open-agreements 0.7.7 → 0.8.0

package/skills/legal-explainers/non-compete-contract-explainer/content/queensland.md

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+---
+jurisdiction: "Queensland, Australia"
+slug: queensland
+countryCode: AU
+snapshotAsOf: "2026-06-19"
+lastReviewed: "2026-06-10"
+canonicalUrl: https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/non-compete/au/queensland
+license: CC BY 4.0
+stale: false
+---
+
+> [!IMPORTANT]
+> **Informational only — not legal advice.** This is a snapshot of an OpenAgreements practice note,
+> provided for general information. It is not legal advice, does not create an attorney-client
+> relationship, and is not a substitute for a licensed attorney in the relevant jurisdiction.
+> Laws change; verify against the canonical version before relying on it.
+>
+> **Canonical:** https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/non-compete/au/queensland · **Snapshot as of:** 2026-06-19 · License: CC BY 4.0 · © openagreements.org
+
+# Non-Compete Enforceability in Queensland[^about]
+
+In Queensland a post-employment non-compete is presumptively void as a restraint of trade and binds a former employee only so far as it is reasonable; Queensland has no statutory read-down power, so courts apply the common-law blue-pencil rule only — they can delete severable words but cannot rewrite an overbroad clause, and a clause that severance cannot save fails entirely.
+
+
+## At a glance
+
+| Question | Queensland, Australia |
+| --- | --- |
+| **Are non-competes enforceable?** | Allowed if reasonable |
+| **Bottom line** | A Queensland non-compete is presumptively void and binds a former employee only so far as it is reasonable to protect a legitimate interest; there is no statutory read-down power, so a court can only strike out grammatically severable words under the blue-pencil rule and an overbroad clause that severance cannot save fails entirely. |
+| **Main law or case** | Common-law restraint of trade (no equivalent of the NSW Restraints of Trade Act 1976) |
+| **Main exceptions** | Sale-of-business covenants are judged more leniently; a proposed federal ban would, if enacted, cover most employees earning under the Fair Work Act high-income threshold (with sale-of-business and above-threshold restraints reported to be excluded), but it is not yet law. |
+| **Can a court narrow it?** | Only strikes wording |
+| **Applies to contractors?** | Yes |
+| **Restriction extended during a breach?** | Untested; Australian courts treat rolling or indefinite restraints with suspicion and generally prefer damages over extending an injunction. |
+| **Maximum length set by law** | No statutory cap; reasonableness is judged case by case, and longer periods attract closer scrutiny (a six-month restraint on senior managers was upheld in Auto Parts Group v Cooper). |
+
+## Are employee non-competes enforceable in Queensland? {#enforceability}
+
+**Short answer.** Only so far as they are reasonable. A post-employment non-compete is treated as a restraint of trade, which the courts presume is void as contrary to public policy unless the employer shows it goes no further than is reasonably necessary to protect a legitimate business interest [^aeci-presumed-void]. The most recent appellate statement of the rule in Queensland puts it directly: a restraint stands only if it is proven reasonable between the parties and is not unreasonable in the public interest [^reims-invalid-unless-reasonable].
+
+Queensland is not a per se ban jurisdiction, and it has no statute that sets fixed numeric limits on duration or area. It is a reasonableness jurisdiction built entirely on the common-law restraint-of-trade doctrine. The starting point is that every post-employment covenant is presumptively unenforceable, and the burden is on the employer to justify it [^autoparts-onus].
+
+"A restraint will be invalid unless it is proven to be reasonable as between the parties or if proven to be unreasonable in the public interest."[^reims-invalid-unless-reasonable]
+
+Courts apply the doctrine more strictly to employment covenants than to covenants in commercial deals: a buyer of a business may protect itself from competition by the seller, but an employer may not protect itself from competition by an employee as such [^aeci-competition-per-se]. The foundational High Court authorities — *Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co* and *Buckley v Tutty* — establish the same framework that Queensland courts continue to apply today. The sections that follow work through whether a court can narrow an overbroad clause, why cascading clauses matter so much, what counts as a legitimate interest, how reasonableness of scope is judged, and the open question of whether a breach can extend the restraint.
+
+## Can a Queensland court narrow an overbroad non-compete? {#court-narrowing}
+
+**Short answer.** Only in a limited way, and far less generously than many employers assume. Queensland has no statute that lets a court read an overbroad restraint down to a reasonable level. A court applies the common-law blue-pencil rule only: it can delete grammatically severable words if what remains is reasonable and the contract still makes sense, but it cannot read down, add to, or rewrite the clause [^autoparts-no-rewrite]. If severance cannot save the clause, the whole restraint fails.
+
+This is the single most important practical point about Queensland restraint law, and it is what most distinguishes Queensland practice. Severance is mechanical, not editorial. A provision can be severed only if it is divisible and can be deleted without materially modifying the effect of what remains; the parties can also expressly provide that each obligation operates independently and is severable [^autoparts-severance]. What a court will not do is approach the clause by first deciding what level of restriction would have been reasonable and then trimming the words to fit — that impermissible approach is reading the clause down to save it, and Queensland courts refuse to do it [^aeci-no-read-down].
+
+"it is not permissible for the Court to approach the construction of a restraint clause by first determining what degree of restriction would be justified; and then reading down an unduly wide clause in order to preserve its validity."[^aeci-no-read-down]
+
+A recent Supreme Court decision shows the limit in action. Faced with an extremely broad definition driving the restraint, the Court — at an interlocutory stage — considered that the argument for validity faced real challenges, on the view that the offending words were not capable of being severed, read down, or supplemented [^maglis-cannot-be-severed]. That was a provisional assessment on an interlocutory application rather than a final holding of invalidity, but the lesson for drafters is the same: an overbroad Queensland covenant whose breadth cannot be cleanly excised is at real risk of failing entirely rather than being narrowed by the court.
+
+> [!CAUTION]
+> **Drafting note.**
+>
+> Because a Queensland court will not read an overbroad restraint down to a reasonable level — it can only delete severable words and cannot rewrite the clause — draft scope, area, and duration to the minimum the legitimate interest actually requires [^aeci-no-read-down]. Build the clause from separate, independently severable covenants rather than one sweeping prohibition, so that if the widest covenant is unreasonable a narrower one can still stand on its own [^autoparts-severance].
+
+## Are cascading or ladder restraint clauses valid in Queensland? {#cascading-clauses}
+
+**Short answer.** Yes, within limits, and they are essential drafting in Queensland precisely because a court cannot read an overbroad clause down. A cascading clause sets out a menu of progressively narrower combinations of period and area, each expressed as a separate, severable restraint, so that if the widest is unreasonable a narrower rung can still be enforced on its own. Queensland courts accept that, within certain limits, a contract may contain cascading restraint of trade clauses [^autoparts-cascading].
+
+The reason cascading clauses are the standard route to survive blue-pencil severance follows directly from the no-read-down rule. Since a court can only delete severable words and will not rewrite the bargain, the drafter does the narrowing in advance by writing several independent covenants. In *Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper*, the employment contract used exactly this structure — a six-month restraint, then three months, then two months, then one month — and the Court enforced the six-month rung as reasonable, treating the ladder as a set of separate covenants rather than a single clause requiring judicial editing [^autoparts-cascading].
+
+A cascade only works if each rung is genuinely independent and severable. A provision can be cut out only where it is divisible and can be deleted without materially modifying what remains, and the parties should expressly state that each restraint operates independently [^autoparts-severance-cascade]. The opposite drafting choice is dangerous: where the breadth comes from a single definition woven through the operative words, the offending language cannot simply be struck out, and the whole restraint can fail [^maglis-sever-definition].
+
+> [!CAUTION]
+> **Drafting note.**
+>
+> A cascading clause is the practical answer to Queensland's no-read-down rule, but only if each rung is a self-contained, reasonable restraint that can stand after the wider rungs are deleted [^autoparts-severance-cascade]. Do not bury the breadth in a defined term that runs through every rung — if the unreasonable element sits inside a single definition rather than in a separable covenant, a court cannot blue-pencil it out and the clause may fail in its entirety [^maglis-sever-definition].
+
+## What legitimate interest must an employer show to enforce a Queensland non-compete? {#legitimate-interest}
+
+**Short answer.** A protectable business interest — not a mere wish to avoid competition. An employer cannot restrain a former employee simply because a rival might benefit; an employer must be prepared to face the competition of a former employee if it comes [^lindner-face-competition]. The recognised interests are the employer's customer connection and goodwill and its confidential information and trade secrets [^aeci-confidential-restraint].
+
+The dividing line drawn in *Lindner v Murdock's Garage* is between protecting an asset and suppressing a rival. A covenant aimed at competition by itself, rather than at a recognised interest, is invalid [^lindner-face-competition]. An employee's own general skill, experience, and know-how are the employee's to use — in one Queensland decision the court underlined that the worker was the employer's employee, not their slave [^gbar-not-slave].
+
+"An employer must be prepared to face the competition of a former employee if it comes."[^lindner-face-competition]
+
+Confidential information is a recognised interest in its own right, and a restraint protecting it need not be limited to a bare non-disclosure promise: it may stop the employee from joining a competitive business that could use the information [^aeci-confidential-restraint]. The practical point for drafters is that the interest has to be identified and real. An employer who cannot point to a genuine customer connection, goodwill, or confidential-information interest cannot enforce the clause whatever its scope.
+
+> [!CAUTION]
+> **Drafting note.**
+>
