ocsp.responderURL=http://ocsp.example.net:80
-
-#
-# Subject name of the OCSP responder's certificate
-#
-# By default, the certificate of the OCSP responder is that of the issuer
-# of the certificate being validated. This property identifies the certificate
-# of the OCSP responder when the default does not apply. Its value is a string
-# distinguished name (defined in RFC 2253) which identifies a certificate in
-# the set of certificates supplied during cert path validation. In cases where
-# the subject name alone is not sufficient to uniquely identify the certificate
-# then both the "ocsp.responderCertIssuerName" and
-# "ocsp.responderCertSerialNumber" properties must be used instead. When this
-# property is set then those two properties are ignored.
-#
-# Example,
-#   ocsp.responderCertSubjectName=CN=OCSP Responder, O=XYZ Corp
-
-#
-# Issuer name of the OCSP responder's certificate
-#
-# By default, the certificate of the OCSP responder is that of the issuer
-# of the certificate being validated. This property identifies the certificate
-# of the OCSP responder when the default does not apply. Its value is a string
-# distinguished name (defined in RFC 2253) which identifies a certificate in
-# the set of certificates supplied during cert path validation. When this
-# property is set then the "ocsp.responderCertSerialNumber" property must also
-# be set. When the "ocsp.responderCertSubjectName" property is set then this
-# property is ignored.
-#
-# Example,
-#   ocsp.responderCertIssuerName=CN=Enterprise CA, O=XYZ Corp
-
-#
-# Serial number of the OCSP responder's certificate
-#
-# By default, the certificate of the OCSP responder is that of the issuer
-# of the certificate being validated. This property identifies the certificate
-# of the OCSP responder when the default does not apply. Its value is a string
-# of hexadecimal digits (colon or space separators may be present) which
-# identifies a certificate in the set of certificates supplied during cert path
-# validation. When this property is set then the "ocsp.responderCertIssuerName"
-# property must also be set. When the "ocsp.responderCertSubjectName" property
-# is set then this property is ignored.
-#
-# Example,
-#   ocsp.responderCertSerialNumber=2A:FF:00
-
-#
-# Policy for failed Kerberos KDC lookups:
-#
-# When a KDC is unavailable (network error, service failure, etc), it is
-# put inside a secondary list and accessed less often for future requests. The
-# value (case-insensitive) for this policy can be:
-#
-# tryLast
-#    KDCs in the secondary list are always tried after those not on the list.
-#
-# tryLess[:max_retries,timeout]
-#    KDCs in the secondary list are still tried by their order in the
-#    configuration, but with smaller max_retries and timeout values.
-#    max_retries and timeout are optional numerical parameters (default 1 and
-#    5000, which means once and 5 seconds). Please note that if any of the
-#    values defined here are more than what is defined in krb5.conf, it will be
-#    ignored.
-#
-# Whenever a KDC is detected as available, it is removed from the secondary
-# list. The secondary list is reset when krb5.conf is reloaded. You can add
-# refreshKrb5Config=true to a JAAS configuration file so that krb5.conf is
-# reloaded whenever a JAAS authentication is attempted.
-#
-# Example,
-#   krb5.kdc.bad.policy = tryLast
-#   krb5.kdc.bad.policy = tryLess:2,2000
-#
-krb5.kdc.bad.policy = tryLast
-
-#
-# Kerberos cross-realm referrals (RFC 6806)
-#
-# OpenJDK's Kerberos client supports cross-realm referrals as defined in
-# RFC 6806. This allows to setup more dynamic environments in which clients
-# do not need to know in advance how to reach the realm of a target principal
-# (either a user or service).
-#
-# When a client issues an AS or a TGS request, the "canonicalize" option
-# is set to announce support of this feature. A KDC server may fulfill the
-# request or reply referring the client to a different one. If referred,
-# the client will issue a new request and the cycle repeats.
-#
-# In addition to referrals, the "canonicalize" option allows the KDC server
-# to change the client name in response to an AS request. For security reasons,
-# RFC 6806 (section 11) FAST scheme is enforced.
-#
-# Disable Kerberos cross-realm referrals. Value may be overwritten with a
-# System property (-Dsun.security.krb5.disableReferrals).
-sun.security.krb5.disableReferrals=false
-
-# Maximum number of AS or TGS referrals to avoid infinite loops. Value may
-# be overwritten with a System property (-Dsun.security.krb5.maxReferrals).
-sun.security.krb5.maxReferrals=5
-
-#
-# This property contains a list of disabled EC Named Curves that can be included
-# in the jdk.[tls|certpath|jar].disabledAlgorithms properties.  To include this
-# list in any of the disabledAlgorithms properties, add the property name as
-# an entry.
-#jdk.disabled.namedCurves=
-
-#
-# Algorithm restrictions for certification path (CertPath) processing
-#
-# In some environments, certain algorithms or key lengths may be undesirable
-# for certification path building and validation.  For example, "MD2" is
-# generally no longer considered to be a secure hash algorithm.  This section
-# describes the mechanism for disabling algorithms based on algorithm name
-# and/or key length.  This includes algorithms used in certificates, as well
-# as revocation information such as CRLs and signed OCSP Responses.
-# The syntax of the disabled algorithm string is described as follows:
-#   DisabledAlgorithms:
-#       " DisabledAlgorithm { , DisabledAlgorithm } "
-#
-#   DisabledAlgorithm:
-#       AlgorithmName [Constraint] { '&' Constraint } | IncludeProperty
-#
-#   AlgorithmName:
-#       (see below)
-#
-#   Constraint:
-#       KeySizeConstraint | CAConstraint | DenyAfterConstraint |
-#       UsageConstraint
-#
-#   KeySizeConstraint:
-#       keySize Operator KeyLength
-#
-#   Operator:
-#       <= | < | == | != | >= | >
-#
-#   KeyLength:
-#       Integer value of the algorithm's key length in bits
-#
-#   CAConstraint:
-#       jdkCA
-#
-#   DenyAfterConstraint:
-#       denyAfter YYYY-MM-DD
-#
-#   UsageConstraint:
-#       usage [TLSServer] [TLSClient] [SignedJAR]
-#
-#   IncludeProperty:
-#       include <security property>
-#
-# The "AlgorithmName" is the standard algorithm name of the disabled
-# algorithm. See the Java Security Standard Algorithm Names Specification
-# for information about Standard Algorithm Names.  Matching is
-# performed using a case-insensitive sub-element matching rule.  (For
-# example, in "SHA1withECDSA" the sub-elements are "SHA1" for hashing and
-# "ECDSA" for signatures.)  If the assertion "AlgorithmName" is a
-# sub-element of the certificate algorithm name, the algorithm will be
-# rejected during certification path building and validation.  For example,
-# the assertion algorithm name "DSA" will disable all certificate algorithms
-# that rely on DSA, such as NONEwithDSA, SHA1withDSA.  However, the assertion
-# will not disable algorithms related to "ECDSA".
-#
-# The "IncludeProperty" allows a implementation-defined security property that
-# can be included in the disabledAlgorithms properties.  These properties are
-# to help manage common actions easier across multiple disabledAlgorithm
-# properties.
-# There is one defined security property:  jdk.disabled.namedCurves
-# See the property for more specific details.
-#
-#
-# A "Constraint" defines restrictions on the keys and/or certificates for
-# a specified AlgorithmName:
-#
-#   KeySizeConstraint:
-#     keySize Operator KeyLength
-#       The constraint requires a key of a valid size range if the
-#       "AlgorithmName" is of a key algorithm.  The "KeyLength" indicates
-#       the key size specified in number of bits.  For example,
-#       "RSA keySize <= 1024" indicates that any RSA key with key size less
-#       than or equal to 1024 bits should be disabled, and
-#       "RSA keySize < 1024, RSA keySize > 2048" indicates that any RSA key
-#       with key size less than 1024 or greater than 2048 should be disabled.
-#       This constraint is only used on algorithms that have a key size.
-#
-#   CAConstraint:
-#     jdkCA
-#       This constraint prohibits the specified algorithm only if the
-#       algorithm is used in a certificate chain that terminates at a marked
-#       trust anchor in the lib/security/cacerts keystore.  If the jdkCA
-#       constraint is not set, then all chains using the specified algorithm
-#       are restricted.  jdkCA may only be used once in a DisabledAlgorithm
-#       expression.
-#       Example:  To apply this constraint to SHA-1 certificates, include
-#       the following:  "SHA1 jdkCA"
-#
-#   DenyAfterConstraint:
-#     denyAfter YYYY-MM-DD
-#       This constraint prohibits a certificate with the specified algorithm
-#       from being used after the date regardless of the certificate's
-#       validity.  JAR files that are signed and timestamped before the
-#       constraint date with certificates containing the disabled algorithm
-#       will not be restricted.  The date is processed in the UTC timezone.
-#       This constraint can only be used once in a DisabledAlgorithm
-#       expression.
-#       Example:  To deny usage of RSA 2048 bit certificates after Feb 3 2020,
-#       use the following:  "RSA keySize == 2048 & denyAfter 2020-02-03"
-#
-#   UsageConstraint:
-#     usage [TLSServer] [TLSClient] [SignedJAR]
-#       This constraint prohibits the specified algorithm for
-#       a specified usage.  This should be used when disabling an algorithm
-#       for all usages is not practical. 'TLSServer' restricts the algorithm
-#       in TLS server certificate chains when server authentication is
-#       performed. 'TLSClient' restricts the algorithm in TLS client
-#       certificate chains when client authentication is performed.
-#       'SignedJAR' constrains use of certificates in signed jar files.
-#       The usage type follows the keyword and more than one usage type can
-#       be specified with a whitespace delimiter.
-#       Example:  "SHA1 usage TLSServer TLSClient"
-#
-# When an algorithm must satisfy more than one constraint, it must be
-# delimited by an ampersand '&'.  For example, to restrict certificates in a
-# chain that terminate at a distribution provided trust anchor and contain
-# RSA keys that are less than or equal to 1024 bits, add the following
-# constraint:  "RSA keySize <= 1024 & jdkCA".
-#
-# All DisabledAlgorithms expressions are processed in the order defined in the
-# property.  This requires lower keysize constraints to be specified
-# before larger keysize constraints of the same algorithm.  For example:
-# "RSA keySize < 1024 & jdkCA, RSA keySize < 2048".
-#
-# Note: The algorithm restrictions do not apply to trust anchors or
-# self-signed certificates.
-#
-# Note: This property is currently used by Oracle's PKIX implementation. It
-# is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
-#
-# Example:
-#   jdk.certpath.disabledAlgorithms=MD2, DSA, RSA keySize < 2048
-#
-#
-jdk.certpath.disabledAlgorithms=MD2, MD5, SHA1 jdkCA & usage TLSServer, \
-    RSA keySize < 1024, DSA keySize < 1024, EC keySize < 224, \
-    SHA1 usage SignedJAR & denyAfter 2019-01-01
-
-#
-# Legacy cryptographic algorithms and key lengths.
-#
-# In some environments, a certain algorithm or key length may be undesirable.
-#
-# Tools such as keytool and jarsigner may emit warnings when these legacy
-# algorithms are used. See the man pages for those tools for more information.
-#
-# The syntax is the same as the "jdk.certpath.disabledAlgorithms" and
-# "jdk.jar.disabledAlgorithms" security properties.
-#
-# Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference
-# implementation. It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other
-# implementations.
-
-jdk.security.legacyAlgorithms=SHA1, \
-    RSA keySize < 2048, DSA keySize < 2048, \
-    DES, DESede, MD5, RC2, ARCFOUR
-
-#
-# Algorithm restrictions for signed JAR files
-#
-# In some environments, certain algorithms or key lengths may be undesirable
-# for signed JAR validation.  For example, "MD2" is generally no longer
-# considered to be a secure hash algorithm.  This section describes the
-# mechanism for disabling algorithms based on algorithm name and/or key length.
-# JARs signed with any of the disabled algorithms or key sizes will be treated
-# as unsigned.
-#
-# The syntax of the disabled algorithm string is described as follows:
-#   DisabledAlgorithms:
-#       " DisabledAlgorithm { , DisabledAlgorithm } "
-#
-#   DisabledAlgorithm:
-#       AlgorithmName [Constraint] { '&' Constraint }
-#
-#   AlgorithmName:
-#       (see below)
-#
-#   Constraint:
-#       KeySizeConstraint | DenyAfterConstraint
-#
-#   KeySizeConstraint:
-#       keySize Operator KeyLength
-#
-#   DenyAfterConstraint:
-#       denyAfter YYYY-MM-DD
-#
-#   Operator:
-#       <= | < | == | != | >= | >
-#
-#   KeyLength:
-#       Integer value of the algorithm's key length in bits
-#
-# Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference
-# implementation. It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other
-# implementations.
-#
-# See "jdk.certpath.disabledAlgorithms" for syntax descriptions.
-#
-jdk.jar.disabledAlgorithms=MD2, MD5, RSA keySize < 1024, \
-      DSA keySize < 1024, SHA1 denyAfter 2019-01-01
-
-#
-# Disabled message digest algorithms for use with plaintext
-# HTTP Digest authentication (java.net.HttpURLConnection).
-# This includes HTTPS Digest authentication to proxies.
-# This may be overridden by setting the networking (or system)
-# property "http.auth.digest.reEnabledAlgorithms" to a comma
-# separated list of algorithms to be allowed.
