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package/skills/legal-explainers/non-compete-contract-explainer/content/northern-territory.md

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+---
+jurisdiction: "Northern Territory, Australia"
+slug: northern-territory
+countryCode: AU
+snapshotAsOf: "2026-06-19"
+lastReviewed: "2026-06-10"
+canonicalUrl: https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/non-compete/au/northern-territory
+license: CC BY 4.0
+stale: false
+---
+
+> [!IMPORTANT]
+> **Informational only — not legal advice.** This is a snapshot of an OpenAgreements practice note,
+> provided for general information. It is not legal advice, does not create an attorney-client
+> relationship, and is not a substitute for a licensed attorney in the relevant jurisdiction.
+> Laws change; verify against the canonical version before relying on it.
+>
+> **Canonical:** https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/non-compete/au/northern-territory · **Snapshot as of:** 2026-06-19 · License: CC BY 4.0 · © openagreements.org
+
+# Non-Compete Enforceability in the Northern Territory[^about]
+
+In the Northern Territory a post-employment non-compete is presumptively void as a restraint of trade and binds a former employee only so far as it is reasonable; the Territory has no statutory read-down power, and in the leading Supreme Court employment case an eighteen-month restraint failed entirely because it was longer than necessary, even though the court considered fifteen months at most would have been reasonable.
+
+
+## At a glance
+
+| Question | Northern Territory, Australia |
+| --- | --- |
+| **Are non-competes enforceable?** | Allowed if reasonable |
+| **Bottom line** | A Northern Territory non-compete is presumptively void and binds a former employee only so far as it is reasonable to protect a legitimate interest; there is no statutory read-down power, and in the leading Supreme Court employment case an eighteen-month restraint failed entirely as longer than necessary even though the court considered fifteen months at most would have been reasonable. |
+| **Main law or case** | Common-law restraint of trade (no equivalent of the NSW Restraints of Trade Act 1976) |
+| **Main exceptions** | Sale-of-business and franchise covenants are judged in their commercial context; a proposed federal ban would, if enacted, cover most employees earning under the Fair Work Act high-income threshold (with sale-of-business and above-threshold restraints reported to be excluded), but it is not yet law. |
+| **Can a court narrow it?** | Only strikes wording |
+| **Applies to contractors?** | Yes |
+| **Restriction extended during a breach?** | Untested; Australian courts treat rolling or indefinite restraints with suspicion and generally prefer damages over extending an injunction. |
+| **Maximum length set by law** | No statutory cap; reasonableness is judged case by case — an eighteen-month restraint on an insurance broker was held void as longer than necessary (fifteen months at most would have been reasonable), while a six-month client-solicitation restraint was one the court said it would have found enforceable. |
+
+## Are employee non-competes enforceable in the Northern Territory? {#enforceability}
+
+**Short answer.** Only so far as they are reasonable. A post-employment non-compete is treated as a restraint of trade, which the courts presume is invalid as contrary to public policy [^henderson-presumed-invalid]. The Supreme Court of the Northern Territory has stated the rule directly: contractual provisions that amount to an unreasonable restraint of trade are void and unenforceable [^oamps-void-unenforceable], and the onus of proving that a restraint is reasonable falls on the party relying on it [^oamps-onus].
+
+The Northern Territory is not a per se ban jurisdiction, and it has no statute that sets fixed numeric limits on duration or area or that empowers a court to read a restraint down. It is a reasonableness jurisdiction built entirely on the common-law restraint-of-trade doctrine, applying the framework laid down by the High Court in cases such as *Lindner v Murdock's Garage* and *Buckley v Tutty*. The governing test asks whether the clause is necessary to give the employer adequate protection while leaving the employee the fullest liberty of action consistent with that protection [^oamps-adequate-protection].
+
+"A restraint of trade clause is reasonable if it is necessary to provide adequate protection to the party who has the benefit of the restraint and at the same time preserves the fullest liberty of action consistent with that protection to the party who has the burden of the restraint"[^oamps-adequate-protection]
+
+One feature of Territory practice is worth stating plainly: the local restraint case law is thin. The Supreme Court has decided only a handful of restraint-of-trade cases — an employment case in which an insurance broker's eighteen-month restraint was held void as longer than necessary, a franchise case in which a restraint was upheld for twelve months, and a recent case in which an employer failed to prove any breach of a six-month client-solicitation clause. Those decisions, together with the High Court authorities they apply, are the working materials for any Northern Territory restraint question, and the sections that follow work through what they do — and honestly, do not — settle.
+
+## Can a Northern Territory court narrow an overbroad non-compete? {#court-narrowing}
+
+**Short answer.** Do not count on it. The Northern Territory has no statute that lets a court read an overbroad restraint down to a reasonable level, so an employer is left with the common-law position: a clause that goes further than the legitimate interest requires is simply void [^oamps-too-long]. The leading local employment case shows the consequence — the Supreme Court held an eighteen-month restraint void as longer than necessary even while observing that fifteen months at most would have been reasonable, and it dismissed the claim rather than enforcing the clause for the shorter period [^oamps-clause-void].
+
+No Northern Territory decision squarely decides how far the common-law blue-pencil rule — deleting grammatically severable words while refusing to rewrite the clause — will save an overbroad Territory restraint, so the honest position is that local severance authority is thin. What the decided cases do establish is the unforgiving baseline: a restraint is unreasonable if its term is too long [^oamps-too-long], and an unreasonable restraint is void, not merely trimmed. In the insurance-broker case no severance rescue was available or attempted; the clause stood or fell as drafted, and it fell [^oamps-clause-void].
+
+"In all of the circumstances I find that the restraint of trade clause contained in clause 8 of the letter dated 3 April 2003, which contained the defendant's contract of employment with the plaintiff, was unreasonable and is void. It was longer than necessary. A reasonable length of time for the duration of the restraint would have been a period of 15 months at the most."[^oamps-clause-void]
+
+The one local data point on contractual narrowing machinery comes from the franchise context, where the agreement itself provided for reading down and severance of the restraint clause where necessary [^henderson-readdown-term]. The Court in that case resolved the matter by fixing a twelve-month period as sufficient without setting out any doctrinal analysis of how the reading-down provision operated, so the decision is a precedent for sensible drafting rather than a settled rule about what a court will do to rescue an overbroad clause.
+
+> [!CAUTION]
+> **Drafting note.**
+>
+> Because no Northern Territory authority establishes that a court will cut an overbroad restraint back to a reasonable level — and the leading employment case ended with the clause failing entirely rather than being shortened [^oamps-clause-void] — draft scope, area, and duration to the minimum the legitimate interest actually requires. A restraint whose term is longer than necessary is unreasonable and void [^oamps-too-long], so the drafting burden of getting the period right sits with the employer, not the court.
+
+## Are cascading or ladder restraint clauses valid in the Northern Territory? {#cascading-clauses}
+
+**Short answer.** There is no Northern Territory decision squarely upholding or striking down a cascading clause, so treat their validity as untested locally rather than assured. The closest local authority is the franchise case, where the restraint period was expressed as a graduated period running from three months through to three years [^henderson-graduated-period] and the Court enforced the restraint for twelve months as sufficient to protect the franchisor [^henderson-twelve-months] — but it did so without any doctrinal analysis of the ladder mechanism itself.
+
+A cascading clause sets out a menu of progressively narrower combinations of period and area, each expressed as a separate restraint, so that if the widest is unreasonable a narrower rung can still be enforced on its own. The drafting logic is the practical answer to the absence of any statutory read-down power in the Territory: since the employer cannot rely on a court rescuing an overbroad clause, the narrowing has to be done in advance, on the face of the contract.
+
+"The restraint period was expressed as a graduated period of three months through to three years or 'any other period during which a person seeking to enforce clause 24 is entitled at law to the benefit of protection afforded by the Franchisee's covenant contained in clause 24 after the expiry or termination of this Agreement.'"[^henderson-graduated-period]
+