+> A clause that simply bars a former employee from joining or starting a competing business, without tying the restraint to a specific protectable interest, is the weakest position, because an employer is not entitled to protection against competition as such [^lindner-face-competition]. Identify the actual interest — the customer connection, the goodwill, or the confidential information — and draft the restraint around it; a covenant protecting confidential information can extend to barring work for a competitor that could use that information [^aeci-confidential-restraint].
+
+## How long and how wide can a Queensland non-compete be? {#reasonableness-factors}
+
+**Short answer.** There is no statutory limit; reasonableness is decided case by case on the activity restrained, the geographic area, the duration, and the employee's seniority and actual customer influence. Reasonableness is tested as at the date the contract was made, not by hindsight [^autoparts-tested-at-contract]. A geographic area wider than the employer's business reaches, or a period longer than is needed to protect the interest, is likely to be unreasonable [^lindner-area-too-wide].
+
+Because the limits are judge-made, there is no fixed ceiling to anchor a covenant, and the analysis cuts both ways. In *Lindner v Murdock's Garage* the High Court held an area covenant void because the area it covered was wider than the employer's business reasonably required [^lindner-area-too-wide]. By contrast, in *Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper* the Supreme Court enforced a six-month, statewide restraint on senior managers, treating that scope as reasonable given their seniority and customer contact.
+
+On duration, the usual question for a customer-connection interest is how long it takes for the former employee's influence over clients to fade — one test is to ask how long it will take the connection between the ex-employee and the customer to die away [^autoparts-die-away]. The parties' own statement that a restraint is reasonable carries some weight but does not bind the court [^autoparts-acknowledgement-not-binding]. There is no fixed numeric ceiling: a six-month restraint on senior managers was held reasonable in *Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper*, and as a general matter longer periods attract closer scrutiny and require a correspondingly stronger interest to justify them.
+
+"One test is to ask how long it will take the connection between the ex-employee and the customer to die away."[^autoparts-die-away]
+
+## Do paid restraints, garden leave, and fresh consideration help in Queensland? {#garden-leave}
+
+**Short answer.** They can strengthen an employer's position, but they do not displace the reasonableness requirement. A restraint the employee was paid to accept is more likely to be enforced, and a court gives weight to what the parties negotiated — though their own acknowledgement that a clause is reasonable does not bind the court [^autoparts-acknowledgement-not-binding-gl]. Garden leave, where the employee stays employed and paid through a notice period, is assessed against the same reasonableness framework rather than being automatically valid; a restraint the employee is paid to observe weighs in favour of enforcement.
+
+Queensland decisions treat consideration paid for a restraint as a meaningful factor. In *AECI Australia Pty Ltd v Convey* the employee had bargained for and been paid a sum the court described as the value of one year of the employee's salary in return for the restraint, and the court regarded that payment as significant support for the clause's reasonableness, even though it ultimately refused interlocutory relief for other reasons [^aeci-paid-restraint]. As a matter of doctrine, garden leave does not sit in a special category: a period in which the employer continues to pay the employee not to compete is assessed against the same reasonableness framework as any other restraint, and the fact that the employee is being paid to observe the restriction is a factor that weighs in favour of enforcement rather than a guarantee of it.
+
+For mid-employment restraints — covenants introduced after the employee is already on foot — the practical concern is that validity is tested as at the date the restraint is made [^autoparts-tested-at-contract-gl], so a restraint added later is judged on the circumstances then, not on the original hiring, and needs its own consideration.
+
+## What if the employer wrongfully dismissed the employee? {#employer-breach}
+
+**Short answer.** The restraint may fall away. The employer carries the onus of proving the restraint reasonable in the first place [^lindner-onus], so an employer seeking an injunction already starts from a position where it must justify the covenant. Beyond that, the long-standing common-law principle associated with *General Billposting Co Ltd v Atkinson* [1909] AC 118 is that an employer who wrongfully dismisses an employee — for example by repudiating the contract through a dismissal without the notice the contract requires — generally cannot afterwards enforce a post-employment restraint against that employee. The staged Queensland authorities here do not themselves decide that point, so it is best treated as a general principle a court may apply rather than a settled Queensland rule.
+
+The reasonableness analysis assumes a clause the employer is entitled to rely on, and the employer bears the onus of establishing that reasonableness [^lindner-onus]. Where the employer is the party in serious breach, a court may, applying the general common-law principle, treat the employee as released from the covenant; and in any event the equitable remedy an employer needs — chiefly an injunction — is discretionary and sensitive to the employer's own conduct.
+
+> [!NOTE]
+> **Practice note.**
+>
+> The employer already bears the onus of proving the restraint reasonable before any question of its own breach arises [^lindner-onus]. On top of that, an employer that terminates abruptly — without giving contractual notice or paying in lieu — may risk losing the very non-compete it wants to rely on, because under the general common-law principle a repudiatory breach by the employer can release the employee from the restraint. That repudiation point is not settled by the Queensland authorities discussed here, so treat it as a risk rather than a certainty: before suing to enforce a covenant, confirm that the termination itself complied with the contract.
+
+## Does a Queensland non-compete pause or extend if the employee breaches? {#tolling}
+
+**Short answer.** This is an open question, and an employer should not assume the clock stops. No settled Queensland authority holds that a restraint period tolls — pauses and then resumes — while a former employee is in breach or while litigation runs. Reasonableness is determined as at the date of the agreement [^autoparts-tested-at-contract-tolling], which sits uneasily with a clause that purports to lengthen the restraint automatically depending on the employee's later conduct.
+
+Because validity is fixed at the date of contract, a drafting device that extends the period by the length of any breach pushes the effective duration beyond what was assessed as reasonable at the outset, and there is no clear Queensland authority validating it. Australian courts tend to treat rolling or indefinite restraints with suspicion and to prefer addressing a breach through a tailored injunction or damages rather than by extending the restraint period. The safer assumption is that the stated period is the maximum the employer can rely on.
+
+> [!CAUTION]
+> **Drafting note.**
+>
+> Do not rely on a clause that purports to extend the non-compete by the length of any breach. No clear Queensland authority validates tolling of the restraint period, and because reasonableness is determined as at the date of the agreement, an automatic extension risks being treated as unreasonable [^autoparts-tested-at-contract-tolling]. Treat the stated duration as the maximum and address an actual breach through an injunction or a damages claim instead.
+
+## Do Queensland restraint rules differ for contractors and business sales? {#contractors-and-sale}
+
+**Short answer.** Yes, in different directions. Restraints on independent contractors are assessed under the same restraint-of-trade doctrine as employee covenants — the same legitimate-interest requirement and the same no-wider-than-necessary test — so the label of the relationship matters less than the substance of the interest the restraint actually protects. Restraints given by the seller of a business, by contrast, are judged much more leniently, because a buyer is entitled to protect the goodwill it paid for [^lindner-sale-distinction].
+
+The sale-of-business leniency is long-standing and uncontroversial — it predates *Lindner* and has never been in doubt, so the way the point is expressed in that case (in a judgment that dissented on the ultimate outcome) reflects settled doctrine rather than any minority view. A restraint in a sale agreement is more easily upheld than the same restraint in an employment contract [^lindner-sale-more-easily], because the policy concerns that make employment covenants suspect — unequal bargaining power and the risk of locking a person out of their livelihood — are weaker when a vendor sells a business for value and promises not to compete away the goodwill just sold. The Court of Appeal has drawn the same line in reverse: a party whose business model merely depends on another's future activity, and who imposes a non-compete to protect that future income rather than purchased goodwill, is more readily seen as merely anticompetitive and requires closer scrutiny [^reims-anticompetitive].
+
+For contractors, the key question is the same one that governs employees: is there a legitimate interest, and is the scope no wider than necessary to protect it. The label matters less than the substance of the relationship and the interest at stake.
+
+## Is a federal ban on non-competes coming to Australia? {#federal-reform}
+
+**Short answer.** A ban has been proposed but is not yet law, and as of June 2026 the common-law restraint-of-trade framework above still governs in Queensland [^reims-still-governs]. According to Australian Government Treasury material and law-firm commentary, the Government announced in the 2025–26 Federal Budget that it intends to ban post-employment non-competes for workers earning under the Fair Work Act high-income threshold (reported at around AUD $183,100), with Treasury running a consultation on the design, and the reform expected to be legislated during 2026 and to take effect from 2027, operating prospectively. Those figures and dates come from that secondary material — Treasury announcements and commentary — not from any enacted statute. Until any ban is enacted, the existing common-law framework continues to govern [^reims-still-governs].
+
+The proposal, as described in current Treasury material and law-firm commentary rather than in any enacted statute, would cover most employees earning below the high-income threshold while excluding sale-of-business covenants and restraints on higher earners. Non-solicitation, no-poach, and wage-fixing arrangements are also reported to be under consideration. None of this is in force, and the precise scope, threshold, and commencement could change before any legislation passes; the threshold figure and the 2026/2027 timeline in particular are drawn from secondary reporting and should be re-checked against the enacted text when it appears.
+
+Because this is a future legislative matter, employers should treat the timeline and detail as provisional rather than settled. A covenant entered into now is governed by existing Queensland law; whether and how a future ban would affect existing or new agreements will depend on the enacted text and its transitional provisions.
+
+> [!NOTE]