-#
-http.auth.digest.disabledAlgorithms = MD5, SHA-1
-
-#
-# Algorithm restrictions for Secure Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security
-# (SSL/TLS/DTLS) processing
-#
-# In some environments, certain algorithms or key lengths may be undesirable
-# when using SSL/TLS/DTLS.  This section describes the mechanism for disabling
-# algorithms during SSL/TLS/DTLS security parameters negotiation, including
-# protocol version negotiation, cipher suites selection, named groups
-# selection, signature schemes selection, peer authentication and key
-# exchange mechanisms.
-#
-# Disabled algorithms will not be negotiated for SSL/TLS connections, even
-# if they are enabled explicitly in an application.
-#
-# For PKI-based peer authentication and key exchange mechanisms, this list
-# of disabled algorithms will also be checked during certification path
-# building and validation, including algorithms used in certificates, as
-# well as revocation information such as CRLs and signed OCSP Responses.
-# This is in addition to the jdk.certpath.disabledAlgorithms property above.
-#
-# See the specification of "jdk.certpath.disabledAlgorithms" for the
-# syntax of the disabled algorithm string.
-#
-# Note: The algorithm restrictions do not apply to trust anchors or
-# self-signed certificates.
-#
-# Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation.
-# It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
-#
-# Example:
-#   jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms=MD5, SSLv3, DSA, RSA keySize < 2048, \
-#       rsa_pkcs1_sha1, secp224r1
-jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms=SSLv3, TLSv1, TLSv1.1, DTLSv1.0, RC4, DES, \
-    MD5withRSA, DH keySize < 1024, EC keySize < 224, 3DES_EDE_CBC, anon, NULL, \
-    ECDH
-
-#
-# Legacy algorithms for Secure Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS)
-# processing in JSSE implementation.
-#
-# In some environments, a certain algorithm may be undesirable but it
-# cannot be disabled because of its use in legacy applications.  Legacy
-# algorithms may still be supported, but applications should not use them
-# as the security strength of legacy algorithms are usually not strong enough
-# in practice.
-#
-# During SSL/TLS security parameters negotiation, legacy algorithms will
-# not be negotiated unless there are no other candidates.
-#
-# The syntax of the legacy algorithms string is described as this Java
-# BNF-style:
-#   LegacyAlgorithms:
-#       " LegacyAlgorithm { , LegacyAlgorithm } "
-#
-#   LegacyAlgorithm:
-#       AlgorithmName (standard JSSE algorithm name)
-#
-# See the specification of security property "jdk.certpath.disabledAlgorithms"
-# for the syntax and description of the "AlgorithmName" notation.
-#
-# Per SSL/TLS specifications, cipher suites have the form:
-#       SSL_KeyExchangeAlg_WITH_CipherAlg_MacAlg
-# or
-#       TLS_KeyExchangeAlg_WITH_CipherAlg_MacAlg
-#
-# For example, the cipher suite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uses RSA as the
-# key exchange algorithm, AES_128_CBC (128 bits AES cipher algorithm in CBC
-# mode) as the cipher (encryption) algorithm, and SHA-1 as the message digest
-# algorithm for HMAC.
-#
-# The LegacyAlgorithm can be one of the following standard algorithm names:
-#     1. JSSE cipher suite name, e.g., TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
-#     2. JSSE key exchange algorithm name, e.g., RSA
-#     3. JSSE cipher (encryption) algorithm name, e.g., AES_128_CBC
-#     4. JSSE message digest algorithm name, e.g., SHA
-#
-# See SSL/TLS specifications and the Java Security Standard Algorithm Names
-# Specification for information about the algorithm names.
-#
-# Note: If a legacy algorithm is also restricted through the
-# jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms property or the
-# java.security.AlgorithmConstraints API (See
-# javax.net.ssl.SSLParameters.setAlgorithmConstraints()),
-# then the algorithm is completely disabled and will not be negotiated.
-#
-# Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation.
-# It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
-# There is no guarantee the property will continue to exist or be of the
-# same syntax in future releases.
-#
-# Example:
-#   jdk.tls.legacyAlgorithms=DH_anon, DES_CBC, SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5
-#
-jdk.tls.legacyAlgorithms=NULL, anon, RC4, DES, 3DES_EDE_CBC
-
-#
-# The pre-defined default finite field Diffie-Hellman ephemeral (DHE)
-# parameters for Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS/DTLS) processing.
-#
-# In traditional SSL/TLS/DTLS connections where finite field DHE parameters
-# negotiation mechanism is not used, the server offers the client group
-# parameters, base generator g and prime modulus p, for DHE key exchange.
-# It is recommended to use dynamic group parameters.  This property defines
-# a mechanism that allows you to specify custom group parameters.
-#
-# The syntax of this property string is described as this Java BNF-style:
-#   DefaultDHEParameters:
-#       DefinedDHEParameters { , DefinedDHEParameters }
-#
-#   DefinedDHEParameters:
-#       "{" DHEPrimeModulus , DHEBaseGenerator "}"
-#
-#   DHEPrimeModulus:
-#       HexadecimalDigits
-#
-#   DHEBaseGenerator:
-#       HexadecimalDigits
-#
-#   HexadecimalDigits:
-#       HexadecimalDigit { HexadecimalDigit }
-#
-#   HexadecimalDigit: one of
-#       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F a b c d e f
-#
-# Whitespace characters are ignored.
-#
-# The "DefinedDHEParameters" defines the custom group parameters, prime
-# modulus p and base generator g, for a particular size of prime modulus p.
-# The "DHEPrimeModulus" defines the hexadecimal prime modulus p, and the
-# "DHEBaseGenerator" defines the hexadecimal base generator g of a group
-# parameter.  It is recommended to use safe primes for the custom group
-# parameters.
-#
-# If this property is not defined or the value is empty, the underlying JSSE
-# provider's default group parameter is used for each connection.
-#
-# If the property value does not follow the grammar, or a particular group
-# parameter is not valid, the connection will fall back and use the
-# underlying JSSE provider's default group parameter.
-#
-# Note: This property is currently used by OpenJDK's JSSE implementation. It
-# is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
-#
-# Example:
-#   jdk.tls.server.defaultDHEParameters=
-#       { \
-#       FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 \
-#       29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD \
-#       EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 \
-#       E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED \
-#       EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 49286651 ECE65381 \
-#       FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF, 2}
-
-#
-# TLS key limits on symmetric cryptographic algorithms
-#
-# This security property sets limits on algorithms key usage in TLS 1.3.
-# When the amount of data encrypted exceeds the algorithm value listed below,
-# a KeyUpdate message will trigger a key change.  This is for symmetric ciphers
-# with TLS 1.3 only.
-#
-# The syntax for the property is described below:
-#   KeyLimits:
-#       " KeyLimit { , KeyLimit } "
-#
-#   WeakKeyLimit:
-#       AlgorithmName Action Length
-#
-#   AlgorithmName:
-#       A full algorithm transformation.
-#
-#   Action:
-#       KeyUpdate
-#
-#   Length:
-#       The amount of encrypted data in a session before the Action occurs
-#       This value may be an integer value in bytes, or as a power of two, 2^29.
-#
-#   KeyUpdate:
-#       The TLS 1.3 KeyUpdate handshake process begins when the Length amount
-#       is fulfilled.
-#
-# Note: This property is currently used by OpenJDK's JSSE implementation. It
-# is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
-#
-jdk.tls.keyLimits=AES/GCM/NoPadding KeyUpdate 2^37, \
-                  ChaCha20-Poly1305 KeyUpdate 2^37
-
-#
-# Cryptographic Jurisdiction Policy defaults
-#
-# Import and export control rules on cryptographic software vary from
-# country to country.  By default, Java provides two different sets of
-# cryptographic policy files[1]:
-#
-#     unlimited:  These policy files contain no restrictions on cryptographic
-#                 strengths or algorithms
-#
-#     limited:    These policy files contain more restricted cryptographic
-#                 strengths
-#
-# The default setting is determined by the value of the "crypto.policy"
-# Security property below. If your country or usage requires the
-# traditional restrictive policy, the "limited" Java cryptographic
-# policy is still available and may be appropriate for your environment.
-#
-# If you have restrictions that do not fit either use case mentioned
-# above, Java provides the capability to customize these policy files.
-# The "crypto.policy" security property points to a subdirectory
-# within <java-home>/conf/security/policy/ which can be customized.
-# Please see the <java-home>/conf/security/policy/README.txt file or consult
-# the Java Security Guide/JCA documentation for more information.
-#
-# YOU ARE ADVISED TO CONSULT YOUR EXPORT/IMPORT CONTROL COUNSEL OR ATTORNEY
-# TO DETERMINE THE EXACT REQUIREMENTS.
-#
-# [1] Please note that the JCE for Java SE, including the JCE framework,
-# cryptographic policy files, and standard JCE providers provided with
-# the Java SE, have been reviewed and approved for export as mass market
-# encryption item by the US Bureau of Industry and Security.
-#
-# Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation.
-# It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
-#
-crypto.policy=unlimited
-
-#
-# The policy for the XML Signature secure validation mode. Validation of
-# XML Signatures that violate any of these constraints will fail.
-# The mode can be enabled or disabled by setting the property
-# "org.jcp.xml.dsig.secureValidation" to Boolean.TRUE or Boolean.FALSE with
-# the javax.xml.crypto.XMLCryptoContext.setProperty() method, or by setting
-# the system property "org.jcp.xml.dsig.secureValidation" to "true" or
-# "false". Any other value for the system property is also treated as "false".
-# If the system property is set, it supersedes the XMLCryptoContext property
-# value.
-#
-# The secure validation mode is enabled by default.
-#
-#   Policy:
-#       Constraint {"," Constraint }
-#   Constraint:
-#       AlgConstraint | MaxTransformsConstraint | MaxReferencesConstraint |
-#       ReferenceUriSchemeConstraint | KeySizeConstraint | OtherConstraint
-#   AlgConstraint
-#       "disallowAlg" Uri
-#   MaxTransformsConstraint:
-#       "maxTransforms" Integer
-#   MaxReferencesConstraint:
-#       "maxReferences" Integer
-#   ReferenceUriSchemeConstraint:
-#       "disallowReferenceUriSchemes" String { String }
-#   KeySizeConstraint:
-#       "minKeySize" KeyAlg Integer
-#   OtherConstraint:
-#       "noDuplicateIds" | "noRetrievalMethodLoops"
-#
-# For AlgConstraint, Uri is the algorithm URI String that is not allowed.
-# See the XML Signature Recommendation for more information on algorithm
-# URI Identifiers. For KeySizeConstraint, KeyAlg is the standard algorithm
-# name of the key type (ex: "RSA"). If the MaxTransformsConstraint,
-# MaxReferencesConstraint or KeySizeConstraint (for the same key type) is
-# specified more than once, only the last entry is enforced.
-#
-# Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation.
-# It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
-#
-jdk.xml.dsig.secureValidationPolicy=\
-    disallowAlg http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-xslt-19991116,\
-    disallowAlg http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-md5,\
-    disallowAlg http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#hmac-md5,\
-    disallowAlg http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#md5,\
-    disallowAlg http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1,\
-    disallowAlg http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#dsa-sha1,\
-    disallowAlg http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1,\
-    disallowAlg http://www.w3.org/2007/05/xmldsig-more#sha1-rsa-MGF1,\
-    disallowAlg http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#ecdsa-sha1,\
-    maxTransforms 5,\
-    maxReferences 30,\
-    disallowReferenceUriSchemes file http https,\
-    minKeySize RSA 1024,\
-    minKeySize DSA 1024,\
-    minKeySize EC 224,\
-    noDuplicateIds,\
-    noRetrievalMethodLoops
-
-#
-# Support for the here() function
-#
-# This security property determines whether the here() XPath function is
-# supported in XML Signature generation and verification.
-#
-# If this property is set to false, the here() function is not supported.
-# Generating an XML Signature that uses the here() function will throw an
-# XMLSignatureException. Validating an existing XML Signature that uses the
-# here() function will also throw an XMLSignatureException.
-#
-# The default value for this property is true.
-#
-# Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation.
-# It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
-#
-#jdk.xml.dsig.hereFunctionSupported=true
-
-#
-# Deserialization JVM-wide filter factory
-#
-# A filter factory class name is used to configure the JVM-wide filter factory.
-# The class must be public, must have a public zero-argument constructor, implement the
-# java.util.function.BinaryOperator<java.io.ObjectInputFilter> interface, provide its
-# implementation and be accessible via the application class loader.
-# A builtin filter factory is used if no filter factory is defined.
-# See java.io.ObjectInputFilter.Config for more information.
-#
-# If the system property jdk.serialFilterFactory is also specified, it supersedes
-# the security property value defined here.
-#
-#jdk.serialFilterFactory=<classname>
-
-#
-# Deserialization JVM-wide filter
-#
-# A filter, if configured, is used by the filter factory to provide the filter used by
-# java.io.ObjectInputStream during deserialization to check the contents of the stream.
-# A filter is configured as a sequence of patterns, each pattern is either
-# matched against the name of a class in the stream or defines a limit.
-# Patterns are separated by ";" (semicolon).
-# Whitespace is significant and is considered part of the pattern.
-#
-# If the system property jdk.serialFilter is also specified, it supersedes
-# the security property value defined here.
-#
-# If a pattern includes a "=", it sets a limit.
-# If a limit appears more than once the last value is used.
-# Limits are checked before classes regardless of the order in the
-# sequence of patterns.
-# If any of the limits are exceeded, the filter status is REJECTED.
-#
-#   maxdepth=value - the maximum depth of a graph
-#   maxrefs=value  - the maximum number of internal references
-#   maxbytes=value - the maximum number of bytes in the input stream
-#   maxarray=value - the maximum array length allowed
-#
-# Other patterns, from left to right, match the class or package name as
-# returned from Class.getName.
