toolfunnel 0.7.0 → 0.7.1

package/src/core/hook-runner.js

@@ -1,566 +1,566 @@
-'use strict';
-
-/**
- * hook-runner.js - run ONE command hook and return a structured result.
- *
- * Contract: the two output protocols and the exact result shape are specified below and pinned by
- * test/gate.test.js + test/hook-runner-bounds.test.js. This module is backend-agnostic and has
- * ZERO host-framework imports so it runs headless under `node --test`.
- *
- * Hard guarantee: runHook NEVER rejects. A spawn failure or a timeout always
- * resolves with the full result object (exitCode:-1, timedOut set appropriately,
- * blocked:false).
- */
-
-const { spawn, execFile } = require('node:child_process');
-const reaper = require('./child-reaper');
-const path = require('node:path');
-
-// Default HOOKS_DIR: <root>/src/hooks. __dirname is <root>/src/core, so up one.
-const DEFAULT_HOOKS_DIR = path.resolve(__dirname, '..', 'hooks');
-
-// Events whose exit-0 stdout is treated as injected context (the exit-code protocol's injection half).
-const INJECTABLE_EVENTS = new Set(['SessionStart', 'UserPromptSubmit']);
-
-// Returned by tryParseJsonProtocol when stdout was clearly meant to be a protocol object (it opens
-// with '{') but does not parse. This is DISTINCT from null: null means "no protocol was attempted,
-// use the exit-code protocol", whereas this means "a decision was attempted but could not be read".
-// The two must be handled differently - an unreadable decision fails closed, the same as output
-// past the cap, so a decision that loses a character is never mistaken for "allow".
-const CORRUPT_PROTOCOL = Symbol('corrupt-protocol');
-
-// Output ceilings. A hook's decision is a small JSON object and its diagnostics are a few lines;
-// anything approaching these is a runaway, and accumulating it unbounded would OOM the gateway
-// itself. Hitting either cap is treated as a WIRING FAILURE and fails closed (see the accumulator
-// and the close handler) - an unreadable decision must never pass for "allow".
-const MAX_STDOUT_BYTES = 1024 * 1024; // 1 MiB
-const MAX_STDERR_BYTES = 256 * 1024; //  256 KiB
-
-/**
- * Decide whether a parsed stdout object should be treated as the JSON
- * protocol. We only switch to the JSON interpretation when the object actually
- * carries one of the protocol's known keys - otherwise an arbitrary JSON blob a
- * hook happens to print should fall through to the exit-code protocol ("the
- * exit-code protocol wins if stdout is not valid JSON").
- *
- * @param {*} parsed
- * @returns {boolean}
- */
-function isKnownJsonProtocol(parsed) {
-  if (parsed === null || typeof parsed !== 'object' || Array.isArray(parsed)) {
-    return false;
-  }
-  return (
-    Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(parsed, 'continue') ||
-    Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(parsed, 'decision') ||
-    Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(parsed, 'reason') ||
-    Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(parsed, 'hookSpecificOutput')
-  );
-}
-
-/**
- * Try to parse stdout as the JSON protocol. Returns the parsed object if it is
- * valid JSON AND carries known protocol keys; CORRUPT_PROTOCOL if stdout opened
- * with '{' (a protocol object was attempted) but did not parse; otherwise null
- * (no protocol attempt - use the exit-code protocol).
- *
- * @param {string} stdout
- * @returns {object|symbol|null}
- */
-function tryParseJsonProtocol(stdout) {
-  const trimmed = (stdout || '').trim();
-  if (!trimmed) return null;
-  // Cheap pre-check: protocol output is always a JSON object. Anything not opening with '{' made
-  // no protocol attempt and belongs to the exit-code protocol (arbitrary text a hook prints).
-  if (trimmed[0] !== '{') return null;
-  let parsed;
-  try {
-    parsed = JSON.parse(trimmed);
-  } catch (_e) {
-    // Opened with '{' but is not valid JSON: an attempted decision that could not be read. Signal
-    // CORRUPT (fail closed) rather than null - falling through to exit-code here would let a
-    // truncated or malformed deny be read as "allow".
-    return CORRUPT_PROTOCOL;
-  }
-  return isKnownJsonProtocol(parsed) ? parsed : null;
-}
-
-/**
- * Run a single command hook.
- *
- * @param {object} hookSpec  Resolved spec: { id, event, command, timeout(seconds), ... }.
- * @param {object} payload   The stdin JSON object (built by events.js buildPayload).
- * @param {object} [opts]
- * @param {string} [opts.cwd]              child working directory.
- * @param {object} [opts.env]             extra env merged over process.env.
- * @param {string} [opts.projectDir]      value for CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR.
- * @param {string} [opts.hooksDir]        value for HOOKS_DIR (default <root>/src/hooks).
- * @param {AbortSignal} [opts.signal]      external cancellation; aborts the child.
- * @returns {Promise<object>}  the full result shape. Never rejects.
- */
-function runHook(hookSpec, payload, opts = {}) {
-  return new Promise((resolve) => {
-    const started = Date.now();
-
-    const id = hookSpec && hookSpec.id != null ? hookSpec.id : null;
-    const event = hookSpec && hookSpec.event != null ? hookSpec.event : null;
-
-    // Build the immutable base of every result so any early exit is well-formed.
-    const baseResult = () => ({
-      id,
-      event,
-      exitCode: -1,
-      timedOut: false,
-      stdout: '',
-      stderr: '',
-      blocked: false,
-      stopLoop: false,
-      reason: null,
-      inject: null,
-      durationMs: 0,
-    });
-
-    // Guard: a malformed spec must not throw out of the runner (the never-reject guarantee).
-    if (!hookSpec || typeof hookSpec.command !== 'string' || hookSpec.command.length === 0) {
-      const r = baseResult();
-      r.stderr = 'hook-runner: invalid hookSpec (missing command)';
-      r.durationMs = Date.now() - started;
-      resolve(r);
-      return;
-    }
-
-    // timeout is stored in SECONDS in the manifest -> convert to ms.
-    // Fall back to a sane default if absent or non-positive.
-    const timeoutSec =
-      typeof hookSpec.timeout === 'number' && hookSpec.timeout > 0 ? hookSpec.timeout : 60;
-    const timeoutMs = timeoutSec * 1000;
-
-    // Child env: inherit process.env, layer opts.env, then set the two paths the
-    // hook scripts rely on to resolve themselves.