+> **Practice note.**
+>
+> Do not draft to a federal ban that does not yet exist. As of June 2026 no Commonwealth statute bans employee non-competes, so enforceability in Queensland still turns on the common-law reasonableness test and the blue-pencil-only severance rule [^reims-still-governs]. Track the proposal through to enacted legislation before changing practice, because its threshold, scope, and commencement remain proposals subject to change.
+
+[^about]: By Steven Obiajulu, J.D. Published by [openagreements.org](https://openagreements.org). Last reviewed 2026-06-10. License: CC BY 4.0. Steven Obiajulu, J.D. is not admitted to practise law in Queensland, Australia. This article summarizes publicly available Queensland, Australia legal sources for general information only — it is not legal advice and does not create a lawyer–client relationship. It may not reflect the most recent legal developments and is provided without warranty as to accuracy or completeness; verify against the primary sources cited and consult a locally qualified lawyer before relying on it.
+
+[^aeci-presumed-void]: **AECI Australia Pty Ltd v Convey** — "A term in a contract, which is a restraint of trade ('a restraint clause'), is presumed to be void as contrary to public policy." *AECI Australia Pty Ltd v Convey [2020] QSC 207 (Bradley J), quoting Just Group Ltd v Peck (2016) 344 ALR 162.* <https://archive.sclqld.org.au/qjudgment/2020/QSC20-207.pdf>
+
+[^reims-invalid-unless-reasonable]: **Reims Investments Pty Ltd v City Fertility Sydney CBD Pty Ltd** — "A restraint will be invalid unless it is proven to be reasonable as between the parties or if proven to be unreasonable in the public interest." *Reims Investments Pty Ltd v City Fertility Sydney CBD Pty Ltd [2025] QCA 243 (Doyle JA).* <https://archive.sclqld.org.au/qjudgment/2025/QCA25-243.pdf>
+
+[^autoparts-onus]: **Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper** — "The party who seeks to enforce the restraint has the onus of proving that the restraint is reasonable as between the parties." *Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper [2015] QSC 155, quoting Vision Eye Institute Ltd v Kitchen [2014] QSC 260.* <https://archive.sclqld.org.au/qjudgment/2015/QSC15-155.pdf>
+
+[^aeci-competition-per-se]: **AECI Australia Pty Ltd v Convey** — "a purchaser of a business is entitled to protect itself from competition by the vendor; but an employer is not entitled to protect itself from competition per se by an employee." *AECI Australia Pty Ltd v Convey [2020] QSC 207 (Bradley J), quoting Just Group Ltd v Peck (2016) 344 ALR 162.* <https://archive.sclqld.org.au/qjudgment/2020/QSC20-207.pdf>
+
+[^autoparts-no-rewrite]: **Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper** — "Courts will not rewrite the parties' contract for them. However, within certain limits which are not alleged to have been exceeded in this case, a contract may contain cascading restraint of trade clauses." *Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper [2015] QSC 155, quoting Vision Eye Institute Ltd v Kitchen [2014] QSC 260.* <https://archive.sclqld.org.au/qjudgment/2015/QSC15-155.pdf>
+
+[^autoparts-severance]: **Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper** — "Provisions in a restrictive covenant may be severed if they are capable of being regarded as divisible and deleted without materially modifying the effect of what remains. In addition, the parties may expressly provide that each obligation has independent operation and is severable." *Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper [2015] QSC 155, quoting Vision Eye Institute Ltd v Kitchen [2014] QSC 260.* <https://archive.sclqld.org.au/qjudgment/2015/QSC15-155.pdf>
+
+[^aeci-no-read-down]: **AECI Australia Pty Ltd v Convey** — "it is not permissible for the Court to approach the construction of a restraint clause by first determining what degree of restriction would be justified; and then reading down an unduly wide clause in order to preserve its validity." *AECI Australia Pty Ltd v Convey [2020] QSC 207 (Bradley J), quoting Just Group Ltd v Peck (2016) 344 ALR 162.* <https://archive.sclqld.org.au/qjudgment/2020/QSC20-207.pdf>
+
+[^maglis-cannot-be-severed]: **Perpetual Limited v Maglis** — "I consider the argument for validity of the restraint clause has real challenges, having regard to the extremely broad definition of ‘Client’, which I do not accept is capable of being severed, read down, or read with additional words, as submitted by the applicants." *Perpetual Limited v Maglis [2025] QSC 71 (Bowskill CJ).* <https://archive.sclqld.org.au/qjudgment/2025/QSC25-071.pdf>
+
+[^autoparts-cascading]: **Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper** — "Courts will not rewrite the parties' contract for them. However, within certain limits which are not alleged to have been exceeded in this case, a contract may contain cascading restraint of trade clauses." *Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper [2015] QSC 155, quoting Vision Eye Institute Ltd v Kitchen [2014] QSC 260.* <https://archive.sclqld.org.au/qjudgment/2015/QSC15-155.pdf>
+
+[^autoparts-severance-cascade]: **Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper** — "Provisions in a restrictive covenant may be severed if they are capable of being regarded as divisible and deleted without materially modifying the effect of what remains. In addition, the parties may expressly provide that each obligation has independent operation and is severable." *Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper [2015] QSC 155, quoting Vision Eye Institute Ltd v Kitchen [2014] QSC 260.* <https://archive.sclqld.org.au/qjudgment/2015/QSC15-155.pdf>
+
+[^maglis-sever-definition]: **Perpetual Limited v Maglis** — "I consider the argument for validity of the restraint clause has real challenges, having regard to the extremely broad definition of ‘Client’, which I do not accept is capable of being severed, read down, or read with additional words, as submitted by the applicants." *Perpetual Limited v Maglis [2025] QSC 71 (Bowskill CJ).* <https://archive.sclqld.org.au/qjudgment/2025/QSC25-071.pdf>
+
+[^lindner-face-competition]: **Lindner v Murdock's Garage** — "An employer must be prepared to face the competition of a former employee if it comes." *Lindner v Murdock's Garage [1950] HCA 48; (1950) 83 CLR 628 (per McTiernan J).* <https://www.hcourt.gov.au/sites/default/files/eresources/1950/HCA/48.pdf>
+
+[^aeci-confidential-restraint]: **AECI Australia Pty Ltd v Convey** — "It may restrain the employee from being involved with a competitive business that could use the confidential information." *AECI Australia Pty Ltd v Convey [2020] QSC 207 (Bradley J), quoting Just Group Ltd v Peck (2016) 344 ALR 162.* <https://archive.sclqld.org.au/qjudgment/2020/QSC20-207.pdf>
+
+[^gbar-not-slave]: **GBAR (Australia) Pty Ltd v Brown** — "He was GBAR's employee, not their slave." *GBAR (Australia) Pty Ltd v Brown [2020] QSC 14 (Bradley J).* <https://archive.sclqld.org.au/qjudgment/2020/QSC20-014.pdf>
+
+[^autoparts-tested-at-contract]: **Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper** — "The reasonableness of the restraint is determined at the date of entry into the agreement." *Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper [2015] QSC 155, quoting Vision Eye Institute Ltd v Kitchen [2014] QSC 260.* <https://archive.sclqld.org.au/qjudgment/2015/QSC15-155.pdf>
+
+[^lindner-area-too-wide]: **Lindner v Murdock's Garage** — "I think it must be held that the area was unreasonably wide." *Lindner v Murdock's Garage [1950] HCA 48; (1950) 83 CLR 628 (per McTiernan J).* <https://www.hcourt.gov.au/sites/default/files/eresources/1950/HCA/48.pdf>
+
+[^autoparts-die-away]: **Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper** — "One test is to ask how long it will take the connection between the ex-employee and the customer to die away." *Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper [2015] QSC 155, quoting Vision Eye Institute Ltd v Kitchen [2014] QSC 260.* <https://archive.sclqld.org.au/qjudgment/2015/QSC15-155.pdf>
+
+[^autoparts-acknowledgement-not-binding]: **Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper** — "However, a declaration by a party that a restraint is reasonable does not bind the court." *Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper [2015] QSC 155, quoting Vision Eye Institute Ltd v Kitchen [2014] QSC 260.* <https://archive.sclqld.org.au/qjudgment/2015/QSC15-155.pdf>
+
+[^autoparts-acknowledgement-not-binding-gl]: **Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper** — "However, a declaration by a party that a restraint is reasonable does not bind the court." *Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper [2015] QSC 155, quoting Vision Eye Institute Ltd v Kitchen [2014] QSC 260.* <https://archive.sclqld.org.au/qjudgment/2015/QSC15-155.pdf>
+
+[^aeci-paid-restraint]: **AECI Australia Pty Ltd v Convey** — "AECI was prepared to pay a significant sum (namely one year of the Employee's salary) for the right it seeks to vindicate" *AECI Australia Pty Ltd v Convey [2020] QSC 207 (Bradley J).* <https://archive.sclqld.org.au/qjudgment/2020/QSC20-207.pdf>
+
+[^autoparts-tested-at-contract-gl]: **Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper** — "The reasonableness of the restraint is determined at the date of entry into the agreement." *Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper [2015] QSC 155, quoting Vision Eye Institute Ltd v Kitchen [2014] QSC 260.* <https://archive.sclqld.org.au/qjudgment/2015/QSC15-155.pdf>
+
+[^lindner-onus]: **Lindner v Murdock's Garage** — "The onus was on the plaintiff firm to prove circumstances showing that the restriction on the defendant's freedom to work was reasonable." *Lindner v Murdock's Garage [1950] HCA 48; (1950) 83 CLR 628 (per McTiernan J).* <https://www.hcourt.gov.au/sites/default/files/eresources/1950/HCA/48.pdf>
+
+[^autoparts-tested-at-contract-tolling]: **Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper** — "The reasonableness of the restraint is determined at the date of entry into the agreement." *Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper [2015] QSC 155, quoting Vision Eye Institute Ltd v Kitchen [2014] QSC 260.* <https://archive.sclqld.org.au/qjudgment/2015/QSC15-155.pdf>
+
+[^lindner-sale-distinction]: **Lindner v Murdock's Garage** — "A distinction is drawn between a restraint upon trade included in an agreement for the sale of a business and a restraint included in an agreement with an employee." *Lindner v Murdock's Garage [1950] HCA 48; (1950) 83 CLR 628 (per Latham CJ).* <https://www.hcourt.gov.au/sites/default/files/eresources/1950/HCA/48.pdf>
+
+[^lindner-sale-more-easily]: **Lindner v Murdock's Garage** — "The restraint is more easily upheld in the former than in the latter case." *Lindner v Murdock's Garage [1950] HCA 48; (1950) 83 CLR 628 (per Latham CJ).* <https://www.hcourt.gov.au/sites/default/files/eresources/1950/HCA/48.pdf>
+
+[^reims-anticompetitive]: **Reims Investments Pty Ltd v City Fertility Sydney CBD Pty Ltd** — "The latter is more readily described as merely anticompetitive and requires closer scrutiny." *Reims Investments Pty Ltd v City Fertility Sydney CBD Pty Ltd [2025] QCA 243 (Doyle JA).* <https://archive.sclqld.org.au/qjudgment/2025/QCA25-243.pdf>
+
+[^reims-still-governs]: **Reims Investments Pty Ltd v City Fertility Sydney CBD Pty Ltd** — "A restraint will be invalid unless it is proven to be reasonable as between the parties or if proven to be unreasonable in the public interest." *Reims Investments Pty Ltd v City Fertility Sydney CBD Pty Ltd [2025] QCA 243 (Doyle JA).* <https://archive.sclqld.org.au/qjudgment/2025/QCA25-243.pdf>