-# If the class is an array type, the class or package to be matched is the
-# element type.
-# Arrays of any number of dimensions are treated the same as the element type.
-# For example, a pattern of "!example.Foo", rejects creation of any instance or
-# array of example.Foo.
-#
-# If the pattern starts with "!", the status is REJECTED if the remaining
-# pattern is matched; otherwise the status is ALLOWED if the pattern matches.
-# If the pattern contains "/", the non-empty prefix up to the "/" is the
-# module name;
-#   if the module name matches the module name of the class then
-#   the remaining pattern is matched with the class name.
-#   If there is no "/", the module name is not compared.
-# If the pattern ends with ".**" it matches any class in the package and all
-# subpackages.
-# If the pattern ends with ".*" it matches any class in the package.
-# If the pattern ends with "*", it matches any class with the pattern as a
-# prefix.
-# If the pattern is equal to the class name, it matches.
-# Otherwise, the status is UNDECIDED.
-#
-#jdk.serialFilter=pattern;pattern
-
-#
-# RMI Registry Serial Filter
-#
-# The filter pattern uses the same format as jdk.serialFilter.
-# This filter can override the builtin filter if additional types need to be
-# allowed or rejected from the RMI Registry or to decrease limits but not
-# to increase limits.
-# If the limits (maxdepth, maxrefs, or maxbytes) are exceeded, the object is rejected.
-#
-# Each non-array type is allowed or rejected if it matches one of the patterns,
-# evaluated from left to right, and is otherwise allowed. Arrays of any
-# component type, including subarrays and arrays of primitives, are allowed.
-#
-# Array construction of any component type, including subarrays and arrays of
-# primitives, are allowed unless the length is greater than the maxarray limit.
-# The filter is applied to each array element.
-#
-# Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation.
-# It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
-#
-# The built-in filter allows subclasses of allowed classes and
-# can approximately be represented as the pattern:
-#
-#sun.rmi.registry.registryFilter=\
-#    maxarray=1000000;\
-#    maxdepth=20;\
-#    java.lang.String;\
-#    java.lang.Number;\
-#    java.lang.reflect.Proxy;\
-#    java.rmi.Remote;\
-#    sun.rmi.server.UnicastRef;\
-#    sun.rmi.server.RMIClientSocketFactory;\
-#    sun.rmi.server.RMIServerSocketFactory;\
-#    java.rmi.server.UID
-#
-# RMI Distributed Garbage Collector (DGC) Serial Filter
-#
-# The filter pattern uses the same format as jdk.serialFilter.
-# This filter can override the builtin filter if additional types need to be
-# allowed or rejected from the RMI DGC.
-#
-# Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation.
-# It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
-#
-# The builtin DGC filter can approximately be represented as the filter pattern:
-#
-#sun.rmi.transport.dgcFilter=\
-#    java.rmi.server.ObjID;\
-#    java.rmi.server.UID;\
-#    java.rmi.dgc.VMID;\
-#    java.rmi.dgc.Lease;\
-#    maxdepth=5;maxarray=10000
-
-#
-# JCEKS Encrypted Key Serial Filter
-#
-# This filter, if configured, is used by the JCEKS KeyStore during the
-# deserialization of the encrypted Key object stored inside a key entry.
-# If not configured or the filter result is UNDECIDED (i.e. none of the patterns
-# matches), the filter configured by jdk.serialFilter will be consulted.
-#
-# If the system property jceks.key.serialFilter is also specified, it supersedes
-# the security property value defined here.
-#
-# The filter pattern uses the same format as jdk.serialFilter. The default
-# pattern allows java.lang.Enum, java.security.KeyRep, java.security.KeyRep$Type,
-# and javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec and rejects all the others.
-jceks.key.serialFilter = java.base/java.lang.Enum;java.base/java.security.KeyRep;\
-  java.base/java.security.KeyRep$Type;java.base/javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec;!*
-
-# The iteration count used for password-based encryption (PBE) in JCEKS
-# keystores. Values in the range 10000 to 5000000 are considered valid.
-# If the value is out of this range, or is not a number, or is unspecified;
-# a default of 200000 is used.
-#
-# If the system property jdk.jceks.iterationCount is also specified, it
-# supersedes the security property value defined here.
-#
-#jdk.jceks.iterationCount = 200000
-
-#
-# PKCS12 KeyStore properties
-#
-# The following properties, if configured, are used by the PKCS12 KeyStore
-# implementation during the creation of a new keystore. Several of the
-# properties may also be used when modifying an existing keystore. The
-# properties can be overridden by a KeyStore API that specifies its own
-# algorithms and parameters.
-#
-# If an existing PKCS12 keystore is loaded and then stored, the algorithm and
-# parameter used to generate the existing Mac will be reused. If the existing
-# keystore does not have a Mac, no Mac will be created while storing. If there
-# is at least one certificate in the existing keystore, the algorithm and
-# parameters used to encrypt the last certificate in the existing keystore will
-# be reused to encrypt all certificates while storing. If the last certificate
-# in the existing keystore is not encrypted, all certificates will be stored
-# unencrypted. If there is no certificate in the existing keystore, any newly
-# added certificate will be encrypted (or stored unencrypted if algorithm
-# value is "NONE") using the "keystore.pkcs12.certProtectionAlgorithm" and
-# "keystore.pkcs12.certPbeIterationCount" values defined here. Existing private
-# and secret key(s) are not changed. Newly set private and secret key(s) will
-# be encrypted using the "keystore.pkcs12.keyProtectionAlgorithm" and
-# "keystore.pkcs12.keyPbeIterationCount" values defined here.
-#
-# In order to apply new algorithms and parameters to all entries in an
-# existing keystore, one can create a new keystore and add entries in the
-# existing keystore into the new keystore. This can be achieved by calling the
-# "keytool -importkeystore" command.
-#
-# If a system property of the same name is also specified, it supersedes the
-# security property value defined here.
-#
-# If the property is set to an illegal value, an iteration count that is not
-# a positive integer, or an unknown algorithm name, an exception will be thrown
-# when the property is used. If the property is not set or empty, a default
-# value will be used.
-#
-# Some PKCS12 tools and libraries may not support algorithms based on PBES2
-# and AES. To create a PKCS12 keystore which they can load, set the system
-# property "keystore.pkcs12.legacy" which overrides the values of the properties
-# defined below with legacy algorithms. Setting this system property (which can
-# only be enabled and has no value) is equivalent to
-#
-#   -Dkeystore.pkcs12.certProtectionAlgorithm=PBEWithSHA1AndRC2_40
-#   -Dkeystore.pkcs12.keyProtectionAlgorithm=PBEWithSHA1AndDESede
-#   -Dkeystore.pkcs12.macAlgorithm=HmacPBESHA1
-#   -Dkeystore.pkcs12.certPbeIterationCount=50000
-#   -Dkeystore.pkcs12.keyPbeIterationCount=50000
-#   -Dkeystore.pkcs12.macIterationCount=100000
-#
-# Also, you can downgrade an existing PKCS12 keystore created with stronger
-# algorithms to legacy algorithms with
-#
-#    keytool -J-Dkeystore.pkcs12.legacy -importkeystore -srckeystore ks -destkeystore ks
-#
-# This system property should be used at your own risk.
-#
-# Note: These properties are currently used by the JDK Reference implementation.
-# They are not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
-
-# The algorithm used to encrypt a certificate. This can be any non-Hmac PBE
-# algorithm defined in the Cipher section of the Java Security Standard
-# Algorithm Names Specification. When set to "NONE", the certificate
-# is not encrypted. The default value is "PBEWithHmacSHA256AndAES_256".
-#keystore.pkcs12.certProtectionAlgorithm = PBEWithHmacSHA256AndAES_256
-
-# The iteration count used by the PBE algorithm when encrypting a certificate.
-# This value must be a positive integer. The default value is 10000.
-#keystore.pkcs12.certPbeIterationCount = 10000
-
-# The algorithm used to encrypt a private key or secret key. This can be
-# any non-Hmac PBE algorithm defined in the Cipher section of the Java
-# Security Standard Algorithm Names Specification. The value must not be "NONE".
-# The default value is "PBEWithHmacSHA256AndAES_256".
-#keystore.pkcs12.keyProtectionAlgorithm = PBEWithHmacSHA256AndAES_256
-
-# The iteration count used by the PBE algorithm when encrypting a private key
-# or a secret key. This value must be a positive integer. The default value
-# is 10000.
-#keystore.pkcs12.keyPbeIterationCount = 10000
-
-# The algorithm used to calculate the optional MacData at the end of a PKCS12
-# file. This can be any HmacPBE algorithm defined in the Mac section of the
-# Java Security Standard Algorithm Names Specification. When set to "NONE",
-# no Mac is generated. The default value is "HmacPBESHA256".
-#keystore.pkcs12.macAlgorithm = HmacPBESHA256
-
-# The iteration count used by the MacData algorithm. This value must be a
-# positive integer. The default value is 10000.
-#keystore.pkcs12.macIterationCount = 10000
-
-#
-# Enhanced exception message information
-#
-# By default, exception messages should not include potentially sensitive
-# information such as file names, host names, or port numbers. This property
-# accepts one or more comma separated values, each of which represents a
-# category of enhanced exception message information to enable. Values are
-# case-insensitive. Leading and trailing whitespaces, surrounding each value,
-# are ignored. Unknown values are ignored.
-#
-# NOTE: Use caution before setting this property. Setting this property
-# exposes sensitive information in Exceptions, which could, for example,
-# propagate to untrusted code or be emitted in stack traces that are
-# inadvertently disclosed and made accessible over a public network.
-#
-# The categories are:
-#
-#  hostInfo - IOExceptions thrown by java.net.Socket and the socket types in the
-#             java.nio.channels package will contain enhanced exception
-#             message information
-#
-#  jar      - enables more detailed information in the IOExceptions thrown
-#             by classes in the java.util.jar package
-#
-# The property setting in this file can be overridden by a system property of
-# the same name, with the same syntax and possible values.
-#
-#jdk.includeInExceptions=hostInfo,jar
-
-#
-# Disabled mechanisms for the Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)
-#
-# Disabled mechanisms will not be negotiated by both SASL clients and servers.
-# These mechanisms will be ignored if they are specified in the "mechanisms"
-# argument of "Sasl.createSaslClient" or the "mechanism" argument of
-# "Sasl.createSaslServer".
-#
-# The value of this property is a comma-separated list of SASL mechanisms.
-# The mechanisms are case-sensitive. Whitespaces around the commas are ignored.
-#
-# Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation.
-# It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
-#
-# Example:
-#   jdk.sasl.disabledMechanisms=PLAIN, CRAM-MD5, DIGEST-MD5
-jdk.sasl.disabledMechanisms=
-
-#
-# Policies for distrusting Certificate Authorities (CAs).
-#
-# This is a comma separated value of one or more case-sensitive strings, each
-# of which represents a policy for determining if a CA should be distrusted.
-# The supported values are:
-#
-#   SYMANTEC_TLS : Distrust TLS Server certificates anchored by a Symantec
-#   root CA and issued after April 16, 2019 unless issued by one of the
-#   following subordinate CAs which have a later distrust date:
-#     1. Apple IST CA 2 - G1, SHA-256 fingerprint:
-#        AC2B922ECFD5E01711772FEA8ED372DE9D1E2245FCE3F57A9CDBEC77296A424B
-#        Distrust after December 31, 2019.
-#     2. Apple IST CA 8 - G1, SHA-256 fingerprint:
-#        A4FE7C7F15155F3F0AEF7AAA83CF6E06DEB97CA3F909DF920AC1490882D488ED
-#        Distrust after December 31, 2019.
-#
-#   ENTRUST_TLS : Distrust TLS Server certificates anchored by
-#   an Entrust root CA and issued after November 11, 2024.
-#
-# Leading and trailing whitespace surrounding each value are ignored.
-# Unknown values are ignored. If the property is commented out or set to the
-# empty String, no policies are enforced.
-#
-# Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation.
-# It is not guaranteed to be supported by other SE implementations. Also, this
-# property does not override other security properties which can restrict
-# certificates such as jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms or
-# jdk.certpath.disabledAlgorithms; those restrictions are still enforced even
-# if this property is not enabled.
-#
-jdk.security.caDistrustPolicies=SYMANTEC_TLS,ENTRUST_TLS
-
-#
-# FilePermission path canonicalization
-#
-# This security property dictates how the path argument is processed and stored
-# while constructing a FilePermission object. If the value is set to true, the
-# path argument is canonicalized and FilePermission methods (such as implies,
-# equals, and hashCode) are implemented based on this canonicalized result.
-# Otherwise, the path argument is not canonicalized and FilePermission methods are
-# implemented based on the original input. See the implementation note of the
-# FilePermission class for more details.
-#
-# If a system property of the same name is also specified, it supersedes the
-# security property value defined here.
-#
-# The default value for this property is false.
-#
-jdk.io.permissionsUseCanonicalPath=false
-
-
-#
-# Policies for the proxy_impersonator Kerberos ccache configuration entry
-#
-# The proxy_impersonator ccache configuration entry indicates that the ccache
-# is a synthetic delegated credential for use with S4U2Proxy by an intermediate
-# server. The ccache file should also contain the TGT of this server and
-# an evidence ticket from the default principal of the ccache to this server.
-#
-# This security property determines how Java uses this configuration entry.