-    const hooksDir = opts.hooksDir || (opts.env && opts.env.HOOKS_DIR) || DEFAULT_HOOKS_DIR;
-    const projectDir =
-      opts.projectDir ||
-      (opts.env && opts.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR) ||
-      process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR ||
-      // Project root is two levels above the hooks dir (<root>/src/hooks -> <root>).
-      path.resolve(hooksDir, '..', '..');
-
-    const childEnv = Object.assign({}, process.env, opts.env || {}, {
-      CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR: projectDir,
-      HOOKS_DIR: hooksDir,
-    });
-
-    // Own AbortController so we can enforce the timeout via kill, and chain any
-    // externally-supplied signal so the engine can cancel us too. The abort path RESOLVES
-    // immediately, exactly like the timeout: it must not depend on 'close', which a surviving
-    // grandchild holding inherited pipes can withhold forever (the same reasoning that moved
-    // the timeout onto its timer).
-    const onExternalAbort = () => {
-      timedOut = true;
-      killChildTree();
-      const r = baseResult();
-      r.stdout = stdout;
-      r.stderr = stderr || 'hook-runner: aborted by caller signal';
-      r.timedOut = true; // exitCode -1, blocked false - the caller cancelled, same class as a timeout
-      finish(r);
-    };
-    const controller = new AbortController();
-    if (opts.signal) {
-      if (opts.signal.aborted) controller.abort();
-      else opts.signal.addEventListener('abort', onExternalAbort, { once: true });
-    }
-
-    let child;
-    try {
-      child = spawn(hookSpec.command, {
-        shell: true, // run as a shell command line (bash/PowerShell-launched scripts)
-        cwd: opts.cwd || undefined,
-        env: childEnv,
-        signal: controller.signal,
-        windowsHide: true,
-        // POSIX: give the shell its OWN PROCESS GROUP so killChildTree can tear down the
-        // grandchildren too (see the comment there - killing the shell alone orphans them and
-        // they hold the stdio pipes open forever). Windows has no process groups in this sense
-        // and uses taskkill /T instead; `detached` there only suppresses a console window, which
-        // windowsHide already covers, so it stays off to keep Windows behaviour byte-identical.
-        detached: process.platform !== 'win32',
-      });
-      // Last-resort sweep: if the gateway dies without running killChildTree (crash, signal),
-      // the reaper's exit handler kills whatever is still tracked - detached children have left
-      // our session and would otherwise run to their natural end unsupervised.
-      reaper.track(child);
-    } catch (err) {
-      // Synchronous spawn failure (rare). Resolve, never throw.
-      cleanupSignal();
-      const r = baseResult();
-      r.stderr = `hook-runner: spawn failed: ${err && err.message ? err.message : String(err)}`;
-      r.durationMs = Date.now() - started;
-      resolve(r);
-      return;
-    }
-
-    let stdout = '';
-    let stderr = '';
-    let timedOut = false;
-    let settled = false;
-    let outputCapped = null; // 'stdout' | 'stderr' once a cap was hit (fail-closed trigger)
-
-    // Kill the WHOLE child tree. Killing the shell (cmd.exe / sh) does NOT kill its node/bash
-    // grandchildren - they orphan and hold the stdio pipes open, which prevents the parent
-    // process (and node:test) from ever exiting. Both platforms need a TREE kill, by their own
-    // mechanism: Windows has taskkill /T; POSIX has process groups, which is why the spawn above
-    // sets `detached` there - the shell is a group leader, so kill(-pid) reaches every descendant.
-    // (Before 0.7.0 the POSIX branch sent SIGKILL to the shell alone: the bug was diagnosed in
-    // this comment and fixed for Windows only.)
-    function killChildTree() {
-      try {
-        if (child && child.pid != null && process.platform === 'win32') {
-          execFile('taskkill', ['/pid', String(child.pid), '/T', '/F'], () => {});
-        } else if (child && child.pid != null) {
-          // Negative pid = the whole process group. ESRCH simply means it is already gone.
-          try {
-            process.kill(-child.pid, 'SIGKILL');
-          } catch (_eg) {
-            child.kill('SIGKILL'); // group gone or never formed - fall back to the direct child
-          }
-        } else if (child) {
-          child.kill('SIGKILL');
-        }
-      } catch (_e) {
-        try {
-          if (child) child.kill();
-        } catch (_e2) {
-          /* nothing more we can do */
-        }
-      }
-      try {
-        controller.abort();
-      } catch (_e) {
-        /* abort backstop */
-      }
-    }
-
-    // Hard timeout: kill the child tree AND resolve immediately - never wait for 'close'.
-    //
-    // 'close' fires only when every stdio pipe is closed, and a GRANDCHILD that inherited those
-    // pipes keeps them open for its own lifetime even after the shell is dead. Waiting for 'close'
-    // therefore made the timeout unenforceable in exactly the case it exists for: measured
-    // 2026-07-30, a hook whose grandchild slept 60 s resolved at 60 s against a 2.5 s timeout, on
-    // Windows, WITH taskkill /T. The tree kill still matters (it stops us leaking processes), but
-    // the timeout contract must not depend on it succeeding on any platform.
-    const timer = setTimeout(() => {
-      timedOut = true;
-      killChildTree();
-      const r = baseResult();
-      r.stdout = stdout;
-      r.stderr = stderr || `hook-runner: timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms`;
-      r.timedOut = true; // exitCode -1, blocked false (the timeout contract)
-      finish(r);
-    }, timeoutMs);
-    if (typeof timer.unref === 'function') timer.unref();
-
-    function cleanupSignal() {
-      if (opts.signal) opts.signal.removeEventListener('abort', onExternalAbort);
-    }
-
-    /** A capped hook resolves NOW (same reasoning as the timeout: 'close' may never come) and
-     *  FAILS CLOSED - a decision we stopped reading is not a decision we may treat as allow. */
-    function finishCapped() {
-      const r = baseResult();
-      r.stdout = stdout;
-      r.stderr = stderr;
-      r.blocked = true;
-      r.reason = `hook-runner: ${event || 'hook'}${id ? ` "${id}"` : ''} exceeded the `
-        + `${outputCapped} output cap (`
-        + `${outputCapped === 'stdout' ? MAX_STDOUT_BYTES : MAX_STDERR_BYTES} bytes); `
-        + 'its decision could not be read, so the call is denied (fail closed).';
-      finish(r);
-    }
-
-    function finish(result) {
-      if (settled) return;
-      settled = true;
-      clearTimeout(timer);
-      cleanupSignal();
-      // Release our ends of the pipes AND unref the child handle. The pipes alone are not
-      // enough: the ChildProcess handle itself keeps the event loop referenced until the child
-      // exits, so a tree that survives killChildTree (measured: a 30 s grandchild) pinned the
-      // process to its natural death even after we had answered. unref() lets the loop drain;
-      // the 'close'/'error' handlers stay attached and no-op behind the settled guard.