package/skills/{non-compete-contract-explainer → legal-explainers/non-compete-contract-explainer}/content/rhode-island.md

@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@
 jurisdiction: "Rhode Island"
 slug: rhode-island
 countryCode: US
-snapshotAsOf: "2026-06-08"
+snapshotAsOf: "2026-06-19"
 lastReviewed: "2026-06-02"
-canonicalUrl: https://openagreements.org/legal/non-compete/rhode-island
+canonicalUrl: https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/non-compete/us/rhode-island
 license: CC BY 4.0
 stale: false
 ---
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ stale: false
 > relationship, and is not a substitute for a licensed attorney in the relevant jurisdiction.
 > Laws change; verify against the canonical version before relying on it.
 >
-> **Canonical:** https://openagreements.org/legal/non-compete/rhode-island · **Snapshot as of:** 2026-06-08 · License: CC BY 4.0 · © UseJunior
+> **Canonical:** https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/non-compete/us/rhode-island · **Snapshot as of:** 2026-06-19 · License: CC BY 4.0 · © openagreements.org
 
 # Non-Competes in Rhode Island[^about]
 
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ The restraint in *Walls* was customer-focused. It barred solicitation and pest-c
 
 **Short answer.** Usually yes if equitable. *Durapin* adopted partial enforcement rather than an all-or-nothing or mechanical blue-pencil rule, absent bad faith or deliberate overreaching [^durapin-partial-enforcement].
 
-Partial enforcement is not a drafting strategy. Even under *Durapin*, the court should go no further than reasonably necessary to protect the promisee's legitimate interests [^durapin-no-further-than-necessary]. Overbreadth still creates litigation risk and may leave the employer without meaningful relief if the employee did not jeopardize a protectable interest.
+Partial enforcement is not a drafting strategy. Even under *Durapin*, the court should go no further than reasonably necessary to protect the promisee's legitimate interests [^durapin-no-further-than-necessary]. Overbreadth still creates litigation risk and may leave the employer without meaningful relief if the employee did not jeopardize a protectable interest. For a clause-by-clause pass over a specific agreement against these limits, the [Rhode Island non-compete review checklist](/checklists/non-compete/us/rhode-island) walks the full covenant suite item by item with each requirement's force level.
 
 RINAA also has a severability rule for contracts containing a non-compete that is unenforceable under § 28-59-3. That rule preserves the remainder of the contract and allows a court to impose a non-compete restriction as a remedy for breach of another agreement or duty [^rinaa-severability-remedy].
 
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ The federal FTC Non-Compete Rule is also background rather than an operative Rho
 >
 > Rhode Island non-compete law may change through future legislation, but un-enacted bills do not replace the enacted worker-category statute. Check Chapter 28-59 and any active bill text before reusing a Rhode Island form [^rinaa-current-baseline].
 
-[^about]: By Steven Obiajulu, J.D. Published by [openagreements.org](https://openagreements.org) · Maintained by [UseJunior](https://usejunior.com). Last reviewed 2026-06-02. License: CC BY 4.0. Steven Obiajulu, J.D. is admitted in New York, not Rhode Island. This article synthesizes Rhode Island primary law and is not legal advice from a Rhode Island-admitted attorney. This article is for informational purposes only and does not create an attorney-client relationship.
+[^about]: By Steven Obiajulu, J.D. Published by [openagreements.org](https://openagreements.org). Last reviewed 2026-06-02. License: CC BY 4.0. Steven Obiajulu, J.D. is admitted in New York, not Rhode Island. This article synthesizes Rhode Island primary law and is not legal advice from a Rhode Island-admitted attorney. This article is for informational purposes only and does not create an attorney-client relationship.
 
 [^rinaa-covered-workers]: **R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-59-3** — "A noncompetition agreement shall not be enforceable against the following types of workers:" *R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-59-3(a).* <https://webserver.rilegislature.gov/Statutes/TITLE28/28-59/28-59-3.htm>
 

package/skills/{non-compete-contract-explainer/content/singapore.md → legal-explainers/non-compete-contract-explainer/content/sg.md}

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 ---
 jurisdiction: "Singapore"
-slug: singapore
+slug: sg
 countryCode: SG
-snapshotAsOf: "2026-06-08"
+snapshotAsOf: "2026-06-19"
 lastReviewed: "2026-06-03"
-canonicalUrl: https://openagreements.org/legal/non-compete/singapore
+canonicalUrl: https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/non-compete/sg
 license: CC BY 4.0
 stale: false
 ---
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ stale: false
 > relationship, and is not a substitute for a licensed attorney in the relevant jurisdiction.
 > Laws change; verify against the canonical version before relying on it.
 >
-> **Canonical:** https://openagreements.org/legal/non-compete/singapore · **Snapshot as of:** 2026-06-08 · License: CC BY 4.0 · © UseJunior
+> **Canonical:** https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/non-compete/sg · **Snapshot as of:** 2026-06-19 · License: CC BY 4.0 · © openagreements.org
 
 # Non-Competes in Singapore[^about]
 
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ The Ministry of Manpower, the National Trades Union Congress, and the Singapore
 >
 > Do not draft to an anticipated tripartite guideline that does not yet exist. No MOM restraint-of-trade guideline is in force as of June 2026, so the enforceability of a Singapore non-compete still turns entirely on the common-law restraint-of-trade test, and any future guideline is expected to build on those same court-articulated principles [^mom-pq].
 