-# There are 3 possible values:
-#
-#  no-impersonate     - Ignore this configuration entry, and always act as
-#                       the owner of the TGT (if it exists).
-#
-#  try-impersonate    - Try impersonation when this configuration entry exists.
-#                       If no matching TGT or evidence ticket is found,
-#                       fallback to no-impersonate.
-#
-#  always-impersonate - Always impersonate when this configuration entry exists.
-#                       If no matching TGT or evidence ticket is found,
-#                       no initial credential is read from the ccache.
-#
-# The default value is "always-impersonate".
-#
-# If a system property of the same name is also specified, it supersedes the
-# security property value defined here.
-#
-#jdk.security.krb5.default.initiate.credential=always-impersonate
-
-#
-# Trust Anchor Certificates - CA Basic Constraint check
-#
-# X.509 v3 certificates used as Trust Anchors (to validate signed code or TLS
-# connections) must have the cA Basic Constraint field set to 'true'. Also, if
-# they include a Key Usage extension, the keyCertSign bit must be set. These
-# checks, enabled by default, can be disabled for backward-compatibility
-# purposes with the jdk.security.allowNonCaAnchor System and Security
-# properties. In the case that both properties are simultaneously set, the
-# System value prevails. The default value of the property is "false".
-#
-#jdk.security.allowNonCaAnchor=true
-
-#
-# The default Character set name (java.nio.charset.Charset.forName())
-# for converting TLS ALPN values between byte arrays and Strings.
-# Prior versions of the JDK may use UTF-8 as the default charset. If
-# you experience interoperability issues, setting this property to UTF-8
-# may help.
-#
-# jdk.tls.alpnCharset=UTF-8
-jdk.tls.alpnCharset=ISO_8859_1
-
-#
-# Global JNDI Object Factories Filter
-#
-# This filter is used by the JNDI runtime to control the set of object factory classes
-# which will be allowed to instantiate objects from object references returned by
-# naming/directory systems. The factory class named by the reference instance will be
-# matched against this filter. The filter property supports pattern-based filter syntax
-# with the same format as jdk.serialFilter. Limit patterns specified in the filter property
-# are unused.
-#
-# Each class name pattern is matched against the factory class name to allow or disallow its
-# instantiation. The access to a factory class is allowed if the filter returns
-# ALLOWED.
-#
-# Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation.
-# It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
-#
-# If the system property jdk.jndi.object.factoriesFilter is also specified, it supersedes
-# the security property value defined here. The default value of the property is "*".
-#
-# The default pattern value allows any object factory class specified by the reference
-# instance to recreate the referenced object.
-#jdk.jndi.object.factoriesFilter=*
-
-#
-# Protocol Specific JNDI/LDAP Object Factories Filter
-#
-# This filter is used by the JNDI/LDAP provider implementation in the JDK to further control the
-# set of object factory classes which will be allowed to instantiate objects from object
-# references bound to LDAP contexts. The factory class named by the reference instance will
-# be matched against this filter. The filter property supports pattern-based filter syntax
-# with the same format as jdk.serialFilter. Limit patterns specified in the filter property
-# are unused.
-#
-# Each class name pattern is matched against the factory class name to allow or disallow its
-# instantiation. The access to a factory class is allowed only when it is not rejected by this filter
-# or by the global filter defined by "jdk.jndi.object.factoriesFilter", and at least one of these
-# two filters returns ALLOWED.
-#
-# Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation.
-# It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
-#
-# If the system property jdk.jndi.ldap.object.factoriesFilter is also specified, it supersedes
-# the security property value defined here. The default value of the property is
-# "java.naming/com.sun.jndi.ldap.**;!*".
-#
-# The default pattern value allows any object factory class defined in the java.naming module
-# to be specified by the reference instance, but rejects any other.
-#jdk.jndi.ldap.object.factoriesFilter=java.naming/com.sun.jndi.ldap.**;!*
-
-#
-# Protocol Specific JNDI/RMI Object Factories Filter
-#
-# This filter is used by the JNDI/RMI provider implementation in the JDK to further control the
-# set of object factory classes which will be allowed to instantiate objects from object
-# references bound to RMI names. The factory class named by the reference instance will
-# be matched against this filter. The filter property supports pattern-based filter syntax
-# with the same format as jdk.serialFilter. Limit patterns specified in the filter property
-# are unused.
-#
-# Each class name pattern is matched against the factory class name to allow or disallow its
-# instantiation. The access to a factory class is allowed only when it is not rejected by this filter
-# or by the global filter defined by "jdk.jndi.object.factoriesFilter", and at least one of these
-# two filters returns ALLOWED.
-#
-# Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation.
-# It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
-#
-# If the system property jdk.jndi.rmi.object.factoriesFilter is also specified, it supersedes
-# the security property value defined here. The default value of the property is
-# "jdk.naming.rmi/com.sun.jndi.rmi.**;!*".
-#
-# The default pattern value allows any object factory class defined in the jdk.naming.rmi module
-# to be specified by the reference instance, but rejects any other.
-#jdk.jndi.rmi.object.factoriesFilter=jdk.naming.rmi/com.sun.jndi.rmi.**;!*
-
-#
-# Policy for non-forwardable service ticket in a S4U2proxy request
-#
-# The Service for User to Proxy (S4U2proxy) Kerberos extension enables a middle service
-# to obtain a service ticket to another service on behalf of a user. It requires that
-# the user's service ticket to the first service has the forwardable flag set [1].
-# However, some KDC implementations ignore this requirement and accept service tickets
-# with the flag unset.
-#
-# If this security property is set to "true", then
-#
-# 1) The user service ticket, when obtained by the middle service after a S4U2self
-#    impersonation, is not required to have the forwardable flag set; and,
-#
-# 2) If a S4U2proxy request receives a KRB_ERROR of the KDC_ERR_BADOPTION error code
-#    and the ticket to the middle service is not forwardable, OpenJDK will try the same
-#    request with another KDC instead of treating it as a fatal failure.
-#
-# The default value is "false".
-#
-# If a system property of the same name is also specified, it supersedes the
-# security property value defined here.
-#
-# [1] https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-sfu/bde93b0e-f3c9-4ddf-9f44-e1453be7af5a
-#jdk.security.krb5.s4u2proxy.acceptNonForwardableServiceTicket=false
+#
+# This is the "master security properties file".
+#
+# An alternate java.security properties file may be specified
+# from the command line via the system property
+#
+#    -Djava.security.properties=<URL>
+#
+# This properties file appends to the master security properties file.
+# If both properties files specify values for the same key, the value
+# from the command-line properties file is selected, as it is the last
+# one loaded.
+#
+# Also, if you specify
+#
+#    -Djava.security.properties==<URL> (2 equals),
+#
+# then that properties file completely overrides the master security
+# properties file.
+#
+# To disable the ability to specify an additional properties file from
+# the command line, set the key security.overridePropertiesFile
+# to false in the master security properties file. It is set to true
+# by default.
+#
+# If this properties file fails to load, the JDK implementation will throw
+# an unspecified error when initializing the java.security.Security class.
+# Properties in this file are typically parsed only once. If any of the
+# properties are modified, applications should be restarted to ensure the
+# changes are properly reflected.
+
+# In this file, various security properties are set for use by
+# java.security classes. This is where users can statically register
+# Cryptography Package Providers ("providers" for short). The term
+# "provider" refers to a package or set of packages that supply a
+# concrete implementation of a subset of the cryptography aspects of
+# the Java Security API. A provider may, for example, implement one or
+# more digital signature algorithms or message digest algorithms.
+#
+# Each provider must implement a subclass of the Provider class.
+# To register a provider in this master security properties file,
+# specify the provider and priority in the format
+#
+#    security.provider.<n>=<provName | className>
+#
+# This declares a provider, and specifies its preference
+# order n. The preference order is the order in which providers are
+# searched for requested algorithms (when no specific provider is
+# requested). The order is 1-based; 1 is the most preferred, followed
+# by 2, and so on.
+#
+# <provName> must specify the name of the Provider as passed to its super
+# class java.security.Provider constructor. This is for providers loaded
+# through the ServiceLoader mechanism.
+#
+# <className> must specify the subclass of the Provider class whose
+# constructor sets the values of various properties that are required
+# for the Java Security API to look up the algorithms or other
+# facilities implemented by the provider. This is for providers loaded
+# through classpath.
+#
+# Note: Providers can be dynamically registered instead by calls to
+# either the addProvider or insertProviderAt method in the Security
+# class.
+
+#
+# List of providers and their preference orders (see above):
+#
+security.provider.1=SUN
+security.provider.2=SunRsaSign
+security.provider.3=SunEC
+security.provider.4=SunJSSE
+security.provider.5=SunJCE
+security.provider.6=SunJGSS
+security.provider.7=SunSASL
+security.provider.8=XMLDSig
+security.provider.9=SunPCSC
+security.provider.10=JdkLDAP
+security.provider.11=JdkSASL
+security.provider.12=Apple
+security.provider.13=SunPKCS11
+
+#
+# A list of preferred providers for specific algorithms. These providers will
+# be searched for matching algorithms before the list of registered providers.
+# Entries containing errors (parsing, etc) will be ignored. Use the
+# -Djava.security.debug=jca property to debug these errors.
+#
+# The property is a comma-separated list of serviceType.algorithm:provider
+# entries. The serviceType (example: "MessageDigest") is optional, and if
+# not specified, the algorithm applies to all service types that support it.
+# The algorithm is the standard algorithm name or transformation.
+# Transformations can be specified in their full standard name
+# (ex: AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding), or as partial matches (ex: AES, AES/CBC).
+# The provider is the name of the provider. Any provider that does not
+# also appear in the registered list will be ignored.
+#
+# There is a special serviceType for this property only to group a set of
+# algorithms together. The type is "Group" and is followed by an algorithm
+# keyword. Groups are to simplify and lessen the entries on the property
+# line. Current groups are:
+#   Group.SHA2 = SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224, SHA-512/256
+#   Group.HmacSHA2 = HmacSHA224, HmacSHA256, HmacSHA384, HmacSHA512
+#   Group.SHA2RSA = SHA224withRSA, SHA256withRSA, SHA384withRSA, SHA512withRSA
+#   Group.SHA2DSA = SHA224withDSA, SHA256withDSA, SHA384withDSA, SHA512withDSA
+#   Group.SHA2ECDSA = SHA224withECDSA, SHA256withECDSA, SHA384withECDSA, \
+#                     SHA512withECDSA
+#   Group.SHA3 = SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512
+#   Group.HmacSHA3 = HmacSHA3-224, HmacSHA3-256, HmacSHA3-384, HmacSHA3-512
+#
+# Example:
+#   jdk.security.provider.preferred=AES/GCM/NoPadding:SunJCE, \
+#         MessageDigest.SHA-256:SUN, Group.HmacSHA2:SunJCE
+#
+#jdk.security.provider.preferred=
+
+
+#
+# Sun Provider SecureRandom seed source.
+#
+# Select the primary source of seed data for the "NativePRNG", "SHA1PRNG"
+# and "DRBG" SecureRandom implementations in the "Sun" provider.
+# (Other SecureRandom implementations might also use this property.)
+#
+# On Unix-like systems (for example, Linux/MacOS), the
+# "NativePRNG", "SHA1PRNG" and "DRBG" implementations obtains seed data from
+# special device files such as file:/dev/random.
+#
+# On Windows systems, specifying the URLs "file:/dev/random" or
+# "file:/dev/urandom" will enable the native Microsoft CryptoAPI seeding
+# mechanism for SHA1PRNG and DRBG.
+#
+# By default, an attempt is made to use the entropy gathering device
+# specified by the "securerandom.source" Security property.  If an
+# exception occurs while accessing the specified URL:
+#
+#     NativePRNG:
+#         a default value of /dev/random will be used.  If neither
+#         are available, the implementation will be disabled.
+#         "file" is the only currently supported protocol type.
+#
+#     SHA1PRNG and DRBG:
+#         the traditional system/thread activity algorithm will be used.
+#
+# The entropy gathering device can also be specified with the System
+# property "java.security.egd". For example:
+#
+#   % java -Djava.security.egd=file:/dev/random MainClass
+#
+# Specifying this System property will override the
+# "securerandom.source" Security property.
+#
+# In addition, if "file:/dev/random" or "file:/dev/urandom" is
+# specified, the "NativePRNG" implementation will be more preferred than
+# DRBG and SHA1PRNG in the Sun provider.
+#
+securerandom.source=file:/dev/random
+
+#
+# A list of known strong SecureRandom implementations.
+#
+# To help guide applications in selecting a suitable strong
+# java.security.SecureRandom implementation, Java distributions should
+# indicate a list of known strong implementations using the property.
+#
+# This is a comma-separated list of algorithm and/or algorithm:provider
+# entries.
+#
+securerandom.strongAlgorithms=NativePRNGBlocking:SUN,DRBG:SUN
+
+#
+# Sun provider DRBG configuration and default instantiation request.
+#
+# NIST SP 800-90Ar1 lists several DRBG mechanisms. Each can be configured
+# with a DRBG algorithm name, and can be instantiated with a security strength,
+# prediction resistance support, etc. This property defines the configuration
+# and the default instantiation request of "DRBG" SecureRandom implementations
+# in the SUN provider. (Other DRBG implementations can also use this property.)
+# Applications can request different instantiation parameters like security
+# strength, capability, personalization string using one of the
+# getInstance(...,SecureRandomParameters,...) methods with a
+# DrbgParameters.Instantiation argument, but other settings such as the
+# mechanism and DRBG algorithm names are not currently configurable by any API.