-      for (const s of [child && child.stdout, child && child.stderr, child && child.stdin]) {
-        try { if (s && typeof s.destroy === 'function') s.destroy(); } catch (_e) { /* ignore */ }
-      }
-      try { if (child && typeof child.unref === 'function') child.unref(); } catch (_e) { /* ignore */ }
-      reaper.untrack(child);
-      result.durationMs = Date.now() - started;
-      resolve(result);
-    }
-
-    // BOUNDED accumulation. An unbounded `stdout += chunk` turns a chatty or runaway hook into an
-    // out-of-memory kill of the GATEWAY - a far worse failure than any hook outcome, and in the
-    // one module whose job is running untrusted external processes. Past the cap we stop
-    // accumulating, kill the tree, and (below) FAIL CLOSED: a decision we could not read in full
-    // must never be interpreted as "allow" just because the exit code was 0.
-    // Caps are measured in REAL bytes (Buffer.byteLength), not String.length - the latter counts
-    // UTF-16 code units, which let non-ASCII output run ~3x past a nominal "byte" ceiling.
-    let hrOutBytes = 0;
-    let hrErrBytes = 0;
-    if (child.stdout) {
-      child.stdout.setEncoding('utf8');
-      child.stdout.on('data', (chunk) => {
-        if (hrOutBytes >= MAX_STDOUT_BYTES) return;
-        hrOutBytes += Buffer.byteLength(chunk, 'utf8');
-        // Trim the final chunk to the byte budget - streams deliver whole chunks, so appending
-        // before checking retained up to cap+chunkSize (seen: +64KB on win node 18/20, where
-        // chunk boundaries do not align with the cap). Chars trimmed by a byte overshoot can
-        // only under-retain (a char is >= 1 byte), which is the safe side of the ceiling.
-        const outOver = hrOutBytes - MAX_STDOUT_BYTES;
-        stdout += outOver > 0 ? chunk.slice(0, Math.max(0, chunk.length - outOver)) : chunk;
-        if (hrOutBytes >= MAX_STDOUT_BYTES) {
-          outputCapped = 'stdout';
-          killChildTree();
-          finishCapped();
-        }
-      });
-    }
-    if (child.stderr) {
-      child.stderr.setEncoding('utf8');
-      child.stderr.on('data', (chunk) => {
-        if (hrErrBytes >= MAX_STDERR_BYTES) return;
-        hrErrBytes += Buffer.byteLength(chunk, 'utf8');
-        const errOver = hrErrBytes - MAX_STDERR_BYTES;
-        stderr += errOver > 0 ? chunk.slice(0, Math.max(0, chunk.length - errOver)) : chunk;
-        if (hrErrBytes >= MAX_STDERR_BYTES) {
-          stderr += '\n[hook-runner: stderr truncated at cap]';
-          if (!outputCapped) outputCapped = 'stderr';
-          killChildTree();
-          finishCapped();
-        }
-      });
-    }
-
-    // Write the payload to the child's stdin, then close it. Guard against EPIPE
-    // (child may exit before reading) - that must not throw the runner.
-    if (child.stdin) {
-      child.stdin.on('error', () => {
-        /* swallow EPIPE / write-after-end; the exit code is what matters */
-      });
-      try {
-        child.stdin.write(JSON.stringify(payload == null ? {} : payload));
-        child.stdin.end();
-      } catch (_e) {
-        // ignore - stdin write race; child outcome still resolves below
-      }
-    }
-
-    // Spawn / runtime error (ENOENT, abort, etc.). If it's the timeout abort we
-    // report timedOut; otherwise a non-blocking error with exitCode -1.
-    child.on('error', (err) => {
-      const r = baseResult();
-      r.stdout = stdout;
-      r.stderr = stderr || (err && err.message ? err.message : String(err));
-      if (outputCapped) {
-        r.blocked = true;
-        r.reason = `hook-runner: ${event || 'hook'}${id ? ` "${id}"` : ''} exceeded the `
-          + `${outputCapped} output cap; its decision could not be read, so the call is denied (fail closed).`;
-        finish(r);
-        return;
-      }
-      if (timedOut) {
-        r.timedOut = true;
-        r.stderr = stderr || `hook-runner: timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms`;
-      }
-      // blocked stays false; exitCode stays -1 (the error contract).
-      finish(r);
-    });
-
-    child.on('close', (code, sig) => {
-      // Output cap hit: the decision is UNREADABLE (we stopped reading mid-stream), so the only
-      // safe classification is a block flagged as a wiring failure. Checked BEFORE the timeout
-      // branch because the cap also kills the tree, which can set timedOut on the way down.
-      if (outputCapped) {
-        const r = baseResult();
-        r.stdout = stdout;
-        r.stderr = stderr;
-        r.blocked = true;
-        r.reason = `hook-runner: ${event || 'hook'}${id ? ` "${id}"` : ''} exceeded the `
-          + `${outputCapped} output cap (${outputCapped === 'stdout' ? MAX_STDOUT_BYTES : MAX_STDERR_BYTES} bytes); `
-          + 'its decision could not be read, so the call is denied (fail closed).';
-        finish(r);
-        return;
-      }
-
-      // If we aborted for the timeout, classify as timeout regardless of code.
-      if (timedOut) {
-        const r = baseResult();
-        r.stdout = stdout;
-        r.stderr = stderr || `hook-runner: timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms`;
-        r.timedOut = true; // exitCode -1, blocked false (the timeout contract)
-        finish(r);
-        return;
-      }
-
-      const r = baseResult();
-      r.stdout = stdout;
-      r.stderr = stderr;
-      // On a clean close, code is a number; if killed by signal, code is null.
-      r.exitCode = typeof code === 'number' ? code : -1;
-
-      // --- Protocol interpretation ---
-      // Exit 2 is ALWAYS stderr-blocking, and stdout/JSON is ignored on any
-      // non-zero exit - this matches real Claude Code (the JSON protocol is
-      // processed ONLY on a clean exit 0; on exit 2 the reason is stderr).