+What the franchise case shows is a Territory court working comfortably within a graduated structure: faced with a ladder running to three years and a submission for two, the Court selected one year as the appropriate and sufficient period [^henderson-one-year] and declared the restraint valid and enforceable for twelve months from termination [^henderson-twelve-months]. What it does not supply is a holding on the validity questions that cascading clauses can raise — whether a particular ladder is so wide or so uncertain that it fails as a whole. That question remains open in the Territory.
+
+> [!CAUTION]
+> **Drafting note.**
+>
+> Cascading restraints are standard Australian drafting, but no Northern Territory decision has squarely tested one, so build the ladder conservatively: make each rung a self-contained, independently reasonable restraint that can stand after the wider rungs are disregarded, and keep the widest rung defensible on its own terms. The local franchise case shows a court selecting a single period from within a graduated range and enforcing it [^henderson-one-year], but it is not authority that any ladder, however wide, will be saved.
+
+## What legitimate interest must an employer show to enforce a Northern Territory non-compete? {#legitimate-interest}
+
+**Short answer.** A protectable business interest — not a mere wish to avoid competition. An employer cannot restrain a former employee simply because a rival might benefit; an employer must be prepared to face the competition of a former employee if it comes [^lindner-face-competition]. The recognised interests in the Territory cases are the employer's customer connection and goodwill [^oamps-customer-connection] and, in the franchise setting, the franchise business itself and the confidential information provided within it [^henderson-franchisor-interest].
+
+The dividing line is between protecting an asset and suppressing a rival. The customer-connection interest is engaged where the employee's position brings them into close and personal contact with customers in a way that lets them take those relationships to a competitor — the formulation the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory adopted from the High Court when it upheld the legitimacy of protecting an insurance broker's client portfolio [^oamps-customer-connection].
+
+"An employer must be prepared to face the competition of a former employee if it comes."[^lindner-face-competition]
+
+The Territory's most recent restraint case is a sharp lesson in what the interest does and does not let an employer control. The employer sued a former support co-ordinator on a six-month client-solicitation restraint after seven clients moved to his new employer — and lost, because it could not prove he had solicited anyone: the Court was not prepared to infer solicitation merely from the clients' departure [^sandrey-no-inference]. The clause restricts the former employee's freedom to solicit; it cannot restrict the clients' own freedom to follow a person they trust or to leave a service they are dissatisfied with [^sandrey-clients-choice]. A restraint's words must actually catch the conduct complained of, and the employer must prove that conduct occurred.
+
+> [!CAUTION]
+> **Drafting note.**
+>
+> A clause that simply bars a former employee from dealing with clients is only as strong as the employer's ability to prove conduct within its terms: clients who choose to follow the employee of their own accord put the employer to proof of actual solicitation, and a court will not infer it from departures alone [^sandrey-no-inference]. Identify the real interest — the customer connection or the confidential information [^oamps-customer-connection] — draft the restraint around it, and remember that protection against competition as such is not a legitimate interest [^lindner-face-competition].
+
+## How long and how wide can a Northern Territory non-compete be? {#reasonableness-factors}
+
+**Short answer.** There is no statutory limit; reasonableness is decided case by case on the activity restrained, the geographic area, the duration, and the employee's actual customer influence. Reasonableness is tested as at the date the contract was made, not by hindsight [^oamps-tested-at-contract]. A geographic area wider than the employer's business reaches is likely to be unreasonable [^lindner-area-too-wide], and a duration longer than the protected interest requires makes the clause void — in the leading Territory employment case eighteen months was too long where fifteen months at most was justified [^oamps-fifteen-months].
+
+Because the limits are judge-made, the analysis is anchored to the interest rather than to any fixed ceiling, and the Territory's leading employment case shows how concretely a court will measure duration. The protected interest was an insurance broker's client portfolio, and the Court treated the reasonable period as the time the employer needed to work through one complete cycle of policy renewals for those clients [^oamps-renewal-cycle] — on the evidence, short of the eighteen months the clause claimed [^oamps-fifteen-months].
+
+"I accept the plaintiff's submission that the question for the Court to determine is, what is the reasonable length of one complete cycle of renewals for the insurance premiums in the defendant's portfolio of clients?"[^oamps-renewal-cycle]
+
+On area, the High Court authority the Territory courts apply held an area covenant void because it covered more ground than the employer's business reasonably required [^lindner-area-too-wide]. The analysis cuts both ways, though: in the Territory's most recent case the judge indicated — without needing to decide, since no breach was proved — that a six-month client-solicitation restraint with no geographical limit at all would have been reasonable, because the restriction itself was so narrow that it did not go beyond protecting the employer's goodwill [^sandrey-limited-restriction]. A tightly limited activity restraint can survive without a geographic boundary; a broad one cannot survive even with one.
+
+## Do paid restraints, garden leave, and fresh consideration help in the Northern Territory? {#garden-leave}
+
+**Short answer.** They can strengthen an employer's position, but no Northern Territory decision squarely addresses garden leave or a restraint the employee was paid to accept, so the safe assumption is that the ordinary reasonableness framework governs without any special discount. The covenant is judged as at the moment it was agreed — the question is whether it was a reasonable one for the parties to agree to at the outset, on the best estimate they could then make of the future [^oamps-best-estimate].
+
+As a matter of general Australian doctrine, garden leave — keeping the employee employed and paid through a notice period — and payment for a post-employment restraint are factors that weigh in favour of enforcement, because the restrained party is being compensated for the restriction. But neither device displaces the requirement that the restraint protect a legitimate interest and go no further than that interest requires, and there is no staged Territory authority giving either device any independent legal effect.
+
+What the Territory cases do illuminate is the mid-employment restraint — a covenant introduced after the employee is already on foot. In the most recent Supreme Court case the six-month solicitation restraint was not in the original contract at all: it was added by a letter of variation the employee signed about two months into the job, and the judge indicated that, had it been necessary to decide, she would have found the clause enforceable [^sandrey-variation-enforceable]. Because reasonableness is assessed when the restraint is agreed [^oamps-best-estimate], a restraint added mid-employment is judged on the circumstances at the date of the variation, and prudent practice is to support it with clear, fresh consideration rather than rely on continued employment alone.
+
+## What if the employer wrongfully dismissed the employee? {#employer-breach}
+
+**Short answer.** The restraint may fall away. The employer carries the onus of proving the restraint reasonable in the first place [^lindner-onus], so an employer seeking to enforce already starts from a position where it must justify the covenant. Beyond that, the long-standing common-law principle associated with *General Billposting Co Ltd v Atkinson* [1909] AC 118 is that an employer who wrongfully dismisses an employee — for example by repudiating the contract through a dismissal without the notice the contract requires — generally cannot afterwards enforce a post-employment restraint. No staged Northern Territory decision decides that point, so treat it as a general principle a Territory court may apply rather than settled local law.
+
+The reasonableness analysis assumes a clause the employer is entitled to rely on, and the employer bears the onus of establishing that reasonableness [^lindner-onus]. The Territory's leading employment case is a pointed reminder that lawful termination does not carry the restraint home either: the Supreme Court held that the employer was justified in summarily dismissing the employee for serious misconduct, yet the employer still lost its restraint claim because the clause itself was unreasonable [^oamps-dismissal-justified]. How the employment ended and whether the clause binds are separate questions, and the employer must win both.
+
+> [!NOTE]
+> **Practice note.**
+>
+> The employer already bears the onus of proving the restraint reasonable before any question of its own breach arises [^lindner-onus]. An employer that terminates abruptly — without giving contractual notice or paying in lieu — may risk losing the very restraint it wants to rely on under the general common-law repudiation principle, which no Northern Territory authority has yet had to apply. And even a termination that is fully justified does not relieve the employer of proving the clause reasonable: in the leading local case the summary dismissal was upheld and the restraint still failed [^oamps-dismissal-justified].
+
+## Does a Northern Territory non-compete pause or extend if the employee breaches? {#tolling}