+#
+# Please note that the SUN implementation of DRBG always supports reseeding.
+#
+# The value of this property is a comma-separated list of all configurable
+# aspects. The aspects can appear in any order but the same aspect can only
+# appear at most once. Its BNF-style definition is:
+#
+#   Value:
+#     aspect { "," aspect }
+#
+#   aspect:
+#     mech_name | algorithm_name | strength | capability | df
+#
+#   // The DRBG mechanism to use. Default "Hash_DRBG"
+#   mech_name:
+#     "Hash_DRBG" | "HMAC_DRBG" | "CTR_DRBG"
+#
+#   // The DRBG algorithm name. The "SHA-***" names are for Hash_DRBG and
+#   // HMAC_DRBG, default "SHA-256". The "AES-***" names are for CTR_DRBG,
+#   // default "AES-128" when using the limited cryptographic or "AES-256"
+#   // when using the unlimited.
+#   algorithm_name:
+#     "SHA-224" | "SHA-512/224" | "SHA-256" |
+#     "SHA-512/256" | "SHA-384" | "SHA-512" |
+#     "AES-128" | "AES-192" | "AES-256"
+#
+#   // Security strength requested. Default "128"
+#   strength:
+#     "112" | "128" | "192" | "256"
+#
+#   // Prediction resistance and reseeding request. Default "none"
+#   //  "pr_and_reseed" - Both prediction resistance and reseeding
+#   //                    support requested
+#   //  "reseed_only"   - Only reseeding support requested
+#   //  "none"          - Neither prediction resistance not reseeding
+#   //                    support requested
+#   pr:
+#     "pr_and_reseed" | "reseed_only" | "none"
+#
+#   // Whether a derivation function should be used. only applicable
+#   // to CTR_DRBG. Default "use_df"
+#   df:
+#     "use_df" | "no_df"
+#
+# Examples,
+#   securerandom.drbg.config=Hash_DRBG,SHA-224,112,none
+#   securerandom.drbg.config=CTR_DRBG,AES-256,192,pr_and_reseed,use_df
+#
+# The default value is an empty string, which is equivalent to
+#   securerandom.drbg.config=Hash_DRBG,SHA-256,128,none
+#
+securerandom.drbg.config=
+
+#
+# Class to instantiate as the javax.security.auth.login.Configuration
+# provider.
+#
+login.configuration.provider=sun.security.provider.ConfigFile
+
+#
+# Default login configuration file
+#
+#login.config.url.1=file:${user.home}/.java.login.config
+
+#
+# Class to instantiate as the system Policy. This is the name of the class
+# that will be used as the Policy object. The system class loader is used to
+# locate this class.
+#
+policy.provider=sun.security.provider.PolicyFile
+
+# The default is to have a single system-wide policy file,
+# and a policy file in the user's home directory.
+#
+policy.url.1=file:${java.home}/conf/security/java.policy
+policy.url.2=file:${user.home}/.java.policy
+
+# Controls whether or not properties are expanded in policy and login
+# configuration files. If set to false, properties (${...}) will not
+# be expanded in policy and login configuration files. If commented out or
+# set to an empty string, the default value is "false" for policy files and
+# "true" for login configuration files.
+#
+policy.expandProperties=true
+
+# Controls whether or not an extra policy or login configuration file is
+# allowed to be passed on the command line with -Djava.security.policy=somefile
+# or -Djava.security.auth.login.config=somefile. If commented out or set to
+# an empty string, the default value is "false".
+#
+policy.allowSystemProperty=true
+
+# whether or not we look into the IdentityScope for trusted Identities
+# when encountering a 1.1 signed JAR file. If the identity is found
+# and is trusted, we grant it AllPermission. Note: the default policy
+# provider (sun.security.provider.PolicyFile) does not support this property.
+#
+policy.ignoreIdentityScope=false
+
+#
+# Default keystore type.
+#
+keystore.type=pkcs12
+
+#
+# Controls compatibility mode for JKS and PKCS12 keystore types.
+#
+# When set to 'true', both JKS and PKCS12 keystore types support loading
+# keystore files in either JKS or PKCS12 format. When set to 'false' the
+# JKS keystore type supports loading only JKS keystore files and the PKCS12
+# keystore type supports loading only PKCS12 keystore files.
+#
+keystore.type.compat=true
+
+#
+# List of comma-separated packages that start with or equal this string
+# will cause a security exception to be thrown when passed to the
+# SecurityManager::checkPackageAccess method unless the corresponding
+# RuntimePermission("accessClassInPackage."+package) has been granted.
+#
+package.access=sun.misc.,\
+               sun.reflect.
+
+#
+# List of comma-separated packages that start with or equal this string
+# will cause a security exception to be thrown when passed to the
+# SecurityManager::checkPackageDefinition method unless the corresponding
+# RuntimePermission("defineClassInPackage."+package) has been granted.
+#
+# By default, none of the class loaders supplied with the JDK call
+# checkPackageDefinition.
+#
+package.definition=sun.misc.,\
+                   sun.reflect.
+
+#
+# Determines whether this properties file can be appended to
+# or overridden on the command line via -Djava.security.properties
+#
+security.overridePropertiesFile=true
+
+#
+# Determines the default key and trust manager factory algorithms for
+# the javax.net.ssl package.
+#
+ssl.KeyManagerFactory.algorithm=SunX509
+ssl.TrustManagerFactory.algorithm=PKIX
+
+#
+# The Java-level namelookup cache policy for successful lookups:
+#
+# any negative value: caching forever
+# any positive value: the number of seconds to cache an address for
+# zero: do not cache
+#
+# default value is forever (FOREVER). For security reasons, this
+# caching is made forever when a security manager is set. When a security
+# manager is not set, the default behavior in this implementation
+# is to cache for 30 seconds.
+#
+# NOTE: setting this to anything other than the default value can have
+#       serious security implications. Do not set it unless
+#       you are sure you are not exposed to DNS spoofing attack.
+#
+#networkaddress.cache.ttl=-1
+
+#
+# The Java-level namelookup cache stale policy:
+#
+# any positive value: the number of seconds to use the stale names
+# zero: do not use stale names
+# negative values are ignored
+#
+# default value is 0 (NEVER).
+#
+#networkaddress.cache.stale.ttl=0
+
+# The Java-level namelookup cache policy for failed lookups:
+#
+# any negative value: cache forever
+# any positive value: the number of seconds to cache negative lookup results
+# zero: do not cache
+#
+# In some Microsoft Windows networking environments that employ
+# the WINS name service in addition to DNS, name service lookups
+# that fail may take a noticeably long time to return (approx. 5 seconds).
+# For this reason the default caching policy is to maintain these
+# results for 10 seconds.
+#
+networkaddress.cache.negative.ttl=10
+
+#
+# Properties to configure OCSP for certificate revocation checking
+#
+
+# Enable OCSP
+#
+# By default, OCSP is not used for certificate revocation checking.
+# This property enables the use of OCSP when set to the value "true".
+#
+# NOTE: SocketPermission is required to connect to an OCSP responder.
+#
+# Example,
+#   ocsp.enable=true
+
+#
+# Location of the OCSP responder
+#
+# By default, the location of the OCSP responder is determined implicitly
+# from the certificate being validated. This property explicitly specifies
+# the location of the OCSP responder. The property is used when the
+# Authority Information Access extension (defined in RFC 5280) is absent
+# from the certificate or when it requires overriding.
+#
+# Example,
+#   ocsp.responderURL=http://ocsp.example.net:80
+
+#
+# Subject name of the OCSP responder's certificate
+#
+# By default, the certificate of the OCSP responder is that of the issuer
+# of the certificate being validated. This property identifies the certificate
+# of the OCSP responder when the default does not apply. Its value is a string
+# distinguished name (defined in RFC 2253) which identifies a certificate in
+# the set of certificates supplied during cert path validation. In cases where
+# the subject name alone is not sufficient to uniquely identify the certificate
+# then both the "ocsp.responderCertIssuerName" and
+# "ocsp.responderCertSerialNumber" properties must be used instead. When this
+# property is set then those two properties are ignored.
+#
+# Example,
+#   ocsp.responderCertSubjectName=CN=OCSP Responder, O=XYZ Corp
+
+#
+# Issuer name of the OCSP responder's certificate
+#
+# By default, the certificate of the OCSP responder is that of the issuer
+# of the certificate being validated. This property identifies the certificate
+# of the OCSP responder when the default does not apply. Its value is a string
+# distinguished name (defined in RFC 2253) which identifies a certificate in
+# the set of certificates supplied during cert path validation. When this
+# property is set then the "ocsp.responderCertSerialNumber" property must also
+# be set. When the "ocsp.responderCertSubjectName" property is set then this
+# property is ignored.
+#
+# Example,
+#   ocsp.responderCertIssuerName=CN=Enterprise CA, O=XYZ Corp
+
+#
+# Serial number of the OCSP responder's certificate
+#
+# By default, the certificate of the OCSP responder is that of the issuer
+# of the certificate being validated. This property identifies the certificate
+# of the OCSP responder when the default does not apply. Its value is a string
+# of hexadecimal digits (colon or space separators may be present) which
+# identifies a certificate in the set of certificates supplied during cert path
+# validation. When this property is set then the "ocsp.responderCertIssuerName"
+# property must also be set. When the "ocsp.responderCertSubjectName" property
+# is set then this property is ignored.
+#
+# Example,
+#   ocsp.responderCertSerialNumber=2A:FF:00
+
+#
+# Policy for failed Kerberos KDC lookups:
+#
+# When a KDC is unavailable (network error, service failure, etc), it is
+# put inside a secondary list and accessed less often for future requests. The
+# value (case-insensitive) for this policy can be:
+#
+# tryLast
+#    KDCs in the secondary list are always tried after those not on the list.
+#
+# tryLess[:max_retries,timeout]
+#    KDCs in the secondary list are still tried by their order in the
+#    configuration, but with smaller max_retries and timeout values.
+#    max_retries and timeout are optional numerical parameters (default 1 and
+#    5000, which means once and 5 seconds). Please note that if any of the
+#    values defined here are more than what is defined in krb5.conf, it will be
+#    ignored.
+#
+# Whenever a KDC is detected as available, it is removed from the secondary
+# list. The secondary list is reset when krb5.conf is reloaded. You can add
+# refreshKrb5Config=true to a JAAS configuration file so that krb5.conf is
+# reloaded whenever a JAAS authentication is attempted.
+#
+# Example,
+#   krb5.kdc.bad.policy = tryLast
+#   krb5.kdc.bad.policy = tryLess:2,2000
+#
+krb5.kdc.bad.policy = tryLast
+
+#
+# Kerberos cross-realm referrals (RFC 6806)
+#
+# OpenJDK's Kerberos client supports cross-realm referrals as defined in
+# RFC 6806. This allows to setup more dynamic environments in which clients
+# do not need to know in advance how to reach the realm of a target principal
+# (either a user or service).
+#
+# When a client issues an AS or a TGS request, the "canonicalize" option
+# is set to announce support of this feature. A KDC server may fulfill the
+# request or reply referring the client to a different one. If referred,
+# the client will issue a new request and the cycle repeats.
+#
+# In addition to referrals, the "canonicalize" option allows the KDC server
+# to change the client name in response to an AS request. For security reasons,
+# RFC 6806 (section 11) FAST scheme is enforced.
+#
+# Disable Kerberos cross-realm referrals. Value may be overwritten with a
+# System property (-Dsun.security.krb5.disableReferrals).
+sun.security.krb5.disableReferrals=false
+
+# Maximum number of AS or TGS referrals to avoid infinite loops. Value may
+# be overwritten with a System property (-Dsun.security.krb5.maxReferrals).
+sun.security.krb5.maxReferrals=5
+
+#
+# This property contains a list of disabled EC Named Curves that can be included
+# in the jdk.[tls|certpath|jar].disabledAlgorithms properties.  To include this
+# list in any of the disabledAlgorithms properties, add the property name as
+# an entry.
+#jdk.disabled.namedCurves=
+
+#
+# Algorithm restrictions for certification path (CertPath) processing
+#
+# In some environments, certain algorithms or key lengths may be undesirable
+# for certification path building and validation.  For example, "MD2" is
+# generally no longer considered to be a secure hash algorithm.  This section
+# describes the mechanism for disabling algorithms based on algorithm name
+# and/or key length.  This includes algorithms used in certificates, as well
+# as revocation information such as CRLs and signed OCSP Responses.
+# The syntax of the disabled algorithm string is described as follows:
+#   DisabledAlgorithms:
+#       " DisabledAlgorithm { , DisabledAlgorithm } "
+#
+#   DisabledAlgorithm:
+#       AlgorithmName [Constraint] { '&' Constraint } | IncludeProperty
+#
+#   AlgorithmName:
+#       (see below)
+#
+#   Constraint:
+#       KeySizeConstraint | CAConstraint | DenyAfterConstraint |
+#       UsageConstraint
+#
+#   KeySizeConstraint:
+#       keySize Operator KeyLength
+#
+#   Operator:
+#       <= | < | == | != | >= | >
+#
+#   KeyLength:
+#       Integer value of the algorithm's key length in bits
+#
+#   CAConstraint:
+#       jdkCA
+#
+#   DenyAfterConstraint:
+#       denyAfter YYYY-MM-DD
+#
+#   UsageConstraint:
+#       usage [TLSServer] [TLSClient] [SignedJAR]
+#
+#   IncludeProperty:
+#       include <security property>
+#
+# The "AlgorithmName" is the standard algorithm name of the disabled
+# algorithm. See the Java Security Standard Algorithm Names Specification
+# for information about Standard Algorithm Names.  Matching is
+# performed using a case-insensitive sub-element matching rule.  (For
+# example, in "SHA1withECDSA" the sub-elements are "SHA1" for hashing and
+# "ECDSA" for signatures.)  If the assertion "AlgorithmName" is a
+# sub-element of the certificate algorithm name, the algorithm will be
+# rejected during certification path building and validation.  For example,
+# the assertion algorithm name "DSA" will disable all certificate algorithms
+# that rely on DSA, such as NONEwithDSA, SHA1withDSA.  However, the assertion
+# will not disable algorithms related to "ECDSA".
