tribunal-kit 9.2.4 → 9.2.5

package/skills/api-patterns/SKILL.md

@@ -1,218 +1,218 @@
----
-name: api-patterns
-description: "Use when API design mastery. REST, GraphQL, tRPC, and gRPC selection. Request/response design, pagination (cursor/offset), filtering, versioning, rate limiting, error formats (RFC 9457), authentication (JWT/OAuth2/API keys), idempotency, file uploads, webhooks, and OpenAPI documentation. Use when designing APIs, choosing protocols, or implementing API standards."
-version: 5.0.0
-last-updated: 2026-09-13
-skills:
-  - api-security-auditor
-  - backend-security-expert
-  - schema-reviewer
-tools: Read, Grep, Glob, Bash, Edit, Write
-scripts-binding:
-  - .agent/scripts/lint_runner.js
-  - .agent/scripts/verify_all.js
----
-
-# API Patterns — Design & Protocol Mastery
-
----
-
-## 🛠️ Technical Architecture & Reference Recipes
-
----
-
-## Hallucination Traps (Read First)
-
-- ❌ JWT in URL query params → ✅ `Authorization: Bearer` header only. Query params get logged in server access logs.
-- ❌ Assuming JWT is encrypted → ✅ JWT is base64-encoded (NOT encrypted). Anyone can decode it. Never put secrets/PII in the payload.
-- ❌ Offset pagination on large tables → ✅ `OFFSET 100000` scans and discards 100K rows. Use cursor pagination for tables > 10K rows.
-- ❌ Verbs in REST URLs (`/api/getUsers`) → ✅ Nouns only (`GET /api/users`). HTTP method IS the verb.
-- ❌ `POST` is idempotent → ✅ `POST` is NOT idempotent — requires `Idempotency-Key` header for safe retries.
-- ❌ GraphQL has no security risks → ✅ Deeply nested queries are a DoS vector. Set max depth, query cost limits. Disable introspection in production.
-
----
-
-## Protocol Selection Matrix
-
-| Protocol      | Use When                                                                              |
-| ------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| **REST**      | Public APIs, 3rd-party consumers, standard CRUD, HTTP caching                         |
-| **GraphQL**   | Complex nested data, multiple clients, flexible queries, mobile bandwidth sensitivity |
-| **tRPC**      | Full-stack TypeScript (Next.js monorepo), shared types, no codegen                    |
-| **gRPC**      | Internal microservices, high-throughput, streaming, binary protocol                   |
-| **WebSocket** | Bidirectional real-time (chat, gaming, live collaboration)                            |
-| **SSE**       | Server-to-client streaming only (AI token streaming, live feeds)                      |
-
----
-
-## REST Design
-
-### URL Conventions
-
-```
-✅  GET    /api/v1/users              list users
-✅  GET    /api/v1/users/123          get user by ID
-✅  POST   /api/v1/users              create user
-✅  PATCH  /api/v1/users/123          partial update
-✅  DELETE /api/v1/users/123          delete user
-✅  GET    /api/v1/users/123/posts    nested resource
-
-❌  /api/getUsers   /api/createUser   /api/user (singular)   /api/Users (uppercase)
-```
-
-### HTTP Status Codes
-
-```
-200 OK             → GET / PUT / PATCH success
-201 Created        → POST success (include Location: /api/v1/users/123 header)
-204 No Content     → DELETE success
-400 Bad Request    → Malformed request / missing fields
-401 Unauthorized   → Missing or invalid authentication
-403 Forbidden      → Authenticated but not authorized
-404 Not Found      → Resource does not exist
-409 Conflict       → Duplicate resource (email already exists)
-422 Unprocessable  → Valid JSON, semantically invalid data
-429 Too Many Req   → Rate limit exceeded
-500 Internal       → Unhandled server error — NEVER expose stack traces
-```
-
-### Response Envelope
-
-```typescript
-interface ApiResponse<T> {
-  data: T;
-  meta?: Record<string, unknown>;
-}
-
-interface ApiError {
-  error: {
-    code: string; // machine-readable: "VALIDATION_ERROR"
-    message: string; // human-readable: "Email is already in use"
-    details?: Array<{ field: string; message: string }>; // field-level errors
-    requestId?: string; // for support/tracing
-  };
-}
-```
-
----
-
-## Pagination
-
-```typescript
-// ✅ Cursor-based — required for large/dynamic datasets
-// GET /api/v1/posts?cursor=eyJpZCI6MTAwfQ&limit=20
-const posts = await db.post.findMany({
-  where: { id: { lt: decodeCursor(req.query.cursor).id } },
-  orderBy: { id: 'desc' },
-  take: limit + 1, // fetch one extra to determine hasMore
-});
-const hasMore = posts.length > limit;