-[^about]: By Steven Obiajulu, J.D. Published by [openagreements.org](https://openagreements.org) · Maintained by [UseJunior](https://usejunior.com). Last reviewed 2026-06-03. License: CC BY 4.0. Steven Obiajulu, J.D. is admitted in New York, not Singapore. This article synthesizes Singapore primary law and is not legal advice from a Singapore-admitted attorney. This article is for informational purposes only and does not create an attorney-client relationship.
+[^about]: By Steven Obiajulu, J.D. Published by [openagreements.org](https://openagreements.org). Last reviewed 2026-06-03. License: CC BY 4.0. Steven Obiajulu, J.D. is not admitted to practise law in Singapore. This article summarizes publicly available Singapore legal sources for general information only — it is not legal advice and does not create a lawyer–client relationship. It may not reflect the most recent legal developments and is provided without warranty as to accuracy or completeness; verify against the primary sources cited and consult a locally qualified lawyer before relying on it.
 
 [^mf-prima-facie-void]: **Man Financial (S) Pte Ltd v Wong Bark Chuan David** — "All interference with individual liberty of action in trading, and all restraints of trade of themselves, if there is nothing more, are contrary to public policy, and therefore void." *Man Financial (S) Pte Ltd v Wong Bark Chuan David [2007] SGCA 53; [2008] 1 SLR(R) 663.* <https://www.elitigation.sg/gdviewer/s/2007_SGCA_53>
 

package/skills/legal-explainers/non-compete-contract-explainer/content/south-australia.md