-      if (r.exitCode === 2) {
-        r.blocked = true;
-        r.reason = stderr != null && stderr.trim().length > 0 ? stderr.trim() : '';
-        finish(r);
-        return;
-      }
-
-      // B) Advanced / JSON protocol - honored only on exit 0.
-      const json = r.exitCode === 0 ? tryParseJsonProtocol(stdout) : null;
-
-      // A protocol object that FAILED TO PARSE (stdout opened with '{' but is not valid JSON) is an
-      // unreadable decision. It fails closed - denied - the same as output past the cap: the runner
-      // saw an attempted answer it could not read, and an unreadable answer is never "allow". Only
-      // stdout that made no protocol attempt (no leading '{', or valid JSON that is not a decision)
-      // falls through to the exit-code protocol below.
-      if (json === CORRUPT_PROTOCOL) {
-        r.blocked = true;
-        r.reason = `hook-runner: ${event || 'hook'}${id ? ` "${id}"` : ''} emitted a protocol `
-          + 'message that could not be parsed; its decision could not be read, so the call is '
-          + 'denied (fail closed).';
-        finish(r);
-        return;
-      }
-
-      if (json) {
-        const hso =
-          json.hookSpecificOutput && typeof json.hookSpecificOutput === 'object'
-            ? json.hookSpecificOutput
-            : null;
-
-        // The decision VOCABULARY is exact and case-sensitive: permissionDecision is
-        // allow|deny|ask, top-level decision is block. A decision SLOT carrying any other
-        // value - miscased "DENY", a synonym like "denied", the right word in the wrong
-        // slot, a non-string - is an ATTEMPTED decision the runner cannot read, and an
-        // unreadable decision is never "allow" (the same rule as CORRUPT_PROTOCOL and the
-        // output caps). A key marks an attempt ONLY when it carries a value: `null` is the
-        // readable spelling of "no value" - what typed-struct and dataclass serialisers
-        // emit for an unset optional field - so a null slot is no decision and falls
-        // through exactly as the absent key does. (0.7.0; gate-semantics.test.js pins
-        // both halves.)
-        const permAttempted =
-          hso !== null &&
-          Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(hso, 'permissionDecision') &&
-          hso.permissionDecision !== null;
-        const decisionAttempted =
-          Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(json, 'decision') && json.decision !== null;
-        const permUnknown =
-          permAttempted &&
-          hso.permissionDecision !== 'allow' &&
-          hso.permissionDecision !== 'deny' &&
-          hso.permissionDecision !== 'ask';
-        const decisionUnknown = decisionAttempted && json.decision !== 'block';
-        // Same rule for the OTHER protocol slots: `continue` is boolean and
-        // `hookSpecificOutput` is an object - a present NON-NULL key with any other type
-        // is an attempted instruction that cannot be read. The hso check tests the RAW
-        // value: `hso` coerces both null and a wrong type (a bare string, a number) to
-        // null, and only the wrong types are unreadable attempts.
-        const contUnknown =
-          Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(json, 'continue') &&
-          json.continue !== null &&
-          typeof json.continue !== 'boolean';
-        const hsoUnknown =
-          Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(json, 'hookSpecificOutput') &&
-          json.hookSpecificOutput !== null &&
-          (hso === null || Array.isArray(hso));
-        if (permUnknown || decisionUnknown || contUnknown || hsoUnknown) {
-          const slot = permUnknown
-            ? 'hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision'
-            : decisionUnknown
-              ? 'decision'
-              : contUnknown
-                ? 'continue'
-                : 'hookSpecificOutput';
-          const got = JSON.stringify(
-            permUnknown
-              ? hso.permissionDecision
-              : decisionUnknown
-                ? json.decision
-                : contUnknown
-                  ? json.continue
-                  : json.hookSpecificOutput
-          );
-          const known = permUnknown
-            ? '"allow", "deny", "ask"'
-            : decisionUnknown
-              ? '"block"'
-              : contUnknown
-                ? 'true, false'
-                : 'an object';
-          r.blocked = true;
-          r.reason = `hook-runner: ${event || 'hook'}${id ? ` "${id}"` : ''} emitted ${slot}: `
-            + `${got}, which is not in the protocol vocabulary (${known}); its decision could `
-            + 'not be read, so the call is denied (fail closed).';
-          finish(r);
-          return;
-        }
-
-        // PreToolUse blocks via hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision
-        // (allow|deny|ask), NOT top-level decision - this is the real Claude Code
-        // mechanism. "deny" blocks (reason = permissionDecisionReason). "allow"
-        // passes. "ask" has no interactive prompt in the autonomous host, so it
-        // is treated as non-blocking with the reason captured for context.
-        const permDecision =
-          hso && typeof hso.permissionDecision === 'string' ? hso.permissionDecision : null;
-        const permReason =
-          hso && typeof hso.permissionDecisionReason === 'string'
-            ? hso.permissionDecisionReason
-            : null;
-
-        // Top-level decision: real Claude Code defines only "block" here (for
-        // UserPromptSubmit / PostToolUse / Stop / PreCompact). There is no "approve".
-        const decision = json.decision;
-        const cont = json.continue;
-        const jsonReason = typeof json.reason === 'string' ? json.reason : null;
-        const additional =
-          hso && typeof hso.additionalContext === 'string' ? hso.additionalContext : null;
-
-        if (permDecision === 'deny') {
-          r.blocked = true;
-          r.reason = permReason != null ? permReason : jsonReason;
-          if (r.reason == null) r.reason = '';
-        } else if (decision === 'block') {
-          r.blocked = true;
-          r.reason = jsonReason; // block reason from JSON.reason
-        }
-        if (cont === false) {
-          r.stopLoop = true; // continue:false -> stop the whole loop
-        }
-        // additionalContext is the injected text when present.
-        if (additional !== null) {
-          r.inject = additional;
-        }
-        finish(r);
-        return;
-      }
-
-      // A) Simple / exit-code protocol, exit 0.
-      if (r.exitCode === 0) {
-        // Success. For SessionStart / UserPromptSubmit, stdout IS the injection.
-        // For other events stdout is advisory only (captured, not injected).
-        if (INJECTABLE_EVENTS.has(event)) {
-          const out = stdout != null ? stdout.trim() : '';
-          r.inject = out.length > 0 ? out : null;
-        }
-      }
-      // Any other non-zero (non-2) code -> non-blocking error: stderr captured,
-      // blocked stays false, reason stays null.