+
+**Short answer.** This is an open question, and an employer should not assume the clock stops. No Northern Territory authority holds that a restraint period tolls — pauses and then resumes — while a former employee is in breach or while litigation runs. Validity is decided as at the date of the agreement [^henderson-tested-at-date], which sits uneasily with a clause that purports to lengthen the restraint automatically depending on the employee's later conduct.
+
+Because validity is fixed when the restraint is agreed [^henderson-tested-at-date], a drafting device that extends the period by the length of any breach pushes the effective duration beyond what was assessed as reasonable at the outset, and nothing in the Territory cases validates it. Australian courts generally treat rolling or indefinite restraints with suspicion and prefer to address a breach through a tailored injunction or damages rather than by extending the restraint period. The safer assumption is that the stated period is the maximum the employer can rely on.
+
+> [!CAUTION]
+> **Drafting note.**
+>
+> Do not rely on a clause that purports to extend the non-compete by the length of any breach. No Northern Territory authority validates tolling of the restraint period, and because validity is decided as at the date of the agreement, an automatic extension risks being treated as unreasonable [^henderson-tested-at-date]. Treat the stated duration as the maximum and address an actual breach through an injunction or a damages claim instead.
+
+## Do Northern Territory restraint rules differ for contractors and business sales? {#contractors-and-sale}
+
+**Short answer.** Yes, in different directions. Restraints outside the employment relationship are assessed under the same restraint-of-trade doctrine — the same legitimate-interest requirement and no-wider-than-necessary test — but the commercial context matters: the Territory's franchise case treated the franchise relationship as supplying a sound basis for a restraint at the date the agreement was made [^henderson-basis-at-entry] and enforced the covenant for twelve months [^henderson-franchise-upheld]. Restraints given by the seller of a business are judged more leniently still, because a buyer is entitled to protect the goodwill it paid for [^lindner-sale-distinction].
+
+The sale-of-business leniency is long-standing and uncontroversial — the distinction predates the High Court's leading employment-restraint case and has never been in doubt, so the way the point is expressed there (in a judgment that dissented on the ultimate outcome) reflects settled doctrine rather than any minority view. A restraint in a sale agreement is more easily upheld than the same restraint in an employment contract [^lindner-sale-more-easily], because the policy concerns that make employment covenants suspect — unequal bargaining power and the risk of locking a person out of their livelihood — are weaker when a vendor sells a business for value and promises not to compete away the goodwill just sold.
+
+The franchise case is the Territory's working example of a restraint between businesses rather than between employer and employee. The franchisees ran their own company, abandoned the franchise, and immediately carried on the same business under a new name from the same premises with the same phone numbers; the Court held there was a basis for the restraint when the agreement was made [^henderson-basis-at-entry] and declared it valid and enforceable for the identified area and a twelve-month period [^henderson-franchise-upheld]. For independent contractors the analysis is the same in kind: the label of the relationship matters less than the substance of the interest the restraint actually protects and whether its scope is no wider than that interest requires.
+
+## Is a federal ban on non-competes coming to Australia? {#federal-reform}
+
+**Short answer.** A ban has been proposed but is not yet law, and as of June 2026 the common-law restraint-of-trade framework above still governs in the Northern Territory [^oamps-still-governs]. According to Australian Government Treasury material and law-firm commentary, the Government announced in the 2025–26 Federal Budget that it intends to ban post-employment non-competes for workers earning under the Fair Work Act high-income threshold (reported at around AUD $183,100), with Treasury running a consultation on the design, and the reform expected to be legislated during 2026 and to take effect from 2027, operating prospectively. Those figures and dates come from that secondary material — Treasury announcements and commentary — not from any enacted statute. Until any ban is enacted, the existing common-law framework continues to govern [^oamps-still-governs].
+
+The proposal, as described in current Treasury material and law-firm commentary rather than in any enacted statute, would cover most employees earning below the high-income threshold while excluding sale-of-business covenants and restraints on higher earners. Non-solicitation, no-poach, and wage-fixing arrangements are also reported to be under consideration. None of this is in force, and the precise scope, threshold, and commencement could change before any legislation passes; the threshold figure and the 2026/2027 timeline in particular are drawn from secondary reporting and should be re-checked against the enacted text when it appears.
+
+Because this is a future legislative matter, employers should treat the timeline and detail as provisional rather than settled. A covenant entered into now is governed by the existing common law as the Northern Territory courts apply it; whether and how a future ban would affect existing or new agreements will depend on the enacted text and its transitional provisions.
+
+> [!NOTE]
+> **Practice note.**
+>
+> Do not draft to a federal ban that does not yet exist. As of June 2026 no Commonwealth statute bans employee non-competes, so enforceability in the Northern Territory still turns on the common-law reasonableness test — under which an unreasonable restraint is simply void [^oamps-still-governs]. Track the proposal through to enacted legislation before changing practice, because its threshold, scope, and commencement remain proposals subject to change.
+
+[^about]: By Steven Obiajulu, J.D. Published by [openagreements.org](https://openagreements.org). Last reviewed 2026-06-10. License: CC BY 4.0. Steven Obiajulu, J.D. is not admitted to practise law in Northern Territory, Australia. This article summarizes publicly available Northern Territory, Australia legal sources for general information only — it is not legal advice and does not create a lawyer–client relationship. It may not reflect the most recent legal developments and is provided without warranty as to accuracy or completeness; verify against the primary sources cited and consult a locally qualified lawyer before relying on it.
+
+[^henderson-presumed-invalid]: **Henderson v Purairclean Pty Ltd** — "There is a presumption that a restraint of trade clause is invalid. This is for public policy reasons." *Henderson v Purairclean Pty Ltd [2013] NTSC 29 (Riley CJ).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/nt/NTSC/2013/29.html>
+
+[^oamps-void-unenforceable]: **OAMPS Insurance Brokers Limited v Shackcloth** — "The common law prohibits unreasonable restraints of trade. Contractual provisions which amount to an unreasonable restraint of trade are void and unenforceable." *OAMPS Insurance Brokers Limited v Shackcloth [2008] NTSC 29 (Southwood J).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/nt/NTSC/2008/29.html>
+
+[^oamps-onus]: **OAMPS Insurance Brokers Limited v Shackcloth** — "The onus of proof that the restraint is reasonable is on the party relying on the restraint" *OAMPS Insurance Brokers Limited v Shackcloth [2008] NTSC 29 (Southwood J), citing Lindner v Murdock's Garage (1950) 83 CLR 628.* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/nt/NTSC/2008/29.html>
+
+[^oamps-adequate-protection]: **OAMPS Insurance Brokers Limited v Shackcloth** — "A restraint of trade clause is reasonable if it is necessary to provide adequate protection to the party who has the benefit of the restraint and at the same time preserves the fullest liberty of action consistent with that protection to the party who has the burden of the restraint" *OAMPS Insurance Brokers Limited v Shackcloth [2008] NTSC 29 (Southwood J), stating the test from Brightman v Lamson Paragon Ltd (1914) 18 CLR 331 per Isaacs J.* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/nt/NTSC/2008/29.html>
+
+[^oamps-too-long]: **OAMPS Insurance Brokers Limited v Shackcloth** — "Clause 8 will be unreasonable if the term of the restraint is for too long a period." *OAMPS Insurance Brokers Limited v Shackcloth [2008] NTSC 29 (Southwood J).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/nt/NTSC/2008/29.html>
+
+[^oamps-clause-void]: **OAMPS Insurance Brokers Limited v Shackcloth** — "In all of the circumstances I find that the restraint of trade clause contained in clause 8 of the letter dated 3 April 2003, which contained the defendant's contract of employment with the plaintiff, was unreasonable and is void. It was longer than necessary. A reasonable length of time for the duration of the restraint would have been a period of 15 months at the most." *OAMPS Insurance Brokers Limited v Shackcloth [2008] NTSC 29 (Southwood J).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/nt/NTSC/2008/29.html>
+
+[^henderson-readdown-term]: **Henderson v Purairclean Pty Ltd** — "Clause 24.2 provided for the reading down of clause 24 and severance where necessary." *Henderson v Purairclean Pty Ltd [2013] NTSC 29 (Riley CJ).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/nt/NTSC/2013/29.html>
+