-if (hasMore) posts.pop();
-return { data: posts, meta: { hasMore, nextCursor: encodeCursor(posts.at(-1)) } };
-
-// Offset-based — only for small datasets where users need page jumping
-// GET /api/v1/posts?page=3&limit=20
-// ❌ TRAP: OFFSET 100000 scans and discards 100K rows — degrades badly at scale
-```
-
----
-
-## Idempotency
-
-```typescript
-// POST /api/v1/payments with header: Idempotency-Key: <uuid>
-app.post('/api/v1/payments', async (req, res) => {
-  const key = req.headers['idempotency-key'];
-  if (!key) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Missing Idempotency-Key' });
-
-  const cached = await redis.get(`idempotency:${key}`);
-  if (cached) return res.status(200).json(JSON.parse(cached));
-
-  const result = await processPayment(req.body);
-  await redis.set(`idempotency:${key}`, JSON.stringify(result), 'EX', 86400);
-  return res.status(201).json(result);
-});
-// GET, PUT, DELETE → naturally idempotent (safe to retry without a key)
-// POST, PATCH      → NOT idempotent by default — require Idempotency-Key
-```
-
----
-
-## Webhooks
-
-```typescript
-// HMAC signature verification (always verify — never trust unsigned webhooks)
-import { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
-function verify(payload: string, signature: string, secret: string): boolean {
-  const expected = createHmac('sha256', secret).update(payload).digest('hex');
-  return timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(signature), Buffer.from(expected));
-}
-
-app.post('/webhooks', (req, res) => {
-  if (
-    !verify(JSON.stringify(req.body), req.headers['x-webhook-signature'] as string, WEBHOOK_SECRET)
-  )
-    return res.status(401).send('Invalid signature');
-  res.status(200).send('OK'); // respond immediately
-  processWebhookAsync(req.body); // process asynchronously
-});
-// Retry policy: 3 retries with exponential backoff (1s → 10s → 100s)
-// Include unique event ID in payload for receiver-side deduplication
-```
-
----
-
-## Versioning
-
-```
-URL path (recommended):  /api/v1/users      → simplest, most common, cache-friendly
-Header:                  Accept: application/vnd.api.v1+json
-Query param:             /api/users?version=1 → messy, avoid
-
-Rules:
-  - Start at v1, never v0
-  - Breaking changes = new major version (v2)
-  - Non-breaking additions (new optional fields) do NOT need a version bump
-  - Deprecate before removing — give consumers 6+ months notice
-```
-
----
-
-## Rate Limiting
-
-```
-Strategy         How                          When
-Token bucket   → Burst allowed, refills       Most APIs (recommended)
-Sliding window → Smooth distribution          Strict fairness required
-Fixed window   → Simple counter per period    Basic needs only
-
-Response headers to always include:
-  X-RateLimit-Limit        (max requests in window)
-  X-RateLimit-Remaining    (requests left)
-  X-RateLimit-Reset        (Unix timestamp when limit resets)
-  Retry-After              (seconds to wait on 429)
-```
-
----
-
-## GraphQL Security
-
-```
-Protect against:
-  Depth attacks    → Set max query depth (typically 7–10)
-  Cost attacks     → Calculate query complexity score, reject > threshold
-  Batch abuse      → Limit batch size / alias count
-  Introspection    → Disable in production (exposes full schema to attackers)
-```
-
----
-
-## Authentication Selection
-
-| Pattern                                         | Best For                               |
-| ----------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------- |
-| **JWT** (short-lived access + httpOnly refresh) | Stateless services, microservices      |
-| **Session**                                     | Traditional server-rendered apps       |
-| **OAuth 2.0 / OIDC**                            | Third-party login, delegated access    |
-| **API Key**                                     | Server-to-server, public API consumers |
-| **Passkey (WebAuthn)**                          | Modern passwordless (2026+)            |
+---
+name: api-patterns
+description: "Use when API design mastery. REST, GraphQL, tRPC, and gRPC selection. Request/response design, pagination (cursor/offset), filtering, versioning, rate limiting, error formats (RFC 9457), authentication (JWT/OAuth2/API keys), idempotency, file uploads, webhooks, and OpenAPI documentation. Use when designing APIs, choosing protocols, or implementing API standards."