+#
+# The "IncludeProperty" allows a implementation-defined security property that
+# can be included in the disabledAlgorithms properties.  These properties are
+# to help manage common actions easier across multiple disabledAlgorithm
+# properties.
+# There is one defined security property:  jdk.disabled.namedCurves
+# See the property for more specific details.
+#
+#
+# A "Constraint" defines restrictions on the keys and/or certificates for
+# a specified AlgorithmName:
+#
+#   KeySizeConstraint:
+#     keySize Operator KeyLength
+#       The constraint requires a key of a valid size range if the
+#       "AlgorithmName" is of a key algorithm.  The "KeyLength" indicates
+#       the key size specified in number of bits.  For example,
+#       "RSA keySize <= 1024" indicates that any RSA key with key size less
+#       than or equal to 1024 bits should be disabled, and
+#       "RSA keySize < 1024, RSA keySize > 2048" indicates that any RSA key
+#       with key size less than 1024 or greater than 2048 should be disabled.
+#       This constraint is only used on algorithms that have a key size.
+#
+#   CAConstraint:
+#     jdkCA
+#       This constraint prohibits the specified algorithm only if the
+#       algorithm is used in a certificate chain that terminates at a marked
+#       trust anchor in the lib/security/cacerts keystore.  If the jdkCA
+#       constraint is not set, then all chains using the specified algorithm
+#       are restricted.  jdkCA may only be used once in a DisabledAlgorithm
+#       expression.
+#       Example:  To apply this constraint to SHA-1 certificates, include
+#       the following:  "SHA1 jdkCA"
+#
+#   DenyAfterConstraint:
+#     denyAfter YYYY-MM-DD
+#       This constraint prohibits a certificate with the specified algorithm
+#       from being used after the date regardless of the certificate's
+#       validity.  JAR files that are signed and timestamped before the
+#       constraint date with certificates containing the disabled algorithm
+#       will not be restricted.  The date is processed in the UTC timezone.
+#       This constraint can only be used once in a DisabledAlgorithm
+#       expression.
+#       Example:  To deny usage of RSA 2048 bit certificates after Feb 3 2020,
+#       use the following:  "RSA keySize == 2048 & denyAfter 2020-02-03"
+#
+#   UsageConstraint:
+#     usage [TLSServer] [TLSClient] [SignedJAR]
+#       This constraint prohibits the specified algorithm for
+#       a specified usage.  This should be used when disabling an algorithm
+#       for all usages is not practical. 'TLSServer' restricts the algorithm
+#       in TLS server certificate chains when server authentication is
+#       performed. 'TLSClient' restricts the algorithm in TLS client
+#       certificate chains when client authentication is performed.
+#       'SignedJAR' constrains use of certificates in signed jar files.
+#       The usage type follows the keyword and more than one usage type can
+#       be specified with a whitespace delimiter.
+#       Example:  "SHA1 usage TLSServer TLSClient"
+#
+# When an algorithm must satisfy more than one constraint, it must be
+# delimited by an ampersand '&'.  For example, to restrict certificates in a
+# chain that terminate at a distribution provided trust anchor and contain
+# RSA keys that are less than or equal to 1024 bits, add the following
+# constraint:  "RSA keySize <= 1024 & jdkCA".
+#
+# All DisabledAlgorithms expressions are processed in the order defined in the
+# property.  This requires lower keysize constraints to be specified
+# before larger keysize constraints of the same algorithm.  For example:
+# "RSA keySize < 1024 & jdkCA, RSA keySize < 2048".
+#
+# Note: The algorithm restrictions do not apply to trust anchors or
+# self-signed certificates.
+#
+# Note: This property is currently used by Oracle's PKIX implementation. It
+# is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
+#
+# Example:
+#   jdk.certpath.disabledAlgorithms=MD2, DSA, RSA keySize < 2048
+#
+#
+jdk.certpath.disabledAlgorithms=MD2, MD5, SHA1 jdkCA & usage TLSServer, \
+    RSA keySize < 1024, DSA keySize < 1024, EC keySize < 224, \
+    SHA1 usage SignedJAR & denyAfter 2019-01-01
+
+#
+# Legacy cryptographic algorithms and key lengths.
+#
+# In some environments, a certain algorithm or key length may be undesirable.
+#
+# Tools such as keytool and jarsigner may emit warnings when these legacy
+# algorithms are used. See the man pages for those tools for more information.
+#
+# The syntax is the same as the "jdk.certpath.disabledAlgorithms" and
+# "jdk.jar.disabledAlgorithms" security properties.
+#
+# Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference
+# implementation. It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other
+# implementations.
+
+jdk.security.legacyAlgorithms=SHA1, \
+    RSA keySize < 2048, DSA keySize < 2048, \
+    DES, DESede, MD5, RC2, ARCFOUR
+
+#
+# Algorithm restrictions for signed JAR files
+#
+# In some environments, certain algorithms or key lengths may be undesirable
+# for signed JAR validation.  For example, "MD2" is generally no longer
+# considered to be a secure hash algorithm.  This section describes the
+# mechanism for disabling algorithms based on algorithm name and/or key length.
+# JARs signed with any of the disabled algorithms or key sizes will be treated
+# as unsigned.
+#
+# The syntax of the disabled algorithm string is described as follows:
+#   DisabledAlgorithms:
+#       " DisabledAlgorithm { , DisabledAlgorithm } "
+#
+#   DisabledAlgorithm:
+#       AlgorithmName [Constraint] { '&' Constraint }
+#
+#   AlgorithmName:
+#       (see below)
+#
+#   Constraint:
+#       KeySizeConstraint | DenyAfterConstraint
+#
+#   KeySizeConstraint:
+#       keySize Operator KeyLength
+#
+#   DenyAfterConstraint:
+#       denyAfter YYYY-MM-DD
+#
+#   Operator:
+#       <= | < | == | != | >= | >
+#
+#   KeyLength:
+#       Integer value of the algorithm's key length in bits
+#
+# Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference
+# implementation. It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other
+# implementations.
+#
+# See "jdk.certpath.disabledAlgorithms" for syntax descriptions.
+#
+jdk.jar.disabledAlgorithms=MD2, MD5, RSA keySize < 1024, \
+      DSA keySize < 1024, SHA1 denyAfter 2019-01-01
+
+#
+# Disabled message digest algorithms for use with plaintext
+# HTTP Digest authentication (java.net.HttpURLConnection).
+# This includes HTTPS Digest authentication to proxies.
+# This may be overridden by setting the networking (or system)
+# property "http.auth.digest.reEnabledAlgorithms" to a comma
+# separated list of algorithms to be allowed.
+#
+http.auth.digest.disabledAlgorithms = MD5, SHA-1
+
+#
+# Algorithm restrictions for Secure Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security
+# (SSL/TLS/DTLS) processing
+#
+# In some environments, certain algorithms or key lengths may be undesirable
+# when using SSL/TLS/DTLS.  This section describes the mechanism for disabling
+# algorithms during SSL/TLS/DTLS security parameters negotiation, including
+# protocol version negotiation, cipher suites selection, named groups
+# selection, signature schemes selection, peer authentication and key
+# exchange mechanisms.
+#
+# Disabled algorithms will not be negotiated for SSL/TLS connections, even
+# if they are enabled explicitly in an application.
+#
+# For PKI-based peer authentication and key exchange mechanisms, this list
+# of disabled algorithms will also be checked during certification path
+# building and validation, including algorithms used in certificates, as
+# well as revocation information such as CRLs and signed OCSP Responses.
+# This is in addition to the jdk.certpath.disabledAlgorithms property above.
+#
+# See the specification of "jdk.certpath.disabledAlgorithms" for the
+# syntax of the disabled algorithm string.
+#
+# Note: The algorithm restrictions do not apply to trust anchors or
+# self-signed certificates.
+#
+# Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation.
+# It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
+#
+# Example:
+#   jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms=MD5, SSLv3, DSA, RSA keySize < 2048, \
+#       rsa_pkcs1_sha1, secp224r1
+jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms=SSLv3, TLSv1, TLSv1.1, DTLSv1.0, RC4, DES, \
+    MD5withRSA, DH keySize < 1024, EC keySize < 224, 3DES_EDE_CBC, anon, NULL, \
+    ECDH
+
+#
+# Legacy algorithms for Secure Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS)
+# processing in JSSE implementation.
+#
+# In some environments, a certain algorithm may be undesirable but it
+# cannot be disabled because of its use in legacy applications.  Legacy
+# algorithms may still be supported, but applications should not use them
+# as the security strength of legacy algorithms are usually not strong enough
+# in practice.
+#
+# During SSL/TLS security parameters negotiation, legacy algorithms will
+# not be negotiated unless there are no other candidates.
+#
+# The syntax of the legacy algorithms string is described as this Java
+# BNF-style:
+#   LegacyAlgorithms:
+#       " LegacyAlgorithm { , LegacyAlgorithm } "
+#
+#   LegacyAlgorithm:
+#       AlgorithmName (standard JSSE algorithm name)
+#
+# See the specification of security property "jdk.certpath.disabledAlgorithms"
+# for the syntax and description of the "AlgorithmName" notation.
+#
+# Per SSL/TLS specifications, cipher suites have the form:
+#       SSL_KeyExchangeAlg_WITH_CipherAlg_MacAlg
+# or
+#       TLS_KeyExchangeAlg_WITH_CipherAlg_MacAlg
+#
+# For example, the cipher suite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uses RSA as the
+# key exchange algorithm, AES_128_CBC (128 bits AES cipher algorithm in CBC
+# mode) as the cipher (encryption) algorithm, and SHA-1 as the message digest
+# algorithm for HMAC.
+#
+# The LegacyAlgorithm can be one of the following standard algorithm names:
+#     1. JSSE cipher suite name, e.g., TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
+#     2. JSSE key exchange algorithm name, e.g., RSA
+#     3. JSSE cipher (encryption) algorithm name, e.g., AES_128_CBC
+#     4. JSSE message digest algorithm name, e.g., SHA
+#
+# See SSL/TLS specifications and the Java Security Standard Algorithm Names
+# Specification for information about the algorithm names.
+#
+# Note: If a legacy algorithm is also restricted through the
+# jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms property or the
+# java.security.AlgorithmConstraints API (See
+# javax.net.ssl.SSLParameters.setAlgorithmConstraints()),
+# then the algorithm is completely disabled and will not be negotiated.
+#
+# Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation.
+# It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
+# There is no guarantee the property will continue to exist or be of the
+# same syntax in future releases.
+#
+# Example:
+#   jdk.tls.legacyAlgorithms=DH_anon, DES_CBC, SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5
+#
+jdk.tls.legacyAlgorithms=NULL, anon, RC4, DES, 3DES_EDE_CBC
+
+#
+# The pre-defined default finite field Diffie-Hellman ephemeral (DHE)
+# parameters for Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS/DTLS) processing.
+#
+# In traditional SSL/TLS/DTLS connections where finite field DHE parameters
+# negotiation mechanism is not used, the server offers the client group
+# parameters, base generator g and prime modulus p, for DHE key exchange.
+# It is recommended to use dynamic group parameters.  This property defines
+# a mechanism that allows you to specify custom group parameters.
+#
+# The syntax of this property string is described as this Java BNF-style:
+#   DefaultDHEParameters:
+#       DefinedDHEParameters { , DefinedDHEParameters }
+#
+#   DefinedDHEParameters:
+#       "{" DHEPrimeModulus , DHEBaseGenerator "}"
+#
+#   DHEPrimeModulus:
+#       HexadecimalDigits
+#
+#   DHEBaseGenerator:
+#       HexadecimalDigits
+#
+#   HexadecimalDigits:
+#       HexadecimalDigit { HexadecimalDigit }
+#
+#   HexadecimalDigit: one of
+#       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F a b c d e f
+#
+# Whitespace characters are ignored.
+#
+# The "DefinedDHEParameters" defines the custom group parameters, prime
+# modulus p and base generator g, for a particular size of prime modulus p.
+# The "DHEPrimeModulus" defines the hexadecimal prime modulus p, and the
+# "DHEBaseGenerator" defines the hexadecimal base generator g of a group
+# parameter.  It is recommended to use safe primes for the custom group
+# parameters.
+#
+# If this property is not defined or the value is empty, the underlying JSSE
+# provider's default group parameter is used for each connection.
+#
+# If the property value does not follow the grammar, or a particular group
+# parameter is not valid, the connection will fall back and use the
+# underlying JSSE provider's default group parameter.
+#
+# Note: This property is currently used by OpenJDK's JSSE implementation. It
+# is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
+#
+# Example:
+#   jdk.tls.server.defaultDHEParameters=
+#       { \
+#       FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 \
+#       29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD \
+#       EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 \
+#       E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED \
+#       EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 49286651 ECE65381 \
+#       FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF, 2}
+
+#
+# TLS key limits on symmetric cryptographic algorithms
+#
+# This security property sets limits on algorithms key usage in TLS 1.3.