+[^henderson-graduated-period]: **Henderson v Purairclean Pty Ltd** — "The restraint period was expressed as a graduated period of three months through to three years or 'any other period during which a person seeking to enforce clause 24 is entitled at law to the benefit of protection afforded by the Franchisee's covenant contained in clause 24 after the expiry or termination of this Agreement.'" *Henderson v Purairclean Pty Ltd [2013] NTSC 29 (Riley CJ).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/nt/NTSC/2013/29.html>
+
+[^henderson-twelve-months]: **Henderson v Purairclean Pty Ltd** — "The restraint of trade clauses in both the Jaymak Franchise Agreement and the Purairclean Franchise Agreement are valid and enforceable for the identified area and for the period of 12 months from the date of termination of the franchise." *Henderson v Purairclean Pty Ltd [2013] NTSC 29 (Riley CJ).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/nt/NTSC/2013/29.html>
+
+[^henderson-one-year]: **Henderson v Purairclean Pty Ltd** — "In my opinion the lesser period of restraint for one year from 29 February 2012 is more appropriate. That, in my view, would have been sufficient to protect the interests of the franchisor in all the circumstances." *Henderson v Purairclean Pty Ltd [2013] NTSC 29 (Riley CJ).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/nt/NTSC/2013/29.html>
+
+[^lindner-face-competition]: **Lindner v Murdock's Garage** — "An employer must be prepared to face the competition of a former employee if it comes." *Lindner v Murdock's Garage [1950] HCA 48; (1950) 83 CLR 628 (per McTiernan J).* <https://www.hcourt.gov.au/sites/default/files/eresources/1950/HCA/48.pdf>
+
+[^oamps-customer-connection]: **OAMPS Insurance Brokers Limited v Shackcloth** — "Where an employee is in a position which brings him into close and personal contact with the customers of a business in such a way that he may establish personal relations with them of such a character that if he leaves his employment he may be able to take away from his former employer some of his customers and thereby substantially affect the proprietary interest of that employer in the goodwill of his business, a covenant preventing him from accepting employment in a position in which he would be able to use to his own advantage and to the disadvantage of his former employer the knowledge of and intimacy with the customers which he obtained in the course of his employment should, in the absence of some other element which makes it invalid, be held to be valid." *OAMPS Insurance Brokers Limited v Shackcloth [2008] NTSC 29 (Southwood J), quoting Latham CJ in Lindner v Murdock's Garage (1950) 83 CLR 628.* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/nt/NTSC/2008/29.html>
+
+[^henderson-franchisor-interest]: **Henderson v Purairclean Pty Ltd** — "It has been recognised that the interest of a franchisor in protecting the franchise business and preserving confidential information provided within that business and which can be used to compete with the franchisor is capable of being afforded protection." *Henderson v Purairclean Pty Ltd [2013] NTSC 29 (Riley CJ).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/nt/NTSC/2013/29.html>
+
+[^sandrey-no-inference]: **Mental Illness Fellowship of Australia (NT) Inc v Sandrey** — "I am not prepared to infer that any of the seven clients who left MIFANT did so as a result of any solicitation by Mr Sandrey." *Mental Illness Fellowship of Australia (NT) Inc v Sandrey [2025] NTSC 57 (Kelly J).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/nt/NTSC/2025/57.html>
+
+[^sandrey-clients-choice]: **Mental Illness Fellowship of Australia (NT) Inc v Sandrey** — "The restraint of trade clause restricts Mr Sandrey's freedom to solicit former clients. It cannot restrict the former clients' freedom to change service providers whether to follow Mr Sandrey because they were happy with the service he provided or simply to leave MIFANT to go elsewhere because of dissatisfaction with the services being provided by MIFANT." *Mental Illness Fellowship of Australia (NT) Inc v Sandrey [2025] NTSC 57 (Kelly J).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/nt/NTSC/2025/57.html>
+
+[^oamps-tested-at-contract]: **OAMPS Insurance Brokers Limited v Shackcloth** — "The reasonableness of the restraint is to be determined at the date the contract of employment was made." *OAMPS Insurance Brokers Limited v Shackcloth [2008] NTSC 29 (Southwood J).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/nt/NTSC/2008/29.html>
+
+[^lindner-area-too-wide]: **Lindner v Murdock's Garage** — "I think it must be held that the area was unreasonably wide." *Lindner v Murdock's Garage [1950] HCA 48; (1950) 83 CLR 628 (per McTiernan J).* <https://www.hcourt.gov.au/sites/default/files/eresources/1950/HCA/48.pdf>
+
+[^oamps-fifteen-months]: **OAMPS Insurance Brokers Limited v Shackcloth** — "In all of the circumstances I find that the restraint of trade clause contained in clause 8 of the letter dated 3 April 2003, which contained the defendant's contract of employment with the plaintiff, was unreasonable and is void. It was longer than necessary. A reasonable length of time for the duration of the restraint would have been a period of 15 months at the most." *OAMPS Insurance Brokers Limited v Shackcloth [2008] NTSC 29 (Southwood J).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/nt/NTSC/2008/29.html>
+
+[^oamps-renewal-cycle]: **OAMPS Insurance Brokers Limited v Shackcloth** — "I accept the plaintiff's submission that the question for the Court to determine is, what is the reasonable length of one complete cycle of renewals for the insurance premiums in the defendant's portfolio of clients?" *OAMPS Insurance Brokers Limited v Shackcloth [2008] NTSC 29 (Southwood J).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/nt/NTSC/2008/29.html>
+
+[^sandrey-limited-restriction]: **Mental Illness Fellowship of Australia (NT) Inc v Sandrey** — "It does not have a defined geographical limitation. Nevertheless, given the nature of the business being conducted by MIFANT, and the limited nature of the restriction, I do not consider the clause goes beyond what is reasonable to protect the good will of MIFANT in the circumstances." *Mental Illness Fellowship of Australia (NT) Inc v Sandrey [2025] NTSC 57 (Kelly J).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/nt/NTSC/2025/57.html>
+
+[^oamps-best-estimate]: **OAMPS Insurance Brokers Limited v Shackcloth** — "The question is whether the covenant was a reasonable one for the parties to agree to at the outset of the service on the best estimate which they could then make of the future" *OAMPS Insurance Brokers Limited v Shackcloth [2008] NTSC 29 (Southwood J), citing Lindner v Murdock's Garage (1950) 83 CLR 628 and Adamson v NSW Rugby League Ltd (1991) 31 FCR 242 per Gummow J.* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/nt/NTSC/2008/29.html>
+
+[^sandrey-variation-enforceable]: **Mental Illness Fellowship of Australia (NT) Inc v Sandrey** — "If it were necessary for me to make a finding on that issue, I would have found the clause enforceable." *Mental Illness Fellowship of Australia (NT) Inc v Sandrey [2025] NTSC 57 (Kelly J).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/nt/NTSC/2025/57.html>
+
+[^lindner-onus]: **Lindner v Murdock's Garage** — "The onus was on the plaintiff firm to prove circumstances showing that the restriction on the defendant's freedom to work was reasonable." *Lindner v Murdock's Garage [1950] HCA 48; (1950) 83 CLR 628 (per McTiernan J).* <https://www.hcourt.gov.au/sites/default/files/eresources/1950/HCA/48.pdf>
+
+[^oamps-dismissal-justified]: **OAMPS Insurance Brokers Limited v Shackcloth** — "I find that the plaintiff was justified in summarily dismissing the defendant from his employment with the plaintiff." *OAMPS Insurance Brokers Limited v Shackcloth [2008] NTSC 29 (Southwood J).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/nt/NTSC/2008/29.html>
+
+[^henderson-tested-at-date]: **Henderson v Purairclean Pty Ltd** — "Generally speaking the validity of the restraint must be decided as at the date of the agreement in which it is imposed." *Henderson v Purairclean Pty Ltd [2013] NTSC 29 (Riley CJ).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/nt/NTSC/2013/29.html>
+
+[^henderson-basis-at-entry]: **Henderson v Purairclean Pty Ltd** — "In my opinion there was, at the time the franchise agreement was entered into, a basis for imposing a restraint of trade." *Henderson v Purairclean Pty Ltd [2013] NTSC 29 (Riley CJ).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/nt/NTSC/2013/29.html>
+
+[^henderson-franchise-upheld]: **Henderson v Purairclean Pty Ltd** — "The restraint of trade clauses in both the Jaymak Franchise Agreement and the Purairclean Franchise Agreement are valid and enforceable for the identified area and for the period of 12 months from the date of termination of the franchise." *Henderson v Purairclean Pty Ltd [2013] NTSC 29 (Riley CJ).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/nt/NTSC/2013/29.html>
+
+[^lindner-sale-distinction]: **Lindner v Murdock's Garage** — "A distinction is drawn between a restraint upon trade included in an agreement for the sale of a business and a restraint included in an agreement with an employee." *Lindner v Murdock's Garage [1950] HCA 48; (1950) 83 CLR 628 (per Latham CJ).* <https://www.hcourt.gov.au/sites/default/files/eresources/1950/HCA/48.pdf>
+
+[^lindner-sale-more-easily]: **Lindner v Murdock's Garage** — "The restraint is more easily upheld in the former than in the latter case." *Lindner v Murdock's Garage [1950] HCA 48; (1950) 83 CLR 628 (per Latham CJ).* <https://www.hcourt.gov.au/sites/default/files/eresources/1950/HCA/48.pdf>
+
+[^oamps-still-governs]: **OAMPS Insurance Brokers Limited v Shackcloth** — "The common law prohibits unreasonable restraints of trade. Contractual provisions which amount to an unreasonable restraint of trade are void and unenforceable." *OAMPS Insurance Brokers Limited v Shackcloth [2008] NTSC 29 (Southwood J).* <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/nt/NTSC/2008/29.html>