-
-      finish(r);
-    });
-  });
-}
-
-module.exports = { runHook };
+'use strict';
+
+/**
+ * hook-runner.js - run ONE command hook and return a structured result.
+ *
+ * Contract: the two output protocols and the exact result shape are specified below and pinned by
+ * test/gate.test.js + test/hook-runner-bounds.test.js. This module is backend-agnostic and has
+ * ZERO host-framework imports so it runs headless under `node --test`.
+ *
+ * Hard guarantee: runHook NEVER rejects. A spawn failure or a timeout always
+ * resolves with the full result object (exitCode:-1, timedOut set appropriately,
+ * blocked:false).
+ */
+
+const { spawn, execFile } = require('node:child_process');
+const reaper = require('./child-reaper');
+const path = require('node:path');
+
+// Default HOOKS_DIR: <root>/src/hooks. __dirname is <root>/src/core, so up one.
+const DEFAULT_HOOKS_DIR = path.resolve(__dirname, '..', 'hooks');
+
+// Events whose exit-0 stdout is treated as injected context (the exit-code protocol's injection half).
+const INJECTABLE_EVENTS = new Set(['SessionStart', 'UserPromptSubmit']);
+
+// Returned by tryParseJsonProtocol when stdout was clearly meant to be a protocol object (it opens
+// with '{') but does not parse. This is DISTINCT from null: null means "no protocol was attempted,
+// use the exit-code protocol", whereas this means "a decision was attempted but could not be read".
+// The two must be handled differently - an unreadable decision fails closed, the same as output
+// past the cap, so a decision that loses a character is never mistaken for "allow".
+const CORRUPT_PROTOCOL = Symbol('corrupt-protocol');
+
+// Output ceilings. A hook's decision is a small JSON object and its diagnostics are a few lines;
+// anything approaching these is a runaway, and accumulating it unbounded would OOM the gateway
+// itself. Hitting either cap is treated as a WIRING FAILURE and fails closed (see the accumulator
+// and the close handler) - an unreadable decision must never pass for "allow".
+const MAX_STDOUT_BYTES = 1024 * 1024; // 1 MiB
+const MAX_STDERR_BYTES = 256 * 1024; //  256 KiB
+
+/**
+ * Decide whether a parsed stdout object should be treated as the JSON
+ * protocol. We only switch to the JSON interpretation when the object actually
+ * carries one of the protocol's known keys - otherwise an arbitrary JSON blob a
+ * hook happens to print should fall through to the exit-code protocol ("the
+ * exit-code protocol wins if stdout is not valid JSON").
+ *
+ * @param {*} parsed
+ * @returns {boolean}
+ */
+function isKnownJsonProtocol(parsed) {
+  if (parsed === null || typeof parsed !== 'object' || Array.isArray(parsed)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return (
+    Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(parsed, 'continue') ||
+    Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(parsed, 'decision') ||
+    Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(parsed, 'reason') ||
+    Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(parsed, 'hookSpecificOutput')
+  );
+}
+
+/**
+ * Try to parse stdout as the JSON protocol. Returns the parsed object if it is
+ * valid JSON AND carries known protocol keys; CORRUPT_PROTOCOL if stdout opened
+ * with '{' (a protocol object was attempted) but did not parse; otherwise null
+ * (no protocol attempt - use the exit-code protocol).
+ *
+ * @param {string} stdout
+ * @returns {object|symbol|null}
+ */
+function tryParseJsonProtocol(stdout) {
+  const trimmed = (stdout || '').trim();
+  if (!trimmed) return null;
+  // Cheap pre-check: protocol output is always a JSON object. Anything not opening with '{' made
+  // no protocol attempt and belongs to the exit-code protocol (arbitrary text a hook prints).
+  if (trimmed[0] !== '{') return null;
+  let parsed;
+  try {
+    parsed = JSON.parse(trimmed);
+  } catch (_e) {
+    // Opened with '{' but is not valid JSON: an attempted decision that could not be read. Signal
+    // CORRUPT (fail closed) rather than null - falling through to exit-code here would let a
+    // truncated or malformed deny be read as "allow".
+    return CORRUPT_PROTOCOL;
+  }
+  return isKnownJsonProtocol(parsed) ? parsed : null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Run a single command hook.
+ *
+ * @param {object} hookSpec  Resolved spec: { id, event, command, timeout(seconds), ... }.
+ * @param {object} payload   The stdin JSON object (built by events.js buildPayload).
+ * @param {object} [opts]
+ * @param {string} [opts.cwd]              child working directory.
+ * @param {object} [opts.env]             extra env merged over process.env.
+ * @param {string} [opts.projectDir]      value for CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR.
+ * @param {string} [opts.hooksDir]        value for HOOKS_DIR (default <root>/src/hooks).
+ * @param {AbortSignal} [opts.signal]      external cancellation; aborts the child.
+ * @returns {Promise<object>}  the full result shape. Never rejects.
+ */
+function runHook(hookSpec, payload, opts = {}) {
+  return new Promise((resolve) => {
+    const started = Date.now();
+
+    const id = hookSpec && hookSpec.id != null ? hookSpec.id : null;
+    const event = hookSpec && hookSpec.event != null ? hookSpec.event : null;
+
+    // Build the immutable base of every result so any early exit is well-formed.
+    const baseResult = () => ({
+      id,
+      event,
+      exitCode: -1,
+      timedOut: false,
+      stdout: '',
+      stderr: '',
+      blocked: false,
+      stopLoop: false,
+      reason: null,
+      inject: null,
+      durationMs: 0,
+    });
+
+    // Guard: a malformed spec must not throw out of the runner (the never-reject guarantee).
+    if (!hookSpec || typeof hookSpec.command !== 'string' || hookSpec.command.length === 0) {
+      const r = baseResult();
+      r.stderr = 'hook-runner: invalid hookSpec (missing command)';
+      r.durationMs = Date.now() - started;
+      resolve(r);
+      return;
+    }
+
+    // timeout is stored in SECONDS in the manifest -> convert to ms.
+    // Fall back to a sane default if absent or non-positive.
+    const timeoutSec =
+      typeof hookSpec.timeout === 'number' && hookSpec.timeout > 0 ? hookSpec.timeout : 60;
+    const timeoutMs = timeoutSec * 1000;
+
+    // Child env: inherit process.env, layer opts.env, then set the two paths the
+    // hook scripts rely on to resolve themselves.