@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
+---
+jurisdiction: "South Australia, Australia"
+slug: south-australia
+countryCode: AU
+snapshotAsOf: "2026-06-19"
+lastReviewed: "2026-06-10"
+canonicalUrl: https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/non-compete/au/south-australia
+license: CC BY 4.0
+stale: false
+---
+
+> [!IMPORTANT]
+> **Informational only — not legal advice.** This is a snapshot of an OpenAgreements practice note,
+> provided for general information. It is not legal advice, does not create an attorney-client
+> relationship, and is not a substitute for a licensed attorney in the relevant jurisdiction.
+> Laws change; verify against the canonical version before relying on it.
+>
+> **Canonical:** https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/non-compete/au/south-australia · **Snapshot as of:** 2026-06-19 · License: CC BY 4.0 · © openagreements.org
+
+# Non-Compete Enforceability in South Australia[^about]
+
+In South Australia a post-employment non-compete is presumptively void as a restraint of trade and binds a former employee only so far as it is reasonable; South Australia has no statutory read-down power, so courts apply the common-law blue-pencil rule only — they can delete severable words but cannot rewrite an overbroad clause, and a clause that severance cannot save fails entirely.
+
+
+## At a glance
+
+| Question | South Australia, Australia |
+| --- | --- |
+| **Are non-competes enforceable?** | Allowed if reasonable |
+| **Bottom line** | A South Australian non-compete is presumptively void and binds a former employee only so far as it is reasonable to protect a legitimate interest; there is no statutory read-down power, so a court can only strike out grammatically severable words under the blue-pencil rule and an overbroad clause that severance cannot save fails entirely. |
+| **Main law or case** | Common-law restraint of trade (no equivalent of the NSW Restraints of Trade Act 1976) |
+| **Main exceptions** | Sale-of-business covenants are judged more leniently; a proposed federal ban would, if enacted, cover most employees earning under the Fair Work Act high-income threshold (with sale-of-business and above-threshold restraints reported to be excluded), but it is not yet law. |
+| **Can a court narrow it?** | Only strikes wording |
+| **Applies to contractors?** | Yes |
+| **Restriction extended during a breach?** | Untested; reasonableness is fixed at the date of contract, and no South Australian authority validates extending a restraint because of a breach. |
+| **Maximum length set by law** | No statutory cap; reasonableness is judged case by case by reference to the time needed to break the customer connection (a 12-month restraint was upheld in International Cleaning Services v Dmytrenko). |
+
+## Are employee non-competes enforceable in South Australia? {#enforceability}
+
+**Short answer.** Only so far as they are reasonable. A post-employment non-compete is treated as a restraint of trade, which the courts presume is void as contrary to public policy unless the party enforcing it shows that, in the particular circumstances, the restraint is reasonable [^dmytrenko-presumed-void]. The onus sits squarely on the employer: it must demonstrate a legitimate interest and show that the restraint goes no further than is necessary to protect that interest [^hydron-onus].
+
+South Australia is not a per se ban jurisdiction, and it has no statute that sets fixed numeric limits on duration or area. It is a reasonableness jurisdiction built entirely on the common-law restraint-of-trade doctrine. The starting point — confirmed by the High Court in *Lindner v Murdock's Garage*, an appeal from South Australia — is that every post-employment covenant is presumptively unenforceable and the burden of justifying it falls on the party seeking to enforce it [^lindner-onus].
+
+"At common law a restraint of trade is contrary to public policy and void unless it can be shown that the restraint is, in the particular circumstances of the case, reasonable."[^dmytrenko-presumed-void]
+
+Courts apply the doctrine more strictly to employment covenants than to covenants given on the sale of a business [^dmytrenko-stricter-view]. The Supreme Court of South Australia continues to apply the framework laid down in *Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co* and *Lindner v Murdock's Garage* today. The sections that follow work through whether a court can narrow an overbroad clause, why cascading clauses matter so much, what counts as a legitimate interest, how reasonableness of scope is judged, and the open question of whether a breach can extend the restraint.
+
+## Can a South Australian court narrow an overbroad non-compete? {#court-narrowing}
+
+**Short answer.** Only in a limited way, and far less generously than many employers assume. South Australia has no statute that lets a court read an overbroad restraint down to a reasonable level. A court applies the common-law blue-pencil rule only: it can delete severable words if what remains is reasonable, but it cannot read down, add to, or rewrite the clause. If the restraint confers greater protection than can be justified, it is unreasonable and unenforceable [^dmytrenko-greater-protection], and if severance cannot save it the whole restraint fails [^hydron-no-rewriting].
+
+The South Australian approach to severance is deletion, not editing. Where part of a restraint is invalid, that part may be severed from the balance and disregarded — an approach the Supreme Court has described in the traditional language of the blue pencil [^dmytrenko-blue-pencil].
+
+"In the context of these cases that approach is sometimes described as the blue pencil rule."[^dmytrenko-blue-pencil]
+
+*International Cleaning Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dmytrenko* is the worked example of severance actually rescuing a clause. Stanley J held that the covenant as drafted went too far, because it reached beyond working in or for a competitor to cover any indirect interest in anything that might assist a competitor — even a passive shareholding [^dmytrenko-severance-worked]. Rather than strike the whole clause down, his Honour deleted the offending words so that what remained was a clean prohibition on being employed directly or indirectly in any competitor, and enforced the trimmed restraint for its full 12-month term. The animating idea is that the court should hold the parties to the bargain they actually struck [^dmytrenko-destroyer].
+
+The limit of the technique appears in *Hydron Pty Ltd v Harous*. A severance clause cannot save a covenant whose defect runs through its core: the court there refused to excise internal parts of the restraint where doing so would have left no certain covenant behind [^hydron-no-rewriting]. Deletion must leave a sensible, self-contained restraint standing on its own; if it would take rewriting to get there, the covenant fails entirely.
+
+> [!CAUTION]
+> **Drafting note.**
+>
+> Because a South Australian court will not read an overbroad restraint down to a reasonable level — it can only delete severable words and cannot rewrite the clause — draft scope, area, and duration to the minimum the legitimate interest actually requires [^dmytrenko-greater-protection]. Structure the clause so that any over-reaching words can be struck out cleanly and leave a complete covenant behind; where deletion would leave no certain obligation, the whole restraint fails [^hydron-no-rewriting].
+
+## Are cascading or ladder restraint clauses valid in South Australia? {#cascading-clauses}
+
+**Short answer.** Yes, within limits, and they are essential drafting in South Australia precisely because a court cannot read an overbroad clause down. A cascading clause sets out a menu of progressively narrower combinations of period and area, each expressed as a separate, severable restraint, so that if the widest is unreasonable a narrower rung can still be enforced on its own. The Full Court upheld restraints built exactly this way in *Richmond v Moore Stephens Adelaide Pty Ltd* [^richmond-cascading], and a ladder clause supported by proper severance provisions is not void for uncertainty where it is a genuine attempt to define the protection needed [^hydron-genuine-attempt].
+
+*Richmond* is the South Australian anchor, and its context matters: the restraints arose from the sale of an accountancy practice together with an ongoing service agreement under which the seller continued to work in the practice, not from a bare employment contract. The service agreement restrained the principal from soliciting or dealing with clients and enticing away staff, with the restraint expressed as a cascade [^richmond-cascading].
+
+"These restraints operate for cascading periods ranging from three years to two years and down to 3 months after termination of the Service Agreement within cascading areas ranging from Australia down to 10 kilometres from the site the Principal carries on business."[^richmond-cascading]
+
+On that service agreement cascade, the Full Court found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that a two-year restraint after termination was reasonable on those facts [^richmond-two-years]. The business sale agreement carried its own separate cascade — four years down to one year, South Australia down to a 10-kilometre radius — which the Full Court likewise upheld at its longest rung of four years after completion. Because the restraints protected goodwill the buyer had paid for, the analysis was more generous than it would be for a covenant imposed on an ordinary employee, so the case should be read as validating the cascading structure rather than as a benchmark for employment durations.
+
+A cascade works only if each rung is genuinely independent and severable. In *Hydron Pty Ltd v Harous* the court accepted that ladder clauses generated by combining variables of conduct, time and area are not void for uncertainty where the agreements state that each combination is a separate covenant and the exercise is a genuine attempt to define the protection required [^hydron-genuine-attempt]. The contrast is a clause that piles up combinations with no statement of priority and no separate covenants: the court in *Hydron* cited the warning of Wootten J that what fails in such a case is not simply an area but a total covenant whose other terms shift underfoot [^hydron-wootten-total-covenant].
+
+> [!CAUTION]
+> **Drafting note.**
+>
+> A cascading clause is the practical answer to South Australia's no-read-down rule, but only if each rung is a self-contained, reasonable restraint that the agreement expressly treats as a separate covenant [^hydron-genuine-attempt]. A pile of mechanical combinations with no severance architecture risks failing as a whole, because a court cannot decide what the covenant forbids when the conduct, period and area all move at once [^hydron-wootten-total-covenant].
+
+## What legitimate interest must an employer show to enforce a South Australian non-compete? {#legitimate-interest}
+
+**Short answer.** A protectable business interest — not a mere wish to avoid competition. An employer cannot restrain a former employee simply because a rival might benefit; an employer must be prepared to face the competition of a former employee if it comes [^lindner-face-competition]. The recognised interests are the employer's customer connection and goodwill and its confidential information; the employee's own skill, experience and know-how remain the employee's to use [^dmytrenko-mere-competition].
+
+The dividing line drawn by the High Court in *Lindner v Murdock's Garage* — a South Australian appeal — is between protecting an asset and suppressing a rival. A covenant aimed at competition by itself, rather than at a recognised interest, is invalid [^lindner-face-competition].
+
+"An employer must be prepared to face the competition of a former employee if it comes."[^lindner-face-competition]
+
+The Full Court's decision in *N P Generations Pty Ltd v Feneley* marks the same line for confidential information. A departing rental property manager had compiled an address book of the employer's landlords from its records: because the list was confided to her for the limited purpose of doing her job, she was obliged to hand it back when the employment ended [^feneley-address-book]. Her work diary, by contrast, was built up from day-to-day appointments, contained material fairly described as her own general knowledge, skill and experience, and was held not to be confidential at all [^feneley-diary]. The customer list belonged to the business; the working knowledge belonged to the person.
+
+That second half of the line is just as important in the restraint context. An employer is not entitled to protection against mere competition, and a former employee is entitled to deploy the skill, experience and know-how acquired in the old job in legitimate competition with it [^dmytrenko-mere-competition]. What can be protected is the customer connection the employee built up at the employer's expense and the genuinely confidential information the role exposed them to — in *Dmytrenko* the court accepted that the risk of clients simply following a well-connected former employee to a competitor was a legitimate interest supporting a non-compete, even if the employee did nothing active to draw them across.
+
+> [!CAUTION]
+> **Drafting note.**
+>
+> A clause that simply bars a former employee from joining or starting a competing business, without tying the restraint to a specific protectable interest, is the weakest position, because an employer is not entitled to protection against competition as such [^lindner-face-competition]. Identify the actual interest — the customer connection or the confidential information — and draft around it, remembering that material reflecting the employee's own accumulated skill and experience cannot be claimed back [^feneley-diary].
+
+## How long and how wide can a South Australian non-compete be? {#reasonableness-factors}
+