package/skills/{non-compete-contract-explainer → legal-explainers/non-compete-contract-explainer}/content/ohio.md

@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@
 jurisdiction: "Ohio"
 slug: ohio
 countryCode: US
-snapshotAsOf: "2026-06-08"
+snapshotAsOf: "2026-06-19"
 lastReviewed: "2026-06-03"
-canonicalUrl: https://openagreements.org/legal/non-compete/ohio
+canonicalUrl: https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/non-compete/us/ohio
 license: CC BY 4.0
 stale: false
 ---
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ stale: false
 > relationship, and is not a substitute for a licensed attorney in the relevant jurisdiction.
 > Laws change; verify against the canonical version before relying on it.
 >
-> **Canonical:** https://openagreements.org/legal/non-compete/ohio · **Snapshot as of:** 2026-06-08 · License: CC BY 4.0 · © UseJunior
+> **Canonical:** https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/non-compete/us/ohio · **Snapshot as of:** 2026-06-19 · License: CC BY 4.0 · © openagreements.org
 
 # Non-Competes in Ohio[^about]
 
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ When a covenant overshoots, an Ohio court may trim it. In *MetroHealth System v.
 
 *Raimonde* holds that a covenant imposing unreasonable restrictions will be enforced to the extent necessary to protect the employer's legitimate interests, giving Ohio courts the power to modify rather than void [^raimonde-reformation]. But that power is not automatic. In *Kross Acquisition Co. v. Groundworks Ohio, LLC*, the First District confirmed that modifying a covenant is within the trial court's discretion, and it affirmed a refusal to rewrite a covenant so overbroad that reforming it would require the court to rebuild the agreement from scratch [^kross-discretionary].
 
-There is also a real cost to overreaching. In *Cintas Corp. v. Perry*, applying Ohio law, the employer's own prevailing-party fee clause boomeranged: after the covenant failed, the court held the former employee was entitled to recover his attorney's fees and litigation costs under that contract [^cintas-fee-shift].
+There is also a real cost to overreaching. In *Cintas Corp. v. Perry*, applying Ohio law, the employer's own prevailing-party fee clause boomeranged: after the covenant failed, the court held the former employee was entitled to recover his attorney's fees and litigation costs under that contract [^cintas-fee-shift]. For a clause-by-clause pass over a specific agreement against these drafting rules, the [Ohio non-compete review checklist](/checklists/non-compete/us/ohio) walks the full covenant suite item by item with each requirement's force level.
 
 > [!CAUTION]
 > **Drafting note.**
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ The enacted baseline therefore remains common-law reasonableness under *Raimonde
 >
 > Treat Senate Bill 11 as a monitoring item, not present Ohio law. Recheck the Ohio General Assembly's bill status before changing forms or telling workers that Ohio has banned non-competes, and note that S.B. 11 as drafted would apply only to agreements made or modified after its effective date [^sb11-prohibition][^sb11-prospective].
 
-[^about]: By Steven Obiajulu, J.D. Published by [openagreements.org](https://openagreements.org) · Maintained by [UseJunior](https://usejunior.com). Last reviewed 2026-06-03. License: CC BY 4.0. Steven Obiajulu, J.D. is admitted in New York, not Ohio. This article synthesizes Ohio primary law and is not legal advice from a Ohio-admitted attorney. This article is for informational purposes only and does not create an attorney-client relationship.
+[^about]: By Steven Obiajulu, J.D. Published by [openagreements.org](https://openagreements.org). Last reviewed 2026-06-03. License: CC BY 4.0. Steven Obiajulu, J.D. is admitted in New York, not Ohio. This article synthesizes Ohio primary law and is not legal advice from a Ohio-admitted attorney. This article is for informational purposes only and does not create an attorney-client relationship.
 
 [^raimonde-reasonableness-test]: **Raimonde v. Van Vlerah** — "A covenant restraining an employee from competing with his former employer upon termination of employment is reasonable if it is no greater than is required for the protection of the employer, does not impose undue hardship on the employee, and is not injurious to the public." *Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 42 Ohio St. 2d 21, 325 N.E.2d 544 (1975).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6865409/raimonde-v-van-vlerah/#:~:text=A%20covenant%20restraining%20an%20employee,not%20injurious%20to%20the%20public.>
 

package/skills/{non-compete-contract-explainer → legal-explainers/non-compete-contract-explainer}/content/oklahoma.md

@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@
 jurisdiction: "Oklahoma"
 slug: oklahoma
 countryCode: US
-snapshotAsOf: "2026-06-08"
+snapshotAsOf: "2026-06-19"
 lastReviewed: "2026-06-03"
-canonicalUrl: https://openagreements.org/legal/non-compete/oklahoma
+canonicalUrl: https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/non-compete/us/oklahoma
 license: CC BY 4.0
 stale: false
 ---
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ stale: false
 > relationship, and is not a substitute for a licensed attorney in the relevant jurisdiction.
 > Laws change; verify against the canonical version before relying on it.
 >
-> **Canonical:** https://openagreements.org/legal/non-compete/oklahoma · **Snapshot as of:** 2026-06-08 · License: CC BY 4.0 · © UseJunior
+> **Canonical:** https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/non-compete/us/oklahoma · **Snapshot as of:** 2026-06-19 · License: CC BY 4.0 · © openagreements.org
 
 # Non-Competes in Oklahoma[^about]
 
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ This makes Oklahoma one of the most employee-protective jurisdictions in the cou
 
 The U.S. Supreme Court later vacated that 2011 decision on arbitration-procedure grounds, so the void rule's firmest anchors are the statute itself and the Court of Civil Appeals' decision in *Autry v. Acosta, Inc.*, discussed below [^stat-217-general-void].
 
-What an Oklahoma employer *can* protect instead is a defined slice: direct solicitation of established customers, raiding of its workforce, the goodwill it buys when it acquires a business, and its trade secrets and confidential information. Each of those is addressed in its own question below.
+What an Oklahoma employer *can* protect instead is a defined slice: direct solicitation of established customers, raiding of its workforce, the goodwill it buys when it acquires a business, and its trade secrets and confidential information. Each of those is addressed in its own question below. For a clause-by-clause pass over a specific agreement against these rules, the [Oklahoma non-compete review checklist](/checklists/non-compete/us/oklahoma) walks the surviving covenant suite item by item with each requirement's force level.
 
 > [!NOTE]
 > **Practice note.**
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ The veto left the strict § 219A regime — and the *Autry* prohibition on reach
 
 "UPDATE: Oklahoma Governor Kevin Stitt vetoed this bill April 30, 2024, and the Legislature did not override the veto in the 2024 legislative session."[^mcafeetaft-sb1543-veto]
 
-[^about]: By Steven Obiajulu, J.D. Published by [openagreements.org](https://openagreements.org) · Maintained by [UseJunior](https://usejunior.com). Last reviewed 2026-06-03. License: CC BY 4.0. Steven Obiajulu, J.D. is admitted in New York, not Oklahoma. This article synthesizes Oklahoma primary law and is not legal advice from a Oklahoma-admitted attorney. This article is for informational purposes only and does not create an attorney-client relationship.
+[^about]: By Steven Obiajulu, J.D. Published by [openagreements.org](https://openagreements.org). Last reviewed 2026-06-03. License: CC BY 4.0. Steven Obiajulu, J.D. is admitted in New York, not Oklahoma. This article synthesizes Oklahoma primary law and is not legal advice from a Oklahoma-admitted attorney. This article is for informational purposes only and does not create an attorney-client relationship.
 
 [^stat-217-general-void]: **15 O.S. § 217** — "Every contract by which any one is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind, otherwise than as provided by Sections 218 and 219 of this title, or otherwise than as provided by Section 2 of this act, is to that extent void." *Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 217.* <https://oksenate.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/os15.pdf>
 

package/skills/{non-compete-contract-explainer → legal-explainers/non-compete-contract-explainer}/content/oregon.md

@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@
 jurisdiction: "Oregon"
 slug: oregon
 countryCode: US
-snapshotAsOf: "2026-06-08"
+snapshotAsOf: "2026-06-19"
 lastReviewed: "2026-06-03"
-canonicalUrl: https://openagreements.org/legal/non-compete/oregon
+canonicalUrl: https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/non-compete/us/oregon
 license: CC BY 4.0
 stale: false
 ---
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ stale: false
 > relationship, and is not a substitute for a licensed attorney in the relevant jurisdiction.
 > Laws change; verify against the canonical version before relying on it.
 >
-> **Canonical:** https://openagreements.org/legal/non-compete/oregon · **Snapshot as of:** 2026-06-08 · License: CC BY 4.0 · © UseJunior
+> **Canonical:** https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/non-compete/us/oregon · **Snapshot as of:** 2026-06-19 · License: CC BY 4.0 · © openagreements.org
 
 # Non-Competes in Oregon[^about]
 
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ Because the statute treats a non-conforming covenant as void rather than merely
 
 The notice or bona-fide-advancement requirement in subsection (1)(a) is only the entry point. Subsections (1)(b) through (1)(e) add the substantive qualifications, all of which must be satisfied at the same time.
 