+# When the amount of data encrypted exceeds the algorithm value listed below,
+# a KeyUpdate message will trigger a key change.  This is for symmetric ciphers
+# with TLS 1.3 only.
+#
+# The syntax for the property is described below:
+#   KeyLimits:
+#       " KeyLimit { , KeyLimit } "
+#
+#   WeakKeyLimit:
+#       AlgorithmName Action Length
+#
+#   AlgorithmName:
+#       A full algorithm transformation.
+#
+#   Action:
+#       KeyUpdate
+#
+#   Length:
+#       The amount of encrypted data in a session before the Action occurs
+#       This value may be an integer value in bytes, or as a power of two, 2^29.
+#
+#   KeyUpdate:
+#       The TLS 1.3 KeyUpdate handshake process begins when the Length amount
+#       is fulfilled.
+#
+# Note: This property is currently used by OpenJDK's JSSE implementation. It
+# is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
+#
+jdk.tls.keyLimits=AES/GCM/NoPadding KeyUpdate 2^37, \
+                  ChaCha20-Poly1305 KeyUpdate 2^37
+
+#
+# Cryptographic Jurisdiction Policy defaults
+#
+# Import and export control rules on cryptographic software vary from
+# country to country.  By default, Java provides two different sets of
+# cryptographic policy files[1]:
+#
+#     unlimited:  These policy files contain no restrictions on cryptographic
+#                 strengths or algorithms
+#
+#     limited:    These policy files contain more restricted cryptographic
+#                 strengths
+#
+# The default setting is determined by the value of the "crypto.policy"
+# Security property below. If your country or usage requires the
+# traditional restrictive policy, the "limited" Java cryptographic
+# policy is still available and may be appropriate for your environment.
+#
+# If you have restrictions that do not fit either use case mentioned
+# above, Java provides the capability to customize these policy files.
+# The "crypto.policy" security property points to a subdirectory
+# within <java-home>/conf/security/policy/ which can be customized.
+# Please see the <java-home>/conf/security/policy/README.txt file or consult
+# the Java Security Guide/JCA documentation for more information.
+#
+# YOU ARE ADVISED TO CONSULT YOUR EXPORT/IMPORT CONTROL COUNSEL OR ATTORNEY
+# TO DETERMINE THE EXACT REQUIREMENTS.
+#
+# [1] Please note that the JCE for Java SE, including the JCE framework,
+# cryptographic policy files, and standard JCE providers provided with
+# the Java SE, have been reviewed and approved for export as mass market
+# encryption item by the US Bureau of Industry and Security.
+#
+# Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation.
+# It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
+#
+crypto.policy=unlimited
+
+#
+# The policy for the XML Signature secure validation mode. Validation of
+# XML Signatures that violate any of these constraints will fail.
+# The mode can be enabled or disabled by setting the property
+# "org.jcp.xml.dsig.secureValidation" to Boolean.TRUE or Boolean.FALSE with
+# the javax.xml.crypto.XMLCryptoContext.setProperty() method, or by setting
+# the system property "org.jcp.xml.dsig.secureValidation" to "true" or
+# "false". Any other value for the system property is also treated as "false".
+# If the system property is set, it supersedes the XMLCryptoContext property
+# value.
+#
+# The secure validation mode is enabled by default.
+#
+#   Policy:
+#       Constraint {"," Constraint }
+#   Constraint:
+#       AlgConstraint | MaxTransformsConstraint | MaxReferencesConstraint |
+#       ReferenceUriSchemeConstraint | KeySizeConstraint | OtherConstraint
+#   AlgConstraint
+#       "disallowAlg" Uri
+#   MaxTransformsConstraint:
+#       "maxTransforms" Integer
+#   MaxReferencesConstraint:
+#       "maxReferences" Integer
+#   ReferenceUriSchemeConstraint:
+#       "disallowReferenceUriSchemes" String { String }
+#   KeySizeConstraint:
+#       "minKeySize" KeyAlg Integer
+#   OtherConstraint:
+#       "noDuplicateIds" | "noRetrievalMethodLoops"
+#
+# For AlgConstraint, Uri is the algorithm URI String that is not allowed.
+# See the XML Signature Recommendation for more information on algorithm
+# URI Identifiers. For KeySizeConstraint, KeyAlg is the standard algorithm
+# name of the key type (ex: "RSA"). If the MaxTransformsConstraint,
+# MaxReferencesConstraint or KeySizeConstraint (for the same key type) is
+# specified more than once, only the last entry is enforced.
+#
+# Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation.
+# It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
+#
+jdk.xml.dsig.secureValidationPolicy=\
+    disallowAlg http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-xslt-19991116,\
+    disallowAlg http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-md5,\
+    disallowAlg http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#hmac-md5,\
+    disallowAlg http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#md5,\
+    disallowAlg http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1,\
+    disallowAlg http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#dsa-sha1,\
+    disallowAlg http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1,\
+    disallowAlg http://www.w3.org/2007/05/xmldsig-more#sha1-rsa-MGF1,\
+    disallowAlg http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#ecdsa-sha1,\
+    maxTransforms 5,\
+    maxReferences 30,\
+    disallowReferenceUriSchemes file http https,\
+    minKeySize RSA 1024,\
+    minKeySize DSA 1024,\
+    minKeySize EC 224,\
+    noDuplicateIds,\
+    noRetrievalMethodLoops
+
+#
+# Support for the here() function
+#
+# This security property determines whether the here() XPath function is
+# supported in XML Signature generation and verification.
+#
+# If this property is set to false, the here() function is not supported.
+# Generating an XML Signature that uses the here() function will throw an
+# XMLSignatureException. Validating an existing XML Signature that uses the
+# here() function will also throw an XMLSignatureException.
+#
+# The default value for this property is true.
+#
+# Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation.
+# It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
+#
+#jdk.xml.dsig.hereFunctionSupported=true
+
+#
+# Deserialization JVM-wide filter factory
+#
+# A filter factory class name is used to configure the JVM-wide filter factory.
+# The class must be public, must have a public zero-argument constructor, implement the
+# java.util.function.BinaryOperator<java.io.ObjectInputFilter> interface, provide its
+# implementation and be accessible via the application class loader.
+# A builtin filter factory is used if no filter factory is defined.
+# See java.io.ObjectInputFilter.Config for more information.
+#
+# If the system property jdk.serialFilterFactory is also specified, it supersedes
+# the security property value defined here.
+#
+#jdk.serialFilterFactory=<classname>
+
+#
+# Deserialization JVM-wide filter
+#
+# A filter, if configured, is used by the filter factory to provide the filter used by
+# java.io.ObjectInputStream during deserialization to check the contents of the stream.
+# A filter is configured as a sequence of patterns, each pattern is either
+# matched against the name of a class in the stream or defines a limit.
+# Patterns are separated by ";" (semicolon).
+# Whitespace is significant and is considered part of the pattern.
+#
+# If the system property jdk.serialFilter is also specified, it supersedes
+# the security property value defined here.
+#
+# If a pattern includes a "=", it sets a limit.
+# If a limit appears more than once the last value is used.
+# Limits are checked before classes regardless of the order in the
+# sequence of patterns.
+# If any of the limits are exceeded, the filter status is REJECTED.
+#
+#   maxdepth=value - the maximum depth of a graph
+#   maxrefs=value  - the maximum number of internal references
+#   maxbytes=value - the maximum number of bytes in the input stream
+#   maxarray=value - the maximum array length allowed
+#
+# Other patterns, from left to right, match the class or package name as
+# returned from Class.getName.
+# If the class is an array type, the class or package to be matched is the
+# element type.
+# Arrays of any number of dimensions are treated the same as the element type.
+# For example, a pattern of "!example.Foo", rejects creation of any instance or
+# array of example.Foo.
+#
+# If the pattern starts with "!", the status is REJECTED if the remaining
+# pattern is matched; otherwise the status is ALLOWED if the pattern matches.
+# If the pattern contains "/", the non-empty prefix up to the "/" is the
+# module name;
+#   if the module name matches the module name of the class then
+#   the remaining pattern is matched with the class name.
+#   If there is no "/", the module name is not compared.
+# If the pattern ends with ".**" it matches any class in the package and all
+# subpackages.
+# If the pattern ends with ".*" it matches any class in the package.
+# If the pattern ends with "*", it matches any class with the pattern as a
+# prefix.
+# If the pattern is equal to the class name, it matches.
+# Otherwise, the status is UNDECIDED.
+#
+#jdk.serialFilter=pattern;pattern
+
+#
+# RMI Registry Serial Filter
+#
+# The filter pattern uses the same format as jdk.serialFilter.
+# This filter can override the builtin filter if additional types need to be
+# allowed or rejected from the RMI Registry or to decrease limits but not
+# to increase limits.
+# If the limits (maxdepth, maxrefs, or maxbytes) are exceeded, the object is rejected.
+#
+# Each non-array type is allowed or rejected if it matches one of the patterns,
+# evaluated from left to right, and is otherwise allowed. Arrays of any
+# component type, including subarrays and arrays of primitives, are allowed.
+#
+# Array construction of any component type, including subarrays and arrays of
+# primitives, are allowed unless the length is greater than the maxarray limit.
+# The filter is applied to each array element.
+#
+# Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation.
+# It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
+#
+# The built-in filter allows subclasses of allowed classes and
+# can approximately be represented as the pattern:
+#
+#sun.rmi.registry.registryFilter=\
+#    maxarray=1000000;\
+#    maxdepth=20;\
+#    java.lang.String;\
+#    java.lang.Number;\
+#    java.lang.reflect.Proxy;\
+#    java.rmi.Remote;\
+#    sun.rmi.server.UnicastRef;\
+#    sun.rmi.server.RMIClientSocketFactory;\
+#    sun.rmi.server.RMIServerSocketFactory;\
+#    java.rmi.server.UID
+#
+# RMI Distributed Garbage Collector (DGC) Serial Filter
+#
+# The filter pattern uses the same format as jdk.serialFilter.
+# This filter can override the builtin filter if additional types need to be
+# allowed or rejected from the RMI DGC.
+#
+# Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation.
+# It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
+#
+# The builtin DGC filter can approximately be represented as the filter pattern:
+#
+#sun.rmi.transport.dgcFilter=\
+#    java.rmi.server.ObjID;\
+#    java.rmi.server.UID;\
+#    java.rmi.dgc.VMID;\
+#    java.rmi.dgc.Lease;\
+#    maxdepth=5;maxarray=10000
+
+#
+# JCEKS Encrypted Key Serial Filter
+#
+# This filter, if configured, is used by the JCEKS KeyStore during the
+# deserialization of the encrypted Key object stored inside a key entry.
+# If not configured or the filter result is UNDECIDED (i.e. none of the patterns
+# matches), the filter configured by jdk.serialFilter will be consulted.
+#
+# If the system property jceks.key.serialFilter is also specified, it supersedes
+# the security property value defined here.
+#
+# The filter pattern uses the same format as jdk.serialFilter. The default
+# pattern allows java.lang.Enum, java.security.KeyRep, java.security.KeyRep$Type,
+# and javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec and rejects all the others.
+jceks.key.serialFilter = java.base/java.lang.Enum;java.base/java.security.KeyRep;\
+  java.base/java.security.KeyRep$Type;java.base/javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec;!*
+
+# The iteration count used for password-based encryption (PBE) in JCEKS
+# keystores. Values in the range 10000 to 5000000 are considered valid.
+# If the value is out of this range, or is not a number, or is unspecified;
+# a default of 200000 is used.
+#
+# If the system property jdk.jceks.iterationCount is also specified, it
+# supersedes the security property value defined here.
+#
+#jdk.jceks.iterationCount = 200000
+
+#
+# PKCS12 KeyStore properties
+#
+# The following properties, if configured, are used by the PKCS12 KeyStore
+# implementation during the creation of a new keystore. Several of the
+# properties may also be used when modifying an existing keystore. The
+# properties can be overridden by a KeyStore API that specifies its own
+# algorithms and parameters.
+#
+# If an existing PKCS12 keystore is loaded and then stored, the algorithm and
+# parameter used to generate the existing Mac will be reused. If the existing
+# keystore does not have a Mac, no Mac will be created while storing. If there
+# is at least one certificate in the existing keystore, the algorithm and
+# parameters used to encrypt the last certificate in the existing keystore will
+# be reused to encrypt all certificates while storing. If the last certificate
+# in the existing keystore is not encrypted, all certificates will be stored
+# unencrypted. If there is no certificate in the existing keystore, any newly
+# added certificate will be encrypted (or stored unencrypted if algorithm
+# value is "NONE") using the "keystore.pkcs12.certProtectionAlgorithm" and
+# "keystore.pkcs12.certPbeIterationCount" values defined here. Existing private
+# and secret key(s) are not changed. Newly set private and secret key(s) will
+# be encrypted using the "keystore.pkcs12.keyProtectionAlgorithm" and
+# "keystore.pkcs12.keyPbeIterationCount" values defined here.
+#
+# In order to apply new algorithms and parameters to all entries in an
+# existing keystore, one can create a new keystore and add entries in the
+# existing keystore into the new keystore. This can be achieved by calling the
+# "keytool -importkeystore" command.
+#
+# If a system property of the same name is also specified, it supersedes the
+# security property value defined here.
+#
+# If the property is set to an illegal value, an iteration count that is not
+# a positive integer, or an unknown algorithm name, an exception will be thrown
+# when the property is used. If the property is not set or empty, a default
+# value will be used.