+**Short answer.** There is no statutory limit; reasonableness is decided case by case on the activity restrained, the geographic area, the duration, and the employee's actual customer influence. The restraint must impose no more than adequate protection on the party it favours [^dmytrenko-adequate-protection], it is assessed prospectively as at the date of the agreement rather than with hindsight [^richmond-prospective], and an area wider than the business reasonably requires is fatal [^lindner-area-too-wide].
+
+Because the limits are judge-made, there is no fixed ceiling to anchor a covenant, and the analysis cuts both ways. In *Lindner v Murdock's Garage* the High Court held a covenant void because it covered an area wider than the employer's business reasonably required [^lindner-area-too-wide]. By contrast, in *International Cleaning Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dmytrenko* a statewide restraint on a senior business-development employee of a commercial cleaning company was upheld — the former employee conceded the geographic reach was reasonable, and the court found that it was.
+
+On duration, the question for a customer-connection interest is how long it takes to break the bond between the departing employee and the clients they dealt with. In *Dmytrenko* the evidence showed it had taken the employee about a year to build relationships with most key clients, and client contracts generally ran for more than a year, so a 12-month restraint was the period needed to sever the connection [^dmytrenko-twelve-months].
+
+"In the circumstances a 12-month restraint is necessary to sever the connection between the respondent and the applicant's customers with whom he dealt."[^dmytrenko-twelve-months]
+
+Two further points shape the analysis. First, the test is what protection is adequate — anything more is over-reach [^dmytrenko-adequate-protection]. Second, reasonableness is fixed when the contract is made: it is assessed prospectively by reference to the contingencies as at the date of the agreement, not retrospectively by reference to how events actually unfolded [^richmond-prospective]. A clause that looks defensible against later events but was over-wide when signed is still void.
+
+## Do paid restraints, garden leave, and fresh consideration help in South Australia? {#garden-leave}
+
+**Short answer.** Payment helps but is not required, and garden leave as such has not been squarely tested in the staged South Australian authorities. The Supreme Court has held that the absence of any obligation to pay the former employee during the restraint period does not, of itself, make the restraint unreasonable [^dmytrenko-no-payment-rule] — payment, where it exists, simply reflects the bargain the parties struck [^dmytrenko-payment-bargain].
+
+The point arose directly in *International Cleaning Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dmytrenko*. The former employee argued that a 12-month restraint was unreasonable because he had no entitlement to be paid during it. Stanley J rejected the submission: while some restraints have been upheld where the employer paid the former employee through the restraint period, there is no rule running the other way [^dmytrenko-no-payment-rule].
+
+"Generally, the existence of an obligation to pay the former employee his or her salary during the period of the restraint reflects the terms of the bargain struck between the parties."[^dmytrenko-payment-bargain]
+
+That cuts in both directions for drafters. Paying a former employee to sit out the restraint can only strengthen the employer's position on reasonableness, because it lightens the burden the covenant places on the employee — but it does not displace the requirement to prove a legitimate interest and a no-wider-than-necessary scope. Garden leave, where the employee stays employed and paid through a notice period, would be assessed under the same reasonableness framework rather than enjoying any special validity; none of the South Australian decisions discussed here rules on a garden-leave clause as such, so its treatment should be regarded as following the general doctrine rather than as settled by local authority. For mid-employment covenants introduced after hiring, the relevant baseline is that validity is judged at the date the covenant is entered into [^dmytrenko-tested-at-contract], so a restraint added later is assessed against the circumstances then and needs its own consideration.
+
+## What if the employer wrongfully dismissed the employee? {#employer-breach}
+
+**Short answer.** It depends on the contract — South Australia's Full Court has rejected the idea that an employer's breach automatically kills the restraint. In *Richmond v Moore Stephens Adelaide Pty Ltd* the covenantor argued that the principle in *General Billposting Co Ltd v Atkinson* laid down a rule of law that a repudiating party can never enforce a post-termination restraint; the Full Court held instead that whether the restraint survives termination depends on the proper construction of the contract [^richmond-construction]. An employer in serious breach can still lose the covenant — but by the route of construction and the facts of termination, not by an automatic rule.
+
+*Richmond* litigated the question on facts connected to the sale of an accountancy practice and an associated service agreement, not a bare employment relationship. The covenantor contended that the covenantee's defaults — chiefly ceasing to pay interest on the outstanding purchase price — amounted to repudiation that freed him of the restraints. The Full Court applied the orthodox threshold: conduct amounts to repudiation only where a party shows itself unwilling or unable to render substantial performance [^richmond-repudiation-standard], and held on the facts that the threshold was not met, so the covenantor and his company were not entitled to terminate [^richmond-no-termination].
+
+"Mr Richmond's contention should be rejected because the question whether the restraint clause survives must depend on the proper construction of the contract."[^richmond-construction]
+
+Two practical conclusions follow. First, the outcome turns on who validly terminated: the Full Court construed the agreements so that the restraints would not have survived a valid termination by the covenantor for the covenantee's breach or repudiation before the agreed term had run — it was the failure of that termination on the facts that left the restraints standing [^richmond-no-termination]. Second, the *General Billposting* concern still has force through construction and through equity: an injunction is a discretionary remedy, and an enforcing party's own serious misconduct will weigh against it.
+
+> [!NOTE]
+> **Practice note.**
+>
+> South Australia's Full Court treats survival of the restraint as a question of construction rather than an automatic rule [^richmond-construction], and on the construction adopted in *Richmond* — a sale-and-services context, not an employment dismissal — the restraints would not have survived a valid termination by the covenantor for the covenantee's breach. By analogy, an employer that terminates abruptly — without giving contractual notice or paying in lieu — risks losing the very non-compete it wants to rely on, with the *General Billposting* principle reinforcing the same caution at common law. Before suing to enforce a covenant, confirm that the termination itself complied with the contract.
+
+## Does a South Australian non-compete pause or extend if the employee breaches? {#tolling}
+
+**Short answer.** This is an open question, and an employer should not assume the clock stops. No settled South Australian authority holds that a restraint period tolls — pauses and then resumes — while a former employee is in breach or while litigation runs. Validity is judged at the date the contract is entered into [^dmytrenko-tested-at-contract-tolling], which sits uneasily with a clause that purports to lengthen the restraint automatically depending on the employee's later conduct.
+
+Because validity is fixed at the date of contract, a drafting device that extends the period by the length of any breach pushes the effective duration beyond what was assessed as reasonable at the outset, and there is no clear South Australian authority validating it. An employer that needs relief for an actual breach is on firmer ground seeking a tailored injunction or damages than relying on the clause itself to stretch the restraint. The safer assumption is that the stated period is the maximum the employer can rely on.
+
+> [!CAUTION]
+> **Drafting note.**
+>
+> Do not rely on a clause that purports to extend the non-compete by the length of any breach. No clear South Australian authority validates tolling of the restraint period, and because validity is judged at the date of entry into the contract, an automatic extension risks being treated as unreasonable [^dmytrenko-tested-at-contract-tolling]. Treat the stated duration as the maximum and address an actual breach through an injunction or a damages claim instead.
+
+## Do South Australian restraint rules differ for contractors and business sales? {#contractors-and-sale}
+
+**Short answer.** Yes, in different directions. Restraints on independent contractors are assessed under the same restraint-of-trade doctrine as employee covenants — in *Richmond v Moore Stephens Adelaide Pty Ltd* the restraint sat in a service agreement between a principal and a contractor company, and the ordinary reasonableness analysis applied [^richmond-overall-circumstances]. Restraints given by the seller of a business, by contrast, are judged more leniently, because a buyer is entitled to protect the goodwill it paid for [^lindner-sale-distinction].
+
+The sale-of-business leniency is long-standing and uncontroversial — it predates *Lindner v Murdock's Garage* and has never been in doubt, so the way the point is expressed in that case (in a judgment that dissented on the ultimate outcome) reflects settled doctrine rather than any minority view. A restraint in a sale agreement is more easily upheld than the same restraint in an employment contract [^lindner-sale-more-easily], and the Supreme Court of South Australia has put the converse directly: courts in general take a stricter and less favourable view of covenants between employer and employee than of covenants between vendor and purchaser [^hydron-stricter-view].
+
+*Richmond* shows the leniency working in the covenantee's favour where employment-like and sale elements are mixed. Because the business sale agreement and the service agreement were inextricably intertwined, the court assessed the restraint in the service agreement against the whole transaction — including the goodwill the buyer had paid for — rather than as a stand-alone working-relationship covenant [^richmond-overall-circumstances]. But the sale label is not a blank cheque. In *Hydron Pty Ltd v Harous* the restraints in the business sale documents themselves were struck down because they ran from the end of the seller's later employment rather than from the transfer of the business, and so bore no real connection to the goodwill actually acquired [^hydron-goodwill-connection]. Substance controls over form in both directions: a sale covenant must genuinely protect the purchased goodwill, and a contractor covenant gets no extra latitude merely because the worker is not called an employee.
+
+## Is a federal ban on non-competes coming to Australia? {#federal-reform}
+
+**Short answer.** A ban has been proposed but is not yet law, and as of June 2026 the common-law restraint-of-trade framework above still governs in South Australia [^dmytrenko-still-governs]. According to Australian Government Treasury material and law-firm commentary, the Government announced in the 2025–26 Federal Budget that it intends to ban post-employment non-competes for workers earning under the Fair Work Act high-income threshold (reported at around AUD $183,100), with Treasury running a consultation on the design, and the reform expected to be legislated during 2026 and to take effect from 2027, operating prospectively. Those figures and dates come from that secondary material — Treasury announcements and commentary — not from any enacted statute. Until any ban is enacted, the existing common-law framework continues to govern [^dmytrenko-still-governs].
+
+The proposal, as described in current Treasury material and law-firm commentary rather than in any enacted statute, would cover most employees earning below the high-income threshold while excluding sale-of-business covenants and restraints on higher earners. Non-solicitation, no-poach, and wage-fixing arrangements are also reported to be under consideration. None of this is in force, and the precise scope, threshold, and commencement could change before any legislation passes; the threshold figure and the 2026/2027 timeline in particular are drawn from secondary reporting and should be re-checked against the enacted text when it appears.
+
+Because this is a future legislative matter, employers should treat the timeline and detail as provisional rather than settled. A covenant entered into now is governed by existing South Australian law; whether and how a future ban would affect existing or new agreements will depend on the enacted text and its transitional provisions.
+
+> [!NOTE]
+> **Practice note.**
+>
+> Do not draft to a federal ban that does not yet exist. As of June 2026 no Commonwealth statute bans employee non-competes, so enforceability in South Australia still turns on the common-law reasonableness test and the blue-pencil-only severance rule [^dmytrenko-still-governs]. Track the proposal through to enacted legislation before changing practice, because its threshold, scope, and commencement remain proposals subject to change.
+
+[^about]: By Steven Obiajulu, J.D. Published by [openagreements.org](https://openagreements.org). Last reviewed 2026-06-10. License: CC BY 4.0. Steven Obiajulu, J.D. is not admitted to practise law in South Australia, Australia. This article summarizes publicly available South Australia, Australia legal sources for general information only — it is not legal advice and does not create a lawyer–client relationship. It may not reflect the most recent legal developments and is provided without warranty as to accuracy or completeness; verify against the primary sources cited and consult a locally qualified lawyer before relying on it.