-"(1) A noncompetition agreement entered into between an employer and employee is void and unenforceable unless:...(b) The employee is a person described in ORS 653.020 (3); (c) The employer has a protectable interest as described in subsection (2) of this section; (d) Within 30 days after the date of the termination of the employee's employment, the employer provides a signed, written copy of the terms of the noncompetition agreement to the employee; and (e) The total amount of the employee's annual gross salary and commissions, calculated on an annual basis, at the time of the employee's termination exceeds $100,533, adjusted annually for inflation pursuant to the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers, West Region (All Items), as published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States Department of Labor immediately preceding the calendar year of the employee's termination."[^q2-ors-653-295-conditions]
+"(1) A noncompetition agreement entered into between an employer and employee is void and unenforceable unless: (a)(A) The employer informs the employee in a written employment offer received by the employee at least two weeks before the first day of the employee's employment that a noncompetition agreement is required as a condition of employment; or (B) The noncompetition agreement is entered into upon a subsequent bona fide advancement of the employee by the employer; (b) The employee is a person described in ORS 653.020 (3); (c) The employer has a protectable interest as described in subsection (2) of this section; (d) Within 30 days after the date of the termination of the employee's employment, the employer provides a signed, written copy of the terms of the noncompetition agreement to the employee; and (e) The total amount of the employee's annual gross salary and commissions, calculated on an annual basis, at the time of the employee's termination exceeds $100,533, adjusted annually for inflation pursuant to the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers, West Region (All Items), as published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States Department of Labor immediately preceding the calendar year of the employee's termination."[^q2-ors-653-295-conditions]
 
 The 30-day post-termination copy requirement in subsection (1)(d) is easy to overlook because it falls due after the employment relationship ends. The state labor agency lists it as a standalone condition of validity alongside the notice, salary, and exempt-status requirements [^q2-boli-conditions].
 
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ The statute supplies three qualifying categories. The first two — access to tr
 
 A narrow third category covers certain on-air broadcasting talent, and it comes with its own promotional-spend and pay conditions rather than the ordinary salary threshold [^q7-ors-653-295-broadcast].
 
-"For purposes of subsection (1)(c) of this section, an employer has a protectable interest when the employee:...(c) Is employed as an on-air talent by an employer in the business of broadcasting and the employer: (A) In the year preceding the termination of the employee's employment, expended resources equal to or exceeding 10 percent of the employee's annual salary to develop, improve, train or publicly promote the employee, provided that the resources expended by the employer were expended on media that the employer does not own or control"[^q7-ors-653-295-broadcast]
+"For purposes of subsection (1)(c) of this section, an employer has a protectable interest when the employee: (a) Has access to trade secrets, as defined in ORS 646.461; (b) Has access to competitively sensitive confidential business or professional information that otherwise would not qualify as a trade secret, including product development plans, product launch plans, marketing strategy or sales plans; or (c) Is employed as an on-air talent by an employer in the business of broadcasting and the employer: (A) In the year preceding the termination of the employee's employment, expended resources equal to or exceeding 10 percent of the employee's annual salary to develop, improve, train or publicly promote the employee, provided that the resources expended by the employer were expended on media that the employer does not own or control"[^q7-ors-653-295-broadcast]
 
 *Nike v. McCarthy* illustrates the second category. The court found a legitimate interest where a departing executive had acquired highly confidential information that a competitor could exploit, even without framing that information as a strict trade secret.
 
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ The distinction is consequential. Under the prior law, a defective covenant was
 
 "As explained below, we conclude that plaintiffs evidence established, at most, that the noncompetition agreement was voidable (not void) but remained valid and in effect at the time that defendant invoked it."[^q8-bernard-voidable]
 
-The 2021 amendments changed the default to void. A covenant that misses a statutory requirement is now unenforceable from the start, without any need for the employee to act. The statute does sever an over-long term, voiding only the portion beyond 12 months, but that targeted severance is not a general license for courts to rewrite an otherwise non-conforming covenant.
+The 2021 amendments changed the default to void. A covenant that misses a statutory requirement is now unenforceable from the start, without any need for the employee to act. The statute does sever an over-long term, voiding only the portion beyond 12 months, but that targeted severance is not a general license for courts to rewrite an otherwise non-conforming covenant. For a clause-by-clause pass over a specific agreement against these statutory conditions, the [Oregon non-compete review checklist](/checklists/non-compete/us/oregon) walks the full covenant suite item by item with each requirement's force level.
 
 "The remainder of a term of a noncompetition agreement in excess of 12 months is void and may not be enforced by a court of this state."[^q8-ors-653-295-void]
 
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ The reach is also retroactive. The 2025 law applies to qualifying medical-licens
 
 **Short answer.** It is a separate, expressly lawful tool that penalizes competition only by forfeiting unpaid bonus compensation. ORS 653.295 excludes bonus restriction agreements from the non-compete checklist and defines them so that the only penalty for competing is forfeiture of profit sharing or other bonus compensation not yet paid [^q12-ors-653-295-bonus-carveout][^q12-ors-653-295-bonus-def].
 
-Because a bonus restriction agreement does not bar the employee from working, it sits outside the non-compete requirements. The statute confirms these agreements are lawful and enforceable.
+Because a bonus restriction agreement does not bar the employee from working, it sits outside the non-compete requirements. The statute makes these agreements lawful and allows Oregon courts to enforce them, but that statutory permission does not by itself guarantee enforceability — the agreement still has to satisfy the ordinary contract-law limits that apply to any term.
 
 "Subsections (1) and (3) of this section do not apply to: (a) Bonus restriction agreements, which are lawful agreements that may be enforced by the courts in this state; or (b) A covenant not to solicit employees of the employer or solicit or transact business with customers of the employer."[^q12-ors-653-295-bonus-carveout]
 
@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ The defining feature is the limited penalty. The employee who competes loses onl
 
 ORS 15.320 provides that, subject to the limitations in ORS 15.305, the law of Oregon applies to several listed categories of contracts. One of those categories is employment performed primarily in the state by an Oregon resident.
 
-"Notwithstanding any other provision of ORS 15.300 to 15.380, but subject to the limitations on applicability imposed by ORS 15.305, the law of Oregon applies to the following contracts:...(3) A contract of employment for services to be rendered primarily in Oregon by a resident of Oregon."[^q13-ors-15-320]
+"Notwithstanding any other provision of ORS 15.300 to 15.380, but subject to the limitations on applicability imposed by ORS 15.305, the law of Oregon applies to the following contracts: (1) A contract for services to be rendered in Oregon, or for goods to be delivered in Oregon, if Oregon or any of its agencies or subdivisions is a party to the contract. The application of Oregon's law pursuant to this subsection may be waived by a person authorized by Oregon's law to make the waiver. (2) A contract for construction work to be performed primarily in Oregon. (3) A contract of employment for services to be rendered primarily in Oregon by a resident of Oregon."[^q13-ors-15-320]
 
 The fee statute then changes the litigation calculus. A contractual fee clause that runs in only one direction is made mutual by statute.
 
@@ -294,11 +294,11 @@ Confidentiality and non-disparagement clauses have their own statutory limit. Th
 >
 > Use confidentiality and trade-secret tools for secrecy interests, and scope nondisclosure and nondisparagement clauses to avoid the Workplace Fairness Act. ORS 653.295 preserves trade-secret remedies, but ORS 659A.370 bars provisions that prevent an employee from discussing discrimination or harassment [^q14-ors-653-295-preserve][^q14-ors-659a-370-wfa].
 
-[^about]: By Steven Obiajulu, J.D. Published by [openagreements.org](https://openagreements.org) · Maintained by [UseJunior](https://usejunior.com). Last reviewed 2026-06-03. License: CC BY 4.0. Steven Obiajulu, J.D. is admitted in New York, not Oregon. This article synthesizes Oregon primary law and is not legal advice from a Oregon-admitted attorney. This article is for informational purposes only and does not create an attorney-client relationship.
+[^about]: By Steven Obiajulu, J.D. Published by [openagreements.org](https://openagreements.org). Last reviewed 2026-06-03. License: CC BY 4.0. Steven Obiajulu, J.D. is admitted in New York, not Oregon. This article synthesizes Oregon primary law and is not legal advice from a Oregon-admitted attorney. This article is for informational purposes only and does not create an attorney-client relationship.
 