+version: 5.0.0
+last-updated: 2026-09-13
+skills:
+  - api-security-auditor
+  - backend-security-expert
+  - schema-reviewer
+tools: Read, Grep, Glob, Bash, Edit, Write
+scripts-binding:
+  - .agent/scripts/lint_runner.js
+  - .agent/scripts/verify_all.js
+---
+
+# API Patterns — Design & Protocol Mastery
+
+---
+
+## 🛠️ Technical Architecture & Reference Recipes
+
+---
+
+## Hallucination Traps (Read First)
+
+- ❌ JWT in URL query params → ✅ `Authorization: Bearer` header only. Query params get logged in server access logs.
+- ❌ Assuming JWT is encrypted → ✅ JWT is base64-encoded (NOT encrypted). Anyone can decode it. Never put secrets/PII in the payload.
+- ❌ Offset pagination on large tables → ✅ `OFFSET 100000` scans and discards 100K rows. Use cursor pagination for tables > 10K rows.
+- ❌ Verbs in REST URLs (`/api/getUsers`) → ✅ Nouns only (`GET /api/users`). HTTP method IS the verb.
+- ❌ `POST` is idempotent → ✅ `POST` is NOT idempotent — requires `Idempotency-Key` header for safe retries.
+- ❌ GraphQL has no security risks → ✅ Deeply nested queries are a DoS vector. Set max depth, query cost limits. Disable introspection in production.
+
+---
+
+## Protocol Selection Matrix
+
+| Protocol      | Use When                                                                              |
+| ------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| **REST**      | Public APIs, 3rd-party consumers, standard CRUD, HTTP caching                         |
+| **GraphQL**   | Complex nested data, multiple clients, flexible queries, mobile bandwidth sensitivity |
+| **tRPC**      | Full-stack TypeScript (Next.js monorepo), shared types, no codegen                    |
+| **gRPC**      | Internal microservices, high-throughput, streaming, binary protocol                   |
+| **WebSocket** | Bidirectional real-time (chat, gaming, live collaboration)                            |
+| **SSE**       | Server-to-client streaming only (AI token streaming, live feeds)                      |
+
+---
+
+## REST Design
+
+### URL Conventions
+
+```
+✅  GET    /api/v1/users              list users
+✅  GET    /api/v1/users/123          get user by ID
+✅  POST   /api/v1/users              create user
+✅  PATCH  /api/v1/users/123          partial update
+✅  DELETE /api/v1/users/123          delete user
+✅  GET    /api/v1/users/123/posts    nested resource
+
+❌  /api/getUsers   /api/createUser   /api/user (singular)   /api/Users (uppercase)
+```
+
+### HTTP Status Codes
+
+```
+200 OK             → GET / PUT / PATCH success
+201 Created        → POST success (include Location: /api/v1/users/123 header)
+204 No Content     → DELETE success
+400 Bad Request    → Malformed request / missing fields
+401 Unauthorized   → Missing or invalid authentication
+403 Forbidden      → Authenticated but not authorized
+404 Not Found      → Resource does not exist
+409 Conflict       → Duplicate resource (email already exists)
+422 Unprocessable  → Valid JSON, semantically invalid data
+429 Too Many Req   → Rate limit exceeded
+500 Internal       → Unhandled server error — NEVER expose stack traces
+```
+
+### Response Envelope
+
+```typescript
+interface ApiResponse<T> {
+  data: T;
+  meta?: Record<string, unknown>;
+}
+
+interface ApiError {
+  error: {
+    code: string; // machine-readable: "VALIDATION_ERROR"
+    message: string; // human-readable: "Email is already in use"
+    details?: Array<{ field: string; message: string }>; // field-level errors
+    requestId?: string; // for support/tracing
+  };
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+## Pagination
+
+```typescript
+// ✅ Cursor-based — required for large/dynamic datasets
+// GET /api/v1/posts?cursor=eyJpZCI6MTAwfQ&limit=20
+const posts = await db.post.findMany({
+  where: { id: { lt: decodeCursor(req.query.cursor).id } },
+  orderBy: { id: 'desc' },
+  take: limit + 1, // fetch one extra to determine hasMore
+});
+const hasMore = posts.length > limit;
+if (hasMore) posts.pop();