+
+[^dmytrenko-presumed-void]: **International Cleaning Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dmytrenko** — "At common law a restraint of trade is contrary to public policy and void unless it can be shown that the restraint is, in the particular circumstances of the case, reasonable." *International Cleaning Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dmytrenko [2020] SASC 222 (Stanley J).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/sa/SASC/2020/222.html>
+
+[^hydron-onus]: **Hydron Pty Ltd v Harous** — "In any event, Hydron bears the onus of demonstrating that the restraint is to protect a legitimate interest of itself, and that the extent of the restraint goes no further than is necessary to protect that interest." *Hydron Pty Ltd v Harous [2005] SASC 176 (Bleby J).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/sa/SASC/2005/176.html>
+
+[^lindner-onus]: **Lindner v Murdock's Garage** — "The onus was on the plaintiff firm to prove circumstances showing that the restriction on the defendant's freedom to work was reasonable." *Lindner v Murdock's Garage [1950] HCA 48; (1950) 83 CLR 628 (per McTiernan J).* <https://www.hcourt.gov.au/sites/default/files/eresources/1950/HCA/48.pdf>
+
+[^dmytrenko-stricter-view]: **International Cleaning Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dmytrenko** — "A stricter view is taken of covenants in restraint of trade in employment contracts than those contained in contracts for the sale of a business." *International Cleaning Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dmytrenko [2020] SASC 222 (Stanley J).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/sa/SASC/2020/222.html>
+
+[^dmytrenko-greater-protection]: **International Cleaning Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dmytrenko** — "If the Court is satisfied that the restraint confers greater protection than can be justified, the restraint will be unreasonable and therefore unenforceable." *International Cleaning Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dmytrenko [2020] SASC 222 (Stanley J).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/sa/SASC/2020/222.html>
+
+[^hydron-no-rewriting]: **Hydron Pty Ltd v Harous** — "Even if this were possible, without rewriting the covenants there would be no certainty when any of the periods commenced." *Hydron Pty Ltd v Harous [2005] SASC 176 (Bleby J).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/sa/SASC/2005/176.html>
+
+[^dmytrenko-blue-pencil]: **International Cleaning Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dmytrenko** — "In the context of these cases that approach is sometimes described as the blue pencil rule." *International Cleaning Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dmytrenko [2020] SASC 222 (Stanley J).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/sa/SASC/2020/222.html>
+
+[^dmytrenko-severance-worked]: **International Cleaning Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dmytrenko** — "In my view, clause 10.8.1 is cast in wider terms than is necessary to protect the applicant's legitimate interests because it seeks to extend beyond working in or for a competitor of the applicant." *International Cleaning Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dmytrenko [2020] SASC 222 (Stanley J).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/sa/SASC/2020/222.html>
+
+[^dmytrenko-destroyer]: **International Cleaning Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dmytrenko** — "The Court should not be the destroyer of bargains." *International Cleaning Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dmytrenko [2020] SASC 222 (Stanley J).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/sa/SASC/2020/222.html>
+
+[^richmond-cascading]: **Richmond v Moore Stephens Adelaide Pty Ltd** — "These restraints operate for cascading periods ranging from three years to two years and down to 3 months after termination of the Service Agreement within cascading areas ranging from Australia down to 10 kilometres from the site the Principal carries on business." *Richmond v Moore Stephens Adelaide Pty Ltd [2015] SASCFC 147 (Blue J, Kourakis CJ and Stanley J agreeing).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/sa/SASCFC/2015/147.html>
+
+[^hydron-genuine-attempt]: **Hydron Pty Ltd v Harous** — "On their face, the clauses appear to be a genuine attempt to define Hydron's need for protection in respect of the various situations covered by the agreements." *Hydron Pty Ltd v Harous [2005] SASC 176 (Bleby J).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/sa/SASC/2005/176.html>
+
+[^richmond-two-years]: **Richmond v Moore Stephens Adelaide Pty Ltd** — "In the circumstances, no error has been demonstrated in the Judge's conclusion that a period of two years after termination comprised a reasonable restraint." *Richmond v Moore Stephens Adelaide Pty Ltd [2015] SASCFC 147 (Blue J, Kourakis CJ and Stanley J agreeing).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/sa/SASCFC/2015/147.html>
+
+[^hydron-wootten-total-covenant]: **Hydron Pty Ltd v Harous** — "But it is not simply a restraint in respect of an area which is unenforceable, but a total covenant." *Hydron Pty Ltd v Harous [2005] SASC 176 (Bleby J), quoting the warning of Wootten J in Austra Tanks Pty Ltd v Running, which Bleby J distinguished on the facts.* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/sa/SASC/2005/176.html>
+
+[^lindner-face-competition]: **Lindner v Murdock's Garage** — "An employer must be prepared to face the competition of a former employee if it comes." *Lindner v Murdock's Garage [1950] HCA 48; (1950) 83 CLR 628 (per McTiernan J).* <https://www.hcourt.gov.au/sites/default/files/eresources/1950/HCA/48.pdf>
+
+[^dmytrenko-mere-competition]: **International Cleaning Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dmytrenko** — "An employer is not entitled to protect itself against mere competition by a former employee, and that employee is entitled to use his or her skill, experience and know-how acquired in the service of the former employer in legitimate competition." *International Cleaning Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dmytrenko [2020] SASC 222 (Stanley J).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/sa/SASC/2020/222.html>
+
+[^feneley-address-book]: **N P Generations Pty Ltd v Feneley** — "Given that the address book was compiled from the appellant's records for use in its business, the respondent was obliged to deliver up the address book once her employment had been terminated." *N P Generations Pty Ltd v Feneley [2001] SASC 185 (Debelle J, Williams and Wicks JJ agreeing).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/sa/SASC/2001/185.html>
+
+[^feneley-diary]: **N P Generations Pty Ltd v Feneley** — "For these reasons, I do not think that the diary constitutes confidential information." *N P Generations Pty Ltd v Feneley [2001] SASC 185 (Debelle J, Williams and Wicks JJ agreeing).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/sa/SASC/2001/185.html>
+
+[^dmytrenko-adequate-protection]: **International Cleaning Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dmytrenko** — "So far as the parties' interests are concerned the restraint must impose no more than adequate protection to a party in whose favour it is imposed." *International Cleaning Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dmytrenko [2020] SASC 222 (Stanley J).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/sa/SASC/2020/222.html>
+
+[^richmond-prospective]: **Richmond v Moore Stephens Adelaide Pty Ltd** — "The reasonableness of the restraint is to be assessed prospectively as at the date of the agreement and not retrospectively as at the date of enforcement." *Richmond v Moore Stephens Adelaide Pty Ltd [2015] SASCFC 147 (Blue J, Kourakis CJ and Stanley J agreeing).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/sa/SASCFC/2015/147.html>
+
+[^lindner-area-too-wide]: **Lindner v Murdock's Garage** — "I think it must be held that the area was unreasonably wide." *Lindner v Murdock's Garage [1950] HCA 48; (1950) 83 CLR 628 (per McTiernan J).* <https://www.hcourt.gov.au/sites/default/files/eresources/1950/HCA/48.pdf>
+
+[^dmytrenko-twelve-months]: **International Cleaning Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dmytrenko** — "In the circumstances a 12-month restraint is necessary to sever the connection between the respondent and the applicant's customers with whom he dealt." *International Cleaning Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dmytrenko [2020] SASC 222 (Stanley J).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/sa/SASC/2020/222.html>
+
+[^dmytrenko-no-payment-rule]: **International Cleaning Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dmytrenko** — "It does not reflect a rule that the absence of payment to the former employee during the restraint period renders the restraint unreasonable." *International Cleaning Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dmytrenko [2020] SASC 222 (Stanley J).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/sa/SASC/2020/222.html>
+
+[^dmytrenko-payment-bargain]: **International Cleaning Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dmytrenko** — "Generally, the existence of an obligation to pay the former employee his or her salary during the period of the restraint reflects the terms of the bargain struck between the parties." *International Cleaning Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dmytrenko [2020] SASC 222 (Stanley J).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/sa/SASC/2020/222.html>
+
+[^dmytrenko-tested-at-contract]: **International Cleaning Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dmytrenko** — "The validity of the covenant in an employment contract is to be judged at the date of entry into the contract." *International Cleaning Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dmytrenko [2020] SASC 222 (Stanley J).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/sa/SASC/2020/222.html>
+
+[^richmond-construction]: **Richmond v Moore Stephens Adelaide Pty Ltd** — "Mr Richmond's contention should be rejected because the question whether the restraint clause survives must depend on the proper construction of the contract." *Richmond v Moore Stephens Adelaide Pty Ltd [2015] SASCFC 147 (Blue J, Kourakis CJ and Stanley J agreeing).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/sa/SASCFC/2015/147.html>
+
+[^richmond-repudiation-standard]: **Richmond v Moore Stephens Adelaide Pty Ltd** — "Conduct only amounts to repudiation if a party evinces an unwillingness or inability to render substantial performance of the contract." *Richmond v Moore Stephens Adelaide Pty Ltd [2015] SASCFC 147 (Blue J, Kourakis CJ and Stanley J agreeing).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/sa/SASCFC/2015/147.html>
+
+[^richmond-no-termination]: **Richmond v Moore Stephens Adelaide Pty Ltd** — "WKYA and Mr Richmond were not entitled to terminate the Business Sale Agreement or the Service Agreement." *Richmond v Moore Stephens Adelaide Pty Ltd [2015] SASCFC 147 (Blue J, Kourakis CJ and Stanley J agreeing).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/sa/SASCFC/2015/147.html>
+
+[^dmytrenko-tested-at-contract-tolling]: **International Cleaning Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dmytrenko** — "The validity of the covenant in an employment contract is to be judged at the date of entry into the contract." *International Cleaning Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dmytrenko [2020] SASC 222 (Stanley J).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/sa/SASC/2020/222.html>
+
+[^richmond-overall-circumstances]: **Richmond v Moore Stephens Adelaide Pty Ltd** — "The Judge was entitled to have regard to the overall circumstances under both agreements in assessing the reasonableness of the restraint clause under the Service Agreement." *Richmond v Moore Stephens Adelaide Pty Ltd [2015] SASCFC 147 (Blue J, Kourakis CJ and Stanley J agreeing).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/sa/SASCFC/2015/147.html>
+
+[^lindner-sale-distinction]: **Lindner v Murdock's Garage** — "A distinction is drawn between a restraint upon trade included in an agreement for the sale of a business and a restraint included in an agreement with an employee." *Lindner v Murdock's Garage [1950] HCA 48; (1950) 83 CLR 628 (per Latham CJ, dissenting as to the outcome).* <https://www.hcourt.gov.au/sites/default/files/eresources/1950/HCA/48.pdf>
+
+[^lindner-sale-more-easily]: **Lindner v Murdock's Garage** — "The restraint is more easily upheld in the former than in the latter case." *Lindner v Murdock's Garage [1950] HCA 48; (1950) 83 CLR 628 (per Latham CJ, dissenting as to the outcome).* <https://www.hcourt.gov.au/sites/default/files/eresources/1950/HCA/48.pdf>
+
+[^hydron-stricter-view]: **Hydron Pty Ltd v Harous** — "The courts in general take a stricter and less favourable view of covenants in restraint of trade entered into between an employer and an employee than of such covenants entered into between a vendor and a purchaser" *Hydron Pty Ltd v Harous [2005] SASC 176 (Bleby J).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/sa/SASC/2005/176.html>
+
+[^hydron-goodwill-connection]: **Hydron Pty Ltd v Harous** — "The period specified shows no real connection with the protection of the acquired goodwill of the Nu Contacts business." *Hydron Pty Ltd v Harous [2005] SASC 176 (Bleby J).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/sa/SASC/2005/176.html>
+
+[^dmytrenko-still-governs]: **International Cleaning Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dmytrenko** — "At common law a restraint of trade is contrary to public policy and void unless it can be shown that the restraint is, in the particular circumstances of the case, reasonable." *International Cleaning Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dmytrenko [2020] SASC 222 (Stanley J).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/sa/SASC/2020/222.html>