 [^q1-ors-653-295-void-unless]: **ORS 653.295** — "A noncompetition agreement entered into between an employer and employee is void and unenforceable unless: (a)(A) The employer informs the employee in a written employment offer received by the employee at least two weeks before the first day of the employee's employment that a noncompetition agreement is required as a condition of employment; or (B) The noncompetition agreement is entered into upon a subsequent bona fide advancement of the employee by the employer" *ORS 653.295(1).* <https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/ors/ors653.html>
 
-[^q2-ors-653-295-conditions]: **ORS 653.295** — "(1) A noncompetition agreement entered into between an employer and employee is void and unenforceable unless:...(b) The employee is a person described in ORS 653.020 (3); (c) The employer has a protectable interest as described in subsection (2) of this section; (d) Within 30 days after the date of the termination of the employee's employment, the employer provides a signed, written copy of the terms of the noncompetition agreement to the employee; and (e) The total amount of the employee's annual gross salary and commissions, calculated on an annual basis, at the time of the employee's termination exceeds $100,533, adjusted annually for inflation pursuant to the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers, West Region (All Items), as published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States Department of Labor immediately preceding the calendar year of the employee's termination." *ORS 653.295(1)(b)-(e).* <https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/ors/ors653.html>
+[^q2-ors-653-295-conditions]: **ORS 653.295** — "(1) A noncompetition agreement entered into between an employer and employee is void and unenforceable unless: (a)(A) The employer informs the employee in a written employment offer received by the employee at least two weeks before the first day of the employee's employment that a noncompetition agreement is required as a condition of employment; or (B) The noncompetition agreement is entered into upon a subsequent bona fide advancement of the employee by the employer; (b) The employee is a person described in ORS 653.020 (3); (c) The employer has a protectable interest as described in subsection (2) of this section; (d) Within 30 days after the date of the termination of the employee's employment, the employer provides a signed, written copy of the terms of the noncompetition agreement to the employee; and (e) The total amount of the employee's annual gross salary and commissions, calculated on an annual basis, at the time of the employee's termination exceeds $100,533, adjusted annually for inflation pursuant to the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers, West Region (All Items), as published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States Department of Labor immediately preceding the calendar year of the employee's termination." *ORS 653.295(1)(b)-(e).* <https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/ors/ors653.html>
 
 [^q2-boli-conditions]: **Oregon BOLI, Noncompetition Agreements** — "In addition, a noncompetition agreement is also void unless: The employee meets the criteria for a salaried exempt employee whose annual income at termination exceeds a minimum amount adjusted each year for inflation. (See below for details). The employer has an interest to protect, such as trade secrets; sensitive, confidential business or professional information; product development plans; launch plans; marketing strategy or sales plans; and finally, The employer must also provide a signed, written copy of the terms of the noncompetition agreement to the employee within 30 days after the employee's termination." *Oregon BOLI, Noncompetition Agreements.* <https://www.oregon.gov/boli/employers/pages/noncompetition-agreements.aspx>
 
@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ Confidentiality and non-disparagement clauses have their own statutory limit. Th
 
 [^q7-nike-interest]: **Nike, Inc. v. McCarthy** — "We also hold that Nike has a legitimate interest in enforcing the agreement, because there is a substantial risk that McCarthy — in shaping Reebok's product allocation, sales and pricing strategies — could enable Reebok to divert a significant amount of Nike's footwear sales given the highly confidential information McCarthy acquired at Nike." *Nike, Inc. v. McCarthy, 379 F.3d 576 (9th Cir. 2004).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/787342/nike-inc-v-eugene-mccarthy/#:~:text=We%20also%20hold%20that%20Nike,information%20McCarthy%20acquired%20at%20Nike.>
 
-[^q7-ors-653-295-broadcast]: **ORS 653.295** — "For purposes of subsection (1)(c) of this section, an employer has a protectable interest when the employee:...(c) Is employed as an on-air talent by an employer in the business of broadcasting and the employer: (A) In the year preceding the termination of the employee's employment, expended resources equal to or exceeding 10 percent of the employee's annual salary to develop, improve, train or publicly promote the employee, provided that the resources expended by the employer were expended on media that the employer does not own or control" *ORS 653.295(2)(c).* <https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/ors/ors653.html>
+[^q7-ors-653-295-broadcast]: **ORS 653.295** — "For purposes of subsection (1)(c) of this section, an employer has a protectable interest when the employee: (a) Has access to trade secrets, as defined in ORS 646.461; (b) Has access to competitively sensitive confidential business or professional information that otherwise would not qualify as a trade secret, including product development plans, product launch plans, marketing strategy or sales plans; or (c) Is employed as an on-air talent by an employer in the business of broadcasting and the employer: (A) In the year preceding the termination of the employee's employment, expended resources equal to or exceeding 10 percent of the employee's annual salary to develop, improve, train or publicly promote the employee, provided that the resources expended by the employer were expended on media that the employer does not own or control" *ORS 653.295(2)(c).* <https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/ors/ors653.html>
 
 [^q8-ors-653-295-void]: **ORS 653.295** — "The remainder of a term of a noncompetition agreement in excess of 12 months is void and may not be enforced by a court of this state." *ORS 653.295(3).* <https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/ors/ors653.html>
 
@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ Confidentiality and non-disparagement clauses have their own statutory limit. Th
 
 [^q12-ors-653-295-bonus-def]: **ORS 653.295** — "The penalty imposed on the employee for competition against the employer is limited to forfeiture of profit sharing or other bonus compensation that has not yet been paid to the employee." *ORS 653.295(8)(a)(C).* <https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/ors/ors653.html>
 
-[^q13-ors-15-320]: **ORS 15.320** — "Notwithstanding any other provision of ORS 15.300 to 15.380, but subject to the limitations on applicability imposed by ORS 15.305, the law of Oregon applies to the following contracts:...(3) A contract of employment for services to be rendered primarily in Oregon by a resident of Oregon." *ORS 15.320(3).* <https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/ors/ors015.html>
+[^q13-ors-15-320]: **ORS 15.320** — "Notwithstanding any other provision of ORS 15.300 to 15.380, but subject to the limitations on applicability imposed by ORS 15.305, the law of Oregon applies to the following contracts: (1) A contract for services to be rendered in Oregon, or for goods to be delivered in Oregon, if Oregon or any of its agencies or subdivisions is a party to the contract. The application of Oregon's law pursuant to this subsection may be waived by a person authorized by Oregon's law to make the waiver. (2) A contract for construction work to be performed primarily in Oregon. (3) A contract of employment for services to be rendered primarily in Oregon by a resident of Oregon." *ORS 15.320(3).* <https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/ors/ors015.html>
 
 [^q13-ors-20-096]: **ORS 20.096** — "the party that prevails on the claim shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees in addition to costs and disbursements, without regard to whether the prevailing party is the party specified in the contract and without regard to whether the prevailing party is a party to the contract." *ORS 20.096(1).* <https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/ors/ors020.html>
 

package/skills/{non-compete-contract-explainer → legal-explainers/non-compete-contract-explainer}/content/pennsylvania.md

@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@
 jurisdiction: "Pennsylvania"
 slug: pennsylvania
 countryCode: US
-snapshotAsOf: "2026-06-08"
+snapshotAsOf: "2026-06-19"
 lastReviewed: "2026-06-03"
-canonicalUrl: https://openagreements.org/legal/non-compete/pennsylvania
+canonicalUrl: https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/non-compete/us/pennsylvania
 license: CC BY 4.0
 stale: false
 ---
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ stale: false
 > relationship, and is not a substitute for a licensed attorney in the relevant jurisdiction.
 > Laws change; verify against the canonical version before relying on it.
 >
-> **Canonical:** https://openagreements.org/legal/non-compete/pennsylvania · **Snapshot as of:** 2026-06-08 · License: CC BY 4.0 · © UseJunior
+> **Canonical:** https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/non-compete/us/pennsylvania · **Snapshot as of:** 2026-06-19 · License: CC BY 4.0 · © openagreements.org
 
 # Non-Competes in Pennsylvania[^about]
 
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ Because the analysis is holistic, time and territory are measured against the em
 
 **Short answer.** Sometimes, but do not count on it. A Pennsylvania court of equity may enforce only the reasonable portions of an overbroad covenant, yet it will scrutinize the restraint closely and may decline to rewrite a covenant drafted far broader than necessary [^sidco-partial-enforcement][^reading-aviation-overreach].
 