+return { data: posts, meta: { hasMore, nextCursor: encodeCursor(posts.at(-1)) } };
+
+// Offset-based — only for small datasets where users need page jumping
+// GET /api/v1/posts?page=3&limit=20
+// ❌ TRAP: OFFSET 100000 scans and discards 100K rows — degrades badly at scale
+```
+
+---
+
+## Idempotency
+
+```typescript
+// POST /api/v1/payments with header: Idempotency-Key: <uuid>
+app.post('/api/v1/payments', async (req, res) => {
+  const key = req.headers['idempotency-key'];
+  if (!key) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Missing Idempotency-Key' });
+
+  const cached = await redis.get(`idempotency:${key}`);
+  if (cached) return res.status(200).json(JSON.parse(cached));
+
+  const result = await processPayment(req.body);
+  await redis.set(`idempotency:${key}`, JSON.stringify(result), 'EX', 86400);
+  return res.status(201).json(result);
+});
+// GET, PUT, DELETE → naturally idempotent (safe to retry without a key)
+// POST, PATCH      → NOT idempotent by default — require Idempotency-Key
+```
+
+---
+
+## Webhooks
+
+```typescript
+// HMAC signature verification (always verify — never trust unsigned webhooks)
+import { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
+function verify(payload: string, signature: string, secret: string): boolean {
+  const expected = createHmac('sha256', secret).update(payload).digest('hex');
+  return timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(signature), Buffer.from(expected));
+}
+
+app.post('/webhooks', (req, res) => {
+  if (
+    !verify(JSON.stringify(req.body), req.headers['x-webhook-signature'] as string, WEBHOOK_SECRET)
+  )
+    return res.status(401).send('Invalid signature');
+  res.status(200).send('OK'); // respond immediately
+  processWebhookAsync(req.body); // process asynchronously
+});
+// Retry policy: 3 retries with exponential backoff (1s → 10s → 100s)
+// Include unique event ID in payload for receiver-side deduplication
+```
+
+---
+
+## Versioning
+
+```
+URL path (recommended):  /api/v1/users      → simplest, most common, cache-friendly
+Header:                  Accept: application/vnd.api.v1+json
+Query param:             /api/users?version=1 → messy, avoid
+
+Rules:
+  - Start at v1, never v0
+  - Breaking changes = new major version (v2)
+  - Non-breaking additions (new optional fields) do NOT need a version bump
+  - Deprecate before removing — give consumers 6+ months notice
+```
+
+---
+
+## Rate Limiting
+
+```
+Strategy         How                          When
+Token bucket   → Burst allowed, refills       Most APIs (recommended)
+Sliding window → Smooth distribution          Strict fairness required
+Fixed window   → Simple counter per period    Basic needs only
+
+Response headers to always include:
+  X-RateLimit-Limit        (max requests in window)
+  X-RateLimit-Remaining    (requests left)
+  X-RateLimit-Reset        (Unix timestamp when limit resets)
+  Retry-After              (seconds to wait on 429)
+```
+
+---
+
+## GraphQL Security
+
+```
+Protect against:
+  Depth attacks    → Set max query depth (typically 7–10)
+  Cost attacks     → Calculate query complexity score, reject > threshold
+  Batch abuse      → Limit batch size / alias count
+  Introspection    → Disable in production (exposes full schema to attackers)
+```
+
+---
+
+## Authentication Selection
+
+| Pattern                                         | Best For                               |
+| ----------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------- |
+| **JWT** (short-lived access + httpOnly refresh) | Stateless services, microservices      |
+| **Session**                                     | Traditional server-rendered apps       |
+| **OAuth 2.0 / OIDC**                            | Third-party login, delegated access    |
+| **API Key**                                     | Server-to-server, public API consumers |
+| **Passkey (WebAuthn)**                          | Modern passwordless (2026+)            |