toolfunnel 0.7.0 → 0.7.1

package/SECURITY.md

@@ -1,84 +1,84 @@
-# Security Policy
-
-ToolFunnel sits between MCP clients and MCP servers - it gates, filters, and forwards
-tool calls. That makes its security surface worth taking seriously, and reports are
-genuinely welcome.
-
-## Reporting a vulnerability
-
-**Please use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting:** go to the
-[Security tab](https://github.com/Rendeverance/toolfunnel/security) → **Report a
-vulnerability**. That opens a private thread with the maintainer - nothing is public
-until a fix is out.
-
-Please **do not** open a public issue for a security-sensitive report. If you're unsure
-whether something is security-relevant, please err on the side of the private route.
-
-## What counts
-
-Anything that lets a client or upstream server do what the configuration says it
-shouldn't. For example:
-
-- Bypassing the tool gate / hidden-tool filtering (`tf_tool_set`, expose config)
-- Auth bypass in the HTTP transport or OAuth resource-server validation
-- Token or credential leakage (in logs, error messages, or forwarded traffic)
-- Escaping the PreToolUse deny-hook
-- Injection via tool names, schemas, or forwarded arguments
-
-Bugs that crash ToolFunnel but don't cross a trust boundary are ordinary bugs -
-public issues are fine for those.
-
-## What to expect
-
-This is a single-maintainer project. Reports get a response on a best-effort basis -
-normally within a few days. Confirmed vulnerabilities are fixed as a priority, and
-you'll be credited in the release notes unless you'd rather not be.
-
-## Supported versions
-
-Only the latest published release (`npm install toolfunnel`) is supported with
-security fixes.
-
-## Trust model
-
-**The config home is the trust boundary.** Anyone who can write the config home
-(`tools/`, `mcp/`, `hooks/`, `auth/`, `toolfunnel.json`) can define register tools, hooks,
-and upstream commands that execute with the gateway process's privileges. Protect it with
-filesystem permissions like you would a crontab or a shell profile.
-
-Everything else follows from that line:
-
-- **Upstream MCP servers are operator-chosen code.** Attaching or wrapping a server means
-  trusting it with whatever its command can reach. In funnel mode the gateway *refuses*
-  upstream arguments, working directories, and code-loading environment variables that
-  reference paths outside the config home. The per-upstream opt-outs are explicit, and each
-  is wider than a single check: `allowOutsidePaths` lifts the outside-path refusal for
-  everything path-shaped that upstream carries - its arguments (including the value after
-  `=` in a `--flag=value` form), the working directory its bare arguments resolve against,
-  and its path-list environment variables; `allowCodeLoadingEnv` permits the code-loading
-  environment class (`NODE_OPTIONS`, `NODE_PATH`, and their equivalents for other runtimes)
-  on its own. Wrap mode permits outside paths with a security notice, because serving your
-  real files is usually the point of a wrapped server. The guard is a tripwire for configs that quietly reach
-  outside an auditable config home - not a sandbox against an untrusted pack author:
-  installing a pack is installing software.
-- **The network surface binds loopback by default** (HTTP, SSE, and the web UI), validates
-  the `Origin` header against loopback origins, and enforces the protocol-version
-  and parameter-mirroring header rules of the 2026-07-28 revision. Exposing the port beyond
-  localhost is an operator decision; put OAuth 2.1 (opt-in) or your own reverse proxy in
-  front of it if you do.
-- **Zero runtime dependencies** - the supply-chain audit surface is this repository's own
-  code (OAuth, if enabled, adds exactly one audited library: `jose`).
-- **An unreadable gate decision is a deny.** A hook that floods its output past the cap, whose
-  decision JSON cannot be parsed, or whose decision slot carries a value outside the exact
-  protocol vocabulary (a miscased `"DENY"`, a synonym like `"denied"`, the right word in the
-  wrong slot, a wrong type) blocks the call it was gating rather than waving it through. A hook
-  matcher that does not compile is the same class: it is refused at authoring, and one already
-  in the manifest denies every tool-bearing call of its event until fixed. A `null` in a
-  protocol slot is NOT an attempt - it reads as "no value", exactly like an absent key, and
-  falls through. The deliberate exception: a hook script that CRASHES, is MISSING, or HANGS
-  past its timeout is a non-blocking error and the call proceeds - Claude Code hook parity, so
-  a script-execution failure cannot take every tool offline. An authored-config defect (the
-  matcher, the decision vocabulary) gets no such grace: the author wrote a gate the runner
-  cannot read, and it denies until corrected. Denies are `exit 2`; a gate that cannot reach a
-  decision should exit 2 explicitly rather than error out. Pinned by
-  `test/gate-semantics.test.js` and `test/matcher-compile.test.js`.