+    const hooksDir = opts.hooksDir || (opts.env && opts.env.HOOKS_DIR) || DEFAULT_HOOKS_DIR;
+    const projectDir =
+      opts.projectDir ||
+      (opts.env && opts.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR) ||
+      process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR ||
+      // Project root is two levels above the hooks dir (<root>/src/hooks -> <root>).
+      path.resolve(hooksDir, '..', '..');
+
+    const childEnv = Object.assign({}, process.env, opts.env || {}, {
+      CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR: projectDir,
+      HOOKS_DIR: hooksDir,
+    });
+
+    // Own AbortController so we can enforce the timeout via kill, and chain any
+    // externally-supplied signal so the engine can cancel us too. The abort path RESOLVES
+    // immediately, exactly like the timeout: it must not depend on 'close', which a surviving
+    // grandchild holding inherited pipes can withhold forever (the same reasoning that moved
+    // the timeout onto its timer).
+    const onExternalAbort = () => {
+      timedOut = true;
+      killChildTree();
+      const r = baseResult();
+      r.stdout = stdout;
+      r.stderr = stderr || 'hook-runner: aborted by caller signal';
+      r.timedOut = true; // exitCode -1, blocked false - the caller cancelled, same class as a timeout
+      finish(r);
+    };
+    const controller = new AbortController();
+    if (opts.signal) {
+      if (opts.signal.aborted) controller.abort();
+      else opts.signal.addEventListener('abort', onExternalAbort, { once: true });
+    }
+
+    let child;
+    try {
+      child = spawn(hookSpec.command, {
+        shell: true, // run as a shell command line (bash/PowerShell-launched scripts)
+        cwd: opts.cwd || undefined,
+        env: childEnv,
+        signal: controller.signal,
+        windowsHide: true,
+        // POSIX: give the shell its OWN PROCESS GROUP so killChildTree can tear down the
+        // grandchildren too (see the comment there - killing the shell alone orphans them and
+        // they hold the stdio pipes open forever). Windows has no process groups in this sense
+        // and uses taskkill /T instead; `detached` there only suppresses a console window, which
+        // windowsHide already covers, so it stays off to keep Windows behaviour byte-identical.
+        detached: process.platform !== 'win32',
+      });
+      // Last-resort sweep: if the gateway dies without running killChildTree (crash, signal),
+      // the reaper's exit handler kills whatever is still tracked - detached children have left
+      // our session and would otherwise run to their natural end unsupervised.
+      reaper.track(child);
+    } catch (err) {
+      // Synchronous spawn failure (rare). Resolve, never throw.
+      cleanupSignal();
+      const r = baseResult();
+      r.stderr = `hook-runner: spawn failed: ${err && err.message ? err.message : String(err)}`;
+      r.durationMs = Date.now() - started;
+      resolve(r);
+      return;
+    }
+
+    let stdout = '';
+    let stderr = '';
+    let timedOut = false;
+    let settled = false;
+    let outputCapped = null; // 'stdout' | 'stderr' once a cap was hit (fail-closed trigger)
+
+    // Kill the WHOLE child tree. Killing the shell (cmd.exe / sh) does NOT kill its node/bash
+    // grandchildren - they orphan and hold the stdio pipes open, which prevents the parent
+    // process (and node:test) from ever exiting. Both platforms need a TREE kill, by their own
+    // mechanism: Windows has taskkill /T; POSIX has process groups, which is why the spawn above
+    // sets `detached` there - the shell is a group leader, so kill(-pid) reaches every descendant.
+    // (Before 0.7.0 the POSIX branch sent SIGKILL to the shell alone: the bug was diagnosed in
+    // this comment and fixed for Windows only.)
+    function killChildTree() {
+      try {
+        if (child && child.pid != null && process.platform === 'win32') {
+          execFile('taskkill', ['/pid', String(child.pid), '/T', '/F'], () => {});
+        } else if (child && child.pid != null) {
+          // Negative pid = the whole process group. ESRCH simply means it is already gone.
+          try {
+            process.kill(-child.pid, 'SIGKILL');
+          } catch (_eg) {
+            child.kill('SIGKILL'); // group gone or never formed - fall back to the direct child
+          }
+        } else if (child) {
+          child.kill('SIGKILL');
+        }
+      } catch (_e) {
+        try {
+          if (child) child.kill();
+        } catch (_e2) {
+          /* nothing more we can do */
+        }
+      }
+      try {
+        controller.abort();
+      } catch (_e) {
+        /* abort backstop */
+      }
+    }
+
+    // Hard timeout: kill the child tree AND resolve immediately - never wait for 'close'.
+    //
+    // 'close' fires only when every stdio pipe is closed, and a GRANDCHILD that inherited those
+    // pipes keeps them open for its own lifetime even after the shell is dead. Waiting for 'close'
+    // therefore made the timeout unenforceable in exactly the case it exists for: measured
+    // 2026-07-30, a hook whose grandchild slept 60 s resolved at 60 s against a 2.5 s timeout, on
+    // Windows, WITH taskkill /T. The tree kill still matters (it stops us leaking processes), but
+    // the timeout contract must not depend on it succeeding on any platform.
+    const timer = setTimeout(() => {
+      timedOut = true;
+      killChildTree();
+      const r = baseResult();
+      r.stdout = stdout;
+      r.stderr = stderr || `hook-runner: timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms`;
+      r.timedOut = true; // exitCode -1, blocked false (the timeout contract)
+      finish(r);
+    }, timeoutMs);
+    if (typeof timer.unref === 'function') timer.unref();
+
+    function cleanupSignal() {
+      if (opts.signal) opts.signal.removeEventListener('abort', onExternalAbort);
+    }
+
+    /** A capped hook resolves NOW (same reasoning as the timeout: 'close' may never come) and
+     *  FAILS CLOSED - a decision we stopped reading is not a decision we may treat as allow. */
+    function finishCapped() {
+      const r = baseResult();
+      r.stdout = stdout;
+      r.stderr = stderr;
+      r.blocked = true;
+      r.reason = `hook-runner: ${event || 'hook'}${id ? ` "${id}"` : ''} exceeded the `
+        + `${outputCapped} output cap (`
+        + `${outputCapped === 'stdout' ? MAX_STDOUT_BYTES : MAX_STDERR_BYTES} bytes); `
+        + 'its decision could not be read, so the call is denied (fail closed).';
+      finish(r);
+    }
+
+    function finish(result) {
+      if (settled) return;
+      settled = true;
+      clearTimeout(timer);
+      cleanupSignal();
+      // Release our ends of the pipes AND unref the child handle. The pipes alone are not
+      // enough: the ChildProcess handle itself keeps the event loop referenced until the child
+      // exits, so a tree that survives killChildTree (measured: a 30 s grandchild) pinned the
+      // process to its natural death even after we had answered. unref() lets the loop drain;
+      // the 'close'/'error' handlers stay attached and no-op behind the settled guard.