-*Sidco Paper* confirms the power: where a covenant imposes restrictions broader than necessary, a court of equity may grant enforcement limited to the portions that are reasonably necessary to protect the employer [^sidco-partial-enforcement]. But the power is bounded. In *Reading Aviation Service, Inc. v. Bertolet*, the Supreme Court explained that freely rewriting overbroad covenants would encourage employers with superior bargaining power to insist on excessive restrictions, secure in the knowledge that a court will simply pare them back [^reading-aviation-overreach]. Pennsylvania courts therefore subject these covenants to close scrutiny [^reading-aviation-close-scrutiny].
+*Sidco Paper* confirms the power: where a covenant imposes restrictions broader than necessary, a court of equity may grant enforcement limited to the portions that are reasonably necessary to protect the employer [^sidco-partial-enforcement]. But the power is bounded. In *Reading Aviation Service, Inc. v. Bertolet*, the Supreme Court explained that freely rewriting overbroad covenants would encourage employers with superior bargaining power to insist on excessive restrictions, secure in the knowledge that a court will simply pare them back [^reading-aviation-overreach]. Pennsylvania courts therefore subject these covenants to close scrutiny [^reading-aviation-close-scrutiny]. For a clause-by-clause pass over a specific agreement against these drafting rules, the [Pennsylvania non-compete review checklist](/checklists/non-compete/us/pennsylvania) walks the full covenant suite item by item with each requirement's force level.
 
 > [!CAUTION]
 > **Drafting note.**
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ Because the enacted baseline remains common-law reasonableness plus the Act 74 h
 >
 > Treat Senate Bill 142 and Senate Bill 680 as monitoring items, not present Pennsylvania law, and do not assume any general statewide non-compete ban has passed. Recheck the General Assembly's bill status before changing forms, because only Act 74's health care restriction is currently enacted [^q12-act74-applicability].
 
-[^about]: By Steven Obiajulu, J.D. Published by [openagreements.org](https://openagreements.org) · Maintained by [UseJunior](https://usejunior.com). Last reviewed 2026-06-03. License: CC BY 4.0. Steven Obiajulu, J.D. is admitted in New York, not Pennsylvania. This article synthesizes Pennsylvania primary law and is not legal advice from a Pennsylvania-admitted attorney. This article is for informational purposes only and does not create an attorney-client relationship.
+[^about]: By Steven Obiajulu, J.D. Published by [openagreements.org](https://openagreements.org). Last reviewed 2026-06-03. License: CC BY 4.0. Steven Obiajulu, J.D. is admitted in New York, not Pennsylvania. This article synthesizes Pennsylvania primary law and is not legal advice from a Pennsylvania-admitted attorney. This article is for informational purposes only and does not create an attorney-client relationship.
 
 [^socko-four-part-test]: **Socko v. Mid-Atlantic Systems of CPA, Inc.** — "Consistent with this legal background, currently in Pennsylvania, restrictive covenants are enforceable only if they are: (1) ancillary to an employment relationship between an employee and an employer; (2) supported by adequate consideration; (3) the restrictions are reasonably limited in duration and geographic extent; and (4) the restrictions are designed to protect the legitimate interests of the employer." *Socko v. Mid-Atlantic Systems of CPA, Inc., 126 A.3d 1266 (Pa. 2015).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3155889/socko-d-v-mid-atantic-systems-of-cpa-inc-aplt/#:~:text=Consistent%20with%20this%20legal%20background%2C,legitimate%20interests%20of%20the%20employer.>
 

package/skills/{non-compete-contract-explainer/content/philippines.md → legal-explainers/non-compete-contract-explainer/content/ph.md}

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 ---
 jurisdiction: "Philippines"
-slug: philippines
+slug: ph
 countryCode: PH
-snapshotAsOf: "2026-06-08"
+snapshotAsOf: "2026-06-19"
 lastReviewed: "2026-06-03"
-canonicalUrl: https://openagreements.org/legal/non-compete/philippines
+canonicalUrl: https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/non-compete/ph
 license: CC BY 4.0
 stale: false
 ---
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ stale: false
 > relationship, and is not a substitute for a licensed attorney in the relevant jurisdiction.
 > Laws change; verify against the canonical version before relying on it.
 >
-> **Canonical:** https://openagreements.org/legal/non-compete/philippines · **Snapshot as of:** 2026-06-08 · License: CC BY 4.0 · © UseJunior
+> **Canonical:** https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/non-compete/ph · **Snapshot as of:** 2026-06-19 · License: CC BY 4.0 · © openagreements.org
 
 # Non-Competes in the Philippines[^about]
 
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ Reform of employee non-competes has been a topic of legislative and practitioner
 >
 > Do not draft to an anticipated Philippine non-compete statute. None is in force as of June 2026, so enforceability still rests entirely on the Civil Code and the courts' reasonableness test, read against the Constitution's policy that no combinations in restraint of trade shall be allowed [^consti-art12].
 
-[^about]: By Steven Obiajulu, J.D. Published by [openagreements.org](https://openagreements.org) · Maintained by [UseJunior](https://usejunior.com). Last reviewed 2026-06-03. License: CC BY 4.0. Steven Obiajulu, J.D. is admitted in New York, not Philippines. This article synthesizes Philippines primary law and is not legal advice from a Philippines-admitted attorney. This article is for informational purposes only and does not create an attorney-client relationship.
+[^about]: By Steven Obiajulu, J.D. Published by [openagreements.org](https://openagreements.org). Last reviewed 2026-06-03. License: CC BY 4.0. Steven Obiajulu, J.D. is not admitted to practise law in Philippines. This article summarizes publicly available Philippines legal sources for general information only — it is not legal advice and does not create a lawyer–client relationship. It may not reflect the most recent legal developments and is provided without warranty as to accuracy or completeness; verify against the primary sources cited and consult a locally qualified lawyer before relying on it.
 
 [^civilcode-1306]: **Civil Code of the Philippines (RA 386), Art. 1306** — "Article 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy." *Civil Code of the Philippines, Republic Act No. 386, Art. 1306.* <https://lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra1949/ra_386_1949.html>
 

package/skills/{non-compete-contract-explainer → legal-explainers/non-compete-contract-explainer}/content/puerto-rico.md

@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@
 jurisdiction: "Puerto Rico"
 slug: puerto-rico
 countryCode: US
-snapshotAsOf: "2026-06-08"
+snapshotAsOf: "2026-06-19"
 lastReviewed: "2026-06-02"
-canonicalUrl: https://openagreements.org/legal/non-compete/puerto-rico
+canonicalUrl: https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/non-compete/us/puerto-rico
 license: CC BY 4.0
 stale: false
 ---
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ stale: false
 > relationship, and is not a substitute for a licensed attorney in the relevant jurisdiction.
 > Laws change; verify against the canonical version before relying on it.
 >
-> **Canonical:** https://openagreements.org/legal/non-compete/puerto-rico · **Snapshot as of:** 2026-06-08 · License: CC BY 4.0 · © UseJunior
+> **Canonical:** https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/non-compete/us/puerto-rico · **Snapshot as of:** 2026-06-19 · License: CC BY 4.0 · © openagreements.org
 
 # Non-Competes in Puerto Rico[^about]
 
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ Two background developments matter for monitoring but do not change the Puerto R
 
 The practical takeaway is stability with a narrow margin. Because the framework is judicial, the most reliable signal of change would be a new Supreme Court decision rather than a bill, and *Reyes Ramis* remains the most recent word: the strict requirements apply to employer-employee covenants, with a single territorial or customer limit sufficing [^rr-current].
 
-[^about]: By Steven Obiajulu, J.D. Published by [openagreements.org](https://openagreements.org) · Maintained by [UseJunior](https://usejunior.com). Last reviewed 2026-06-02. License: CC BY 4.0. Steven Obiajulu, J.D. is admitted in New York, not Puerto Rico. This article synthesizes Puerto Rico primary law and is not legal advice from a Puerto Rico-admitted attorney. This article is for informational purposes only and does not create an attorney-client relationship.
+[^about]: By Steven Obiajulu, J.D. Published by [openagreements.org](https://openagreements.org). Last reviewed 2026-06-02. License: CC BY 4.0. Steven Obiajulu, J.D. is admitted in New York, not Puerto Rico. This article synthesizes Puerto Rico primary law and is not legal advice from a Puerto Rico-admitted attorney. This article is for informational purposes only and does not create an attorney-client relationship.
 
 [^ay-test]: **Arthur Young & Co. v. Vega III** — "Para ser razonable, un acuerdo de no competir debe reunir los siguientes requisitos: (1) debe ser necesario para proteger un interés legítimo del patrono, (2) no debe imponer al empleado una carga demasiado onerosa, (3) y no debe afectar demasiado al público." *Arthur Young & Co. v. Vega III, 136 D.P.R. 157 (1994).* <https://aldia.microjuris.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/136DPR157.pdf>