+# Security Policy
+
+ToolFunnel sits between MCP clients and MCP servers - it gates, filters, and forwards
+tool calls. That makes its security surface worth taking seriously, and reports are
+genuinely welcome.
+
+## Reporting a vulnerability
+
+**Please use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting:** go to the
+[Security tab](https://github.com/Rendeverance/toolfunnel/security) → **Report a
+vulnerability**. That opens a private thread with the maintainer - nothing is public
+until a fix is out.
+
+Please **do not** open a public issue for a security-sensitive report. If you're unsure
+whether something is security-relevant, please err on the side of the private route.
+
+## What counts
+
+Anything that lets a client or upstream server do what the configuration says it
+shouldn't. For example:
+
+- Bypassing the tool gate / hidden-tool filtering (`tf_tool_set`, expose config)
+- Auth bypass in the HTTP transport or OAuth resource-server validation
+- Token or credential leakage (in logs, error messages, or forwarded traffic)
+- Escaping the PreToolUse deny-hook
+- Injection via tool names, schemas, or forwarded arguments
+
+Bugs that crash ToolFunnel but don't cross a trust boundary are ordinary bugs -
+public issues are fine for those.
+
+## What to expect
+
+This is a single-maintainer project. Reports get a response on a best-effort basis -
+normally within a few days. Confirmed vulnerabilities are fixed as a priority, and
+you'll be credited in the release notes unless you'd rather not be.
+
+## Supported versions
+
+Only the latest published release (`npm install toolfunnel`) is supported with
+security fixes.
+
+## Trust model
+
+**The config home is the trust boundary.** Anyone who can write the config home
+(`tools/`, `mcp/`, `hooks/`, `auth/`, `toolfunnel.json`) can define register tools, hooks,
+and upstream commands that execute with the gateway process's privileges. Protect it with
+filesystem permissions like you would a crontab or a shell profile.
+
+Everything else follows from that line:
+
+- **Upstream MCP servers are operator-chosen code.** Attaching or wrapping a server means
+  trusting it with whatever its command can reach. In funnel mode the gateway *refuses*
+  upstream arguments, working directories, and code-loading environment variables that
+  reference paths outside the config home. The per-upstream opt-outs are explicit, and each
+  is wider than a single check: `allowOutsidePaths` lifts the outside-path refusal for
+  everything path-shaped that upstream carries - its arguments (including the value after
+  `=` in a `--flag=value` form), the working directory its bare arguments resolve against,
+  and its path-list environment variables; `allowCodeLoadingEnv` permits the code-loading
+  environment class (`NODE_OPTIONS`, `NODE_PATH`, and their equivalents for other runtimes)
+  on its own. Wrap mode permits outside paths with a security notice, because serving your
+  real files is usually the point of a wrapped server. The guard is a tripwire for configs that quietly reach
+  outside an auditable config home - not a sandbox against an untrusted pack author:
+  installing a pack is installing software.
+- **The network surface binds loopback by default** (HTTP, SSE, and the web UI), validates
+  the `Origin` header against loopback origins, and enforces the protocol-version
+  and parameter-mirroring header rules of the 2026-07-28 revision. Exposing the port beyond
+  localhost is an operator decision; put OAuth 2.1 (opt-in) or your own reverse proxy in
+  front of it if you do.
+- **Zero runtime dependencies** - the supply-chain audit surface is this repository's own
+  code (OAuth, if enabled, adds exactly one audited library: `jose`).
+- **An unreadable gate decision is a deny.** A hook that floods its output past the cap, whose
+  decision JSON cannot be parsed, or whose decision slot carries a value outside the exact
+  protocol vocabulary (a miscased `"DENY"`, a synonym like `"denied"`, the right word in the
+  wrong slot, a wrong type) blocks the call it was gating rather than waving it through. A hook
+  matcher that does not compile is the same class: it is refused at authoring, and one already
+  in the manifest denies every tool-bearing call of its event until fixed. A `null` in a
+  protocol slot is NOT an attempt - it reads as "no value", exactly like an absent key, and
+  falls through. The deliberate exception: a hook script that CRASHES, is MISSING, or HANGS
+  past its timeout is a non-blocking error and the call proceeds - Claude Code hook parity, so
+  a script-execution failure cannot take every tool offline. An authored-config defect (the
+  matcher, the decision vocabulary) gets no such grace: the author wrote a gate the runner
+  cannot read, and it denies until corrected. Denies are `exit 2`; a gate that cannot reach a
+  decision should exit 2 explicitly rather than error out. Pinned by
+  `test/gate-semantics.test.js` and `test/matcher-compile.test.js`.