+      for (const s of [child && child.stdout, child && child.stderr, child && child.stdin]) {
+        try { if (s && typeof s.destroy === 'function') s.destroy(); } catch (_e) { /* ignore */ }
+      }
+      try { if (child && typeof child.unref === 'function') child.unref(); } catch (_e) { /* ignore */ }
+      reaper.untrack(child);
+      result.durationMs = Date.now() - started;
+      resolve(result);
+    }
+
+    // BOUNDED accumulation. An unbounded `stdout += chunk` turns a chatty or runaway hook into an
+    // out-of-memory kill of the GATEWAY - a far worse failure than any hook outcome, and in the
+    // one module whose job is running untrusted external processes. Past the cap we stop
+    // accumulating, kill the tree, and (below) FAIL CLOSED: a decision we could not read in full
+    // must never be interpreted as "allow" just because the exit code was 0.
+    // Caps are measured in REAL bytes (Buffer.byteLength), not String.length - the latter counts
+    // UTF-16 code units, which let non-ASCII output run ~3x past a nominal "byte" ceiling.
+    let hrOutBytes = 0;
+    let hrErrBytes = 0;
+    if (child.stdout) {
+      child.stdout.setEncoding('utf8');
+      child.stdout.on('data', (chunk) => {
+        if (hrOutBytes >= MAX_STDOUT_BYTES) return;
+        hrOutBytes += Buffer.byteLength(chunk, 'utf8');
+        // Trim the final chunk to the byte budget - streams deliver whole chunks, so appending
+        // before checking retained up to cap+chunkSize (seen: +64KB on win node 18/20, where
+        // chunk boundaries do not align with the cap). Chars trimmed by a byte overshoot can
+        // only under-retain (a char is >= 1 byte), which is the safe side of the ceiling.
+        const outOver = hrOutBytes - MAX_STDOUT_BYTES;
+        stdout += outOver > 0 ? chunk.slice(0, Math.max(0, chunk.length - outOver)) : chunk;
+        if (hrOutBytes >= MAX_STDOUT_BYTES) {
+          outputCapped = 'stdout';
+          killChildTree();
+          finishCapped();
+        }
+      });
+    }
+    if (child.stderr) {
+      child.stderr.setEncoding('utf8');
+      child.stderr.on('data', (chunk) => {
+        if (hrErrBytes >= MAX_STDERR_BYTES) return;
+        hrErrBytes += Buffer.byteLength(chunk, 'utf8');
+        const errOver = hrErrBytes - MAX_STDERR_BYTES;
+        stderr += errOver > 0 ? chunk.slice(0, Math.max(0, chunk.length - errOver)) : chunk;
+        if (hrErrBytes >= MAX_STDERR_BYTES) {
+          stderr += '\n[hook-runner: stderr truncated at cap]';
+          if (!outputCapped) outputCapped = 'stderr';
+          killChildTree();
+          finishCapped();
+        }
+      });
+    }
+
+    // Write the payload to the child's stdin, then close it. Guard against EPIPE
+    // (child may exit before reading) - that must not throw the runner.
+    if (child.stdin) {
+      child.stdin.on('error', () => {
+        /* swallow EPIPE / write-after-end; the exit code is what matters */
+      });
+      try {
+        child.stdin.write(JSON.stringify(payload == null ? {} : payload));
+        child.stdin.end();
+      } catch (_e) {
+        // ignore - stdin write race; child outcome still resolves below
+      }
+    }
+
+    // Spawn / runtime error (ENOENT, abort, etc.). If it's the timeout abort we
+    // report timedOut; otherwise a non-blocking error with exitCode -1.
+    child.on('error', (err) => {
+      const r = baseResult();
+      r.stdout = stdout;
+      r.stderr = stderr || (err && err.message ? err.message : String(err));
+      if (outputCapped) {
+        r.blocked = true;
+        r.reason = `hook-runner: ${event || 'hook'}${id ? ` "${id}"` : ''} exceeded the `
+          + `${outputCapped} output cap; its decision could not be read, so the call is denied (fail closed).`;
+        finish(r);
+        return;
+      }
+      if (timedOut) {
+        r.timedOut = true;
+        r.stderr = stderr || `hook-runner: timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms`;
+      }
+      // blocked stays false; exitCode stays -1 (the error contract).
+      finish(r);
+    });
+
+    child.on('close', (code, sig) => {
+      // Output cap hit: the decision is UNREADABLE (we stopped reading mid-stream), so the only
+      // safe classification is a block flagged as a wiring failure. Checked BEFORE the timeout
+      // branch because the cap also kills the tree, which can set timedOut on the way down.
+      if (outputCapped) {
+        const r = baseResult();
+        r.stdout = stdout;
+        r.stderr = stderr;
+        r.blocked = true;
+        r.reason = `hook-runner: ${event || 'hook'}${id ? ` "${id}"` : ''} exceeded the `
+          + `${outputCapped} output cap (${outputCapped === 'stdout' ? MAX_STDOUT_BYTES : MAX_STDERR_BYTES} bytes); `
+          + 'its decision could not be read, so the call is denied (fail closed).';
+        finish(r);
+        return;
+      }
+
+      // If we aborted for the timeout, classify as timeout regardless of code.
+      if (timedOut) {
+        const r = baseResult();
+        r.stdout = stdout;
+        r.stderr = stderr || `hook-runner: timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms`;
+        r.timedOut = true; // exitCode -1, blocked false (the timeout contract)
+        finish(r);
+        return;
+      }
+
+      const r = baseResult();
+      r.stdout = stdout;
+      r.stderr = stderr;
+      // On a clean close, code is a number; if killed by signal, code is null.
+      r.exitCode = typeof code === 'number' ? code : -1;
+
+      // --- Protocol interpretation ---
+      // Exit 2 is ALWAYS stderr-blocking, and stdout/JSON is ignored on any
+      // non-zero exit - this matches real Claude Code (the JSON protocol is
+      // processed ONLY on a clean exit 0; on exit 2 the reason is stderr).