+#
+# Some PKCS12 tools and libraries may not support algorithms based on PBES2
+# and AES. To create a PKCS12 keystore which they can load, set the system
+# property "keystore.pkcs12.legacy" which overrides the values of the properties
+# defined below with legacy algorithms. Setting this system property (which can
+# only be enabled and has no value) is equivalent to
+#
+#   -Dkeystore.pkcs12.certProtectionAlgorithm=PBEWithSHA1AndRC2_40
+#   -Dkeystore.pkcs12.keyProtectionAlgorithm=PBEWithSHA1AndDESede
+#   -Dkeystore.pkcs12.macAlgorithm=HmacPBESHA1
+#   -Dkeystore.pkcs12.certPbeIterationCount=50000
+#   -Dkeystore.pkcs12.keyPbeIterationCount=50000
+#   -Dkeystore.pkcs12.macIterationCount=100000
+#
+# Also, you can downgrade an existing PKCS12 keystore created with stronger
+# algorithms to legacy algorithms with
+#
+#    keytool -J-Dkeystore.pkcs12.legacy -importkeystore -srckeystore ks -destkeystore ks
+#
+# This system property should be used at your own risk.
+#
+# Note: These properties are currently used by the JDK Reference implementation.
+# They are not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
+
+# The algorithm used to encrypt a certificate. This can be any non-Hmac PBE
+# algorithm defined in the Cipher section of the Java Security Standard
+# Algorithm Names Specification. When set to "NONE", the certificate
+# is not encrypted. The default value is "PBEWithHmacSHA256AndAES_256".
+#keystore.pkcs12.certProtectionAlgorithm = PBEWithHmacSHA256AndAES_256
+
+# The iteration count used by the PBE algorithm when encrypting a certificate.
+# This value must be a positive integer. The default value is 10000.
+#keystore.pkcs12.certPbeIterationCount = 10000
+
+# The algorithm used to encrypt a private key or secret key. This can be
+# any non-Hmac PBE algorithm defined in the Cipher section of the Java
+# Security Standard Algorithm Names Specification. The value must not be "NONE".
+# The default value is "PBEWithHmacSHA256AndAES_256".
+#keystore.pkcs12.keyProtectionAlgorithm = PBEWithHmacSHA256AndAES_256
+
+# The iteration count used by the PBE algorithm when encrypting a private key
+# or a secret key. This value must be a positive integer. The default value
+# is 10000.
+#keystore.pkcs12.keyPbeIterationCount = 10000
+
+# The algorithm used to calculate the optional MacData at the end of a PKCS12
+# file. This can be any HmacPBE algorithm defined in the Mac section of the
+# Java Security Standard Algorithm Names Specification. When set to "NONE",
+# no Mac is generated. The default value is "HmacPBESHA256".
+#keystore.pkcs12.macAlgorithm = HmacPBESHA256
+
+# The iteration count used by the MacData algorithm. This value must be a
+# positive integer. The default value is 10000.
+#keystore.pkcs12.macIterationCount = 10000
+
+#
+# Enhanced exception message information
+#
+# By default, exception messages should not include potentially sensitive
+# information such as file names, host names, or port numbers. This property
+# accepts one or more comma separated values, each of which represents a
+# category of enhanced exception message information to enable. Values are
+# case-insensitive. Leading and trailing whitespaces, surrounding each value,
+# are ignored. Unknown values are ignored.
+#
+# NOTE: Use caution before setting this property. Setting this property
+# exposes sensitive information in Exceptions, which could, for example,
+# propagate to untrusted code or be emitted in stack traces that are
+# inadvertently disclosed and made accessible over a public network.
+#
+# The categories are:
+#
+#  hostInfo - IOExceptions thrown by java.net.Socket and the socket types in the
+#             java.nio.channels package will contain enhanced exception
+#             message information
+#
+#  jar      - enables more detailed information in the IOExceptions thrown
+#             by classes in the java.util.jar package
+#
+# The property setting in this file can be overridden by a system property of
+# the same name, with the same syntax and possible values.
+#
+#jdk.includeInExceptions=hostInfo,jar
+
+#
+# Disabled mechanisms for the Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)
+#
+# Disabled mechanisms will not be negotiated by both SASL clients and servers.
+# These mechanisms will be ignored if they are specified in the "mechanisms"
+# argument of "Sasl.createSaslClient" or the "mechanism" argument of
+# "Sasl.createSaslServer".
+#
+# The value of this property is a comma-separated list of SASL mechanisms.
+# The mechanisms are case-sensitive. Whitespaces around the commas are ignored.
+#
+# Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation.
+# It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
+#
+# Example:
+#   jdk.sasl.disabledMechanisms=PLAIN, CRAM-MD5, DIGEST-MD5
+jdk.sasl.disabledMechanisms=
+
+#
+# Policies for distrusting Certificate Authorities (CAs).
+#
+# This is a comma separated value of one or more case-sensitive strings, each
+# of which represents a policy for determining if a CA should be distrusted.
+# The supported values are:
+#
+#   SYMANTEC_TLS : Distrust TLS Server certificates anchored by a Symantec
+#   root CA and issued after April 16, 2019 unless issued by one of the
+#   following subordinate CAs which have a later distrust date:
+#     1. Apple IST CA 2 - G1, SHA-256 fingerprint:
+#        AC2B922ECFD5E01711772FEA8ED372DE9D1E2245FCE3F57A9CDBEC77296A424B
+#        Distrust after December 31, 2019.
+#     2. Apple IST CA 8 - G1, SHA-256 fingerprint:
+#        A4FE7C7F15155F3F0AEF7AAA83CF6E06DEB97CA3F909DF920AC1490882D488ED
+#        Distrust after December 31, 2019.
+#
+#   ENTRUST_TLS : Distrust TLS Server certificates anchored by
+#   an Entrust root CA and issued after November 11, 2024.
+#
+# Leading and trailing whitespace surrounding each value are ignored.
+# Unknown values are ignored. If the property is commented out or set to the
+# empty String, no policies are enforced.
+#
+# Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation.
+# It is not guaranteed to be supported by other SE implementations. Also, this
+# property does not override other security properties which can restrict
+# certificates such as jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms or
+# jdk.certpath.disabledAlgorithms; those restrictions are still enforced even
+# if this property is not enabled.
+#
+jdk.security.caDistrustPolicies=SYMANTEC_TLS,ENTRUST_TLS
+
+#
+# FilePermission path canonicalization
+#
+# This security property dictates how the path argument is processed and stored
+# while constructing a FilePermission object. If the value is set to true, the
+# path argument is canonicalized and FilePermission methods (such as implies,
+# equals, and hashCode) are implemented based on this canonicalized result.
+# Otherwise, the path argument is not canonicalized and FilePermission methods are
+# implemented based on the original input. See the implementation note of the
+# FilePermission class for more details.
+#
+# If a system property of the same name is also specified, it supersedes the
+# security property value defined here.
+#
+# The default value for this property is false.
+#
+jdk.io.permissionsUseCanonicalPath=false
+
+
+#
+# Policies for the proxy_impersonator Kerberos ccache configuration entry
+#
+# The proxy_impersonator ccache configuration entry indicates that the ccache
+# is a synthetic delegated credential for use with S4U2Proxy by an intermediate
+# server. The ccache file should also contain the TGT of this server and
+# an evidence ticket from the default principal of the ccache to this server.
+#
+# This security property determines how Java uses this configuration entry.
+# There are 3 possible values:
+#
+#  no-impersonate     - Ignore this configuration entry, and always act as
+#                       the owner of the TGT (if it exists).
+#
+#  try-impersonate    - Try impersonation when this configuration entry exists.
+#                       If no matching TGT or evidence ticket is found,
+#                       fallback to no-impersonate.
+#
+#  always-impersonate - Always impersonate when this configuration entry exists.
+#                       If no matching TGT or evidence ticket is found,
+#                       no initial credential is read from the ccache.
+#
+# The default value is "always-impersonate".
+#
+# If a system property of the same name is also specified, it supersedes the
+# security property value defined here.
+#
+#jdk.security.krb5.default.initiate.credential=always-impersonate
+
+#
+# Trust Anchor Certificates - CA Basic Constraint check
+#
+# X.509 v3 certificates used as Trust Anchors (to validate signed code or TLS
+# connections) must have the cA Basic Constraint field set to 'true'. Also, if
+# they include a Key Usage extension, the keyCertSign bit must be set. These
+# checks, enabled by default, can be disabled for backward-compatibility
+# purposes with the jdk.security.allowNonCaAnchor System and Security
+# properties. In the case that both properties are simultaneously set, the
+# System value prevails. The default value of the property is "false".
+#
+#jdk.security.allowNonCaAnchor=true
+
+#
+# The default Character set name (java.nio.charset.Charset.forName())
+# for converting TLS ALPN values between byte arrays and Strings.
+# Prior versions of the JDK may use UTF-8 as the default charset. If
+# you experience interoperability issues, setting this property to UTF-8
+# may help.
+#
+# jdk.tls.alpnCharset=UTF-8
+jdk.tls.alpnCharset=ISO_8859_1
+
+#
+# Global JNDI Object Factories Filter
+#
+# This filter is used by the JNDI runtime to control the set of object factory classes
+# which will be allowed to instantiate objects from object references returned by
+# naming/directory systems. The factory class named by the reference instance will be
+# matched against this filter. The filter property supports pattern-based filter syntax
+# with the same format as jdk.serialFilter. Limit patterns specified in the filter property
+# are unused.
+#
+# Each class name pattern is matched against the factory class name to allow or disallow its
+# instantiation. The access to a factory class is allowed if the filter returns
+# ALLOWED.
+#
+# Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation.
+# It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
+#
+# If the system property jdk.jndi.object.factoriesFilter is also specified, it supersedes
+# the security property value defined here. The default value of the property is "*".
+#
+# The default pattern value allows any object factory class specified by the reference
+# instance to recreate the referenced object.
+#jdk.jndi.object.factoriesFilter=*
+
+#
+# Protocol Specific JNDI/LDAP Object Factories Filter
+#
+# This filter is used by the JNDI/LDAP provider implementation in the JDK to further control the
+# set of object factory classes which will be allowed to instantiate objects from object
+# references bound to LDAP contexts. The factory class named by the reference instance will
+# be matched against this filter. The filter property supports pattern-based filter syntax
+# with the same format as jdk.serialFilter. Limit patterns specified in the filter property
+# are unused.
+#
+# Each class name pattern is matched against the factory class name to allow or disallow its
+# instantiation. The access to a factory class is allowed only when it is not rejected by this filter
+# or by the global filter defined by "jdk.jndi.object.factoriesFilter", and at least one of these
+# two filters returns ALLOWED.
+#
+# Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation.
+# It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
+#
+# If the system property jdk.jndi.ldap.object.factoriesFilter is also specified, it supersedes
+# the security property value defined here. The default value of the property is
+# "java.naming/com.sun.jndi.ldap.**;!*".
+#
+# The default pattern value allows any object factory class defined in the java.naming module
+# to be specified by the reference instance, but rejects any other.
+#jdk.jndi.ldap.object.factoriesFilter=java.naming/com.sun.jndi.ldap.**;!*
+
+#
+# Protocol Specific JNDI/RMI Object Factories Filter
+#
+# This filter is used by the JNDI/RMI provider implementation in the JDK to further control the
+# set of object factory classes which will be allowed to instantiate objects from object
+# references bound to RMI names. The factory class named by the reference instance will
+# be matched against this filter. The filter property supports pattern-based filter syntax
+# with the same format as jdk.serialFilter. Limit patterns specified in the filter property
+# are unused.
+#
+# Each class name pattern is matched against the factory class name to allow or disallow its
+# instantiation. The access to a factory class is allowed only when it is not rejected by this filter
+# or by the global filter defined by "jdk.jndi.object.factoriesFilter", and at least one of these
+# two filters returns ALLOWED.
+#
+# Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation.
+# It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
+#
+# If the system property jdk.jndi.rmi.object.factoriesFilter is also specified, it supersedes
+# the security property value defined here. The default value of the property is
+# "jdk.naming.rmi/com.sun.jndi.rmi.**;!*".
+#
+# The default pattern value allows any object factory class defined in the jdk.naming.rmi module
+# to be specified by the reference instance, but rejects any other.
+#jdk.jndi.rmi.object.factoriesFilter=jdk.naming.rmi/com.sun.jndi.rmi.**;!*
+
+#
+# Policy for non-forwardable service ticket in a S4U2proxy request
+#
+# The Service for User to Proxy (S4U2proxy) Kerberos extension enables a middle service
+# to obtain a service ticket to another service on behalf of a user. It requires that
+# the user's service ticket to the first service has the forwardable flag set [1].
+# However, some KDC implementations ignore this requirement and accept service tickets
+# with the flag unset.
+#
+# If this security property is set to "true", then
+#
+# 1) The user service ticket, when obtained by the middle service after a S4U2self
+#    impersonation, is not required to have the forwardable flag set; and,
+#
+# 2) If a S4U2proxy request receives a KRB_ERROR of the KDC_ERR_BADOPTION error code
+#    and the ticket to the middle service is not forwardable, OpenJDK will try the same
+#    request with another KDC instead of treating it as a fatal failure.
+#
+# The default value is "false".
+#
+# If a system property of the same name is also specified, it supersedes the
+# security property value defined here.
+#
+# [1] https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-sfu/bde93b0e-f3c9-4ddf-9f44-e1453be7af5a
+#jdk.security.krb5.s4u2proxy.acceptNonForwardableServiceTicket=false