+      if (r.exitCode === 2) {
+        r.blocked = true;
+        r.reason = stderr != null && stderr.trim().length > 0 ? stderr.trim() : '';
+        finish(r);
+        return;
+      }
+
+      // B) Advanced / JSON protocol - honored only on exit 0.
+      const json = r.exitCode === 0 ? tryParseJsonProtocol(stdout) : null;
+
+      // A protocol object that FAILED TO PARSE (stdout opened with '{' but is not valid JSON) is an
+      // unreadable decision. It fails closed - denied - the same as output past the cap: the runner
+      // saw an attempted answer it could not read, and an unreadable answer is never "allow". Only
+      // stdout that made no protocol attempt (no leading '{', or valid JSON that is not a decision)
+      // falls through to the exit-code protocol below.
+      if (json === CORRUPT_PROTOCOL) {
+        r.blocked = true;
+        r.reason = `hook-runner: ${event || 'hook'}${id ? ` "${id}"` : ''} emitted a protocol `
+          + 'message that could not be parsed; its decision could not be read, so the call is '
+          + 'denied (fail closed).';
+        finish(r);
+        return;
+      }
+
+      if (json) {
+        const hso =
+          json.hookSpecificOutput && typeof json.hookSpecificOutput === 'object'
+            ? json.hookSpecificOutput
+            : null;
+
+        // The decision VOCABULARY is exact and case-sensitive: permissionDecision is
+        // allow|deny|ask, top-level decision is block. A decision SLOT carrying any other
+        // value - miscased "DENY", a synonym like "denied", the right word in the wrong
+        // slot, a non-string - is an ATTEMPTED decision the runner cannot read, and an
+        // unreadable decision is never "allow" (the same rule as CORRUPT_PROTOCOL and the
+        // output caps). A key marks an attempt ONLY when it carries a value: `null` is the
+        // readable spelling of "no value" - what typed-struct and dataclass serialisers
+        // emit for an unset optional field - so a null slot is no decision and falls
+        // through exactly as the absent key does. (0.7.0; gate-semantics.test.js pins
+        // both halves.)
+        const permAttempted =
+          hso !== null &&
+          Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(hso, 'permissionDecision') &&
+          hso.permissionDecision !== null;
+        const decisionAttempted =
+          Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(json, 'decision') && json.decision !== null;
+        const permUnknown =
+          permAttempted &&
+          hso.permissionDecision !== 'allow' &&
+          hso.permissionDecision !== 'deny' &&
+          hso.permissionDecision !== 'ask';
+        const decisionUnknown = decisionAttempted && json.decision !== 'block';
+        // Same rule for the OTHER protocol slots: `continue` is boolean and
+        // `hookSpecificOutput` is an object - a present NON-NULL key with any other type
+        // is an attempted instruction that cannot be read. The hso check tests the RAW
+        // value: `hso` coerces both null and a wrong type (a bare string, a number) to
+        // null, and only the wrong types are unreadable attempts.
+        const contUnknown =
+          Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(json, 'continue') &&
+          json.continue !== null &&
+          typeof json.continue !== 'boolean';
+        const hsoUnknown =
+          Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(json, 'hookSpecificOutput') &&
+          json.hookSpecificOutput !== null &&
+          (hso === null || Array.isArray(hso));
+        if (permUnknown || decisionUnknown || contUnknown || hsoUnknown) {
+          const slot = permUnknown
+            ? 'hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision'
+            : decisionUnknown
+              ? 'decision'
+              : contUnknown
+                ? 'continue'
+                : 'hookSpecificOutput';
+          const got = JSON.stringify(
+            permUnknown
+              ? hso.permissionDecision
+              : decisionUnknown
+                ? json.decision
+                : contUnknown
+                  ? json.continue
+                  : json.hookSpecificOutput
+          );
+          const known = permUnknown
+            ? '"allow", "deny", "ask"'
+            : decisionUnknown
+              ? '"block"'
+              : contUnknown
+                ? 'true, false'
+                : 'an object';
+          r.blocked = true;
+          r.reason = `hook-runner: ${event || 'hook'}${id ? ` "${id}"` : ''} emitted ${slot}: `
+            + `${got}, which is not in the protocol vocabulary (${known}); its decision could `
+            + 'not be read, so the call is denied (fail closed).';
+          finish(r);
+          return;
+        }
+
+        // PreToolUse blocks via hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision
+        // (allow|deny|ask), NOT top-level decision - this is the real Claude Code
+        // mechanism. "deny" blocks (reason = permissionDecisionReason). "allow"
+        // passes. "ask" has no interactive prompt in the autonomous host, so it
+        // is treated as non-blocking with the reason captured for context.
+        const permDecision =
+          hso && typeof hso.permissionDecision === 'string' ? hso.permissionDecision : null;
+        const permReason =
+          hso && typeof hso.permissionDecisionReason === 'string'
+            ? hso.permissionDecisionReason
+            : null;
+
+        // Top-level decision: real Claude Code defines only "block" here (for
+        // UserPromptSubmit / PostToolUse / Stop / PreCompact). There is no "approve".
+        const decision = json.decision;
+        const cont = json.continue;
+        const jsonReason = typeof json.reason === 'string' ? json.reason : null;
+        const additional =
+          hso && typeof hso.additionalContext === 'string' ? hso.additionalContext : null;
+
+        if (permDecision === 'deny') {
+          r.blocked = true;
+          r.reason = permReason != null ? permReason : jsonReason;
+          if (r.reason == null) r.reason = '';
+        } else if (decision === 'block') {
+          r.blocked = true;
+          r.reason = jsonReason; // block reason from JSON.reason
+        }
+        if (cont === false) {
+          r.stopLoop = true; // continue:false -> stop the whole loop
+        }
+        // additionalContext is the injected text when present.
+        if (additional !== null) {
+          r.inject = additional;
+        }
+        finish(r);
+        return;
+      }
+
+      // A) Simple / exit-code protocol, exit 0.
+      if (r.exitCode === 0) {
+        // Success. For SessionStart / UserPromptSubmit, stdout IS the injection.
+        // For other events stdout is advisory only (captured, not injected).
+        if (INJECTABLE_EVENTS.has(event)) {
+          const out = stdout != null ? stdout.trim() : '';
+          r.inject = out.length > 0 ? out : null;
+        }
+      }
+      // Any other non-zero (non-2) code -> non-blocking error: stderr captured,
+      // blocked stays false, reason stays null.
+
+      finish(r);
+    });
+  });
+}
+
+module.exports = { runHook };